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CROSBY V. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL [Syllabus] 1. Whether economic sanctions against Burma enacted by Congress in 1996-- three months after enactment of the Massachusetts Burma Law-- implicitly permit, or preempt, state and local selective purchasing laws regarding Burma. 2. Whether selective purchasing law such as the Massachusetts Burma Law represent ""market participation,"" not regulation, and are therefore exempt from claims based on the Foreign Commerce Clause and the foreign affairs power of the federal government. 3. Whether selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally interfere with the power of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs. 4. Whether selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Law discriminate against foreign commerce in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause." |
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AUCIELLO IRON WORKS, INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BD., 517 U.S. 781 (1996) [Syllabus] |
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE V. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. [Opinion] |
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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS V. FINLEY [Dissent] |
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HUDGENS V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD [Opinion] |
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE V. BUTTON [Opinion] |
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BARNHART V. THOMAS [Syllabus] Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act define disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that a claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(B). Under the Act, work which exists in the national economy means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions in the country. 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(B). The question presented is: Whether the Commissioner of Social Security may determine that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act because the claimant remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without considering whether that particular job exists in significant numbers in the national economy. |
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WATTERS V. WACHOVIA BANK, N. A. [Syllabus] |
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CROSBY V. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL [Syllabus] 1. Whether economic sanctions against Burma enacted by Congress in 1996-- three months after enactment of the Massachusetts Burma Law-- implicitly permit, or preempt, state and local selective purchasing laws regarding Burma. 2. Whether selective purchasing law such as the Massachusetts Burma Law represent ""market participation,"" not regulation, and are therefore exempt from claims based on the Foreign Commerce Clause and the foreign affairs power of the federal government. 3. Whether selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally interfere with the power of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs. 4. Whether selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Law discriminate against foreign commerce in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause." |
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AUCIELLO IRON WORKS, INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BD., 517 U.S. 781 (1996) [Syllabus] |
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BENEFICIAL NAT. BANK V. ANDERSON [Syllabus] This Court has long held that section 30 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86, creates an exclusive federal cause of action and an exclusive federal remedy for usury claims by borrowers against national banks, preempting state law under the doctrine of ordinary preemption. Borrowers filed this case against a national bank in state court, claiming violation of state usury law, and the national bank removed the case to federal district court, where a motion to remand was denied. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and explicitly disagreed with decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holding that section 30 completely preempts state usury claims against national banks and thus permits removal of cases asserting state usury laws against them. The question presented is: |
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EASTERN ENTERPRISES V. APFEL, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) [Syllabus] |
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MARQUEZ V. SCREEN ACTORS [Syllabus] |
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STRATE V. A-1 CONTRACTORS, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). [Syllabus] |
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ALASKA V. UNITED STATES [Syllabus] |
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KIRCHER V. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST [Syllabus] |
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CHRISTOPHER V. HARBURY [Syllabus] Respondent did not state an actionable claim when she alleged that she was denied access to courts by Government officials, who intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been tortured and killed by the Guatemalan army. |
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TILL V. SCS CREDIT CORP. [Syllabus] |
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CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC V. BILLING [Syllabus] |
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BOGGS V. BOGGS, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). [Syllabus] |
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HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD [Syllabus] |
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POSTAL SERVICE V. FLAMINGO INDUSTRIES (USA) LTD. [Syllabus] The federal antitrust laws apply to a person, which is defined to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of * * * the United States. 15 U.S.C.7 (sherman Act), 12 (a) (Clayton Act). The question presented is whether the United States Postal Service is a person amenable to suit under the antitrust laws. |
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GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER [Syllabus] 1. Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C> 2000d), or 42 U.S.C. 1981? 2. Should an appellate court required to apply strict scrutiny to governmental race-based preferences review de novo the district court's findings because the fact issues are constitutional? |
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CLINTON V. JONES, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) [Syllabus] |
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EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES, LTD. V. TSUI YUAN TSENG [Syllabus] |
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BLESSING V. FREESTONE, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) [Syllabus] |
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NEBRASKA DEP'T OF REVENUE V. LOEWENSTEIN, 115 S. CT. 557, 130 L. ED. 2D (1994) [Syllabus] |
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RAYMOND B. YATES, M.D., P.C. PROFIT SHARINGPLAN V. HENDON [Syllabus] Whether the working owner of a business (here, the sole shareholder of a corporate employer) is precluded from being a "participant" under Section 3(7) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1002(7), in an ERISA plan? |