|Edwards v. Balisok (95-1352), 520 U.S. 641 (1997).|
[ Scalia ]
[ Ginsburg ]
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EDWARDS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
Respondent, an inmate of a Washington state prison, was found guilty of prison rule infractions and sentenced to, inter alia, the loss of 30 days' good time credit he had previously earned toward his release. Alleging that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, he filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a declaration that those procedures were unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. Although he expressly reserved the right to seek restoration of the lost good time credits in an appropriate forum, he refrained from requesting that relief in light of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, under which the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking such restoration is habeas corpus. The District Court applied Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, which held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under §1983 if a judgment for him would "necessarily imply" the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. Although holding that a judgment for respondent would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary hearing and the resulting sanctions, the court did not dismiss the suit, but stayed it pending filing and resolution of a state court action for restoration of the good time credits. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing is always cognizable under §1983.
1. Respondent's claim for declaratory relief and money damages is not cognizable under §1983. The principle relied on by the Ninth Circuit--that a claim seeking damages only for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result, is always cognizable under §1983--is incorrect, since it disregards the possibility, clearly envisioned by Heck, supra, at 482-483, 486-487, and n. 6, that the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. If established, respondent's allegations of deceit and bias by the hearing officer at his disciplinary proceeding would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good time credits. Cf., e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535. His contrary contention, which is based on Washington's "some or any evidence" standard, is rejected. Pp. 2-7.
2. Although a prayer for prospective injunctive relief ordinarily will not "necessarily imply" the invalidity of a previous loss of good time credits, and so may properly be brought under §1983, respondent's claim for such relief must be remanded because it was not considered by either lower court, and its validity was neither briefed nor argued here. P. 7.
3. The District Court erred in staying this §1983 action. That court was mistaken in its view that once respondent had exhausted his state remedies, the action could proceed. Section 1983 contains no judicially imposed exhaustion requirement, Heck, supra, at 481, 483; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim either is cognizable under §1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed. Pp. 7.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined.