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Your query death penalty capital punishment returned 21 results.

	RING V. ARIZONA [Syllabus] Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
	ROPER V. SIMMONS [Syllabus]
	BAZE V. REES [Syllabus]
	MORGAN V. ILLINOIS, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). [Syllabus]
	MILLER-EL V. DRETKE [Syllabus]
	UTTECHT V. BROWN [Syllabus]
	LOVING V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). [Syllabus]
	ATKINS V. VIRGINIA [Syllabus] Executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
	HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) [Syllabus]
	PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN [Syllabus]
	BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) [Syllabus]
	PAYNE V. TENNESSEE, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) [Syllabus]
	BANKS V. DRETKE [Syllabus] In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
	MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL [Syllabus] The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
	ARAVE V. CREECH, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). [Syllabus]
	JONES V. UNITED STATES [Syllabus]
	ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN [Syllabus]
	SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) [Syllabus]
	WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR [Syllabus] 1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
	LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) [Syllabus]
	TENNARD V. DRETKE [Syllabus]