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	02-1277 -- KIDNEIGH V. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA -- 10/03/2003 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
	96-8119 -- BROWN V. ROYAL MACCABEES LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 03/03/1998 Is an illustration used to sell a universal life insurance policy considered part of the insurance contract when the illustration and the policy contain conflicting provisions and the insured party relied on the illustration in entering the insurance contract? We must also determine whether. Maccabees is estopped from asserting certain provisions of a universal life insurance policy. We ultimately conclude (1) an illustration is not considered part of an insurance contract under Wyoming law simply because the insured party relied on the illustration in entering the insurance contract and the policy and illustration contain conflicting provisions. (3) Maccabees is not estopped from enforcing the provisions of the insurance policy. The policy further provided
	OPINION/ORDER Was on brief.
	OPINION/ORDER Argue that the District Court should have remanded their claims to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Maintain that the District Court should have dismissed the claims entirely. As they depend on state law that is expressly preempted by ERISA § 514. The insurance providers argue that the District Court should have dismissed the claims because the state law decision on which they rely. Jurisdiction is proper in the District Court. The underlying claims are preempted by ERISA and must be dismissed. Benjamin Edmondson (the
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: These are appeals from judgments following two separate phases of a jury trial to adjudicate whether the coordinated terrorist attacks of September 11. The parties are entities with varying property interests in the WTC (the
	OPINION/ORDER The documents to be produced were created before the insureds purchased coverage. The insureds have appealed from that order. They have also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate and reverse the order. The six law firms and the accounting firm that have been subpoenaed to produce documents have moved to intervene and join in the insureds' requests for relief. We will grant the petitioners' request for relief and issue a writ of mandamus to the district court and direct it to vacate its order that these documents be produced. The Parties and the Nature of the Proceedings Rhône Poulenc Rorer Inc. is the successor to the Rorer Group Inc. One of Armour's products was Factorate. Armour was named in the first of a series of lawsuits filed by individuals who claimed Factorate had infected them with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Which is thought to be the cause of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). They allege they are insureds under a primary comprehensive general liability insurance policy provided by The Home Indemnity Company.
	OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On slip opinion page 9856. Judges Graber and Paez have voted to deny the Plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing en banc. The Plaintiffs' petitions for panel rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED. The Defendant's petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Which are various insurance companies and a trade association of insurance companies. The main question for decision is this: May California constitutionally require the disclosure of insurance claims related information by an insurance company that is licensed to do business in California even though the required information may be in the hands of a related entity that is located in a foreign country? Requires any insurer doing business in California that sold insurance policies to persons in Europe that were in effect between the years 1920 and 1945 (Holocaust era policies) to file certain information about those policies with the Commissioner.1 Cal. The reporting requirement also applies to insurance companies that do business in California and are
	OPINION/ORDER Romberger was found negligent in his care and treatment of Christina Beery. Christina Beery was diagnosed with a ventricular septal defect. MICA was continually updated on the Beery litigation. The first of these payments was made in July 1996 in the sum of $4.3 million. The second payment was made in June 1997 in the amount of $3.6 million. I. Both the viability of the bad faith claims and the correct computation of MICA's contribution depend upon whether the competing insurance carriers are primary. The inclusion of such a clause will not convert a primary policy into
	OPINION/ORDER Is withdrawn. Insurance companies are required to send adverse action notices to consumers whenever they increase the rates for insurance on the REYNOLDS v. 1681m(a).1 The principal question before us is straightforward: Does FCRA's adverse action notice requirement apply to the rate first charged in an initial policy of insurance? We hold that the answer is yes: The Act requires that an insurance company send the consumer an adverse action notice whenever a higher rate is charged because of credit information it obtains. Regardless of whether the rate is contained in an initial policy or an extension or renewal of a policy and regardless of whether the company has previously charged the consumer a lower rate. We hold that FCRA's adverse action notice requirement applies whenever a consumer would have received a lower rate for insurance had his credit information been more favorable. Regardless of whether his credit rating is above or below average. The requirement covers those whose credit information is disregarded and replaced for purposes of a rate computation by an average or neutral credit figure.
	OPINION/ORDER Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman	02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E	08 13 2003


In re: Will C. Cohen	03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM	07 08 2004


In re: Will C.
	BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021) Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the
	OPINION/ORDER As will be seen. We summarily will resolve the substantive issue before us which we find not to be difficult. Have sought indemnification from the approximately 50 appellees (
	OPINION/ORDER Low is substituted for his predecessor as Commissioner of Insurance for the State of California. Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs are three insurance companies and one trade organization of insurance companies who do business in California. To persons in Europe to file certain information about those policies with the Commissioner.1 Cal. 1 The information that the insurance companies must provide is: (1) the number of insurance policies. The reporting requirement also applies to insurance companies that do business in California and are
	OPINION/ORDER Our standard of review is plenary. 1113 (3d Cir. 1993). 3 several lawsuits against it by former employees.2 Plaintiffs are former Prudential sales agents who brought suit alleging that Prudential took adverse employment action against them in alleged retaliation for their refusal to participate in the company's insurance sales fraud. Arguing that Prudential could not invoke Form U 4 because it is not a party to that agreement. The district court held that Prudential could seek to enforce the arbitration agreement even though it is not a signatory to Form U 4. The court nevertheless held that the exception applied on the ground that plaintiffs' claims are
	OPINION/ORDER Jerome Wayne Johnson	03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM	07 12 2004


In re: Will C. Bowman	02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E	08 13 2003


In re: Will C. Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v.
	OPINION/ORDER The
	HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF GEORGIA V. EMPLOYERS HEALTH INS. CO. (2/2/2001, NO. 99-11241) Circuit Judge:
	OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: 1. Replace
	OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. claims and was dismissed from the case. Although Doe settled his claim and was dismissed from Roe's Br. at 1 n.2. This action was the case. Doe is no longer a party to this action. This case remains a We will therefore In 1989. United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 2 Insurance on property I [Roe] give as security is required. If insurance is required. I promise to keep the property insured throughout the term of my loan and to deliver a certificate of insurance to you that shows I have purchased insurance of this kind. ... I will immediately repay you for any amounts you spend in purchasing that insurance. In force during the term of the loan and will furnish Norwest . . . with a loss payable endorsement upon each renewal of said insurance. Which indicated that only Norwest's interest in the vehicle was insured. The same process was repeated. Which is otherwise similar to ordinary comprehensive and collision coverage. Is limited to either the damage to the collateral or the balance of the customer's loan.
	OPINION/ORDER Romberger was found negligent in his care and treatment of Christina Beery. Christina Beery was diagnosed with a ventricular septal defect. MICA was continually updated on the Beery litigation. The first of these payments was made in July 1996 in the sum of $4.3 million. The second payment was made in June 1997 in the amount of $3.6 million. I. Both the viability of the bad faith claims and the correct computation of MICA's contribution depend upon whether the competing insurance carriers are primary. The inclusion of such a clause will not convert a primary policy into
	OPINION/ORDER ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the
	OPINION/ORDER Low is substituted for his predecessor as Commissioner of Insurance for the State of California. Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs are three insurance companies and one trade organization of insurance companies who do business in California. To persons in Europe to file certain information about those policies with the Commissioner.1 Cal. 1 The information that the insurance companies must provide is: (1) the number of insurance policies. The reporting requirement also applies to insurance companies that do business in California and are
	FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO. V. TROPICAL SHIPPING (6/19/2001, NO. 99-14643) Arising out of the destruction of a mobile stage while it was being loaded for transport from the Port of Palm Beach to the island of St. Which the district court noted would have been approximately $64. If Tropical is correct. Tall Pony's recovery for property damage to the stage is limited to the $500 per package limitation provided under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).
	BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021) Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the
	FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO. V. TROPICAL SHIPPING (6/19/2001, NO. 99-14643) Arising out of the destruction of a mobile stage while it was being loaded for transport from the Port of Palm Beach to the island of St. Which the district court noted would have been approximately $64. If Tropical is correct. Tall Pony's recovery for property damage to the stage is limited to the $500 per package limitation provided under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).
	OPINION/ORDER Insurance companies are required to send adverse action notices to consumers whenever they increase the rates for insurance on the basis of information contained in consumer credit reports. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). 1681m(a).1 The principal quesSection 1681m(a) provides that any person who
	OPINION/ORDER Alvarez LLP were on brief. S were on brief. The suit was dismissed at the pleadings stage under Fed. Have agreed to and created a monopoly in the JUA as to all forms of low cost compulsory insurance and have boycotted and coerced at least one broker in order to maintain that monopoly. The private insurers and the JUA argue that this monopoly is a result required by the state law. That is untrue. The claims before us are a different matter: a federal antitrust suit raises different issues than issues of compliance with local statutes. It was estimated that only 25 percent to 30 percent of the vehicles in Puerto Rico were covered under some type of liability insurance.
	OPINION/ORDER Allstate Indemnity Company (
	OPINION/ORDER Is withdrawn. Insurance companies are required to send adverse action notices to consumers whenever they increase the rates for insurance on the basis of information contained in consumer credit reports. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). 1681m(a).1 The principal question before us is straightforward: Does FCRA's adverse action notice requirement apply to the rate first charged in an initial policy of insurance? We hold that the answer is yes: The Act requires that an insurance company send the consumer an adverse action notice whenever a higher rate is charged because of credit information it obtains. Regardless of whether the rate is contained in an initial policy or an extension or renewal of a policy and regardless of whether the company has previously charged the consumer a lower rate. We hold that FCRA's adverse action notice requirement applies whenever a consumer would have received a lower rate for insurance had his credit information been more favorable. Regardless of whether his credit rating is above or below average.
	OPINION/ORDER Sanders & Smith was on brief for appellant. Raulerson & Middleton were on brief for appellee. The issue before us is whether Employers' insurance contract required it to reimburse Stratford for them. Employers was contractually bound to pay the fees and costs only if Stratford had no
	OPINION/ORDER The District Court held that unless asbestos in a building was of such quantity and condition as to make the structure unusable. The expense of correcting the situation was not within the scope of a first party insurance policy covering
	FULLER V. GREAT OAKS MANAGEMENT Appellant is the trustee of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
	OPINION/ORDER Which are various insurance companies and a trade association of insurance companies. The main question for decision is this: May California constitutionally require the disclosure of insurance claims related information by an insurance company that is licensed to do business in California even though the required information may be in the hands of a related entity that is located in a foreign country? Requires any insurer doing business in California that sold insurance policies to persons in Europe that were in effect between the years 1920 and 1945 (Holocaust era policies) to file certain information about those policies with the Commissioner.1 Cal. The reporting requirement also applies to insurance companies that do business in California and are
	OPINION/ORDER We hold that the policy is ambiguous and reverse and remand for further proceedings. One is a commercial general liability policy issued by ACE American Insurance Company (ACE). The other policy is a commercial umbrella policy with Great American.
	HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF GEORGIA V. EMPLOYERS HEALTH INS. CO. (2/2/2001, NO. 99-11241) Circuit Judge:
	OPINION/ORDER End page heading. >
	OPINION/ORDER This appeal primarily presents an issue that divides sister Courts of Appeals and is of first impression in our court namely. Dismissed the remaining defamation action on the ground that the alleged defamatory statements were not sufficiently directed toward the plaintiff so that a jury could reasonably conclude that they referred to him. Our standard of reviewing the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary. Shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. Are to leave regulation and taxation of the insurance business to the states and to ensure that
	OPINION/ORDER The principal issue on appeal is whether a self funded employee benefit plan which purchases stop loss insurance from a third party insurance provider is subject to Pennsylvania laws governing the enforcement of anti subrogation clauses in insurance contracts. W e join our sister circuits in holding a self funded employee benefit plan with stop loss insurance is not deemed an insurance provider under the Employee Retirement Income Security 2 Act. The plan is not subject to state laws regulating insurance contracts. Is a welfare benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Plan is designed. The Cover ed Person may incur medical or other charges due to Injuries for which benefits are paid by the Plan. The Covered Person may have a claim against that other person or third party for payment of the medical or other charges. The Plan will be subr ogated to all rights the Covered Person may have against that other person or third party and will be entitled to reimbursement. 1.
	OPINION/ORDER Over 1500 personal injury and property damage claims were filed against the vessel interests. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Claiming that the fund is inequitable. The Attorneys assert that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Which allows appeals of
	OPINION/ORDER An Order was entered on behalf of this panel denying Northbrook's petition for rehearing. Northbrook's first contention is that the panel opinion ignored
	OPINION/ORDER 2005 and appearing at 421 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005) is hereby amended as follows: 1) 421 F.3d at 852. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehaInsurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. The facts giving rise to the original settlement between Bazyler and Hawthorne are undisputed and were stipulated at trial. 4 HAWTHORNE SAVINGS v. Hawthorne was insured by a
	OPINION/ORDER Insurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehabilitation proceedings began. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. Hawthorne was insured by a
	OPINION/ORDER A jury found Chemical Leaman was entitled to partial coverage under several policies. Therefore we conclude the district court's jury instructions were proper. We will affirm the district court's holdings on the pollution exclusion clause. We also conclude that the exclusion of certain evidence was within the sound discretion of the district court. The ponds were intended to purify rinsewater by filtering out contaminants as the water seeped into the soil. An Inspector with the New Jersey Division of Fish Game & Wildlife informed Chemical Leaman that its water treatment system was
	OPINION/ORDER Who was killed during a work accident on Payless's premises. Finding that Payless was not insured under AE's policy and that CU's policy provided only excess insurance after United States Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Company's (USF&G) primary coverage was exhausted. Hincher worked for KamCo and was performing re merchandising work in Payless's Newport store when a display fell. Asserting that KamCo was liable under the Payless KamCo re merchandising contract to defend and indemnify Payless for any liability related to the accident. The terms of which were contained in an unsigned Supplementary Terms and Conditions Agreement (Supplementary Agreement). The appellants do not appeal the district court's ruling that Payless was not insured under AE's policy. 2 1 in which they agreed to allow the district court to determine whether their agreement included the Supplementary Agreement. The court ultimately found that the Supplementary Agreement was part of the contract between Payless and KamCo. The parties also agreed that KamCo was obligated to indemnify Payless under the indemnity agreement only for fault attributable to KamCo.
	OPINION/ORDER Three issues are presented for decision following the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the excess insurer. Did the District Court err in holding that New York law governs this dispute as the state in which the insurance 3 contract was issued and delivered. We conclude that although Pennsylvania's choice of law rules have abandoned the lex loci doctrine. Was unloading bags at the Pittsburgh International Airport. He was severely injured and is now a quadriplegic requiring constant round the clock care. Which was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dyson KissnerMoran Corporation (
	OPINION/ORDER The Arkansas General Assembly's goal in passing the PPA was to ensure
	OPINION/ORDER A viatical contract is an agreement to purchase life insurance benefits from a viator. A policyholder who is terminally ill or of advanced age. The insurers have not named these individuals or their estates as additional 3 defendants in this suit. Nor have they joined the investors who ultimately purchased interests in these separate viaticals as parties. Is that they all contain
	BARNETT BANK V. GALLAGHER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Barnett Bank v. The Florida Associations of Insurance Agents allege that the district court erred in finding that Appellant Barnett Marion was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="959"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan95/93-3508.html">BARNETT BANK V. GALLAGHER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Barnett Bank v. The Florida Associations of Insurance Agents allege that the district court erred in finding that Appellant Barnett Marion was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="957"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1964.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Wheeler & Dittmar were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. The question in this appeal is CYR. The RIIIFA requires all insurers licensed in Rhode Island to make pro rata monetary contributions to the Fund to meet certain types of insurance claims lodged against licensed Rhode Island insurers which have become insolvent. The Fund is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="955"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1997/97a1750p.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court also held the insurance <p>carrier did not have a perfected security interest in its <p>former agent's post bankruptcy renewal commissions. We will affirm. <br wp= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="952"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033101p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are satisfied that. Is entitled to recover both the collateral (an aircraft engine) and the proceeds. This conclusion is also supported: (1) by the language of the controlling agreements between Tower and FINOVA. We will therefore affirm the order of the District Court. The agreements specified that insurance proceeds of the engines were part of FINOVA's collateral.1 Tower also covenanted to maintain insurance on the aircraft. The engine at issue in this appeal was severely damaged in an in flight accident. The cross collateralization was created in page 2 of the Aircraft Mortgage. As 49 U.S.C. § 44107 is such a statute. Its UCC filings in New York were unnecessary. 503.26 was directly attributable to the accident. Was appointed Chapter 7 trustee. The engine was returned to FINOVA. Some of FINOVA's other collateral was apparently destroyed or impaired by Tower. There is no dispute that the engine was returned in fully repaired condition. FINOVA contends that the total value of all returned collateral was some $36 million. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="948"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar97/95-5398.man.html">BROOKS V. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Brooks v. Senior Circuit Judges.<p> <p> PER CURIAM:<p> <p> The district court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants is AFFIRMED based upon the holding and rationale contained in Part III.A of the district court's September 22. A copy of which is attached as Appendix A hereto. We have no occasion to reach the remaining issues addressed in other parts of that order and imply no view concerning any of them.<p> AFFIRMED.<p> ATTACHMENT<p> <p> APPENDIX A<p> <p> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. It is hereby<p> ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:<p> 1. Defendant Blue Cross's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (DE # 31) is GRANTED. Defendant New York Life's motion for instructions and an Order directed to Plaintiff's counsel (DE # 46) is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant New York Life's combined motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment (DE # 47) is GRANTED. Defendant New York Life's corrected motion for more definite statement and for RICO case statement (DE # 56) is DENIED AS MOOT. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="948"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar97/95-5398.man.html">BROOKS V. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Brooks v. Senior Circuit Judges.<p> <p> PER CURIAM:<p> <p> The district court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants is AFFIRMED based upon the holding and rationale contained in Part III.A of the district court's September 22. A copy of which is attached as Appendix A hereto. We have no occasion to reach the remaining issues addressed in other parts of that order and imply no view concerning any of them.<p> AFFIRMED.<p> ATTACHMENT<p> <p> APPENDIX A<p> <p> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. It is hereby<p> ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:<p> 1. Defendant Blue Cross's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (DE # 31) is GRANTED. Defendant New York Life's motion for instructions and an Order directed to Plaintiff's counsel (DE # 46) is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant New York Life's combined motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment (DE # 47) is GRANTED. Defendant New York Life's corrected motion for more definite statement and for RICO case statement (DE # 56) is DENIED AS MOOT. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="948"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/08/96-4063.htm">96-4063 -- DAVISTER CORPORATION V. UNITED REPUBLIC LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 08/28/1998<BR></A><BR> We therefore affirm its judgment. <p> The facts of this matter are relatively simple. United was to obtain certain real property interests in Waco. That were the principal assets of RGA. The Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department notified United this and other similar transactions were improper and must cease. The Commissioner advised United the transaction involving the stock of RGA </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="946"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jun2000/995117.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> CNIS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Commerce Bancorp. We will reverse.1 I. By the time this litigation was commenced. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and review the District Court's factual findings for clear error. We are left with a definite and firm conviction that mistake has been committed. Neither CIA nor CBI were aware that anyone believed that the companies were business affiliates of each other. The application was granted. The District Court first determined that CBI's rights in the Commerce mark were senior to those of CIA. The Court found that CIA's use of the Commerce mark in 1983 was likely to create confusion. Because reasonable consumers dealing with CIA </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="946"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200303/01-5449a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="946"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022389.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> ORDER Intervenors Appellants have filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The appellants' petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was submitted to this Court. 2 As the panel considered the petition for rehearing and is of the opinion that it should be denied. IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is denied. It is ORDERED that footnote 3 on page 25 of the printed slip opinion is amended to read as follows: The intervenors have urged us to refer to the Maryland Court of Appeals the questions of Maryland law involved in this case. The arguments of each to the district court were the opposite. The intervenors appeal from the district court's decision adopting what is called the pro rata rule of Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Holding that the intervenors' claims are subject to an aggregate limit by reason of the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="946"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/06/011898P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a dispute between several insurers and an insured. WalMart and National Union argued that they were protected from liability by an indemnity clause in the vendor agreement between Wal Mart and its supplier. That Wal Mart's insurance with National Union was underlying insurance under RLI's policy and must be exhausted before RLI is obligated as an excess insurer. They argue that the result of the decision is to make a covered insured (Wal Mart) liable to its own insurer (RLI). They also assert that the District Court's decision will result in unnecessary and circular litigation. Wherein RLI will ultimately still be held liable for the entire settlement because of Cheyenne's promise to indemnify Wal Mart. Cheyenne was also required to demonstrate proof of at least $2 million of liability insurance. Cheyenne was covered by two insurance companies. Paul was its primary insurer. RLI was an excess insurer beyond the St. Wal Mart was a covered insured under both the St. Allegedly was defective. This </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054708p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were both </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/05/97-6226.htm">97-6226 -- DEBOARD V. SUNSHINE MINING AND REFINING CO. -- 05/02/2000<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc0MDhfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7408_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: We are presented with a simple set of facts on this appeal. A shipper's goods were damaged in transit. While the facts are simple. The statutory and regulatory context in which this case arises is complex and presents a question that is one of first impression in this and other circuits. That question is whether 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(3) (2000) (amended 2005). We are faced on this appeal with a situation where two parallel channels leading to the harbor were merged into one to provide a wider and more navigable trench through 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 which all ships may travel. The question we must answer is whether it was permissible for the Harbor Master to continue to impose this requirement. show. These groups included the We think it was. As the following discussion will Inland Marine Underwriters Association in support of the insurer. That the agency's discretion is entitled to deference. It is necessary to establish the legislative and regulatory framework in which this appeal must be decided. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1997/97a1750p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court also held the insurance carrier did not have a perfected security interest in its former agent's post bankruptcy renewal commissions. We will affirm. I. Professional Insurance Management ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9FB6609FB94D334B88256F40005E5E70/$file/0235881.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case. 15525 15526 ENLOW v. Is amended as follows: The second paragraph on slip op. 7621 that reads: We affirm the denial of his motion because we conclude that Yellow Cab presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it terminated Mr. Enlow failed to present prima facie evidence that Yellow Cab acted with a discriminatory motive or intent. is deleted. Enlow's employment was intended to be temporary or permanent. Whether Yellow Cab acted pursuant to a facially discriminatory employment practice to discharge employees over seventy years old. is deleted. Enlow's employment was permanently terminated solely to save costs. Stated that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="942"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/07/98-4120.htm">98-4120 -- JOHNSON V. LIFE INVESTORS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA -- 07/11/2000<BR></A><BR> Johnson was admitted to the hospital in the early morning hours of July 30. 1995 and was treated for his injuries. The district court instead concluded the companies were estopped from relying on the sickness exclusions to deny coverage because the companies failed to disclose the sickness exclusions in the manner required by Utah insurance regulations. Each argues the regulation is inapplicable to its policy. Life Investors concedes the disclosure regulation applies to accidental death policies but contends the regulation is inapplicable to its policy because Utah adopted the rule after AMEX issued the original policy to Mr. Both companies argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the Johnsons failed to show Mr. The Johnsons cross appeal the denial of their request for attorney fees. <ol> <li>APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT TO THE POLICIES</li> <br wp= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="940"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/04/97-6226.htm">97-6226 -- DEBOARD V. SUNSHINE MINING AND REFINING CO. -- 04/05/2000<BR></A><BR> Plaintiffs have filed two cross appeals challenging various aspects of the district court's judgment. Knox Van Hoy are former employees of Woods Petroleum Corporation (Woods). As part of the merger (which was described in the record as more akin to a hostile takeover). 1985. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="940"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1994/94a0806p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which is owned by Capital Health Systems. We hold that John Hancock is not responsible either for Capital Health's inaccurate representations made to its employees or for any additional recovery under John Hancock's clearly stated policy. We further hold that Capital Health is liable under the alternative theories of breach of fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel. I. The historical facts of this case are not in dispute. Up to the amount they were currently receiving. Curcio was not a member of this group.[fn2] One year later Capital Health wanted to extend to all employees the opportunity to purchase the same supplemental coverage from John Hancock as offered to the frozen group. The presentations clearly represented to the employees that this option was available </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="938"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1995/95a1223p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will. Two co defendants were indicted on one count of conspiracy and eight counts of mail and wire fraud on November 18. After one co defendant was acquitted. The remaining counts against him were dismissed at sentencing. Neadle was released pending appeal and filed his notice of appeal the next day. Neadle was chief executive officer of the company. The Insurance Division required an insurance company to have a minimum capital of $450. The certificates were encumbered. As Neadle was fully aware. AMPAC was unable to meet the resulting claims of its policyholders. Testified that he would not have certified a company to do business without the $700. The Insurance Division could have demanded that unencumbered assets be infused into the company or. Testified that the gross figure for Hurricane Hugo losses incurred on property insured by AMPAC was $37. Testified that the best estimate of non Hugo related claims on AMPAC was $500. The Insurance Division had discovered that AMPAC had no general ledger the basic accounting format in which debits and credits are captured so that AMPAC's assets and liabilities could not be determined. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="931"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/10/992942P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Stated it was for $5 million in flood coverage. Its main facility is located in the Chesterfield Valley area of St. Because the Chesterfield Valley facility was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="931"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-2639_031.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Are at the heart of this case. We will discuss the facts of each separately in the interest of clarity. Which were neither MBEs nor WBEs. One or more members of a minority group must have ownership of 51% of the company. One or more members of a minority group must have dayto day management and control. There was an additional limitation. An established business was one which. This restriction indicates that Chicago was not interested in subsidizing entrenched. Even if the businesses were owned by women or minorities. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="931"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/08/011206P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Popkin & Stern was a troubled law firm. The firm has since ceased doing business and sought bankruptcy protection. 2 The question presented in this case is whether. Is liable for a claim made against Popkin & Stern in October of 1991. Old Republic argues that it is not liable for this claim because Popkin & Stern dissolved an event which would have terminated the policy before the claim was made. Popkin & Stern did not dissolve until after the claim was made. We conclude that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="929"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200005/99-5158a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs were Robert B. Crotty were on the brief for amici curiae American Bankers Association and Association of Banks in Insurance. Sinder argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees. Filed suit in the district court claiming that this interpretation was incorrect as a matter of law. 12 U.S.C. s 24 (Seventh) confers the following powers upon national banks: [National banks shall have the power] [t]o exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking. The most pertinent phrase to this case is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="927"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/96-6254.htm">96-6254 -- VINING V. ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP INC. -- 07/06/1998<BR></A><BR> Failure to order a new trial because the jury verdict was the product of passion and prejudice. Arguing that in the event a new trial is ordered. Claiming that Milford had misrepresented material health history in his insurance application and that the Policy was issued in reliance upon this misrepresentation. Milford's visit was not precipitated by any symptoms or medical reasons. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I DO NOT PRESENTLY HAVE. NOR HAVE I EVER HAD. NOR HAVE I BEEN TOLD I HAVE. NOR HAVE I BEEN TREATED WITHIN THE PRECEDING 12 MONTHS FOR ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: ANY HEART DISEASE. Sullivan was his only medical visit in the twelve months preceding the Policy purchase date. Enterprise does not have a claims manual or any written guidelines specifying when a claim is payable or not. Cluck never paid a claim if she had any reason to doubt whether a person's medical history was inconsistent with the health disclaimer included on the insurance application. Cluck did not investigate whether Sidler was informed of Milford's medical history. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="925"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200310799.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal under Rule 23(f). We have determined that we have no jurisdiction in this matter and shall dismiss the appeal. Is not subject to the 2 federal antitrust laws. Which is not the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="925"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052715p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2006) This case was argued before the panel of Judges Sloviter. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 1 * Richard L. That no coverage would be provided until the first premium was paid by Wise while he remained in good health. We are asked to determine whether the life insurance policy was in effect at the 2 time of Wise's death. Wise was able to obtain quotes from several insurance carriers. The application stated that Temporary Insurance was available to the applicant only if 1) the full first modal premium was submitted with the application and 2) the applicant had not had certain health problems and was not more than seventy years old.1 (Id. at A105. That his statements The health problems that preclude an applicant from being eligible for Temporary Insurance are any past incidence of a heart attack. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="925"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0152p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policies were altered over time as to the levels of deductibles for 1) assessed product related injury liability and 2) legal costs associated with litigation stemming from the covered productrelated injuries. The parties have had a long standing disagreement about how they should determine when a particular policy has been triggered by a claim involving a benefits of a double auditing system. It was in a position to act much earlier in order to prevent some of the inconvenience and cost associated with this legal controversy. Paul was liable for failing to adhere to the terms of its policies held by Lincoln Electric. Paul was liable pursuant to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="920"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/95opinions/95-7039a.html">LIB MTL INS CO V. SMITHY BRAEDON PROP<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="918"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2002/01-11376.opn.html">PATTON V. TRIAD GUAR. INS. (1/2/2002, NO. 01-11376)<BR></A><BR> Patton claimed that she was wrongfully required to obtain mortgage insurance from Triad as a result of the illegal kickback scheme between Premier and Triad. Because Patton was financing more than 80% of the home's value. Were never passed on to Triad's consumers. The district court determined that the claim was barred by § 1012 of the McCarran Ferguson Act. 694 (11th Cir. 1998). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="918"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2002/01-11376.opn.html">PATTON V. TRIAD GUAR. INS. (1/2/2002, NO. 01-11376)<BR></A><BR> Patton claimed that she was wrongfully required to obtain mortgage insurance from Triad as a result of the illegal kickback scheme between Premier and Triad. Because Patton was financing more than 80% of the home's value. Were never passed on to Triad's consumers. The district court determined that the claim was barred by § 1012 of the McCarran Ferguson Act. 694 (11th Cir. 1998). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="918"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041224pa.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Argue that the District Court should have remanded their claims to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Maintain that the District Court should have dismissed the claims entirely. As they depend on state law that is expressly preempted by ERISA § 514. The insurance providers argue that the 4 District Court should have dismissed the claims because the state law decision on which they rely. Jurisdiction is proper in the District Court. The underlying claims are preempted by ERISA and must be dismissed. Benjamin Edmondson (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="918"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1996/96a1312p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is such a case. It is a class action that seeks to settle the claims of between 250. 000 individuals who have been exposed to asbestos products against the twenty companies known as the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR).[fn2] Most notably. These </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="916"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055428p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We disagree and will reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts of the underlying RICO suit are straightforward. Weiss was employed by Tucker Anthony Sutro as an investment banker. He was insured by First Unum through a group insurance policy with Tucker Anthony Sutro. The policy provided long term disability benefits when the insured is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="916"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/061729np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case is a dispute between two insurers over who should pay the first tier of excess coverage for injuries sustained by a third party in a vehicle accident. Because we conclude that the District Court was correct in holding that Great Northern solely occupied the first tier of excess coverage. We will affirm. Casey White was injured in an automobile accident while a passenger in a 1996 Jeep Cherokee. The Eulers were New York residents. Was at the wheel when the accident occurred. The Eulers were insured under Continental's USP Deluxe Package. Ahearn was insured by Great Northern under a primary automobile insurance policy that provided 2 $500. The parties have stipulated that White's civil action had a value in excess of $250. Because Continental's Optional Excess Liability Coverage was umbrella coverage. 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="916"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0877p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appellee is Allegheny International. Allegheny Ludlum was an operating division of Allegheny International but between mid 1979 and late 1980 was its wholly owned subsidiary. Allegheny Ludlum was known as the Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation (Allegheny Ludlum Steel). LSC Corporation was merged into Allegheny Ludlum Steel. The reimbursement required by this section shall be made at the time any such tax benefit is determined by the filing of a tax return. See app. at 77.[fn2] Paragraph 12(e) provides that Allegheny International will reimburse LSC for any tax detriment suffered by LSC after the sale </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="916"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0085p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (2) the IRS's summons was overbroad in that it sought documents not relevant to the investigation of Johnson. Even if we were to affirm the district court's decision. A protective order should be imposed upon any proprietary materials that Monumental is required to provide to the IRS. These arrangements are often used to disguise tax avoidance schemes. Marien believed that the same types of life insurance products provided by Monumental to Johnson were involved in the case of Neonatology Associates. The Tax Court held that the contributions made by two professional medical corporations into an employee benefits program were disguised taxable dividends and not deductible expenses by the employer. 299 F.3d at 231 33. Employers are not generally prohibited from funding term life insurance policies for their employees and deducting the premiums paid as business expenses. In which the employees are generally the owners. Employers are disguising investments that accumulate cash value as deductible benefit plan expenses. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1997/97a1543p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Specifically whether the tort of malicious prosecution </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4DDA894E76AEE31588256B5D005DBC3B/$file/0071082.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A qualified life insurance company is entitled to special tax treatment under the Code. We have jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). I Best is a California company that writes life insurance contracts and cancellable accident and health insurance contracts. In California these companies are required to file reports of their anticipated liabilities and reserves with the Insurance Department on Annual Statement Forms promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/08/96-5200.htm">96-5200 -- BLANKE V. ALEXANDER -- 08/05/1998<BR></A><BR> Judgment was entered for them on September 26. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043408p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellants/Plaintiffs are physicians and their professional corporations who purchased life insurance through Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C713195D08108D4988256D740078A5A1/$file/0235080.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Stephanie Elliot was first diagnosed with cancer in 1995. Her breast cancer was found to be in complete remission. Elliot was placed on Tamoxifen1 therapy beginning in July Tamoxifen is an antiestrogen drug that has been shown to reduce the risk of recurrence of cancer and the risk of developing new cancers in 1 ELLIOT v. The Tamoxifen was not prescribed for the treatment of any active cancer or other disease. She was enrolled in Crowley's long term disability insurance policy with Fortis Benefits Insurance Company. This coverage was effective as of her first day of work. Which were defined as follows: A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/96-6254a.htm">96-6254A -- VINING V. ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. -- 07/22/1998<BR></A><BR> </strong> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1996/96a1312r.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The petition for rehearing is DENIED. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1996/96a1312r.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTIwNzYtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-2076-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (b) dismissing UBS's third party complaint seeking a declaration that the third party defendant insurance companies are required to defend and indemnify UBS in this action. The district court dismissed the complaint and the third party complaint on the ground that the claims are barred by provisions in various contracts among the parties. Plaintiffs contend that the provisions relied on by the district court either are without effect because of a contractual breach by UBS or are unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Third partydefendants TIG Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="912"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/06/041465P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND HMOP is a health maintenance organization ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="910"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/80D30AD0ABD8D5A7882572B5005A498F/$file/0535323.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court held that Kelly Ryan is not entitled to indemnity from Royal under the Marine Coverage Endorsement ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="910"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/04BD340382A7132288256F89005DDC55/$file/0315728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND PMI is a large financial institution that sells. This insurance covers a lender for losses incurred when a borrower defaults on the repayment of a mortgage loan and the collateral is not sufficient to make the lender whole. The Third Amended Class Complaint alleged that PMI was undercharging its lender clients for various insurance products and services in exchange for customer referrals on mortgage insurance. The Baynham complaint also alleged that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="910"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7F465228AE63142988256A8F005D18C3/$file/0035293.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: OVERVIEW We are presented with the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Removed this action to federal court on the ground that it was an instrumentality of a foreign state as defined by the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="910"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/689511FBD34948AF88256E5A00707BF8/$file/0035293.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: OVERVIEW We are presented with the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Removed this action to federal court on the ground that it was an instrumentality of a foreign state as defined by the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="910"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/96-6254b.htm">96-6254B -- VINING V. ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP INC. -- 07/22/1998<BR></A><BR> The error is located on page three of the opinion. Except we retain jurisdiction and do not now decide the issues raised on appeal pertaining to prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees. <p> A corrected copy of page three is attached for your convenience. <p> Very truly yours. </strong> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="905"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/08/002788P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue in this case is whether certain provisions of Missouri law are preempted by the Employee's Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Arguing that the Missouri provisions could not be enforced because they were preempted by ERISA. I. The Missouri legislation which led to this lawsuit was enacted in 1997. A maintenance prescription is one providing medication to treat a medical condition for a period of greater than 30 days. If any such contract is rejected by any pharmacy provider. 3 unless such limit is applied uniformly to all pharmacy providers in the health maintenance organization's network. Are preempted by ERISA. After discovery was complete. That the existence of ERISA plans is not essential to their operation. It also concluded that the statutes were saved from ERISA preemption because they regulate HMOs which are in the business of insurance. They say that the statutes are within the scope of ERISA preemption because they relate to employee benefit plans since they directly regulate health benefit plans and impact plan structure. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="905"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1565.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom <U>Ricardo Ortiz Colon</U> was on brief. The costs of that insurance are far from negligible. He stated that he believes in a free market economy and is opposed to government sponsored social programs. Especially for those who are not indigent. The mandatory life insurance provision is contrary to his political philosophy. He objects to this non incidental expenditure on ideological grounds.</P> <P> The Colegio moved for summary judgment on three grounds: the first two were that the statute of limitations had run and that Romero had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. That there was simply no constitutional issue. The Colegio offered no argument or evidence that mandatory life insurance is germane to the Colegio's purposes. Other than saying that it is a member benefit. We vacate the decision of the district court and remand with instructions.</P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="903"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr2001/99-15405.man.html">BUCE V. ALLIANZ LIFE INS. CO. (4/10/2001, NO. 99-15405)<BR></A><BR> The denial of benefits was overturned and the plaintiff the widow of the decedent was awarded $150. The insurance carrier also argues that the proper standard of District Court review of the denial of benefits was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="903"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr2001/99-15405.man.html">BUCE V. ALLIANZ LIFE INS. CO. (4/10/2001, NO. 99-15405)<BR></A><BR> The denial of benefits was overturned and the plaintiff the widow of the decedent was awarded $150. The insurance carrier also argues that the proper standard of District Court review of the denial of benefits was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="903"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/April1995/95a1014p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a dispute between an excess insurer and a reinsurer over who should pay for defense litigation costs arising out of asbestos injury claims against the underlying insured. [fn1] an arbitrator ruled that North River Insurance Company was obligated to pay defense costs. That a reinsurance certificate's indemnity limit caps the amount a reinsurer is obligated to pay under the policy. Holding defense costs were not covered under the reinsurance certificates and North River violated its duty of good faith. We believe the coverage of defense costs was reasonably within the terms of the North River Owens Corning insurance policies as reinsured. We will reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to CIGNA Re and reverse the denial of summary judgment to North River on all points except the question of bad faith relating to North River's failure to schedule and its rejection of the settlement proposal. Some background is useful. Primary insurance policies describe what kinds of liability will be covered and specify dollar limits. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="903"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/03/02-2050.htm">02-2050 -- SLOAN V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY -- 03/04/2004<BR></A><BR> Reverse the judgment insofar as damages and remand for a new trial on compensatory and punitive damages. <p> <center><u>Background</u></center> <p> The insured and his family were traveling eastbound on I 40 near Grants. Shelton was seriously injured. The claims of the insured's two children were settled (for $35. Shelton were tried to a jury. 000 of coverage was available to compensate Mrs. That policy form is shown as # 9805.<u>3</u> and is different from what the insurer now relies upon. The <u>Haney</u> court concluded that the per accident limits were not subject to the per person limits. Was actually issued. Whether the change was the correction of an inadvertent error or an attempt to prevent the insured from exercising his contractual rights was the subject of the federal court trial. It is clear. That the insurer was well aware of the potential for an excess judgment against its insured. <p> On appeal. Because (2) the evidence supported compensatory damages and (3) there was sufficient evidence for punitive damages. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-9.gif" ALT="903"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1909.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Capone</U> were on brief. Associates</U> was on brief. E) was sued for malpractice.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="899"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1639.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It alleged that a shipment of cigars entrusted 2 Nos. 02 1639 and 02 1741 to Yellow Freight was damaged in transit. That none of the excepted causes under the Carmack Amendment were proven by Yellow Freight. That the damaged cartons were part of the shipment at issue in the case. National Insurance crossappeals the district court's determinations that the date of subrogation rather than the date of delivery of the damaged goods is the date of accrual for prejudgment interest and that prejudgment interest would be simple rather than compound. He noted that some of the cardboard box tops were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="899"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981558.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was enacted as an exception to a FIRREA moratorium prohibiting certain </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="899"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1997/97a1663p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Moessner was substituted as appellant after 3 VE filed a bankruptcy petition and assigned to Moessner its rights in the coverage litigation in exchange for his releasing VE from liability and dismissing his products liability lawsuit. We find no merit in Moessner's contentions that: (1) the policy was ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted in his favor. (2) the TPE was rendered invalid by Reliance's failure to obtain approval by the Insurance Commissioner. (3) Reliance is precluded from relying on the TPE by the doctrines of unilateral mistake or illusory coverage. The most important and difficult issues on appeal are: (1) whether VE's status as a sophisticated insured renders the doctrine of the parties' reasonable expectations inapplicable. (2) whether VE had a reasonable expectation of coverage under the renewal policy because its original policy would have covered Moessner's claim. VE was never told that the TPE was being included in the renewal policy. We will reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Reliance and remand for further proceedings. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="897"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1877.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> UNUM Corporation and UNUM Life Insurance Company of America were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Whether the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="897"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1995/94a0934p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are presented with disputes over coverage under two contracts. The primary issue is whether the indemnification agreement sufficiently waived the immunity granted employers under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. Holding the contractor was entitled to conditional indemnification but its general partner was not. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Which as Chen's employer was immune from suit under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.[fn2] After Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern tendered their defense to CNA Insurance. Alleging it was obligated to defend and indemnify them. The district court had jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).[fn3] We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Our review is plenary. Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Injuries or death or other claims or suits are caused by the sole negligence of a party indemnified hereunder unless otherwise provided in the Prime Contract. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="897"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0049p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Chapter 21 of the Michigan Insurance Code would only create a private cause of action if the remedies that Chapter 21 provided were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="897"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/99-5022.htm">99-5022 -- AIR LIQUIDE AMERICA CORP. V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. -- 06/19/2000<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="893"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-3105.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Seeking damages and declaratory relief for the Insurers' alleged breach of insurance policies under which THAN is insured. I. BACKGROUND THAN is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware with <hr> its principal place of business in Lenexa. Kansas.(1) THAN is a subsidiary of Philips Electronics North America Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="893"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0BE4E7A7BFEA490488256EAF0053EE8F/$file/0235881.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case. 7617 7620 ENLOW v. Enlow contends that he was entitled to summary judgment because he presented direct evidence that Yellow Cab permanently discharged him solely because of his age. Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment to raise a genuine issue of material fact requiring that the parties have their day in court to determine which party should prevail. It is undisputed that Yellow Cab purchased the insurance policy from Meadowbrook Insurance Group because the cost of its new product. Was more than $10. Yellow Cab's liability coverage under the Star Insurance policy was scheduled to take effect on June 25. The same date that its Reliance Insurance policy was due to expire. Was scheduled to begin making monthly payments on that policy on July 1. Ch. 30.124 requires as follows: Whenever any . . . policy of insurance is required in connection with any license required by this title. Upon receiving information that such . . . insurance is. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="893"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972253.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which are located in high risk areas and have been partially vacant over the years. Portions of one property were vandalized in December 1994 and again in March 1995. Ruling that the properties were either vacant or lacked protective safeguards and that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="891"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1452.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judges.(2) The issues in this appeal are whether the district court erred in reforming an insurance policy and in dismissing various claims against The Hartford Insurance Group. The underlying lawsuit was based on an insurance coverage dispute arising from an accident in Denver. After the settlement was executed. Hartford claimed it was not obligated to provide any reimbursement despite its participation in the settlement agreement because its insurance policy did not cover the operations of Zone Cabs. Hartford insisted its insurance policy (1) This order is not binding precedent. This cause is submitted withoutoral argument. Plaintiffs appeal arguing that both reformation and summary judgment were improper. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Inc. was a licensed and registered Colorado motor vehicle carrier regulated by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Though both were owned by Cabs. Paratransit Risk Retention Group Insurance Company was a mutual insurance company owned and operated by taxicab fleet owners. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="891"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055017p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue presented in this appeal is whether the adverse action notice provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="891"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031320.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Texas proceeding was thereafter transferred to the Eastern District of Vir SEABULK OFFSHORE v. Seabulk sought a declaration that it was entitled to insurance coverage by American Home for a lawsuit then pending against it in Texas. Seabulk alleged that it was covered under an insurance policy issued by American Home. The district court ruled that Seabulk was not entitled to either insurance coverage or damages. Because the July Opinion was filed without the benefit of this decision. Was premature in that it sought review of an interlocutory decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (establishing that courts of appeals </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="891"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0019p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> WILL & EMERY. WILL & EMERY. The plaintiffs in these four consolidated appeals are retirees or surviving spouses of the J.I. The underlying issue is whether the retirement health care benefits vested for life. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that their health care benefits are fully vested for life. The defendants are El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Company and CNH America. Was established in 1842 and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco (now El Paso) in 1970. Included was all of the JI Case business (defined as the farm and construction equipment business of Tenneco) except for Tenneco's JI Case stock. Case Equipment was then spun off on July 1. Is now known as CNH America.2 In 1996. Tenneco merged with a subsidiary of El Paso Natural Gas Company and is now known as El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Company. At times the opinion will refer to CNH America by its previous names. Page 3 forward contain the following language in Section 4A with respect to the Group Insurance Plans: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0370p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a diversity action under Kentucky law in which the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs after a jury found that the defendant had reviewed the decedent's life insurance application in bad faith. Is sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that Southern Farm reviewed the decedent's application in bad faith. Although the plaintiffs are generally of the opinion that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. They raise two arguments on cross appeal: (1) that the district court should have applied Kentucky law. (2) that they were entitled to seek punitive damages. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. They dispute whether these facts are sufficient to show that the defendant acted in bad faith in reviewing the life insurance application submitted by the decedent. The application was for $200. Was given a conditional receipt. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0833n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sellers of a pool in which Plaintiff was injured. Defendants in the instant case are all insurance companies with whom the underlying tort defendants had policies or coverage. Defendant One Beacon Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0901p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/993064P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court denied the motion for class certification on the grounds that (1) the proposed class definition of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/09/032347P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policies are reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="886"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19954284.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Transco Syndicate's is GRANTED and California Union Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. I. The factual and procedural background of the motions for summary judgment filed in this matter are not in dispute. Three of the defendant insurance companies here have filed motions for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of law their insurance policies do not provide coverage for the cause of action in the underlying state case. California Union issued one policy that is at issue in this case. Transco Syndicate and California Union have filed separate motions for summary judgment asking this Court to find. Syndicate and California Plaintiff has responded that Transco Union are liable on the following independent grounds: (1) the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the comprehensive general liability insurance policies do not preclude coverage to the insureds for the environmental contamination that occurred in this case. The standard to be applied in reviewing summary judgment motions is stated unambiguously in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1995/95a1161p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal by defendant/third party plaintiff Commer cial Union Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001173.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. She was an additional insured under a policy issued to her employer by Medical Protective. If it is. The Medical Protective clause provided as follows: The insurance afforded by this policy is primary insurance. The National Union clause provided: This insurance is excess over other valid and collectable insurance except insurance written specifically to cover as excess over the limits of liability that apply in this policy. There are three basic types of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june96/95-4284.opa.html">CITY OF DELRAY BEACH V. AGRICULTURAL INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>City of Delray Beach v. Transco Syndicate's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and California Union Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.<p> I.<p> <p> The factual and procedural background of the motions for summary judgment filed in this matter are not in dispute. Three of the defendant insurance companies here have filed motions for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of law their insurance policies do not provide coverage for the cause of action in the underlying state case. California Union issued one policy that is at issue in this case. 1988.<p> Transco Syndicate and California Union have filed separate motions for summary judgment asking this Court to find. Plaintiff has responded that Transco Syndicate and California Union are liable on the following independent grounds: (1) the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the comprehensive general liability insurance policies do not preclude coverage to the insureds for the environmental contamination that occurred in this case. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/04/00-1528.htm">00-1528 -- WILSON V. AMERICAN INVESTMENT SERVICES INC. -- 04/05/2002<BR></A><BR> AIS notified Wilson and other similarly situated brokers that AIS was terminating the outside errors and omissions coverage. AIS and others.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june96/95-4284.opa.html">CITY OF DELRAY BEACH V. AGRICULTURAL INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>City of Delray Beach v. Transco Syndicate's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and California Union Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.<p> I.<p> <p> The factual and procedural background of the motions for summary judgment filed in this matter are not in dispute. Three of the defendant insurance companies here have filed motions for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of law their insurance policies do not provide coverage for the cause of action in the underlying state case. California Union issued one policy that is at issue in this case. 1988.<p> Transco Syndicate and California Union have filed separate motions for summary judgment asking this Court to find. Plaintiff has responded that Transco Syndicate and California Union are liable on the following independent grounds: (1) the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the comprehensive general liability insurance policies do not preclude coverage to the insureds for the environmental contamination that occurred in this case. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="884"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3F82B2240C03373088256C2B004F8426/$file/9917148.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is the subrogee/assignee of a Medicare supplemental insurance contract between National States Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0183n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Jeff Coppinger was the president of Cherokee Rental. Which was in the business of renting and leasing automobiles in several cities in Eastern Tennessee. BFM Leasing Company (BFM) was formed to carry out this plan. It was BFM's role to own the vehicles and Cherokee's role to recruit the customers. Residual value insurance guarantees that the leased vehicles will have the expected residual value when they are returned at the end of a lease period. Martin and Atkins became suspicious that Coppinger was not correctly performing his duties when the state of Tennessee failed to return some titles. Coppinger created fictitious title applications for vehicles he did not intend to purchase or for vehicles he did purchase but were titled to Cherokee and put to his own use. It is unclear when Coppinger began the scam. Plaintiffs submitted to the district court a private investigator's report showing that some of the leases were legitimate. Martin testified that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1492.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom Rossell Rentas & Rabell M ndez was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Which was assigned to the Commissioner simultaneously with its purchase. The district court held that the FDIC properly relied on the books and records of an insolvent institution in making its determination that the Commissioner was not entitled to deposit insurance. The sole issue before us is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment against the Commissioner in his action against the FDIC in its corporate capacity.1 For the reasons stated herein. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The facts of this case are undisputed. Girod was not a party to the assignment. Another document was executed on the same date. The Certificate was itself given to. Was due on April 26. Was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1994/94a0855p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The lawsuit was the result of years of friction between Blanche Road and Township regarding the development of certain parcels of land located in Township. Arguing that the new language added to the exclusion clause is inconsistent with the parties' reasonable expectations. The court imposed a $2000 sanction on Township after finding that it had failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry when it filed a motion to determine the Rule 59(e) motion in the district court while a petition for rehearing was pending on appeal. Township contends that the motion was reasonable under the circumstances because a premature appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to consider a pending Rule 59(e) motion. We will reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We will also reverse the order imposing a Rule 11 sanction against Township. Township apparently believed it was receiving essentially the same type of insurance policy it had always received from Insurers. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021885.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The defendant contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to set forth any objective evidence that the product was damaged under the terms of the insurance policy and that the plaintiff cannot maintain the breach of contract claim because it failed to adhere to a two year period of limitation set forth in the insurance policy. (Edwards) is a wholesale seller of Virginia ham. (4) certification from the FDA that the meat is contaminated and cannot be sold. While Edwards was waiting for the results of the tests from Microbac. Samples of the repackaged product were also sent to Microbac Edwards & Sons notified its insurance agent of the ammonia incident on October 7. It is not clear from the record whether this would be regulated by the FDA or the USDA. The plaintiff stated in its brief that the USDA is the agency that regulates meat products. The plaintiff was informed that. The meat packer had the responsibility for assuring that the product was safe for human consumption and the USDA remained neutral until the product had been released into commerce. 1 4 EDWARDS & SONS v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1996/96a1247p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1995/95a1176p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Although numerous issues are raised on appeal. The primary issue is the appropriate test to determine if Chemical Leaman </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042564np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. I. Mason Cook was employed as a driver for Atlantic Express Transportation Group. Atlantic Express was insured under a policy of a multi state commercial automobile insurance. 000 for Pennsylvania </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011102.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Seeking primarily reimbursement of monies paid to Prudential pursuant to a subrogation term in its policy that was issued as an employee benefit plan. Singh's complaint alleged that the subrogation term was illegal under the provisions of the Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/11/02-6167.htm">02-6167 -- RGS CONTRACTORS INC. V. GC BUILDERS INC. -- 11/04/2003<BR></A><BR> Appellant contractor maintained a builder's risk insurance policy through Kemper Insurance which premium was reimbursed by GC. Appellant is the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EAFC4B2B87D0DDE2882572AE0057DF1A/$file/0535080.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: 1. Insert </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/991854.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the district court's order dismissing the complaint on the ground that appellants have not alleged an injury to business or property cognizable under RICO. Appellants instituted this purported class action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class 4 consisting </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2001/001974.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That there were genuine issues of material fact as to the type of equitable relief that should be awarded as a result of that breach. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The premiums for this supplemental insurance were the same without regard to the employee's age and were deducted from the employee's paycheck. The premiums for this supplemental coverage were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="873"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200212409.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the entry of a default was an abuse of discretion. Extra contractual damages that are not available under ERISA. The plaintiffs are unable to establish liability under ERISA because Mass Mutual simply is not a fiduciary for any purpose related to the misconduct they allege.1 Indeed. We do not address Mass Mutual's additional arguments. 2 1 that this was never really an ERISA case at all. That it never should have been litigated in federal court. That the plaintiffs' motion to remand should have been granted at the outset. Our statement of the case is. Cotton and Eickhoff were executive officers of BEI Holdings. The other former co defendants in this case were not its legal agents. Rather were simply independent agents authorized to sell Mass Mutual products. We assume that they were in fact Mass Mutual agents. 3 2 on a permanent whole life insurance policy issued on the employee. The cash value of each whole life policy would continue to grow until it would cover the annual premium payments that is. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="873"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ACAFBA8856D2747088256DA2005B0CCE/$file/0256038o.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case is withdrawn from submission until further order of this court and all further proceedings in this court are stayed pending final action by the California Supreme Court. There are no controlling precedents resolving these important questions. The answers will in all probability determine the outcome of the present appeal. Our phrasing of the questions below is not meant to restrict the California Supreme Court's consideration of the issues involved. Is deemed the petitioner in this request because California appeals from the district court's adverse rulings on the specified issues. The caption of the case is: STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. The names and addresses of counsel are: For the State of California: Jan Zabriskie. II QUESTIONS OF LAW The questions of law we wish to be answered are: A. Concerning the assets of an insolvent insurance company for which the Insurance Commissioner is acting as conservator or liquidator. III STATEMENT OF FACTS As this case was dismissed on the pleadings for failure to state a claim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug97/95-9602.opa.html">WESTCHESTER SPECIALTY INS. SERV. V. U.S. FIRE INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Westchester Specialty Ins. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This diversity case is governed by Georgia law<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1429.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. This case is the sequel to United States v. Woodward claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any of the four counts. Woodward was first elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1977. He was assigned to the Joint Committee on Insurance ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct2000/97-8838.ma3.html">CHAPMAN V. AI TRANSP. (10/2/2000, NO. 97-8838)<BR></A><BR> Chapman's ADA claims were tried before a jury. Those issues have to do with an employer's ability to select its own criteria for making employment decisions and with the permissibility of using subjective criteria. As we will explain in due course. It turns out that general corporate credibility issue is not presented by the record. While we have the case. We will also use it to decide whether a district court may consider a losing party's financial status in awarding costs to the prevailing party.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2001/002423.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policy in question was a general liability policy for the Clyde Mine. Who was pushed to her death through an open shaft in the Clyde Mine. Acceptance sought to establish that the Clyde Mine insurance policy was effectively terminated prior to Joelene Bowers's death and. That Acceptance is not obligated to provide a defense for Mon Valley or to pay for any recovery. The Clyde Mine policy could not effectively be canceled until the DEP was notified. The District Court further held that no reasonable jury could find from the undisputed facts that Acceptance had notified the DEP of its cancellation of the Clyde Mine policy and that therefore 2 the policy was still in effect at the time of Joelene Bowers's death. Notification was not a necessary precondition of cancellation. The policy's coverage was to be effective from December 7. Was subsequently extended through January 24. Although it is not clear on what date Acceptance actually canceled the policy. It is undisputed that Acceptance took actions which. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2003/02-12274.opn.html">RAMIREZ V. PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INS. CO. (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12274)<BR></A><BR> PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. § 15 2 9. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0139p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a consolidated appeal. Challenging the TennCare program's handling of their applications for coverage under the program when Plaintiffs were denied coverage. Plaintiffs Ooten and Hyslope requested and were granted permission to intervene in the action in 1998 and 2000. The TennCare program is a federal waiver plan under the Medicaid Act approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1315. TennCare coverage is extended to three groups of individuals: (1) existing Medicaid beneficiaries and those who meet Medicaid's financial and/or medical eligibility requirements. 1993 . . . did not have coverage under an individual health insurance policy or who did not have (either directly or through a family member) coverage under. The TennCare regulations define uninsurable persons as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct2000/97-8838.ma3.html">CHAPMAN V. AI TRANSP. (10/2/2000, NO. 97-8838)<BR></A><BR> Chapman's ADA claims were tried before a jury. Those issues have to do with an employer's ability to select its own criteria for making employment decisions and with the permissibility of using subjective criteria. As we will explain in due course. It turns out that general corporate credibility issue is not presented by the record. While we have the case. We will also use it to decide whether a district court may consider a losing party's financial status in awarding costs to the prevailing party.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2003/02-12274.opn.html">RAMIREZ V. PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INS. CO. (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12274)<BR></A><BR> PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. § 15 2 9. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug97/95-9602.opa.html">WESTCHESTER SPECIALTY INS. SERV. V. U.S. FIRE INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Westchester Specialty Ins. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This diversity case is governed by Georgia law<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="869"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/07/021601P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The monthly premium was billed to the Dodsons' J.C. Dodson was given the option of cancelling the policy immediately and receiving a rebate of the unused premium or allowing the policy to lapse as of the date the next premium was due (August 13. The Dodsons were killed in an automobile accident. Penney Life and made a claim for the policy proceeds but were told the policy had been cancelled effective August 13. The Dodson children argued there was a genuine question of material fact as to whether the Dodsons called to cancel the policy on June 30. Or whether they simply called to decline the offer of additional coverage and the policy was mistakenly cancelled. Two days beyond the date on which the Dodsons were killed. The district court held there was no issue of material fact concerning cancellation of the policy. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be awarded to a party if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3 The Dodson children contend the district court erroneously concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Dodsons' insurance policy had been cancelled. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="867"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTY2NzktY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-6679-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That defendant appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The action was brought against Crystal. Crystal was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. GlobalNet was in the business of providing on line news and financial information to private investors in Europe and the United States and to on line trading facilities. GlobalNet is a Delaware company that had an office in Boca Raton. Crystal is a commercial insurance broker incorporated. The primary D&O policy was issued by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh. An excess D&O policy was issued by Lloyd's of London. A second excess D&O policy was issued by Federal Insurance Company. Although Crystal never was a party to the premium financing agreement (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="867"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1831.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief. Were on brief. Was charged with five counts of wire fraud. The charges are based on five wire transfers made in June 1988. The transfers were to pay liens and costs on properties owned by Reeder which had been posted as collateral for the purchase of two insurance companies. Reeder was convicted of all ten counts. An insurer that was licensed in Arizona and had its principal offices in California. Was a shell company. Diamond was to receive about $29.4 million in cash from LACOP. $18 million was to be delivered to Diamond at closing. The total was about $17 million. Those preexisting liens were significant because they meant that American's and Diamond's security interests would be subordinated to other mortgages on the properties. At the same time that these representations were being made. Reeder was repeatedly advised that Resolute had no means by which to pay the debt. The Rhode Island regulators were particularly concerned about the encumbrances on the property securing the promissory note to American. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="867"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTkwOThfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-9098_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because there is no demonstrated conflict with state law that would require federal common law rule making in this case. Federal common law rule making is only appropriate if the operation of state law would </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="867"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063133np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a breach of contract and bad faith action based on an insurance company's behavior in failing to pay a claim for damaged mining equipment to a loss payee. We will reverse the District Court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim and vacate the corresponding compensatory 2 damages award. We will affirm the remainder of the District Court's judgments. We will forgo a lengthy recitation of the factual and legal background to this case. Because Mon View was losing money. This policy was obtained by Mon View acting through its insurance agent Ronald Massari. Which it was entitled to recover from Westchester if UPAC canceled the policy under its power of attorney. Mon View was unable to pay its electricity bills. As all of this was happening. No notice was sent to Gallatin at that time. Gallatin initiated the process of invoking the insurance coverage for its equipment that was still underground. It maintains that it was unaware that the insurance policy for its equipment had been terminated. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031675.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 were engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy with medical doctors and medical associations whose purpose was to harm chiropractors. Claiming that Trigon and the medical doctors and associations were engaged in a conspiracy that used Trigon's reimbursement policies and treatment guidelines to limit severely the flow of insurance dollars to chiropractors and steer those monies toward medical doctors. Trigon Healthcare was recently purchased by Anthem Healthcare. Trigon is a for profit. These healthcare benefit plans list the benefits and services covered by Trigon under the plan and describe any services that are excluded from the plan or are the subject of coverage limitations. Trigon creates this network of healthcare providers by entering into contracts with providers who are willing to abide by Trigon's terms and conditions. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982722.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Bennett told Shipp she was covered for everything except theft and liability arising out of the drunk driving of a patron. Bennett and Shipp were not sent a copy of the binder. Robert Morris was injured at the Tavern when he was assaulted by another patron with a pool cue. Shipp asked Bennett whether she would have any problems with her insurance coverage. Bennett told her the insurance was effective as of the date she made her down payment. The policy prepared by Mountaineer contained the following assault and battery exclusion: It is agreed and understood that this insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of assault and battery or any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of such acts. A copy of the policy was sent to Bennett on June 10. Shipp testified that she never received a copy of the policy and was not otherwise informed of the assault and battery exclusion. After she was served with the complaint. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5032.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief were Ernest M. With him on the brief were Eileen J. This is the second appeal in an action by John Greene ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/509D1769B5B829E088256BE3007F9AFD/$file/0015895.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Allbaugh is substituted for his predecessor. P. 43(c)(2). *Karen Armes is substituted for her predecessor. English is substituted for her predecessor. The federal government is essentially a last resort provider of disaster relief. FEMA is not satisfied with the amount of Hawaii's reimbursement. The state could have received the full amount that FEMA spent on the disputed repairs. Federal law requires a disaster victim to reimburse FEMA for all duplicative assistance </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan2001/003307.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1993 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0287p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> What recourse does an excess insurer have against the primary insurer? National Surety also seeks to assert a claim against Hartford for Hartford's failure to discover that Sufix was insured by National Surety. The district court held that National Surety did not have a cause of action under Kentucky law. Which permits an insurance company to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051560p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Requires us to decide whether its policy covers claims incurred when a second story exterior wooden deck attached to one of the association's units collapsed and caused injuries to a number of people who were on the deck. The unit was owned by Jeffrey and Gail Alexander. The District Court determined that the Alexanders' loss was indeed covered by the National Fire policy. The District Court held that the coverage provided by National Fire for this loss was primary. That the two policies issued separately to the Alexanders by third party defendants Shelby Insurance Co. and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1996/95a1238p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This consolidated class action is brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants breached section 1104(a)'s fiduciary duties and as to whether the defendants are entitled to section 1104(c)'s protection. We will. Vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor and will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Each plan permitted an employee to contribute a percentage of his or her compensation into an individual account and to direct that it be invested in any one or a number of funds that were comprised of different types of investments. A GIC is a contract under which the issuer is obligated to repay the principal deposit at a designated future date and to pay interest at a specified rate over the duration of the contract. The Sperry Plan and the BEST Plan were consolidated to form the Unisys Savings Plan. Was closed to new contributions. Assets invested in the Fixed Income Fund were reinvested in the new Insurance Contract Fund. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/95-4589.opa.html">UNIFORCE TEMP. PERSONNEL V. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMP. INS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Uniforce Temp. The premiums are higher because of the combined loss experience of the insurance carriers in the residual market and because these carriers oftentimes contract their duties under the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july96/95-4589.opa.html">UNIFORCE TEMP. PERSONNEL V. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMP. INS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Uniforce Temp. The premiums are higher because of the combined loss experience of the insurance carriers in the residual market and because these carriers oftentimes contract their duties under the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="863"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1998/98a1868p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the order of the district court dismissing Ford's complaint even though we differ with the district court by finding Ford eligible to file suit under Title I of the ADA. I. The facts concerning the plaintiff's employment and her disability are not in dispute. Ford was an employee of Schering from 1975 until May of 1992. When she became disabled by virtue of a mental disorder and was unable to continue her employment. The plan mandated that benefits cease after two years if the disabled employee was not hospitalized. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Our review over the district court's order is plenary. Because the facts of this case are not in dispute. Whether Ford is even eligible to sue under the ADA. We will address Ford's claims under Titles I and III seriatim. The defendants' group insurance plan is a fringe benefit of employment at Schering. We must first ascertain whether Ford is eligible tofile suit under Title I. The question of standing is not at issue in this case. Which is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="858"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jul1998/98a1913p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from the approval of the settlement of a nationwide class action lawsuit against Prudential Life Insurance Company alleging deceptive sales practices affecting over 8 million claimants throughout thefifty states and the District of Columbia. The class is comprised of Prudential policyholders who allegedly were the victims of fraudulent and misleading sales practices employed by Prudential's sales force. Each cause of action is based on fraud or deceptive conduct. There are no allegations of personal injury. There are no futures classes. The relief awarded includes full compensatory damages consisting of what plaintiffs thought they were purchasing from the insurance agent. There is no cap on the amount of compensatory damages for those who qualify. Although punitive damages are not included in the settlement. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is properly grounded on the alleged violations of the federal securities laws. 6 supplemental jurisdiction is proper because all of the claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="858"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/September2004/034363p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is whether ERISA preempts Pennsylvania's bad faith statute for insurance claims. C.S. § 8371 is conflict preempted by ERISA. We will reverse the judgment of the District C ourt and rema nd w ith instructions to dismiss Barber's bad faith claim. Benefits under the plan were insured under a group long term disability policy Barber's employer obtained from defendant UNU M Life Insura nce Company of America. U NUM subsequently terminated the benefits after determining Barber was no longer disabled under the policy's terms. To obtain a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to benefits. C.S. § 8371 because it is a separate enforcement scheme with a punitive damages provision that adds to the detailed provisions of ERISA's remedial mechanism. The court may take all of the following actions: (1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%. (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="858"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034363p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is whether ERISA preempts Pennsylvania's bad faith statute for insurance claims. C.S. § 8371 is conflict preempted by ERISA. We will reverse the judgment of the District C ourt and rema nd w ith instructions to dismiss Barber's bad faith claim. Benefits under the plan were insured under a group long term disability policy Barber's employer obtained from defendant UNU M Life Insura nce Company of America. U NUM subsequently terminated the benefits after determining Barber was no longer disabled under the policy's terms. To obtain a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to benefits. C.S. § 8371 because it is a separate enforcement scheme with a punitive damages provision that adds to the detailed provisions of ERISA's remedial mechanism. The court may take all of the following actions: (1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%. (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="858"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033755p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge This is a securities class action lawsuit brought on behalf of shareholders of the Chubb Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C37FE78EBE161BA088256FBF0077D03D/$file/0315728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: PMI MORTGAGE INS. v. For Certification of the Controlling Issue to the California Supreme Court and Appellees Columbia Casualty Company and Federal Insurance Company's Petition for Panel Rehearing are DENIED. BACKGROUND PMI is a large financial institution that sells. This insurance covers a lender for losses incurred when a borrower defaults on the repayment of a mortgage loan and the collateral is not sufficient to make the lender whole. The Third Amended Class Complaint alleged that PMI was undercharging its lender clients for various insurance products and services in exchange for customer referrals on mortgage insurance. The Baynham complaint also alleged that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/08/98-4145.htm">98-4145 -- CRANER V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 08/27/1999<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Plaintiff Marilyn Craner appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. As plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue as to any material fact and Northwestern is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Both of these answers were false. Which is a form of depression. <p> The next day. He was given a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0321p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 all commissioners of insurance or Mike Pickens is a defendant on ly in the action brought by First Tennessee Bank. Therefore is a party only to Appeal No. 03 5521. 1 The Honorable Gordon J. Who were sued in their official capacity as receivers for various insolvent insurance companies (collectively. Because it lacked jurisdiction or because it should have declined jurisdiction in its discretion. While at the same time controlling the unregistered brokerage that was supposedly investing the large cash reserves that insurance companies typically have on hand. He was funneling the money to overseas bank accounts. Frankel was the subject of a four month. Bank accounts used in Frankel's money laundering scheme were held by the insurance companies at both AmSouth. The Receivers argue that the Banks were negligent in not realizing the massive fraud that those accounts were being used to commit. The Receivers concluded they might have claims against AmSouth. That tolling agreement was extended six times. Negotiations were ongoing. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043609p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that evidence of pre petition conduct in this case by a law firm is relevant to a review of a debtor's application to retain the firm as special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted as counsel for the debtor pre petition in negotiating settlement arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by attorneys who were co counsel with the firm in insurance matters for those same claimants. Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess carriers.1 The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi. We take judicial notice of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of certain facts such as that a document was filed. Garnering support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success of a plan. A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/10/97-6391.htm">97-6391 -- MGA INSURANCE CO. INC. V. FISHER-ROUNDTREE -- 10/30/1998<BR></A><BR> They contended that the policy was ambiguous as to whether it excluded completed operations coverage and that it should be construed in their favor. That the coverage should be read into the policy because it was required by the statute and regulations under which the Wiggins obtained their permit to sell LP gas. The district court concluded that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for completed operations and that because the policy was not ambiguous. Their contention that the policy is ambiguous regarding whether completed operations coverage is excluded derives from a certificate of insurance issued under the policy. Defendants contend that this can be reasonably interpreted to mean that the policy includes completed operations coverage and that only the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2002/012862.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/04/98-3038.htm">98-3038 -- MITCHAEL V. INTRACORP, INC. -- 04/27/1999<BR></A><BR> In this antitrust case.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="854"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/012862.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982673.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Thirty two of the units were known as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200110829.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that Alabama's bad faith law is not saved from preemption by the saving clause. That a sole shareholder can be a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1556.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for FDIC. Motejunas & Doyle were on brief for Insurance Company of North America. Allowing forfeiture of coverage where notice to an insurer of a claim was late. At issue here is whether the notice due under a fidelity bond was late. The import here is whether a suit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0196p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> B. Substantive History The facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff Stefanie Shields is covered by her mother's no fault automobile insurance policy with Defendant State Farm. GEHA's benefit plan was drafted pursuant to FEHBA whereas the State Farm policy was drafted in accordance with the MNFIA. Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident after a 70 pound piece of steel fell off the back of a truck and onto her car. Plaintiff was required to reimburse the $160. Plaintiff then sought to have Defendant State Farm. Reimburse her for the cost of the medical expenses GEHA was now requiring her to pay. State Farm was not obligated to pay Shields to reimburse GEHA. The State Farm Policy in this case is a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1998/98a1810p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue we must address on this appeal is whether Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act. The purpose of Act 44 was to contain the spiraling costs of medical treatment for work related injuries. It is these provisions of Act 44 which create the utilization review process and the corresponding supersedeas that are challenged in this action. Utilization review is a process whereby medical providers assess the reasonableness or necessity of current. Section 531(5) provides the mechanism by which utilization review is invoked. The decision to invoke utilization review is made independently by the employer or insurer. 7 A. Utilization review is invoked when an employee. The Bureau reviews the Initial Request to ensure that it is properly completed i.e. That all information required by the form is provided. If the Initial Request is improperly completed (i.e. If the Initial Request is completed properly. The request is approved and the party requesting review must serve a copy of the Initial Request upon the remaining interested parties. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec2001/01-10829.opn.html">GILBERT V. ALTA HEALTH & LIFE INS. CO. (12/27/2001, NO. 01-10829)<BR></A><BR> We hold that Alabama's bad faith law is not saved from preemption by the saving clause. That a sole shareholder can be a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-5172.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> On a person in whom it does not have an insurable interest. The facts set forth here are undisputed. Tillman was extended a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May2000/995028.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Have bedeviled the federal courts since considered dicta in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. The Court instructed that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec2001/01-10829.opn.html">GILBERT V. ALTA HEALTH & LIFE INS. CO. (12/27/2001, NO. 01-10829)<BR></A><BR> We hold that Alabama's bad faith law is not saved from preemption by the saving clause. That a sole shareholder can be a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/03/02-3063.htm">02-3063 -- PEOPLES MORTGAGE CORP. V. KANSAS BANKERS SURETY CO. -- 03/26/2003<BR></A><BR> Holding it was entitled to indemnification to the extent it settled the litigation in good faith and for a reasonable amount. The district court ruled that the amount paid was reasonable and entered judgment for the full settlement amount plus interest. The court also awarded attorneys' fees under a Kansas statutory provision that permits a court to award an insured attorneys fees if the court concludes an insurer's refusal to pay a claim was without just cause or excuse. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031457.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We remand to the district court so that it may consider the scope of the pollution exclusion clause as well as the other exclusions which Auto Owners argued are applicable in its declaratory judgment action. The AutoOwners policy requires the insurer to pay those sums Whitewood is legally obligated to pay as a result of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2003/023843u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. Joel Resnick was in Brazil on a business trip. Resnick was involved in an accident when the driver allegedly had an epileptic seizure causing him to drive off the road and strike a pole. Resnick believed that the taxi driver was uninsured and sought uninsured motorists benefits from his insurance providers. Chubb Corporation is the parent company of both Federal Insurance and Pacific Indemnity. Uninsured motorists protection 2 was limited to the geographical restrictions set forth in the Federal Insurance policy. Resnick acknowledged that he was not entitled to benefits under the Federal Insurance policy because of its geographical restrictions and that he could not maintain his fiduciary duty claim against any of the defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm only if no relief could be granted under any set of facts the plaintiff could prove. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001373.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. A. Trygg is a Swedish insurance company that approximately ten years ago decided to enter the United States reinsurance market. Burlington Group is not itself an insurance company. Is a parent company indirectly holding controlling equity in both Burlington Insurance and First Financial. 1999 (exactly five years after the ROA was signed). (6) a declaration that the ROA is valid and enforceable. A determination of the factual disputes is unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. That in reality Burlington Insurance and First Financial were concealing mounting claims under the insurance contracts that Trygg was obligated to reinsure. Burlington Insurance and First Financial dispute both the allegation that they fraudulently concealed claims and the allegation that the forgiveness of the $3 million was conditioned solely on Trygg's understanding of the profits it had achieved during its relationship with the Plaintiffs. 1 BURLINGTON INSURANCE v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200512220.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Steamship is a mutual insurance association that provided protection and indemnity ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1996/96a1450p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Even if the initial cause of that damage was an event (such as a chemical spill) that occurred prior to the policy period. (2) the court erroneously instructed the jury that the insurer has the burden of proving that the specific property damage that occurred was not fortuitous but was expected or intended by the insured. We will accordingly reverse and remand with instructions to reduce the judgment to account for the settling insurers' apportioned shares. I. Koppers is a large. Are a group of certain underwriters for Lloyd's of London and certain London market insurance companies (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Apr2002/005201.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is whether an insurance company must turn over to its terminated agent $259. Because we recognized that this issue was one of first impression in New Jersey. Essentially at will or. That the termination was at will. The consequence of this ruling is that New Jersey's Agency Termination Statute requires Ohio Casualty to pay PIM commissions on all policies for one year following termination. PIM would have no right to these commissions. The remaining issues on appeal arise from the ruling that the termination was at will. (2) whether PIM is entitled to pre judgment interest on the commissions. We remand to the Bankruptcy Court to apply to the facts of this case the legal determination that the initial at will termination can become a termination for cause between the notice of termination and the effective termination date. The claims of constructive trust and contempt of court addressed by the District Court were not raised on appeal. Factual and Procedural Background The facts of this case are set out at length in previous opinions of this Court3 and the District Court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-6338.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND Plaintiff Haberman is the sole shareholder of a professional corporation. Were returning to Oklahoma City from a pleasure trip in Dallas. Moomey was the driver and owner of a 2000 Mercury SUV that was headed northbound on I 35 just five miles south of Davis. The 2000 Mercury SUV was not a scheduled vehicle under the Center's commercial insurance policy. <hr> On some date. The Center was the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0055p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Plaintiff sought life insurance benefits after the death of her husband and statutory penalties in the amount of $110 per day for each day she was not provided with the Plan documents she had requested. Was employed by M&M and/or one of its subsidiaries for nearly 30 years. He was earning an annual salary of $210. MetLife was the insurer of the life insurance benefits and was responsible for administering claims for such benefits. This election was referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1998/98a1854p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have an independent duty to determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. The town of Sea Bright is located on a narrow strip of land bounded by the Shrewsbury River on one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. The Van Holts' home is located in an area that floods frequently. Sea Bright was flooded. The Van Holts' home and personal property were again damaged by flooding which resulted from high winds and rain. The first was a homeowner's policy. The other was a flood insurance policy issued pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Program ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011214.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> North Carolina </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTUxMjMtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-5123-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2006) The clerk is requested to correct the official caption to eliminate the additional repetition of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0166p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Plaintiffs are the United Steelworkers of America union and several retirees formerly employed by defendant. Plaintiffs' complaint was based on their claim that their benefits were vested and could not unilaterally be altered by Joy. Summary judgment was granted to Joy against those plaintiffs retiring after August 19. Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees was denied. The district court is affirmed. Plaintiffs are former Joy employees who were represented by the United Steelworkers of America union ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec97/96-4308.opa.html">DA CUNHA V. STANDARD FIRE INS. CO./AETNA FLOOD INS. PROGRAM<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Da Cunha v. Both cases were filed in the same district court and consolidated for some purposes below. Appellants' homes were damaged by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. We affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> The appellants are owners of three story townhouses in a real estate development known as L'Hermitage. The homes are located in Dade County. Was also involved in the design. Including a requirement from the City that some units have break away walls on the ground floor. Adler testified that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-4294.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Facts ClearOne is a publicly held. Edward Bagley is ClearOne's single largest shareholder and is on the board of directors. ClearOne was required to complete an insurance application. One question asked applicants to provide copies of various documents or to indicate whether the documents are available on the Internet. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec97/96-4308.opa.html">DA CUNHA V. STANDARD FIRE INS. CO./AETNA FLOOD INS. PROGRAM<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Da Cunha v. Both cases were filed in the same district court and consolidated for some purposes below. Appellants' homes were damaged by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. We affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> The appellants are owners of three story townhouses in a real estate development known as L'Hermitage. The homes are located in Dade County. Was also involved in the design. Including a requirement from the City that some units have break away walls on the ground floor. Adler testified that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-30257.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2553.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> were on brief for movants. Were on brief for defendants. Brewster</SPAN> were on brief for plaintiff. Were on brief for defendants. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-3829_022.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who are licensed merchant marine officers. 98 Stat. 2863 (1984) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 2114 (2002)).2 The plaintiffs claim that they were discharged in retaliation for engaging in statutorily protected correspondence with the United States Coast Guard ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042645p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Are the Insurance Contracts Mass Assets? . . . . . . . 13 IV. Capital claims that it properly established a basis in hundreds of insurance contracts that were terminated in that year. That it is therefore entitled to take a loss deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 165 to account for the cancellation of those contracts. That the zero basis found by the Court was inconsistent with the facts and hence clearly erroneous. We are convinced that Capital's process was thorough and professional. We are unwilling to affirm the Tax Court merely because we find some flaws in Capital's valuation process. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. The existence of some problems in Capital's valuation process will not justify finding a zero basis in the lost contracts. By proposing alternative methods that will lead to what. Such a procedure is insufficient to reject Capital's claimed deductions. The Service has inform[ed] Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance organizations that the Service will challenge deductions for losses that relate to the termination of 4 individual customer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0881p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a dispute over the interpretation of a regulation governing the amount of insurance coverage provided for federally insured joint accounts in a failed savings and loan association. At issue is whether the funds in joint accounts are insured as a single unit or as multiple units and. Whether the two holders of several joint accounts are insured for up to $100. Contend the regulation provides that each of them is insured for up to $100. 000 for funds held in their joint accounts and that together they are insured for up to $200. We will affirm the district court. V 1993).[fn2] It can approve or reject claims for insured deposits and determine the amount of insurance to which depositors are entitled under the Act. The Sekulas held six accounts at Atlantic Financial when the institution was declared insolvent. The total amount in the six accounts was $169. 717.52 was insured. That Raymond and Kathleen were therefore entitled to $100. The Sekulas contended the entire amount was insured because they each were entitled to receive up to $100. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/dec95/93-6143.html">MACKLANBURG-DUNCAN CO. V. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY CO.<BR></A><BR> Appellants claimed insurance companies that had sold umbrella liability or comprehensive general liability ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc3NDBfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7740_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Corning's motion is denied. The order appealed from is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Will & Emery (Richard B. Circuit Judge: INTRODUCTION Underlying this appeal are massive asbestos liability claims against appellee Corning. The immediate issues are whether a state or federal forum will determine certain insurers' claims that their policies do not cover asbestos claims against Corning and whether we have jurisdiction to review the determination of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denise L. Judge) that the claims belong in federal court because they are core to PCC's Pennsylvania bankruptcy proceeding. The appellants in this procedurally complicated appeal are insurers that issued liability coverage to appellee Corning. The London 3 Market Insurers as the affiliate insurers.1 The affiliate insurers wish to have their liability to Corning assessed in New York State Supreme Court while Corning prefers a federal forum. Corning removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania where PCC's bankruptcy proceeding was pending. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2338.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Flom LLP</SPAN> were on brief for appellants.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1855.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a class action on behalf of retired employees and surviving spouses of retired employees of Rockford Powertrain. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether RPI contractually was obligated to maintain retirement benefits for the life of its retirees and their surviving spouses. Further that RPI was not equitably estopped from modifying the benefits. The terms of the plan were described in a booklet entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/10/97-1139.htm">97-1139 -- LIPS V. AMERICAN COMMUNITY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. -- 10/23/1998<BR></A><BR> Filled in the answers himself. <p> Four questions on the insurance application are relevant to this case. Do you have any physical. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="839"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022100.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> HAWKE 3 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701 and 6714. Rather than to the provisions as codified. 2 The West Virginia Bankers Association is a banking trade association consisting of community banks. Savings and loans located in West Virginia. 3 The Joint Appendix is cited as J.A. in this opinion. 4 CLINE v. Were preempted by federal law. Where there is a regulatory conflict between a State insurance regulator and a Federal regulator. The Federal or State regulator </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/06/97-6437.htm">97-6437 -- STAUTH V. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY -- 06/24/1999<BR></A><BR> <a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept97/96-4796.opa.html">WILLIAMS FARMS OF HOMESTEAD, INC. V. RAIN AND HAIL INS. SERV.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Williams Farms of Homestead. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> Plaintiffs brought this action against private insurance companies after crop loss claims on their multi peril crop insurance policies were denied. The insurance companies were reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The district court dismissed the action because it concluded that under the Federal Crop Insurance Act the exclusive remedy for such claims is an action against the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation or the Secretary of Agriculture. We reverse and remand.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> Plaintiffs are three corporate potato farmers in south Dade County. Who were the insureds under multi peril crop insurance policies issued by the defendants. Were issued policies by defendant Cigna Property and Casualty Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021002.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. It was not possible to complete all of Part I at that time. Because the trust which was to be the beneficiary of the policy had not yet been formed. The plaintiffs in the underlying action were: Janet and Daphne Hammond. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 3 Part I of the application included a declarations section containing the following provision: I represent that the foregoing answers and statements contained in Parts I and II are correctly recorded. No insurance will take effect before the policy for such insurance is delivered and the first premium paid during the lifetime(s) and before any change in the health of the Proposed Insured(s). Insurance will take effect if the answers and statements in this application are then true. Hammond was examined by an independent medical examiner (not a doctor) selected by Pacific Life. As is discussed in the text. Was entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept97/96-4796.opa.html">WILLIAMS FARMS OF HOMESTEAD, INC. V. RAIN AND HAIL INS. SERV.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Williams Farms of Homestead. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> Plaintiffs brought this action against private insurance companies after crop loss claims on their multi peril crop insurance policies were denied. The insurance companies were reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The district court dismissed the action because it concluded that under the Federal Crop Insurance Act the exclusive remedy for such claims is an action against the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation or the Secretary of Agriculture. We reverse and remand.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> Plaintiffs are three corporate potato farmers in south Dade County. Who were the insureds under multi peril crop insurance policies issued by the defendants. Were issued policies by defendant Cigna Property and Casualty Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1751.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. Were on brief. Intentionally or criminally caused or incurred by an insured person </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200314866.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a judgment in the amount of $75. Found that the insurance company was nonetheless liable for bad faith in failing to contribute to the settlement. Sitting by designation. 2 there was no proven damage to the insured to support the compensatory damage award to the insured. Without damage there was no basis for imposing punitive damages. Since there was no coverage under the insurance policy for the claim. Both parties to this lawsuit are insurance companies. The appellant insurance company that issued the policy is The Twin City Fire Insurance Company. The appellee insurance company that was the insured under that policy is Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="835"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1556.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: On page 11. Garcia was on briefs for plaintiffs. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled that Nieves was an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/08/962429P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They argue that the district court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous because Ceridian provided vested disability benefits and did not unambiguously reserve the right to retroactively change the level of disability benefits that employees would receive in the future. 1 who were disabled before January 1. Dental insurance in which they were enrolled at the time they became disabled. Ceridian is the successor in interest to Control Data Corporation. We will refer to the appellee as Ceridian. The class specifically excluded those individuals who were members of the class in Chiles v. An opinion regarding this class action is recorded at 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996). 22 1 Appellants brought this action alleging that Ceridian's refusal to continue paying their insurance premiums violates ERISA. Disabled employees were eligible for long term disability status beginning after their fifth consecutive month of disability. Employees who qualified under this plan were entitled to up to 60% of their predisability salary. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/348077E8C62D364588256C7E00171976/$file/0116693.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Executive Risk maintained that it was not obliged to defend Conestoga under Conestoga's insurance policy because the policy contained an exception that precluded coverage for claims </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/032833p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellant We address in this appeal whether the National Flood Insurance Program (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971835.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was destroyed by fire. Believing that the fire was incendiary in nature. In attempting to prove its claim that the fire was deliberately set. Westfield Insurance presented the testimony of the West Virginia Deputy Fire Marshal who gave his opinion that the fire was incendiary. Including one which Harris conceded at oral argument was error that the verdict should not be reduced by the amount that Westfield Insurance paid Harris' mortgagor as an innocent insured. Was amiss. Just moments before the fire was discovered. The outside gas meter was clicking very rapidly. Based on the evidence and conclusion reached by the investigator as well as evidence that there was little furniture in the house and that Harris had a history of at least seven prior fire loss claims. Harris' dwelling in West Hamlin was destroyed by fire while no one was home. Which was located directly across the road from the later dwelling which burned on January 10. Was also destroyed by fire. No one was home at the time of this fire. 3. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/709025ADA965725088256CBC0059EFF1/$file/0055400.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Petition for Panel Rehearing and the Petition for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED. Allstate's Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. 2002 is amended. The amendment to the opinion is as follows: Add the following footnote to the end of the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 13: In its Petition for Rehearing. Allstate argues for the first time that it is precluded from waiving the proof of loss requirement by a guideline in the FEMA Flood Insurance 11 PECAROVICH v. IT IS SO ORDERED. The district court granted summary judgment for Allstate on the ground that the damage was not caused by a covered </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0096p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Blue Cross moved for dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the civil RICO action was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2443646ADB60F7BF8825724B0001E8BF/$file/0456394.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> ORDER The Appellee Gulf Insurance Company's Petition For Panel Rehearing is GRANTED. 2006 and published at 466 F.3d 867 is hereby AMENDED as follows: After the second to last sentence in the opinion. 656 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying California law and reversing district court's summary judgment that there was no coverage under insurance policy. IT IS SO ORDERED. Pan Pacific and Western were each insured under a Directors' and Officers' Liability and Company Indemnification Policy ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914166.OP2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court effectively determined Appellant was in breach of an indemnification agreement because Appellant did not reimburse Appellee for its payment of $2.4 million in accordance with an obligation on a bond. This judgment is comprised of a principal amount of $2.4 million and pre judgment interest at an annual rate of 38.76%. (2) a bond which was required under the Lottery Contract. 1 and (3) an indemnification agreement which required Appellant to reimburse Appellee for sums paid to Ecosalud and for any interest paid on such While this document is entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/99-14863.man.html">BANK OF AM. V. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (3/23/2001, NO. 99-14863)<BR></A><BR> That specific question is one of those complicated and transitory regulatory banking issues that is of no immediate interest to anyone except those directly involved with it.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0588n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That Continental was The Honorable R. Because the Continental policy at issue is not ambiguous. Because there was no mutual mistake regarding the terms of the Policy. The district court erred in holding that Continental was obligated under the Policy to defend and indemnify Lord & Taylor in that litigation. Which is owned by the mall developer. Continental's case was removed to the United States District Court. Were responsible for the lack of coverage. That extrinsic evidence demonstrated that the Policy's Common Area Endorsement ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/99-14863.man.html">BANK OF AM. V. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (3/23/2001, NO. 99-14863)<BR></A><BR> That specific question is one of those complicated and transitory regulatory banking issues that is of no immediate interest to anyone except those directly involved with it.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914166.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court effectively determined Appellant was in breach of an indemnification agreement because Appellant did not reimburse Appellee for its payment of $2.4 million in accordance with an obligation on a bond. This judgment is comprised of a principal amount of $2.4 million and pre judgment interest at an annual rate of 38.76%. (2) a bond which was required under the Lottery Contract. (3) the entry of summary judgment for Appellee While this document is entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/08/041967P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from the district court's order granting judgment as a matter of law (JAML) following a jury verdict in favor of Paul Garvey and Fenton. Who was acting as the agent of James and Beverly Garvey. Was instructed by his father to obtain insurance coverage for the property. Each time told him he was acting on their behalf. The residence was destroyed by fire. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Paul was acting as an agent for his parents when he obtained the policy. The district court granted summary judgment finding Paul had never disclosed he was acting for his parents. Paul and Fenton argued the district 2 court erred when it concluded James and Beverly were undisclosed principals. Holding United Fire could avoid the contract of insurance if Paul failed to disclose he was acting as an agent for his parents. There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he disclosed the agency relationship when he obtained coverage. A jury trial was held. The jury found Paul disclosed to Hebbeln he was acting as an agent for his parents at the time he obtained the insurance. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043714p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge This is an insurance coverage dispute arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving a truck owned by Sukhjit Singh and a passenger vehicle driven by Suzanne Espenshade. Was on the road principally for Singh to seek its sale or trade in. Among the issues before us is whether a policy issued by Underwriters at Lloyd's London (Underwriters) covering Singh's truck. We believe the answer is no. I. Facts and Procedural History The material facts are undisputed. Singh was an independent trucker. Two relevant insurance policies were in effect. Singh was covered by a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0251p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Cochran's insurance agency was located in Nashville and. Weary was paid solely upon a commission basis. As he was permitted to do. Weary was over forty years of age. Asserting that he was impermissibly terminated because of his age. The sole issue in this appeal is whether Weary was an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="826"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0237p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Garcia's appeal is granted and the case remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment in Garcia's favor. * The Honorable Gregory W. The existing policies were term policies with end dates between 2003 and 2009. The Old Line application for insurance requested a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="822"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-2226.htm">97-2226 -- WOODWORKER'S SUPPLY INC. V. PRINCIPAL MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 03/10/1999<BR></A><BR> 3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings of fraud. 4) Principal Mutual is entitled to contract damages resulting from Woodworker's failure to pay certain premiums. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="822"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0002p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Decedent was over eighty years old and became interested in planning his estate so that Spendthrift would continue after his death. Retained exclusive control over the private placement: All sales are subject to the discretion of the Sellers including the right to accept each unit as purchased or none until the entire offering is purchased. INSURING CLAUSE If during the policy period any claim or claims are made against the Insured (as herinafter defined) or any of them for a Wrongful Act (as hereinafter defined) while acting in their individual or collective capacities as Directors or Officers. The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Insureds or any of them. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="822"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-60320.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Finding that the agreement that contains the arbitration clause is an agreement separate from the one under which Appellants seek Pursuant to 5TH CIR. The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Consequently Appellants are not bound to arbitrate their claims. I. The controversy in this appeal arises from Plaintiffs Appellants' action to reform the terms of an insurance contract to conform with what Appellants contend was the understanding of the contracting parties. The decedent was sold the million dollar policy by his brother. Who was licenced to sell non variable insurance policies in Mississippi. The beneficiary of the Manulife Policy was the Trust. The beneficiaries of the Trust were and are Peden's children and his second wife. Bobby Peden was himself not licenced to sell variable insurance policies. At the time of the transaction in question DefendantAppellee Peterson was licenced as an insurance agent under Mississippi law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="822"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0024p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is not entitled to recover any amount from Motorists Mutual pursuant to its automobile insurance policy for Albin Used Cars. This Court finds that Albin owned the car that Vaniqua Hammond was occupying at the time of the accident. Hammond No. 02 5577 was an insured pursuant to the Motorists Mutual policy and was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits thereunder. Another individual were passengers in the Mercury at the time of the accident. Which is insured by Motorists Mutual. Which is insured by Motorists Insurance Company. Subsequently was removed to federal court and consolidated with the district court action where jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship. As mother and legal guardian of Vaniqua The following undisputed facts are taken from the district court's memorandum opinion and order of November 26. They are set out in bullet point format: · On August 12. Hammond was driving the Mercury in which her daughter. Was a passenger. When the car was struck by a vehicle driven by Patricia Hastings. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="822"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0185p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The declaration that Citizens is first in priority for the payment of medical expenses incurred as a result The Honorable Dan Aaron Polster. The holding of the district court is reversed. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this ruling. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts in this case are undisputed. Jacqueline Bradshaw ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug97/96-2469.opa.html">LAFARGE CORP. V. TRAVELERS INDEM. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>LaFarge Corp. v. Initiated this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Travelers Indemnity Co. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/28BE8D70C3ADADBE88256BBC00524133/$file/0057054.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court held that the death was caused by an intentionally self inflicted injury. Thus was not covered by the policy. I. Facts The relevant facts are not in dispute. Gerald Alan Padfield told his wife he was going to the cleaners and drove away from his home in the family's van. Padfield was found sitting in an upright position behind the front passenger seat with his back against the sliding door. He was naked from the waist down. One end of a necktie was tied around his neck. The other end was tied to the sliding door hinge. Which was located directly above him. The two back seats were folded down. On top of them were numerous sexual devices and a backpack. Inside the backpack were pornographic materials and a small bottle containing a liquid later identified as Chlorohexanol. Another bottle of the liquid was nearby. Said that there were no personal problems at home and that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug97/96-2469.opa.html">LAFARGE CORP. V. TRAVELERS INDEM. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>LaFarge Corp. v. Initiated this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Travelers Indemnity Co. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/08/981845P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Winthrop argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment to USF&G and Travelers because: (1) USF&G was not prejudiced by late notice of loss. (2) there is coverage under the prior insurance clause of the Travelers policy. (3) Travelers is estopped from denying coverage. Sustained loss during the period of any prior insurance that you or the predecessor in interest could have recovered under that insurance except that the time within which to discover loss had expired. We will pay for it under this insurance provided: (1) This insurance became effective at the time of cancellation or termination of the prior insurance: and Effective July 1. We will identify Aetna as Travelers and the policy at issue as the Travelers policy. 2 2 (2) The loss would have been covered by this insurance had it been in effect when the acts or events causing the loss were committed or occurred. b. The insurance under this Condition is part of. The Limits of Insurance applying to this insurance and is limited to the lesser of the amount recoverable under: (1) This insurance as of its effective date. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-2137_016.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Coverage was barred as a matter of law. Sustained burns over sixty five percent of his body after his clothes ignited while he was cleaning paint equipment with flammable thinner on Corn Island's premises. Fremont was responsible for both Williams's medical expenses and the 1 A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962146.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). 10 OPINION PER CURIAM: The issue in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion when it granted a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal in a suit filed by the Commissioner of Insurance of the State Corporation Commission of the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Commission). HOW was formed in 1973 by the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB). The How Insurance Company (HOWIC) was incorporated as a risk retention group. The HOW Companies) were operated as a single business enterprise. Both orders were entered with the consent of the HOW Companies. The Receiver was authorized to take all actions it deemed advisable in connection with the rehabilitation or liquidation of the HOW Companies. Was appointed as the Deputy Receiver (D.R.).1 In addition to setting forth the terms of the receivership. Were most responsible for the financial condition of the HOW Companies. The D.R. alleged that the HOW Companies' arrangement with NAHB was so extensive as to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may97/95-9542.opa.html">EVANSTON INS. CO. V. STONEWALL SURPLUS LINES INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Evanston Ins. After the claims for these losses were settled. The insured sought but was denied permission to cross claim against Stonewall Insurance Co.. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The cases were heard together. Was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by Laverne Zachery in which her two daughters Allyson Zachery (age five) and Kayla Zachery (age four) were passengers.<p> The driver of the truck. Was attempting to negotiate a lefthand U turn in the middle of the road when the left dolly leg of the trailer got hung up on the pavement. The trailer was perpendicular to the road.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1584.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brener and Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP were on brief. Were on brief for Sheils Title Company. Sheils was appointed a non exclusive agent of Commonwealth. Was authorized to solicit and issue Commonwealth title insurance policies in Puerto Rico. The majority of the policies issued by Commonwealth on the island were mortgagee policies. The purchasers of these mortgagee policies were institutional lenders. Sheils was authorized to issue policies under $1. Sheils was also authorized to collect the premiums belonging to Commonwealth on its behalf. Although the policies were issued by Sheils as Commonwealth's agent. At the time those policies were issued. Each title insurance policy insured that the mortgage acquired by Bankers Finance as security for the loan was the first and primary lien on the property. Because the vast majority of Bankers Finance residential mortgage loans were made in the context of a refinancing of an existing mortgage loan. It was often necessary for the existing mortgage loan to be discharged in order for the Bankers Finance loan to attain first priority. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may97/95-9542.opa.html">EVANSTON INS. CO. V. STONEWALL SURPLUS LINES INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Evanston Ins. After the claims for these losses were settled. The insured sought but was denied permission to cross claim against Stonewall Insurance Co.. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The cases were heard together. Was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by Laverne Zachery in which her two daughters Allyson Zachery (age five) and Kayla Zachery (age four) were passengers.<p> The driver of the truck. Was attempting to negotiate a lefthand U turn in the middle of the road when the left dolly leg of the trailer got hung up on the pavement. The trailer was perpendicular to the road.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec96/95-3257.opa.html">SLAGLE V. ITT HARTFORD<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Slagle v. Contending that their alleged conduct was exempt under the McCarran Ferguson Act. The FWUA is a joint underwriting association comprised of property insurers licensed to do business in Florida. State law mandates that the described insurers belong to the FWUA and provide windstorm coverage to eligible applicants who are unable to obtain such coverage through ordinary means. <i>See American Ins. 785 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (construing Fla.Stat. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D5E10A5DBCAE208D88256C62007C4140/$file/0055400.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court granted summary judgment for Allstate on the ground that the damage was not caused by a covered </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec96/95-3257.opa.html">SLAGLE V. ITT HARTFORD<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Slagle v. Contending that their alleged conduct was exempt under the McCarran Ferguson Act. The FWUA is a joint underwriting association comprised of property insurers licensed to do business in Florida. State law mandates that the described insurers belong to the FWUA and provide windstorm coverage to eligible applicants who are unable to obtain such coverage through ordinary means. <i>See American Ins. 785 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (construing Fla.Stat. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/12/011926P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> After Melissa and Tim Lancaster's settlement with Melissa's employer was reduced to judgment. After the settlement was reduced to judgment. The Lancasters never intimated that the action was anything other than a regular garnishment action brought pursuant to Missouri's garnishment statute. Which was referenced in each summons. The Lancasters do not dispute that the statute and rule mandate an award of fees and costs in garnishment actions but argue that this was not actually a garnishment action. The Lancasters argue that this was in effect a direct action brought under Missouri Revised Statute section 379.200. The Wood case was originally brought as a garnishment action pursuant to Chapter 525 to execute on insurance proceeds held by the insurer of a tortfeasor against whom the plaintiff had received a judgment. The court of appeals determined that the action was The Lancasters appealed the summary judgment ruling. The court reasoned that section 379.200 was the exclusive method whereby a judgment creditor could judicially enforce payment of insurance proceeds owed to the judgment debtor. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="816"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/05/002173P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Facts A decree of dissolution was entered in 1988 between Harold and Deborah Gander. In 1992 the agreement was modified. Said sums are to be used for the equal benefit of the children. For how any and all such sums are expended. Harold Gander was an employee of Barnes Jewish Christian Center. ITT Hartford was the policyholder for Barnes Jewish Christian Center. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co. defines a viatical agreement as follows: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/11/043576P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Facts The facts underlying this lawsuit are largely undisputed. The car in which the Murrays were riding collided with a car driven by Linda Hohnbaum. The Murrays were insured by American Family through six automobile policies. The vehicle Hohnbaum was driving at the time of the accident was a rental car owned by National Car Rental Financing. Hohnbaum was insured by Allstate Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQzOTktY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-4399-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Make over to an assignee the indemnification it is owed under an insurance contract. Because it cannot be determined at the summary judgment stage whether Old Globecon's claims for property damage and for loss of its business income were of a sort that could validly be assigned 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 to New Globecon. Background Old Globecon was a financial educational services company. Old Globecon's place of business was approximately 250 feet from the World Trade Center. Was subsequently forced to suspend its operations. What is undisputed is that sometime after September 11. New Globecon insists that Old Globecon was in the process of establishing its claim at the time of its asset sale. Or was informed of. The purchase agreement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on January 15. The purchase price of the agreement was $270. Old Globecon's revenue from 2000 to 2002 was approximately $2 million. 3% of which is $60. Attached to the e mail were. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043521p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of an insurer on the basis that an insurance applicant's material omissions on an application constituted bad faith as a matter of law and rendered the policy void ab initio. There is no relevant relationship between the information Babayan provided on her application and the specific information she omitted. We will affirm the 3 judgment of the District Court that Babayan's omissions on her insurance application constituted bad faith as a matter of law. The crux of the dispute between the parties is the interaction between Gallina and Babayan at the February 2001 meeting. Babayan does not dispute that Question 14.K.2 was answered </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQzOTktY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-4399-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Make over to an assignee the indemnification it is owed under an insurance contract. Because it cannot be determined at the summary judgment stage whether Old Globecon's claims for property damage and for loss of its business income were of a sort that could validly be assigned 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 to New Globecon. Background Old Globecon was a financial educational services company. Old Globecon's place of business was approximately 250 feet from the World Trade Center. Was subsequently forced to suspend its operations. What is undisputed is that sometime after September 11. New Globecon insists that Old Globecon was in the process of establishing its claim at the time of its asset sale. Or was informed of. The purchase agreement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on January 15. The purchase price of the agreement was $270. Old Globecon's revenue from 2000 to 2002 was approximately $2 million. 3% of which is $60. Attached to the e mail were. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1354.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Garcia Rodon was on brief. If that power is upheld. Fernandez is essentially uninsured on the malpractice claim and it may be that the malpractice plaintiffs will recover nothing regardless of the merits of their claim. PCFA had been dissolved by an act of the legislature and was no longer liable on Dr. Dr. 2 2 Fernandez was covered by PCFA under an occurrence policy.1 However. PCFA was abolished before Mercado Boneta filed his claim against Dr. Which provides coverage for occurrences within the policy period regardless of when the claim is made. Is distinguished from a claims made policy. Which only covers the insured for claims that are actually made during the policy period. 2. Veronica was born on January 1. Was treated by Dr. Was taken several times to Dr. Fernandez was negligent in failing to properly diagnose Veronica's condition and in failing to hospitalize her. Submits that Veronica's hearing impairment was the likely result of head trauma Veronica suffered when she fell from a slide in January of 1986. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022360.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> $3 million of which was funded through an interim agreement between three insurance companies: St. Benchmark Management is the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTE5MjAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-1920-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The grant of partial summary judgment to Palmieri on the question of whether he was entitled to recover the full replacement cost of his damaged home. Circuit Judge: This contract dispute over a flood insurance policy requires us to determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear claims involving policies issued by private insurers pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200612/05-7140a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> O:\Slip\WP\2006\05 7140 Stewart7a.odl.wpd
	OPINION/ORDER Stat. § 44 710.13 is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
	OPINION/ORDER We are also faced with the issue of whether. Only to the extent that the enhancement (1) reflects the contingent risk of the particular case and (2) is not based on factors already considered in calculating the lodestar amount. We will reverse the judgment of the district court in part and will remand for further proceedings. The court determined that Begier's regular hourly rate was $300. Finding the case to be unique in that it was based upon the
	97-3022 -- OMI HOLDINGS INC. V. ROYAL INSURANCE CO. OF CANADA -- 06/30/1998 Will &. Will &. (OMI) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian brewer. OMI is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. Although Labatt is a sophisticated. No one in the company had considered whether the cost of defending the suit was covered under any of the company's numerous insurance policies. OMI notified Zurich Insurance Company. The companies first asserted that Manildra's claims were not covered under the policies issued to Labatt. The district court concluded that the companies were not obligated to defend the case. On appeal. OMI argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the insurance companies
	JORDAN V. AVCO FIN. SERVS. OF GA., INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Jordan v. Senior District Judge.<p> <p> Plaintiffs/appellees are consumers who have filed suit against defendants/appellants. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19953257.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Contending that their alleged conduct was exempt under the McCarran Ferguson Act. The FWUA is a joint underwriting association Slagle appealed. State law mandates that the described insurers belong to the FWUA and provide windstorm coverage to eligible applicants who are unable to obtain such coverage through ordinary means. Member insurers are required to pay for the FWUA's losses on a proportionate basis. As 1 Fla.Stat. § 627.351(2)(b) reads: The department shall require all insurers licensed to transact property insurance on a direct basis in this state to provide windstorm coverage to applicants from areas determined to be eligible pursuant to paragraph (c) who in good faith are entitled to. Are unable to procure. Slagle alleged that the appellees have engaged in concerted anticompetitive conduct by the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="811"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july97/96-9168.opa.html">JORDAN V. AVCO FIN. SERVS. OF GA., INC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Jordan v. Senior District Judge.<p> <p> Plaintiffs/appellees are consumers who have filed suit against defendants/appellants. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/00-6100.htm">00-6100 -- HARDISON V. BALBOA INSURANCE CO. -- 02/16/2001<BR></A><BR> We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200513457.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The answers to the state law questions at the core of the case are sufficiently unclear and difficult that we think the proper course is to certify them to the Florida Supreme Court. I. Mercedes Zota was injured when she fell from scaffolding while painting a mural on the second story ceiling of a home under construction in Lighthouse Point. Zota was performing work as a salaried employee of Perla Lichi Designs and the President of Trompe L'Oeils `R' Us when she was injured. The owner of the premises where Zota was injured. The facts relevant to the insurance dispute are these. Which is in the business of building </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031926.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Would have corrected any alleged misstatements made by Karen Yates. Weeks argues that Defendants should not have been granted summary judgment because Advance Stores. Weeks also argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper because. Such a duty was created by Advance Stores' customary practice of informing employees about this right. Weeks argues that the district court erred by concluding that she and Weeks were not entitled to rely on Yates' alleged misstatements about the termination of coverage under Weeks' health and life insurance plans because Yates did not qualify as an ERISA fiduciary. I. Perry Weeks was a full time employee of Advance Stores from October 17. He was initially hired to work at Advance Stores' Roanoke distribution center but was later transferred to the road crew. Which contained her contact information should he have any questions concerning the information contained in the employee handbook. That </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2004/031760p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Subject to a $2.5 million aggregate annual deductible (as to which Olympic was effectively self insured). Before the policy was cancelled by Highlands just seven months later. 500 premium required to button up a surety arrangement that would have protected Highlands against such nonpayment. Eventually Highlands' action was whittled down to three countsclaims of negligent misrepresentation and negligence against Hobbs and a claim of negligence against Global. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. We find that the district court was correct in holding that no such duty ran from Global to Highlands. Facts Olympic was a limousine and livery service that operated in and around Manhattan. Olympic's insurance coverage was technically a contract between Olympic and Virginia Surety. Because Highlands was completely responsible for all financial and administrative aspects of the policy. Global was carrier. Although Olympic never actually signed all the documents that would have legally bound it to obtain the surety bond. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0236n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The central issue presented here is whether. The defendant insurance company could rescind the plaintiff's insurance policy on the ground that there was a material misrepresentation in the plaintiff's signed application. The district court held that rescission was permissible as a matter of law. Were a jury to so find. Question 2 is most pertinent to this appeal. It asked: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0291p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The facts that precipitated this case are not in dispute. Federal is the subrogee of Norvest L.L.C. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1004EC107EC8531788256C44007C163E/$file/0017055.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an action alleging breach of a fiduciary responsibility insurance policy arising out of an insurance company's refusal to defend its insured against a third party claim. At issue is whether the Winncrest action involves an alleged breach of fiduciary duty that triggers Federal's obligation to defend under California law. Procedural History PTF is an employee benefit trust that has a fiduciary responsibility insurance policy with Federal. (2) whether Federal was prejudiced by any late tender of the claim. Summary judgment was ultimately granted to Federal because the court found that the Winncrest action did not proximately result from a breach of fiduciary duty. It is necessary to understand the complex factual scenario alleged by Winncrest. Federal does not have standing to maintain its cross appeal. The district court found that Federal did not have a duty to defend PTF in the Winncrest action. Federal was not the aggrieved party in this judgment. A party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962858.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In which Judge Wilkins concurred. Judge Russell heard oral argument in this case but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. I. There is no dispute as to the material facts. Among the items of personal business property contained in the building and destroyed in the fire were two Patch Masters. The Patch Masters functioned as melting pots for the materials used in the paving and were equipped with radiant heat panels which melted the area of pavement surrounding the repair. Monumental's Patch Masters were each permanently affixed to Ford truck chassis and cab. It is possible to mount them on trailers. Normally they were not kept in the burned maintenance building. They were inside at the time of the fire due to harsh weather. There is no dispute but that at the time of the fire. Replacement cost value is the cost of replacement without deduction for depreciation. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-2338.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: p.48. Grasso & Mortensen were on brief for defendants. Berry & Howard were on brief for plaintiffs. Of the District of Maine. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court in an action brought by a number of foreign reinsurance syndicates. At issue are reinsurance contracts (or </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul14/03-20848-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> TIG filed a declaratory action asking the district court to declare that it is not liable for state court judgments against PinkMonkey.com ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0306n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Those proceedings were stayed because the Mathises filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. If the mortgagee . . . has notified us . . . of any . . . foreclosure . . . of which the mortgagee was aware prior to loss. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="807"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/06/99-3393.htm">99-3393 -- COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE CO. V. SEA HARVEST SEAFOOD CO. -- 06/11/2001<BR></A><BR> 000 pounds of decomposed frozen shrimp. <p> <p> <u> </u>This appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff Appellee Commercial Union Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2001/99-14166.op2.html">SEGUROS DEL ESTADO, S.A. V. SCIENTIFIC GAMES (8/20/2001, NO. 99-14166)<BR></A><BR> The district court effectively determined Appellant was in breach of an indemnification agreement because Appellant did not reimburse Appellee for its payment of $2.4 . This judgment is comprised of a principal amount of $2.4 million and pre judgment interest at an annual rate of 38.76%. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTE4OTgtY3YgYXR0eSBmZWVzX29wbi5wZGY=/04-1898-cv%20atty%20fees_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Dubbin's fee request on the ground that his contributions were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1998/98a1957p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are called upon to answer as a controlling question of law whether the law of the forum New Jersey applies to liability insurance policies covering environmental damage claims arising out of numerous sites in many states. That law differs from that of the state where the waste site is located. Then the law of the waste site will apply. This is the second of two declaratory judgment actions brought to establish the extent of insurance coverage for a number of claims against NL Industries arising out of its nationwide lead processing activities. These actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under diversity jurisdiction. NL was incorporated in New Jersey until recently and still has some industrial plants there. Its national headquarters and principal place of business are located in New York. The insurance contracts were negotiated and executed by NL with a New York broker. One of the carriers has informed us that the numbers have increased to 202 sites in 34 states. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001482.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The nine Intervenor Appellants are Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company. Zurich Insurance Company. 2 We recognize that an award of partial summary judgment is not ordinarily a final order and. After Notices of Appeal were prematurely filed (on April 12 and April 17. The prematurely filed notices of appeal are treated as filed on </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001891.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Included in the amount financed column of the RISC was a charge for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/03/001646P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The defendant/appellant is the personal representative of the estate of the deceased pilot and the intervenors are the personal representatives of the estates of the three passengers killed in the accident (collectively appellants). I. BACKGROUND The relevant facts of this case are as straightforward as they are tragic. The money was collected at a table near the runway. The parties have stipulated that the money collected by Farington was not sufficient to cover the operating expenses of the flights. Farington was president of AFS. Was covered by name under the policy when piloting the plane. Or loss . . . [w]hen your insured aircraft is . . . used for a commercial purpose. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may98/96-3657.man.html">VESTA FIRE INS. CORP. V. FLORIDA (5/22/1998, NO. 96-3657)<BR></A><BR> The Florida legislature passed several statutes.</P> <P> The first of these statutes was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962392.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: We are presented with the question of whether the use by the Office of Personnel Management (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/10/95-2144.htm">95-2144 -- VALLEY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION INC. V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA -- 10/20/1997<BR></A><BR> G) which was removed to federal court and consolidated with other declaratory actions. Were obligated to defend on VIA's behalf claims made against VIA in certain state court litigation. VIA should have been awarded all relief supported by the evidence. Will serve as the context for the issues to be addressed. <p> <center><strong>I</strong></center> <p> <strong><em>Background.</strong></em> The background of this litigation is an apparently ill fated effort to develop large tracts of land in Valencia County. 000 acres which have been platted into two subdivisions of approximately 100. Our record does not reveal how many of these lots were sold by the developer. We are informed that only about 6. 000 people actually live on these lands. <p> The developer of this ambitious project was Horizon Corporation. Horizon formed VIA (which was originally named the Horizon Communities Improvement Association) and deeded all of the lands to it. Which were unplatted and were to be used for purposes such as school sites. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2F2EFC35C3CDFF70882571CA007F9587/$file/0355601.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> John Will Ongman. Which was both the administrator and the funding source of the plan. We have returned to first principles. As we will explain below. This case requires us to consider how a court is to review an ERISA plan administrator's decision when the procedure that produced the decision did not follow all statutory requirements. For the reasons that we will develop. The administrator is not. Only life insurance is at issue in this appeal. The life insurance policy under the plan was originally issued by Home Life Financial Assurance Company. Alta is the successor in interest to Home Life's rights and responsibilities. The insured may request what is commonly referred to as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/05/00-8083.htm">00-8083 -- MOFFETT V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES INC. -- 05/29/2002<BR></A><BR> We affirm. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may98/96-3657.man.html">VESTA FIRE INS. CORP. V. FLORIDA (5/22/1998, NO. 96-3657)<BR></A><BR> The Florida legislature passed several statutes.</P> <P> The first of these statutes was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2001/99-14166.op2.html">SEGUROS DEL ESTADO, S.A. V. SCIENTIFIC GAMES (8/20/2001, NO. 99-14166)<BR></A><BR> The district court effectively determined Appellant was in breach of an indemnification agreement because Appellant did not reimburse Appellee for its payment of $2.4 . This judgment is comprised of a principal amount of $2.4 million and pre judgment interest at an annual rate of 38.76%. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="803"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0720n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bell Because Bell admittedly signed an application with false answers to two questions and because nothing suggests that Metropolitan or its agent told Bell that those false answers were irrelevant. Whether it was occupied and other similar questions. None of which are specifically relevant to this case unanswered. Declaring </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/02/944045P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Robert Phillips was the principal in a professional corporation that performed accounting services between 1983 and 1986 for an Iowa company owned by Lonnie Kent Wildrick (for simplicity's sake. Professional negligence in accounting services all three counts based on payments alleged to have been improperly made to Phillips. Was also the principal. The allegedly improper payments were exactly the same in each count. That North River was reserving its rights to limit the defense provided to only those claims covered by the policy. Criminal or malicious act or omission </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012419.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Since this is an interlocutory appeal. Filed even before the parties have completed discovery. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/02/03-6088.htm">03-6088 -- NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. V. AMERICAN RE-INSURANCE CO. -- 02/12/2004<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/11/02-5112.htm">02-5112 -- MCQUAY V. PENN-AMERICA INSURANCE CO. -- 11/10/2003<BR></A><BR> We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/09/951957P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1991.2 The facts of this case are provided in detail in the opinion of the District Court. The following is a summary of the facts material to Klimstra alleged that as she was driving on Although the unidentified car did 1329 (D. She was thrown from her car She was hospitalized and received medical care At the time of the accident. Klimstra for third and fourth degree burns. was a resident of Wisconsin. Does not make physical contact with the other vehicle. 2 2 Change of Residence When the change of location is from one state to another and you are a risk still acceptable to us at the time you notify us of the change. Daly informed Klimstra that the Granstrom Agency was not authorized to write insurance policies in Wisconsin and did not have access to Wisconsin insurance rates. She The Smader Agency is not Klimstra met in person with Nancy Gregerson of the Smader Agency. 000 Gregerson also informed Klimstra that because her Wisconsin premium was $90.00 lower than her Minnesota premium. The application was signed by Klimstra and the Smader Agency with coverage bound effective June Klimstra applied her unearned premium from the Minnesota policy Klimstra toward payment of the initial premium on her Wisconsin policy. policy would become effective as of June 11. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6BE85A29D92B9F038825706E004F24F0/$file/0355601.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Abatie was employed by the Santa Barbara Medical Foundation Clinic ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0279p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Substantive Facts Defendant MTA is an association of approximately 700 member companies in the metalworking industry in Michigan. Plaintiff is a licensed insurance agent in the state of Michigan. While Plaintiff was initially hired as a salaried employee. Plaintiff was deemed an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982000.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Shearson was sued on the theory that it was a controlling person by virtue of its ownership stake in First Capital. The deputy receiver 1 Foster was succeeded as deputy receiver by Alfred W. The counterclaims in this action were severed. There was also a nine day insolvency and rehabilitation proceeding before the State Corporation Commission. Gubar were directors and shareholders of First Capital. For $75 million.2 After First Capital bought Fidelity Bank 2 The acquisition was brought about as follows: First Capital Insurance Group. For these services First Capital was paid a sum equal to 0.5 percent of Fidelity Bankers' invested assets each month. The purchaser had the option to either keep the annuity at whatever rate Fidelity Bankers was then offering or get his money back. That is. These annuities were extremely popular. Life Insurance was merged into Fidelity Bankers. Non investment grade (junk) bonds in Fidelity Bankers' portfolio until 38 percent of Fidelity Bankers' assets were junk bonds. These investment decisions were approved by Fidelity Bankers' investment committee (Weingarten. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2001/011377.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is an issue of first impression in this court. The bases for its action are that the UPMC ad contained false statements and deceptive advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. UPMC later asserted that plaintiff 's Lanham Act claims also were proscribed by the McCarran Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA). The CommunityBlue Direct plan is also marketed solely to employers and subscribers in Western Pennsylvania. Both UPMC plans and Highmark's CommunityBlue Direct plan are network based plans. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2001/011377a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is an issue of first impression in this court. The bases for its action are that the UPMC ad contained false statements and deceptive advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. UPMC later asserted that plaintiff 's Lanham Act claims also were proscribed by the McCarran Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA). The CommunityBlue Direct plan is also marketed solely to employers and subscribers in Western Pennsylvania. Both UPMC plans and Highmark's CommunityBlue Direct plan are network based plans. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-1465.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (for injunctive relief only since he is immune from suit for damages). (for injunctive relief in only since he is immune from capacity suit for as damages). Ed and Tom Sieverding are all parties in at least one of the three appeals that we have consolidated for procedural purposes. These appeals arise out of contempt proceedings that were instituted as a result of Ms. Sieverding's alleged violations of two filing restrictions orders that were entered by the district court in March 2004 and January 2006. Which was dismissed. That dismissal is the subject of the appeal in case No. 06 1524. (1) After examining the briefs and appellate record. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. The Sieverdings have filed a motion seeking to consolidate the appeals for the purpose of paying a single filing fee. All four of the Sieverdings were parties in the underlying district court action. Ed and Tom are filing a joint appeal and joint briefings with Ms. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/june96/95-3221.wpd.html">GLICKMAN, INC. V. HOME INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> In which judgment is rendered against any insurance company . . . if it appear from the evidence that such company . . . has refused without just cause or excuse to pay the full amount of such loss. The central question before us is whether the statutory qualifier </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2003/001961p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> As we conclude that Nationwide is not so required. Provide coverage in the event that an insured is involved in an accident with a tortfeasor who has inadequate liability coverage. 3 per person and $300. Pamela also claimed but was denied underinsured motorist benefits from Nationwide under her father's policy. The basis for her claim was the clause included in that policy providing that Nationwide </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/01/943777P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a complex insurance coverage case. The award of attorney fees to SRT is vacated. SRT's cross appeal from the order denying its request for paralegal fees is dismissed as moot. While he was installing a satellite television dish. SRT is headquartered in Minot. The work in Sioux Falls was being performed by SRT on behalf of Hughes Network Systems pursuant to a contract between SRT and Hughes that the parties signed on August 9 and August 14. The Bureau dismissed the claim because Schettler's death occurred at an identifiable out of state job site and thus was not incidental and referable to Schettler's principal employment in North Dakota. SRT could have covered its employees working in South Dakota through the Bureau at no additional cost by obtaining a certificate of extraterritorial coverage. North Dakota and South Dakota have reciprocal agreements. Never notified the Bureau that it would have employees working in South Dakota. While SRT was appealing the Bureau's decision. SRT filed a counterclaim alleging that the loss was covered or that NFU was negligent in not providing the 3 appropriate coverage. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/09/033374P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> These were so called fronting policies. Terra also had an excess </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="796"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1548.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: On page 2. Was on brief. Were on brief for appellee FDIC. Were on brief for appellee FDIC. This case is part of the aftermath of that financial crisis. At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Considerable sums are at stake. I. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created by the Banking Act of 1933. Those premiums are used to maintain two insurance funds. When these provisions were amended and made part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/99/99-3777.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Events were set in motion in August and September 1991. The old tunnels have found new uses. Deterioration could have been stopped if the damage had been detected during inspections and the roof shored up pending repairs. Navigation on the River was halted for about a month while the tunnel was repaired. As part of a settlement the City of Chicago and a class of injured parties have succeeded to Great Lakes' rights under the policies. Insurance coverage could have been simple. At the beginning of August 1991 Great Lakes was the beneficiary of three relevant policies: a primary policy with a cap of $1 million and two excess policies purchased by its corporate parent Itel Corporation. On which Great Lakes was an additional insured: a first excess policy providing $40 million in coverage. Both of these excess policies were underwritten by a consortium that for convenience we call the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200214388.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The program is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1E602EB5C9A0D3B288256D91005B3715/$file/0016691.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Opinion by Judge Fisher Judge Tallman was drawn to replace Judge Henry Politz. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/12/97-8028.htm">97-8028 -- MEYER V. CONLON -- 12/21/1998<BR></A><BR> That they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Rain and Hail sold him the policy and was reinsured by the FCIC. <p> A crop insurance policy sets a per acre crop production guarantee and pays the farmer for any difference between the guaranteed yield and the actual amount the farmer harvests. The per acre crop production guarantee is set by (a) considering the past production of the particular farmer or. (b) if there are no adequate past production records. Which is set by regulation. Paying the premium after the crop is sold creates the unusual contractual situation in which the farmer has insurance before he has paid his premium. <p> On April 13. No evidence suggests that it was at more than 999 pounds per acre. <p> On June 22. Meyer's crop was damaged by hail. Meyer that the crop was a total loss. Although the adjuster admits that the crop was damaged. Meyer that the beans were not going to make it and would have to be torn up. Meyer claims to have had a conversation with Mr. Meyer said he was going to plow under the crop and wanted payment under the policy at 999 pounds per acre. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-3143.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> No. 01 3143 Jimmie Johnson was an employee of General Electric ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov94/94latorre.html">LATORRE V. CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INS. LATORRE V. THE APPLICATION CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING PROVISION: "IF A PREMIUM IS PAID WITH THIS APPLICATION. THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY IS STATED IN A CONDITIONAL ADVANCE PREMIUM RECEIPT.". THE RECEIPT PROVIDED THAT COVERAGE WOULD BEGIN "AT THE LATER OF THE COMPLETION OF THE APPLICATION PART I AND PART II INCLUDING THE COMPLETION OF ANY PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REQUIRED WHEN THE PART II IS FIRST COMPLETED.". THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT NEITHER PARTY CONTENDED THAT MARIO LATORRE WAS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. THE DISTRICT COURT NOTED THAT ITS FINDING WAS CONSISTENT WITH NEW YORK LAW REQUIRING THAT THE APPLICATION. THE DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT CONNECTICUT MUTUAL WAS BARRED FROM USING HIS ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS AS A BASIS FOR CONTESTING THE BENEFICIARY'S CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS. CONTENTIONS CONNECTICUT MUTUAL CONTENDS THAT THE TWO YEAR INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE BECAME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE STATED IN THE FORMAL POLICY RATHER THAN THE DATE THE APPLICATION FOR THE POLICY WAS COMPLETED AND THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT ISSUED. THE BENEFICIARY CONTENDS THAT THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE BECAME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE MARIO LATORRE RECEIVED THE CONDITIONAL ADVANCE PREMIUM RECEIPT."><BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002592.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jones faxed to OCL a document which stated as follows: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may98/97-2138.opn.html">MICHIGAN MILLERS MUT. INS. CORP. V. BENFIELD (5/4/1998, NO. 97-2138)<BR></A><BR> To the extent that we find it was error on the part of the trial court to direct verdicts as to Millers' arson defense and as to Millers' concealment and fraud defense. The policy issued to the Benfields is a standard homeowners insurance policy in that it describes the rights and obligations of the insurer and the insured under the insurance contract. Are exclusions and conditions that limit this protection.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2103.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Woodworth & Evarts was on brief for Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company. Procter & Hoar were on brief for Pediatricians. Claiming that the coverage amount at the time of Flaherty's death was $200. Pediatricians also contends that it is entitled to attorney's fees. Final Judgment was entered September 20. Background The material historical facts are not in dispute. Of which he was president and 50% shareholder. The amount of this premium was $598.50 (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/98-5500.man.html">SHAPS V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. (3/16/2001, NO. 98-5500)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2671.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Hahn LLP</SPAN> were on brief. Were on brief. This is a case of first impression for this circuit on several issues under the Lanham Act. Was chartered in 1990 by the Rhode Island legislature as the workers' compensation insurer of last resort in the state. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/03/98-8080.htm">98-8080 -- MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE LLC V. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. -- 03/16/2001<BR></A><BR> Remand. <p> <center><strong>I</strong></center> <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0073n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Inc. and Royal Indemnity Company (collectively Southside) are seeking indemnity from CSX Transportation. The primary issue on appeal is whether a provision in the agreement between Southside and CSX that required Southside to obtain liability insurance also insulated CSX from liability. Southside claims that the district court erred in determining that the provision absolved CSX and further argues that the court should not have applied the agreement to the dispute in the first place. One of Southside's clients is Cognis Corporation. Was ready for delivery. That the substance in the tank car was not in fact methyl ester. The car contained an inedible fatty acid that CSX was supposed to deliver to Peter Cremer North America. Summary judgment is proper where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The central issue is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/11/00-6224.htm">00-6224 -- DAVIS V. MID-CENTURY INSURANCE CO. -- 11/20/2002<BR></A><BR> The district court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to Appellees holding that the cost to remove damaged shingles and the labor cost involved in installing new shingles were not subject to depreciation under the actual cash value provision of Appellees' dwelling policy. <p> Prior to submitting Appellees' bad faith insurance claim to a jury. Retained the right to challenge the district court's holdings that the cost to remove damaged shingles and the labor cost involved in installing new shingles were not subject to depreciation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's response is attached to our decision in <u>Branch</u> and by reference is made a part of this opinion. The cost of removing damaged shingles is not subject to depreciation. The labor cost of installing new shingles is subject to depreciation. The law at the time of the alleged bad faith must be settled. <u>See</u> <u>id.</u> at 1224. <p> The law was not settled at the time of Mid Century's actions. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/07/02-8045.htm">02-8045 -- REINER V. U.S. LIFE INSURANCE CO. IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK -- 07/22/2003<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Reiner also alleges that USLIC denied his claim for benefits in bad faith and that he is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. <p> USLIC moved for summary judgment on Reiner's claims. It contended that Reiner had not been eligible to participate in the group insurance policy because he was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2002/013316.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Minor child Elena Lawson ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/06/962285P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who at the time of his discharge was also insured under a group health plan sponsored by his wife's employer. Was not entitled to take advantage of the continuation coverage mandated by COBRA. Who was substituted as plaintiff upon James Geissal's death. James was a beneficiary under a plan provided by his wife's employer. James stated that he was unhappy about the circumstances surrounding his termination and even requested. James ultimately declined to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1998/98a1864p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Each of which provides benefits for a death that is accidental and independent of all other causes. Is the widow of Arthur Murray who. Murray's death was within the scope and conditions of the policies. His death was not independent of all other causes. Murray's death was accidental and independent of all other causes. New Jersey law is opaque on what is the critical question here: whether a plaintiff can prevail if she can prove (1) that the insured's pre existing condition or disease. Was under 3 medical control. That the insured was expected to live a productive life for the foreseeable future (measured in terms of years). (2) that the accident was the direct. We are forced to predict how that court would decide the issue. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict under New Jersey law as we interpret it. Although the district court's charge to the jury was erroneous under the law as we now predict it. The findings necessarily implied by the jury's verdict under the incorrect instructions make clear that the jury would have reached the same conclusion under correct instructions. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1994/94a0761p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> National Union and Gulf sought to rescind insurance policies which they had issued and under which City Savings and the RTC were seeking coverage. National Union and Gulf were jurisdictionally barred from raising certain affirmative defenses to the RTC's counterclaim. We will affirm the district court's holding that under FIRREA the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action. We will reverse the district court's holding that under FIRREA National Union and Gulf are barred from raising affirmative defenses to the counterclaim. Sent a letter to National Union and Gulf providing notice that City Federal might have suffered a loss covered by the insurance policies as a result of dishonest or fraudulent acts of City Federal employees. City Federal was declared insolvent by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1997/97a1682p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are faced with an apparent conflict between </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov94/94latorre.html">LATORRE V. CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INS. LATORRE V. THE APPLICATION CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING PROVISION: "IF A PREMIUM IS PAID WITH THIS APPLICATION. THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY IS STATED IN A CONDITIONAL ADVANCE PREMIUM RECEIPT.". THE RECEIPT PROVIDED THAT COVERAGE WOULD BEGIN "AT THE LATER OF THE COMPLETION OF THE APPLICATION PART I AND PART II INCLUDING THE COMPLETION OF ANY PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REQUIRED WHEN THE PART II IS FIRST COMPLETED.". THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT NEITHER PARTY CONTENDED THAT MARIO LATORRE WAS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. THE DISTRICT COURT NOTED THAT ITS FINDING WAS CONSISTENT WITH NEW YORK LAW REQUIRING THAT THE APPLICATION. THE DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT CONNECTICUT MUTUAL WAS BARRED FROM USING HIS ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS AS A BASIS FOR CONTESTING THE BENEFICIARY'S CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS. CONTENTIONS CONNECTICUT MUTUAL CONTENDS THAT THE TWO YEAR INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE BECAME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE STATED IN THE FORMAL POLICY RATHER THAN THE DATE THE APPLICATION FOR THE POLICY WAS COMPLETED AND THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT ISSUED. THE BENEFICIARY CONTENDS THAT THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE BECAME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE MARIO LATORRE RECEIVED THE CONDITIONAL ADVANCE PREMIUM RECEIPT."><BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1994/94a0799p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who are husband and wife. Appeal from an order in these consolidated diversity of citizenship cases granting summary judgment to Electric Insurance Company and declaring that Electric is not obligated to provide coverage under a personal excess liability insurance policy it issued to Nathan Rubin for claims made by Patricia Rubin arising from an automobile accident on November 7. The germane facts are not in dispute. The parties agree that the case is governed by Pennsylvania law. The facts are not complicated. Which is sometimes called an umbrella policy. The application was an uncomplicated two page form which identified Nathan Rubin's two automobiles and included an option for a $2. Except insofar as it stated that applicants must have underlying liability policies with specified limits including. The insurance was to be effective when Electric received the application. The policy was renewed annually through the issuance of declaration statements. The total premium for that year was $112.50. Her medical bills were $746. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/98-5500.man.html">SHAPS V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. (3/16/2001, NO. 98-5500)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may98/97-2138.opn.html">MICHIGAN MILLERS MUT. INS. CORP. V. BENFIELD (5/4/1998, NO. 97-2138)<BR></A><BR> To the extent that we find it was error on the part of the trial court to direct verdicts as to Millers' arson defense and as to Millers' concealment and fraud defense. The policy issued to the Benfields is a standard homeowners insurance policy in that it describes the rights and obligations of the insurer and the insured under the insurance contract. Are exclusions and conditions that limit this protection.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200613162.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We must determine whether the district court acted properly in concluding that the appellantsa group of plaintiffs alleging claims against appellee Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1997/97a1512p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The principal question we are asked to decide in this appeal is whether federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit between diverse citizens when. Will reverse the district court's decision to the contrary. The London Market Insurers are comprised of underwriting syndicates at Lloyd's of London and companies participating in the London insurance market. Is a corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in the State of New York. The remaining London Market Insurers are aliens. The policies in question were not issued by a single insurer. Each policy was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/12/023952P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND The plaintiff/appellants in this case are National Crop Insurance Services. Farmers Alliance and Alliance are both private insurance companies that provide crop insurance under the authority of the FCIA. NCIS is a trade association comprised of such companies. This case was consolidated with several other actions currently pending in the District of Minnesota brought by numerous Minnesota growers against members of NCIS. The FCIC is an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture authorized to carry out the purposes of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA). The purpose of the FCIA is to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jun2004/Jun30/03-30570-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bethea asserts that the facts alleged in its Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to state claims of detrimental reliance and unjust enrichment. I This is an insurance dispute between St. The medical malpractice policy at issue (1) provides that both parties have the right to non renewal. Paul informed its policyholders that it was exiting the medical malpractice market. Are raised after the policy has expired. Tail coverage is also referred to as a reporting endorsement. 2 2 1 the free tail coverage to any doctor who had been insured by St. The relevant circumstance here being The letter was sent by Kevin O'Brien. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D9DDFE4693D792A588256D81005BD0C9/$file/0016521.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs Appellants ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200014507.OP2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Liberty National contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by both Alabama's applicable statute of limitations and Alabama's common law doctrine of repose. Liberty National further argues that §§ 1981 and 1982 frustrate Alabama's statutory scheme of insurance regulation and are thus reverse preempted by the McCarran Ferguson Act. We do have the jurisdiction to address those claims if we choose. The district court ruled that the § 1981 claims accrued at the time the insurance contracts were made and therefore were barred by Alabama's two year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. The court found that the proposed amended complaint alleged with particularity (as that term is defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)) that Liberty National fraudulently concealed the information that gave rise to plaintiffs' claims. The court held that the two year statute of limitations would be tolled under Alabama law if these specific allegations were true. 4 Liberty National argued that even if the complaint could not be dismissed at the pleadings stage on the basis of the statute of limitations. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1966.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on brief. Were on brief. Were in the business of selling gasoline and home heating oil. Although the policies were issued by The Continental Insurance Company. While the 1983 policies were still in effect. Although the 1985 policy was issued to BC&L. Down East was named as an additional insured and thus was covered by that policy. While the policy was still in effect. Down East's 1986 Niagara policy was canceled effective December 23. Down East was covered for claims made during the policy period as a result of pollution incidents which also occurred during the policy period. If a claim was made on December 24. Down East would have no insurance coverage. The 1986 Niagara policy would not provide coverage because the claim was made after cancellation of the Niagara policy. Quinlan recommended that Down East purchase an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200014507.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Liberty National contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by both Alabama's applicable statute of limitations and Alabama's common law doctrine of repose. Liberty National further argues that §§ 1981 and 1982 frustrate Alabama's statutory scheme of insurance regulation and are thus reverse preempted by the McCarranFerguson Act. We do have the jurisdiction to address those claims if we choose. The district court ruled that the § 1981 claims accrued at the time the insurance contracts were made and were therefore barred by Alabama's two year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. The court found that the proposed amended complaint alleged with particularity (as that term is defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)) that Liberty National fraudulently concealed the information that gave rise to plaintiffs' claims. The court held that the two year statute of 4 limitations would be tolled under Alabama law if these specific allegations were true. The court held that the state rule of repose was inapplicable to plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/11/00-6385.htm">00-6385 -- BRANCH V. FARMERS INSURANCE CO. INC. -- 11/20/2002<BR></A><BR> The district court held that the cost to tear off damaged shingles and the labor cost to install new shingles were both subject to depreciation. The issues on appeal are whether the cost to tear off damaged shingles is subject to depreciation. Whether the labor cost of installing shingles is subject to depreciation. There was no relevant state case law to assist us in determining these issues consistent with Oklahoma state law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion is attached hereto and by reference made a part of this opinion. <p> We reverse the district court's holding that the labor cost to remove damaged shingles is depreciable. We affirm the district court's holding that the labor to install new shingles is subject to depreciation. Because Farmer's interpretation of the actual cash value provision was a reasonable position taken in litigation of a legitimate coverage dispute. Appeals were taken. Held that: (1) actual cash value (ACV) is not replacement cost less depreciation. Is determined by the broad evidence rule. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2001/00-14507.op2.html">ELLEN MOORE V. LIBERTY NAT'L LIFE INS. CO. (9/28/2001, NO. 00-14507)<BR></A><BR> Liberty National contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by both Alabama's applicable statute of limitations and Alabama's common law doctrine of repose. Liberty National further argues that §§ 1981 and 1982 frustrate Alabama's statutory scheme of insurance regulation and are thus reverse preempted by the McCarran Ferguson Act. We do have the jurisdiction to address those claims if we choose. The district court ruled that the § 1981 claims accrued at the time the insurance contracts were made and therefore were </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/04/96-6038.htm">96-6038 -- GAYLOR V. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 04/29/1997<BR></A><BR> Gaylor maintains first that her policy with Defendant John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (Hancock) is not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She argues that even if her claim is governed by ERISA. The bases relied upon by Hancock were insufficient to deny her claim. Life and accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policies are mandatory. Is optional. Was finally referred to Dr. Gaylor was not in need of orthopedic surgery. Gaylor was still his patient and that he would see her in further follow ups. <p> In the meantime. She was unable to work as of October 13. Who informed her that there was nothing more he could do for her and suggested that she return to her primary care physicians for long term treatment. Non surgical condition required follow up and care and medications that are best handled by primary care physicians who would continue to see patients on a regular basis. She was rejected. Because she was financially unable to pay the doctor's bill. Claiming that (1) she was not under the regular care of a physician. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTU4OTAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-5890-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court having determined that the claim was barred by the policy's contamination exclusion clause. The action was brought to recover under a first party property insurance contract (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2001/00-14507.op2.html">ELLEN MOORE V. LIBERTY NAT'L LIFE INS. CO. (9/28/2001, NO. 00-14507)<BR></A><BR> Liberty National contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by both Alabama's applicable statute of limitations and Alabama's common law doctrine of repose. Liberty National further argues that §§ 1981 and 1982 frustrate Alabama's statutory scheme of insurance regulation and are thus reverse preempted by the McCarran Ferguson Act. We do have the jurisdiction to address those claims if we choose. The district court ruled that the § 1981 claims accrued at the time the insurance contracts were made and therefore were </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042615p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appellants or the decedents they represent (hereinafter collectively referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EE4D2E5B42A85E5D88256BB8007E2C84/$file/0056913.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of whether tax deferred variable annuities are covered securities under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0168FFB46E51AC548825718F00493302/$file/0356621.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Both these ordinances and Santa Monica's administrative interpretation of them have changed substantially. Appellants' persistent urging and Santa Monica's willingness to change its regulations have together produced a transformation in the applicable permitting scheme that to the credit of all par SANTA MONICA FOOD v. We hold that Santa Monica's Community Events Ordinance is. Is not constitutionally sound and cannot be enforced. The facial challenges to other ordinances either are moot or fail on the merits. We are not to be understood as having reviewed or approved aspects of the ordinances or implementing regulations not here challenged. We have endeavored throughout to be quite specific about the limited nature of the challenges to which we respond. 2 Santa Monica has requested that we take judicial notice of six documents: Staff Report. Santa Monica submits that each document is a certified public record. The first four documents are on file with the City Clerk of the City of Santa Monica. The remainder can be accessed at Santa Monica's official website found at www.santa monica.org/ccs/events and are on file with the Open Space Management Division of the Community and Cultural Services Department of the City of Santa Monica. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/03/052321P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This breach of contract action was brought by a group of thirteen insurance companies1 who provide federal crop insurance. Ruled in the alternative that dismissal was also warranted because the insurers had neither exhausted their administrative remedies nor established any exception to the exhaustion requirement. The FCIC was to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2503.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> LLP</SPAN> were on brief for plaintiff appellant/cross appellee. <P> <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-4230.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> Ramses Cortez Galaviz contends that a traffic stop ultimately leading to his conviction for possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Cortez Galaviz maintains that the information on which the detaining officer relied to effect the stop Ä derived from a state computer system containing vehicle insurance and registration data Ä was too meager to give rise to reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct. This is apparently one of at least three possible responses to an officer's computer search. The others being messages indicating that the vehicle either definitely is or definitely is not insured.(1) The database queried by Officer Rapela is the product of a program. Is audited at least annually for accuracy. The law was amended to ensure that non commercial vehicle policies are reported by insurers twice a month. The MVD also was statutorily required to report its information at the time of Mr. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0020n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> After the matter was fully briefed on appeal. The tractor trailer was owned by Dairy Farmers of America. DFA is not listed as an additional insured in the AISLIC Policy. Liberty Mutual paid these settlement fees out of a $2 million policy provided for in the separate agreement between Liberty Mutual and Geo to which DFA was an additional insured. When that limit was almost reached. Liberty Mutual argued that the Policies make AISLIC the primary insurer and that the LM Policy's coverage is excess to the AISLIC policy. The district court agreed with Liberty Mutual that the AISLIC Policy was required to exhaust its $9 million policy before Liberty Mutual would be liable for the $2 million from the DFA Policy. A. The Policies There are three agreements that contain language relevant to this Court's decision: the LM Policy between Liberty Mutual and DFA. While any covered </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAxLTk0NzRfb3BuLnBkZg==/01-9474_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that a workers' compensation insurer's right to reimbursement under § 624(e) of proceeds of an underinsured motorist policy is governed by the law in effect at the time that the injured worker recovers those proceeds. Circuit Judge: This case is before us for the second time. Holding that its earlier acceptance was improvidently granted. § 624(e) (2003) of proceeds of an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy is governed by the law in effect at the time that the injured worker recovers those proceeds. BACKGROUND The facts underlying this case are fully set forth in our order of certification. Carpenter was injured in a single car accident. Carpenter's coworker Kimberly Webb was driving the car. Which was settled for $25. Which was settled in April of 2000 for $150. Travelers is the real party in interest to the state negligence suit as well. The negligence lawsuit was still pending. A declaration that it was entitled to the value of Carpenter's settlement under her personal UIM policy. An injured employee may both claim workers' compensation benefits and seek compensation from a party other than the employer who is under some legal liability to pay. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200312129.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance is $1. All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance is in excess of $1. The title insurance policy guaranteed that the McKnights would have a fifty foot wide easement on their property. The McKnights learned that the easement was only twenty feet wide. Thus the property was unsuitable for subdividing. This was Alternatively. The trial court did not make any findings of fact about which was the proper index to use. Thus it was error to support its conclusion with the McKnight's index. Because we conclude that the district court correctly found that the provision was otherwise unenforceable. This error is harmless. 3 1 a conclusion of law which we review de novo. First is the Federal Arbitration Act. That arbitration provisions in contracts involving commerce will be enforced. 1255 (1989) ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/08/99-6354.htm">99-6354 -- RICE V. OFFICE OF SERVICEMEMBERS' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE -- 08/14/2001<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/943216P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Paul and Minneapolis are entitled to insurance coverage for compensatory damages awarded by a state court jury to Thomas Mrozka who had been sexually abused by a priest. Is that the abuse was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19963657.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We affirm on all other issues. 1 Background Plaintiffs in this case are insurance companies subject to the Florida statutes. The Florida legislature passed several statutes. 4 The first of these statutes was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0455p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Contending that the district court's judgment was erroneous because: (1) Prime's Coinsurance Provision upon which it relied to deny Melson full coverage is invalid. (2) the Coinsurance Provision is ambiguous. We were unable to determine with certainty. The total purchase price for both properties was $250. The total insurance coverage for both buildings was $480. Prime was required to pay the full amount of actual loss in the event of a fire. One of these conditions was the imposition of a coinsurance penalty if it were determined that Melson had underinsured the property. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001834.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/943380P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Benton argues that UHC was Benton also UHC. Risk retention groups and purchase groups are exempt from state laws prohibiting their operation or regulating their membership. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3902 & 3903. UHC is the parent company of United HealthCare Management Corporation (United HealthCare Management). United HealthCare Management sought this Over the HealthCare Management is responsible for obtaining liability insurance coverage from Healing Arts National Association (HANA). HANA insureds were to be covered by master insurance policies provided by either Diversified Insurers Corporation (Diversified) or Victoria Insurance Company (Victoria). UHC discovered that the insurance premiums it had paid had never in fact reached these insurance companies and that the policies purporting to provide insurance coverage were worthless. Which was to be insured through the HANA program. instead. The premiums were initially That company would deduct its commission and forward the remaining premium to Robis International. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2000/97-5856.man.html">GALINDO V. ARI MUT. INS. CO. (2/7/2000, NO. 97-5856)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</P> <P> These consolidated cases present the issue of whether a supplemental claim on a homeowner's insurance policy permits the insurance company to investigate the additional claim before an appraisal is required under the policy. The district judges determined that the insurance companies' investigation of the subsequent claims was a condition precedent to appraisal. The insureds' appraisal request was premature. Three such homeowners and their respective insurance companies are involved in this appeal: Hilda Galindo ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/04/98-6122.htm">98-6122 -- DANG V. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA -- 04/29/1999<BR></A><BR> The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted judgment in favor of defendant UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) on the ground that Dang's claim for benefits under UNUM's long term disability policy was untimely under the notice and proof of . ' which is followed in the majority of jurisdictions. If that is possible. If that is not possible. The Company must be notified as soon as it is reasonably possible to do so. <p> . . . . <p> 2. If it is not possible to give proof within these time limits. Proof of claim may not be given later than one year after the time proof is otherwise required. <p> Appellant's App. at 227. The policy defines the elimination period as the first 150 days of disability during which no benefits are paid. <u></u>Therefore. His claim was not submitted until November 13. It is undisputed that his claim was submitted outside the policy provision period. <p> Our answer to the question of whether a notice prejudice rule can be applied to Dang's claim involves a delving look into Oklahoma state law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-31175.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are not in dispute. Richard Washington was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Which was entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1758.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Snow & Hahn was on brief for appellant/cross appellee Focus Investment Associates. Sheehan and Wistow & Barylick Inc. were on brief for appellee/cross appellant American Title Insurance Company. Kelly & Murphy were on brief for appellees Tobak and Abrams & Verri. Bruzzi was on brief for appellee Owen B. 000 damage award on Focus's contract claim may have resulted from erroneous instructions and should therefore be vacated. Both motions are now known as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-1402.html">WILLIAM O. SCHISM V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/07/023934P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This dispute involves whether his designated beneficiary is entitled to an accidental death benefit. The beneficiary is Schanus's daughter. This action was brought by her mother. Schanus was killed after the motorcycle he was operating veered off a road and struck a fence. Schanus was ejected from the motorcycle and suffered fatal head injuries. Blood tests taken after the accident showed that Schanus was legally intoxicated at the time of the crash (with a blood alcohol level of 0.19). Which would have doubled the life insurance benefit paid to Amber Lynn. On the ground that Schanus's death was not the result of an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2000/97-5856.man.html">GALINDO V. ARI MUT. INS. CO. (2/7/2000, NO. 97-5856)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</P> <P> These consolidated cases present the issue of whether a supplemental claim on a homeowner's insurance policy permits the insurance company to investigate the additional claim before an appraisal is required under the policy. The district judges determined that the insurance companies' investigation of the subsequent claims was a condition precedent to appraisal. The insureds' appraisal request was premature. Three such homeowners and their respective insurance companies are involved in this appeal: Hilda Galindo ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0494n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we find that an award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not an award of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/10/97-5186.htm">97-5186 -- BANCOKLAHOMA MORTGAGE CORP. V. CAPITAL TITLE CO. INC. -- 10/18/1999<BR></A><BR> District Judge. <p> <center> </center> <p> <strong><center>Background</center> </strong> <p> Bancoklahoma Mortgage Corp. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Aug2004/Aug18/03-31175.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are not in dispute. Richard Washington was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Which was entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/05/98-1075.htm">98-1075 -- BLACKHAWK-CENTRAL CITY SANITATION DISTRICT V. AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY -- 05/31/2000<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="782"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19963657.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We affirm on all other issues.1 Background Plaintiffs in this case are insurance companies subject to the Florida statutes. The first of these statutes was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1092p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issues raised in these appeals are whether the district court erred in determining that: (1) the FDIC's takeover and sale of Meritor was not a reorganization for purposes of the plaintiffs' separation pay plan. (7) the FDIC was not liable for a statutory penalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) as a result of its failure to respond in a timely manner to plaintiffs' request for plan documents. (8) the certification of three plaintiff classes was inappropriate. We will affirm the orders of the district court. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the FDIC is not liable for the statutory penalty prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). We will affirm the order of the district court pertaining to this issue. The FDIC was appointed as receiver for the insolvent bank. Eligible employees were entitled to severance pay based on their years of service and salary. Benefits were payable for involuntary termination due to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0010n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Petitioner Appellant Suresh Kumar is serving a life sentence after his federal conviction for conspiracy to commit arson. The transaction was successful. Van Meter Insurance is owned by Chip Van Meter. Soon after it was purchased. Kumar claimed he was not aware of Broderick's relationship with Van Meter until a former secretary of Broderick came forward after his conviction. Kumar alleged that Broderick was also a friend and business associate of Michael Caudill. Broderick's representation of Van Meter Insurance did not create a conflict because it was not Van Meter Insurance that was antagonistic to Kumar's interests. The attorneys' use of a lien on the hotel was normal practice and did not give them an incentive to make sure Kumar was convicted because. If he was acquitted. They would still have been paid from the insurance proceeds. Even if there were a conflict. An evidentiary hearing is required </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/99-11778.opn.html">ALL UNDERWRITERS V. WEISBERG (8/18/2000, NO. 99-11778)<BR></A><BR> Underwriters filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking to have the contract deemed void </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F75C846040C51E0688256EBE004D32BB/$file/0217423.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Paul Revere paid Hangarter benefits for an eleven month period and then terminated her benefits based upon the opinion of its medical examiners and claim investigators that Hangarter was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/09/00-6286.htm">00-6286 -- MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO. V. U.S. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO. -- 09/05/2002<BR></A><BR> Insurance providers notify Midland when a policy expires or is cancelled. Midland then notifies the property owner that the owner is required to secure insurance. This is called </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july99/98-9069.opn.html">SCI LIQUIDATING CORP. V. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO. (7/20/1999, NO. 98-9069)<BR></A><BR> SCI Liquidating Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0383p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case involves the legal question of whether a federallyprescribed form endorsement attached to a trucking company's insurance contract modifies the attachment point of an umbrella policy when the endorsement was not legally required in the first The Honorable William O. The trucking company in this case purchased liability insurance beyond what was required under federal regulations and allegedly attached to the policy an endorsement in the nature of a form prescribed by the United States Department of Transportation for the purpose. The content of the filled out form is ambiguous in the context of the umbrella policy to which it was allegedly attached. The form is best interpreted in light of the policies for which it was created. The form did not require that the defendant insurance company pay more than what was required under the original umbrella insurance contract. Which held that the insurance company defendant was not liable beyond the terms of its original insurance contract. Were it solvent. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1559.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> III</SPAN> was on brief for appellants.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1111.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Hostage and Reed & Hostage P.C. were on brief for appellant. Department of Justice were on brief for appellee. Christopher was convicted after a jury trial in the district court on eleven counts of wire fraud. (American was a Rhode Island corporation. Diamond was an Arizona corporation subject to jurisdiction of both Arizona and California.). That capital was to come from business entities controlled by George W. Three of the notes are relevant here. The first was payable to American for $50 million and was executed by Hilltop Developers ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0584n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The case was referred to a magistrate judge upon the consent of the parties. Green was married to the decedent. Green was designated as the primary beneficiary of Mr. Page 2 was also the sole beneficiary of Mr. Green's will. Which was drafted in 1994 or 1995. Green acknowledges that the signature on this document is Mr. Claims that she was unaware of this change in beneficiary. Green assumed that she was the beneficiary of the policy during this time. It was typical for Mrs. Because your policy was issued before 1986. A duplicate copy is not available. We are able to provide you with the following policy summary: Insured: Carl Green Owner (as of current date): Carl Green Beneficiary (as of current date): Patricia Green Face Amount: $25. 1983 Issue Age: 59 Plan of Insurance: Ultimate IV This certificate is issued based upon a written statement by the owner that the original policy has been lost or destroyed. It is verification that the above policy was issued. Green was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/994581.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was a successful podiatrist in West Virginia and Ohio.1 During this time. That the ATV accident was caused by Suzuki's negligence and that. A mistrial was declared after videotapes were played at trial showing Donald executing mentally and physically demanding activities. 000 in attorDonald was born in October 1932. The second scheme involved a scheme to defraud various individuals and corporations out of the attorneys' fees ordered after the Suzuki trial and was charged in Counts Twelve through Fourteen. Donald and Thomas were also indicted on three counts (Counts Eighteen through Twenty) of various money laundering offenses. Donald was indicted on one count (Count Fifteen) of making a false claim for Social Security disability benefits in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. That the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Disagree with Donald's contentions that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts Thirteen and Seventeen and that the district court erred when it refused to give his proposed diminished capacity instruction. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct2001/00-16542.opn.html">GERLING GLOBAL REINSURANCE CORP. OF AM. V. GALLAGHER (10/2/2001, NO. 00-16542)<BR></A><BR> Plaintiffs several insurers operating in Florida with corporate affiliations to German insurers who may have issued policies to Holocaust victims prior to 1945 brought this suit alleging that the Act violates the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the U.S. The district court agreed that the Act violates Due Process because it effectively regulates a subject and transactions that have an insufficient connection with Florida. The sole explicit purpose of the Act is to ensure that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july99/98-9069.opn.html">SCI LIQUIDATING CORP. V. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO. (7/20/1999, NO. 98-9069)<BR></A><BR> SCI Liquidating Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/03-5052.htm">03-5052 -- ALLISON V. UNUM INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA -- 08/25/2004<BR></A><BR> Alleging that she was entitled to disability benefits under the plan. Finding that the bad faith claim was preempted by ERISA. 1132(a)(1)(B) claim was correct because UNUM has established by substantial evidence that its denial of benefits. Was reasonable. Under a provision entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/99-6215a.htm">99-6215A -- NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF HARTFORD V. YELLOW CAB OF OKLAHOMA INC. -- 06/09/2000<BR></A><BR> The word </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971429.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. On which the contract was based. Was completed by Michael O. Rhonda Darling was not present during the meeting between her husband and Benke. Benke operated an insurance agency known as Business Management Consultants and was a sub agent of American Health Underwriters (formerly known as Savers Health Underwriters). American Health Underwriters is not corporately related to appellee. Benke was licensed to submit applications for insurance to Savers Life through American Health Underwriters. The application was attached to and made a part of the Certificate. Carefully check the application to be sure all information is correct. This Application is part of the Certificate. The Certificate was issued on the basis that the answers to all questions and the information shown on the Application was correct and complete. That the Darlings would not have qualified for coverage if they had provided accurate. South Carolina Code Ann. § 38 71 40 provides: The falsity of any statement in the application for any policy covered by this chapter does not bar the right to recovery thereunder unless the false statement was made with actual intent to deceive or unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022018.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Alleging that the software had substantial </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct2001/00-16542.opn.html">GERLING GLOBAL REINSURANCE CORP. OF AM. V. GALLAGHER (10/2/2001, NO. 00-16542)<BR></A><BR> Plaintiffs several insurers operating in Florida with corporate affiliations to German insurers who may have issued policies to Holocaust victims prior to 1945 brought this suit alleging that the Act violates the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the U.S. The district court agreed that the Act violates Due Process because it effectively regulates a subject and transactions that have an insufficient connection with Florida. The sole explicit purpose of the Act is to ensure that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200015856.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> From the district court's declaration that they have a duty to defend their insured. We reverse and remand for consideration of whether Frit is entitled to attorneys' fees based on the offshore insurers' failure to admit they had a duty to defend. Frit Industries is an Alabama corporation that manufactures micronutrients for fertilizers. Three product liability actions were filed against Frit in North Carolina state court. Those lawsuits were removed to federal court. Frit was ultimately granted summary judgment in all cases. Frit was insured by Agrichem. Agrichem and Insurco are Cayman Islands companies. Inter Industry is an Isle of Man company. 4 2 1 On March 5. First State and Wausau (who were defending Frit in the product liability lawsuits along with Mutual Service) filed cross claims against the offshore insurers. We will refer only to those relevant to this appeal. Mutual Service sought pro The complaint was originally filed under the name. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/10/953489P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> ProMed entered ProMed's motion to strike portions of Murff's brief and appendix is denied as moot in light of the fact that the matters contained in the challenged materials are irrelevant to our disposition of the appeal. 1 supervision of the Circuit Court of Jackson County. When ProMed's rehabilitation was converted to The Director of the a liquidation on April 7. United States The Act was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Which had held that the Sherman Act was applicable to insurance companies. The McCarran Ferguson Act's basic purposes were to allay doubts about states' power to tax and regulate insurance companies. A federal statute is inverse preempted under the McCarran Ferguson Act if (1) it (2) does the not state </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/05/952672P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Thompson was not covered under an aviation insurance policy issued by it to Arkansas Aircraft Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/99-11778.opn.html">ALL UNDERWRITERS V. WEISBERG (8/18/2000, NO. 99-11778)<BR></A><BR> Underwriters filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking to have the contract deemed void </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1443.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Allstate Insurance Company.1 Turner was a field claims adjuster for Allstate. Turner was authorized to write settlement checks on be 1 Allstate Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation and is a subsidiary of Allstate Corporation. The other thirteen uncharged checks were considered during sentencing. In this appeal Michael Turner argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1033 is unconstitutional as Congress has exceeded its authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause. Turner avers that neither he nor Allstate Insurance Company are instrumentalities or things in interstate commerce and that his actions were wholly intrastate. His activity is only tangentially related to and did not have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. Affect a company which is involved in interstate commerce. Cl. 3. 2 Turner admitted that he was not authorized to deposit the checks into his account and that by doing so he committed a crime. Turner could have been charged under any number of Illinois statutes relating to theft or deception. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may99/97-6536.opn.html">BUTERO V. ROYAL MACCABEES LIFE INS. CO. (5/10/1999, NO. 97-6536)<BR></A><BR> The replacement policy would have a portability feature.</P> <P> Based on this information. Full time employees with 90 days' tenure who were not enrolled under the old policy were invited to enroll. 000) and who was eligible (full time employees with 90 days' tenure). The form contained a signature space at the bottom to indicate that the enrollment was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="775"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may99/97-6536.opn.html">BUTERO V. ROYAL MACCABEES LIFE INS. CO. (5/10/1999, NO. 97-6536)<BR></A><BR> The replacement policy would have a portability feature.</P> <P> Based on this information. Full time employees with 90 days' tenure who were not enrolled under the old policy were invited to enroll. 000) and who was eligible (full time employees with 90 days' tenure). The form contained a signature space at the bottom to indicate that the enrollment was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/08/963545P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At the core of the dispute between the Vaccaros and Agribank is whether the Vaccaros waived their rights to the proceeds from the American Life policy and whether Agribank is equitably estopped from disclaiming that $464. Jr.'s and Joseph's debts was satisfied by the lapsed Executive Life policy. Agribank was formerly known as the Federal Land Bank of St. We will only refer to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/10/02-6060.htm">02-6060 -- EATERIES INC. V. J.R. SIMPLOT CO. -- 10/06/2003<BR></A><BR> We affirm in part and reverse in part. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug99/98-8506.man.html">AM. MFG. MUT. INS. CO. V. TISON HOG MKT. (8/3/1999, NO. 98-8506)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</P> <P> Plaintiff American Manufacturing Mutual Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1608.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom Seder & Chandler was on brief for appellants. Hall & Stewart were on brief for appellees Travelers Indemnity Company and Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois. Colinvaux and Zelle & Larson were on brief for appellee American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company. Are obligated to defend and indemnify Dryden in connection with a lawsuit brought against Dryden by Raymond King. After the pleadings were closed. A liability insurance carrier must defend an action against its insured if the allegations </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/09/992595P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policy application required a description of the properties for which Option 13 coverage was sought. It is undisputed that Mr. Saunders concedes that the Stallards' homeowner's policy did not cover the property where he was injured. Thus that the district court should have reformed the policy to reflect the understood terms of the agreement. Baker was the Stallards' agent and not Secura's. Reformation of a written instrument under Missouri law is an extraordinary equitable remedy that should be granted with great caution and only in clear cases of fraud or mistake. It is undisputed that there was an agreement and that there was a mistake in carrying out the agreement. What is at issue here is whether Secura made a mistake. Baker was acting as the agent of the Stallards or of Secura when he filled out the relevant application. Under Missouri law an insurance broker is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0575n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a diversity insurance coverage lawsuit under Kentucky law arising from the October 2001 death of a teenage boy from injuries that he suffered while riding on a float that had just completed a town parade route in Nicholasville. That case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Among the week's events was the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1421.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.S.C.</U> were on brief. <U>National Labor Relations Board</U> were on brief. Because the Board's order is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Some of the casino employees are represented by the Asociació. Ortiz replied that the matter was out of his hands. Krans stated that the then existing group coverage was provided through a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/09/96-5206.htm">96-5206 -- FEDERAL INSURANCE CO. V. TRI-STATE INSURANCE CO. -- 09/15/1998<BR></A><BR> Federal's insured was also listed as an additional insured under policies issued by Tri State Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2002/01-15497.opn.html">HYMAN V. NATIONWIDE MUT. FIRE INS. CO. (9/6/2002, NO. 01-15497)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug99/98-8506.man.html">AM. MFG. MUT. INS. CO. V. TISON HOG MKT. (8/3/1999, NO. 98-8506)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</P> <P> Plaintiff American Manufacturing Mutual Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1721.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Alves II and Gorham & Gorham were on brief for appellant. Parks & Whitman were on brief for appellee. 2 Laura A. We will have followed a sizeable number of the courts that have considered the issue. The Claims Warwick is in the business of dyeing. There is no evidence. The United States Environmental Protection Agency ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/11/95-2144.htm">95-2144 -- VALLEY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. V. UNITED STATES FEDELITY AND GUARANTY CORP. -- 11/13/1997<BR></A><BR> The Court will issue today a modified opinion. Is withdrawn and vacated. We note that the modifications to the original opinion are as follows: <p> 1. A new footnote 6 has been added on page 26 of the modified opinion to clarify the point that the holding in this case is not in conflict with the case of <u>American General Casualty Co. v. The petitions for rehearing are denied. The motion for certification of a question of state law to the Supreme Court of New Mexico is denied. <p> <img src= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1561.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and one substantive mail fraud count. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. He contends that the letter underlying the substantive mail fraud count was never introduced into evidence and. Would not have constituted a mailing in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. The exhibit was not provided and the 2255 petition was dismissed. Petitioner contends that this exhibit with its label removed would show his innocence and that the district court should have held the government in contempt for failing to produce it. Some background is needed to place exhibit 79 in context. The contemplated burning of R & S Sales in order to collect on the insurance policy was discussed at a meeting in Rivera's office attended by Jose Luis (El Cano) Latorre. Due to the way the organization was operating with agents on the payroll in the police and other places. Most merchandise was removed from R & S Sales. Carlos was burned. That Carlos claims to have been burned on a boat Rivera and Jose Luis owned. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1997/97a1566p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We find that the meaning of the term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/08/97-1172.htm">97-1172 -- METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. BUSH -- 08/31/1998<BR></A><BR> Bush's claim that she was the sole beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued to her friend Patricia Moore and concluded that Ms. Van Heiden were each entitled to twenty five percent of the policy's proceeds. <u>See</u> <u>Metropolitan Life Ins. Executed the two designation of beneficiary forms that are at issue here. Sparks was responsible for providing employees with information about benefits. 1995 form was not valid because Ms. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="771"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2002/01-15497.opn.html">HYMAN V. NATIONWIDE MUT. FIRE INS. CO. (9/6/2002, NO. 01-15497)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972726.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Seeking damages on several theories only two of which are at issue in this appeal: (1) a common law claim for alleged bad faith settlement practices. The details and sequence of which are significant to the resolution of the appeal. It is necessary to recount the somewhat tortuous series of events following the tragedy. 2 A. Lori Stokely Hall were passengers in the Nickleson vehicle at the time of the collision. Jr. and his son were killed in the accident. State Auto was the liability insurance carrier for both Charles W. The Wilt policy insured four vehicles and the total policy premium was reduced by virtue of a multi car discount. Underinsured Motorists Coverage is the most we will pay regardless of the number of ... vehicles or premiums shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19986958.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff sued defendants for damages incurred when his boat was damaged and defendants denied insurance coverage. Plaintiff won a judgment against the remaining defendants and was awarded damages including $90. I. Eladio Ruiz de Molina purchased a sloop named Ariel in June of 1994.1 The boat was moored in Alabama at the time and was part of a fleet of charter boats. Florida to inquire about insurance for the boat were it moored in Mexico. The boat was damaged at sea. 1400 (11th Cir.1994). 1 2 he would </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2072.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.A.</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/06/00-1524.htm">00-1524 -- FARMINGTON CASUALTY CO. V. UNITED EDUCATORS INSURANCE RISK RETENTION GROUP INC. -- 06/11/2002<BR></A><BR> We will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those damages. . . . If there is another primary insurer. The obligation will be shared equally. Was excess rather than primary insurance. Such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. <p> . . . . <p> If other valid and collectable insurance with any other insurer . . . is available to the Insureds covering a Loss covered by this Policy. Other than insurance which is expressly and specifically in excess of this Policy. After Deitz II was filed. The magistrate judge stated that the new claims could have. Probably should have. Noting that its policy was excess to other available insurance. <p> On February 2. Was not entitled to contribution or subrogation from UE for defense costs related to Deitz I. That Farmington was entitled to reimbursement of defense costs attributable only to Deitz II. <p> In the course of discovery. Which will eliminate [Farmington] from the case. Not clear why they are still offering up to $50k to settle . . . . </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0190p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who was injured during the scope of his employment with Preston Trucking Company. Filed this action seeking a declaration that he is entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage under two insurance policies issued to Preston by The Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania. White's wife and their children have filed separate claims for loss of consortium. Holding that no coverage was available under either insurance policy. Terry White was involved in an accident with another Preston employee who was operating a tractor trailer in the course and scope of his employment. 000.00 and are increasing. Each policy has a liability limit of three million dollars and each is subject to a Self Insured Retention Agreement requiring Preston to reimburse the Insurance Company for up to two million dollars for any losses paid. The term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/10/011223P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Except contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion . . . is valid. (3) section 435.350 was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. The parties did not dispute in the District Court whether the first two factors were met. Thus the court correctly focused on the third factor: whether section 435.350 was enacted to regulate </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021358.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Baltimore Business Communications. Concluding that it was not obliged to defend or indemnify Baltimore Business. Seeking a determination of whether it is obliged to defend and indemnify Baltimore Business in the Pinney case. Id. at The Complaint was first filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the Pinney case with four other class actions involving similar claims. 2 A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/06/963003P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Blumeyer owned and operated a number of insurance related businesses that were affiliated with Bel Aire. The state required a start up company such as Bel Aire to have $800. He did not disclose that all of these assets were fully encumbered. Which was coordinated by Mark Stalhuth. (It was later determined that the Treasury notes and CDs were purchased with borrowed funds and that the corporate stock was worthless because the corporation did not exist on September 30. The MDI issued a press release stating that Bel Aire was a viable insurance company with which it was safe to do business. Crump was at the time a Missouri state representative and chairman of the House Insurance Committee. Crump was also on the payroll of one of Bel Aire's affiliates at a salary of approximately $55. The funding for Stalhuth's position was restored. Crump also sponsored a 1989 legislative amendment that would have made it easier for Bel Aire to meet the MDI's capital requirements. He introduced a bill in 1990 that would have altered the requirements of Stalhuth's position so that Stalhuth would not have qualified for the job. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992540.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was injured in an automobile accident in Greenville County. The negligent driver's liability insurance coverage was limited to $125. Continental's policies had to be reformed and Continental was obliged to provide UIM coverage. 1 UIM coverage obligates an insurer to pay the insured all sums up to the limits of the policy in question which the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages from the negligent owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. We are mindful that summary judgment is appropriate </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2995.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case presents a tangled factual scenario which we will try to untangle as best as we can. There is a factual dispute about whether Kamler stated that he did not want PAL's health insurance if he had to pay premiums. This letter is silent about health insurance coverage. Which was to be faxed via PAL's office in Sao Paolo. Life and long term disability insurance are carried by the firm on a group basis for the benefit of its employees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/10/993631P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Reliance policy was a comprehensive general liability ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-1087_021.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Could not prevail because John was not a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug96/94-9152.ma2.html">MORSTEIN V. NATIONAL INS. SERVS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Morstein v. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This case was taken en banc to clarify the law in our circuit regarding state law preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1788.