NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part
of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,200 U.S. 321,
337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
BRADSHAW, WARDEN v. STUMPF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 04637.Argued April 19,
2005Decided June 13, 2005
Respondent Stumpf and his accomplice Wesley
committed an armed robbery that left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs.
Stout dead. Stumpf admitted shooting Mr. Stout but has always
denied killing Mrs. Stout. In Ohio state court proceedings,
Stumpf pleaded guilty to, among other things, aggravated murder
and one of three capital murder specifications charged in his
indictment. This left Stumpf eligible for the death penalty.
In a contested penalty hearing before a three-judge panel,
Stumpfs principal mitigation
arguments were that he had participated in the robbery at
Wesleys urging, that Wesley had killed Mrs. Stout, and
that Stumpfs minor role in
the murder counseled against the death sentence. The State,
however, claimed that Stumpf had shot Mrs. Stout, and that he
therefore was the principal offender in her murder. In the
alternative, the State noted that even an accomplice can be
sentenced to death under Ohio law if he acted with the specific
intent to cause death, and the State argued that such intent
could be inferred from the circumstances of the robbery
regardless of who actually shot Mrs. Stout. The panel
concluded that Stumpf was the principal offender and sentenced
him to death. At Wesleys subsequent jury trial, however,
the State presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to
shooting Mrs. Stout. But Wesley argued that the prosecutor had
taken a contrary position in Stumpfs trial, and Wesley was sentenced to life in
prison with the possibility of parole. After Wesleys
trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his own plea or vacate his
death sentence, arguing that the evidence endorsed by the State
in Wesleys trial cast doubt on Stumpfs conviction and sentence. This time, however,
the prosecutor emphasized other evidence confirming Stumpf as
the shooter and again raised, in the alternative, the
aider-and-abettor theory. The court denied Stumpfs motion, and Ohios
appellate courts affirmed. Subsequently, the Federal District
Court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed on two grounds. First, the Sixth Circuit found that
Stumpf had not understood that specific intent to cause death
was a necessary element of the aggravated murder charge, and
that his guilty plea therefore had not been knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. Second, the court found that the conviction
and sentence could not stand because the State had secured
convictions of both Stumpf and Wesley for the same crime, using
inconsistent theories.
Held:
1. The Sixth
Circuit erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed of the
aggravated murder charges specific intent element. While
a guilty plea is invalid if the defendant has not been informed
of the crimes elements, Stumpfs attorneys represented at his plea hearing that
they had explained the elements to their client, and Stumpf
confirmed that the representation was true. This Court has
never held that the judge must himself explain a crimes
elements to the defendant. Rather, constitutional requirements
may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the
charges nature and the crimes elements were
explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.
Stumpf argues that his plea was so inconsistent with his denial
of having shot Mrs. Stout that he could only have pleaded
guilty out of ignorance of the aggravated murder charges
specific intent element. But that argument fails because
Stumpfs conviction did not
require a showing that Stumpf had shot Mrs. Stout. Ohio law
also considers aiders and abettors who act with specific intent
to cause death liable for aggravated murder. Stumpf and Wesley
entered the Stout home with guns, intending to commit armed
robbery, and Stumpf admitted shooting Mr. Stout. Taken
together, these facts could show that the two men had agreed to
kill both Stouts, which in turn could make both men guilty of
aggravated murder regardless of who shot Mrs. Stout. Stumpfs claim that he and his attorneys
were confused about the relevance and timing of defenses that
they planned to make is not supported by the record. Finally,
the pleas validity may not be collaterally attacked on
the ground that Stumpf made what he now claims was a bad deal.
Pp. 610.
2. The Sixth
Circuit was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial
inconsistencies between the Stumpf and Wesley cases required
voiding Stumpfs guilty plea.
The precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to
Stumpfs aggravated murder
conviction, and Stumpf has never explained how the
prosecutions postplea use of inconsistent arguments could
have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of
his plea. P. 11.
3. The
prosecutors use of allegedly inconsistent theories may
have a more direct effect on Stumpfs sentence, however, for it is arguable that the
sentencing panels conclusion about his role was material
to its sentencing determination. The opinion below leaves some
ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower court
resolved Stumpfs due process
challenge to his conviction and how it resolved his challenge
to his sentence. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals
would have found Stumpf entitled to resentencing had it not
also considered the conviction invalid. Likewise, the
parties briefing here, and the question on which this
Court granted certiorari, largely focused on the conviction.
In these circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to
resolve the merits of Stumpfs
sentencing claim before giving the Sixth Circuit the
opportunity to consider in the first instance the question of
how the prosecutors conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley
cases related to Stumpfs
death sentence in particular. Pp. 1112.
367 F.3d 594, reversed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded.
OConnor, J.,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Souter, J., filed
a concurring opinion in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Thomas,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J.,
joined.