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1000 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
1000 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
993 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Dissent]
989 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Opinion]
960 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
958 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
952 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Opinion]
947 UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
[Opinion]
941 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Opinion]
919 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Dissent]
917 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Dissent]
908 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Opinion]
902 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
891 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Dissent]
891 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Opinion]
882 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
882 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
867 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
854 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
854 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Dissent]
843 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
830 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
815 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
813 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Opinion]
813 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Opinion]
813 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
809 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Opinion]
806 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Dissent]
802 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
796 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Opinion]
778 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Dissent]
772 PROFFITT V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
737 KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
733 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[]
724 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
724 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
707 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
702 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Concurrence]
698 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Opinion]
672 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Dissent]
670 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
659 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
657 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concurrence]
648 ROPER V. SIMMONS
[Syllabus]
648 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Opinion]
631 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Opinion]
629 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
629 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Opinion]
624 PULLEY V. HARRIS
[Concurrence]
624 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Opinion]
624 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
613 RING V. ARIZONA
[Syllabus]
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
611 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Syllabus]
603 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concurrence]
596 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
596 LOCKETT V. OHIO
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
592 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
592 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
587 GREGG V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
587 SCHICK V. REED
[Dissent]
576
[Syllabus]
576 BELL V. OHIO
[Opinion]
572 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Dissent]
572 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Opinion]
570 MILLER-EL V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
570 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Dissent]
561 KANSAS V. MARSH
[Syllabus]
559 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
559 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
555 THOMPSON V. OKLAHOMA
[Syllabus]
550 PENRY V. LYNAUGH
[Syllabus]
542
[Syllabus]
527 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Concurrence]
527 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Syllabus]
518 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
516 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
514 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Concurrence]
503 WALTON V. ARIZONA, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
[Syllabus]
501 FLORIDA V. NIXON
[Syllabus]
496 PROFFITT V. FLORIDA
[Concurrence]
496 PROFFITT V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
496 SCHICK V. REED
[Opinion]
483 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Dissent]
479 BELL V. OHIO
[Syllabus]
479 EX PARTE QUIRIN
[Opinion]
472 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
470
[Syllabus]
468 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Concurrence]
468 WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
[Concurrence]
462 UTTECHT V. BROWN
[Syllabus]
462 BAZE V. REES
[Syllabus]
462 TROP V. DULLES
[Opinion]
459 LOVING V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
[Syllabus]
459 DAWSON V. DELAWARE
[Opinion]
457 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
449 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
449 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
446 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Dissent]
442 BROWN V. SANDERS
[Syllabus]
433 SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA
[Syllabus]
Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.
433 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Concurrence]
431 MCCLESKEY V. KEMP
[Dissent]
431 LOCKHART V. MCCREE
[Syllabus]
422 JUREK V. TEXAS
[Syllabus]
418 CULLEN V. PINHOLSTER
[Syllabus]
403 ROE V. WADE
[Opinion]
396 WEEKS V. ANGELONE
[Syllabus]
1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"
396 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
Executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
394 SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.
388 UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
[Dissent]
383 MONGE V. CALIFORNIA, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
[Syllabus]
383 BOBBY V. BIES
[Syllabus]
383 EX PARTE GARLAND
[Dissent]
373 CALDERON V. THOMPSON, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)
[Syllabus]
366 SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
[Syllabus]
366 BANKS V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
366 BRADSHAW V. STUMPF
[Syllabus]
360 PENRY V. JOHNSON
[Syllabus]
The jury instructions at Penry's resentencing for capital murder did not comply with the Court's mandate in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302; the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with Penry did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
360 HOPKINS V. REEVES, 524 U.S. 88 (1998)
[Syllabus]
360 BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)
[Syllabus]
360 WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS
[Syllabus]
355 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
347
[Syllabus]
347 DECK V. MISSOURI
[Syllabus]
347 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Syllabus]
342
[Syllabus]
342
[Syllabus]
342 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
342 UNITED STATES V. BROWN
[Opinion]
342 HELLING V. MCKINNEY
[Dissent]
327 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Opinion]
327 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
327 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
327 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
323
[Syllabus]
323 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
323 MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL
[Syllabus]
The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
323 BROWN V. PAYTON
[Syllabus]
323 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Dissent]
