STEVENS, J., Dissenting Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

430 U.S. 651

Ingraham v. Wright

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE's analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue is, I believe, unanswerable. I am also persuaded that his analysis of the procedural due process issue is correct. Notwithstanding my disagreement with the Court's holding [p701] on the latter question, my respect for MR. JUSTICE POWELL's reasoning in Part IV-B of his opinion for the Court prompts these comments.

The constitutional prohibition of state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not, by its express language, require that a hearing be provided before any deprivation may occur. To be sure, the timing of the process may be a critical element in determining its adequacy -- that is, in deciding what process is due in a particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard in advance of any deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest are essential. The Court has recognized, however, that the wording of the command that there shall be no deprivation "without" due process of law is consistent with the conclusion that a post-deprivation remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient. ^[n1]

When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater likelihood that a damages award will make a person completely whole than when an invasion of the individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has occurred. In the property context, therefore, frequently a post-deprivation state remedy may be all the process that the Fourteenth Amendment requires. It may also be true -- although I do not express an opinion on the point -- that an adequate state remedy for defamation may satisfy the due process requirement when a State has impaired an individual's interest in his reputation. On that hypothesis, the Court's analysis today gives rise to the thought that Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, may have been correctly decided on an incorrect rationale. Perhaps the Court will one day [p702] agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN s appraisal of the importance of the constitutional interest at stake in id. at 720-723, 734 (dissenting opinion), and nevertheless conclude that an adequate state remedy may prevent every state-inflicted injury to a person's reputation from violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ^[n2]

1. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 90-92; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598-600; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-599; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140-142; cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-114.

2. Cf. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1318-1320 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. 76-6204; see also Judge Swygert's thoughtful opinion, id. at 569-578.