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OPINION/ORDER
As Co Trustee of the Marital Trust Created under the will of Willet H. As Co Trustees of the Marital Trust Created Under the Will of Willet H. We must consider whether the IRS was entitled to apply the
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OPINION/ORDER
Was born on June 12. True (David).
Dave was a successful entrepreneur and established a number of companies involved in oil and gas exploration. Companies which generated a substantial amount of revenue often provided the funds to support companies which were not as profitable. Dave developed a business philosophy which was guided by four basic principles. Buy sell agreements were necessary to avoid conflicts among owners and to establish clear (1) Of these business entities. The True Ranches were structured as partnerships under Wyoming law. White Stallion Ranch were structured as Subchapter S corporations.
exit strategies. Each True company was governed by buy sell agreements which embodied these business principles. Disability were each treated as if the holder of the interest had notified the other owners of his or her intent to withdraw from ownership. The other owners were required to purchase the departing owner's interests at a formula price listed in the buy sell agreement. The formula prices in the buy sell agreements were derived from a calculation of the tax book value for the various True companies.
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01-5133 -- U.S. V. BOTEFUHR -- 10/31/2002
The Appellants are precluded from litigating the value of the Hondo stock in the present action. 184 F.3d at 1179. Less than two years after the sale and over four years before Davenport and Vestal were to commence paying their promissory notes. Her last will and testament were admitted to probate in Tulsa.
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OPINION/ORDER
The IRS assessed additional gift taxes on the grounds that Armstrong undervalued the stock when the original gift taxes were paid. So
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98-9005A -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999
A copy of the corrected cover page is attached. Sincerely. She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.
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98-9005 -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999
She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.
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O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)
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O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)
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OPINION/ORDER
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OPINION/ORDER
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SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and
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SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and
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OPINION/ORDER
Concluding the transfer of assets was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. We will affirm.
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OPINION/ORDER
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and comment only on two issues discussed by our esteemed dissenting colleague: (1) whether the gift was properly characterized as one of interests in land instead of shares of the family partnership. (2) whether a 33.5 percent discount is inapplicable when valuing the land gifted in this case. I. GIFT OF LAND We agree with the Tax Court that the gift in this case was an indirect gift of We review decisions of the Tax Court
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NATL TAXPAYERS UNION V. USA
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Tax Court. The Commissioner contends that equitable recoupment is not available on the facts of this case. Was named the executor and residuary beneficiary of his estate. The Willits stock was valued at $485 per share and the Savings stock at $181.50 per share. The executor was authorized to sell a certain portion of this stock (500 shares of Willits stock and 2800 shares of Savings stock) in order to pay applicable estate taxes. The declared value of the stock was used as a basis for determining the gain from their sale.1 Consistent with this statutory requirement. 000) was reported as a capital gain on the estate tax return. March was also required to use the stock value declared on the estate tax return for the purpose of determining her capital gain from the sale. The basis of this deficiency was the Commissioner's conclusion that the Willits and Savings stocks were worth substantially more than the estate declared. The Tax Court concluded that the Willits Stock was worth $626 per share and the Savings Stock was worth $276 per share.
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Tax Court. The Commissioner contends that equitable recoupment is not available on the facts of this case. Was named the executor and residuary beneficiary of his estate. The Willits stock was valued at $485 per share and the Savings stock at $181.50 per share. The executor was authorized to sell a certain portion of this stock (500 shares of Willits stock and 2800 shares of Savings stock) in order to pay applicable estate taxes. The declared value of the stock was used as a basis for determining the gain from their sale.1 Consistent with this statutory requirement. 000) was reported as a capital gain on the estate tax return. March was also required to use the stock value declared on the estate tax return for the purpose of determining her capital gain from the sale. The basis of this deficiency was the Commissioner's conclusion that the Willits and Savings stocks were worth substantially more than the estate declared. The Tax Court concluded that the Willits Stock was worth $626 per share and the Savings Stock was worth $276 per share.
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OPINION/ORDER
That the inter vivos transfer was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). At the age of eighty eight.1 She was survived by her son. Who is the executor of The facts we recite are undisputed facts. Was attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney from 1986 until decedent died. Is the attorney of record for this appeal. These gifts were in keeping with decedent's practice of making cash gifts to her children every year around Christmas. After she was released from the hospital. Which was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a first position deed of trust on the Padaro Lane property in favor of the bank. 2 whose stated purpose was to engage in the business of owning and operating residential real property.
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. This is an appeal from a Tax Court determination unfavorable to the estate of Ida Abraham (the Estate). That the purchase of the decedent's interests by the children were not bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. That action was taken in order to ensure that Mrs. Which were owned by Mrs. Were transferred to three family limited partnerships (FLPs). Abraham and her children were partners in those FLPs. When the FLPs were set up. Abraham received from her husband were three pieces of commercial real estate located in Tyngsboro and Walpole. The Walpole property was leased to a lumber yard. The other properties were skating rinks leased to third parties. The leases on all of these properties were long term. The feud was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. The litigation was also draining Mrs. There was a separate estate plan. The family also understood that the FLPs were a means to protect Mrs. The protection was there for her as a guarantee that she would live status quo.
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ESTATE OF HUBERT V. COMMISSIONER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Estate of Hubert v. We affirm the United States Tax Court holding that the marital and charitable deductions are to be reduced only by the portion of administration expenses allocated to principal and not by amounts allocated to income. <i>Estate of Otis C. This holding brings us in conflict with the two other circuits which have decided the issue. <i>Estate of Street v. Specifically declined to accept the reasoning in <i>Street</i> in a comprehensive opinion.<p> Since the Tax Court wrote a careful analysis of every argument that is made by the Commissioner on this appeal. </i> the Tax Court was confronted with other issues not raised on this appeal so that the portion attached deals only with the issue on this appeal. Is the following footnote on page 2 of the original opinion:<p> We are using the terms
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept95/94-8287.opa.html">ESTATE OF HUBERT V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Hubert v. We affirm the United States Tax Court holding that the marital and charitable deductions are to be reduced only by the portion of administration expenses allocated to principal and not by amounts allocated to income. <i>Estate of Otis C. This holding brings us in conflict with the two other circuits which have decided the issue. <i>Estate of Street v. Specifically declined to accept the reasoning in <i>Street</i> in a comprehensive opinion.<p> Since the Tax Court wrote a careful analysis of every argument that is made by the Commissioner on this appeal. </i> the Tax Court was confronted with other issues not raised on this appeal so that the portion attached deals only with the issue on this appeal. Is the following footnote on page 2 of the original opinion:<p> We are using the terms
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/40E591FE947FF24488256F79006F684C/$file/0256002.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The U.S. bankruptcy court and the U.S. district court have rendered conflicting judgments that decide the claims of the surviving spouse and that affect the distribution of the net property of the decedent's trust and probate estate. While active probate proceedings were pending in the courts of the State of Texas. In a cross appeal the surviving spouse seeks to reverse the district court's determination that the bankruptcy proceeding was not a core proceeding. Which reduced the sum she was awarded by the bankruptcy court. Incidentally we are required to determine whether the probate exception applies in a bankruptcy case. We have appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Are bound by the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction and that we are required to refrain from deciding state law probate matters. No matter how the issue is framed by the parties. Howard Marshall II were initially named as co trustees of the 1982 trust. They were married on June 27. Last will and testament or conveyance in which Vickie Lynn Marshall is identified as a legatee.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/03/99-9031.htm">99-9031 -- MCMORRIS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/20/2001<BR></A><BR>
We reverse and remand with directions to vacate the deficiency assessment at issue here and to recalculate any remaining unrelated deficiencies owing. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1996/96a1462p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will reverse and remand with the direction that the tax court enter judgment in favor of appellant. I. The facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties. Decedent transferred her remainder interest in her shares to Vaparo in exchange for an annuity which was to pay her $296. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that she made this transfer in contemplation of death or with testamentary motivation. The parties stipulate that this was also the fair market value of the remainder interest. The tax court reasoned that the transfer of the remainder interest in the Vaparo stock was an abusive tax avoidance scheme that should not be permitted: In the instant case. Was excluded therefrom. Decedent's transfer of the remainder interest was of a testamentary nature. Made when she was 80 years old to a family owned corporation in return for an annuity worth more than $1 million less than the stock itself. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482. Both parties agree that our standard of review for this issue of law is plenary.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/06/002171P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rodney was unmarried and had no children. 283 worth of stock to each of their own children.2 The transfers were made to irrevocable trusts for each set of children (Larry's. 000 gift tax exclusions and electing to have each gift treated as made one half by each spouse. Those transfers are not at issue here. Rodney was not assessed any additional tax as the transfers to his nieces. Brothers were all bona fide transfers. The IRS reasoned that the gifts to each of the donors' own children were valid gifts. That the gifts to each niece and nephew were constructive gifts to the donors' own children. Appellate Jurisdiction We have jurisdiction over appeals from tax court cases pursuant to Section 7482 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 The IRS argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear The IRS assessed the taxes for 1992 against the trusts rather than the individuals because the statute of limitations had run against the donors. Which expires three years after the return is filed. 6901(c)(1). 3 This appeal was originally filed in the Seventh Circuit because the tax court was located within that circuit.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/02/01-2212.htm">01-2212 -- WELLS FARGO BANK NEW MEXICO V. U.S. -- 02/11/2003<BR></A><BR>
Senior Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May20/03-10529-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF RUTH A. Ltd (Partnership) was includible in her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 because the transfer was not a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration. (2) a transfer of assets in return for a pro rata partnership interest is not a transfer for full and adequate consideration. The district court also erred in failing to consider uncontroverted record evidence to support the taxpayer's position that the transfer was a bona fide sale. She was 96 years old. Is the Decedent's son and the executor of her estate. Which was a revocable living trust administered by Mrs. David Kimbell was the sole manager of the LLC. The oil and gas properties were a continuation of an oil and gas business that the Decedent's late husband had founded in the 1920's. Approximately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11%) and royalty (4%) interests. Kimbell's assets were conveyed to the LLC and the Partnership. The primary focus of this appeal is on this transfer from the LLC and the Trust to the Partnership.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012161.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were gifts or compensation for services. The district court concluded that they were gifts and dismissed the complaint. It also held that the counterclaim was time barred under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(b) because the government failed to prove that Lane made intentional or knowing misrepresentations in connection with the amended income tax returns he filed. Because the payments in question were gifts. Because Lane's grossly negligent misrepresentations were sufficient to trigger the extended limitations period of § 6532(b). I. What follows is a story of sentiment which appellant would convert LANE v. Hampton Powell was formerly CEO of the Lane Company. Jane Young was his secretary there from 1958 until he retired in 1984. Powell was a very generous man. Giving was his primary pleasure in life. His practice at Christmas was to give shares of stock in equal amounts to Young. Which was converted to Interco stock when Interco acquired Lane Co. in the mid 1980s. He was very grateful to her. She visited him whenever he was in the hospital.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/03/96-9016.htm">96-9016 -- KORNFELD V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/03/1998<BR></A><BR>
Kornfeld (taxpayer) was not entitled to a federal income tax deduction for amortization of a life interest in bonds that he purportedly jointly purchased with his daughters and secretary. The question for determination is whether what was done. Was the thing which the statute intended. <p> <u>Gregory v. 469 (1935).<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/05/012465P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the regulation is valid and affirm the district court's3 judgment upholding the estate tax assessment based on the regulation. Walshire's children were the contingent beneficiaries under Walshire's brother's will. They would have received any property that Walshire disclaimed from his brother's estate. Walshire's share of his brother's estate was distributed to him by checks made jointly payable to him and each of his children. The checks were used to purchase certificates of deposit (CDs). Which were originally held solely in Walshire's name with his children named as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/08/973249P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellants contend that the district court erred in failing to hold that a taxpayer's disclaimer under Arkansas law has the legal effect of voiding interests created under Arkansas law such that federal tax liens are incapable of attachment. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper The Honorable Pasco M. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Facts The relevant facts are undisputed. 000.00 was personalty and $75. 000.00 was realty located in Pulaski County. Drye was survived by her son and sole heir at law. Drye was insolvent and owed the government approximately $325. Drye was appointed the Personal Representative and Administrator of his mother's estate in Pulaski County Probate No. 94 1440. Theresa Drye was appointed Successor Personal Representative and Administratrix of Irma Deliah Drye's estate on February 8. Joined in the election of the disclaimer in order to consent to the disclaiming of any dower or homestead interests that she might have had. 3 3 On March 10.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/12/061201P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The transfer was not a bona fide sale for consideration. When Edna was sixty eight and Austin seventy nine years old. The Korbys filed gift tax returns in 1995 claiming a discount of 43.61% on the book value of each gift because the limited partnership interests were minority interests. Their transfer was restricted. In February 1993 when she was diagnosed with severe Alzheimer's dementia. Were intended to pay for the limited partners' income taxes.3 Edna Korby died on July 3. Rejecting the claim that payments from KPLP to the living trust were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/01/96-1403.htm">96-1403 -- LINDBERG V. U.S. -- 01/13/1999<BR></A><BR>
The Estate argues that it is entitled to a deduction for payments of $2.27 million made to settle Buell's descendants' tort claims for interference with inheritance. (2) the payments were an administrative expense under I.R.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/94AA2EF4319F6F2F88256F93005945E3/$file/0372240.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 7482(a). Davis executed both a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1602.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellee. Promised as part of a reciprocal will agreement with their father that she would devise her estate in equal shares to them and their stepsister. The question posed by this appeal is whether the estate may deduct the settlement amount for purposes of the federal estate tax. The answer depends upon whether the mutual will agreement was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1897.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The bankruptcy court also sustained in part Mungo's objection to Taylor's proof of claim by reducing the amount of the claim to a figure that Mungo argued was permissible. Mungo later sought to have the claim judgment reconsidered. Arguing that she had not actually agreed to that figure but rather that it was the only permissible amount that could be awarded. The district court's decision is appended below. The bankruptcy court's order as amended is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Taylor was a disputed creditor by virtue of her representation of Mungo in state court divorce proceedings. That motion was denied. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to award Mungo costs where she was the prevailing party at trial. These issues are as follows: 1. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor failed to give thorough advice concerning the divorce settlement was clearly erroneous. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor and her former spouse were undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown in August 1997 was clearly erroneous.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001498.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Benjamin Cotten and Ronald Charnock were longtime friends and business associates. Is due to our relationship.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-5118.html">FISHER V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/94-5211.opa.html">ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july96/94-5211.opa.html">ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/012109P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined the stock transfers were reciprocal cross gifts and assessed a deficiency of $215. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George. He and George had discussed with their insurance agent their desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The IRS denied annual exclusions for gifts made by Robert in 1994 and 1995 to members of George's family on the basis that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199810/97-7157a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Chrys D. With him on the brief were Myles V. 000 in possible future estate tax liability that her estate would incur pursuant to 26 U.S.C. s 2035(a) if she were to die within three years after the transfer. Contributions to it would therefore have been subject to gift taxes. Was less than the $170. 901 that Stevenson would have had to pay had the trust been set up correctly. (Steven son would have been liable for gift taxes on $161. The district court found that the estate tax claim was unripe. Stevenson would have paid less in gift taxes than she eventually did. Stevenson fails to point to anything in the record suggesting that she would have altered her gift giving practices had the trust been properly established. Stevenson's own estate tax expert states in his affidavit:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct2002/01-16536.opn.html">ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536)<BR></A><BR>
The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct2002/01-16536.opn.html">ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536)<BR></A><BR>
The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/01/051118P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mark Senda as trustee of his revocable living trust was the general partner with a 10 percent interest. Contributed oral accounts receivable (reported at $200) in exchange for their interests which were unpaid at the time of trial. Mark Senda's revocable trust was the general partner with a 1.0 percent interest. Gave oral accounts receivable (reported at $148) in exchange for their interests which were unpaid at the time of trial. The Sendas' essential claim is that they made gifts of partnership interests. At stake is the value of the gifts. The Code
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1998/98a2018p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The grant of a development easement 2 was a disposition of an interest in the farmland. We will reverse. Was not as a dairy farm. Its value was $349. Taxpayer was the executor of his father's estate and its sole heir. Which was enacted. Development easements are closely akin to the more commonly referenced
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8A98DADBE23347A388256F0E00819979/$file/0210287.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
As the error went to the heart of Boulware's defense and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Boulware is entitled to a new trial on the nine tax counts. Boulware was indicted on four counts of filing false tax returns for the 1989 1992 tax years. The company was renamed Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-3093.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Those are the circumstances in this case. The Hackls believed the transfers were excludable from the gift tax. Nos. 02 3093 & 02 3094 3 A.J. was named
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Opinion by Judge Tashima *Submission was deferred for seven days in order to allow supplemental briefing of the jurisdiction issue. **The Honorable Thomas M. Miller contends that the tax court erred in concluding that she was not entitled to an abatement of interest on employment taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6404(e). The Commissioner conducted an examination of Miller's business and concluded that the individuals should have been treated as employees rather than independent contractors. Was dispositive. The tax court's grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Or (B) any payment of any tax described in section 6212(a) to the extent that any error or delay in such payment is attributable to such an officer or employee being erroneous or dilatory in performing a ministerial act. The statute was amended by adding the word
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/03/046059P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court allowing a claim by The Estate of Victor Litzinger in the amount of $130. We remand with instructions to the bankruptcy court to address a jurisdictional issue which was never raised or briefed before the bankruptcy court or this Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Was Guy's wife. Victor was an elderly man when. Victor executed a Last and Will and Testament which named Guy as Personal Representative of Victor's estate. The will left all assets which Victor owned at the time of his death to Guy and Warren equally. Guy did sign a Substitute W 9 which indicated that the account was opened as a joint account and the evidence showed that the brokerage company considered the account a joint account with right of survivorship. No draws were made on the Victor/Guy account between the time it was opened and Victor's death. 2 On January 7. Were transferred to the Guy/Louise account. The only evidence of Louise's complicity in this transfer was the testimony of both Guy and Louise that.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5054.html">OKERLUND, ET AL. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With her on the brief were <u>Eileen J. Mso bidi font family:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2E057485A6713B9E88256B6D0060425A/$file/0070753.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The IRS explained that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116536.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. The Tax Court found that no annuity payments were ever actually made to Atkinson from the assets of the annuity trust. The estate continues to claim that checks 2 were sent to Atkinson. That Atkinson saw no need to cash them because her material needs were amply met by non trust assets. This claim is undercut by the fact that the estate produced no copies of these checks or the cover letters that supposedly accompanied the checks to Atkinson. The non charitable beneficiaries next in line to the annuity trust's assets were compelled to make an election. The estate was required to file its federal estate tax return. Found that the estate was not entitled to take any charitable deduction because the annuity trust failed to comply with certain statutory procedures applicable to the deductibility of charitable remainders. Which agreed with the IRS that a charitable deduction was not appropriate.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/27B565D1754D4E5E88256B50005F20CE/$file/0070753.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The IRS explained that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5096.html">UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiff appellant.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Howard N. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Peter D. Director.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief was <u>Marc E. 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.) ( EPACT ).<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>EPACT imposes special monetary assessments on domestic utility companies that have purchased government enriched uranium for the purpose of commercial electricity generation. 535 U.S. 1095 (2002).<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This case presents the question whether the assessments constitute unconstitutionally unapportioned direct taxes.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This issue was raised in passing in <u>Maine Yankee</u>. On the merits we hold that the EPACT special assessments are not direct taxes and do not therefore require apportionment in accordance with the Direct Tax Clauses of the Constitution.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-1920_024.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which is composed of the salvage value of the line's track and other materials plus the value of land owned in fee by TP&W. Were functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1516.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Pree was indicted by a grand jury for one count of failing to file a tax return for the tax year 1994. The mandate of the court is stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Pree was convicted of filing false returns for tax years 1995 and 1996. To present a coherent background of the circumstances upon which those convictions are based. Pree was a nurse and held a real estate license. Pree signed a lease that was assigned to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B0BAABBB7A00F70088256FB700013652/$file/0371908.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These decisions were based on stipulations by the parties. The lawyer for the taxpayer was employed as a consultant by the Internal Revenue Service during the period he represented the estate. The Tax Court held that there was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4DE616BC2382EFD088256CD1005CCFA5/$file/0270007.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The question presented is whether the twolife annuity retained by the Schotts in their grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs) is an interest qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 2702 and so to be subtracted from the value of the gift. The trust provided that 11.54% of the initial net fair market value was to be paid to the grantor commencing on May 31. Ending on the date that was fifteen years after the commencement date or. The annuity was to be paid to the spouse for the balance of the term. The terms of the annuity payments in the trust in material respects were identical with those of the trust established by his wife. The Tax Court held that an annuity measured by two lives was unqualified because the annuity could extend beyond the life of
