| Richmond v. Lewis (91-7094), 506 U.S. 56 (1992). | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Concurrence [ Thomas ] | Syllabus | Dissent [ Scalia ] | Opinion [ O'Connor ] |
| HTML version WordPerfect version | HTML version WordPerfect version | HTML version WordPerfect version | HTML version WordPerfect version |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.
WILLIE LEE RICHMOND, PETITIONER v. SAMUEL A. LEWIS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[
Justice
I joined the dissent in Stringer, and I continue to think that case was wrongly decided. In particular, I remain convinced that Stringer transformed Teague's retroactivity principle from a rule that validates "reasonableness" into a rule that mandates "prescience." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (Souter, J., dissenting). Had Stringer been decided differently, petitioner could not now complain that two Arizona Supreme Court justices violated the Constitution in 1983 by neglecting to reweigh. Nevertheless, because Stringer is good law, and because I agree that the concurring justices in this case did not reweigh, I join the Court's opinion.
Notes
1 Richmond's conviction became final on November 14, 1983--15 months before Stringer's conviction became final. I cannot imagine, however, thatthis distinction renders Stringer inapplicable to this case. The decision in Stringer rested on the premise that the rule against automatic affirmance "emerges not from any single case," but from a "long line of authority," Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9), and that "line of authority" consists entirely of cases decided before Richmond's conviction became final, see id., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 4-8).