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1000 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
1000 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
989 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
969 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
884 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
863 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Opinion]
861 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Dissent]
850 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Opinion]
798 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Dissent]
791 UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
[Opinion]
783 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Dissent]
783 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
780 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Concurrence]
776 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Opinion]
772 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Opinion]
761 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Dissent]
741 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
737 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Opinion]
711 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Opinion]
696 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Opinion]
696 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
691 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Opinion]
687 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
672 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
668 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
648 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
635 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Dissent]
629 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Opinion]
626 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Opinion]
607 KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
594 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Opinion]
589 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
589 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
576 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Dissent]
572 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
572 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
566 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Concurrence]
561 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Opinion]
555 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Dissent]
550 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[]
544 REID V. COVERT
[Concurrence]
542 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Syllabus]
533 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Concurrence]
529 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Opinion]
524 PROFFITT V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
509 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Dissent]
507 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Syllabus]
505 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Syllabus]
501 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Dissent]
496 SCHICK V. REED
[Dissent]
485 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
485 LOUISIANA EX REL. FRANCIS V. RESWEBER
[Dissent]
483 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Syllabus]
479 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Opinion]
475 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Dissent]
470 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
468 JOHNSON V. LOUISIANA
[Opinion]
462 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
455 UNITED STATES V. QUARLES
[Dissent]
446 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Concurrence]
442 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
442 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
433 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Opinion]
433 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
433 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
431 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
431 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
427 RING V. ARIZONA
[Syllabus]
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
427 TROP V. DULLES
[Opinion]
422 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
420 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
420 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
418 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Syllabus]
409 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
409 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
409 ROTH V. UNITED STATES
[Opinion]
403 PATTON V. UNITED STATES
[Opinion]
403 DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA
[Opinion]
399 POWELL V. TEXAS
[Dissent]
392 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
388 ROPER V. SIMMONS
[Syllabus]
388 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Dissent]
388 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Opinion]
366
[Syllabus]
366 GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
[Concurrence]
360 BOULWARE V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
360 BAZE V. REES
[Syllabus]
360 KILBOURN V. THOMPSON
[Opinion]
360 REID V. COVERT
[Dissent]
360 ADAMSON V. CALIFORNIA
[Dissent]
351 TROP V. DULLES
[Dissent]
347 BARTKUS V. ILLINOIS
[Opinion]
342
[Syllabus]
342 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concurrence]
342 ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA
[Concurrence]
342 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Syllabus]
334 CALDER V. BULL
[Opinion]
334 POWELL V. ALABAMA
[Opinion]
334 WORCESTER V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
327 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
323 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
Executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
323 JONES V. ALFRED H. MAYER CO.
[Opinion]
323 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
323 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Concurrence]
323 EX PARTE QUIRIN
[Opinion]
323 EX PARTE GROSSMAN
[Opinion]
323 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
312 PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
312 WILLIAMS V. FLORIDA
[Dissent]
312 BURCH V. LOUISIANA
[Opinion]
299 UTTECHT V. BROWN
[Syllabus]
299 WEEKS V. ANGELONE
[Syllabus]
1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"
299 EX PARTE MILLIGAN
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
299 ULLMANN V. UNITED STATES
[Dissent]
299 UNITED STATES V. SALERNO
[Opinion]
290 LOVING V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
[Syllabus]
290 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
284 GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
284 BETTS V. BRADY
[Opinion]
268
[Syllabus]
268
[Syllabus]
268 SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
[Syllabus]
268
[Syllabus]
268 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Syllabus]
268 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Syllabus]
268 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Syllabus]
268 LOEWE V. LAWLOR
[Opinion]
268 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Syllabus]
268 EX PARTE MILLIGAN
[Opinion]
266 WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
[Concurrence]
266 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
266 ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN
[Opinion]
266 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
266 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
266 UNITED STATES V. QUARLES
[Opinion]
266 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
266 PITTSBURGH PRESS CO. V. PITTSBURGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
[Opinion]
247
[Syllabus]
247
[Syllabus]
247 DAWSON V. DELAWARE
[Dissent]
247 HOLDEN V. HARDY
[Opinion]
247 GOMEZ V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[Dissent]
236 BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)
[Syllabus]
236 WHITNEY V. CALIFORNIA
[Opinion]
236 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Concurrence]
236 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
236 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
236 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Opinion]
223 MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL
[Syllabus]
The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
223
[Syllabus]