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/37103027FB39452688256E5A00707A98/$file/9971013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the Tax Court disregarded what should have been dispositive. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS The asset of the Estate to be valued is 46. Seminole's sole 3304 asset is the stock of Kazoo. Kazoo is the largest seller of professional uniforms in a highly competitive business. Was held as follows: Shareholders Decedent's Estate A. Trustees under will of Julia Kaufman Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer Branch Diane K. 800 100.00 Class B shares owned by a Seminole employee were subject to redemption by the company on termination of the employee's employment. Voting for directors was noncumulative. The state in which Seminole was incorporated. The stock was not publicly traded. The Merrill Lynch final report was delivered to him on July 5. 1994 Merrill Lynch wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a minority interest was $29.77 per share. Each seller subsequently testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been under no compulsion. The Tax Court rejected the evidence of the two sales on the ground that they were not at arm's length and that they were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F5E3B20BC4D1587188256A10006132BE/$file/9971013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the Tax Court disregarded what should have been dispositive. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS The asset of the Estate to be valued is 46. Seminole's sole 3304 asset is the stock of Kazoo. Kazoo is the largest seller of professional uniforms in a highly competitive business. Was held as follows: Shareholders Decedent's Estate A. Trustees under will of Julia Kaufman Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer Branch Diane K. 800 100.00 Class B shares owned by a Seminole employee were subject to redemption by the company on termination of the employee's employment. Voting for directors was noncumulative. The state in which Seminole was incorporated. The stock was not publicly traded. The Merrill Lynch final report was delivered to him on July 5. 1994 Merrill Lynch wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a minority interest was $29.77 per share. Each seller subsequently testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been under no compulsion. The Tax Court rejected the evidence of the two sales on the ground that they were not at arm's length and that they were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-4100.htm">96-4100 -- TAYLOR V. RUPP -- 01/12/1998<BR></A><BR>
Was denied discharge in bankruptcy on the basis that he had willfully and fraudulently omitted material information from his statements and schedules. Claiming that Harold's transfers to Julia of the assets at issue here were void or voidable as fraudulent conveyances or. That Harold had equitable interests in them such that the court should impose a constructive or resulting trust. <p> The bankruptcy judge determined that Harold retained a one half equitable interest in the couple's Park City home even though he had conveyed his share of a joint tenancy title to Julia seven years before when he was solvent. That this equitable interest was part of Harold's bankruptcy estate. The judge also determined that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a money judgment against Julia for $5. The district court summarily affirmed.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-4100a.htm">96-4100A -- TAYLOR V. RUPP -- 01/12/1998<BR></A><BR>
For Appellant</a>. <p> A copy of the corrected cover page is attached for your convenience. <p> Very truly yours. Was denied discharge in bankruptcy on the basis that he had willfully and fraudulently omitted material information from his statements and schedules. Claiming that Harold's transfers to Julia of the assets at issue here were void or voidable as fraudulent conveyances or. That Harold had equitable interests in them such that the court should impose a constructive or resulting trust. <p> The bankruptcy judge determined that Harold retained a one half equitable interest in the couple's Park City home even though he had conveyed his share of a joint tenancy title to Julia seven years before when he was solvent. That this equitable interest was part of Harold's bankruptcy estate. The judge also determined that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a money judgment against Julia for $5. The district court summarily affirmed.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2241.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Levinson LLP</SPAN> was on brief. P.C.</SPAN> were on brief. Because the charitable organization was still functioning as such at the time its entitlement to the bequest vested. BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-9000.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> Taxpayer Scanlon White. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 7482(a)(1) and affirm. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0133p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Indmar argued at trial that the advances were legitimate loans made to the company. Concluding that the advances were equity contributions and therefore the company could not deduct any purported interest payments on these advances. We conclude that the Tax Court clearly erred in finding the advances were equity. The Tax Court failed to consider several factors used by this court for determining whether advances are debt or equity. We reverse and find that the stockholder advances were bona fide debt. Is a marine engine manufacturer. Indmar's stockholders have advanced funds to it. The note was payable on demand and freely transferable. The line of credit agreements provided that the balances were payable on demand and the notes were freely transferable. None of the advances were secured. Repayments of the advances were paid on demand. The advances were treated by the Rowes as short term debt under Tennessee law. The notes to Indmar's financial statements disclosed that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6A1B530D534423F488256FE7005C1750/$file/0330010.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The jury also rendered a special verdict that several properties were used to facilitate his crimes or were proceeds of them and should be forfeited to the government pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. We must decide whether forfeiture was proper where Victor has never held title to the two forfeited properties. Operates in rem against the property itself on the theory that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing. 1414 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996) (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/03/066060P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The result of which was that less property was available to creditors in his bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court1 held that the tuition savings plans are assets of his estate. That they could not be claimed as exempt at the time the case was filed. The business was performing poorly and was unable to pay its debts. These payments were voluntary. Was approximately $22. Said they were not property of the estate. Asserted that the § 529 accounts were property of the estate and not subject to any exemptions. Legal conclusions de novo.3 The question of whether a § 529 tuition account is property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate is subject to de novo review.4 With regard to the homestead and IRA issues.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1995/95a0996p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Trustees of the Stock Trust Under Item Third of the Will of Rodman Wanamaker. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Leaving a will and codicils[fn1] that established trusts for his children and their descendants. At issue in this case is a $120 million trust created in Paragraph Third of his will. The stock was sold for $60 million. After the stock was sold. Holding that Wanamaker had intended to provide spendthrift protection for his great grandchildren and Kellogg's interest in the trust was protected. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Our review of the district court's construction of Pennsylvania law is de novo. Will be reviewed de novo.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/04/982924P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The IRS determined that Taxpayers should have included the fair market value of the deferred obligation in their 1990 and 1991 taxable incomes rather than in the year the payments were received for purposes of comparing their Alternative Minimum Tax (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/05/97-9022.htm">97-9022 -- BURKE V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 05/06/1999<BR></A><BR>
These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Petitioners Datha D. The sole issue is whether Mr. and Mrs. Burke are entitled to relief from the discharge of indebtedness income pursuant to <u>Bowers v. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. <u>See</u> 26 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200707/05-5139b.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Stephen M. Renner was on the brief for amici curiae No FEAR Coalition. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. Chief Judge: Marrita Murphy brought this suit to recover income taxes she paid on the compensatory damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation she was awarded in an administrative action she brought against her former employer. Her award should have been excluded from her gross income because it was compensation received
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/10/002812P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2237.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Strother</SPAN> and <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1995/95a1197p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This matter is before the court on an appeal by taxpayers in a suit involving claims for income tax adjustments and refunds. The facts are not in dispute. 000 shares were not registered under the Securities Act of 1933. So their sale to the public was restricted. While this examination was pending. 788.05 against the Kosses for 1974.[fn1] The deficiency was attributable to the IRS placing the fair market value of the 22. Which they computed was the amount due after application of the carryback loss. It reasoned that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C. § 6511 and could not be salvaged by the mitigation sections at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1311 14. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and exercise plenary review. Limitations on Jurisdiction The United States
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/00-9000.htm">00-9000 -- SCHUTTER V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 12/19/2000<BR></A><BR>
Senior District Judge.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/08/041459P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mathias Pizano and Jessica Pizano are brother and sister. Celia Pizano is their mother. Jessica and Celia were convicted on all counts of a twenty count indictment. Jessica and Celia were convicted of the following: Mathias 2 was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (cocaine and marijuana) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846. Jessica was convicted of three counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Counts 8. Celia was convicted of five counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 2. Related facts will be grouped accordingly. A. In General Jessica is the mother of five children. Mathias's reported income in 1991 and 1992 was $2. The restaurant was in operation from early 2000 until 4 the end of 2001. It was not profitable. Jessica and Celia were living in Moline. Which was jointly owned by Mathias. Mathias was hosting a party for a drug dealer who had been sentenced and would be leaving for prison. Were present at the party. The police told Jessica that drugs were found at Mathias's house and that they were looking for him.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/02/041407U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Langers' pro se complaint sought review of the determination of the IRS Office of Appeals that Patricia Langer was liable for the employee portion of certain unpaid FICA taxes. The crux of their complaint is that the IRS incorrectly assessed Patricia Langer's FICA taxes as income taxes. Because the Tax Court had determined in a prior proceeding that the taxes at issue in this case were FICA and not income liabilities. Where the underlying tax is an income. The IRS is required to send the taxpayer a deficiency notice before making the assessment. 165 n.4 (1976) (deficiency notice is of import primarily because it is jurisdictional prerequisite to taxpayer's suit in Tax Court for redetermination of his tax liability). (2) that the underlying tax is in fact not an income. Thus the IRS was not required under sections 6212 and 6213(a) to send the Langers a deficiency 2 notice. That the Langers acknowledge the underlying tax is in fact a FICA tax. The essence of their suit is that the IRS incorrectly assessed the FICA tax as an income tax.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4058.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Michael Frierdich is a Chapter 7 debtor. That he does not have enough assets to pay off a staggering amount of debt. We will ring her up on strikes. Frierdich was a director and the treasurer of Columbia Centre. The stock record book was also lost. Meanwhile Frierdich and Oswald were pondering the business of marriage. Frierdich and Oswald were engaged. This is part of the prenuptial agreement we have. Oswald never received a stock certificate and no notation on the (missing) stock record book was ever made. Paragraph six of Oswald's waiver read: It is the intent of the undersigned that her present and future interest in any assets of Michael V. Frierdich is specifically limited to those assets which Michael V. Frierdich shall have voluntarily transferred an interest to the undersigned and only then in circumstances wherein he has affirmatively taken action transferring an ownership interest to the undersigned. Frierdich and Oswald were married 3 days later. Who was Columbia Centre's president and managing officer.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1896.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed. Sack is a veteran who graduated from law school in 1959. The IRS announced that it was accepting applications for Estate and Gift Tax Attorney positions (Grades 9 and 11) in its Boston and Portsmouth offices. Sack was 58 years old when he sought this position. All applicants were evaluated and assigned a numerical score pursuant to the Single Agency Qualification Standard (SAQS) for Attorney (Estate Tax) and Law Clerk (Estate Tax) described in the IRS's Qualifications Standards and Guidelines Handbook.1 1. Applicants were not required to complete a written examination. They were rated based on the extent and quality of their education. These points were also available to applicants who had completed accounting education or experience within similar time frames. Who was employed as a salesman for Lechmere when he submitted his 42). 2. Bonus points were available if an applicant had special qualifications. He was given 70 points for having a law degree and 5 points for being a veteran under 5 U.S.C. 3309.3 Sack was only given 1 point for his past legal experience.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0020p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Recovery for personal injury is ordinarily not taxable under § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. The interest on the award is. There was no purpose to shift tax liability among members of a family. The assignees were the object of gifts and not subject to income taxation themselves if the income was taxed to their assignor or donor. Here the lawyer is taxed on the full amount of the payment. Under the government's theory both the lawyer and the client are taxable. The present transaction under scrutiny is more like a division of property than an assignment of income. Here the lawyer's income is the result of his own personal skill and judgment. The situation is no different from the transfer of a one third interest in real estate that is thereafter leased to a tenant. Both claimed that they should not have to include the assignment as income. The Supreme Court concluded that the
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P.S.C.</SPAN> were on brief. The lease term was five years. </P> <P> Softex manufactured paper products and. Was potentially eligible for a ninety percent reduction in taxes under Puerto Rico law. Its application was denied with prejudice because Industrial had outstanding debts to the government. </P> <P> In June 1999. The district court was presented with what amounted to cross motions for summary judgment on the counterclaims.<A HREF=
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Relying on appraiser Gerald Gray's opinion that the shares were worth $.50 each at the time of the gifts. The Commissioner did not contend that the stock was worth $1.65 per share. The amount of a gift is the value of the property on the date of the gift. 26 U.S.C. § 2512(a).
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These deemed facts were critical to the outcome because they not only furnished the predicate for use by the Internal Revenue Service (
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Is amended as follows: Page 35. Line 4 change
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The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We held it was not appropriate under Missouri law. The issue before the court was the
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Line 2 the crossreference is corrected to read
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The taxpayers maintain that the Tax Court erred in concluding that certain travel related expenses paid by WVI were primarily for their personal benefit and constituted constructive dividends paid to Dr. Each of these contentions is without merit. I. WVI was incorporated in July 1983 to develop a time share resort near Williamsburg. The initial shareholders were Dr. Gow as the trustee.1 The Voting Trust was to continue for ten years until September 30. It was amended on October 24. Gow served as both A voting trust is a device whereby two or more persons. On which the time share resort was to be built. Regardless of which figures are correct. That is. The taxpayers were guests in lavish hotels and resorts costing up to $900 per night. WVI's corporate tax returns were audited in July 1991. The Gows' jointly filed tax returns were thereafter included in the audit. Was $1. In the event that the fraud penalties were found inapplicable.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EB342847E32C4B7888256C4700551B32/$file/0115901.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who are Arizona residents and taxpayers. The action is justiciable in federal court. I. BACKGROUND The statute at issue in this case is Arizona Revised Statute § 43 1089 (hereinafter
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1998/98a1935p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Venue is proper pursuant to 26 U.S.C. We will reverse the Tax Court's decision. Leaving a will which provided that its
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Ronald was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined $2.3 million for operating an
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Is amended as follows: 1. It is so ORDERED. 6591 OPINION WARDLAW. Although we find that the Commissioner's notice was timely. The Estate had reported the stock was worth $28.5 million based on a valuation conducted by a private accounting firm. Its return was filed on July 20. 1990 the date on which the return was mailed to the IRS. The Estate argued that the Notice was untimely under 26 U.S.C. § 6501 because it was mailed on July 21. The Tax Court ruled that the Notice was timely. The Tax Court reasoned that 26 U.S.C. § 7502 was not relevant because it only applies in situations where a return is untimely filed. Which considers as timely filed a return due on a weekend or holiday that is 2 The Commissioner determined penalties of $8. The combined total of the penalties is $8. The Estate's return was timely because the IRS received it on Monday. The Estate filed a motion with the Tax Court disputing that it bore the burden of persuasion to show the Commissioner's assessment was inaccurate. The Estate argued that the evidence established that it owned 49.04 percent of the outstanding stock in JPMS on the valuation date and thus its interest in JPMS was a minority interest.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/74D5FB8DF5A1847988256E5A00707B15/$file/9970421.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Although we find that the Commissioner's notice was timely. The Estate had reported the stock was worth $28.5 million based on a valuation conducted by a private accounting firm. Its return was filed on July 20. 1990 the date on which the return was mailed to the IRS. The Estate argued that the Notice was untimely under 26 U.S.C. § 6501 because it was mailed on July 21. The Tax Court ruled that the Notice was timely. The Tax Court reasoned that 26 U.S.C. § 7502 was not relevant because it only applies in situations where a return is untimely filed. The combined total of the penalties is $8. Which considers as timely filed a return due on a weekend or holiday that is received by the IRS on the first business day following that weekend or holiday. The Estate's return was timely because the IRS received it on Monday. The Estate filed a motion with the Tax Court disputing that it bore the burden of persuasion to show the Commissioner's assessment was inaccurate. The Estate argued that the evidence established that it owned 49.04 percent of the outstanding stock in JPMS on the valuation date and thus its interest in JPMS was a minority interest.
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Although we find that the Commissioner's notice was timely. The Estate had reported the stock was worth $28.5 million based on a valuation conducted by a private accounting firm. Its return was filed on July 20. 1990 the date on which the return was mailed to the IRS. The Estate argued that the Notice was untimely under 26 U.S.C. § 6501 because it was mailed on July 21. The Tax Court ruled that the Notice was timely. The Tax Court reasoned that 26 U.S.C. § 7502 was not relevant because it only applies in situations where a return is untimely filed. The combined total of the penalties is $8. Which considers as timely filed a return due on a weekend or holiday that is received by the IRS on the first business day following that weekend or holiday. The Estate's return was timely because the IRS received it on Monday. The Estate filed a motion with the Tax Court disputing that it bore the burden of persuasion to show the Commissioner's assessment was inaccurate. The Estate argued that the evidence established that it owned 49.04 percent of the outstanding stock in JPMS on the valuation date and thus its interest in JPMS was a minority interest.
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Is amended as follows: 1. It is so ORDERED. 6591 OPINION WARDLAW. Although we find that the Commissioner's notice was timely. The Estate had reported the stock was worth $28.5 million based on a valuation conducted by a private accounting firm. Its return was filed on July 20. 1990 the date on which the return was mailed to the IRS. The Estate argued that the Notice was untimely under 26 U.S.C. § 6501 because it was mailed on July 21. The Tax Court ruled that the Notice was timely. The Tax Court reasoned that 26 U.S.C. § 7502 was not relevant because it only applies in situations where a return is untimely filed. Which considers as timely filed a return due on a weekend or holiday that is 2 The Commissioner determined penalties of $8. The combined total of the penalties is $8. The Estate's return was timely because the IRS received it on Monday. The Estate filed a motion with the Tax Court disputing that it bore the burden of persuasion to show the Commissioner's assessment was inaccurate. The Estate argued that the evidence established that it owned 49.04 percent of the outstanding stock in JPMS on the valuation date and thus its interest in JPMS was a minority interest.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct96/95-2370.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Estate of Lucas United States Court of Appeals. Lucas (the Estate) was not entitled to
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OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Estate of Lucas United States Court of Appeals. Lucas (the Estate) was not entitled to
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OPINION/ORDER
Whether those loans were effectively discharged. III (
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judges. 1 2 In re Fordu COUNSEL No. 97 3936 No. 97 3936 In re Fordu 31 will not disturb a lower court's findings with respect to sanctions unless a clear abuse of discretion is found. There was no abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court. There is no evidence. Sanctions under this provision appropriately may be awarded when an attorney advances an argument that is
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LEFEVER V. COMMISSIONER
Respondent determined that they were not putting the land to a qualifying use as required to maintain the benefits of the election. Contending that they were never actually entitled to the special use valuation election and that a three year statute of limitations barred the assessments. The Tax Court ruled that the assessments were timely under a provision of the Code extending the limitations period for three years after Respondent has notice that the property is no longer being put to a qualifying use. The Tax Court ruled that Petitioners were precluded under the doctrine of the duty of consistency from denying the initial validity of the special use valuation election. Section 2032A The Tax Code imposes a general estate tax on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a resident or citizen of the United States. 26 U.S.C. 2001. The estate's executor is responsible for paying this tax. The estate tax under 2001 is generally based on the fair market value of the taxable property. The decedent must have been a citizen or resident of the United States.
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OPINION/ORDER
Lucas (the Estate) was not entitled to
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OPINION/ORDER
The Debtor claims the jewelry is exempt as
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OPINION/ORDER
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 1 Background The following facts are undisputed based on evidence introduced at trial. The district court determined that the growth of the Company is not likely to continue at its current rate absent the continuation of an aggressive acquisition policy. It may not have more than 75 shareholders. The Company had 63 shareholders: 40 were Robert family members and 23 were non family members. While it 3 would have been possible to attain Subchapter S status without squeezing out the minority shareholders. Anderson asserted that the merger action was taken to assure that the Subchapter S election could be made and preserved into the future without being repealed. Even though he also admitted that the bylaws could have been amended to provide that no person could transfer their shares in violation of the Subchapter S election.
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OPINION/ORDER
Jr. were on brief for appellee. Challenge decisions of the United States Tax Court which upheld determinations made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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OPINION/ORDER
This case is an example of how the best laid plans of mice and men can often go awry. I. BACKGROUND The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. He was survived by his wife. Who were minors when he died. Of which he was both grantor and trustee. Three days before he executed his will. The allocation herein to the Marital Trust shall have a value equal to the smallest pecuniary amount which. Only to the extent that those state death taxes are not thereby increased. The Residuary Trust is established pursuant to section 4.2. The remainder of the trust estate not allocated to the Marital Trust or used for the payment of the debts and expenses of Lurie's estate was to be allocated into a Residuary Trust for the benefit of Mrs. Section 4.1 of the Revocable Trust instrument provides that if the residue of the probate estate was insufficient. Then any remaining expenses from the administration of his estate were to be paid from the Revocable Trust. To the extent that the assets of the Grantor's estate . . . are insufficient.
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02-3221 -- LAMPE V. WILLIAMSON -- 06/03/2003
Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER
The Tax Court ruled that because the putative refunds were really disguised rate reductions. They were not eligible for treatment under that provision. I. The facts in this case are fully set forth in the Tax Court's opinion. Florida Power is subject to the rules and regulations of both the Florida Public Service Commission (
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OPINION/ORDER
Defendants Blanding's and Derrick's convictions (as well as Taylor's and Gordon's) were eventually overturned by this court on appeal on the grounds that the intervening Supreme Court decisions in McCormick v. Rendered defective the jury instructions that were given at their trials. All three cases were remanded to the district court for retrial. Are now deceased. Neither of these individuals is a party to this appeal. Was concluded in October of 1994. All of these materials were to be surrendered by December 1. That the government take every scrap of paper that they have. The district court concluded that the government's argument that the drugrelated audiotapes produced in March of 1995 were not relevant or discoverable under Brady was
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OPINION/ORDER
AS TRUSTEE OF THE ETHEL BROWNSTONE MARITAL TRUST UNDER ARTICLE SEVENTH OF WILL OF LUCIEN BROWNSTONE. I. Background Lucien Brownstone was a successful man during his life. In his will he created a trust for the benefit of his wife Ethel1. Created under Article Seventh of Lucien's will. Lucien's will also gave Ethel the power to distribute upon her death the remaining principal of the Trust to whomever she appointed in her will (the
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OPINION/ORDER
The Foundation argues that it does meet the requisite test and is therefore a supporting organization. Claims that the Tax Court was correct in holding that the Foundation did not meet the
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OPINION/ORDER
Have been audited by the Internal Revenue Service virtually. Every year since Richard Nixon was President. Kanter was a wellknown and accomplished tax and estate lawyer. Among Kanter's clients was the Pritzker family of Hyatt Corporation fame. Kanter was also an accomplished businessman. Was an expert on the subject of trusts and estate planning. His estate was subsequently substituted as the principal party to this litigation.
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SCHUSTERMAN V. UNITED STATES
That the prevailing market interest rate in September 1980 was eleven and one half percent. That is. 551 which is $3. Taxpayers and the United States stipulated
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OPINION/ORDER
Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman | 02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E | 08 13 2003 |
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| In re: Will C. Cohen | 03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM | 07 08 2004 |
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OPINION/ORDER
Jerome Wayne Johnson | 03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM | 07 12 2004 |
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| In re: Will C. Bowman | 02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E | 08 13 2003 |
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KATZ D. MARK V. NATL ARCHV RECORDS
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OPINION/ORDER
We must decide whether an estate is entitled to a theft loss deduction under the federal tax code for funds wrongfully paid out from an estate and never returned. The bonds had been stolen from Meriano but were later returned to the estate. Excessive fees and costs were charged against the estate by the stockbroker and the attorney/investigator who had retrieved the bonds and administered the estate. Tax Court that the stockbroker and the attorney/investigator had committed theft under Pennsylvania state law and that 2 the estate was therefore entitled to a deduction for its loss pursuant to 26 U.S.C. We will reverse the tax court's decision and allow the estate its deduction. I. FACTS The facts of this case were set forth in great detail by the tax court. We will recount only those facts that are relevant to the issues on appeal. Meriano notified the Philadelphia Police Department that the bonds themselves were missing from a safe located in an area of the residence damaged by the fire. Was appointed administratrix of his estate.
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01-9009 -- KATZ V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/07/2003
Aron Katz (Taxpayer) was a partner in a number of partnerships that suffered substantial losses during a year in which he filed for bankruptcy. The question before us is whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can challenge that allocation in a proceeding involving only the Taxpayer. We hold that a partnership level proceeding is necessary. - Background
Taxpayer's partnerships did not do well in 1990. Although he could have elected to bifurcate his 1990 tax year into two short years. The remaining partnerships of which Taxpayer was a member did not distinguish between pre petition and post petition items in the K 1 forms they prepared. Are not subject to the federal income tax.
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OPINION/ORDER
Argue that Oklahoma's statutory scheme for specialty motor vehicle license plates is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Motorists contend that Oklahoma's laws unlawfully discriminate against their views by permitting drivers to obtain license plates bearing the messages
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OPINION/ORDER
000 down payment on the Lodi property was. That the Versailles property was property of the Debtor's estate.1 For the reasons that follow. The bankruptcy court's judgment is AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether a loan in the amount of $157. 000 loan
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OPINION/ORDER
Janis (
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Complications from an automobile accident have prevented Judge Gibson from reviewing this opinion prior to its being filed. The opinion is consistent with Judge Gibson's vote at conference. 1 BOWMAN. Before us is another matter arising from the bankruptcy of Popkin & Stern (P&S). A Missouri law firm in which Ronald Lurie was a general partner. That an interest in certain real property was fraudulently transferred to them by their father and thus could be reached by the bankruptcy trustee and sold for the benefit of P&S's creditors. That they are entitled to compensation for their loss of it. Concluding that at least one of the disclaimers executed by Ronald is facially valid and enforceable. I. At issue is a piece of real property. Edna's last will and testament named Ronald as the executor and. As a co trustee of all trusts created under her will. Edna's will provided that upon her death. Her sons Ronald and Robert were the intended beneficiaries of her estate.
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WILKES V. UNITED STATES (4/22/2002, NO. 00-16614)
The primary issue on appeal
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OPINION/ORDER
Jacobs's federal income tax debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy and that Mr. We have jurisdiction over Mr. Sitting by designation. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) provides:
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WILKES V. UNITED STATES (4/22/2002, NO. 00-16614)
The primary issue on appeal
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OPINION/ORDER
Opinion by Judge McKeown *This case was argued telephonically. 1449 No. 99 70805 Tax Ct. Who are co executors of the estate (collectively. Are the Estate's coexecutors and its only beneficiaries. The value of these shares is one of the key areas of disagreement between the Estate and the Internal Revenue Service (
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OPINION/ORDER
Contending that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Custom's claim for refund and offset because Custom did not
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OPINION/ORDER
Is the equivalent of a
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01-1345 -- MCKOWEN V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE -- 06/01/2004
We affirm.
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ESTATE OF KOSOW V. COMMISSIONER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >Estate of Kosow v. District Judge:<p> <p> The Estate of Joseph Kosow has appealed the Tax Court's decision to disallow a deduction for a claim that was made against and paid by the estate. The Tax Court held that the estate had failed to prove that the agreement by the deceased that gave rise to the claim was an agreement supported by full and adequate consideration. Who were born in 1940 and 1945. Joseph had largely disassociated himself from the manufacturing businesses and was primarily engaged in financing activities through the Industrial Finance Corporation. A corporation of which he and his brother were equal shareholders.<p> Joseph's business ventures permitted him and his family to enjoy a very comfortable standard of living. One of which was a Cadillac that was regularly replaced. Joseph paid all the major bills as they came due and Barbara was not aware of any reliance on credit to sustain their standard of living. Joseph was very secretive about his business ventures.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb95/93-4307.opa.html">ESTATE OF KOSOW V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Estate of Kosow v. District Judge:<p> <p> The Estate of Joseph Kosow has appealed the Tax Court's decision to disallow a deduction for a claim that was made against and paid by the estate. The Tax Court held that the estate had failed to prove that the agreement by the deceased that gave rise to the claim was an agreement supported by full and adequate consideration. Who were born in 1940 and 1945. Joseph had largely disassociated himself from the manufacturing businesses and was primarily engaged in financing activities through the Industrial Finance Corporation. A corporation of which he and his brother were equal shareholders.<p> Joseph's business ventures permitted him and his family to enjoy a very comfortable standard of living. One of which was a Cadillac that was regularly replaced. Joseph paid all the major bills as they came due and Barbara was not aware of any reliance on credit to sustain their standard of living. Joseph was very secretive about his business ventures.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200016614.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The primary issue on appeal1 is whether the district court abused its discretion making the award. Concluding that the government's position in the underlying estate tax case was lacking in substantial justification pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B). The other 13% were owned by Nolan Wilkes. The decedent also owned some real property that was used by Suwannee. The total tax liability was $515. The executor elected to have the provisions of IRC § 2210 apply. Are references to the Internal 2 2 1 provided that the executor was relieved of liability for a certain portion of the taxes owed by the estate if an ESOP bought the employer securities and agreed to pay that portion of the estate tax liability.3 The estate paid $168. 000 in estate tax when the return was filed. An appropriate election was made to pay this $347. The problems giving rise to this litigation occurred because the ESOP did not pay any of the installments and guarantor Suwannee was similarly unable to pay. The IRS responded to the TAO application and advised that the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/08/023978P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Russell was in charge of the farming operation in North Dakota. While Melvin was in charge of the oil and gas exploration in the United States and Canada. The brothers withdrew profits from the partnership that were attributable to each of their respective business pursuits and paid the expenses related to each of their respective activities. In years where the oil business was more profitable. Paid some of the oil business's taxesand vice versa for years when the oil business was less profitable. Many of the assets used by BBP were not held in the partnership's name. Were owned by the brothers jointly or individually. For taxable years 1980 through 1994 (which encompasses the records which were before the Tax Court). Which was attributable to grain sales by BBP. The proper 1 Form 1065 is the Partnership Return of Income form. 2 distribution of these 1994 grain sales are at the heart of the dispute in this case. After Melvin was diagnosed with cancer in late 1993. It appears that this was the first that Melvin's family knew of the partnership arrangement to split the tax burden evenly.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQ0NDMtYWcucGRm/04-4443-ag.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The brothers were the only members of the partnership. The issue is whether the fair market value of the artwork upon which the estate tax was calculated also constitutes the cost basis of the property for income tax purposes when it was later sold. The taxpayers do not challenge the accuracy of the method used to calculate the fair market value of the works of art upon which the estate tax was calculated. The Ninth Circuit held that the value of the artwork owned by Sidney Janis at his death was a question of fact and that (1) the valuation of $14.5 million placed upon it by the Tax Court was not clearly erroneous and (2) the Janises were obligated by
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/11/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 11/04/2003<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/07/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 07/08/2003<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001696.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 3 was ultimately valued at over $20 million. Because much of Hunter's estate was tied up in real estate. The trust was considered a complex trust and it took a deduction for this interest payment. The estate and the IRS entered into a settlement agreement in which the estate tax liability of the estate was substantially reduced. Regardless of who was the payee of the check for refunded interest from the IRS. The tax benefit rule is a judicially created doctrine. A completed transaction in one tax year will unexpectedly reopen in a subsequent tax year. Prove not to have been a deductible expense at all. Such a cancelation will occur only when a subsequent event is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0441p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court made the following statement of facts: The case sub judice is a quiet title action filed in the Jessamine County Circuit Court brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2410. The facts are as follows. The account was in the name of Orion Holding Company. A debit card account was set up for each client at the TSB Bank in the Isle of Jersey. Both Grand Turk and Isle of Jersey have stringent bank secrecy laws and the records of bank accounts in these places can not be reached by legal process. Ray Spotts would have commissions and other taxable income due him sent to Proven Triumphs. These funds were then sent to Orion Holding Company's account at Barclay Bank. Were forwarded to the settlement officer at the time of settlement on the purchase of the home. To disguise the fact that the Spott's were using their own money to purchase the home. This note was secured by a mortgage on the home. The home was purchased for $272. Although the note and mortgage with Orion Bank and Trust were in the names of both Ray and Peggy Spotts.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032263np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an individual retirement account (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/mar96/95-4001.wpd.html">DALTON V. IRS<BR></A><BR>
The bankruptcy court held that the tax debts were not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1)(C). He also contends that the finding that he willfully concealed assets was clearly erroneous. Therefore the tax debts were excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1)(C). If unambiguous statutory language is not defined. Provided (1) Section 523(a)(1)(C) provides that an individual bankrupt debtor is not discharged from any tax debt which the debtor
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr2001/00-11916.man.html">FOSTER V. UNITED STATES (4/30/2001, NO. 00-11916)<BR></A><BR>
We review whether punitive damages are taxable income. Whether the position of the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr2001/00-11916.man.html">FOSTER V. UNITED STATES (4/30/2001, NO. 00-11916)<BR></A><BR>
We review whether punitive damages are taxable income. Whether the position of the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/06/062286P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to determine the ownership of biological materials contributed by individuals for the purpose of genetic cancer research and currently housed on the campus of Washington University (WU). Was employed by WU from 1976 to 2003. Catalona's principal areas of research was the genetic basis of prostate cancer. Catalona was instrumental in establishing the GU2 Biorepository (Biorepository). United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 1
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-3178.htm">97-3178 -- U.S. V. SINGLETON -- 07/01/1998<BR></A><BR>
Singleton was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. A detective of the Wichita Police Department contacted local Western Union agents to determine if drug dealers were using Western Union services to transfer drug money. The records led authorities to a group of people whom they believed were involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs. Further investigation indicated the drug business was begun by men who had moved from California to Wichita. Singleton was identified as one who transferred and received money for the conspiracy. She was the common law wife of Eric Johnson. She was listed as either the sender or recipient on eight wire transfers suspected to have been sent on behalf of the conspiracy. Handwriting experts confirmed that her handwriting was present on paperwork accompanying the eight wire transfers. <p> Ms. Singleton and others were charged in a superseding indictment with multiple counts of money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The basis for her motion was that the government had impermissibly promised Mr.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1CAC7BCD271C987F88256CE1007F2C68/$file/0215498.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Seinfeld contends that the proxy statement should have included the value of stock options granted to outside (non employee) directors. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Which is part of the company's 1996 Stock Incentive Plan. Which was approved by shareholder vote at the November 1999 annual meeting. He contended that the proxy statement should have included the value of the option grants based on the Black Scholes option pricing model. Was $1. Was $630. The proxy statement stated that each director was paid an annual retainer of $32. Seinfeld alleged that this statement was materially false and misleading because. No value will be realized from the option grants made to the executive officers.'
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011916.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This decision is rendered by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). We review whether punitive damages are taxable income. Whether the position of the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011916.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We review whether punitive damages are taxable income. Whether the position of the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-8019.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Article 1.3(i) of the Agreement provides:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2000/99-12803.opn.html">CRAVEN V. UNITED STATES (6/19/2000, NO. 99-12803)<BR></A><BR>
Linda had sued the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2000/99-12803.opn.html">CRAVEN V. UNITED STATES (6/19/2000, NO. 99-12803)<BR></A><BR>
Linda had sued the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/50A03335A6C29F6188256E5A00707B46/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B1A43334A16E06FB88256A4C0057B941/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/nov95/94-9018.html">ESTATE OF HOOVER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
In determining the fair market value it is appropriate to take into account a discount factor for the minority interest holder's lack of control and marketability. Included among the assets in the decedent's estate was a 26% interest in the T 4 Cattle Company. 000) is qualified real property. The estate and the Commissioner stipulated that this methodology would be appropriate to arrive at the fair market value of the decedent's 26% interest in the qualified real property if 2032A were not elected. The fair market value was thus $1. The estate and the Commissioner further stipulated that the 2032A special use value of the ranch was $2. The decedent's 26% pro rata share of the of the special use value of the qualified real property was therefore $533. The estate reported that the value of the decedent's 26% interest in the limited partnership's qualified real property for estate tax purposes was $1. The total value of the decedent's interest in the limited partnership for estate tax purposes was $2.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0347p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a consolidated appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court. (2) Petitioner was not entitled to an income tax deduction in the taxable year 1990 for payments made to his former spouse as part of their divorce settlement. When he was terminated. The fact that the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims were still being litigated was evidenced elsewhere in the order. The limitation on relief sought was also confirmed in the part of the pretrial order calling for a non jury trial:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972683.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Before the bankruptcy petition was filed. Done all that was necessary to obtain its lien against the debtor's after acquired property. Determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. We affirm. 2 I Dwight Avis was placed in an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding by a petition filed by his creditors on May 10. Under his will. Maureen was given a power of appointment to convey trust assets to the beneficiaries. Her own support and maintenance were administered by trustees. In Maureen's will. She exercised the power of appointment given to her by the Davis Weir trust by bequeathing whatever was left of the trust's assets to the beneficiaries. Because Avis' interest was contingent on (1) how the Davis Weir trust was administered. It was unclear to Avis what. The bankruptcy estate was closed on December 15. He timely moved to have the bankruptcy proceedings reopened in order to bring the inheritance within the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A). 819 of its claim was secured by a lien that it had obtained almost a year before Avis was placed 3 in bankruptcy.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-9016.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellant.</P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200415013.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The estate of Blount was required to sell Bount's shares when he died. Blount's family business owned an insurance policy to ensure that it would have sufficient liquidity to accomplish the contractual buyout. Because the Tax Court should not have added the insurance proceeds to the value of the corporation when calculating its fair market value. I. BACKGROUND Blount Construction Company (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/01/033917P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
It was successful and enabled the Blodgetts to lead a lavish lifestyle. Blodgett as he was charged with and convicted of several counts of fraud. His wife was not charged with any criminal wrongdoing. Blodgett and the FTC reached a settlement which was memorialized in a consent order signed March 4. A receiver was appointed to liquidate the assets in both estates and disburse the money. The litigation estate was used to pay litigation expenses for the defense of actual or reasonably anticipated governmental enforcement actions against the Blodgetts. The settlement estate was used to pay claims of defrauded customers of the business. The litigation estate was established with $300. The remaining proceeds from the 2 liquidation of the Coin Fund were transferred to the settlement estate. The Florida condominium and Simbari painting each became parts of the bankruptcy estate and were not returned to the settlement estate. The trustee prepared and issued to the shareholders a notice indicating each respective share of the loss amount and the fact such loss was deductible only to the extent of shareholder basis in the corporation.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0890p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will reverse the district court's order. We will remand the case to the district court for the proceedings we outline in this opinion. Which was the post petition portion of the fourth quarter wages it withheld for payment to the City of Farrell. The city contends that Begier held that a trust is created for the benefit of the taxing authority whenever an employer withholds a portion of an employee's wages as income taxes. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961924.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That they were ineligible to receive a credit for the full amount. Were entitled to a credit of only $423.1 Accordingly. The Singletons reported that their total 1987 tax liability was $160. They reported that they were entitled to a refund of the $30. 291 difference. 1 A general business credit is limited to the smaller of three figures: (1) the amount of the carryforward. The Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5113.html">NATIONSBANK OF TEXAS, N.A., V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiff appellant.<span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2002/002149.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Appellants Anthony Gricco and Michael McCardell were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Anthony Gricco was the regional manager for private companies that contracted with the Philadelphia Parking Authority to operate the parking 2 facilities at the Philadelphia International Airport. Gricco was responsible for the general operation of the facilities. Was Gricco's chief assistant. A customer who had parked in the lot for a long period of time would have a real ticket reflecting a high parking fee. Flannery also disabled the fare displays on the ticket reading machines so that customers could not see that the parking fees that they were paying were higher than the fees recorded by the machines. More corrupt cashiers were enlisted. The rest was divided into four equal shares for Gricco. The cashiers waived their right to a jury trial and were convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Million were acquitted. The government submitted a sentencing memorandum asserting that the total amount stolen between 1990 and 1994 was $3.4 million and that the tax loss was $952.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/19BBECB6DFA3241C88256B6F00572140/$file/0017239.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the tax was paid upon a transfer of property by a general power of appointment under a trust that became irrevocable in 1976. Was therefore a generation skipping transfer exempted by§ 1433(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The judgment of the district court is accordingly reversed. Sections I and II of his will established a trust in favor of his wife E. The remainder on her death to be distributed
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1527.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
King</SPAN> were on brief for appellant.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A Notice of the Right of Redemption was served on Ms. The plan provided that the trustee was to make payments to Advanta Mortgage to cure an arrearage in mortgage payments of $9. The trustee was directed by the plan to accumulate sufficient funds to pay Tax 58's claim in one lump sum prior to distributions of other claims except for the trustee's administrative expenses. Since the focus of this appeal is the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation and application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Our review is de novo. 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for the lower court's application of facts to the legal interpretation of a statute is de novo). The holder of the certificate of purchase may serve the property owner with notice stating that the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1759.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On the cover sheet: after Hon. Were on brief for appellant. Ltd. were on brief for appellee. * Of the District of Puerto Rico. The tax issues have become snarled in confusion wrought by a cryptic notice from the Internal Revenue Service. Provided that the estate's total tax liability was $345. 266.24was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011887.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Estate contends that the Tax Court should have applied a minority discount by discounting Godley's interest in the partnerships because he lacked control over them. Whether a minority discount is appropriate in a given situation is part of the larger factual question of valuation. Inasmuch as the Tax Court's valuation of Godley's interest was not clearly erroneous. The remaining fifty percent was owned by Godley's son Frank D. Were formed in 1978 and owned and operated housing projects for elderly tenants. Was formed in 1980 for the purpose of managing the operations of the Housing Partnerships. Housing Assistance payments are made to the Housing Partnerships to cover the difference between the rental rates agreed to under the HAP contracts and the portion of the rent paid by eligible families. Rocky Mount was thirty years and the term for Clinton was twenty years. Jr. was the managing partner for the Housing Partnerships. Jr. was the managing partner. Godley was actively involved in the Housing Partnerships.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200512814.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
How soon does asking have to be? The issue presented in this case is whether the statute of limitations period set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) applies to claims for refunds made by those who have mistakenly filed a return and paid tax when they were not actually required to file a tax return. As the Beatles probably would have guessed. The lamentable answer is yes. I. Wachovia Bank is the trustee for the George C. Which was created in 1984. When it was reformed in order to meet the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 664(c). The trust has qualified as a charitable remainder trust that is exempt from federal income tax. The denial letter explained that the claims for a refund as to those tax years were barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). The government contended that Wachovia's suit was time barred because it had not filed an administrative claim for a refund within the time limits established by § 6511(a). Wachovia contended that § 6511 did not apply to its refund claims because it was never required to file a tax return for the trust to begin with.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1326.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. Was convicted by a jury of filing false federal income tax returns for the years 1991 and 1992. The estimated tax loss to the government was $457. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison. A term which he is now serving. His appeal results in our resolving for the first time several issues under the Federal Rules of Evidence.</FONT></P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1995/95a1174p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Our ruling on this issue is dispositive. Which is not properly before us. Which is rendered superfluous. The resulting claims were settled for $243. Which was turned over to the bankruptcy trustee. The requisite order was issued on March 23. The bankruptcy proceedings were closed sometime prior to February 1989. 000 in retired business debt was not taxable income. Alleging it was granted erroneously since Hutchins was not the proper party to receive a refund of taxes paid by the bankruptcy estate. We have jurisdiction over the district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. The question of standing is itself subject to plenary review. The right to the refund was not abandoned but was instead retained by the estate. Any tax refund granted to Hutchins was erroneous and could be recovered. The refund claim was at best a derivative asset that arose as a result of the trustee's tax filings on behalf of the estate. The claim was not asserted until after the bankruptcy had closed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A28DE0C65113158E88256C590053448D/$file/0135892.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Priority unsecured creditors have a right to obtain only that portion of the proceeds equaling the amount of the tax liens. Then to the holders of the tax liens insofar as their claims were not already satisfied and. The Creditors are entitled to a share of the proceeds. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Those parcels were subject to a number of liens. Citing 11 U.S.C. § 724(b) and arguing that the Creditors' claims were completely subordinate to the claims of certain priority unsecured creditors (namely. The Creditors assert that the district court's decision is final for the purpose of appellate review. We must consider independently whether appellate review is permissible at this point in the bankruptcy proceedings. A district court's decision is final when it affirms or reverses a bankruptcy court's final order. If the matters on remand
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/07/046010P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bankruptcy Judge The Trustees of the Trism Liquidating Trust (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/05/963462P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Alleging that the Gavin estate is entitled to (1) value certain farmland under the special use valuation provisions of Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 2032A (1988 & Supp. The facts of this case are not in dispute. Verdon Gavin was a farmer who owned two parcels of farmland (Parcel One and Parcel Two) in Jones Parcel One was approximately 200 acres. Parcel Two was During Verdon's active farming years. Gary Gavin was to pay his father
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/976088P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we determine that 2 the bankruptcy court was without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the federal income tax liability for the 1990 through 1994 taxable years. The opinion below will be vacated. This Chapter 11 bankruptcy case was filed by the debtor on August 24. The taxes were based upon the additional $500. The debtor objected to the proof of claim on the basis that the funds were not income. An evidentiary hearing was held on the objection after which the bankruptcy court found. The IRS proof of claim was allowed in its entirety. That the debtor may have made restitution in subsequent tax years. No years were specified and the opinion does not indicate what tax years the Court believed would be in issue.1 Payments in the nature of restitution are deductible with respect to the tax years in which they are made. 26 U.S.C. § 165. He was entitled to claim a deductions of the amounts paid on his 1040 return for the 1991 taxable year. It appears that the delay was occasioned by settlement negotiations between the parties. 4 2 response objecting to the motion.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200511951.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Ricky Bracewell from an order of the district court excluding from the estate a payment Bracewell received under the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 for crop losses he had sustained. The appeal turns on the issue of whether a crop disaster payment is property of the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) or (a)(6) if the losses occurred before the bankruptcy filing or conversion date but the legislation authorizing the payment came afterwards. The bankruptcy court ruled that the payments were property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) but not under (a)(6). The district court ruled that the payment was not property of the bankruptcy estate under either subsection of § 541. This is the trustee's appeal from that ruling. I. The facts have been stipulated throughout these proceedings. He was unable to repay the debts he had incurred to produce the crops. While Bracewell's bankruptcy petition was pending. The Emergency Farmer and Rancher Assistance Act of 2002 was introduced in the House of Representatives.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/01/971110P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Contending that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict for the United States. I. Jennifer Meisner was married to Randall Meisner from 1963 to 1981. Paragraph nine of the PSA provides: [Jennifer] shall have as her separate property and the title to the same shall be quieted in her the following items: .... c. That Jennifer's rights to an undivided forty percent interest in the royalty contract was not subject to any reversionary or contingent interests. Claiming that the royalties were properly taxable to her ex husband rather than to her. A jury trial was held regarding her claims for 1987. Where such payment is not practicable. It is understood by the parties that such payments will be made at such times and intervals as provided in the various contracts now existing with such paying companies.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2003/021917o.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The relevant facts are undisputed. Hechinger was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/02/951856P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Seeking a declaratory judgment that they are exempt from state sales and income taxation and for an injunction prohibiting the state from imposing such taxes. The PCAs moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue The HONORABLE ADRIAN G. Sitting by designation. * of whether they were immune from state sales and income taxation because PCAs are statutorily declared instrumentalities of the United States and. Are entitled to immunity from such state taxation. The state responded that Congressional declaration of PCAs as federal instrumentalities was insufficient to confer tax immunity and that waiver of immunity should be implied. The state further argued that it was necessary to make a factual inquiry into the governmental nature of PCAs in order to determine whether they are federal instrumentalities immune from state taxation. Summary Judgment is appropriate if the record. Shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001244.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The first is whether a 1992 transfer of land from a husband to his former wife constitutes a transfer
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200612654.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude that some of Becker's individual claims are subject to arbitration and others are not. Because she was not a signatory to the agreements. Were not signatories to the agreements. Davis was president and principal owner of Falcon FM and Falcon FP. Davis was also a registered representative and registered principal of IFG SEC and a registered investment advisor of IFG AS. The complaint alleges that all the defendants were working together to induce Becker and the Trust to adopt a financial strategy that was unsuitable for her personal investment objectives. The complaint also generally alleges that the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-9012.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellant.</P> <P><U> Craig J. Braunstein LLP</U> was on brief for appellee.</P> <P> </P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0745n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Harris and Schwentker were romantically involved. Owners who were loyal to him.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8DB7AF5C9709C2BA88256C590052C1D7/$file/0135819.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ARC had threatened to stop clearing MarkAir's tickets which essentially would have shut down the airline's business unless MarkAir posted a letter of credit in the amount of $1.8 million. ARC was given a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/04/002035P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court2 agreed with the IRS that the estate had to have all disputed amounts paid or be up to date on any installments. I. There are few facts in dispute. The offer was rejected by the IRS and the estate was not given credit for the money. Which was eventually returned to it. Was $393. The estate moved for summary judgment claiming that the IRS had not properly calculated the taxes due and that the estate should have judgment on the legal merits. The court also recognized that the estate must have paid the full amount of the tax liability before bringing the action if the IRS had accelerated any part of the estate's tax liability. The court found that the estate was required to have fully paid each installment of principal and interest due before the suit had been filed and continue to make timely payments during the pendency of the suit. It was jurisdictionally barred from bringing this action. The estate was further barred from suit because it had not paid installments due during the litigation and had not paid the full amount of its tax liability after acceleration by the IRS.4 II.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043942np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This appeal is from the District Court's grant of the United States' motion for summary judgment against defendants Rudolph and Elaine Isley for unpaid taxes and interest. The parties have not appealed the amounts assessed against Rudolph and Elaine jointly. The controversy is founded in the substantive consolidation of Rudolph's bankruptcy estate with those of his two brothers. We will remand for the resolution of that limited issue. I. Because this is a Not Precedential Opinion. O'Kelly Isley were all members of a music group called the Isley Brothers that obtained some fame and wealth beginning in the 1960s. The proceedings were converted to Chapter 7 and the bankruptcy court substantively consolidated the individual estates in 1989. While others did not provide such a designation.1 1 Some of the copies of the checks in the appendix are unreadable. 3 After the trustee paid the amounts due under the consent order. 826.78 was applied to the tax liability of the consolidated estate. The IRS calculations are based on records that were not revealed to Rudolph until this case was on appeal and are encoded in such a fashion that they require explanation.2 In 1999.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FCD5B0E9FD2E964688256DA2005A70D6/$file/0215618.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an IRS claim for delinquent taxes secured outside of bankruptcy by a lien on a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan is secured in bankruptcy
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-5130.html">FLUOR CORP. V. THE UNITED STATES<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-9003.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court permitting the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-4258_032.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were indicted. Both were convicted Marin of assisting in the preparation and presentation of a false tax return and Palivos of conspiracy to obstruct justice though he was acquitted of obstruction of justice. Was JACPG. The buyer was Peter Bouzanis. Was a felon. The mortgage to finance the purchase was obtained from The Money Store and was partially guaranteed by the United States Small Business Administration (SBA). The loan itself was for approximately $1.25 million. The Money Store and the SBA were not aware that 100 percent of the funds for the closing came from the seller. We will use full names to distinguish between Peter and George. George Palivos and Bouzanis are fugitives believed to be living in Greece. 2 Nos. 05 4258 & 05 4329 3 Obviously. Bouzanis was required to come to the closing with over $350. Palivos's brother in law Dimitrios Bousis went to a bank where he was a long time customer and pledged his own accounts to guarantee a $354. The dispute was then
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2003/01-17249.opn.html">BALLARD V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 01-17249<BR></A><BR>
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's findings. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0309p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
His estate was worth approximately $10 million. Roughly $1.9 million in federal estate taxes was due as a result of Karam's death. Who are Karam's wife and children. The plaintiffs argue that Sagemark was untimely in seeking judgment as a matter of law and. Factual background Karam's trust agreement contained what is known as a tax equalization clause. The theoretical advantage of an equalization clause is that. Two smaller distributions on the deaths of each spouse will result in less total estate tax liability than would one large distribution on the death of the survivor. Are relatively uncommon in estate planning. More prevalent is the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D5937C263AF96D6E8825735300510DFC/$file/0555988.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The BAP agreed that the County was liable for damages resulting from its violation of the automatic stay. The BAP held that the Brawders were not due a refund of the taxes paid in excess of the confirmed Plan amount. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We further elaborate upon the facts of the case and address the effect of the parties' stipulation in the current Chapter 13 adversary proceeding on the County's right to enforce its lien to recover the pre petition taxes that were not paid fully by the prior Plan payments. The Plan stated that the Brawders were in default to the County in the amount of $9. The County accepted them. (1991) (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2003/01-17249.opn.html">BALLARD V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 01-17249<BR></A><BR>
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's findings. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july97/96-2145.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp. United States Court of Appeals. Senior Circuit Judge: The issue here is whether the district court correctly ruled that when a corporate debtor's fiscal tax year straddles the filing of a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization. The portion of the year's income tax attributable to income earned during the prepetition part of the year is not allowable as an administrative expense under section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
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OPINION/ORDER
He claims that the materials comprising the Tax Toolbox were never introduced into evidence at the hearing on the injunction. Because the injunction's scope is appropriately tailored and does not unduly burden his livelihood.
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OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp. United States Court of Appeals. Senior Circuit Judge: The issue here is whether the district court correctly ruled that when a corporate debtor's fiscal tax year straddles the filing of a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization. The portion of the year's income tax attributable to income earned during the prepetition part of the year is not allowable as an administrative expense under section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
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OPINION/ORDER
Constituted income from the trade or business of farming that was subject to the self employment tax pursuant to § 1401 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court agreed with the Wuebkers' position that the payments constituted
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OPINION/ORDER
Concluding that his case was a core proceeding and that it had authority to decide the matter. Dunmore consulted with his tax attorney to determine whether he should list these refund claims as assets on a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition he was preparing. Any potential waiver objection is now itself waived. 1 1212 DUNMORE v. Dunmore admitted he was not prepared to proceed with trial in the bankruptcy court. Whether Dunmore was entitled to a jury trial in federal court. Dunmore must have suffered an
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97-9024 -- GILMORE & WILSON CONSTRUCTION CO. AND SUBSIDIARY V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 01/13/1999
These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. These three appeals challenge the Tax Court's affirmance of the Commissioner's imposition of penalties and interest due to the taxpayers appellants' negligent underpayment of taxes owed for various tax years from 1979 to 1983. See Estate of Hogard v. 1997 WL 160769 (1997).
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OPINION/ORDER
Facts The facts of this case are. F&G was a direct mail marketing company engaged in the marketing of gifts. A leveraged purchase of a large number of F&G shares by the ESOP was proposed. F&G had been enjoying record profitability for several years and was forecasted to continue this trend into the future. F&G's largest subsidiary was Michigan Bulb Company (
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OPINION/ORDER
The Tax Court held that Suzy's Zoo exercised such degree of control over the manufacturing of its products by third party contractors that it was a
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OPINION/ORDER
In 1995 David Stinnett was diagnosed as suffering from depression and as a result has been collecting substantial monthly benefits from two different policies of long term disability insurance. The district court concluded that the disability payments are property of the bankruptcy estate. That Stinnett is entitled to an exemption of $6000 per month under Indiana law. Which we have consolidated for decision. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the disability payments are property of the bankruptcy estate and also that Stinnett is entitled to exempt only $6000 not 100% of the disability payments. Because the disability payments are property of the bankruptcy estate. I. Background David Stinnett worked for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (
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The Tax Court held that Suzy's Zoo exercised such degree of control over the manufacturing of its products by third party contractors that it was a
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OPINION/ORDER
Congress was silent whether the elimination of § 212(c) relief applied retroactively to people who were convicted of crimes before 1996. Aliens who committed aggravated felonies were placed in deportation proceedings after being served with an Order to Show Cause. Aliens were placed in removal proceedings after being served with a Notice to Appear. The Supreme Court noted that
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2 were convicted pursuant to a 133 count indictment charging them with various offenses arising out of the operation of the concessions at the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport. Ira Jackson was the first black person elected to the Atlanta City Council and served from 1970 to 1990. Will be referred to herein as
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UNITED STATES V. PARADIES
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States v. <a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept96/94-8485.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. PARADIES<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. <a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/08/97-9028.htm">97-9028 -- KURZET V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 08/16/2000<BR></A><BR>
These are: (4) the Kurzet's 24 room mansion in Orange. Alleging that they were deficient in their tax payments for the years 1987. The tax court found that the Kurzets were deficient in their tax payments because they claimed impermissible tax deductions in connection with the Tahiti property. The tax court felt that penalties were not appropriate in light of the fact that the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/52A6ACBBB6C52CBF88256ED90068AC5B/$file/0273933.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When calculating the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/95-1437.htm">95-1437 -- INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE V. CRADDOCK -- 07/28/1998<BR></A><BR>
The original opinion is withdrawn. This opinion is ordered substituted for the original opinion filed in this case. <p> The Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/05/95-1437.htm">95-1437 -- U.S. V. CRADDOCK -- 05/01/1998<BR></A><BR>
Craddock's bankruptcy estate relating to tax years 1979 1986.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2488.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rose Cleveland is executrix of the estate of her late husband. Which are for legal malpractice sounding in contract and tort. We will affirm the dismissal if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling it to relief. Who was an attorney. The estate alleges that this is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/076BE43BBCFA9CF088256E5A00707C7A/$file/9917541.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I Fran Lebowitz may have rightly observed that a person has the same chance of winning the lottery whether one plays or not. 1 the probability of tax imposition on the prize is almost 100%. Nor were his heirs. Future payments were to be made to a deceased winner's estate according to the annuity terms. The payment of federal estate tax is not similarly structured. Which is themed
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-1276.htm">97-1276 -- UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1992 BENEFIT PLAN V. RUSHTON -- 07/09/1998<BR></A><BR>
Are
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I Fran Lebowitz may have rightly observed that a person has the same chance of winning the lottery whether one plays or not. 1 the probability of tax imposition on the prize is almost 100%. Nor were his heirs. Future payments were to be made to a deceased winner's estate according to the annuity terms. The payment of federal estate tax is not similarly structured. Which is themed
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/12/971221P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
[Debtor] may not have filed income tax returns with either the IRS or the State of Missouri for the years. [Debtor] wishes to have [Snyder] represent him. Does not have the present cash with which to pay [Snyder]. [Snyder] is willing to represent [Debtor] based upon [Debtor's] proposal to give him a Second Deed of Trust in the property. ... *** 17. This Note was for Snyder's
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054168p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Laher's TIAA CREF retirement annuity is excluded from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). We hold that it is. Will reverse the decision of the District Court and order that the case be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for entry of an order excluding the annuity from the bankruptcy estate. Pre tax contributions were taken from his paycheck and accumulated into a sum that would be used to purchase a contract that would pay him an annuity over time after retirement.1 Salary
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026024P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The IRS determined that the Harkers were liable for income tax deficiencies and statutory additions to tax for 1985 through 1987. Found that Harker filed it
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTUxNTEtYWdfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-5151-ag_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that investment advice fees incurred by a trust are not fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code under 26 U.S.C. § 67(e)(1). Instead are deductible only to the extent that they exceed two percent of the trust's adjusted gross income pursuant to § 67(a). Because the remaining members of the Panel are in agreement. Circuit Judge: The question presented on this appeal is whether investment advice fees incurred by a trust are fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/01/056034P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from orders of the bankruptcy court1 entered on June 27. I. Standard of Review The court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The issue of what constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate is a question of law. Even if that ground was not considered by the trial court. 853 The opinion and order in the Law case were entered by the Honorable Jerry W. The order in the Brouse case was entered by the Honorable Arthur B. Tax refunds arising from an overpayment of taxes or from the federal earned income credit are property of the estate and are not considered exempt. The debtors here each take the position that the portion of their federal tax refunds attributable to the child tax credit is not property of the estate. Asserting that the amount of the refund resulting from the child tax credit is indeed property of the bankruptcy estate. A hearing was held in each case. A memorandum opinion and order were entered in the Law case holding that the refundable portion of the child tax credit is property of the bankruptcy estate.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1379.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On page 20. P.C. were on brief for appellant. Stern were on brief for appellee Peter M. J. Daniel Marr with whom Hamblett & Kerrigan P.A. was on brief for appellees Robert and Frances Shaine. *Of the District of Maine. Argues that the bankruptcy court's order to pay over the disputed funds to the estate was an error of law. Appellee Robert Shaine continued to serve as president of SPM and was an unsecured
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/02/00-3013.htm">00-3013 -- ROGERS V. U.S. -- 02/22/2002<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/96opinions/96-1253a.html">AIR TRANS ASSN AMER V. DOT<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/09/012962P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (transferring jurisdiction of cases arising in or related to Title 11 from district court to bankruptcy court). Jurisdiction in district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (enabling district court to consider interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts). Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (authorizing appeals from final district court judgments reviewing The Honorable Rodney S. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. The balance of the note was to be paid on September 30. Nerland Oil was responsible for forwarding from Conoco to Superpumper the credit card receivables generated by the Dakota Fuel Stop. Superpumper and Nerland Oil did not have a contract governing this relationship. It is a well known industry practice which is generally not recognized in writing. The existence of these contracts is puzzling. As WFTS was not a Conoco jobber authorized to sell the Conoco fuel products required.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200117249.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's 1 Mary B. Ballard is a participant in this dispute solely as a result of having filed joint tax returns with her spouse Claude M. All references will be to Claude M. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income. Both Ballard and Lisle worked in Prudential's real estate department which was divided into two divisions: equity operations and mortgage operations. Prudential was one of the largest owners of commercial real estate in the United States. Their offices were located next to one another. Arrangements were made to buy Ballard's and Lisle's influence.2 For 2 Referred to as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/01/976084P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The filing was precipitated by the Internal Revenue Service's (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199810/97-1489a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the brief were Loretta C. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Court sustaining the position of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue regarding the tax treatment of certain losses. The appellants are the co executors of an estate and the decedent's widow. When the taxpayer is an estate. Or is venue determined by the residence of an executor who filed a petition in Tax Court. Other ques tions relating to venue are also presented. If venue is proper here. The merits of the case are governed by Stoller v. If venue is not proper here. Gray was then a resident of New York. Audrey Israel was a resident of New Jersey. As was her husband at the time of his death. When the original petition was filed. Stoller was a resident of Bermuda.1 The Commissioner answered the amended peti 1 Amendments relate back to the original date of the petition. Admitting the portion of the petition alleging that the petitioners were Gray. It is unnecessary to describe the ruling on the merits or the underlying facts.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/aug97/95-4130.wpd.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court determined that a large payment made by the Talbots to the IRS for unpaid income taxes was improper because it was made outside of the confirmed plan of reorganization (the
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Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. I. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.1 With the ultimate goal of applying their overpayment to the tax liability that was not discharged. The Ryans argued that because their 1990 overpayment was a voluntary payment of taxes. The IRS was required to follow their instructions about how to allocate that payment. The government responded that the Ryans did not have the power to control the application of their 1990 overpayment. 1988 were discharged. A determination that is not challenged here. The court found that the IRS should have honored the Ryans' request to apply the 1990 tax year overpayment to their 1989 tax liability.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/12/02-9009.htm">02-9009 -- JONSON V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 12/30/2003<BR></A><BR>
Relief from the joint and several liability that generally follows from filing a joint income tax return may be available to a spouse who is no longer married to or is legally separated from the culpable spouse. Barbara was happily married to David Jonson at the time of her death. Claiming that Barbara was no longer married to David and had not been living with him for the year prior to the election. We agree with the Tax Court that the Estate is not entitled to relief under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3F4B8C5C35AAF35A882569EA00621DD7/$file/9955692.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Chelalas are citizens of France who permanently reside in the Congo and are the sole ultimate shareholders of Lidas. Although the IRS was apparently notified a number of times that the Congo was the Chelalas'
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The Chelalas are citizens of France who permanently reside in the Congo and are the sole ultimate shareholders of Lidas. Although the IRS was apparently notified a number of times that the Congo was the Chelalas'
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept95/94-6724.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Ryan United States Court of Appeals. Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.
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OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Ryan United States Court of Appeals. Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.
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OPINION/ORDER
White were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: On page 8. Wheatley and Gordon & Wise were on briefs for defendants. Hall & Stewart were on briefs for appellees. At issue in this case are two different appeals. Which we have consolidated. Whose source is a lawsuit over unpaid bank loans. The background facts are largely undisputed. The borrowers were licensees or had other ownership interests in radio stations in various cities. Fleet concluded that the borrowers were in default and brought suit in two different federal district courts to collect upon different notes made or guaranteed by the borrowers. The borrowers were required by that date either to have made a down payment of $6.4 million or to have in force purchase agreements with third parties obligating the latter to buy stations from the borrowers for that amount or more. The precise terms of the settlement agreement and other pertinent facts are set forth below. Giddens had an extensive background in appraising and selling radio stations and was a partner in a brokerage firm.
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OPINION/ORDER
Was denied. A. The relevant facts underlying this claim are undisputed and fully detailed in the district court's opinion. DRI's gross income from its electric utility business is a function of the electricity rates it charges its customers. Many public utilities have established similar reserve accounts to meet deferred income tax liability. They may have received similar compensation from the utility serving their new residence or business). The remittance was allocated on the basis of the 1991 customers' electricity use during the preceding 12 months. The issue here is whether DRI is entitled to invoke § 1341 to obtain from the government an additional $1.2 million deduction. It was determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the income. His only option was to deduct the amount of that income in the year of repayment he could not recalculate his income for the year of receipt. § 1341 is designed to put the taxpayer in essentially the same position he would have been in had he never received the returned income.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: Petitioners appeal the decision of the United States Tax Court finding that advances made to their closely held corporation were nondeductible loans and that prepaid real estate taxes were not deductible in the year paid. We have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Tax Court
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UNITED STATES V. 9844 S. TITAN CT.
There is merit in both arguments. These were adjacent units in an industrial condominium. Philip May was indicted on January 28. He was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Frances May was never arrested or charged with any crime. Contending that the property was connected with the sale and distribution of controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) and (a)(7). By reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. (7) All real property. Which is used. By reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. (1) The May home at 1277 South Memphis in Aurora. Unit 9 was purchased with marital funds but was titled in Philip's name only. (3) The $13. 050 in cash that Philip had with him when he was arrested. (4) The $2. Arguing that he was unable to stop the searches as promised once the police took him from the search sites.
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OPINION/ORDER
She thought that she was Cameron's common law wife but neither New York nor New Jersey. IRS contends it was entitled to the settlement funds by virtue of tax liens arising out of taxes assessed against Cameron and Freck on income attributable to Cameron for tax years 1978. That it was entitled to credit the payment first to interest and principal for the earliest years or in the manner most advantageous to the government. The district court concluded that Freck could not qualify for relief from the assessment under 26 U.S.C.A. § 6013(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994) as an innocent spouse because she was never married to Cameron. It then accepted IRS's argument that she was equitably estopped from asserting she was not liable for taxes on Cameron's income because of IRS's reliance on her innocent misrepresentation that Freck was Cameron's wife in giving him the benefit of the lower joint rates he was not entitled to as a single person during taxable years now closed. Freck contends the settlement funds were paid to IRS by her adversary's counsel without her knowledge and that she had no opportunity to tell IRS how to apply them.
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OPINION/ORDER
Specifically they argue (1) that the injunction is overbroad as it relates to a book they sell. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). I. Background Irwin Schiff has a long history of opposition to the federal income tax laws.1 For over thirty years he has maintained that the federal income tax is voluntary. Co defendant Lawrence Cohen is an employee at Freedom Books. Is sold individually and as part of tax avoidance packages. Which authorizes a district court to enjoin any person from conducting activities that are subject to penalty under 26 See. Including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter. Including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income that they know or have rea (2) (3) UNITED STATES v. SCHIFF 10821 son to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter.
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OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
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OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
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OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
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OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
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OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
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OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
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OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
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OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
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OPINION/ORDER
We are presented with the question whether defendants' acts. We must determine what showing is required for plaintiffs to meet the
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SLEIMAN V. COMMISSIONER (9/10/1999, NO. 98-2872)
The lease agreement provided that if the property was environmentally contaminated. Was environmentally contaminated and required substantial cleanup. The second loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and REE's interest in the Blockbuster lease and by Eli's personal guarantee. The Roosevelt property was an environmentally contaminated former gas station that had been accepted into Florida's EDI program.
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OPINION/ORDER
Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court.
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SLEIMAN V. COMMISSIONER (9/10/1999, NO. 98-2872)
The lease agreement provided that if the property was environmentally contaminated. Was environmentally contaminated and required substantial cleanup. The second loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and REE's interest in the Blockbuster lease and by Eli's personal guarantee. The Roosevelt property was an environmentally contaminated former gas station that had been accepted into Florida's EDI program.
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99-6116 -- MANCHESTER V. ANNIS -- 10/19/2000
Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER
Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court.
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OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court concluded that the pre petition application of the right to the tax refund was an asset as of the petition date. The facts are not in dispute. The Debtors overpaid their 2001 federal and state income tax returns and were entitled to tax refunds as a result of the overpayments. This was not done. Arguing that the Debtors' interest in the tax overpayments was property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 that must be turned over to the Trustee under section 542. They were no longer entitled to a tax refund. The Debtors argue that their prebankruptcy application of their tax overpayment to the subsequent year's tax obligation was not property of their bankruptcy estate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). They would have been entitled to a tax refund of over $280. The bankruptcy trustee filed income requests for the tax refund that the Feilers would have received had they chosen the first option.
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OPINION/ORDER
Richmond & Rothstein were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Holding that Progressive's mortgage was not entitled to priority over the federal tax liens under the Massachusetts common law doctrines of equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The mortgage at issue is secured by real property located in Marshfield. 000.00 mortgage note which was properly recorded in favor of the Miles Standish Federal Credit Union (
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OPINION/ORDER
LLC were on brief for appellant. P.A. were on brief for cross appellant. It ruled that because the Advest IRA was in Cox's name when Cox petitioned for bankruptcy. Hence was not subject to the later judgment of the divorce court. We reverse the court's decision as to the Advest IRA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Laurie Davis and Thomas Cox were married on August 17. They have two minor children. Davis was a homemaker and. Cox was a successful commercial attorney. The court was required by Maine law to issue. The preliminary injunction was meant to keep intact. Is equitably divided by the court between the divorcing pair irrespective of in whose name it was held.
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OPINION/ORDER
The sentencing court's finding should have precluded relitigation of the fraud issue before the tax court. Even if relitigation is not precluded. We hold that he is entitled to deduct certain bona fide business expenses. The first provided for a base offense level of ten
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OPINION/ORDER
Is not an exemption statute and there is no exemption for tax refunds under state law or applicable federal law. The Mohrhards and Benn (
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OPINION/ORDER
Whether the obligors on unmatured promissory notes can obtain declaratory relief against the obligees of those notes and have the notes declared void and unenforceable. Whether transactions involving investment securities are covered under section 9.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 2 Practices and Consumer Protection Law (
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is the effect of a conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings on the priority status of a postpetition. They stated that they no longer operated their long term care facility and were now employed by others. To reflect additional interest and penalties which had accrued while the estate was still proceeding under Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court agreed and held that a tax claim filed during the pendency of a Chapter 13 petition must be prioritized as if the claim had arisen prepetition because § 1305(b) states that claims for taxes filed under § 1305(a) are allowed or disalUnless otherwise indicated. The bankruptcy court noted that filing a proof of claim under § 1305 is voluntary. Therefore the IRS could have avoided application of § 1305 by not filing a claim after the conversion. The district court found that § 348(d) is the only section that addresses the issue of administrative expenses in a conversion from one Chapter to another and that § 1305 did not apply.
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OPINION/ORDER
Determining that the case should have been brought in the United States Tax Court. We have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. The appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. The hearing was rescheduled. A declaration that the IRS's deficiency determination was erroneous. The presumption is that review should be sought in the Tax Court. The crux of his dispute with the IRS is obviously his income tax liability. A declaration that his income tax liability was erroneously determined. Voelker suggests that he should have been allowed to pursue his claims in the district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Voelker could have raised these same due process arguments had he properly filed his case in the Tax Court. 108 F.Supp.2d at 1364 n.4 (noting that taxpayer was free to raise due process arguments in the Tax Court). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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OPINION/ORDER
His will created the Grover M. The primary beneficiary of the trust was Mr. Bryan a general power of appointment by will. This transfer is subject to a special enactment known as the Generation Skipping Transfer tax (GST). Unless it is entitled to the benefit of an effective date provision under which transfers under a trust which was irrevocable on September 25. Are not subject to the GST tax. There is no sufficient reason not to apply the plain language of the statute. ¶ A of the will of Grover M. That is. In her will. She thus had a general power of appointment by will. Upon her death the remaining corpus of the trust was included in her estate for purposes of the federal estate tax. Bryan made her will in 1982. The will became effective upon Mrs. It is unnecessary to describe the details of the GST tax. It is sufficient for present purposes to know that the transfer was a
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MELLON BANK V. US
Font family:Arial'>for plaintiffs appellants.
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OPINION/ORDER
Is entitled to
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WILLIAM K. VANCANAGAN V. U.S.
Of counsel was Edward A. With her on the brief were Loretta . ) with their application was a ". The effect of that ruling was to invalidate as untimely their claim that they had overpaid their taxes. Which was the extended date for that return. Bovey died and his personal representative was substituted as a plaintiff appellant. 000 remittance in April 1990 was a ". Were
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OPINION/ORDER
He financed $1.4 million of the purchase price with a loan from Wells Fargo Bank that was secured by a lien on Catalano's residence. Catalano opposed the motion on the ground that the value of the property was substantially greater than that of the outstanding debt. The property was sold to Wells Fargo for $1. The outstanding principal balance of the Wells Fargo loan was $1. Which was the amount of interest that. Catalano's residence was property of the bankruptcy estate at the time of the foreclosure. That therefore all tax consequences of the sale should have fallen upon the bankruptcy estate. Catalano could not be considered to have paid any interest in 1995 because the fair market value of his residence. Which the Commissioner maintained was accurately reflected in the amount Wells Fargo bid at the foreclosure sale. Was less than the outstanding principal on the loan. Because the proceeds from the sale were insufficient to pay off the entire 1153 amount of outstanding principal. There were no proceeds remaining with which interest could have been paid.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The parties are now litigating over the remaining money in the instant appeal. 3 judge's decision:2 (1) the magistrate judge erred in refusing to allow Floyd to reduce the amount paid to Powell by the amount of money he would owe in capital gains taxes if he had otherwise disposed of the stock. Powell was to receive $15. Its name is spelled
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FIRST FINANCIAL INS. CO. V. ROACH
The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. The state court action centers around an automobile accident in which several people were killed. The plaintiffs in that action claim that Pond Creek Country Club and Frisco Bar served 3.2 beer to a customer who was already intoxicated. If such liability is imposed (i) by. Defendants argue that 3.2 beer is not an alcoholic beverage. That the term is ambiguous because it is susceptible to two meanings and. That summary judgment was inappropriate. That the terms of the insurance policies are not ambiguous and that the term
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OPINION/ORDER
The state and local taxing authorities who had received and refused or failed to refund the recordation and transfer tax proceeds were located in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Each of the taxing authorities was served with notice of the motion and each responded by filing motions for abstention. NVR was exempt from transfer and recordation taxes on any real property transfers completed between April 6. The date that its reorganization plan was fully implemented and the bankruptcy period ended. Specifically holding that
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OPINION/ORDER
Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's
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OPINION/ORDER
Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's
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OPINION/ORDER
Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Other damages recoverable at law.
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OPINION/ORDER
Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Other damages recoverable at law.
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OPINION/ORDER
These cases were consolidated for purposes of oral argument on appeal. The appeal in each case is from an order of the bankruptcy court filed September 24. This matter was originally submitted after oral argument on February 8. The findings have been made and the matter was reargued on March 2. STANDARD OF REVIEW The findings of fact are uncontested and no review thereof is sought by the parties. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. A bankruptcy court's denial of a claim of exemption is a final. The attorney for the debtor is holding the refunds pending a final judgment. Which were estimated in the total amount of $2. The attorneys for the debtors are holding the original refunds pending a final judgment. The debtors filed an amended Schedule C claiming that all of the 2003 tax refunds are exempt pursuant to Missouri statutes. That a debtor's anticipated tax refund is not exempt. The court therefore sustained the Trustee's objection to exemptions and ordered turnover to the Trustee. 3 DISCUSSION Each of the debtors claimed that the federal and state tax refunds were exempt under Missouri law.
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MONAHAN V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12164)
The losses and credits claimed by Barrister and its partners were subsequently examined in an IRS audit of Barrister's tax return.
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OPINION/ORDER
Are reserved to the States respectively.
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MONAHAN V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12164)
The losses and credits claimed by Barrister and its partners were subsequently examined in an IRS audit of Barrister's tax return.
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OPINION/ORDER
While the garnishment proceedings were pending. She argued that her interest in the marital assets was a matter for the state court. I. Background In November 2004 Frank Kollintzas was convicted by a jury of converting money from the City of East Chicago. Sentencing was scheduled for February 24. Where Kollintzas's property is located. Served interrogatories on third party account holders (
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OPINION/ORDER
I. The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant was appointed Chapter 7 Interim Trustee. At the time the petition was filed. The home was valued at $266. Was subject to a lien in the amount of $56. An interest as a tenant by the entirety. . .to the extent that such interest. . .is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
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OPINION/ORDER
Facts White was president and sole shareholder of WCC.
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OPINION/ORDER
Including undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty as the executor of a will. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Appellant Robert Golden is a citizen of the state of New York and holds general power of attorney for Leah Golden. Appellant Donald Earwood is the personal representative of the estate of Helen Earwood. Golden and Darlene Koposko are both adult citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. King executed a Last Will and Testament (the
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OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse the order of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Overview of Affected Parties The underlying matter in this appeal is an accounting malpractice action. The Trustee's principal allegation is that Price Waterhouse erroneously reported in its audit that accrued interest on Litigation Trust accounts belonged to the debtor rather than to the Litigation Trust. Underlying this claim was a suit between the Litigation Trust and the debtor. Price Waterhouse's erroneous reports were relied on by the bankruptcy court to the Litigation Trust's detriment. Is not a party to the malpractice action. The Trustee alleges the debtor's estate would still be affected by the malpractice suit because the Litigation Trust is effectively a continuation of the bankruptcy estate. Who were former creditors of the debtor's estate. Is not a continuation of the bankruptcy estate for jurisdictional purposes. Price Waterhouse contends the debtor is only tangentially affected by this malpractice action after it assigned away its interests in the litigation claims.
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. The question presented to the Tax Court was whether petitioner Louis Filios was pursuing horse racing and breeding for the primary purpose of earning a profit during the years in question. The Tax Court held that the requisite profit motive was lacking. See generally Filios v. Commissioner. Is amply supported by the record. We largely reiterate it here.
