Davis v. United States

In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court held that an officer may search a vehicle incident to an arrest only where the person arrested is within reaching distance of the vehicle, or where the officer reasonably believes the vehicle contains evidence relating to the offense for which the person was arrested.The Court must now decide whether the retroactive application of Gant to Davis's case should result in suppression of evidence resulting from a search that would be invalid if conducted under the current law.

The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence in a criminal trial if the evidence was obtained in an illegal search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule may apply in situations where an officer reasonably relies on law that is valid during a search but is later overturned. If applied, the good-faith exception allows the evidence to be entered in the criminal trial because, even though the evidence was obtained unconstitutionally, the police officer did not know the evidence was obtained unconstitutionally at the time of the search. Petitioner Willie Davis argues that the exclusionary rule should control the result of this case, but Respondent the United States argues that the good-faith exception applies.

Whether the Exclusionary Rule Should Apply

Davis argues that it is well-established precedent that when the Court announces a new decision, the ruling applies to “all cases not yet final” at the time the decision is handed down. Furthermore, Davis maintains that retroactive application of a new rule results in the defendant receiving the benefit of the new decision. Because Davis’s case was on direct appeal and thus “not yet final” when the Court decided Gant, Davis argues that he should receive the benefit of the Gant decision through the exclusion of the evidence. Furthermore, Davis contends that the good-faith exception should not apply in his case because the prior decisions which would mandate use of the good-faith exception concerned the use of the exclusionary rule to enforce existing law, as opposed to promoting development of new law.

On the other hand, the United States argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply when officers engage in objectively reasonable conduct, and that Officer Curtis Miller acted within the bounds of then-current law when he searched Davis’s car. The United States contends that Davis’s interpretation of the exclusionary rule would affect police officers’ job performance by making it harder for officers to rely on precedent.

The United States further argues that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct, not remedy Fourth Amendment violations. According to the United States, the exclusionary rule is not a required remedy for Fourth Amendment violations because the admission of evidence is not in itself a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the United States claims that the exclusionary rule should only be used when the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule outweighs societal costs, such as the possibility of letting guilty individuals go free. The United States argues that applying the exclusionary rule in this instance would have little to no deterrent effect on future police misconduct; indeed, Officer Miller was in full compliance with the law when he conducted the search.

Davis counters by arguing that the exclusionary rule has the alternate purpose of enforcing the Constitution. Davis asserts that by giving defendants an opportunity to have their convictions overturned, the exclusionary rule creates an incentive for defendants to challenge and subsequently change the law. If the government always wins, then defendants will not try to appeal their cases, and the law would stagnate. Finally, Davis asserts that other doctrines may preserve the conviction even if the exclusionary rule is applied, thereby minimizing the social cost of setting guilty individuals free.

Affecting Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

The United States proposes that plaintiffs may use civil actions to effect change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, instead of relying upon the exclusionary rule. The United States argues that plaintiffs may bring suits against municipalities for searches violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Davis answers that civil suits seeking damages cannot effectively change Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because of the doctrine of qualified immunity. Davis argues that, under this doctrine, a plaintiff in a civil suit can only recover damages if the constitutional violation is clearly established at the time of the search. Davis concludes that in the situation where the search is retroactively invalidated, the civil case will be fruitless because the search is actually legal at the time it is performed.

Exclusionary Rule vs. Retroactivity Jurisprudence

According to Davis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit created a new exception to the exclusionary rule, namely that the rule does not apply when police rely on unequivocal but incorrect circuit court precedent. Davis characterizes this new rule as a modified Linkletter retroactivity test. According to the Linkletter test, use of the exclusionary rule depends on a case-by-case balance of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule versus the cost of releasing criminals. Davis argues that the new rule adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is similar to Linkletter because the Eleventh Circuit weighed reliance interests against deterrence interests in reaching its decision. Davis concludes that the Eleventh Circuit’s rule is untenable because the Court has already rejected the Linkletter rule.

The United States counters by claiming that Davis has confused retroactivity and the exclusionary rule. The United States argues that retroactivity governs when a criminal defendant is eligible to seek relief in his case, but the exclusionary rule is a form of relief for Fourth Amendment violations. According to the United States, issues of retroactivity are decided based on factors that include the judicial process, equitable treatment of litigants, and principals of finality. However, issues regarding the exclusionary rule are decided based on whether the deterrent effects justify the social cost. Thus, the United States argues that Davis cannot rely upon retroactivity case law to determine the outcome in this case, which concerns the exclusionary rule.

Article III Requirements

Davis asserts that application of the exclusionary rule is required by Article III of the United States Constitution. Davis first argues that if the exclusionary rule does not apply, then a court announcing a new rule would be deciding cases prospectively: only future cases would be affected by the new rule. Davis contends that this violates Article III because judges only have the power to interpret the law, not make prospective changes to it.

The United States counters by arguing that a federal court can determine if the Fourth Amendment was violated before deciding whether the officer committed the violation in good faith. Essentially, the United States argues that the Fourth Amendment issue is separate from the good-faith exception issue, and that courts clearly have jurisdiction under Article III, regardless of the good-faith exception issue.

Standing Requirements

One requirement for standing is that the court must be able to redress the defendant’s injury. Davis argues that if the exclusionary rule does not apply, then the defendant appealing his decision will always lack standing because evidence will never be excluded retroactively, and the government will always win. Davis argues that this result would be unfair and that courts of appeal should be able to redress wrongs.

The United States responds by arguing that standing is almost always met in evidence cases because the conviction is an injury, which is linked to the challenged evidence, and the injury can be redressed if the appellate court reverses. The United States analogizes the good-faith exception to the harmless error doctrine and concludes that both have the same effect (the defendant loses), and yet neither results in the defendant lacking standing.