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CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY V. DOE (01-1231) 538 U.S. 1 (2003)
271 F.3d 38, reversed.
Syllabus
 
Opinion
[ Rehnquist ]
Concurrence
[ Scalia ]
Concurrence
[ Souter ]
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538 U.S. ____ (2003)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 01—1231

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
et al., PETITIONERS v. JOHN DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[March 5, 2003]

    Justice Scalia, concurring.

    I join the Court’s opinion, and add that even if the requirements of Connecticut’s sex offender registration law implicate a liberty interest of respondent, the categorical abrogation of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suffices to provide all the process that is “due”–just as a state law providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty interest. Absent a claim (which respondent has not made here) that the liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called “substantive” due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it. That is ultimately why, as the Court’s opinion demonstrates, a convicted sex offender has no more right to additional “process” enabling him to establish that he is not dangerous than (in the analogous case just suggested) a 15-year-old has a right to “process” enabling him to establish that he is a safe driver.