| Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
(No. 79-243)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Burger ] | Concurrence
[ White ] | Concurrence
[ Stevens ] | Concurrence
[ Brennan ] | Concurrence
[ Stewart ] | Concurrence
[ Blackmun ] | Dissent
[ Rehnquist ] |
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees "the accused" the right to a public trial, does not confer upon representatives of the press or members of the general public any right of access to a trial. [n1] But the Court explicitly left [p599] open the question whether such a right of access may be guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution, id. at 391-393. MR. JUSTICE POWELL expressed the view that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do extend at least a limited right of access even to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, id. at 397-403 (concurring opinion). MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST expressed a contrary view, id. at 403-406 (concurring opinion). The remaining Members of the Court were silent on the question.
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with respect to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal. [n2] As has been abundantly demonstrated in Part II of the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion concurring in the judgment, and in MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion dissenting in part last Term in the Gannett case, supra at 406, it has for centuries been a basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system that trials shall be public trials. The opinions referred to also convincingly explain the many good reasons why this is so. With us, a trial is, by very definition, a proceeding open to the press and to the public.
In conspicuous contrast to a military base, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828; a jail, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39; or a prison, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, a trial courtroom is a public place. Even more than city streets, sidewalks, and [p600] parks as areas of traditional First Amendment activity, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, a trial courtroom is a place where representatives of the press and of the public are not only free to be, but where their presence serves to assure the integrity of what goes on.
But this does not mean that the First Amendment right of members of the public and representatives of the press to attend civil and criminal trials is absolute. Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333. Much more than a city street, a trial courtroom must be a quiet and orderly place. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532. Moreover, every courtroom has a finite physical capacity, and there may be occasions when not all who wish to attend a trial may do so. [n3] And while there exist many alternative ways to satisfy the constitutional demands of a fair trial, [n4] those demands may also sometimes justify limitations upon the unrestricted presence of spectators in the courtroom. [n5]
Since, in the present case, the trial judge appears to have [p601] given no recognition to the right of representatives of the press and members of the public to be present at the Virginia murder trial over which he was presiding, the judgment under review must be reversed.
It is upon the basis of these principles that I concur in the judgment.
1. The Court also made clear that the Sixth Amendment does not give the accused the right to a private trial. 443 U.S. at 382. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury does not include right to be tried without a jury).
2. It has long been established that the protections of the First Amendment are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the States. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652. The First Amendment provisions relevant to this case are those protecting free speech and a free press. The right to speak implies a freedom to listen, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753. The right to publish implies a freedom to gather information, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681. See opinion of MR JUSTICE BRENNAN concurring in the judgment, ante p. 584, passim.
3. In such situations, representatives of the press must be assured access. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (opinion concurring in judgment).
4. Such alternatives include sequestration of juries, continuances, and changes of venue.
5. This is not to say that only constitutional considerations can justify such restrictions. The preservation of trade secrets, for example, might justify the exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil trial. And the sensibilities of a youthful prosecution witness, for example, might justify similar exclusion in a criminal trial for rape, so long as the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial were not impaired. See, e.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 56 F.2d 532, 539-542 (CA2 1974).