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OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1229. We reverse because we conclude that the transfer at issue in this case was necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Berkshire Mortgage Finance Corporation was the only lender willing to advance the debtors $23.5 million before August 31. Kissimmee's hotel was not subject to the RCAP mortgage. It was under no obligation to refinance its hotel at the time. In pertinent part: 3 Berkshire's willingness to make the loan to [the debtors] is contingent upon Kissimmee Lodge's agreement to refinance its hotel through Berkshire. Berkshire will not provide any financing to [the debtors] unless Kissimmee Lodge refinances through Berkshire. The Kissimmee Lodge refinancing therefore is incident to an a condition precedent to the reorganization of [the debtors] and that refinancing therefore is exempt from Florida documentary stamp taxes. The FDOR argued that the plan failed to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)1 because the § 1146(c) exemption the proposed plan conferred on the Kissimmee transaction was not available as a matter of law to non debtor entities.
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OPINION/ORDER
Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Johnson Blakely removed the malpractice action to the United States 2 Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.1 Johnson Blakely subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that the claims asserted in Alvarez's complaint are property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The trustee is an indispensable party to the litigation. Johnson Blakely argued that unless the trustee is joined. The bankruptcy court held that the claims in Alvarez's complaint are not property of the estate and that. The trustee is not an indispensable party to the litigation. Holding that the malpractice action is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy trustee is indispensable to maintenance of the action.
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OPINION/ORDER
Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Johnson Blakely removed the malpractice action to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.1 Johnson Blakely subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that the claims asserted in Alvarez's complaint are property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The trustee is an indispensable party to the litigation. Johnson Blakely argued that unless the trustee is joined. The bankruptcy court held that the claims in Alvarez's complaint are not property of the estate and that. The trustee is not an indispensable party to the litigation. Holding that the malpractice action is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy trustee is indispensable to maintenance of the action.
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98-7057A -- U.S. V. ROBERTS -- 08/03/1999
13 of the original version. A corrected copy of the opinion is attached for your convenience with the proper citations. Very truly yours. Hollis Earl Roberts was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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98-7057 -- U.S. V. ROBERTS -- 08/03/1999
Hollis Earl Roberts was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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97-1149A -- PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. V. SKEEN -- 12/22/1998
The liability was not incurred by the bankruptcy estate and did not qualify as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C.
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97-1149 -- BAYLY V. SKEEN -- 12/22/1998
The liability was not incurred by the bankruptcy estate and did not qualify as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C.
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellants. Although we agree with the district court that summary judgment for the taxpayer was appropriate. Factual Background Factual Background The material facts are not in dispute. The IRS has three years from the date a return is filed to make an assessment of liability. 26 U.S.C. 6501. If the IRS discovers that an assessment
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question presented is whether mortgages held by the FDIC can be extinguished without the FDIC's consent through foreclosure of plaintiff's superior real estate tax liens. The loans were made respectively in March 1987 for $200. The Bank's assets were taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
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OPINION/ORDER
Is precluded from applying Chapter 13 plan payments from the Debtors' bankruptcy estates to postpetition interest on their nondischargeable student loan debts. Because we conclude that creditors are not precluded from applying bankruptcy estate payments to accrued postpetition interest on nondischargeable student loan debts. Which was confirmed on June 12. Will be paid in full through the Trustee.
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OPINION/ORDER
It had neither paid the taxes it was disputing nor sought administrative relief before the Internal Revenue Service. Arguing that the judgment is void because the jurisdictional defect that existed when the suit began was incurable. Whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Were the only children of S. One of their businesses was Primco Management Company. An Oklahoma corporation whose stock was held equally by the brothers' revocable living trusts. Primco was the nerve center for the Goldmans' other businesses: it performed administrative services such as bookkeeping. The complaint and stipulation were amended as follows: 1. Goldman for the tax (1) The district court said that
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98-3149 -- BAER V. MONTGOMERY -- 09/11/2000
Chief Judge.
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01-3129 -- TUTTLE V. U.S. -- 05/29/2002
Interest that accrued between the date her petition was filed and the date her plan was confirmed. 519.17 was for a priority claim. Tuttle's Chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in December 1999. 000 that accrued on its priority tax claim between the time she filed her bankruptcy petition and the time her plan was confirmed.
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Petitioners Lauren Ostrow and Joseph Tieger are tenant stockholders of a cooperative housing corporation in New York. Such a deduction is generally allowed pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (
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OPINION/ORDER
Which is. The Reynolds asserted that these letters were binding admissions by the IRS. The Tax Court upheld a 20% accuracy related penalty because it found that some of the remaining errors were the result of negligence. Reynolds graduated from law school and was promoted to a supervisory position. The IRS commenced an investigation of Reynolds springing from concerns that he may have been conducting his private law practice during his workday at the IRS. The investigation was officially terminated in 1995. Which is the time period relevant to this dispute. These efforts were limited to a few real estate closings and related activities. Are currently before us on appeal. Schedule C is used to calculate a profit or loss from a sole proprietorship e.g. Schedule A is used to itemize various personal expenses that are deductible under federal law. Schedule E is used to state supplemental income or loss from various other activities e.g. Schedule F is used to state a profit or loss from farming activity. 3 2 Neither party in this case provides an intelligible summary of precisely which automobile and travel deductions are now on appeal nor do they give us the total amount of the claimed deductions.
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97-9016 -- PRESLAR V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 02/16/1999
Owned the ranch and was a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Which had been experiencing serious financial difficulties and whose interest was subordinate to the other banks. Moncor Bank's actions were designed to avoid foreclosure and recoup as much of its loan as possible. On July 12. The agreement expressly referred to the fact that Moncor Bank was financing the purchase. The Preslars were to pay fourteen annual installments of $66. The goal was to sell each cabin lot for approximately $16. There is no reference to this unique repayment arrangement in the loan documents. The arrangement is also discussed in an unsigned 1985
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OPINION/ORDER
The RTC was formally appointed as Saratoga's receiver. Saratoga's assets were liquidated and transferred to a new. Although Saratoga was no longer in his control after 1989. His personal use of the 1992 Cal Housing tax The RTC was
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00-1317 -- STERLING CONSULTING CORP. V. U.S. -- 04/10/2001
The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed. II. IMMI was one of several companies embroiled in a dispute over the Indian Motorcycle trademark. Have been in bankruptcy in Massachusetts since before 1995. The assets of the receivership estate and bankruptcy estates were combined for sale and eventually sold. $3.5 million of the proceeds from the sale of assets was allocated to the bankruptcy estates and placed in an escrow account with the district court in Colorado. The account was established for the payment of claims owed by the bankruptcy estates. Claiming the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the tax liabilities of debtors who were in bankruptcy in Massachusetts. In December 1999. The government indicated that the tax liabilities of the bankruptcy estates for 1999 would amount to $1.2 million if the top corporate tax rate was applied to the $3.5 million allocated to the bankruptcy estates from the sale of the combined estates. 000 to cover the potential tax liabilities of the bankruptcy estates was insufficient. The bankruptcy court entered an order approving the trustee's amended final accounts.
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OPINION/ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 11701 mined that these items were capital expenditures depreciable under 26 U.S.C. § 263. We have jurisdiction over appeals from the tax court pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). Vanalco was in the business of smelting aluminum. Aluminum is made from bauxite. Bauxite is refined to make aluminum oxide. Aluminum is produced by use of the chemical process electrolysis. Where it is dissolved in a bath of molten cryolite solution. Which is a cubical carbon block attached to a copper rod. Is then introduced into the cell. An electrical current is passed from the anode. Which is a carbon block that lines the bottom of each cell. The factual background is taken from the parties' joint stipulation of facts. 2 The terms
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97-9003 -- TWENTY MILE JOINT VENTURE, PND, LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE - - 12/27/1999
The primary individuals in the group of investors were Mr. Which is one of the Appellants in these matters. Is the Appellant in No. 97 9003. As was the case with Parker Properties. These details are unimportant to the issues presented in these appeals. We have ignored these intermediate entities and have referred to the investors as if they individually were partners of Parker Properties and Twenty Mile. The parent company of Empire. Commercial was also influenced by the fact that the real estate market was on the decline. Commercial's goal was to receive as much cash as possible and to be indemnified from all continuing liabilities associated with the joint venture partnerships. It was willing to accept less than the outstanding balance of the loans in order to liquidate its interests and to avoid future liabilities associated with the projects. In early 1988. 910.
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OPINION/ORDER
This is a tax case that started out as a criminal investigation. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Determined that there were deficiencies in taxpayer's returns for 1993. Jeffrey Williams did not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7482. Taxpayer was employed as a staff radiation therapist by Deland & Noell. When she was 21 years old. Who was also employed by the corporation. Was discharged. The corporation provided treatment to cancer patients and was owned and operated by Drs. Who were husband and wife. Their return was prepared and filed by a commercial return preparer. The returns for 1994 and 1995 were prepared by taxpayer's husband.
opened multiple treatment centers. Taxpayer was promoted in 1991 to Chief Therapist and then in 1993 to Corporate Chief Therapist. The corporation was in a period of expansion and opened cancer treatment centers in multiple geographical locations. Who was president and a shareholder of the corporation.
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OPINION/ORDER
Braunstein LLP were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER
Discovered after oral argument that he was disqualified. Particularly the strength of the rule that such exemptions are construed narrowly against the party seeking them. Inc. (
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OPINION/ORDER
Because we find that judgment was properly awarded to the government. Facts1 The facts in this case are not in dispute. * At all times Honorable Harlington Wood. Our statement of the facts is taken in large measure (verbatim in considerable part) from the district court's excellent opinion. 1 relevant to this controversy. The The bankruptcy court entered an order granting that application. order stated that the commission would be paid
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellants. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of Dartmouth's usage fees which are assessed on boats that the appellants keep moored in the town's harbor. 2 to support 1 Capobianco is the president and treasurer of LCM which was created to hold ownership of one of Capobianco's boats. 2 Mass. The fund is financed by a waterways use fee (the
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OPINION/ORDER
Was incorporated in Hong Kong in 1972. DHL and DHLI/MNV were part of a global network in which DHL handled United States operations exclusively and DHLI/MNV handled foreign operations. A Worldwide Coordination Center was established in Belgium. The MOA was extended through 1990. Which was then used worldwide. The agreement was terminable only for cause and had a 15 year term. With an automatic 10 year renewal if both parties were satisfied. If the agreement was terminated. This offer was not well received. A second offer was made on June 14. Was of some value that should be reflected in the final price. DHLI is sometimes used to refer to both DHLI and MNV collectively. This valuation was based in part on the view that DHL's trademark rights were diluted by its agreements with DHLI. Appears to have been done without knowledge of any ownership problems in the trademark. Should not have to pay royalties given its difficult financial position. DHL would have the exclusive U.S. rights to the trademark for 10 years.
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OPINION/ORDER
Which have been consolidated before the district court for pretrial purposes. Which is in the business of purchasing such delinquent claims from municipalities in several states. Appendix references are to the appendix filed in Nos. 99 3858 and 99 3859. 4 September 1996. The City and the School District entered into a Purchase Agreement whereby existing claims and liens for unpaid taxes and sewer charges were assigned to NTF.2 App. at 517. Ltd. (
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OPINION/ORDER
Which are amply supported by the record. ACM invested $175 million of its cash in private placement Citicorp notes paying just three basis points more than the cash was earning on deposit. Which is evident from the Tax Court's well supported factual findings. Is essential to assessing whether the transaction's tax consequences may be disregarded and lends significant support to the court's ultimate finding that ACM's transactions did not have sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. The consideration consisted of $140 million in cash and LIBOR notes whose present value was $34. Reduced by the transaction costs established by Merrill Lynch. 38 acquire an amount of LIBOR notes that was identical. To the amount of such notes that ACM could have acquired by investing its $35 million in cash directly into such assets. Just as the Gregory Court found that the intervening creation and dissolution of a corporation and transfer of stock thereto and therefrom was a
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OPINION/ORDER
With him on the briefs was James H. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. There are nine plaintiffs. Five are individuals who claim that although they are eligible for a certification. They are unable to obtain one. Two are persons whose ability to sell or transfer these fire arms allegedly has been impaired by the inability of prospec tive purchasers to obtain certifications. Two are local chief law enforcement officers. That he is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph appearing on the application are those of the applicant and that the firearm is intended by the applicant for lawful purposes.
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OPINION/ORDER
Was actually listed as the owner of SCV in the Illinois Department of Revenue filings. Structured the sale of the Halsted property to make it appear that the purchase price was only $675. This finding is not challenged on appeal. The only problem was that they had to somehow make the SCV debt worthless to Chavin. He was told that the sale was nothing more than a
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OPINION/ORDER
872 imposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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KENT A. LOMONT V. PAUL O'NEILL
Halbrook argued the cause for appellants.
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OPINION/ORDER
CIR COUNSEL Petitioner appellant was represented by Robert E. Respondent appellee was represented by Eileen J. This is an appeal by Charlotte's Office Boutique. Were actually wages and that appellant was liable for employment taxes on those wages and penalties. Which was first raised before the Tax Court by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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UNITED STATES V. GIBBONS
It held she was entitled to only one half of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. They were divorced in January 1982. House is to be sold and equity divided equally between David J. In June 1992 the IRS filed this suit seeking to reduce to judgment federal tax 2 Notices were recorded in 1984. The total amount of the liens which attached to David Gibbons' interest in the Ogden Street property was $42. That the separation agreement conveyed to her a life estate interest in the property for which she was entitled to be compensated. It determined that David and Betty continued to hold the Ogden Street property in joint tenancy and that Betty was entitled to only one half of the proceeds of the forced sale. The threshold question before us is whether. If we find that it did then we must address whether (based on Colorado recording statutes) her failure to record her interest where deeds are registered rendered it invalid as against the recorded tax liens. If we find that Betty's interest was valid against the IRS liens.
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OPINION/ORDER
That the portions of the Glass property covered by each conservation easement is a
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96-9002 -- JEPPSEN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 10/31/1997
On the grounds that it was reasonably foreseeable by the end of 1987 that Jeppsen would recover the stolen money. When Jeppsen was awarded almost $1. The tax court agreed with the IRS that Jeppsen was not entitled to the theft loss deduction claimed on his 1987 tax return. We affirm. BACKGROUND The facts of the present case are largely undisputed. Who knew that Jeppsen was not experienced or sophisticated in securities investments. Barker then invested much of the money in this account in certain
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JEPPSEN V. COMMISSIONER
On the grounds that it was reasonably foreseeable by the end of 1987 that Jeppsen would recover the stolen money. When Jeppsen was awarded almost $1. The tax court agreed with the IRS that Jeppsen was not entitled to the theft loss deduction claimed on his 1987 tax return. BACKGROUND The facts of the present case are largely undisputed. Who knew that Jeppsen was not experienced or sophisticated in securities investments. Barker then invested much of the money in this account in certain
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OPINION/ORDER
The notices stated that Taxpayers were not entitled to a loss in the amount of $5. Determining that COD income of an insolvent S corporation cannot be used to increase the shareholders' basis. evidence shows that the bankruptcy trustee was actively administering New Manchester's estate well into 1995. Some of New Manchester's creditors were. There is no need to address the pass through issue at this time. Friedman's death would not affect the continuation of this matter. 1 demonstrate that the debts were. There was no such event. Further evidence that a discharge had not occurred in 1992 is the fraudulent conveyance claim filed in December. This offer was refused by the bankruptcy court. The claim was eventually settled on or about April 11. These facts demonstrate that not only was the fraudulent conveyance claim still pending after 1992. The value of the claim was in dispute well into 1995. Because the value of the claim was uncertain in 1992. The actual amount New Manchester's estate would realize from the claim was not ascertainable in that year.
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OPINION/ORDER
We hold that because there was no final administrative determination of the Mantzs' tax liability prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. An administrative hearing was held on October 27. [or] penalty . . . if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 000 tax payment that he made in 1996 was credited properly by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to his tax liability for 1980 rather than for 1981 and 1982. I. Martin was married to Amilu Rothhammer during 1980. They were divorced in 1981. Martin and Rothhammer are both physicians. (A. at 16.)1 The Manhattan partnerships were involved in a group of tax court cases. The IRS also References to the appendix provided by Martin will be denoted by the abbreviation
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OPINION/ORDER
With her on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Amanda Wood. Illinois that was suitable for office use. If no full tax assessment is made during the calendar year in which the Government lease commences. The base year will be the first year of a full assessment. Real estate taxes were payable in arrears. Which means that they were payable after the period for which they were assessed. Taxes assessed for 1999 were payable in March and October 2000. The real estate taxes that were assessed for 2000 and that Greenwood actually paid during 2001 increased substantially over those taxes assessed for 1999 and actually paid during 2000. The increase was apparently due to Cook County's periodic and routine reassessment of real estate. It asserted that the Government was responsible for a share of the difference between the real estate taxes for 1999. The Government responded that it was not responsible for that tax increase because the base year when the lease commenced was 2000. Because 2000 was the base year.
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OPINION/ORDER
Was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan of six counts of extortion and one count of conspiring to commit extortion. Was convicted of one count of extortion and one count of conspiring to commit extortion. Kelley was a long time employee of Wayne County. Was an employee of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan. Kelley was the Assistant Wayne County CEO. Kelley was responsible for the operation of Wayne County's Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (
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OPINION/ORDER
We are presented with two decisions of the district court dated May 18. We are asked to decide whether the district court erred in determining that the bankruptcy court was not authorized to compel the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate tax payments first to trust fund taxes. We will affirm the decisions of the district court. I. We feel compelled to set forth the facts in detail because these bankruptcy cases are so heavily fact intensive. KBS is a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring and operating a modular home manufacturing business. Were its sole owners. That payment was not accompanied by a quarterly return. 468 were
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OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the Debtor's 1040 Forms filed after the Internal Revenue Service had assessed the tax liabilities qualify as returns for purposes of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i). The bankruptcy court entered summary judgment in favor of the Debtor determining that the 1040 Forms qualified as returns and that the Debtor's tax obligation was not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i). Assessed the tax liabilities did not qualify as returns under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) and that therefore the taxes were excepted from discharge. The court concluded that the 1040 Forms were returns for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i). The court entered its order denying the United States' motion for summary judgment and determining that the Debtor's tax liabilities for tax years 1992 through 1996 were discharged. The United States appealed that order. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW The facts are not in dispute.
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OPINION/ORDER
Spalding were on brief for petitioner.
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OPINION/ORDER
The facts are undisputed and were fully recited by the district court in this case. His will created a residuary trust for the benefit of his wife and children. The Government acknowledged the residuary trust should have been taxed with the G.A. It was not because of the estate's QTIP election. The Government conceded the sons were entitled to a refund plus interest. Argued the amount of the refund should be offset by a proportionate amount of the tax that should have been paid on the trust by G.A. The district court* analyzed the elements of equitable recoupment and concluded they were satisfied. Limited the amount recouped to the tax burden that would have been borne by the plaintiffs if the improper QTIP election had not been made and the tax had been imposed in a timely manner. Agreed with the parties that the tax code's general rule is that interest is paid on tax unpaid on or before the due date. That none of the Code provisions directly address whether interest is due in the equitable recoupment context.
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OPINION/ORDER
Nor was it asked to make. We conclude that the Tax Court's order is not a final decision and that we lack jurisdiction over the Giants' appeal under section 7482(a)(1). Built in gain is measured by the appreciation of the asset that accrued prior to conversion to an S corporation. The IRS argued that its own Notice of Deficiency as to those years was invalid because the built in gains tax liability had to be determined in a unified audit proceeding under I.R.C. §§ 6241 45. The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the built in gains tax liability for FYEs 1996 and 1997 were subject to unified audit procedures. The petition with respect to FYE 1998 was not affected because the statutes establishing the unified procedures were repealed. The Giants' petition with respect to FYE 1998 is presently before the Tax Court. Reserving its contention that the dismissal was a final and immediately appealable judgment. Concluding that
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OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal 1 The Honorable James G. ISSUE The issues on appeal are whether: (1) the bankruptcy court improperly asserted jurisdiction to order disgorgement of the fees paid to the Attorney for services allegedly performed for the debtor. (3) the conclusion that the disgorged fees should be returned to the estate was appropriate as a matter of law. The deed transferring the Illinois property to the third party was recorded in Illinois. The bill stated that it was for past. The Debtor's schedules show that his only major asset was the $102. The Attorney testified that because the first two checks were for attorneys' fees. He represented that the reason he did not disburse his attorneys' fees directly to himself from his attorney trust account was to make sure he left a
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98-4125 -- MORGANROTH & MORGANROTH V. DELOREAN -- 06/05/2000
The only one which is relevant to this appeal is the theory that the transfer of the property should be set aside under Utah Code Ann.
