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Marsh v. Chambers (No. 82-23)
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Opinion
[ Burger ]
Dissent
[ Brennan ]
Dissent
[ Stevens ]
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STEVENS, J., Dissenting Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


463 U.S. 783

Marsh v. Chambers

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT


No. 82-23 Argued: April 20, 1983 --- Decided: July 5, 1983

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the chaplain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the [p823] lawmakers' constituents. Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah's Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature. Regardless of the motivation of the majority that exercises the power to appoint the chaplain, [n1] it seems plain to me that the designation of a member of one religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith over another in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The Court declines to "embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer." Ante at 795. Perhaps it does so because it would be unable to explain away the clearly sectarian content of some of the prayers given by Nebraska's chaplain. [n2] Or perhaps the Court is unwilling to [p824] acknowledge that the tenure of the chaplain must inevitably be conditioned on the acceptability of that content to the silent majority.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

1. The Court holds that a chaplain's 16-year tenure is constitutional as long as there is no proof that his reappointment "stemmed from an impermissible motive." Ante at 793. Thus, once again, the Court makes the subjective motivation of legislators the decisive criterion for judging the constitutionality of a state legislative practice. Cf. Roger v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), and City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Although that sort of standard maximizes the power of federal judges to review state action, it is not conducive to the evenhanded administration of the law. See 458 U.S. at 642-650 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); 446 U.S. at 91-94 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

2. On March 20, 1978, for example, Chaplain Palmer gave the following invocation:

Father in heaven, the suffering and death of your son brought life to the whole world moving our hearts to praise your glory. The power of the cross reveals your concern for the world and the wonder of Christ crucified.

The days of his life-giving death and glorious resurrection are approaching. This is the hour when he triumphed over Satan's pride; the time when we celebrate the great event of our redemption.

We are reminded of the price he paid when we pray with the Psalmist:

My God, my God, why have you forsaken me, far from my prayer, from the word of my cry?

O my God, I cry out by day, and you answer not; by night, and there is no relief for me.

Yet you are enthroned in the Holy Place, O glory of Israel!

In you our fathers trusted; they trusted, and you delivered them.

To you they cried, and they escaped; in you they trusted, and they were not put to shame.

But I am a worm, not a man; the scorn of men, despised by the people.

All who see me scoff at me; they mock me with parted lips, they wag their heads:

He relied on the Lord; let Him deliver him, let Him rescue him, if He loves him.

Amen.

App. 103-104.