223 NORTHERN PIPELINE CONSTR. CO. V. MARATHON PIPE LINE CO.
[Opinion]
223 CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
223 STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY V. UNITED STATES
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
223 JOHNSON V. LOUISIANA
[Concurrence]
223 STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY V. UNITED STATES
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
223 ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
223 SCOTT V. SANDFORD
[Dissent]
223 PARIS ADULT THEATRE I V. SLATON
[Dissent]
223 UNITED STATES V. SALERNO
[Dissent]
223 ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
193 TENNARD V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
193 MILLER-EL V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
193 BANKS V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
193 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
193 LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
[Syllabus]
193 ROE V. WADE
[Opinion]
193 JOHNSON V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
193 IN RE GAULT
[Concurrence]
193 JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. V. WILSON
[Concurrence]
193 BERGER V. NEW YORK
[Dissent]
193 PALKO V. CONNECTICUT
[Opinion]
193 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Syllabus]
193 IN RE GAULT
[Dissent]
193 UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK V. NEW JERSEY
[Opinion]
193 REID V. COVERT
[Opinion]
193 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Dissent]
193 HURTADO V. CALIFORNIA
[Opinion]
193 CHAMBERS V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
193 BATES V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA
[Opinion]
149 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
149 BOBBY V. BIES
[Syllabus]
149 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
149 SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES
[Syllabus]
149 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
149 VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE V. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, INC.
[Opinion]
149 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
149 PROFFITT V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
149 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Dissent]
149 BAILEY V. DREXEL FURNITURE COMPANY
[Opinion]
149 BELL V. OHIO
[Syllabus]
149 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
149 ALLEN V. WRIGHT
[Opinion]
149 GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
[Opinion]
149 DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
1000 KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
774 RING V. ARIZONA
[Syllabus]
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
770 ROPER V. SIMMONS
[Syllabus]
611 BAZE V. REES
[Syllabus]
603
[Syllabus]
567 MILLER-EL V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
566 UTTECHT V. BROWN
[Syllabus]
558 LOVING V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
[Syllabus]
535 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
Executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
517 WEEKS V. ANGELONE
[Syllabus]
1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"
512
[Syllabus]
454 PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
443 BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)
[Syllabus]
438
[Syllabus]
429
[Syllabus]
417 KANSAS V. MARSH
[Syllabus]
416 BANKS V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
406 MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL
[Syllabus]
The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
399
[Syllabus]
396 BOBBY V. BIES
[Syllabus]
387 GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
375 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
374 WALTON V. ARIZONA, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
[Syllabus]
372 FLORIDA V. NIXON
[Syllabus]
351 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
349
[Syllabus]
343 SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
[Syllabus]
329 BROWN V. SANDERS
[Syllabus]
327 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
322 SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA
[Syllabus]
Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.
311 CULLEN V. PINHOLSTER
[Syllabus]
309 LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
[Syllabus]
293 SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.
287 TENNARD V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
285 MONGE V. CALIFORNIA, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
[Syllabus]
277 CALDERON V. THOMPSON, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)
[Syllabus]
272 BRADSHAW V. STUMPF
[Syllabus]
272 SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
[Syllabus]
267 BOULWARE V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
267 PENRY V. JOHNSON
[Syllabus]
The jury instructions at Penry's resentencing for capital murder did not comply with the Court's mandate in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302; the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with Penry did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
267 HOPKINS V. REEVES, 524 U.S. 88 (1998)
[Syllabus]
258 DECK V. MISSOURI
[Syllabus]
254
[Syllabus]
254
[Syllabus]
240 BROWN V. PAYTON
[Syllabus]
240
[Syllabus]
232 O'DELL V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 1969, 138 L.ED.2D 351 (1997).
[Syllabus]
222 AYERS V. BELMONTES
[Syllabus]
211
[Syllabus]
211 MCKUNE V. LILE
[Syllabus]
The Tenth Circuit's judgment-that Kansas prison officials' threat to reduce respondent inmate's privilege status and transfer him to maximum security if he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program constituted compelled self-incrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment-is reversed, and the case is remanded.
199 HARRIS V. ALABAMA, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
[Syllabus]
199 MAGWOOD V. PATTERSON
[Syllabus]
199
[Syllabus]
199
[Syllabus]
199
[Syllabus]
198 WOOD V. ALLEN
[Syllabus]
198 BELL V. CONE
[Syllabus]
Respondent's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his sentencing hearing was governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of his claim neither was "contrary to" nor involved "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
183
[Syllabus]
183 SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN
[Syllabus]
1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?
183
[Syllabus]
183 LEWIS V. UNITED STATES, 523 U.S. 155 (1998)
[Syllabus]
183 DRETKE V. HALEY
[Syllabus]
Whether the "actual innocence" exception to the procedural default rule concerning federal habeas corpus claims should apply to noncapital sentencing errors?
175 ROMPILLA V. BEARD
[Syllabus]
175 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
166
[Syllabus]
166
[Syllabus]
143 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
143 SMITH V. SPISAK
[Syllabus]
143 HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
[Syllabus]
143
[Syllabus]
143 MAYLE V. FELIX
[Syllabus]
143 YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO
[Syllabus]
(1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.
143 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
2. Whether 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (e) (2), which prohibits a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing only ""if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State Court proceedings, ""governs petitioner's claims where throughout state proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied petitioner's discovery requests, denied all investigative and expert resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an evidentiary hearing."
143 CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
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143 WOODFORD V. GARCEAU
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For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.
143 GRAY V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S. CT. 110, 137 L. ED. 2D 234 (1996)
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143 FELKER V. TURPIN, WARDEN, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996).
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143 HOLLAND V. FLORIDA
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143 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
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143 CONE V. BELL
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143 STEWART V. MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)
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111 GONZALEZ V. CROSBY
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111 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. V. GARAMENDI
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California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) requires California insurers to provide extensive information regarding every insurance policy issued in Nazi dominated Europe between 1920 and 1945 by any insurer with which the California insurer now has a legal relationship. The district court enjoined enforcement of the Act on three constitutional grounds: interference with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, due process, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Over the objections of the U.S. government and affected foreign governments, and in direct conflict with Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the HVIRA in all respects. 1. Whether the HVIRA, which the U.S. government has called an actual interference with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 2. Whether the HVIRA, which attempts to regulate insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 3. Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015, insulates the HVIRA form review under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
111 BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
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111 CAREY V. SAFFOLD
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As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.
111 TYLER V. CAIN
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The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).
111 BERGHUIS V. SMITH
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111 DUNCAN V. WALKER
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A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.
111 RHINES V. WEBER
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111 FRY V. PLILER
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111 INS V. ST. CYR
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Amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made to the Immigration and Nationality Act did not affect the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law; nor did they affect the availability of discretionary relief from deportation for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements before the amendments' effective dates.
111 PHILIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS
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111 J. D. B. V. NORTH CAROLINA
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111 PLILER V. FORD
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(1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?
111 EDWARDS V. CARPENTER
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Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."
111
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111 ARTUZ V. BENNETT
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Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"
111 SLACK V. MCDANIEL
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If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?
111 EVANS V. CHAVIS
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111 JIMENEZ V. QUARTERMAN
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111 MARTIN V. HADIX
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111 CALDERON V. ASHMUS, 523 U.S. 740 (1998)
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111 WOODFORD V. NGO
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111 HOHN V. UNITED STATES, 524 U.S. 236 (1998)
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111 RICE V. COLLINS
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111 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES
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111 HARRINGTON V. RICHTER
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111 BRACY V. GRAMLEY, WARDEN, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).
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111 SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
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111 WALL V. KHOLI
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111 LOCKYER V. ANDRADE
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The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
111 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES OFAMERICA V. WHITING
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111 PACE V. DIGUGLIELMO
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111 RENICO V. LETT
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111 LINDH V. MURPHY, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 2059, 138 L.ED.2D 481 (1997).
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