skip navigation
search

United States v. Armstrong (No. 95-157)
48 F. 3d 1508, reversed and remanded.
Syllabus

Opinion
[ Rehnquist ]
Concurrence
[ Souter ]
Concurrence
[ Ginsburg ]
CDInPart
[ Breyer ]
Dissent
[ Stevens ]
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version

GINSBURG, J., Concurring Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


517 U.S. 456

United States v. Armstrong

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT


No. 95-157 Argued: February 26, 1996 --- Decided: May 13, 1996

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.

I do not understand the Court to have created a "major limitation" on the scope of discovery available under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. See post, at 5 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As I see it, the Court has decided a precise issue: whether the phrase "defendant's defense," as used in Rule 16(a)(1)(C), encompasses allegations of selective prosecution. I agree with the Court, for reasons the opinion states, that subsection (a)(1)(C) does not apply to selective prosecution claims. The Court was not called upon to decide here whether Rule 16(a)(1)(C) applies in any other context, for example, to affirmative defenses unrelated to the merits. With the caveat that I do not read today's opinion as precedent foreclosing issues not tendered for review, I join the Court's opinion.