| Davis v. Alaska
(No. 72-5794)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Burger ] | Concurrence
[ Stewart ] | Dissent
[ White ] |
| HTML version
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Davis v. Alaska
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.
As I see it, there is no constitutional principle at stake here. This is nothing more than a typical instance of a trial court exercising its discretion to control or limit cross-examination, followed by a typical decision of a state appellate court refusing to disturb the judgment of the trial court and itself concluding that limiting cross-examination had done no substantial harm to the defense. Yet the Court insists on second-guessing the state courts and, in effect, inviting federal review of every ruling of a state trial judge who believes cross-examination has gone far enough. I would not undertake this task, if for no other reason than that I have little faith in our ability, in fact-bound cases and on a cold record, to improve on the judgment of trial judges and of the state appellate courts who agree with them. I would affirm the judgment.




