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KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL (97-1709) 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
131 F.3d 1433, reversed.
Syllabus
 
Opinion
[ Breyer ]
Concurrence
[ Scalia ]
Other
[ Stevens ]
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Stevens, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 97—1709

KUMHO TIRE COMPANY, LTD., et al., PETITIONERS
v. PATRICK CARMICHAEL, etc., et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 23, 1999]

    Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

    The only question that we granted certiorari to decide is whether a trial judge “[m]ay . . . consider the four factors set out by this Court in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in a Rule 702 analysis of admissibility of an engineering expert’s testimony.” Pet. for Cert. i. That question is fully and correctly answered in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, which I join.

    Part III answers the quite different question whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he excluded the testimony of Dennis Carlson. Because a proper answer to that question requires a study of the record that can be performed more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the nine Members of this Court, I would remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit to perform that task. There are, of course, exceptions to most rules, but I firmly believe that it is neither fair to litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions not raised by the certiorari petition. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150—151 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

    Accordingly, while I do not feel qualified to disagree with the well-reasoned factual analysis in Part III of the Court’s opinion, I do not join that Part, and I respectfully dissent from the Court’s disposition of the case.