BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. V. WESTVIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES (99-1848) 532 U.S. 598 (2001)
203 F.3d 819, affirmed.
Syllabus
Opinion
[ Rehnquist ]
Concurrence
[ Scalia ]
Dissent
[ Ginsburg ]
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Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC., et al. v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES et al.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


No. 99—1848. Argued February 27, 2001–Decided May 29, 2001

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates assisted living residences, failed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal’s office because some residents were incapable of “self-preservation” as defined by state law. After receiving orders to close its facilities, Buckhannon and others (hereinafter petitioners) brought suit in Federal District Court against the State and state agencies and officials (hereinafter respondents), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the “self-preservation” requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Respondents agreed to stay the orders pending the case’s resolution. The state legislature then eliminated the “self-preservation” requirement, and the District Court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the case as moot. Petitioners requested attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” under the FHAA and ADA, basing their entitlement on the “catalyst theory,” which posits that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party” if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. As the Fourth Circuit had previously rejected the “catalyst theory,” the District Court denied the motion, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The “catalyst theory” is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the FHAA and ADA. Under the “American Rule,” parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney’s fees, and courts follow a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority, Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819. Congress has employed the legal term of art “prevailing party” in numerous statutes authorizing awards of attorney’s fees. A “prevailing party” is one who has been awarded some relief by a court. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758. Both judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create a material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship and thus permit an award. The “catalyst theory,” however, allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship. A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. The legislative history cited by petitioners is at best ambiguous as to the availability of the “catalyst theory”; and, particularly in view of the “American Rule,” such history is clearly insufficient to alter the clear meaning of “prevailing party” in the fee-shifting statutes. Given this meaning, this Court need not determine which way petitioners’ various policy arguments cut. Pp. 3—12.

203 F.3d 819, affirmed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.