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee. Contending that Appellee Internal Revenue Service (
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97-4121 -- PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. V. CF&I FABRICATORS OF UTAH INC. -- 08/03/1998
Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER
The decedent executed a will and a trust agreement. Article I of the will
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OPINION/ORDER
The United States instituted an adversary proceeding against Gardner in the bankruptcy court by filing a complaint seeking a determination that his unpaid tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991 were excepted from discharge in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(1)(C) of the Code. The bankruptcy court determined the liabilities were excepted from discharge under that provision because appellant had willfully attempted to evade or defeat those liabilities. He was a partner in the law firm of Gardner. Gardner assured Thomas he was working on several cases that could settle within the following months for which his personal fees would be sufficient to satisfy the tax obligations. Except now one bank account reflected a zero balance and the other disclosed that it was overdrawn. Debtor also testified that he was aware of his obligation to pay his 1990 and 1991 federal income taxes. That he could have used some of the income he earned between 1990 and 1996 to pay those taxes. Thomas also testified that he would not have considered debtor's original offer in compromise to be bona fide had he known.
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OPINION/ORDER
The request for rehearing en banc is denied. 3085 3086 WINN v. Dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc: The decision in this case sharply limits the traditional restraints on federal judicial interference with state tax systems and is in conflict with the position of the Sixth Circuit. The Arizona statute at issue grants a tax credit of up to $500 a year for taxpayer contributions to
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OPINION/ORDER
Who was governor. The trustee's first complaint was dismissed as to Morris and the Morris. Not to Senior Cottages itself because there was no allegation that Senior Cottages had a value in excess of creditors' claims against it. The complaint
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OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order and judgment of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court can require the Taxing Authorities. The holders of tax claims against the debtor which are secured by liens on certain real property presently owned by the debtor's non debtor spouse. During the period that the Homestead was jointly owned by Fred and JoAnna Bame. An involuntary Chapter 7 petition was filed against Fred Bame (
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OPINION/ORDER
P.C. was on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. Some of which have been stipulated and incorporated in the district court's findings. Are not in dispute. Are recapitulated here. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 1989. When Taxpayer was sixty four (64) years old. In which Taxpayer was represented by the law firm of Ryan & White. According to which Young was to pay Taxpayer $350. 000 was allocated to Count III. This deduction was explained in 1 J. Hampden County 1988). 2 The Settlement Agreement also provided that (i) Taxpayer would be deemed to have retired from Young effective October 15. 5% of the Legal Fee was attributable to settlement of Count III. 000 Legal Fee) was deducted from the settlement proceeds attributable to Counts I and II. 000 received from Young in settlement of Counts I and II was gross income to Taxpayer. That the Legal Fee associated with Counts I and II were miscellaneous itemized deductions. Taxpayer was liable for the Alternative Minimum Tax (
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OPINION/ORDER
Waterman (
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98-9009 -- GITLITZ V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/06/1999
A was a partner in Parker Properties Joint Venture. A's pro rata share was $2. A was insolvent to the extent of $2. 748 and thus was excluded from tax liability for the discharged debt income. See 26 U.S.C.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Although Hunt is not entitled to interest under the applicable statute. The district court held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was equitably estopped from denying payment of interest on the 1982 refund. A claimant may not use equitable estoppel to require the Government to make payments out of the Federal Treasury that are not authorized by statute. A decision was filed in the Tax Court on December 20. The Tax Court decision did not mention the 1982 tax year at all and did not incorporate Hunt's draft settlement language.2 After the Tax Court decision was entered. Hunt contacted the IRS to find out why he had not received the refund for the 1982 tax year and was advised to file an amended return for 1982 to claim the NOL carryback. Hunt made further inquiries with the IRS to determine why his refund was not the We note that because Hunt did not receive a notice of deficiency with respect to the 1982 tax year. The Tax Court did not have jurisdiction over that tax year.
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DANTZLER V. UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (8/10/1999, NO. 98-8514)
The binding aspect of an earlier case is found in the actual disposition of the case given its particular essential facts. The power of precedent chiefly is to assure that like cases have like results. Cases that are not essentially alike can rightly have different results. Because Taxpayers' claims for refunds were not timely. Who are husband and wife. These amounts were sent to the IRS: $5. The returns showed that the Dantzlers' liability was less than the remittances the Dantzlers had made in connection with the corresponding extension requests. The IRS later notified the Dantzlers that it had disallowed their refund claims because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Dantzlers brought this action seeking a refund for the years 1985. We conclude that the remittances were payments. The Dantzlers' refund claims are therefore time barred. The Internal Revenue Code contains two jurisdictional time bars for tax refund claims. Section 6511(a) provides that a refund claim must be filed
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OPINION/ORDER
Appeal from an order of the United States Tax Court sustaining the findings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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DANTZLER V. UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (8/10/1999, NO. 98-8514)
The binding aspect of an earlier case is found in the actual disposition of the case given its particular essential facts. The power of precedent chiefly is to assure that like cases have like results. Cases that are not essentially alike can rightly have different results. Because Taxpayers' claims for refunds were not timely. Who are husband and wife. These amounts were sent to the IRS: $5. The returns showed that the Dantzlers' liability was less than the remittances the Dantzlers had made in connection with the corresponding extension requests. The IRS later notified the Dantzlers that it had disallowed their refund claims because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Dantzlers brought this action seeking a refund for the years 1985. We conclude that the remittances were payments. The Dantzlers' refund claims are therefore time barred. The Internal Revenue Code contains two jurisdictional time bars for tax refund claims. Section 6511(a) provides that a refund claim must be filed
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OPINION/ORDER
The district court concluded that Integrated lacked standing to pursue the state law claims because its purchase of the claims from a trustee in bankruptcy was void ab initio under New Jersey law. We disagree and will affirm. 2 I. The debt was secured by separate security agreements in assets such as accounts. Certain individual defendants who were former Machine Technology employees entered Machine Technology's offices and took or copied various documents. Were unlawfully competing with Integrated. The district court denied Integrated's request for an injunction on the ground that Integrated was not
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Randolph George was convicted by a jury on two felony counts of willful filing of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Are receivership1
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98-8015 -- TRUE V. U.S. -- 09/09/1999
Sharing equal minority interests in the ownership and operation of the businesses.
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OPINION/ORDER
Powers was on brief for appellees Michael D. LLP were on brief for appellees Transamerica Corporation. Twenty three owners of real property in Rhode Island were disadvantaged by being part of a group required to pay their real estate taxes annually rather than quarterly. Were required to pay taxes in one lump sum. The quarterly payment method is more favorable to the taxpayer because it permits the taxpayer to receive the interest on the escrowed funds until the quarter in which payment is due.
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OPINION/ORDER
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. As will be shown in detail below. The appellants' allegations are premised on misrepresentation or mischaracterization of the tax court record and misunderstanding of the legal principles at issue. 1976 (
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OPINION/ORDER
The notice was untimely and we lack jurisdiction. A. SMA asserts that we have jurisdiction over its appeal of the tax court's decision because: (i) Pursuant to Rule 13(a).
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OPINION/ORDER
DeMallie & Lougee were on brief for appellants. DeMallie & Lougee were on brief for appellants. Were on brief Section Tax Division and David I. Were on brief for appellee. for appellee. A closely held corporation of which Ralph and his three brothers were the only individual shareholders. The IRS determined that the alleged loans were taxable as
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OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. From which it might have paid a
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OPINION/ORDER
As deficiencies were assessed against her because she filed a joint tax return with her husband. References to
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SHEWFELT V. U.S.
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OPINION/ORDER
MD 21201 Amicus Law Professors in support of Appellant *** Joining Professor Lipson on the brief are Professors Ralph Brubaker. Introduction This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court. The question on appeal is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. While the question in Hartford Underwriters was one of a nontrustee's right unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme. Our conclusion is consistent with the received wisdom that
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UNITED STATES V. HUNERLACH (12/7/1999, NO. 98-4781)
He argues that his conviction for filing a false statement should be reversed because the prosecution was commenced beyond the six year statute of limitations and the district court erroneously admitted evidence in violation of his constitutional rights. He also challenges his conviction for wilful evasion of payment of taxes arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. He further argues that the district court erroneously included interest and penalties as
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UNITED STATES V. HUNERLACH (12/7/1999, NO. 98-4781)
He argues that his conviction for filing a false statement should be reversed because the prosecution was commenced beyond the six year statute of limitations and the district court erroneously admitted evidence in violation of his constitutional rights. He also challenges his conviction for wilful evasion of payment of taxes arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. He further argues that the district court erroneously included interest and penalties as
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OPINION/ORDER
At issue is whether a permanent injunction barring defendant Thurston Paul Bell from promoting and selling unlawful tax advice is permissible under the First Amendment. We will affirm the injunction with modifications. 2 I. Thurston Paul Bell is a professional tax protester who ran a business and a website selling bogus strategies to clients endeavoring to avoid paying taxes. An entity dedicated to the proposition that
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OPINION/ORDER
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 holding that $3. 300.00 in accrued and unpaid wages owing to Stephanie Irish are totally exempt from property of her bankruptcy estate. Unpaid wages that are owing on the petition date in addition to any amounts the debtor would be able to exempt against a garnishing creditor. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. She is paid on a twelve month basis. Her expected calendar year earnings for 2003 were between $16. Only consumer debts were listed in the Debtors' schedules. Contends that she is entitled to exempt her accrued. Which provides: A debtor who is a resident of this state may hold exempt from execution the following property .... 9. This exemption is in addition to the limitations contained in sections 642.21 and 537.5105. § 642.21(1)(b) states that
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OPINION/ORDER
This case is before us on the bankruptcy Trustee's appeal from a ruling of the bankruptcy court that the Debtors. Were the beneficiaries of trusts with enforceable transfer restrictions such that their beneficial interests in those trusts were excluded from their bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Because we conclude that the Debtors failed to carry their burdens of proof that they were beneficiaries of trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The principal issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred when it concluded that the Debtors' § 403(b) annuity plans constitute trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The bankruptcy court's determination that the assets of these pension plans were excluded from the bankruptcy estate by operation of § 541(c)(2) is a conclusion of law which is reviewed de novo. A court's findings of fact are accepted by appellate courts unless they are clearly erroneous. Both of which are qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) as tax sheltered annuity pension plans.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This appeal was filed by Wallace Resources. (Wallace) subsequent to the district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy court decision holding that the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS or United States) tax liens on the claim of Colstar Petroleum (Colstar) against ARC Energy Corporation (ARC) were superior to Wallace's judgment against Colstar (which arose from a default judgment). The company was required under a confirmed liquidation plan to pay $37. Wallace and the IRS are competing claimants and creditors of Colstar and both seek to enforce their claims by receiving Colstar's $37. The IRS included a letter stating that the notice of levy was not an accelerated demand for payment insofar as ARC was in bankruptcy. Notices of the liens were also filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Fairfax County. 797 is the amount claimed by both Wallace and the IRS. The United States filed a motion in bankruptcy court for summary judgment claiming that its tax liens were entitled to priority over competing creditors' claims to Colstar's funds.
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TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)
The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion.
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TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)
The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion.
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OPINION/ORDER
I. BACKGROUND The facts in this case are not in dispute. married since 1988. The O'Hagans have been The IRS appeals. Which is their principal place of residence. The O'Hagans have owned the homestead property at all times In during their marriage as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. 1988. O'Hagan has not been assessed any income tax liability and is not obligated to pay any part of her husband's taxes. Which sale was to occur on November Mrs. DISCUSSION The question before us is whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin the government from selling Mr. The primary purpose of the Act is to See The § facilitate the expeditious collection of taxes by the government. The Supreme Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases brought by an allegedly delinquent taxpayer in which the collection or assessment of taxes would be enjoined because: (1) the government cannot prevail on the merits even if the facts and law are examined in the light most favorable to the government.
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OPINION/ORDER
Nonstock one of which was herbicide for its crops. Several fertilizer liens were also filed in Madison and Pierce Counties. Negotiations were undertaken between DLC and Cooperative for damages. Finding that DLC was indebted to Cooperative on its open account in the sum of $15. The court also found that the affirmative defenses raised by DLC were conclusions of law and that no facts were alleged in support of the conclusions. Which was denied on October 12. This decision was appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. In 1995 the Court of Appeals found there were genuine issues of material fact for trial. This decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Demerath Land Co. v. After its RICO action was dismissed. The request was denied. Found that Cooperative was entitled to a judgment for $27. The appeal was summarily dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court on April 14. No deeds were prepared. Three lawsuits were filed by Fort Calhoun State Bank against DLC. Those suits alleged that the real estate conveyances were fraudulent transfers under the Nebraska Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
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OPINION/ORDER
Simek thought it was worth. Simek asserts five(1) (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. At the time this Agreement was negotiated and signed. Did not have a Wyoming license. King was required to prepare under Wyo. Six qualified bidders were present at the auction. Was
previously known to J.P. Was an entity that Mr. The sale price for the property was $1. This amount was less than Mr. Was a disappointment to Mr. Who believed the property was worth at least $3 million. Simek] ha[d] sustained significant losses and will continue to incur additional damages until this matter is resolved.
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OPINION/ORDER
They were residents of Bethesda. David Hillman was the sole shareholder of Southern Management Corporation (SMC). Under which the corporation's profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on each shareholder's individual federal income tax returns. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A). 1 HILLMAN v. Which were involved in real estate rental activities.2 At all times relevant to the issues in this appeal. The general partner of each limited partnership was either David Hillman or an upper tier partnership or Subchapter S corporation in which he owned an interest. Joint venturers and partners are taxed under a passthrough taxation system. 26 U.S.C. § 701 04. Each joint venturer or partner is individually taxed on his distributive share of joint venture or partnership income. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We are presented with the following question of law: May the Hillmans legally deduct their passive management fee expenses from their related nonpassive management fee income for purposes of lowering their taxable income for taxable years 1993 and 1994?
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OPINION/ORDER
Johnson is a certified public accountant and regulation. Lyon are married and reside in New to Mr. Which was lower than the rate applied to
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OPINION/ORDER
P.C. was on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER
Because it appears from the record and from our review of the applicable law that Decosimo improperly sought compensation for accounting work that was not reasonable and necessary to the maintenance of the bankruptcy estate of the debtor. The Parties The factual setting for this dispute is a bit complicated. Appellant Decosimo is an accounting firm hired by Das A. It is Decosimo's work for Borden and the eighteen other related entities that is the basis of this dispute. The other entities are Turtle Lake. Greentree's bankruptcy case was filed in New Orleans. The appellees are Ed Lee McMillan. McMillan is a secured creditor of the Company and Borden. McMillan is obligated to pay the allowed administrative expenses necessary to wind up the Company's bankruptcy case.1 Initially. Was a guarantor of $3. First United Bank was a $4. Its security was the partnership interests and distributions. McMillan agreed to have his cash collateral applied to the 1 2. The Company and Borden were general partners of approximately 40 limited partnerships which operated various apartment complexes throughout the southeast.3 On October 8.
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OPINION/ORDER
Because it appears from the record and from our review of the applicable law that Decosimo improperly sought compensation for accounting work that was not reasonable and necessary to the maintenance of the bankruptcy estate of the debtor. The Parties BACKGROUND The factual setting for this dispute is a bit complicated. Appellant Decosimo is an accounting firm hired by Das A. It is Decosimo's work for Borden and the eighteen other related entities that is the basis of this dispute. The other entities are Turtle Lake. Greentree's bankruptcy case was filed in New Orleans. The appellees are Ed Lee McMillan. McMillan is a secured creditor of the Company and Borden. McMillan is obligated to pay the allowed administrative expenses necessary to wind up the Company's bankruptcy case.1 2. Was a guarantor of $3. First United Bank was a $4. Its security was the partnership interests and distributions. McMillan agreed to have his cash collateral applied to the administrative expenses necessary to the preservation of the Company's estate. 3 1 to the entry of an order of relief under Chapter 7. 2 On July 12.
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OPINION/ORDER
Assessed $62 million in additional taxes based on a finding that the foreign banks to which the income was allocated were not bona fide equity partners. J.) ruled that the banks were bona fide equity partners. For which the taxpayer was the tax matters partner. Was drastically reduced by huge depreciation deductions which the IRS would not recognize. The effects of the ostensible allocation of the majority of the partnership's income to the non taxpaying Dutch banks were to shelter most of the partnership's income from taxation and to redirect that income tax free to the taxpayer. What the Dutch banks were in fact to receive from the partnership was dictated by provisions of the partnership agreement calling for the reimbursement of their initial investment at an annual rate of return of 9.03587% (or. The banks' reimbursement at the agreed rate of return was formidably secured by a variety of contractual undertakings by the taxpayer and its parent GECC. The effect of the reallocation was to assign a far greater percentage of Castle Harbour's income to the taxpayer.
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OPINION/ORDER
Because it appears from the record and from our review of the applicable law that Decosimo improperly sought compensation for accounting work that was not reasonable and necessary to the maintenance of the bankruptcy estate of the debtor. The Parties The factual setting for this dispute is a bit complicated. Appellant Decosimo is an accounting firm hired by Das A. It is Decosimo's work for Borden and the eighteen other related entities that is the basis of this dispute. The other entities are Turtle Lake. Greentree's bankruptcy case was filed in New Orleans. The appellees are Ed Lee McMillan. McMillan is a secured creditor of the Company and Borden. McMillan is obligated to pay the allowed administrative expenses necessary to wind up the Company's bankruptcy case.
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OPINION/ORDER
Because it appears from the record and from our review of the applicable law that Decosimo improperly sought compensation for accounting work that was not reasonable and necessary to the maintenance of the bankruptcy estate of the debtor. The Parties The factual setting for this dispute is a bit complicated. Appellant Decosimo is an accounting firm hired by Das A. It is Decosimo's work for Borden and the eighteen other related entities that is the basis of this dispute. The other entities are Turtle Lake. Greentree's bankruptcy case was filed in New Orleans. The appellees are Ed Lee McMillan. McMillan is a secured creditor of the Company and Borden. McMillan is obligated to pay the allowed administrative expenses necessary to wind up the Company's bankruptcy case.
