SHAFER v. SOUTH CAROLINA


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.


TOP

Dissent

WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr ., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina


[March 20, 2001]

Justice Scalia , dissenting.

While I concede that today’s judgment is a logical extension of Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U. S. 154 (1994) , I am more attached to the logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.

As I pointed out in Simmons , that common-law tradition does not contain special jury-instruction requirements for capital cases. Today’s decision is the second page of the “whole new chapter” of our improvised “ ‘death-is-different’ jurisprudence” that Simmons began. Id. , at 185 ( Scalia, J. , dissenting). The third page (or the fourth or fifth) will be the (logical-enough) extension of this novel requirement to cases in which the jury did not inquire into the possibility of parole. Providing such information may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it. See App. B to Brief for Petitioner. The Constitution, however, does not. I would limit Simmons to its facts.