Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre- pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

Syllabus

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 90-906. Argued April 16, 1991 -- Decided June 17, 1991

An Act of Congress (hereinafter the Transfer Act) authorized the transfer of operating control of Washington National Airport (National) and Dulles International Airport (Dulles) from the federal Department of Transportation to petitioner Metropolitan Washington Airports Author- ity (MWAA), which was created by a compact between Virginia and the District of Columbia. Both airports are located in the Virginia suburbs of the District. Dulles is larger than National and lies in a rural area miles from the Capitol. National is a much busier airport due to the convenience of its location at the center of the metropolitan area, but its flight paths over densely populated areas have generated concern among residents about safety, noise, and pollution. Because of congressional concern that surrender of federal control of the airports might result in the transfer of a significant amount of traffic from National to Dulles, the Transfer Act authorizes the MWAA's Board of Directors to create a Board of Review (Board). The Board is to be composed of nine con- gressmen who serve on committees having jurisdiction over transporta- tion issues, and who are to act "in their individual capacities." The Board is vested with a variety of powers, including the authority to veto decisions made by MWAA's directors. After the directors adopted by- laws providing for the Board, and Virginia and the District amended their legislation to give MWAA powers to establish the Board, the direc- tors appointed the Board's nine members from lists submitted by Con- gress. The directors then adopted a Master Plan providing for exten- sive new facilities at National, and the Board voted not to disapprove that Plan. Subsequently, respondents -- individuals living along Na- tional flight paths and Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (CAAN), whose members include persons living along such paths, and whose purposes include the reduction of National operations and associ- ated noise, safety, and air pollution problems -- brought this action seek- ing declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Board's veto power is unconstitutional. Although ruling that respondents had stand- ing to maintain the action, the District Court granted summary judg- ment for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that Congress' delegation of the veto power to the Board violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

1. Respondents have standing. Accepting as true their claims that the Master Plan will result in increased noise, pollution, and accidents, they have alleged "personal injury" to themselves that is "fairly trace- able" to the Board's veto power. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751. This is because knowledge that the Plan was subject to that power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's directors when they drew up the Plan. Moreover, because invalidation of the veto power will prevent enactment of the Plan, the relief respondents have requested is "likely to . . . re- dres[s]" their alleged injury. Ibid. Furthermore, the harm they allege is not confined to the consequences of a possible increase in National ac- tivity, since the Board and the Master Plan injure CAAN by making it more difficult for it to fulfill its goal of reducing that activity. Pp. 10-11.

2. Congress' conditioning of the airports' transfer upon the creation of a Board of Review composed of congressmen and having veto power over the MWAA directors' decisions violates the separation of powers. Pp. 12-23.

(a) Petitioners argue incorrectly that this case does not raise any separation-of-powers issue because the Board is a state creation that nei- ther exercises federal power nor acts as an agent of Congress. An examination of the Board's origin and structure reveals an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has man- dated in detail, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged fed- eral interest in the efficient operation of airports vital to the smooth con- duct of Government and congressional business, and membership in which is controlled by Congress and restricted to Members charged with authority over air transportation. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal powers as an agent of Congress to mandate separation- of-powers scrutiny. Any other conclusion would permit Congress to evade the Constitution's "carefully crafted" constraints, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959, simply by delegating primary responsibility for exe- cution of national policy to the States, subject to the veto power of Mem- bers of Congress acting "in their individual capacities." Cf. Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 755 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Nor is there merit to petitioners' contention that the Board should neverthe- less be immune from scrutiny for constitutional defects because it was created in the course of Congress' exercise of its power to dispose of fed- eral property under Article IV, 3, cl. 2. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212, distinguished. Pp. 12-18.

(b) Congress has not followed a constitutionally acceptable proce- dure in delegating decision-making authority to the Board. To forestall the danger of encroachment into the executive sphere, the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not in- vest itself, its Members, or its agents with executive power. See, e. g., J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406; Bowsher, supra, at 726. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered pro- cedures" specified in Article I. Chadha, supra, at 951. If the Board's power is considered to be executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. However, if the power is considered to be legislative, Congress must, but has not, exercised it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, 7. Although Congress imposed its will on the MWAA by means that are unique and that might prove to be innocuous, the statutory scheme by which it did so provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legis- lative power beyond its constitutionally defined role. Pp. 18-23.

286 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 917 F. 2d 48, affirmed.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Marshall, J., joined.