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nereyda Garcia and Sherin & Lodgen LLP were on brief. David Chaffin and Hare & Chaffin were on brief. Berry & Howard were on brief. Eaton and Sloane & Walsh were on brief. Other environmental laws have pitted businesses against their insurers in fierce disputes over who will bear these costs. That is the case here. Underlying this lawsuit is the cleanup of five hazardous waste sites. Millipore Corporation was one of the sources of waste at the sites. Was a defendant in several actions alleging violations of federal and state environmental laws. The primary issue here is whether the district court erred in entering summary judgment for the insurers (and then denying reconsideration) on the ground that none of Millipore's CERCLA liability is covered under any of the comprehensive general liability ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/11/96-9010.htm">96-9010 -- SCHELBLE V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 11/26/1997<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <strong><hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/971652P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Coon were convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Five of which were separately charged. Riley was also convicted of three counts of fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Coon was convicted of all charges except bribery of the Maryland employee. These companies were collectively the alleged RICO enterprise. Defendants maintained that state insurance regulators were biased against them because they sold surplus lines. Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and upholding a count of conviction if a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Though CAIC's principals explained it was not licensed to sell health insurance. 000 in health care premiums that were deposited into a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19986958.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff sued defendants for damages incurred when his boat was damaged and defendants denied insurance coverage. Plaintiff won a judgment against the remaining defendants and was awarded damages including $90. Eladio Ruiz de Molina purchased a sloop named Ariel in June of 1994.1 The boat was moored in Alabama at the time and was part of a fleet of charter boats. Florida to inquire about insurance for the boat were it moored in Mexico. The boat was damaged at sea. An employee of Worldwide Marine telephoned Ruiz de Molina and told him that he would </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/05/962096P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Webb argues the district court erred in (1) holding defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his safety as a matter of law (count I) and (2) dismissing his state negligence claim on the ground of sovereign immunity (count II). There was an independent jurisdictional basis diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 for the state negligence claim.). The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. The following statement of facts is taken in large part from the memorandum opinion and order of the district court. After Webb was apprehended. In October 1993 he was transferred to the Lawrence County jail to face the pending South Dakota charges. He was placed in maximum security. At the time Webb was 19 years old. Defendants did not place him in one of two minimum security sections in the jail because they wanted to separate him from his accomplice (the accomplice had been placed in one of two minimum security sections) and because the other minimum security section was full. Another maximum security inmate. 3 Apparently Webb's first cellmate was leaving the jail and Webb did not want to share a cell with incoming federal prisoners. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug96/94-9152.ma2.html">MORSTEIN V. NATIONAL INS. SERVS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Morstein v. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This case was taken en banc to clarify the law in our circuit regarding state law preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="764"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/99-6215.htm">99-6215 -- NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF HARTFORD V. YELLOW CAB OF OKLAHOMA INC. -- 06/09/2000<BR></A><BR> These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> In appeal No. 99 6215. The issue in that appeal is whether an insurance policy National issued to Yellow Cab of Oklahoma. National. <p> The relevant facts are undisputed. Lawrence was seriously injured at Will Rogers Airport (Airport) in Oklahoma City. Talley accidently pinned him between the cab he was driving and the cab Mr. Lawrence did not sue the Airport. <p> Yellow Cab was self insured for automobile liability purposes. Yellow Cab was required to obtain </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/07/033307P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Charles Davenport and Brent Johnson1 are both Minnesota residents who have purchased property and automobile insurance policies from Farmers for over ten years. Is licensed to do business in Minnesota. The district court determined that the MIFIRA was not preempted by the FCRA. That the MIFIRA did not provide the plaintiffs any relief because it allowed disclosure of personal information without written authorization where such disclosure was permitted by another law. Where state law is inconsistent with the FCRA </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1704.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Tory Hall was covered by a disability benefits policy underwritten by Life Insurance Co. of North America (LINA). This perquisite of employment is part of a welfare benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. That coverage was furnished under a group certificate issued by New York Life Insurance Co. to the Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants Insurance Trust. 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) that the reduction is improper. Appellate jurisdiction is secure: the judgment was entered on February 25. The notice of appeal was filed on March 22. This motion was filed after the period allowed by Fed. Other Benefits is a defined term. Clauses of this kind not only reduce the employer's outlay for disability coverage (and thus enable the employer to provide additional fringe benefits from a given budget) but also control the moral hazard of insurance that is. The chance that the existence of insurance will increase the likelihood of the insured event. People who know that their full income will continue after they stop working may take more risks in their daily lives and will not try as hard to return to work after injury or illness. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199807/97-5244a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Power were on the briefs for appellant. If that is possible </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200314720.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we find that this case turns on an important question of state law for which there is no controlling precedent. We defer our decision pending certification of the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 2 BACKGROUND Taurus is in the business of manufacturing. Government municipalities have sued Taurus and other handgun manufacturers seeking compensation for expenses allegedly incurred as a result of gun violence in their communities. The municipalities claim they have spent substantial sums of money toward police operations. Insurance Providers have the duty to defend Taurus against lawsuits seeking damages for bodily injury. The Federal Insurance Company policy1 defines a products completed operations hazard as follows: [A]ll bodily injury and property damage occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of your product or your work except: a. products that are still in your physical possession. Or 3. a person or organization whose business or assets you have acquired. The question presented in this appeal is whether the products completed operations hazard exclusion applies to the lawsuits pending against Taurus. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/10/962543P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who was an occupant of a semi tractor truck owned by his father. Rodney was seriously injured in the accident. Canal's claim against Rodney Ashmore was tried before the district court without a jury. The district court identified three issues pertinent to the question of whether coverage exists under the policy: (1) whether Rodney was an employee of Dale Ashmore at the time of the accident. (2) whether Rodney was driving the truck 2 with Dale's permission at the time of the accident. (3) whether the policy's Occupant Hazard Exclusion is unenforceable as contrary to Arkansas public policy. The district court exercised its equitable discretion to refrain from considering the first two factual issues whether Rodney was either an employee or the driver of the truck at the time of the accident out of deference to the concurrent Mississippi state court proceedings. The OHE endorsement is printed in decidedly larger type than the policy and is on a separate page. The OHE endorsement specifically states that it is part of the policy to which it is attached. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0310n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is the beneficiary of his son's life insurance policy. The plan administrator is Airborne Freight Corporation. Benefits under [the] Plan [are] paid only if the Plan Administrator. Decides in its discretion that the applicant is entitled to them. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-5022.html">BRANCH V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982081.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Agora and Burns & Wil2 cox were also named as intervenor defendants by the Estates. Pursuant to a judgment the Estates obtained against Beach Bungee for which no defense was provided by the defendant insurance companies. Agora and Burns & Wilcox argue that Beach Bungee was not covered by any policy that they issued. Even if Beach Bungee was covered. I. The pertinent facts for this appeal are largely undisputed. Sports & Entertainment was a retail insurance agency located in New Orleans and operated by Charles and Gray Morton ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200312484.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Ala.).1 Daiwa's indemnity claim against Goldome was based on a loan portfolio sale agreement in which (1) Daiwa bought a portfolio of loans from Goldome and (2) Goldome agreed to indemnify and defend Daiwa against any claim arising out of the origination of loans within the loan portfolio and filed within three years of the sale. We hold that the loan portfolio sale agreement is not a contract of insurance and. Alleging that Daiwa was a successor in interest to Goldome and that it ratified and joined in Goldome's fraud by taking assignment of the loans it bought from Goldome without disclosing the alleged fraud and lending law violations. There was already litigation pending alleging that Goldome had perpetrated fraud in connection with the origination of home mortgage loans. In the event the class were decertified and former class members filed new suits after the three year anniversary of the loan portfolio sale (which was the limitations period set out in the sale agreement). Unless Goldome were willing to waive the three year time limit for such suits. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/024204p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The ill fated flight was part of a bi weekly shuttle operated by Executive Airlines ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1877A.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Molloy was on brief for defendants Arsenal Auto Repairs. Were on brief for defendant Jack Markarian. Were on brief for plaintiff appellee Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. 3 KEETON. The purpose of the scheme was to obtain payments on fraudulent insurance claims. The judgment was for Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200013811.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: These consolidated appeals arise from the district court's final judgment resolving a series of cases that were filed after a passenger train of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/08/053594P.pdf">P:\DOCS\E-DOS\8-30\05-3594 ADVANCE TERRAZZO V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY OPN 8.23.WPD<BR></A><BR> United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 1 and others after James Fanjoy was allegedly exposed to an excessive amount of carbon monoxide gas released from Advance Terrazzo's propane powered grinders. Was working on drywall at the construction site. Carbon monoxide emitted from Advance Terrazzo's propane powered grinders caused him to fall and sustain injuries that have left him physically and mentally impaired. The complaint alleges that Advance Terrazzo was negligent in failing to provide proper ventilation when operating its floor grinders and failed in its duty to properly monitor the work environment for carbon monoxide gas. The policy specifically excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by pollution in what is referred to as the absolute pollution exclusion: f. Site or location on which any insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on any insured's behalf are performing operations: (i) If the pollutants are brought on or to the premises. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/oct97/95-2144.wpd.html">VALLEY IMPROVEMENT ASS'N V. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUAR. CORP.<BR></A><BR> Inc. (hereinafter VIA or the insured) brought a state court declaratory judgment action in New Mexico against defendant appellant/cross appellee United States Fidelity & Guaranty Corporation (hereinafter USF&G) which was removed to federal court and consolidated with other declaratory actions. Were obligated to defend on VIA's behalf claims made against VIA in certain state court litigation. VIA should have been awarded all relief supported by the evidence. Will serve as the context for the issues to be addressed. The background of this litigation is an apparently ill fated effort to develop large tracts of land in Valencia County. 000 acres which have been platted into two subdivisions of approximately 100. Our record does not reveal how many of these lots were sold by the developer. We are informed that only about 6. The developer of this ambitious project was Horizon Corporation. Horizon formed VIA (which was originally named the Horizon Communities Improvement Association) and deeded all of the lands to it. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/08/993482P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court1 granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims except for McClure's breach of contract claim which was tried to a jury. Judgments were entered in favor of the defendants. American Family) are affiliated Wisconsin corporations operating under common management. Dale Mathwich are officers of American Family. American Family is licensed to sell insurance in Minnesota. American Family markets its insurance through exclusive agents whose relationships with it are governed by written contracts which state that they supersede all prior agreements.2 Its exclusive agents are required to sell all types of insurance offered by American Family. McClure and Kemp were both exclusive agents under contract with American Family. No modification of its terms may be made unless that modification is agreed to in writing by the Agent and the Company. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0374p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court held that State Farm was obligated to defend McGowan in the underlying action under the terms of the policy. The premises were insured under a policy issued by State Farm to McGowan. McGowan's insurance policy contained the following relevant provisions: BUSINESS LIABILITY We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury. No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered unless explicitly provided for under Supplementary Payments. RIGHT AND DUTY TO DEFEND We will have the right and duty to defend any claim or suit seeking damages payable under this policy even though the allegations of the suit may be groundless. The amount we will pay for damages is limited as described in the Limits of Insurance. ... The cancellation was effective as of August 1. State Farm subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the insurance policy at issue was an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034659np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bazzone appeals from the final orders of the District Court granting Appellee Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company's motions to compel arbitration and confirming the arbitrators' award in Nationwide's favor. 1 We will affirm the District Court's orders. 1 We may only vacate an arbitration award in limited circumstances. Such as when an award was procured by corruption or fraud. That is required to be arbitrated under the rules. The Form U 4 identified the NASD as the organization with which he was registering. With the exception of disputes involving the insurance business of any member which is also an insurance company. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5036.html">PRINCIPAL MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for defendant appellee.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/dec95/94-2131.html">ARMIJO V. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> Who were terminated by Prudential Insurance Co. of America ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/04/983097P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> She signed a retail installment contract that stated the dealer was assigning the contract to CAC. The installment contract required LaBarre to maintain insurance on her car until the loan was repaid and permitted LaBarre to fulfill this requirement by providing her own insurance or by obtaining insurance through CAC. We will affirm the district court's dismissal of LaBarre's complaint only if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that LaBarre can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. The decisive question is whether RICO's application to the activities of CAC. The answer to that question is yes. LaBarre's arguments to the contrary are foreclosed by this court's holding in Doe and by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Humana. The alleged 3 activities of First Lenders and Bankers in scheming to sell LaBarre higher priced VSI insurance rather than LPD insurance are governed by Minnesota's insurance law. CAC's alleged activities are not governed by Minnesota's insurance statutes. 459 (1969) ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A4C3E50E8C15444C88256CA9006081F9/$file/0055306.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question we address here is to what extent. Homedics was sued in federal district court for infringing the design patents of its competitor Nikken. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Nikken appears to allege that Homedics directly infringed its patent by offering to sell infringing products through advertising.1 To show Offering to sell an infringing product is. It alleged that Homedics' sale of its products was severely hurting its business. This action was based on similar activity as Nikken I. The complaint sought damages for breach of contract and a declaration that Homedics was entitled to a defense of the Nikken action by the insurance companies. The case was dismissed against all defendants except ACE on October 20. The court preliminarily found that ACE was obligated under its insurance policy to pay for the defense of Nikken I. Homedics brought a second action against ACE seeking a declaration that ACE was obligated to defend Homedics in Nikken II. Order declaring that ACE was obligated to defend Homedics in Nikken I. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/07/052275P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> England & Company (MEC) was an Arkansas accounting firm headed by Michael Miller. MEC carried what is called a claims made professional liability insurance policy with the Chicago Insurance Company. MEC's agent for this policy was Rhodes & Associates. Chicago's agent was the Herbert H. MEC had sixty days during which to report to Chicago any claims that were first made against MEC during the policy period. An endorsement to the policy gave MEC the right to buy what is called tail coverage. Which would provide coverage for claims first made after the policy period expired that were based on conduct that had occurred prior to the policy's expiration date. Was another Arkansas accounting firm. Firms that had been merged with or acquired by BAC were insured under the policy for up to thirty days following the effective date of the acquisition or merger. It was eventually revoked for failure to pay franchise taxes. Landy mentioned that additional </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-5126.html">CIENEGA GARDENS V. US<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2004/032139p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment. One such fear was the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012081.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The plaintiffs Sherif Saad and Nooshin Soozangar are not United States citizens. Plaintiff Saad is a citizen of SAAD v. Saad is also a legal resident of the United States. Plaintiff Soozangar is an Iranian citizen. Soozangar is a legal resident pursuant to her marriage to a United States citizen. The representatives asked both plaintiffs if they were citizens of the United States. The plaintiffs both received letters from Baltimore Life stating that their applications were rejected. The stated basis for both rejections was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2002/00-13811.opn.html">NAT'L R.R. PASSENGER CORP. V. ROUNTREE TRANSP. AND RIGGING, INC.(3/26/2002, NO. 00-13811)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/10/96-1240.htm">96-1240 -- VITKUS V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURGH -- 10/14/1997<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2002/00-13811.opn.html">NAT'L R.R. PASSENGER CORP. V. ROUNTREE TRANSP. AND RIGGING, INC.(3/26/2002, NO. 00-13811)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1887.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This insurance dispute leads us into familiar territory the question of who is responsible for over $80 million in losses the Stone Container Corporation incurred when one of its pulp and paper plants exploded. This is the third time claims stemming from that event have reached our court. Is but </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1686.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on brief. Were on brief. Noting that the Heard Street warehouse was surrounded by residential properties and had a narrow driveway to provide access to and from the street. The City of Chelsea prevented DeCicco from using the property as a warehouse.</P> <P> After the permit was denied. The purchase was financed with a $104. Which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Covering the property for the first month that DeCicco owned it.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/05/062466P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Judgment was then entered in Kent's favor for $4. Kent approached United later that year and it was agreed after negotiations that United would provide health insurance for ICB beginning in January 1990 and that it would designate Kent as the insurance agent for these transactions.1 Kent received an 8% fee from United for the ICB account. Kent did not tell ICB that he was discussing conversion of the health insurance plan with United nor did he inform United that he did not have authorization from ICB for the proposed conversion. They agreed that the plan sponsor At that time South Dakota required that insurers have policies </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/01/953185P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Business Men's Assurance Company of America (BMA) appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to United of Omaha (United) in a dispute under Missouri state law over which company was responsible to pay health insurance benefits. I. FACTS BMA issued a group Western's group The undisputed facts of this case are as follows. health insurance policy to Western Water Management. 1989. policy was a welfare plan subject to ERISA. This was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19952346.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Although the evidence presented by the government was thin. We conclude that it was sufficient to support the convictions and that the evidence established a substantial nexus with interstate Honorable Myron H. Were tragically killed as they attempted to fight the fire. The two firefighters were endeavoring to locate the source of the fire when they were overcome by smoke. Yelvington retained a mortgage on the Although the property was deeded in Susan's name. Some checks were returned for insufficient funds. Yelvington was forced to pay the taxes. Although the application was apparently approved. Utter never actually obtained insurance as he was unable to pay the premium on the policy. Stormy's was destroyed by fire on September 2. The evidence was intended to As described above. The government also established that (1) the restaurant's sales and payroll taxes were behind in payment. (2) the restaurant's liquor license was in danger of being revoked for failure to pay the surcharge tax on alcohol sales. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/01/023675P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Summary judgment is appropriate if the record. Demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. Burbach was a flatbed semitractor trailer driver employed by Marquardt Transportation Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/06/01-6225.htm">01-6225 -- GRAIN DEALERS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. V. FARMER ALLIANCE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. - - 06/13/2002<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/10/981657P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue was whether Timberland was covered under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Lumbermen's for personal injury claims made against it by the Chamberlains. The district court found there was no coverage because Timberland's dump truck was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/12/96-4190.htm">96-4190 -- ADAMS V. GENERAL ACCIDENT ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA -- 12/30/1997<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-4021.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Guises were assessed a finance charge of $434. A company that is under common ownership and management with The Loan Arranger. The plaintiffs argue that because the title insurance and endorsement fees were not disclosed as finance charges. The statement of finance fees was understated in excess of the permitted margin of error provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1605(f)(2)(A) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(g). The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to rescind their loan. Finding that the finance charges disclosed were within the applicable TILA tolerance. We also </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/12/96-6102.htm">96-6102 -- HENSLIN V. KENNEDY TRANSPORTATION SERVICES -- 12/02/1997<BR></A><BR> The sole issue raised by Appellant in this petition for rehearing is that of attorneys fees. The petition for rehearing is granted. <p> Appellant argues that the grounds relied on by the district court in its order granting attorney's fees were waived on appeal by counsel for Appellee during oral argument before this court. We have reviewed the tape recorded account of the parties' oral arguments and we agree with the Appellant. A transcript of the relevant portion of the argument is attached to this order on rehearing. <p> Based upon our review of the parties' recorded arguments. At oral argument counsel for Appellee argued that an award of attorneys fees could be predicated in this case upon a claim that the proceedings below were brought in bad faith. That Appellant is therefore entitled to attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American rule. We are not prepared to make such a finding in the first instance. <p> Because we reject Appellant's claim for attorney's fees based upon the bad faith exception. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct96/95-2346.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. UTTER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Although the evidence presented by the government was thin. We conclude that it was sufficient to support the convictions and that the evidence established a substantial nexus with interstate commerce. Were tragically killed as they attempted to fight the fire. The two firefighters were endeavoring to locate the source of the fire when they were overcome by smoke. Although the property was deeded in Susan's name. Some checks were returned for insufficient funds. Yelvington was forced to pay the taxes.<p> Utter also failed to pay the premiums owed his insurance carrier. Although the application was apparently approved. Utter never actually obtained insurance as he was unable to pay the premium on the policy.<p> In June of 1991. Stormy's was destroyed by fire on September 2.<p> At trial. The evidence was intended to establish a motive for the alleged arson. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-3358.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> On the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Paul N. Of counsel was John H. She challenged the reduction by appealing to the Board and requesting that the Board adjudicate her claim that she should not have been required to pay the back premiums. She was removed from her position because the agency determined that she was unable to perform her duties for medical reasons. Her appeal was unsuccessful. OPM reviewed her application and determined that she had been eligible for immediate retirement in January 1991 when she was terminated. Because at that time she was 63 years old and had completed 16 years of service. Miller was entitled to a retirement annuity retroactive to January 6. The day after her employment was terminated. Miller was entitled to a retroactive annuity payment. OPM stated that it was required to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5137.html">THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for defendant appellant.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-8028.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bad faith arising from Mid Continent's failure to defend True Oil and pay for its liability resulting (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Or expense arising under either (i) or (ii) from: (A) The sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee or any independent contractor who is directly responsible to such indemnitee. Are against public policy and are void and unenforceable to the extent that such contract of indemnity by its terms purports to relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence. The statute was likely a response to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/961282P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Lindsay is a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in Lindsay. Lindsay was a wholly owned subsidiary of DeKalb Ag Research. DEKALB is a Delaware corporation with its The Honorable Frank J. Magill was an active judge at the time this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. Before the opinion was filed. 2 1 principal place of business in DeKalb. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. 3 Hartford Insurance Company of Illinois is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. The primary policy excluded from coverage payments that are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200513824.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that Andreini was the initial transferee under 11 U.S.C. § 550 of a $310. Pony Express' check was returned twice for insufficient funds. We conclude that Andreini was not the initial transferee of the wire transfer. I Andreini is a California insurance broker who arranges insurance coverage for its clients and bills them for the premiums due on these policies. Those payments are deposited in a client trust account. Sitting by designation. 2 These client trust funds are then remitted to the insurance carriers as payment for Andreini's client's insurance policies. The various premiums invoiced were due to the insurance carriers by May 18. The total amount of the invoices was $310. Andreini issued several checks from its client trust account to Pony Express' insurance carriers in payment of the insurance premiums that were now either overdue or due in one week.1 Unbeknownst to Andreini. Pony Express was in serious financial difficulty and its check was returned for insufficient funds. It was again returned. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2001/005157.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct96/95-2346.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. UTTER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Although the evidence presented by the government was thin. We conclude that it was sufficient to support the convictions and that the evidence established a substantial nexus with interstate commerce. Were tragically killed as they attempted to fight the fire. The two firefighters were endeavoring to locate the source of the fire when they were overcome by smoke. Although the property was deeded in Susan's name. Some checks were returned for insufficient funds. Yelvington was forced to pay the taxes.<p> Utter also failed to pay the premiums owed his insurance carrier. Although the application was apparently approved. Utter never actually obtained insurance as he was unable to pay the premium on the policy.<p> In June of 1991. Stormy's was destroyed by fire on September 2.<p> At trial. The evidence was intended to establish a motive for the alleged arson. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May18/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C587F062C620F861882573480056C878/$file/0516380.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> If Merrick was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May19/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0F14F96F8F9983E988256E290070F3C5/$file/0236101.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This time the contamination was more significant. Indicated that she was not aware of any prior contamination. For which Whittier was securing the policy. Not whether contamination had occurred at the site where the tank was located. Zurich's coverage obligation was limited to any release of contamination from the new tank occurring after December 9. The contamination levels in the soil and groundwater were substantially greater than the levels had been when the soil was tested in 1995. Nearly a foot of free gasoline product was found floating on the groundwater. Holding that Whittier had made a material misrepresentation on the insurance application form and that rescission was an appropriate remedy. We must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district Akiak Native Cmty. v. Or (3) the insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy . . . or would not have issued a policy . . . in as large an amount. Or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-5133.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This matter is before the court on appellee's petition for rehearing. 2005 is withdrawn and is replaced by a revised order and judgment. Which is attached to this order. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appeals from a final judgment granted in favor of Sovereign Life Insurance Company of California on his claim that he was entitled to assume a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/04/98-1075.htm">98-1075 -- BLACKHAWK-CENTRAL CITY SANITATION DISTRICT V. AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE CO. -- 04/11/2000<BR></A><BR> The action was originally filed in Colorado state court but. Was removed to federal court pursuant to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/987552.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The question is whether the advertising converts the theft into </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/02/99-1015.htm">99-1015 -- GARDNER V. CONTINENTAL WESTERN INSURANCE CO. -- 02/01/2000<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/06/00-1258.htm">00-1258 -- SCOTT'S LIQUID GOLD INC. V. LEXINGTON INSURANCE CO. -- 06/14/2002<BR></A><BR> The wells are near the Arsenal and Scott's facility. One of which was Lexington. Relevant to this appeal is language in the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1995/95a1192p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Maia Caplan and Vigilant Insurance Company (Vigilant) have brought this expedited appeal from the District Court's Order of May 25. Were parties to the settlement. Have moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds both that the May 25 Order is not an injunction appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and that the order is interlocutory and does not fall within the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb99/98-6147.opn.html">SLAMEN V. PAUL REVERE LIFE INS. CO. (2/1/1999, NO. 98-6147)<BR></A><BR> <U>et seq.</U> ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/10/021472U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was sued for negligence and breach of warranty in the Eastern District of Arkansas by Allen Engineering Corporation. Contending they should not be required to indemnify Amsoil for any of the $1.5 million settlement because none of the expenses covered by the settlement were for property damage. So the entire settlement was precluded from insurance coverage under Wisconsin law. We agree with the district court that although Allen's initial tort claims were brought in Arkansas. 282 (Wis. 2000) ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981967.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question before this Court is whether a claimant who never received written notice of his right of conversion as guaranteed by an insurance policy governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Is entitled to benefits. Canada Life first filed this action in district court seeking a declaration that at the time of his death Lebowitz was not covered by the Policy. Although Canada Life may not have been required by ERISA to provide Lebowitz with written notice of his right of conversion. The life insurance policy was a Policyholder Administered Group Life Benefit policy. WTP was designated the Policyholder/Plan Sponsor. Canada Life was designated the Claims Administrator. The Summary Plan Description document (SPD) of the Policy was distributed to all partners. Lebowitz was still considered a full time senior partner by WTP. III ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021226.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will first set forth the relevant statutory and regulatory background. Including the use by motor carriers of leased or borrowed vehicles to avoid financial responsibility for accidents that occurred while goods were being transported in interstate commerce. One remedial measure provided in the MCA is a liability insurance requirement imposed upon each motor carrier registered to engage in interstate commerce. The Secretary of Transportation also has the authority to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/aug97/96-4034.wpd.html">MESA OIL, INC. V. INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA<BR></A><BR> This is a diversity case involving a dispute over insurance coverage. While it was insured by INA. Ekotek's facility in Utah was subsequently declared a Superfund site. Mesa was identified by the EPA as a Potentially Responsible Party ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb99/98-6147.opn.html">SLAMEN V. PAUL REVERE LIFE INS. CO. (2/1/1999, NO. 98-6147)<BR></A><BR> <U>et seq.</U> ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200512/04-5257a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With her on the briefs were Gregory G. With him on the brief was Rhonda M. Peter Buscemi was on the brief for amici curiae State and Local Bar Associations in support of appellees. Babb were on the brief for amicus curiae The Conference of Chief Justices in support of appellee American Bar Association. The Bar Associations sought a declaratory judgment that the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in the practice of law are covered by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="752"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/05/01-4254.htm">01-4254 -- JOHNSON V. LIFE INVESTORS' INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA -- 05/27/2004<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <br wp= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/04/00-3018.htm">00-3018 -- UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY V. FEDERATED RURAL ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY -- 04/17/2002<BR></A><BR> We therefore certified the following question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/01/01-2117.htm">01-2117 -- ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. V. INDEPENDENT APPLIANCE & REFRIGERATION SERVICE INC. -- 01/03/2002<BR></A><BR> FACTS</strong> <p> <strong> </strong>Meister was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist on April 13. The only policy relevant to this appeal is Policy No. 038351893. Regardless of the number of vehicles insured under the policy. <strong> </strong>Allstate's attempt to preclude stacking entirely was voided by the New Mexico Supreme Court in <em>Allstate Insurance Co. v. Both stated that stacking was not allowed. This endorsement also contained seemingly contradictory language indicating that no stacking was allowed: <p> [i]f <strong>you </strong>have two or more <strong>autos</strong> insured in <strong>your</strong> name and one of these <strong>autos</strong> is involved in an accident. Only the coverage limits shown on the declarations page for that <strong>auto </strong>will apply. . . . <p> The limits available for any other <strong>auto</strong> covered by this policy will not be added to the coverage for the involved or chosen <strong>auto</strong>. <p> Both Meister and Allstate moved for summary judgment. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/03/052225P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Concluding that plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims against defendants against whom they have alleged no direct injury. The court rejected plaintiffs' alternative theory that they have standing without proof of direct contacts because their knowledge of the defendants' underwriting practices deterred them from making futile applications for insurance. 3 On appeal. Plaintiffs further argue that it is sufficient proof of direct contact that a plaintiff applied for homeowners insurance and was rejected. Without regard to the reason for the rejection or whether the plaintiff was made aware of that reason. That is. A plaintiff must show that he or she applied for homeowners insurance and was rejected for a reason related to the challenged underwriting criteria. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the court's findings regarding the absence of direct injury were clearly erroneous. 4 plaintiffs lack standing to claim that a different rate should have been charged. Were the product of an illegal price fixing conspiracy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BECE2A5B17CC658888256E04006F9C0B/$file/0235665.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june95/93-5187.opa.html">FIORETTI V. MASS. GENERAL LIFE INS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Fioretti v. Senior District Judge:<p> <p> This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in this diversity action. <a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/10/96-6102.htm">96-6102 -- HENSLIN V. KENNEDY TRANSPORTATION SERVICES -- 10/21/1997<BR></A><BR> Jurisdiction was not based on diversity. The district court then granted summary judgment for Twickenham and dismissed the case against it. <p> The district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because there is no implied right of action under the ICA and because Henslin had not created a genuine issue as to whether Twickenham had insured Henslin or was otherwise liable for Henslin's claim. The attorney fees appeal is under docket number 96 6285. Whereas the summary judgment and jurisdictional appeals are under docket number 96 6102. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14906.man.html">HARRIS CORP. V. HUMANA HEALTH INS. CO. OF FLORIDA (6/6/2001, NO. 99-14906)<BR></A><BR> The district court held that the plan of the Harris Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0103p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Michele Adkins was involved in an automobile accident in 1983 that seriously injured her and her unborn daughter. Michele's husband was employed by a subsidiary of the American Electric Power Company. Was controlling. The Adkinses argue that Galatis is void ab initio and therefore not controlling because of an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because the decision violated the Galatises' due process rights. Michele Adkins was involved in a head on automobile accident in Licking County. She was seriously injured sustaining fractures to her femur. Michele was eight months pregnant with Lindsay Adkins. Lindsay was born prematurely and now suffers from cerebral palsy. The Adkinses maintain that Lindsay's condition is a direct and proximate result of the accident. Michele was not at fault in the collision. Was employed by a subsidiary of American Electric Power Company. American Electric was the named insured on several automobile insurance policies in effect during this time that provided UM/UIM coverage. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14906.man.html">HARRIS CORP. V. HUMANA HEALTH INS. CO. OF FLORIDA (6/6/2001, NO. 99-14906)<BR></A><BR> The district court held that the plan of the Harris Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-7259b.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sandza argued the cause for appellees.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/08/952791P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is required to pay federal income tax on certain payments it received through its sponsorship of group insurance plans. affirm. The Academy is a national association of family physicians that was organized to represent the interests of family physicians and to promote quality health care. The Academy is exempt from federal income tax as a The Academy created the business league under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a). We conclude the payments are not taxable. American Academy of Family Physicians Foundation (Foundation) to serve as The Foundation is exempt from federal income See id. § 501(a). Life insurance plans that are available to Academy members and their employees. The policies were initially administered by an individual. ISI is a for profit corporation that pays federal The ISI when he died. Principal controls the investment of The group policies require Principal to turn over to the In the Academy any reserve funds remaining after the policies have been terminated and all the claims have been paid. Whether the insurance plans are profitable for Principal or not. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012011.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that because </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042539p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In connection with a complaint filed by Tran alleging that he was misled by MetLife's agent as to the number of years he was obligated to pay premiums on a life 2 insurance policy he purchased. I. Factual Background and Procedural History Tran was born in Vietnam and came to the United States in 1979. The communications between Lam and Tran took place in Chinese.2 Lam eventually sold Tran what is commonly known as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-7259a.html">YWCA V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA<BR></A><BR> Sandza argued the cause for appellees.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTM5MjItY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-3922-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court found that Plaintiff Appellee Dennis Paese was entitled to benefits under a long term disability plan provided by his employer. Rather is an affirmative defense. Which was issued by Hartford and governed by ERISA. Could not perform the essential duties of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B30BFE070248D2F888256C8500593F01/$file/0136013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2002 and published at 307 F.3d 1127 is AMENDED as follows: On page 1137. After the sentence that ends </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0053p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Hartford acknowledges that it had provided Rose with a policy that was effective at the time of the fire. Rose was later indicted and arrested for arson related to the fire in January of 1998. Was subsequently acquitted of the arson charges. Hartford filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that Rose's remaining breach of contract claim was barred as a matter of law by the one year statute of limitations set forth in the fire insurance policy. The fire insurance policy stated that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982374.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A. Rhoads was hired as a financial analyst in September 1987 by Standard Federal Savings Bank ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/oct97/96-6102.wpd.html">HENSLIN V. KENNEDY TRANSP. SERV.<BR></A><BR> Jurisdiction was not based on diversity. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. The district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because there is no implied right of action under the ICA and because Henslin had not created a genuine issue as to whether Twickenham had insured Henslin or was otherwise liable for Henslin's claim. The attorney fees appeal is under docket number 96 6285. Whereas the summary judgment and jurisdictional appeals are under docket number 96 6102. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. She would have no claim for relief based on the undisputed facts of this case. Because the prevailing party in an action in tort against an insurance company is entitled to attorney fees under Oklahoma law. Is an interstate motor carrier. Various federal laws require motor carriers to carry insurance and file certificates reflecting coverage with what was formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2312.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Rodriguez Suris & Godreau were on consolidated briefs. Lance Belsome was on brief. With whom Will Kemp and Monita F. Were on brief. Should expenses indigenous to a court's handling of mass disaster litigation be reallocated once the winners and losers have been judicially determined? Finding that the court's abrupt slamming of these doors was improvident. Among the many 2 successful innovations that brought the litigation to a celeritous conclusion were (1) the creation of a Joint Document Depository (JDD). Each of whom was responsible for dispersing filings among his or her constituents. The court periodically requisitioned fresh monies as funds on hand were depleted. The orders were silent as to (i) whether or not the court planned to readjust defendants' contributions in light of future developments. 1Because the mechanics of the allocation process are not critical for present purposes. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) and the defendant San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Corporation were assessed a total of $100. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/01/031307P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> After the tomato plants were planted. The tomatoes that did grow were smaller than normal and suffered from sunburn. Phillip Ferrell testified that the quality of the crop with the defective film was worse than if no film had been used at all. West Bend first argues that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the district court because the insurance company lacked sufficient contacts with Arkansas. A West Bend attorney attested to several facts in support of this contention: West Bend is a Wisconsin company with its principal place of business in Wisconsin. It does not conduct business or have an office. It is not licensed to conduct business in Arkansas. West Bend was not a party to the contract between the tomato growers and Hi Tech. HiTech's insurance policy with West Bend was sold and paid for in Wisconsin. Concluded that it was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914563.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Robinson mandates the conclusion that Gonzales is no longer good law and must be deemed overruled. Appellant is eligible to file suit under Title I. Who was then the manager of a K Mart store in Tampa. Employees who are disabled due to a mental illness may receive salary replacement benefits for two years. After which K Mart responded by filing a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that appellant was not within the protective ambit of § 12112(a) because. He was not a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0126p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> For indemnification on the basis that Minges Creek was named as an additional insured under the card store's liability policy with Royal. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Minges Creek. BACKGROUND Minges Creek is the owner of the Minges Brook Mall located in Battle Creek. The </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0698n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Jessica Hale and Rachel Riley are mentally handicapped young women who live with their respective parents and legal guardians in rural Livingston County. They were transported from their homes to Creative Workshops and back again in a van owned and operated by Security pursuant to a contract between Creative Workshops and Appellants' guardians. Security was insured by an insurance policy issued by State Auto. Had a history of violent felony sex offense convictions and was listed on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. Were named as defendants in the underlying declaratory judgment action filed by State Auto. Neither Security nor Buford participated in the district court proceedings and neither is a party to this appeal. 2 1 imprisoned and sexually assaulted Hale before delivering her to her home.2 Appellants instituted a tort action in the Circuit Court for Livingston County. Shortly before the state court action was scheduled to go to trial. The parties would litigate the question of whether State Auto was subject to exposure in the amount of an additional $500. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-3253.htm">96-3253 -- LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA V. CENTENNIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 01/14/1998<BR></A><BR> District Judge<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov2001/99-14563.opn.html">JOHNSON V. K MART CORP. (11/21/2001, NO. 99-14563)<BR></A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov2001/99-14563.opn.html">JOHNSON V. K MART CORP. (11/21/2001, NO. 99-14563)<BR></A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1081.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. was on brief for appellant Edgar M. Were on brief for appellee. Stella was president. Defendant Alemany was a former comptroller of the hospital. Loan proceeds were periodically disbursed to the hospital according to the following procedure. Loan funds were also disbursed from a separate equipment escrow account. Which were disbursed to the companies by Merrill Lynch pursuant to the procedure described above. The hospital was unable to make a scheduled payment on the loan. Defendants were charged under a nine count criminal indictment based upon the events described above. Stella was sentenced to 20 years in prison and placed on probation for an additional five years on the condition that he pay $686. 1 Alemany was sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined $10. An individual is liable under the FCA if he or she </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200201/00-7259b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With her on the brief were Michael F. That some of the panels were unacceptable because they were chipped. The misrepresentation claim was dismissed pretrial. Showed that the primary cause of the deterioration of the panels was the introduction of excessive chloride ions when Beer improperly acid etched the panels. The deterioration was exacerbated by Beer's failures to manufacture the panels with sufficient concrete cover over the imbedded steel. To protect the steel from attack by chloride ions where the concrete cover was less than one and a half inches thick. The corrosion of the imbedded steel and the resulting cracking was an ongoing. That Beer was negligent. The jury also found that Tiber and Beer had failed to prove that the YWCA knew or reasonably should have known that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/11/96-2212.htm">96-2212 -- HOBBS V. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. -- 11/09/1998<BR></A><BR> Perez held what was later determined to be a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200201/00-7259a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With her on the brief were Michael F. That some of the panels were unacceptable because they were chipped. The misrepresentation claim was dismissed pretrial. Showed that the primary cause of the deterioration of the panels was the introduction of excessive chloride ions when Beer improperly acid etched the panels. The deterioration was exacerbated by Beer's failures to manufacture the panels with sufficient concrete cover over the imbedded steel. To protect the steel from attack by chloride ions where the concrete cover was less than one and a half inches thick. The corrosion of the imbedded steel and the resulting cracking was an ongoing. That Beer was negligent. The jury also found that Tiber and Beer had failed to prove that the YWCA knew or reasonably should have known that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/DB16212F739572F688256CDE005E71AE/$file/0055466.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: These are appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee. That were damaged on January 17. All of them received payments for the damage and their claims were closed by Allstate over the next two years. The Homeowners learned that there were questions regarding the authenticity of the engineering reports they had received from Allstate during the claims adjustment process. The </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/94opinions/94-5164.html">IBM V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june95/93-5187.opa.html">FIORETTI V. MASS. GENERAL LIFE INS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Fioretti v. Senior District Judge:<p> <p> This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in this diversity action. <a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="745"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2029.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Rafael Vil Carri¢n and Pinto Lugo & Rivera were on brief. With whom Bird Bird & Hestres was on brief. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1853.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for United States of America. Rabell Mendez and Rossello Rentas & Rabell Mendez were on brief for Juan Antonio Garcia. It will be unable to collect any of the money owed. He pointed out that Puerto Rico's insurance company liquidation statute says that claims for which proofs are filed after the deadline shall not be paid until all timely filed claims have been </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec99/98-9251.man.html">KATZ V. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF GROUP INS., ALLTEL (12/8/1999, NO. 98-9251)<BR></A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge:</P> <P> This is an appeal from the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr2000/99-13349.man.html">MINDIS METALS V. TRANSP. INS. CO. (4/20/2000, NO. 99-13349)<BR></A><BR> There is no consensus in other jurisdictions as to whether intentional conduct premised on erroneous information is an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1718.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Mejer was on brief for appellant. Colon Pagan was on brief for appellee. This appeal concerns the scope of insurance coverage for the loss at sea of 19 containers en route from Puerto Rico to Miami.1 The disputing parties are the two insurance companies that maintained insurance policies covering the shipper. Ayala and Maduro were stevedores: Ayala's operations were in Puerto Rico. Maduro's were in Miami. Maduro and Zapata agreed to 1 As the full names of the relevant entities in this case are somewhat unwieldy. Each will be referred to by the following abbreviations: Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct2001/99-15090.opn.html">TRANSAMERICA LEASING, INC. V. INST. OF LONDON UNDERWRITERS (10/4/2001, NO. 99-15090)<BR></A><BR> We reverse and remand for trial.</SPAN></P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr2000/99-13349.man.html">MINDIS METALS V. TRANSP. INS. CO. (4/20/2000, NO. 99-13349)<BR></A><BR> There is no consensus in other jurisdictions as to whether intentional conduct premised on erroneous information is an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb96/94-9152.opa.html">MORSTEIN V. NATIONAL INS. SERVS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Morstein v. Those claims were preempted by ERISA. Is the president. Morstein was also one of two employees of Graphic. The policy was to be administered by National Insurance Services. The policy offered by Hankins was issued to Graphic. Graphic paid the initial premium.<p> Over one year after the policy was issued. National then rescinded the policy and refunded the premium payments to Graphic that were made on behalf of Morstein. She further alleges that Hankins and the Shaw Agency were negligent in processing her application for insurance and that she has state law claims against them for negligence and fraud.<p> Morstein filed an action in state court. The district court denied Morstein's motion to remand and found that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to the state law claims against them. Those claims are preempted by ERISA. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/08/053766P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> SMG was a frozen poultry wholesaler based in Rogers. Sanderson was one of SMG's chicken suppliers. The request was denied. The poultry in fourteen of the twenty four containers was sold during the pendency of the investigation and the appeal. The containers were seized anew by Russian authorities as part of a different investigation involving Techpromptorg. The ten containers were never returned to SMG or P & O. Arguing (1) P & O was not an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the Lloyd's policy. Finding P & O was not an intended beneficiary of the Lloyd's policy and SMG did not have an insurable interest in the cargo at the time of seizure. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199915090.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Transamerica is a lessor of ocean cargo containers and related equipment. Named Assured is more precisely as below and not as previously advised: C.A. Losses if any are payable to the Assured as their respective interests may appear or order. The named assureds were: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0470n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We believe the arbitrator's conclusion that the grievances that prompted this case were timely filed and her award ordering the Plaintiffs to stop any further unilateral changes in insurance coverage draw their essence from the agreement. The relationship between Bixby and its nurses was controlled by a Collective Bargaining Agreement that was in effect from October 1. The two MNA bargaining units have been consolidated into one. Nurse hospital relations are governed by an agreement between MNA and the Lenawee Health Alliance (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1764.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1995 is amended as follows: Bottom of page 8. Was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellees. In the months before the Escape was lost. Giragosian's adverse experiences relating to the vessel were 1 The Giragosians also counterclaimed for violations of Mass. The engine stalled as Giragosian was entering Scituate Harbor after a pleasure cruise. He was unable to restart the engine. Someone noticed that the Escape was lying very low in the water and the Coast Guard was called to pump the boat out. The two planned to sail the Escape to the Bay Point Marina in Quincy to have it hauled for the season. Giragosian and Likely rowed to where the Escape was moored. That it was rainwater. Because the batteries were low. As the winds were light. He estimated that he was sailing at about six knots. Giragosian noticed that his floorboards were now covered with sloshing water and that they had begun to float. Could not find one as the water was now flooding the cockpit and the flashlight was underwater. Could raise noone. 4 It was getting close to sunset. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A97583447D4C38CE88256C4C007B61D6/$file/0136013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A subcontractor on a major develop Because Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company of America are subsidiaries of Travelers Property Casualty Company. The defendants are hereby collectively referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1696.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom Lawson & Weitzen was on brief. DeMallie & Lougee were on brief. This is an appeal from the LYNCH. As a defendant in a suit arising out of Paul Revere Life Insurance Company's refusal to pay disability insurance benefits to plaintiff's late husband when he was suffering from his final illness. Plaintiff sought to add a new party defendant on a state law claim in an action which the district court was simultaneously dismissing against the original defendants as being preempted by federal law. We review the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and conclude that there is no such abuse under the circumstances. We need not and do not reach the issue of whether the state law misrepresentation claim is preempted by the Employee Income Security Act of 1974. One month later he was diagnosed with bone cancer and sought disability benefits. His request was denied as being related to a preexisting condition for which he sought treatment during the enrollment period. Plaintiff contends that this pamphlet was misleading. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992228.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Who was to have procured a liability policy containing basic pollution coverage. Who are specialists the agent knew had contracted to remove and/or transport hazardous waste from a contaminated site. (3) Brown was liable for failing to notify AETC and B&D Maintenance. (4) AETC was not contributorily negligent. I. AETC is a company specializing in the removal and disposal of hazardous waste. B&D was to supply rigging and cranes to move the transformers. Which were filled with PCB contaminated oil. AETC then was to remove the transformers from the premises. AETC did not request a copy of the complete insurance policy despite the fact that the certificate also contained a disclaimer on its face that warned the coverages were subject to exclusions contained within the policy itself. B&D employees were in the process of lowering transformers from the roof of the Columbia building to the floor when a rigging winch hit a stationary transformer on the rooftop. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec99/98-9251.man.html">KATZ V. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF GROUP INS., ALLTEL (12/8/1999, NO. 98-9251)<BR></A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge:</P> <P> This is an appeal from the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/apr97/96-6038.wpd.html">GAYLOR V. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Gaylor maintains first that her policy with Defendant John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (Hancock) is not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She argues that even if her claim is governed by ERISA. The bases relied upon by Hancock were insufficient to deny her claim. Life and accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policies are mandatory. Is optional. Was finally referred to Dr. Gaylor was not in need of orthopedic surgery. Gaylor was still his patient and that he would see her in further follow ups. She was unable to work as of October 13. Who informed her that there was nothing more he could do for her and suggested that she return to her primary care physicians for long term treatment. Non surgical condition required follow up and care and medications that are best handled by primary care physicians who would continue to see patients on a regular basis. She was rejected. Because she was financially unable to pay the doctor's bill. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1430.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Ndez was automatically substituted as a party for Flores Galarza\ in his official capacity as Secretary. <span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-9152.opa.html">MORSTEIN V. NATIONAL INS. SERVS.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Morstein v. Those claims were preempted by ERISA. Is the president. Morstein was also one of two employees of Graphic. The policy was to be administered by National Insurance Services. The policy offered by Hankins was issued to Graphic. Graphic paid the initial premium.<p> Over one year after the policy was issued. National then rescinded the policy and refunded the premium payments to Graphic that were made on behalf of Morstein. She further alleges that Hankins and the Shaw Agency were negligent in processing her application for insurance and that she has state law claims against them for negligence and fraud.<p> Morstein filed an action in state court. The district court denied Morstein's motion to remand and found that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to the state law claims against them. Those claims are preempted by ERISA. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962081.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The issue is which insurer is responsible for certain medical benefits claimed by Richard Mayotte. Whereby Pan Am contracted to continue benefits for twelve months after cessation of insurance if an insured was totally disabled when his insurance ceased. The district court concluded that this provision was valid and. Pan Am was responsible for paying the benefits at issue here. The Pan Am policy provides in pertinent part: If an insured person is totally disabled when his insurance ceases. Benefits will be extended for the twelve (12) months following cessation of insurance and only for the ailment causing the illness. Ryobi employed Mayotte and he was a participant in this ERISA plan. Mayotte was involved in an accident and. At issue in this case is the responsibility for payment of Mayotte's benefits from January 1. Pan Am brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment to determine which insurer itself or Blue Cross is responsible for providing these benefits to Mayotte. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/08/00-6384.htm">00-6384 -- PHILLIPS V. NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE CO. -- 08/28/2001<BR></A><BR> Jurisdiction in federal court is based on diversity of the parties. <em>See</em> 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1080.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on briefs for appellants. Hoag & Eliot were on briefs for appellee. Even though the action was commenced more than two years after the policy was issued. He falsely stated that his health was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/99-1511.htm">99-1511 -- ADAMS V. AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE CO. -- 12/01/2000<BR></A><BR> As the parties are familiar with the facts. We will only briefly restate them here. <p> <u>A. The Financial Transactions</u> <p> The Plaintiffs are investors in First Capital Network. Associates could not pay First Capital all the money it was owed. Gregory and Employers never reached agreement and the Employers' coverage was not renewed. Summary judgment is appropriate only if </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1596.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellants. Colinvaux and Zelle & Larson LLP were on brief for appellee. Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022317.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. That its claim to those portions is superior to the claims of Pepper Hamilton and MLCA. Colkitt are siblings. Were insured. Colkitt was an officer and director of National Medical Financial Services. National Union agreed to provide his defense under a reserThe Rahman Agreement was one of four settlement agreements entered into by the United States. The other settlement agreements are not relevant to the issues on appeal. 2 10 UNITED STATES v. 2000 were not covered by the D&O policy and would not be paid. COLKITT 11 it would not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/March2004/031436np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Mohney alleged that what he was led to believe were savings plans were instead simply life insurance policies. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. 2 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Our jurisdiction for review of the District Court's final order is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mohney testified in his deposition that he informed Forney of his intention to buy a savings plan for his children and that he was not interested in purchasing insurance policies. MetLife's financial products were described without any reference to insurance. The materials suggested that the 50/50 Plan was the only investment vehicle that 3 guaranteed </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct2001/99-15090.opn.html">TRANSAMERICA LEASING, INC. V. INST. OF LONDON UNDERWRITERS (10/4/2001, NO. 99-15090)<BR></A><BR> We reverse and remand for trial.</SPAN></P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5078.html">AMERICAN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for plaintiff appellant.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9EA6645FBBA6B29B88256B59000308AC/$file/9916194.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041749p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Reliance Insurance Company and United Pacific Insurance Company are Pennsylvania corporations with their principal places of business in Philadelphia. Reliance Surety Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. Plaintiff Reliance National Indemnity Company is a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin or in Philadelphia. For itself and as successor in interest by merger with United Pacific Insurance Company and Reliance National Indemnity Company is the successor to the original plaintiffs. As a matter of convenience we will refer to the plaintiffs appellants as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001907.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Line 10 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1464.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Wistow & Barylick Incorporated were on brief for plaintiff. Allen & Snyder were on brief for defendant. Title Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EAABDD953A8D3B7D88256E21005D3621/$file/0217136.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We find that whether or not Eichacker met the physician's care requirement is a disputed issue of fact that warrants a jury trial. I. Factual and Procedural History Milton Eichacker is a lawyer who started his own law practice in Las Vegas. The claimant is (a) unable to perform the important duties of his or her occupation. (b) receiving a physician's care.1 The policy defines </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002495.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court held that Lauri Jo Hartz's complaint was styled in tort not contract. The policy was issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. There were no personal injuries resulting from the fire. Neither that crew nor a subsequent crew was able to successfully repair the damage. Hartz's asthma began to worsen and she was unable to stay in her home. Even though other family members were able to do so. Liberty Mutual asserted that the appraiser was not impartial as required by the policy. A Consent Order was executed in which Liberty Mutual acknowledged that it had violated the unfair claim settlement provision of the Maryland Code. Hartz alleged that this delay was a direct result of Liberty Mutual's unreasonable and improper conduct. There was no private right of action against an insurance company in tort for failure to settle a claim with an insured. The court further held that any contract action Hartz had was moot because Liberty Mutual had already paid Hartz's claims for damages to her home as a result of the fire. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/96-4094.htm">96-4094 -- WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. V. AV&S, AM&S, LSK, AS&S AND AMBASSADOR PIZZA, INC. -- 07/14/1998<BR></A><BR> S is a corporation whose business is a franchisee of Ambassador Pizza. As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured. Separately to each insured against whom claim is made or 'suit' is brought. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="739"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0706p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the defendant. The product at issue here is an anchoring system made by Lucker for the off shore oil drilling industry and called a Lateral Mooring System ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/09/98-6134.htm">98-6134 -- CENTRA, INC. V. CHANDLER INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. -- 09/07/2000<BR></A><BR> 1291. <p> Plaintiffs are involved in the trucking business and Defendants are involved in the insurance business. Their relationship was close and symbiotic until they had a falling out. The parties </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1998/98a1989p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is the fourth installment in this lengthy and tortuous insurance saga. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. I. The Lake Erie Employers' Association ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1186.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The insurance contracts were claims made policies under which coverage was only provided against claims made and reported during the (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Did not appear in the district court and is not before us on appeal. (2) Coregis contends Ms. Peterson was sued by Ms. Contending the claims made policies were issued in violation of Colorado law. It was Coregis' position that even </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/02/98-6311.htm">98-6311 -- MANNING & SMITH INSURANCE INC. V. HAWK-MORGAN INSURANCE AGENCY INC. -- 02/03/2000<BR></A><BR> Affirm the district court's judgment in its entirety. <p> <center>I.</center> <p> MSI is a Kansas corporation with its principal place of business in Wichita. (Hawk Moran) is a suspended Oklahoma corporation which at all material times had its principal place of business in or near Oklahoma City. Are all Oklahoma citizens. <p> On August 4. The total purchase price was $319. Smith Insurance and good will. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/05/97-7102.htm">97-7102 -- STATE INSURANCE FUND V. SOUTHERN STAR FOODS, INC. -- 05/21/1998<BR></A><BR> Appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) decision that its claim for unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums is not entitled to priority status under 11 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan96/94-3377.opa.html">FLORIDA HOSP. TRUST FUND V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Florida Hosp. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The salient facts are not in dispute. Appellants are three trust funds<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1998/98a2032p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. I. Newport is a subsidiary of the LeFrak Organization. Those claims were later settled. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. The breakwater is located about 120 feet from the dock's end and is designed to limit wave action in the area in which the boats are moored. Feinstein acknowledges he was not aware of the existence of the breakwater at the time he drafted the policy. The breakwater was severely damaged by a storm. We apply the same test as the district court: that is. We determine </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-1050_023.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> These reinsurance agreements were negotiated by BCS' former reinsurance intermediary Guy Carpenter & Company. ISI itself was not an insurer and therefore needed to affiliate with a company licensed to provide insurance for the warranties it sold. The ISI program was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/12/01-5011a.htm">01-5011A -- IDG INC. V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. -- 12/26/2001<BR></A><BR> Is a member of the firm of Winstead. These policies provided liability and defense coverage in the event IDG was sued for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1877.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Molloy was on brief for defendants Arsenal Auto Repairs. Were on brief for defendant Jack Markarian. Were on brief for plaintiff appellee Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. The purpose of the scheme was to obtain payments on fraudulent insurance claims. The judgment was for Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5071.html">MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for plaintiff <a name=QuickMark></a>appellant.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0368p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The ultimate question in this appeal is whether an insurance company that was both the administrator of a disability benefits plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/39A0558D48658EBA88256F0000588273/$file/0250365.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Its President at the time of the yacht's purchase was Paul Ebeling. Who was 12300 UNITED STATES v. Ebeling testified that the name </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031329.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The word </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001378.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Provident Bank of Maryland was served with a summons and complaint in the case of Suriel Finance. Travelers also stated: As you are aware. The limit of insurance on this endorsement is $100. The total amount of damages sought by the plaintiff is in excess of your policy limits and. Any judgment rendered against you in excess of your policy limits will not be covered. The original insurer was a subsidiary of Aetna Life & Casualty Company. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP. 3 But a few weeks later Travelers wrote Provident Bank again and stated that it had reviewed the allegations and </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb2000/991292.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because this case is before us in the unusual procedural posture of an appeal from a consent judgment. Before we reach this question we must consider whether the stringent conditions for appellate jurisdiction over a consent judgment have been met. The case also presents an interesting issue of justiciability insofar as the consent judgment is founded on a settlement of the underlying claim under which the plaintiff gets more or less depending on the legal rule we apply on appeal. Two of her injuries to her knee and to her shoulder were clearly caused by the accident. Was more difficult to evaluate because Keefe had a preexisting problem with her wrist. It was not immediately clear how much of the post accident condition of her wrist was attributable to the accident. She asserts in this suit that Prudential acted in bad faith by failing to settle her claims for her knee and shoulder injuries while it was awaiting more information regarding her wrist injury. Are satisfied that the understanding between the parties that Prudential would appeal was sufficiently clear to avoid waiver. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-8068.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They were infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0430p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was convicted of two counts of conspiracy and 155 counts of money laundering. Contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Jamieson further alleges that the government was guilty of misconduct in making certain prejudicial statements in closing argument The Honorable William W Schwarzer. He contends that he is entitled to be re sentenced under United States v. The marketing of viaticals is legal. The record establishes that Jamieson was aware of the risk of investing in fraudulent viatical policies. The viator's date of HIVpositive or AIDS diagnosis actually preceded the date the policy was issued by the insurance company. Jamieson gave testimony under oath to the Ohio Department of Commerce's Division of Securities that Liberte Capital never reviewed the policies it purchased to determine whether they were fraudulent because (contrary to his earlier description of how viators obtain fraudulent policies) he </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan96/94-3377.opa.html">FLORIDA HOSP. TRUST FUND V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Florida Hosp. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The salient facts are not in dispute. Appellants are three trust funds<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1996/96a1408p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue on appeal is whether a liability insurance policy's Sexually Transmitted Disease Exclusion excludes coverage for claims arising out of a gym member's expulsion from a gym due to his Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982083.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the evidence presented at trial. Was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of Cooper and against the Lee County. Was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to render a verdict in his favor. Each Commissioner of Revenue is an independent constitutional officer. See id.1 The salaries of constitutional officers and their staff are paid by each county. Each county is reimbursed for these expenditures by the Compensation Board of the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Compensation Board). It is within the constitutional officer's discretion to determine how this money is used. Each county is required to provide group life. Was hired to work full time as a deputy commissioner by the Lee County Commissioner of Revenue. Cooper's position was funded by lump sum money allocated by the Compensation Board to pay temporary employees. At the time he was hired. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/12/01-5011.htm">01-5011 -- IDG, INC. V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY -- 12/26/2001<BR></A><BR> These policies provided liability and defense coverage in the event IDG was sued for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011922.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That he was diagnosed with and treated for sarcoidosis (a disease involving the formation of tumor like nodules). Mardirossian alleged that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200512114.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The key issue is whether. Did not resolve it because all but one of the claims for relief in that appeal were rendered moot by a repeal of the challenged ordinance. CAMP was unable to apply for a permit because Atlanta imposed a moratorium on the issuance of permits from November 27. That other provisions were constitutional. (2) whether the challenge by CAMP to the moratorium on festival permits is moot because the moratorium has expired. Our review of these issues involving these parties is familiar territory. We also conclude that the complaint of CAMP regarding the denial of its application for a permit during the moratorium is not moot. A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A49420EE0F8959C588256FC500824CBC/$file/0316671o.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The question of law will be determinative of the matter pending before this court. There is no clearly controlling precedent in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court. All further proceedings in this case are stayed pending receipt of the answer to the certified question. This appeal is withdrawn from submission and will be submitted after receipt of the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion on the question certified. The parties will notify the Clerk of this court within one week after the Nevada Supreme Court 3307 3308 OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE v. Kevin Jensen was piloting a plane and approaching the runway of the Carson City Airport when his plane crashed in the backyard of appellant Robert Griffin. Old Republic filed an action for a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to pay any damages to Griffin or Jensen because the accident was excluded from coverage. The company alleged that because Jensen failed to have an annual inspection performed on the aircraft as required by the airworthiness provisions of the policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/07/00-1289.htm">00-1289 -- SIPMA V. MASSACHUSETTS CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. -- 07/17/2001<BR></A><BR> Background</strong></center> <p> The facts in this case are uncontested. Byron were covered by the disability and life insurance policies. Sipma was injured and claimed disability benefits. Sipma's state law claims are preempted. Summary judgment is appropriate </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="732"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1221.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Kademenos & Heichel were on brief for appellants. Hammer were on brief for appellees. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This appeal from summary judgment is all that remains from a shareholder class action filed in 1991 by Plaintiffs Appellants Channing M. The only remaining defendant was E&Y. Was to mislead investors by artificially inflating the price of Monarch Capital s stock. The district court granted summary judgment for E&Y on the Class claims for primary liability under Section 10(b) and denied the Class motions. 2 An insurance company s statutory surplus is comprised of its admitted assets (or statutory assets minus statutory liabilities). 3 During this period of inactivity. That all pending secondary liability claims against E&Y were barred and granted summary judgment in favor of E&Y on all claims for aiding and abetting. 3 This appeal follows. Monarch Capital the Parent Holding Company Monarch Capital was a typical financial holding company of the 1970s and 1980s. It was clear that this focus was in error. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2984.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 2 No. 02 2984 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/02/01-5172.htm">01-5172 -- CONOVER V. AETNA U.S. HEALTH CARE INC. -- 02/20/2003<BR></A><BR> Sallee Conover appeals from a district court decision holding her state law bad faith claim is preempted under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. <em> See</em> <em>Conover v. Conover argues her claim is not preempted because the Act saves </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-4601_041.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Michael Segal and Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB) were charged in 27 counts of a 28 count fourth superseding indictment: Segal with racketeering. NNIB was ordered to pay a $1.4 million fine and pay restitution totaling 2 Nos. 05 4601 & 05 4756 $841. Segal was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. Segal was a licensed attorney. An insurance broker who began working for NNIB in 1964 when it was owned by George Dunne. By the early 1990s Segal was the owner and sole shareholder of the company. During the 1990s NNIB was earning close to $50 million annually. Required insurance brokers to maintain a premium fund trust account (PFTA) into which all premiums were to be deposited and held in a fiduciary capacity until the carriers demanded the premium payments. Brokers were required to maintain PFTAs in trust with sufficient funds to pay premiums. Failure to properly maintain a PFTA was grounds for suspension or revocation of a broker's license. Conversion of more than $150 was a felony. Everything was deposited in the PFTA. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2000/99-14141.man.html">MORRISON V. ALLSTATE INDEM. CO. (9/26/2000, NO. 99-14141)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june98/96-9249.man.html">ELAN PHARM. RESEARCH CORP. V. EMPLOYERS INS. OF WAUSAU (6/26/1998, NO. 96-9249)<BR></A><BR> Plc ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0128p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue in this insurancecoverage dispute is the scope of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0252p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The basic facts are undisputed. The policy also contains a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2000/99-14141.man.html">MORRISON V. ALLSTATE INDEM. CO. (9/26/2000, NO. 99-14141)<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1BACABC54855C87088256E5A00707D7A/$file/0016514.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to decide an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether California Insurance Code Section 10369.6 applies to group disability insurance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Twohey that it was entitled to offset his benefits under the policy. Teresa Twohey learned that Lincoln's offsets may have been inconsistent with California Insurance Code Section 10369.6. (3) Twohey's claims are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The model language of Section 10369.6 provides: Insurance With Other Insurers: If there is other valid coverage. Twohey argues that Lincoln's dollar for dollar offsets resulted in a monthly benefit that was less favorable to her husband than the pro rata formula set forth in Section 10369.6. Since group disability insurance is identified in the statute. The cited statutes are. Which provides that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1119.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Of counsel was Arlie O. With her on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Major Anissa Parekh. The preconstruction conference was held on November 2. It became apparent that the government's plans were flawed and that construction could not begin until the government provided Singleton with new construction drawings. Singleton responded that it was not obligated to furnish proof of insurance until ten days after the government allowed work to begin. The audit focused on the amount that Singleton claimed it was owed for unabsorbed overhead. It did not make a determination as to whether Singleton was entitled to the overhead. Regarding the claim for overhead for the period during which performance of the contract was delayed. The Board found that Singleton was responsible for the delay. The Board ruled that the government's failure to provide new drawings was merely a concurrent cause of the delay and that Singleton therefore was not entitled to unabsorbed overhead under Nicon. Singleton essentially asks that we find that the government was solely responsible for the delay. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F49C2FA4BAA3E57988256B18007EB22E/$file/0016514.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to decide an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether California Insurance Code Section 10369.6 applies to group disability insurance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Twohey that it was entitled to offset his benefits under the policy. Teresa Twohey learned that Lincoln's offsets may have been inconsistent with California Insurance Code Section 10369.6. (3) Twohey's claims are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The model language of Section 10369.6 provides: Insurance With Other Insurers: If there is other valid coverage. Twohey argues that Lincoln's dollar for dollar offsets resulted in a monthly benefit that was less favorable to her husband than the pro rata formula set forth in Section 10369.6. Since group disability insurance is identified in the statute. The cited statutes are. Which provides that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/951899.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Section 2 the caption is corrected to read </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june98/96-9249.man.html">ELAN PHARM. RESEARCH CORP. V. EMPLOYERS INS. OF WAUSAU (6/26/1998, NO. 96-9249)<BR></A><BR> Plc ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Mar2002/993505up.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court concluded that HOVIC's claim was unambiguously excluded from coverage under Zurich's policy. We will reverse. The unit was to be used in the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0159n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Matthews' disability was caused by a psychological impairment that Matthews' treating physician diagnosed as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0950AE0F097F01DE88257353006EEACE/$file/0516358.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policy was set to expire on February 28. It was unable to do so because other insurance companies had no interest in doing business with an ailing telecommunications company whose financial weakness was known throughout the industry. IFCI was incorporated in Arizona. 12342 IN RE: INTERNATIONAL FIBERCOM the following provision: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041642p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Lexington Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A3424B3CE00FFC6B88256D7500836EEE/$file/0215329.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 10641 paintings were worth far more than the $558 declared value listed on the waybill. Was able to purchase insurance in excess of the limitation. BACKGROUND Kesel is a corporate executive in the high technology arena and a sponsor of a foundation that distributes fine art from Russia and the Ukraine. 000 apiece. decided that placing the Ark inside a crate amid a giant warehouse filled with identical crates was the best way to ensure that it would never be found. 10642 KESEL v. If the commission decides that a work of art is not an antique. They are presumed to be lost. The court concluded that UPS had given Kesel a fair opportunity to purchase greater liability because Belik insured the paintings for $558 more than the $100 released value that otherwise would have applied. The district court concluded that Kesel had failed to lay a proper foundation for the declaration because he provided </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FD672BA6C63F946D88256E5A00707DA8/$file/9917094.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> She argues that the district court was incorrect in concluding that ERISA barred her suit against Allmerica. I. Appellant was married to Charles Everhart. For which it was the plan administrator. The terms of the policy dictated that his beneficiaries were to receive a death benefit of twice his annual earnings. Charles Everhart was a plan participant. Was roughly $239. That figure was $480. It continued to maintain it was required to pay benefits only on Charles Everhart's stated salary of $84. Interpretation of ERISA is a question of law reviewed de novo. An employee welfare benefit plan is a plan an employer establishes or maintains to provide benefits for its participants. A money judgment for an action brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B) may be enforced </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2004/033383np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I. Because the parties are familiar with the facts. Intermodal chassis are specialized trailers used to transport cargo containers over American roadways. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1995/94a0943p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who purchased or otherwise beneficially acquired securities that were incorrectly and misleadingly labelled or described as annuities from Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company during the period August 14. Because all of these claims were essentially grounded in fraud. Because federal jurisdiction over one of the claims is exclusive and there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the remaining claims. We hold that the district court erred when it concluded that there is an opportunity for timely and adequate state court review of Plaintiffs' federal securities claims. We will therefore reverse the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' case without prejudice and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[fn2] I. General Background Mutual Benefit was established in 1845. It was one of the country's largest life insurance companies. Until the late 1970's Mutual Benefit was a relatively conservative institution. These withdrawals were projected to reach $1 billion by the end of the year. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1678.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Blankstein & Lund were on brief for appellee. were on brief for appellee. Challenges a district court judgment declaring that the attorney fees appellant incurred in successfully defending against three malpractice actions brought by former clients were not recoverable under the professional liability policy issued by New England Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1995/95a1227p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act. HMO/NJ argues that the premium assessments under the Reform Act are preempted by FEHBA because they will increase the cost of individual health care benefits to federal employees. Benefits which are payable from the Federal Employee Health Benefits Fund. Will reverse the district court's order on the issue of FEHBA preemption. (Individual health care coverage is coverage offered by an insurance company or health maintenance organization directly to an individual and his or her family. Who often do not have the option of purchasing employer based or group health coverage). Carriers were required to start offering the five plans on August 1. The central component of the Reform Act is the requirement that all carriers in the state pay an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-40540.