THORNTON V. UNITED STATES (03-5165) 541 U.S. 615 (2004)
325 F.3d 189, affirmed.
Syllabus
Opinion
[ Rehnquist ]
Concurrence
[ O’Connor ]
Concurrence
[ Scalia ]
Dissent
[ Stevens ]
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541 U.S. ____ (2004)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 03—5165

MARCUS THORNTON, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[May 24, 2004]

Justice O’Connor, concurring in part.

I join all but footnote 4 of the Court’s opinion. Although the opinion is a logical extension of the holding of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area. As Justice Scalia forcefully argues, post, p. 2-5 (opinion concurring in judgment), lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). That erosion is a direct consequence of Belton’s shaky foundation. While the approach Justice Scalia proposes appears to be built on firmer ground, I am reluctant to adopt it in the context of a case in which neither the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit.