BURGER, C.J., Concurring Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

446 U.S. 291

Rhode Island v. Innis

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.

Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), I concur in the judgment.

The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear, and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. I fear, however, that the rationale in Parts 446 U.S. 298"]II-A and II-B of the Court's opinion will not clarify the tension between this holding and II-A and II-B of the Court's opinion will not clarify the tension between this holding and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and our other cases. It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court's test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. See, e.g., ante at 302, n. 8. Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist, asked to express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody, would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgment now charged to police officers. [p305]

Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries and nuances flowing from post-Miranda opinions, and we do not clarify that situation today. ^[*]

* That we may well be adding to the confusion is suggested by the problem dealt with in California v. Braeseke, 444 U.S. 1309 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers) (difficulty of determining whether a defendant has waived his Miranda rights), and cases cited therein.