312 O'DELL V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 1969, 138 L.ED.2D 351 (1997).
[Syllabus]
312 BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. V. GORE
[Opinion]
312 NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES
[Opinion]
312 ULLMANN V. UNITED STATES
[Dissent]
312 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Dissent]
299 PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
299 AYERS V. BELMONTES
[Syllabus]
299 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Syllabus]
299 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Opinion]
299 OREGON V. MITCHELL
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
299 OREGON V. MITCHELL
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
290 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL MISSOURI V. DANFORTH
[Opinion]
290 UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
[Syllabus]
290 TROP V. DULLES
[Concurrence]
290 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
[Opinion]
284 MCKUNE V. LILE
[Syllabus]
The Tenth Circuit's judgment-that Kansas prison officials' threat to reduce respondent inmate's privilege status and transfer him to maximum security if he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program constituted compelled self-incrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment-is reversed, and the case is remanded.
284
[Syllabus]
268 HARRIS V. ALABAMA, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
[Syllabus]
268
[Syllabus]
268
[Syllabus]
268
[Syllabus]
268 MAGWOOD V. PATTERSON
[Syllabus]
268 SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
[Syllabus]
268 WILLIAMS V. FLORIDA
[Dissent]
268 COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES V. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BD. NO. 12
[Opinion]
268 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Syllabus]
266 WOOD V. ALLEN
[Syllabus]
266 BELL V. CONE
[Syllabus]
Respondent's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his sentencing hearing was governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of his claim neither was "contrary to" nor involved "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
266 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Dissent]
266 EVANS V. ABNEY
[Opinion]
266 CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. V. CITY OF HIALEAH
[Opinion]
266 BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
247 SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN
[Syllabus]
1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?
247 DRETKE V. HALEY
[Syllabus]
Whether the "actual innocence" exception to the procedural default rule concerning federal habeas corpus claims should apply to noncapital sentencing errors?
247 LEWIS V. UNITED STATES, 523 U.S. 155 (1998)
[Syllabus]
247 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
247 FORD V. WAINWRIGHT
[Syllabus]
236 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
236 GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
236 ROMPILLA V. BEARD
[Syllabus]
236 SCOTT V. SANDFORD
[Dissent]
236 ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS
[Dissent]
236 WILLIAMS V. FLORIDA
[Opinion]
236 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
223
[Syllabus]
223 LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
[Syllabus]
223
[Syllabus]
223 STANFORD V. KENTUCKY
[Concurrence]
223 MCCRAY V. UNITED STATES
[Opinion]
223 JOHNSON V. LOUISIANA
[Dissent]
223 HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
[Dissent]
223 ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE
[Opinion]
223 COHENS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
223 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
223 IN RE NEAGLE
[Dissent]
223 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
223 POWELL V. ALABAMA
[Opinion]
223 FORD V. GEORGIA
[Opinion]
223 GOMEZ V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[Dissent]
223 NEBRASKA PRESS ASSN. V. STUART
[Opinion]
223 BARTKUS V. ILLINOIS
[Opinion]
223 TROP V. DULLES
[Dissent]
193 TENNARD V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
193 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
193 SMITH V. SPISAK
[Syllabus]
193 HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
[Syllabus]
193
[Syllabus]
193 MAYLE V. FELIX
[Syllabus]
193 YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO
[Syllabus]
(1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.
193 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
2. Whether 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (e) (2), which prohibits a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing only ""if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State Court proceedings, ""governs petitioner's claims where throughout state proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied petitioner's discovery requests, denied all investigative and expert resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an evidentiary hearing."
193 CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
[Syllabus]
193 SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
[Syllabus]
193 WOODFORD V. GARCEAU
[Syllabus]
For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.