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sued Associates Financial Life Insurance Company (AFLIC)in Texas state court alleging that she was owed money on a life insurance policy (the Policy) purchased from AFLIC. This Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. This Court will affirm. This policy was purchased to cover a mortgage loan of $22. Pena contends that the Policy was for $100. 000.00 and that she is therefore still owed $83. Summary judgment is proper if the movant can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If the movant meets this test the burden shifts to the non movant to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. 000.00 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2001/00-15541.opn.html">ESCOBIO V. AM. INT'L GROUP (8/23/2001, NO. 00-15541)<BR></A><BR> Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053497p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The key issue in this diversity case governed by New Jersey law is the proper construction of the policy exclusion. We further predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that this clear and unambiguous policy exclusion should be A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0BAF300A5292AB2B88256B2F0001ADD2/$file/9917094.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> She argues that the district court was incorrect in concluding that ERISA barred her suit against Allmerica. I. Appellant was married to Charles Everhart. For which it was the plan administrator. The terms of the policy dictated that his beneficiaries were to receive a death benefit of twice his annual earnings. Charles Everhart was a plan participant. Was roughly $239. That figure was $480. It continued to maintain it was required to pay benefits only on Charles Everhart's stated salary of $84. Interpretation of ERISA is a question of law reviewed de novo. An employee welfare benefit plan is a plan an employer establishes or maintains to provide benefits for its participants. A money judgment for an action brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B) may be enforced </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1126.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Insurance is meant to cushion the blow caused by a disaster. It is supposed to be part of the solution. The contest is over who was responsible for inadequacies in the insurance policy itself. One of the issues we are considering on appeal concerns the effect of a settlement between IBJ and Cory in the main action on the eve of trial. It therefore limited the trial to the question whether there was a fiduciary relationship between Cory and IBSI. The jury decided that there was. Claiming that this was error. The district court should not have so restricted the trial. This opinion will continue to refer to this party as International Bank of Japan. We affirm the court's ruling that Travelers was entitled to summary judgment. I At the heart of this case is a simple but expensive communication failure. IBSI was authorized to undertake a variety of tasks on behalf of Travelers. In which all CCC stock and claims were assigned to IBJ. Although a detailed post mortem of the coverage dispute is unnecessary for the purposes of the present appeal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200214044.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policy is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Barbara Kennedy was Clint Kennedy's second wife. They were married from 1983 to July of 1991. Mary Beth Kennedy was Clint Kennedy's third wife and was married to him from July of 1991 until the time of his death. BACKGROUND Clint Kennedy was employed by Georgia Pacific Corporation for more than twenty five years. His last position was that of Executive Vice President and. Naming his then wife Barbara as the sole beneficiary if she were still living at the time of his death. We will omit the word </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2001/00-15541.opn.html">ESCOBIO V. AM. INT'L GROUP (8/23/2001, NO. 00-15541)<BR></A><BR> Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9300D61A9D3C173088256F0900552C3D/$file/0217317.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether. A company which contracted to build a house is covered under its commercial general liability policy against claims brought against the company by the dissatisfied homeowners. Construction was completed. The gravamen of the homeowners' allegations was that Oceanic improperly designed and/or constructed the foundation of the residence causing earth movement and resulting in physical and structural damage to both the residence and the retaining walls on the property. At the time the counterclaim was filed. Oceanic was the named insured under a standard form commercial general liability ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/013183.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The parties entered into settlement discussions during which the plaintiff contended that the airplane's crash into the water resulted only in emotional distress to her husband and that his death by drowning was a separate occurrence from the crash itself. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2004/031511p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A Pennsylvania insurance company that was already in financial difficulty. The stocks were found to be worthless. Though the stocks were essentially worthless. I. Appellants Michael Miller and Philip Rennert were convicted by a jury of conspiracy. Appellant George Jensen was convicted by a jury of securities fraud. Are set forth in our earlier opinion in United States v. We repeat only such details as are necessary to decide the issues before us in this appeal. reinsurance regulations that require u n l i c e n s e d o f f s h o r e r e i n s u r a n ce companies. The Teale Network was Forum Rothmore's sole client. Forum Rothmore was the Teale Network's only consistent source of assets. Jensen was at various times in control of and president of Ecotech. Although Ecotech's shares were virtually wo rthless. Was corporate counsel for Forum Rothmore and a shareholder in Ecotech. The Ecotech stock at issue was not tradeable and carried a restrictive legend to that effect. The Government submitted evidence that Miller was paid $130. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/04/97-4050.htm">97-4050 -- NOVELL INC. V. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO. -- 04/14/1998<BR></A><BR> Michael Ross is the sole proprietor of Enhancement Software. StampIt was designed to work as an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-3270.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/98opinions/98-5008.html">ALDER V. US<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/00/00-3910.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brenda Combes was the insured person. Was surprised to discover that Brenda had changed the beneficiaries on these policies (or had tried to do so) from himself and the couple's daughter Ashley to Brenda's sister. The third policy was part of a benefit plan established under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. Since their interests are aligned for present purposes). Seeking a declaration that she was the sole beneficiary of that policy as well and demanding payment of the proceeds. The Pennsylvania and North Carolina actions were later transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. The three cases were consolidated. All contested proceeds were deposited with the court. While we do not doubt that David and Ashley were sympathetic figures. We conclude that the oral agreement is not sufficient under the law of Illinois to override a written designation of a beneficiary on an insurance policy. We also conclude that the flaws David identifies in the ERISA change of beneficiary form were not enough to defeat its effectiveness. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/02/99-3022.htm">99-3022 -- ERA FRANCHISE SYSTEMS INC. V. NORTHERN INSURANCE CO. OF NEW YORK -- 02/17/2000<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> This appeal involves a declaratory judgment action brought by ERA Franchise Systems. The first suit was filed on July 10. REC is an independently owned ERA franchisee in Santa Cruz. Bryant are real estate brokers. Gil Osorio was an independent contractor selling real estate for REC. The plaintiffs further alleged they </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011081.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I WIMSA was formed for the purpose of establishing a memorial (the Memorial) at the Arlington National Cemetery to honor women in military service. WIMSA was permitted to proceed with construction of the Memorial. Safety within the area involved until the work was completed. Thereafter as long as the Memorial was in place. WIMSA was responsible for all damages to lands or other property of the United States caused by WIMSA or by WIMSA's employees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-30406.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts underlying this appeal are generally uncontested. The parties agree that on the date of the accident Shura was an employee of Parks Transportation. Fikes no longer operated the Freightliner and the tractor trailer was not listed on the insurance policy it renewed with Lancer on October 1. A certificate of insurance that Fikes was required to file with the Texas Department of Transportation continued to include the 1993 Freightliner as a covered vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Fikes and Lancer after finding that: (1) Shura was employed by Parks Transportation. The certificate of insurance Fikes filed with the Texas Department of Transportation was incapable of creating insurance coverage that was not part of an actual insurance policy. appealed. 502 (5th Cir. 2001). judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of In the meantime. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011523.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was actually issued by Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company. 1 DANBY OF NORTH AMERICA v. Under which Cinco was given a non exclusive license to market the Danby System in the United States. Alleging that the termination of its licenses was unjust because Danby had breached the Agreement in eleven respects. Two of these allegations were that Danby had breached the Agreement by: (1) actively discouraging potential users from using the Danby System. Rondeau Bay further claimed that Danby's breaches of contract were tortious in nature. Danby had also breached the Agreement by representing to others that the Danby System was inappropriate for small diameter pipes. Danby's attempted termination of the Agreement was therefore unjust. Arbitration proceedings were conducted in San Francisco. Concluding that Rondeau Bay's claims were without merit. Was in effect from November 3. Danby was insured. Danby therefore contended that Travelers was obligated to reimburse it for its defense costs. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-1924_039.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The funds were intended for payment of health insurance premiums. Whiting was sentenced to 90 months of incarceration. (2) finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Whiting's convictions for conversion. Badger's employees were members of the United Electrical. Badger employees were covered by a United Healthcare insurance policy that was funded in part by employee payroll deductions. Employee contributions were withheld from paychecks and kept in Badger's general operating account until they were used to pay the United Healthcare premium. The company was in financial distress and behind in payments to vendors. Although these funds were deducted. MBA was not an insurance company. Have MBA enroll employees in the plan in groups of one or two. Badger first gave official notice to the employees that the plan was self funded. Although the self funded plan was effective July 1. Due to processing delays medical claims were not presented to Badger for approval until late September 2001. Badger employees were left with $414. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar96/95-8371.opa.html">MACON-BIBB CTY. INDUS. AUTH. V. NORD BITUMI, U.S., INC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Macon Bibb Cty. Senior Circuit Judges.<p> <p> PER CURIAM:<p> <p> This is an alleged subrogation claim by the fire insurer of a property owner against the allegedly negligent tenant of the property. Essentially for the reasons set forth in the Order from which this appeal is taken. The material parts of which are incorporated herein as an Appendix.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/00-6122.htm">00-6122 -- INTERIOR SHUTTERS, INC. V. VALIANT INSURANCE COMPANY -- 12/28/2000<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> <p> Plaintiffs appellants appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to appellee Valiant Insurance Company (Valiant) on appellants' claims relating to non payment of insurance proceeds. Reasoning that their policy with Interior only covered damage caused by rain if it were proceeded by damage to the walls or roof of the structure resulting from a covered cause of loss. Summary judgment is only appropriate if </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/08/99-5223.htm">99-5223 -- VBF, INC. V. CHUBB GROUP OF INSURANCE CO. -- 08/28/2001<BR></A><BR> In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-7175a.html">CHARTER OIL CO V. AETNA<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022474.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A title insurance company must indemnify its insured for (1) expenses incurred by the insured to resolve a defect in title to land when the expenses were incurred after the insured conveyed the land away. Holding that the insurance company was responsible for both the expenses incurred in resolving the defect in title and the costs of defending the trespass action. We reverse the district court's ruling that the expenses incurred by the insured in resolving the title defect were covered. The effective date of that title policy was December 18. Included only a special warranty CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE v. 100 INVESTMENT LIMITED 3 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0199p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Seeking a declaration that it was not required to defend or indemnify J & L in a personal injury action in state court relating to a logging accident that occurred on November 13. Was preparing to haul a load of timber from a J & L logging site. 2004ction was whether Shields was an employee of J & L at the time of his injury and. Facts J & L is a small. Is a fifty eight year old man who has worked in or around the logging industry most of his adult life. Which were garaged at his house and were maintained primarily by him. J & L hired Shields's trucks and drivers when it needed loads hauled and did not have any available trucks or drivers of its own. Although there was no formal contract between them. The payment arrangement between Shields and J & L was somewhat complicated. Shields was paid by the load for his work hauling for J & L. Shields was listed as an employee on the J & L payroll registers. He received a weekly payroll check of $250 from which taxes and health insurance premiums were withheld. He also received a check from the general account from which no withholdings were taken. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958371.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PER CURIAM: This is an alleged subrogation claim by the fire insurer of a property owner against the allegedly negligent tenant of the property. Essentially for the reasons set forth in the Order from which this appeal is taken. The material parts of which are incorporated herein as an Appendix. 1 See Tuxedo Plumbing & Honorable Levin H. While the defendant was in possession of the leased premises. The INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY contends that this fire was caused by the negligence of defendant NORD BITUMI and/or its employees. Plaintiff was paid $104. Pursuant to an agreement styled as a loan receipt. was $109. There was a $5. It seems more efficient to issue this opinion and let the matter pend on a Petition for Rehearing if the parties are so advised. Lessor agrees that it will. In an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the full replacement value of the property of which the premises are a part as determined from time to time. Or is claimed to be resulted. This is a diversity case. Georgia law is applied to decide the substantive issues. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031674.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is a fine art gallery located in the Eastgate Shopping Center in Chapel Hill. Studio Frames was required to purchase federal flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The terms of Studio Frames' policy were set forth in the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). Was invalid under the SFIP because Studio Frames did not own the building. Did not include damage that would have been covered under the SFIP's building coverage. A decision that its counsel now asserts was made </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan98/95-3649.man.html">UNITED STATES V. COOPER (1/13/1998, NO. 95-3649)<BR></A><BR> Cooper also contends that her convictions are preempted by the McCarran Ferguson Act. TCL was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Florida holding company. Martin was the chief executive officer ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/06/983380P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was injured in October 1993 when the tractor trailer he was driving through Missouri collided with another vehicle driven by an uninsured resident of Missouri. He is apparently not able to return to his chosen occupation of truck driving. He was employed by Adair Transportation (Adair) which had leased the tractor trailer and Brown's services to Chemical Leaman Corporation (Chemical). Brown was the sole driver assigned to the truck which he drove regularly on interstate trips. When he was home in Tennessee he parked the rig at his house or at Chemical's Memphis depot. The trailer was licensed and registered in Tennessee. The tractor was licensed and registered in Texas. Both policies recognize that the covered vehicles are likely to travel through various states. Policy TKF167115 (policy 115) is referred to by the Browns as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0129p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was seriously injured in a four vehicle chain reaction collision on October 24. When his pickup truck was rear ended by a tractor trailer rig driven by Richard Martin. Was a passenger. Because the Conway rig carried a placard indicating that it was leased to Wall Street Systems. There is no dispute that the notice sent by Wall Street systems complied with the terms of the lease. The dispute is over whether it was effective. Company officials learned for the first time that Willie Conway's vehicle was actually titled to his mother. Although the plaintiff's theories of recovery were not clearly stated in the complaint. The defense theory was obvious: the lease. There was no basis on which to hold either Wall Street Systems or Gulf Insurance liable for Ross's injuries. The plaintiff contended specifically that Wall Street Systems was liable due to the presence of its placard on the Conway vehicle at the time of the accident. The underlying ICC regulations have changed. This rule is no longer in effect. As was the case in Jackson. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19969249.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The defendant cross appellant appeals the district court's decision to grant the insured's motion for summary judgment on the question of coverage under the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/03-2055.htm">03-2055 -- SIPP V. UNUM PROVIDENT CORP. -- 08/20/2004<BR></A><BR> Sipp's application for benefits was initially approved. UNUM informed him that his benefits would be terminated because he was no longer considered disabled. His last position was that of Senior Pastor in a New Jersey congregation and Chaplain for the Union County Sheriff's Office. This type of policy is known as an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19969249.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Honorable Stanley Marcus was a U.S. When this appeal was argued and taken under submission. Plc ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/03-6013.htm">03-6013 -- KEIRSEY V. BANNER LIFE INSURANCE CO. -- 08/16/2004<BR></A><BR> The Imkes are independent insurance agents/brokers and the claims Banner asserted against them related to an application for a life insurance policy submitted by one of their clients. Keirsey's policy was in effect on the date of his death notwithstanding the fact that the policy had not been physically delivered to him. This court <strong>affirms</strong> the district court's order. <ol> <li><strong>FACTUAL BACKGROUND </strong></li> </ol> <p> The Imkes are insurance agents doing business in the state of Oklahoma as Imke and Associates. The Imkes were under contract with Banner to solicit applications for Banner's insurance policies. He specifically elected to have the monthly premium payments automatically deducted from his checking account pursuant to Banner's pre authorized check plan. <p> The Imkes advised Mr. This amount was more than the $14.44 monthly premium but less than two months' premium. The purpose of the conditional receipt was to provide temporary coverage to Mr. Coverage under the conditional receipt terminated </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec97/96-9390.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
	OPINION/ORDER Appellees Jack and Marie Buczek and Michael and Sandy Neill are the sole and exclusive members of an unincorporated condominium association known as
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This putative diversity class action suit arises out of a dispute over insurance coverage for the diminished value of a vehicle after it sustains physical damage and is repaired. We remand the case to the district court to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that jurisdiction is present. Listed below are the named plaintiffs and their respective insurers: Plaintiff Rex T. Who are all citizens of Florida. The policy for Allstate Indemnity Company involved in this case provides that
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This putative diversity class action suit arises out of a dispute over insurance coverage for the diminished value of a vehicle after it sustains physical damage and is repaired. We remand the case to the district court to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that jurisdiction is present. Listed below are the named plaintiffs and their respective insurers: Plaintiff Defendant Rex T. Who are all citizens of Florida. The policy for Allstate Indemnity Company involved in this case provides that
	OPINION/ORDER The district court adopted a Report and Recommendation that recommended granting summary judgment to Liberty Mutual based upon the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that asbestosrelated personal injury claims asserted against Treesdale and PMP are one occurrence under the terms of the disputed insurance policies and that a Non Cumulation provision in those policies precludes stacking coverage. We will affirm. Several thousand asbestos exposure claims have been filed against Treesdale to date. The asbestos claims are typically filed by steel workers who worked in the open hearth part of steel mills and others who claim to have had contact with the open hearth. Liberty Mutual issued primary liability policies to PMP is a division of Treesdale. Both will be referred to as
	OPINION/ORDER The sole issue before us is whether the District Court erred in applying Mo. I. Solon Gershman was a director of Missouri Savings Association. Stated that American Casualty would not pay
	OPINION/ORDER We relate the facts of this case in somewhat more detail than is customary. Finn are enrolled members of the Band. When Pemberton was secretary treasurer of the Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee (LLRBC). Brown was one of three district representatives on the LLRBC. Finn was the Band's legal counsel.3 Before 1985. 1985 would have increased the previous year's property casualty premium from $122. The Band could
	OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
	OPINION/ORDER Church Mutual contends that a jury instruction as to insurance contents coverage was not supported by substantial evidence and therefore seeks a new trial. After Agape was advised at a Christian Law Association seminar to reevaluate the adequacy of its insurance coverage. Agape's personal property was destroyed by the fire. Pursuant to an endorsement that was effective as of May 20.
	OPINION/ORDER It has no duty to defend or indemnify Prewitt in a state tort action based on a sailing accident that occurred while Prewitt was at the helm of a sailboat owned by his friend Dr. Hensley was at the helm for five hours. This was the first time during the trip that Hensley had ever given Prewitt a specific course to sail. After realizing that the course set by Hensley was taking them directly toward the reef. The adjustment was not enough and the boat ran aground on the reef. The sailboat was uninsured. The district court concluded that it was appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action by West American. (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of procedural fencing or to provide an arena for a race for res judicata. (5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective. Are: (1) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an informed resolution of the case. (2) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is the federal court.
	OPINION/ORDER This litigation provides yet another reminder of why it is essential for individuals to review periodically the documents designating their beneficiaries. His wishes were very nearly frustrated. That decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. The date on which the proceeds of the SSIP were paid to the estate. The estate could have secured the assets of the SSIP in a more timely fashion. Among the benefits of a salaried Ford employee were a company sponsored group term life insurance program and SSIP. Their marriage was annulled in 1972. If the policy owner was unmarried. Although his will left his entire estate to his nephews.
	UNITED STATES V. COOPER (1/13/1998, NO. 95-3649) Cooper also contends that her convictions are preempted by the McCarran Ferguson Act. TCL was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Florida holding company. Martin was the chief executive officer (
	OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: Before the court is an appeal from a summary judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Davis. That (1) plaintiffs had not established genuine issues of material fact concerning claims of race discrimination in light of the defendants' practice of targeting for insurance sales the very applicants allegedly discriminated against and (2) plaintiffs' alienage claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 failed because defendants' denial of life insurance was based on the nation of plaintiffs' origin. We affirm. 2 BACKGROUND Plaintiffs appellants are Sherif M. Azad are non U.S. citizens of Middle Eastern origin. The appellants allege that they were victims of the defendants appellees' discriminatory insurance practices. The defendants appellees are Baltimore Life Insurance Company (
	MACON-BIBB CTY. INDUS. AUTH. V. NORD BITUMI, U.S., INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Macon Bibb Cty. Senior Circuit Judges.<p> <p> PER CURIAM:<p> <p> This is an alleged subrogation claim by the fire insurer of a property owner against the allegedly negligent tenant of the property. Essentially for the reasons set forth in the Order from which this appeal is taken. The material parts of which are incorporated herein as an Appendix.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2061.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Before us today is but a small part of a much larger dispute over insurance coverage for an $80 million explosion at a Florida pulp and paper plant. The issue is whether the statute of limitations bars the claims against an insurance broker. Stone Container Corporation is a pulp and paper company with a plant in Panama City. Aon Risk Services is an insurance broker. The losses were estimated to exceed $80 million. Hartford notified Stone that it was denying coverage. Stone knew that its insurers were refusing to cover the loss. This suit was dismissed without prejudice so that Stone could pursue an action solely against Hartford under the boiler and machinery policy. Stone and the allrisk insurers (but not Aon) signed agreements tolling the statute of limitations until the suit against Hartford was resolved. The claims were for breach of contract. Arguing that the claims were time barred. The issue is one of Illinois law. The applicable statute of limitations was 735 ILCS 5/13205. Which allows a plaintiff 5 years to bring a suit that is not otherwise subject to a specific limitations period. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011857.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Smith was the wife of Myron Smith. Whereby he obtained checks payable to his brother for the death of persons falsely claimed to have named his brother as beneficiary. Susan Smith is not alleged to have had knowledge of her husband's fraudulent scheme. 000 was used to pay off her debts and obligations. Myron Smith was later killed in California. Found that Susan Smith was liable to FIC for conversion of $229. SMITH 3 the law of conversion is inapplicable to the case for three reasons: (1) FIC did not have a right to the money at the time it was converted and thus has no standing to maintain the action. (3) FIC's claim against her was merely an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0004p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was insured under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA). The sons argued that Gamble's designation of Terry as the sole beneficiary was defective. A controversy arose between her three sons and her sister over who was entitled to the $197. Gamble's sons contended that the designation of beneficiary was defective because Gamble had signed only her first name and had not dated the form. Then FEGLIA benefits will be distributed according to an order of precedence specified in the statute. Gamble's sons are the preferred individuals in the event that Gamble failed to properly designate another beneficiary. It was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001590.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. After The corporation was known as Texasgulf at the time of the agreement to construct the heat recovery system. Enviro Chem recommended to that plant's owner a change in the way it was operated. American claims that the cause of both accidents was a vacuum created by steam from a boiler leak. This motion was granted on April 6. In relevant part: Any release from liability entered into by the Insured prior to loss shall not affect the right of the Insured to recover nor shall the Insurers have any right of subrogation against: .... (f) Any other party for whom the Insured has agreed in writing to obtain such a waiver. Is whether PCS has agreed. After such Builder's Risk Insurance shall have terminated. However caused </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar99/96-9212.man.html">CHARLES V. BURTON (3/12/1999, NO. 96-9212)<BR></A><BR> Which holds that the Burtons were joint employers and therefore statutorily required to carry insurance or a liability bond.</P> <P> In this case involving the Agricultural Workers Protection Act. The district court found that the appellees were not joint employers of the farm workers under the AWPA and did not award the farm workers actual damages for a violation of the AWPA's registration provision. Both were to share in the profits. The workers were entitled only to statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1). Refused to award actual damages because the workers' injuries were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1995/95a1154p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is novel. I. PECO is a Pennsylvania electric utility with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. Each policy provided that covered losses were subject to a deductible. PECO acknowledged that it did not have any direct evidence of DSI thefts. That the thefts were part of a single continuous plan or scheme. The district court held that DSI's thefts constituted one occurrence because they were part of a single continuous scheme and that this occurrence took place during the 1990 91 policy period. A federal court must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state when it is sitting in diversity. Pennsylvania law provides that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2002/01-12100.opn.html">WALKER V. S. CO. SERVICES (1/23/2002, NO. 01-12100)<BR></A><BR> Such that the tort of bad faith under Alabama law is now saved from preemption. BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0167p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by provisions in the insurance The Honorable Gerald E. We agree that the limitations provisions were valid under applicable state law (the law of Kentucky) and were enforceable against the plaintiffs in the circumstances presented here. The challenged judgment will be affirmed. The policies were issued by Allstate Insurance Company in January of 2000. The insured was also required to submit a signed and sworn proof of loss statement. A covered loss was to be settled within 30 days after its amount was finally determined. The Smiths' insured properties were damaged by fire of suspicious origin on April 17. The date by which the proof of loss statements were due. Page 3 The Smiths' examinations under oath were rescheduled for October 19. It was agreed that the examinations would be completed on December 19. The examinations were in fact concluded on that date. Some (but not all) of the requested information was provided in January of 2001. Smith were sent their examination transcripts promptly. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May2000/995126.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. They were sued on a $6 million bank loan made to an entity named Kiddie Craft. Each thus was liable for the amount of the subsequent settlement of the lawsuit $3.8 million. Scrimshaw was operating at a net loss. Rishty was a public insurance adjuster in New York City who had conspired with various clients in over 200 fraudulent insurance schemes in the past. Which was Scrimshaw's insurer. Marchello assured Rishty that Chubb would assign him to handle the future Scrimshaw claim. 3 The basis of the fraudulent insurance claim was a staged flooding in Scrimshaw's warehouse caused by a broken sprinkler head. Isaac was in his office with Tom Yaccarino. Neil told them the agreed upon cover story that he had accidentally broken the sprinkler head while moving a heavy box that was piled on top of other boxes in the storage area. Appellants were unable to provide invoices for certain merchandise valued at approximately $500. 000 that was listed in their claim. Neil informed the accountants that they were having trouble locating these invoices because they were old and stored away in a trailer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042480p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are not concerned with them on this appeal. At this point Dilworth's claims are for negligence and fraud and deceit. Or are statutory under the UTPCPL. The court's bases for granting MetLife summary judgment were that 1 Dilworth brought the action in state court but MetLife removed it to the district court on diversity of citizenship grounds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 the statute of limitations barred all of Dilworth's claims remaining after the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. For the reasons we set forth below we will reverse the orders of April 6. Will remand the case to the district court for trial. Regarding the purchase of a life insurance policy insuring the life of her daughter.3 Dorsey had a close relationship to Dilworth as she was Dilworth's sister's best friend. Dilworth asserts that she believed that she was purchasing a life insurance policy requiring a minimal number of out of pocket cash payments. The policy was said to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972780.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The key question in this case is whether Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act). I. The facts are undisputed and can be stated in short order. Major Rogers was employed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) as a maintenance engineer for approximately 22 years. As a state worker Rogers was a participant in a long term disability plan sponsored by the State of South Carolina (the State) for the benefit of its employees. The plan administrator was the South Carolina Budget and Control Board. It appears that all eligible state employees were covered by the same plan. Rogers was diagnosed with a panic anxiety disorder. He alleged (1) that he was discriminated against because he was denied the same level of benefits as someone with a physical disability and (2) that the plan's </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011130.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is a named defendant in four lawsuits. The plaintiffs are California municipalities who allege that Ellett's marketing of handguns creates public and private nuisances and violates the California Business and Professions Code. Ellett argues that the term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/06/012297P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> There is evidence in the record that certain members of Reliable's management team then set out to get rid of Gosney by charging him for shortages in funds purportedly owed to the company from his prior term of employment with Reliable. Stating that it was terminating Gosney's agent appointment with Reliable on account of a shortage. There is evidence in the record that they then set out </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0367n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Seeking a declaration that it is not liable under the Appletons' homeowners insurance policy. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The undisputed facts are as follows. The subject claim would be invalidated unless they proved it was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Feb2003/014467u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Defendants are Temple University Hospital. The issue on appeal is whether excess and umbrella insurer St. We will reverse the District Court's dismissal of the complaint and remand this case to the District Court for the entry of a declaratory judgment permitting St. There is also a Shared Excess Retention in the amount of $2 million. This is a capped buffer that applies only once per policy term. That it is covered by another policy with Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) and that Lexington has the right to defend Temple's 3 medical malpractice claims. Paul argues to the contrary that no other basic coverage was scheduled at the time that Temple purchased its policy from St. Paul objected to Lexington's alleged duty to defend because the Lexington policy was not included in the record before the court and. Temple's contractual relationship with Lexington was outside the scope of a 12(b)(6) motion. Addressing the issue that the CAT Fund Statute precluded A fronting policy is not a basic policy but a surety agreement which obligates the insurer to step in if the insured. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-2810_015.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Farmers insurance company bought what is called </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972319.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> NEMA argues the Gulf insurance policy's pollution exclusion does not apply to relieve Gulf of its duty to defend NEMA in the underlying claims and Gulf has an unqualified duty to defend NEMA even though it is an excess insurer. I. NEMA is a trade association. Its members are manufacturers of products that generate. Before trial the parties agreed that the duty to indemnify issue was not ripe because NEMA had not been held liable to pay damages in any underlying claim. Which is the only issue before us. 2 a number of class action welders.2 These welders alleged NEMA knew the dangers of exposure to manganese fumes but nevertheless promulgated standards for its member companies permitting the use of manganese in welding rods. The welders claim they were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1276.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Fisher & Boylan were on brief for appellant. Fortenbaugh & Young were on brief for appellee. Is obligated to indemnify it for environmental cleanup costs related to land and water contamination allegedly caused by Peterson/Puritan. Factual Background The ultimate issue in this case is whether Northbrook is obligated to indemnify CPC for environmental cleanup costs related to land and water contamination caused by Peterson/Puritan. CPC is a multinational packaging and manufacturing corporation headquartered in New Jersey. Its manufacturing facility is located in the town of Cumberland. The wells were closed later that year. That suit was settled in 1984 for $780. The settlement was paid by Northwestern National Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar99/96-9212.man.html">CHARLES V. BURTON (3/12/1999, NO. 96-9212)<BR></A><BR> Which holds that the Burtons were joint employers and therefore statutorily required to carry insurance or a liability bond.</P> <P> In this case involving the Agricultural Workers Protection Act. The district court found that the appellees were not joint employers of the farm workers under the AWPA and did not award the farm workers actual damages for a violation of the AWPA's registration provision. Both were to share in the profits. The workers were entitled only to statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1). Refused to award actual damages because the workers' injuries were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0250p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Clarks allege that the injuries James Clark sustained in an automobile accident were covered under three policies of insurance issued by Federal to Clark's employer. Erred in holding that one of the policies was not a motor vehicle liability policy at all. I. BACKGROUND The parties have stipulated to the facts of this case. James Clark was involved in an automobile accident with David Sholtis. James Clark was an employee of Clark Rubber. Which was insured at the time under three different policies with Federal. Clark Rubber was insured under a Business Auto policy (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1307.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom Norman Roy Grutman and Grutman Greene & Humphrey were on brief. Mahoney & Miller were on brief. Vetter & White were on brief. Was a vendor to Sammartino. The gold was made available in daily allotments for SI's manufacture of fine jewelry. A field warehouse was established under the auspices of SLT Warehouse Company (SLT). Putnam was to be paid for the metal as and when the manufacturer sold the jewelry which it made from the gold. Learned that Putnam's carrier was planning to cancel existing coverage. Pateman was the lead underwriter.1 In July 1987. Sammartino notified Putnam that substantial amounts of the vendor's gold were missing. Putnam filed claim under the Lloyd's policy for 1Lloyd's marine policy no. 243440200 was syndicated and. That Pateman was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/009004.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the District Court's orders as to all claims regarding the guilt phase of Marshall's trial. We will remand for further evidentiary development as to his claim that his attorney was ineffective in the penalty phase. Was convicted and sentenced to death in 1986 for having hired someone to murder his wife. Maria and her husband both were examined by a physician to qualify for an additional insurance policy. Marshall was hit on the head and Maria was fatally shot. We will reprise the facts at some length as they provide a necessary background for understanding much of our analysis. Marshall mentioned that he was seeking an out of town investigator to track missing casino winnings that he had given to his wife. Since Toms River was a small community where news traveled quickly. Marshall's only contact with McKinnon was through telephoning Cumber both at home and at the hardware store. McKinnon had a person whose name really was Jimmy Davis sign for the money each time. The numerous telephone conversations were. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AB314B86CCA3F50588256BAE00579F18/$file/0016874.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether the government is an intended beneficiary. Parties to surety contracts are free. We interpret the language of the contract in this case to have done so. Therefore hold that both the state and federal governments are intended beneficiaries of the surety contract to the extent of the subcontractor's past due tax obligations. 6554 ISLAND INSURANCE CO. v. Hawaiian was required by its contract with Oahu ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2386.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom <U>Wolfe Associates</U> was on brief. LLP</U> was on brief. The parties have stipulated that Borden. Borden contends that the plaintiffs are only due reinstatement in the Plan. Reimbursement for expenses incurred that would have been covered by the Plan. Plaintiffs assert that this remedy is inadequate and that they are entitled to additional equitable relief. Even though the estate was no longer legally obliged to pay those costs. We deny the plaintiffs' appeal and rule for Borden on the cross appeal.</FONT></P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200516771.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Also paid out claims to tens of thousands of individuals whose structures were insured under FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program. After questions were raised concerning how 2 individual disaster assistance was disbursed in one Florida county following one of the hurricanes. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that disclosure of both the names and the addresses was exempt under Exemption 6. At issue today is whether FEMA has established that the names and addresses of 1.3 million individuals who applied for aid or made insurance claims after one of 31 federally declared disasters are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. We conclude that the addresses are not exempt under Exemption 6 because FEMA has failed to meet its heavy burden of showing a 3 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/09/99-1200.htm">99-1200 -- COREGIS INSURANCE COMPANY V. LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP S. DECARO, P.C. -- 09/22/2000<BR></A><BR> Summary judgment is appropriate </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2002/01-12100.opn.html">WALKER V. S. CO. SERVICES (1/23/2002, NO. 01-12100)<BR></A><BR> Such that the tort of bad faith under Alabama law is now saved from preemption. BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0104p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Reasoning that Crosby received all of the life insurance benefits she was due and that the company's conduct did not warrant monetary penalties. Which noted that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2004/031283np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ligon was operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer. He was rear ended by another vehicle. Are the facts surrounding the issuance of Atlantic's insurance binder and after issued policy. Atlantic was seeking to obtain automobile insurance for its operations in a variety of states. The insurance sought by Atlantic was a new policy. There are several apparent deficiencies with the accord. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/97opinions/97-7195b.html">BRAD WILLIAMS V. FIRST GOVERNMENT MORTGAGE<BR></A><BR> With them on the briefs was </P> <P>Jean Constantine Davis.</P> <P> Before: Wald. Was reasonable in </P> <P>relation to Williams's success in the litigation. Remand his common law unconsciona </P> <P>bility claim for the district court to clarify whether he lacked </P> <P> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1435.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Mahoney & Miller were on brief. Vieira and Bergstresser and Associates were on brief. The district court ruled that USLIC had a duty to indemnify Selman with respect to those injuries that occurred while the subject policies were in force. BACKGROUND The chronology of events is not in dispute. The Agency notified Selman and he made arrangements to purge the entire building (including 2 apartment #1A).1 Inspection reports reveal that by March 29 lead removal in apartment #1A was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/july96/95-2044.wpd.html">TIBERI V. CIGNA CORP.<BR></A><BR> This is a diversity case involving New Mexico contract and tort law. We will hereinafter refer only to Tiberi. The Tiberi Agency was independent and free to place its clients with any insurance companies in the market. A group of insurance companies were operating an enterprise known as the COMPAR program. The COMPAR program was comprised of insurance companies and agencies that did business exclusively with one another. CIGNA was formed. The agencies subsequently signed a new deal which was to take effect on January 1. The terms of the contracts were simple: the Kelly and Tiberi Agencies became </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200008/97-7195b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With them on the briefs was Jean Constantine Davis. Was reasonable in relation to Williams's success in the litigation. I The facts of this case are set forth in detail in Williams v. 176 F.3d 497 (D.C. * Former Circuit Judge Wald was a member of the panel at the time of oral argument. Most would not give him credit because his income was too low. Al though the monthly payment was $100 more than he had been paying. Although the term of the loan was longer than he wanted. Williams was receiving $1. Water were cut off. Oral argument in this case was heard on the same day as DeBerry v. Because local D.C. courts had </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0324p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Plaintiffs are or were members of the Defendant Transportation Workers Union of America ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1061.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief for CIGNA Fire Insurance. Clair & Cava was on brief for MacDonald & Johnson. Before us are BOWNES. CIGNA Fire Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-2246.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Lougee</U> were on brief. Pease LLP</U> were on brief. That the rules and regulations of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) grant them a right to arbitrate the claims that the respondents have asserted against them in parallel state court litigation. The Paul Revere Variable Annuity Insurance Company (Variable) and The Paul Revere Protective Life Insurance Company (Protective) are wholly owned subsidiaries of The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company (Revere Life). Revere Life is. A is a wholly owned subsidiary of a Delaware corporation. Both are headquartered in Tennessee.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="711"></TD> <TD CLAS