Kansas v. Gleason

In this case, the Court will decide whether, in capital murder cases, jurors must be instructed that the existence of mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Kansas statute § 21-6617(e), a death penalty sentence requires the jury to find unanimously that aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and that those aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. Gleason argues that an affirmative instruction is necessary, because the jury here could have been confused by the court’s jury instruction, and the prosecution’s conflation of the burden of proof for establishing the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances during closing arguments. On the other hand, Kansas contends that the prosecution’s closing arguments created no such confusion, as the jury was instructed unambiguously to take into account all of the mitigating circumstances. And Kansas argues that the prosecution’s decision not to contest all but one of the mitigating circumstances renders moot the question of whether the jurors considered the mitigating circumstances in their ultimate decision.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Gleason asserts that the jury instructions for sentencing failed to adequately distinguish between the burden of proof required to establish the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Gleason maintains that any barrier to the jury’s accounting for mitigating circumstances in their decision-making process is at odds with the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In support, Gleason cites the Court’s decision in Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). In Boyde, Gleason explains, the Court stated that a “commonsense” view, rather than a “technical” parsing of language, is the proper perspective to determine whether a jury instruction likely prevented jurors from considering mitigating circumstances. Gleason asserts that Boyde focused on the jury instruction itself as the first item of inquiry, with the actual evidence presented by the parties and the arguments of counsel considered secondary. Gleason contends that the jurors did not consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, because the reasonable doubt standard for establishing aggravating circumstances was mentioned, but the lack of burden of proof needed to establish mitigating circumstances was not.

Kansas contests Gleason’s interpretation of Boyde, arguing that the Court laid out a three-pronged test to determine whether the jury in Boyde understood an instruction “to prevent the consideration of mitigating evidence.” According to Kansas, the Boyde Court stated that the language of the jury instructions, the actual mitigating evidence presented, and the arguments of counsel need to be considered together in order to ascertain whether a jury understood an instruction. Kansas agrees with the dissent in State v. Gleason, which argued that a failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt does not justify a reversal under the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Kansas argues that, under Boyde, a review of Gleason’s context including the arguments of counsel and the mitigating evidence itself, does not lead to the conclusion that the jury failed to consider all the mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, Kansas denies that the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires an affirmative instruction be made as to the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances. Kansas contends that so long as the jurors were apprised that they were to consider all of the relevant mitigating circumstances in making their decisions, nothing further is necessary.

EFFECT OF THE PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENTS ON THE JURY’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Gleason asserts that the prosecution’s closing arguments only served to deepen the jury’s confusion regarding their instructions. Gleason states that the prosecution’s closing argument never explicitly mentioned the relevant burden of proof for mitigating circumstances, and only instructed the jury to weigh “everything.” As a result, Gleason argues, the jury did not receive satisfactory instruction on the burden of proof required to establish the existence of mitigating circumstances. Additionally, Gleason claims that the prosecution’s attack on a few of the mitigating circumstances, such as asking whether evidence existed to substantiate the relevant claims, further cast doubt on the relevant burden of proof. Lastly, Gleason argues that such an analysis is not “technical hair-splitting,” which the Court disclaimed in its previous decisions, but rather an evaluation of the context of the case from the commonsense approach the Court advocated in Boyde.

Kansas challenges this interpretation of the prosecution’s closing arguments, noting that, for eight of the nine mitigating circumstances, the prosecution’s inquiries did not dispute any of the material facts presented by the defense. Even if the prosecution did challenge Gleason’s alleged inability to understand his crimes, Kansas asserts that the prosecution only illuminated the lack of evidence presented to support Gleason’s claim. Kansas purports that this attack focused on the weight the evidence should carry in the jury’s decision-making, rather than an affirmation of the relevant burden of proof required to prove the claim’s existence. Kansas concludes that both parties’ closing arguments underscored the importance of considering mitigating evidence in reaching a decision. Kansas asserts that both parties instructed the jurors to weigh the mitigating circumstances as they saw fit and to consider mercy a legitimate factor in their analysis.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAW

In the alternative, Gleason maintains that the Court could decline to decide the merits of the Eighth Amendment issue and declare that the Kansas Supreme Court decision should stand on an adequate and independent state ground. As the Kansas Supreme Court was only adjudicating Kansas’ law, Gleason contends that the court would produce the same decision on remand, thereby making the Supreme Court’s decision an advisory opinion. Moreover, Gleason claims that, in the interests of comity and federalism, states should be allowed to afford criminal defendants more protections than are required by the federal Constitution or other states.

Kansas rejects the notion that the Kansas Supreme Court is providing a supra-constitutional protection in this case, because such a decision is highly inconsistent with how similarly situated states treat Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Citing a wide variety of opinions from various state supreme courts, federal courts, and military tribunals, Kansas claims that the Kansas Supreme Court decision is an “outlier” that does not comport with the manner in which courts have dealt with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the past.