193 GRAY V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S. CT. 110, 137 L. ED. 2D 234 (1996)
[Syllabus]
193 FELKER V. TURPIN, WARDEN, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996).
[Syllabus]
193 HOLLAND V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
193 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
193 CONE V. BELL
[Syllabus]
193 STEWART V. MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)
[Syllabus]
193 BELL V. OHIO
[Concurrence]
193 BARENBLATT V. UNITED STATES
[Dissent]
193 COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES V. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BD. NO. 12
[Dissent]
193 BELL V. OHIO
[Concurrence]
193 REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
[Concurrence]
193 LEE V. WEISMAN
[Concurrence]
193 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
193 BOOTH V. MARYLAND
[Syllabus]
193 MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
[Opinion]
193 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Dissent]
193 OREGON V. MITCHELL
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
193 OREGON V. MITCHELL
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
193 THORNBURGH V. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
[Dissent]
193 DAWSON V. DELAWARE
[Dissent]
193 CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
149 PACE V. DIGUGLIELMO
[Syllabus]
149 CAREY V. SAFFOLD
[Syllabus]
As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.
149 LINDH V. MURPHY, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 2059, 138 L.ED.2D 481 (1997).
[Syllabus]
149 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. V. GARAMENDI
[Syllabus]
California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) requires California insurers to provide extensive information regarding every insurance policy issued in Nazi dominated Europe between 1920 and 1945 by any insurer with which the California insurer now has a legal relationship. The district court enjoined enforcement of the Act on three constitutional grounds: interference with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, due process, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Over the objections of the U.S. government and affected foreign governments, and in direct conflict with Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the HVIRA in all respects. 1. Whether the HVIRA, which the U.S. government has called an actual interference with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 2. Whether the HVIRA, which attempts to regulate insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 3. Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015, insulates the HVIRA form review under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
149 TYLER V. CAIN
[Syllabus]
The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).
149 BERGHUIS V. SMITH
[Syllabus]
149 DUNCAN V. WALKER
[Syllabus]
A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.
149 FRY V. PLILER
[Syllabus]
149 INS V. ST. CYR
[Syllabus]
Amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made to the Immigration and Nationality Act did not affect the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law; nor did they affect the availability of discretionary relief from deportation for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements before the amendments' effective dates.
149 RHINES V. WEBER
[Syllabus]
149 J. D. B. V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
149 PLILER V. FORD
[Syllabus]
(1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?
149 PHILIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS
[Syllabus]
149 EDWARDS V. CARPENTER
[Syllabus]
Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."
149
[Syllabus]
149 ARTUZ V. BENNETT
[Syllabus]
Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"
149 SLACK V. MCDANIEL
[Syllabus]
If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?
149 EVANS V. CHAVIS
[Syllabus]
149 JIMENEZ V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
149 MARTIN V. HADIX
[Syllabus]
149 CALDERON V. ASHMUS, 523 U.S. 740 (1998)
[Syllabus]
149 WOODFORD V. NGO
[Syllabus]
149 HOHN V. UNITED STATES, 524 U.S. 236 (1998)
[Syllabus]
149 RICE V. COLLINS
[Syllabus]
149 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
149 HARRINGTON V. RICHTER
[Syllabus]
149 WALL V. KHOLI
[Syllabus]
149 BRACY V. GRAMLEY, WARDEN, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).
[Syllabus]
149 LOCKYER V. ANDRADE
[Syllabus]
The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
149 SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
[Syllabus]
149 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES OFAMERICA V. WHITING
[Syllabus]
149 RENICO V. LETT
[Syllabus]
149 GONZALEZ V. CROSBY
[Syllabus]
149 BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
[Syllabus]
149 COKER V. GEORGIA
[Concurrence]
149 UNITED STATES V. LOVETT
[Concurrence]
149 SCOTT V. SANDFORD
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
149 EDDINGS V. OKLAHOMA
[Concurrence]
149 REYNOLDS V. SIMS
[Dissent]
149 MARYLAND V. CRAIG
[Opinion]
149 SCHALL V. MARTIN
[Dissent]
149 WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
[Opinion]
149 EX PARTE QUIRIN
[Syllabus]
149 GEORGIA V. MCCOLLUM
[Opinion]
149 EX PARTE MILLIGAN
[Syllabus]
149 PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT
[Opinion]
149 PROPRIETORS OF CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE V. PROPRIETORS OF WARREN BRIDGE
[Dissent]
149 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE V. BUTTON
[Opinion]
149 WOODSON V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Concurrence]
149 FURMAN V. GEORGIA
[Syllabus]
149 PATTON V. UNITED STATES
[Opinion]
149 BRANZBURG V. HAYES
[Opinion]
149 DAWSON V. DELAWARE
[Syllabus]
149 ENMUND V. FLORIDA
[Concurrence]
149 PROPRIETORS OF CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE V. PROPRIETORS OF WARREN BRIDGE
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
149 MAXWELL V. DOW
[Dissent]
149 MUNN V. ILLINOIS
[Dissent]
149 OHIO V. ROBERTS
[Opinion]
149 CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA
[Concur in part, dissent in part]
149 THORNBURGH V. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
[Dissent]
1000 KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
859 RING V. ARIZONA
[Syllabus]
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
811 ROPER V. SIMMONS
[Syllabus]
709
[Syllabus]
671 FLORIDA V. NIXON
[Syllabus]
671
[Syllabus]
663 MILLER-EL V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
656 KANSAS V. MARSH
[Syllabus]
629 WALTON V. ARIZONA, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
[Syllabus]
629 MONGE V. CALIFORNIA, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
[Syllabus]
610 LOVING V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
[Syllabus]
598 SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.
589 UTTECHT V. BROWN
[Syllabus]
589 BAZE V. REES
[Syllabus]
562 SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA
[Syllabus]
Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.
550 HOPKINS V. REEVES, 524 U.S. 88 (1998)
[Syllabus]
527 WEEKS V. ANGELONE
[Syllabus]
1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"
527 ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
[Syllabus]
Executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
479 DECK V. MISSOURI
[Syllabus]
479
[Syllabus]
474
[Syllabus]
460 PENRY V. JOHNSON
[Syllabus]
The jury instructions at Penry's resentencing for capital murder did not comply with the Court's mandate in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302; the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with Penry did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
460 BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE, 522 U.S. 269 (1998)
[Syllabus]
456 MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL
[Syllabus]
The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
456
[Syllabus]
453
[Syllabus]
445 O'DELL V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 1969, 138 L.ED.2D 351 (1997).
[Syllabus]
445
[Syllabus]
445 HARRIS V. ALABAMA, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
[Syllabus]
441 BOBBY V. BIES
[Syllabus]
433 AYERS V. BELMONTES
[Syllabus]
433 CALDERON V. THOMPSON, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)
[Syllabus]
426 BANKS V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
426
[Syllabus]
426 BRADSHAW V. STUMPF
[Syllabus]
426 BROWN V. SANDERS
[Syllabus]
414 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
403 CULLEN V. PINHOLSTER
[Syllabus]
403
[Syllabus]
401 PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
384 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
382 BROWN V. PAYTON
[Syllabus]
372 SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
[Syllabus]
353 SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
[Syllabus]
340 ROMPILLA V. BEARD
[Syllabus]
330
[Syllabus]
330 WOODFORD V. GARCEAU
[Syllabus]
For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.
330 WOOD V. ALLEN
[Syllabus]
330 LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
[Syllabus]
311 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
311 DRETKE V. HALEY
[Syllabus]
Whether the "actual innocence" exception to the procedural default rule concerning federal habeas corpus claims should apply to noncapital sentencing errors?
311 SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN
[Syllabus]
1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?
299 GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
299 WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
[Syllabus]
2. Whether 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (e) (2), which prohibits a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing only ""if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State Court proceedings, ""governs petitioner's claims where throughout state proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied petitioner's discovery requests, denied all investigative and expert resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an evidentiary hearing."
299 TENNARD V. DRETKE
[Syllabus]
288 CALDERON V. ASHMUS, 523 U.S. 740 (1998)
[Syllabus]
274 MCKUNE V. LILE
[Syllabus]
The Tenth Circuit's judgment-that Kansas prison officials' threat to reduce respondent inmate's privilege status and transfer him to maximum security if he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program constituted compelled self-incrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment-is reversed, and the case is remanded.
274
[Syllabus]
259
[Syllabus]
259 MAGWOOD V. PATTERSON
[Syllabus]
257
[Syllabus]
257 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
257 BELL V. CONE
[Syllabus]
Respondent's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his sentencing hearing was governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of his claim neither was "contrary to" nor involved "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
257 SNYDER V. LOUISIANA
[Syllabus]
257 GRAY V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S. CT. 110, 137 L. ED. 2D 234 (1996)
[Syllabus]
238 LEWIS V. UNITED STATES, 523 U.S. 155 (1998)
[Syllabus]
228 JONES V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
215 RHINES V. WEBER
[Syllabus]
215 DUNCAN V. WALKER
[Syllabus]
A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.
215 LINDH V. MURPHY, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 2059, 138 L.ED.2D 481 (1997).
[Syllabus]
215
[Syllabus]
186 HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
[Syllabus]
186 CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
[Syllabus]
186 FELKER V. TURPIN, WARDEN, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996).
[Syllabus]
186 SMITH V. SPISAK
[Syllabus]
186 HOLLAND V. FLORIDA
[Syllabus]
186 MAYLE V. FELIX
[Syllabus]
186 STEWART V. MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)
[Syllabus]
186 CONE V. BELL
[Syllabus]
186 YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO
[Syllabus]
(1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.
144 RICE V. COLLINS
[Syllabus]
144 BRACY V. GRAMLEY, WARDEN, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).
[Syllabus]
144 PACE V. DIGUGLIELMO
[Syllabus]
144 EDWARDS V. CARPENTER
[Syllabus]
Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."
144 GONZALEZ V. CROSBY
[Syllabus]
144 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES OFAMERICA V. WHITING
[Syllabus]
144 BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
[Syllabus]
144 LOCKYER V. ANDRADE
[Syllabus]
The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
144 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES
[Syllabus]
144 CAREY V. SAFFOLD
[Syllabus]
As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.
144 TYLER V. CAIN
[Syllabus]
The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).
144 BERGHUIS V. SMITH
[Syllabus]
144 WALL V. KHOLI
[Syllabus]
144 SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
[Syllabus]
144 FRY V. PLILER
[Syllabus]
144 INS V. ST. CYR
[Syllabus]
Amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made to the Immigration and Nationality Act did not affect the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law; nor did they affect the availability of discretionary relief from deportation for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements before the amendments' effective dates.
144 J. D. B. V. NORTH CAROLINA
[Syllabus]
144 PLILER V. FORD
[Syllabus]
(1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?
144
[Syllabus]
144 SLACK V. MCDANIEL
[Syllabus]
If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?
144 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. V. GARAMENDI
[Syllabus]
California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) requires California insurers to provide extensive information regarding every insurance policy issued in Nazi dominated Europe between 1920 and 1945 by any insurer with which the California insurer now has a legal relationship. The district court enjoined enforcement of the Act on three constitutional grounds: interference with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, due process, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Over the objections of the U.S. government and affected foreign governments, and in direct conflict with Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the HVIRA in all respects. 1. Whether the HVIRA, which the U.S. government has called an actual interference with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 2. Whether the HVIRA, which attempts to regulate insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 3. Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015, insulates the HVIRA form review under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
144 EVANS V. CHAVIS
[Syllabus]
144 HOHN V. UNITED STATES, 524 U.S. 236 (1998)
[Syllabus]
144 HARRINGTON V. RICHTER
[Syllabus]
144 PHILIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS
[Syllabus]
144 ARTUZ V. BENNETT
[Syllabus]
Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"
144 JIMENEZ V. QUARTERMAN
[Syllabus]
144 MARTIN V. HADIX
[Syllabus]
144 RENICO V. LETT
[Syllabus]
144 WOODFORD V. NGO
[Syllabus]