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OPINION/ORDER
We reaffirm the principle that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over appeals from CDP determinations is limited to issues over which the Tax Court would have had jurisdiction to consider the underlying tax liability. Is entitled to raise defenses and to contest the levy or lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A).1 After receiving a determination from Section 6320(c) looks to § 6330 for issues regarding hearings. Which was denied. II [1] The Tax Court is an Article I
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OPINION/ORDER
We reaffirm the principle that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over appeals from CDP determinations is limited to issues over which the Tax Court would have had jurisdiction to consider the underlying tax liability. The lien is not effective until the IRS has filed notice. Is entitled to raise defenses and to contest the levy or lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A).1 After receiving a determination from the 1 Section 6320(c) looks to § 6330 for issues regarding hearings. Which was denied. II [1] The Tax Court is an Article I
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GRISWOLD V. UNITED STATES
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Griswold v. Denied the taxpayer's claim for damages because the IRS's failure to file a certificate of release was neither knowing nor negligent. Several of the notices of federal tax lien were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034768p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We must determine whether a non profit organization's obligation to reimburse the New Jersey Department of Labor (
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765 (1985) (states are permitted to tax Indians
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-5087.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Melvin C. Of counsel on the brief was Thomas R. With him on the brief were Stuart E. The plaintiffs argue that the 1993 legislation breached the contract because it changed the tax laws to abrogate tax benefits to which they were entitled at the time the contract was executed and because the legislation specifically targeted the benefits they enjoyed under the contract. Holding that under the pre 1993 tax laws they were entitled to the tax benefits in question and that * Paul R. The plaintiffs have cross appealed from the court's denial of their request for additional damages. Fixed rate mortgages created when interest rates were low. The acquisition was effected through a contract between FSLIC. FSLIC bound itself to make assistance payments to Texas Trust in an amount equal to the difference between the book basis of the covered assets and the value of those assets when they were sold or written down. The Consolidated Group expected to be able to take deductions for the built in losses on the covered assets as those assets were liquidated or written down.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0196p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5069.html">CRNKOVICH LAWRENCE P. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
With him on the brief were <U>Loretta C. Final judgment was entered in favor of the Skinners after the United States chose not to contend that the Skinners had impliedly waived the requirement that the government assess them within the statutory period. </P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug95/94-2496.opa.html">GRISWOLD V. UNITED STATES<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Griswold v. Denied the taxpayer's claim for damages because the IRS's failure to file a certificate of release was neither knowing nor negligent. Several of the notices of federal tax lien were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0050p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was the company permitted to deduct anticipated warranty expenses in the year that it sold warranted motor vehicles to its dealers even though warranty claims had not necessarily been made? 2) Was Chrysler barred by the ten year statutory limitations period 1 No. 03 1214 Chrysler Corp. v. We will abandon our usual practice of beginning our opinion with a generalized background section in favor of treating each issue individually. The Tax Court framed the issue in these terms: We must decide whether for Federal income tax purposes all events necessary to determine petitioner's liability for its warranty expenses have occurred when it sells its vehicles to its dealers. A liability . . . is incurred. Generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes. In the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability. Only the first prong of the test whether the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200215103.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1 have taken this interlocutory appeal from the district court's order denying their motions for class certification and preliminary injunction. The other seventeen property owners are George Cashin. The other appellees are the Glynn County Board of Equalization. The Glynn County Board of Education and City Commission of the City of Brunswick have not joined in the cross appeal. 2 2 1 * jurisdiction over this lawsuit. I. The essential background and procedural facts are these. This lawsuit arises out of a grievance they have with the way Glynn County assessed their ad valorem property taxes in the year 2000. Glynn County's system for assessing property taxes and adjudicating assessment disputes is complex. Which is responsible for assessing the county's property taxes. At which point the Board must notify any taxpayers whose assessments have been changed within five days. See O.C.G.A. § 48 5 302. 3 A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the Board's reassessment of his property may appeal through the process set forth in O.C.G.A. § 48 5 311.
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Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case. The issue is whether the claim of the California Uninsured Employers Fund (
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Were on brief. Were on brief. The claims are Massachusetts state law claims and jurisdiction is premised on diversity. They allege that the plan was managed by MassMutual in violation of the contract underlying the plan. McAdams and Odom allege that MassMutual unlawfully assessed a tax charge against participants' deferred compensation earnings that was designed to fully offset the tax costs to MassMutual from running the plan. The charge assessed by MassMutual was. MassMutual admits that such a tax charge was assessed but argues that the contract allowed it and that the amount of the charge was reasonable.</P> <P> After discovery. These general agents were not classified as employees of MassMutual and in fact were closer to independent contractors than to employees for example. The plan at issue here was created in 1970. All of the related plaintiffs (whose claims in the putative class have been joined in this consolidated appeal) were general agents who deferred compensation under this plan. At least 117 general agents were participants in this plan at some point. </P> <P> The deferred compensation plan was created and advertised as a perk for the general agents.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200106/00-1313a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were David L. With him on the brief was Jonathan S. The United States all of which were related to each other and to Delcom Financial. The final transaction was a $14 million loan from Del Investments Netherlands B.V. (
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Inc. were on brief for petitioners. Were on brief for respondent. 000 settlement recovery in a tort based action for personal injuries is subject to federal income tax as statutory prejudgment interest. Without deciding whether prejudgment interest is ever excludable as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-1313a.html">DEL CMERCL PROP INC V. CMSNR IRS<BR></A><BR>
Fuller argued the cause for appellant.<span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/sept97/95-9014.wpd.html">LDL RESEARCH & DEV. II V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
Section 174(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200513776.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to decide whether Padrón failed to renew Vila's employment contract because she engaged in First Amendment protected speech. We conclude Vila's speech was not protected by the First Amendment and therefore affirm the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law.1 I. Vila was a licensed attorney and member of the Florida Bar. We have determined the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Vila's claim against Padrón in his individual capacity. Vila's motion to amend was made at the last minute and failed to comply with Fed. Was then given a oneyear contract from July 1. Vila] is not re employed by the Board . . . after June 30. The contract was not drafted or reviewed by Vila or anyone else in legal affairs. They became concerned that the wording of the agenda item would give the Board the impression Zimmerman was selected after a request for proposal. An e mail explaining that they believed the wording for the agenda item was misleading and that as a matter of law MDCC could not contract for over $25.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2004/032679p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm the decision of the District Court. The District Court referred the motion to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Ila The named Board members are Kevin McKeegin. It could halt the proper functioning of state government in a manner that was antithetical to principles of comity. The federal courts still have jurisdiction because Appellants lack a plain. And/or 3) the Tax Injunction Act is unconstitutional. A. Appellants' first argument is that the Tax Injunction Act does not apply because they have not asked the District Court to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/953020.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from an order of the United States Tax Court. Horowitz failed to persuade the Tax Court that the Commissioner's determinations were incorrect. The parties were admonished: Continuances will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Even joint motions for continuance will not routinely be granted.3 On June 16. Because his tax preparer was shortly expecting a child. The Tax Court denied the request for a continuance on the same day it was filed by marginal order upon Mr. Continuances will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Conflicting engagements of counsel or employment of new counsel ordinarily will not be regarded as ground for continuance. Filed 30 days or less prior to the date to which it is directed. Ordinarily will be deemed dilatory and will be denied unless the ground therefor arose during that period or there was good reason for not making the motion sooner . . . . He was deemed to have admitted receiving the amounts of income indicated by the Commissioner for the years in question.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/43DD75F6CE2C39D8882571DB007D4E39/$file/0473833.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The answer is no. A deal is a deal. His business was successful for many years. Which are immaterial here. Are stated in the tax court's opinion. A qualified offer must
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054997p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Tomko was also ordered to undergo twenty2 eight days of in house treatment for alcohol abuse. This sentence is unreasonable in light of the circumstances of this case and the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the District Court to impose it and we will vacate the judgment and remand for resentencing. Inc. is classified as a flow through
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/06/963024P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is the sole stockholder of both Arkansas Oil & Gas and Arkansas Leasing. The date on which the taxpayers' petitions were set for trial. The taxpayers failed to take action during this period notwithstanding that Adams was duly notified of each of the various motions and orders and notwithstanding that the tax court sent several notices to Adams. None of the correspondence sent to Adams was ever returned. 1994 orders were sent to Adams. 7 Although Braden
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2001/99-2289.man.html">PORTER V. OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH (2/15/2001, NO. 99-2289)<BR></A><BR>
Also appealed are an order of a magistrate judge denying the Trustees' motion to compel and an order of the magistrate judge permitting the Trustees to obtain financial worth documents. Boone Porter's (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2001/99-2289.man.html">PORTER V. OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH (2/15/2001, NO. 99-2289)<BR></A><BR>
Also appealed are an order of a magistrate judge denying the Trustees' motion to compel and an order of the magistrate judge permitting the Trustees to obtain financial worth documents. Boone Porter's (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/11/002102P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lee's motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted by a magistrate judge. His complaint was filed in the district court. The district court determined that it was required by statute to dismiss Lee's claim. The court did not find that the misstatements were a result of any bad faith on the part of Lee and. Lee then timely petitioned this court for rehearing and his petition was granted. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to deny appellant the relief sought. A jury trial was set for February 14. Attached to defendant's motion were references to Lee's deposition testimony and deposition exhibits. Reminded Lee that the financial affidavit takes into account both incomes without regard to how the funds are divided. He was unemployed until the fall of 1997. He stated that he was employed as a substitute teacher in 1997 and earned $1200 per month. He reported that he was unemployed in 1998 but earned $600 in May 1999. Determined that Lee was untruthful in his financial affidavit.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov96/95-2665.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. RUFF<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Because we find that judgment was properly awarded to the government. Facts</i><a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021413.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
To enforce the principle that `no one is above the law'.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/014534up.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Pursuant to a fifty year ground lease with the City that was executed on September 27. To recover money that was allegedly overpaid in real estate taxes. As the parties are well aware of the history of these proceedings and the facts involved. (2) the ruling that Nedmac was entitled to no remedy notwithstanding the City's breach of Article 10 of the Lease. Our review of the District Court's determination is plenary. That is. Lessee agrees that as additional rent it will pay and discharge all taxes. Nedmac is required to pay real estate taxes on the portion of the building devoted to non parking uses. It is clear that Article 4 does not impose any obligations on the City. Nedmac argues that the Bankruptcy Court's analysis was flawed because it treated the issue as a dispute between a real estate taxpayer and a taxing municipality instead of as an issue between a tenant and landlord. Nedmac asserts that Article 4 of the Lease somehow obligated the City as a landlord to ensure that the methodology used by the tax assessor was proper.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov96/95-2665.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. RUFF<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Because we find that judgment was properly awarded to the government. Facts</i><a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/68D4F2F06A95F35C88256E5A00707C7D/$file/9955853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When the liens 11707 were imposed before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Claiming that under 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b) Orange County's collection of the real property tax penalties was unlawful. That the FDIC was not liable for redemption penalties which were not secured by liens. If they have not been paid by December 10. The property tax delinquent penalties are subject to statutory liens. The FDIC argues that as receiver it is not liable for pre receivership liens on the real property securing property tax delinquent penalties. When the statute's language is plain. The sole function of the courts at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd is to enforce it according to its terms.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/068D325B1B17BDA588256AB6005E36CC/$file/9955853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When the liens 11707 were imposed before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Claiming that under 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b) Orange County's collection of the real property tax penalties was unlawful. That the FDIC was not liable for redemption penalties which were not secured by liens. If they have not been paid by December 10. The property tax delinquent penalties are subject to statutory liens. The FDIC argues that as receiver it is not liable for pre receivership liens on the real property securing property tax delinquent penalties. When the statute's language is plain. The sole function of the courts at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd is to enforce it according to its terms.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/09/02-1114.htm">02-1114 -- SORRENTINO V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE -- 09/14/2004<BR></A><BR>
The taxpayer's timely filing of such claim with the IRS is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a . Rebuttable presumption the communication was . The Sorrentinos are . Is supported by the March 1 signature date on the photocopied return the IRS . Statements of proper mailing in a deposition and affidavit were uncorroborated. Holding
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/09/954206P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He was sentenced to 293 months in prison for the continuing financial crimes enterprise violation. Lefkowitz argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any crime. Lefkowitz was President of Citi Equity Group. Or acquire buildings in which a prescribed percentage of the apartment units are occupied by low income tenants. Money raised from limited partners was the project's equity. Remaining debts to the builder were paid. While CEG obtained permanent financing to replace the construction loan once a building was completed. 000 were unbuilt. Funds from limited partners and FSM investors were first deposited in an operating account for each particular investment. 000 was used to pay Lefkowitz's personal expenses. The black hole was $3. IRS agents traced new partnership deposits that cleared negative balances in the central CEG account and then were used to meet Lefkowitz's personal needs and to fund older projects. This practice was not disclosed to CEG investors. Lefkowitz denies that this was fraudulent.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/04/006115P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Order of the Bankruptcy Court will be affirmed. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are straightforward and uncontroverted.3 The Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota on September 7. Wayne Drewes was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. Nearly five months after his bankruptcy petition was filed. The Trustee and the Debtor entered into a stipulation of facts which was incorporated into both of the parties' appellate briefs. 2 3 ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the MLAP and CDP payments received postpetition by the Debtor were or were not property of the bankruptcy estate.4 STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the findings of fact of the bankruptcy court for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. The determination of whether property constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate is a legal issue to be reviewed de novo. DISCUSSION The Trustee argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it determined that the CDP and MLAP payments received by the Debtor postpetition were not property of the bankruptcy estate.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/03/954263P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case involves the tax status of land within an Indian reservation which was once alienated from Indian ownership and subsequently reacquired by the tribe in fee simple. Minnesota levied an ad valorem tax on such fee land owned by the Leech Lake Band of The Band paid the taxes under protest and sought a declaratory judgment that the land is immune from state taxation. I. The Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe. Whose reservation is located in northern Minnesota. The reservation was created by a series of treaties with the United States government. The Band's original reservation was impacted by changes in federal Indian policy. See The purpose of the policy was to open land to non Indians and to assimilate the Indian The overall effect Id. at was drastically to reduce the amount of land under Indian control. The legislative centerpiece of the allotment policy was the General Allotment Act (GAA). Parcels of land to be granted to individual Indians were initially held in trust by the United States.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/11/98-9016.htm">98-9016 -- TUCEK V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 11/02/1999<BR></A><BR>
Depending on whether the mixed question is primarily factual or legal. <u>See</u> <u>Anderson v. All partners have a right for a limited period of time to participate in settlements offered to other partners. <u>See</u> 26 U.S.C. <p>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTUwMDVfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-5005_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Affirming bankruptcy court order rejecting debtor's objection to appellee's claim based on a timely tax assessment that was erroneously abated and was reinstated after expiration of the statute of limitations period applicable to the initial imposition of the assessment. Ruling that the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/99-10679.opn.html">DAVENPORT RECYCLING ASSOCIATES V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/2/2000, NO. 99-10679)<BR></A><BR>
Denying them leave to file a motion to vacate the assessment of tax liability arising from a partnership in which they were limited partners.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5181.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This disposition is not citable as precedent. It is a public record. Because we conclude that the lease is ambiguous with regard to the issue of the CAM charges. The United States Postal Service is a tenant in the shopping center. Acquired the shopping center through foreclosure and is now the successor landlord to the lease. Two disputes have arisen between Kimco and the government. The government contends that its responsibility is limited to three percent of the CAM 05 5181 2 charges for the shopping center's general parking area. Asserts that the government is responsible for three percent of the CAM charges attributable to the entire shopping center. The parties disagree about whether the government is required. The lease provides: It is mutually understood that the U.S. Postal Service will be responsible for their proportionate share of all applicable common area maintenance charges . . . . The lease states: Tenant will be responsible for any and all general maintenance for the common area maintenance for his 38.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/99-10679.opn.html">DAVENPORT RECYCLING ASSOCIATES V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/2/2000, NO. 99-10679)<BR></A><BR>
Denying them leave to file a motion to vacate the assessment of tax liability arising from a partnership in which they were limited partners.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031771.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981401.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and taxpayer Allen dispute whether § 163(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986 is facially ambiguous. Is a valid regulation. Ruling that the language of § 163(h) is clear. We find without doubt that I.R.C. § 163(h) is facially ambiguous. The district court ruled that the language of I.R.C. § 163(h) is so unambiguous on its face that Temp. Reg. § 1.163 9T(b)(2)(i)(A) is per se invalid. The facts of this case are essentially uncontested. Allen is a real estate developer. He is also the director and majority shareholder of D.R. That held among its assets a tract of land upon which apartments were subsequently built. Was later extended. The IRS eventually audited Allen and determined that he should have reported the gain on the sale of both properties on his own 1984 individual return. While the Tax Court proceeding was pending. Noting in a letter of explanation that income tax deficiency interest is considered nondeductible personal interest pursuant to Temp.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Feb2003/022807.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Inc.1 is a United States Virgin Islands corporation that owns commercial property in St. Equivest is a corporation formed by the merger of the corporations listed in the caption. S 2404.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/04/99-7042.htm">99-7042 -- CHICKASAW NATION V. U.S. -- 04/05/2000<BR></A><BR>
The Nation alleges that these taxes were unlawfully assessed against its pull tab gaming activities pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-2436.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LaMountain were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. This is an action to recover income tax payments that. Were not due. In 1988 Kendal Ham died leaving a will with several provisions for his wife. To waive her rights under the will and elect the share of his estate permitted by the New Hampshire statute. Now claims it was inappropriate to apply the tax transfer of 661 and 662 to payments in satisfaction of a widow's elective share and that the income tax on Mr. Ham's estate's 1990 and 1991 earnings should not have been passed on. No income tax was required of Mrs. To the extent that payments to her were taxable. Ham was paid her elected share in funds subject to depreciation through taxes. If a payee within the 26 U.S.C. 643(c) definition of
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199910/98-5361a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Pamela F. With her on the brief were Loretta C. Appeal the district court's ruling that Telecom is not entitled to the income tax refund it seeks. Telecom's principal contention is that its basis in depreciable property should be reduced by the amount of ITC it received in the year to which it carried its ITC forward. We agree with the district court and the other courts that have consid ered this issue. Vari ous other methods of depreciation also have been permitted. ACRS permits recovery of capital costs for most tangible depreciable property by using accelerated methods over predetermined periods that are generally shorter than the useful life of the asset. The investment tax credit dates back to the Kennedy Administra tion and was also designed to stimulate the economy by encouraging investment. The credit was a dollar for dollar offset against a taxpayer's tax liability. Congress concluded that this combination was distorting the allocation of capital re sources and determined to reduce the level of benefits.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200117249op2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We now remand the case to the Tax Court with the following instructions: (1) The
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063007p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to determine whether Internal Revenue Code (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQyNjAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-4260-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We agree with the district court that subject matter jurisdiction over this action is conferred by the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199902/98-3080b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were David G. With them on the brief were Laura S. Owen moved in the district court to dismiss an indictment charging tax evasion and related crimes on the ground that the indictment was beyond the prosecutorial jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. It gave Indepen dent Counsel Starr jurisdiction to investigate whether any individuals or entities have committed a violation of any federal criminal law. Who are reasonably believed to have committed a violation of any federal criminal law arising out of such matters. Including persons or entities who have engaged in an unlawful conspiracy or who have aided or abetted any federal offense. The Special Division ordered that the Independent Counsel have prosecutorial jurisdiction to fully investigate and prose cute the subject matter with respect to which the Attor ney General requested the appointment of independent counsel. These grants of authority were under 28 U.S.C. s 593(b)(1). Secret Service records indicate that James Riady had made several visits to the White House in the days before the payment to Hubbell was made.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/98opinions/98-5361a.html">TELECOMUSA, INC V. USA<BR></A><BR>
With </P> <P>him on the briefs were Pamela F. With her on the brief </P> <P>were Loretta C. Appeal the district court's </P> <P>ruling that Telecom is not entitled to the income tax refund it </P> <P>seeks. Telecom's principal contention </P> <P>is that its basis in depreciable property should be reduced by </P> <P>the amount of ITC it received in the year to which it carried </P> <P>its ITC forward. We agree </P> <P>with the district court and the other courts that have consid </P> <P>ered this issue. Vari </P> <P>ous other methods of depreciation also have been permitted. </P> <P> . ACRS permits recovery of capital costs for most </P> <P>tangible depreciable property by using accelerated methods </P> <P>over predetermined periods that are generally shorter than </P> <P>the useful life of the asset. The </P> <P>investment tax credit dates back to the Kennedy Administra </P> <P>tion and was also designed to stimulate the economy by </P> <P>encouraging investment. The credit was a dollar for dollar offset </P> <P>against a taxpayer's tax liability.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/12/046045P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Shall be deemed not to have assumed. The cases are being jointly administered. The court went on to hold that United is not entitled to an order directing the state courts as to how its tax liability should be determined. STANDARD OF REVIEW The question of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to de novo review.4 When subject matter jurisdiction is at issue. We are required to reach the jurisdictional question before turning to the merits.5 3 Appellant's Appendix. Upon the concentrate so produced.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQyNjAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-4260-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We agree with the district court that subject matter jurisdiction over this action is conferred by the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0404p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND Mas One is an Ohio limited partnership that was organized in 1986 with two partners. One was Mas One Generals. The other was Midland Mutual Life Insurance Company. The partnership agreement stipulated that gains and losses were to be generally allocated in proportion to each parties' ownership interest. Were to be allocated first to partners with negative balances. While any such losses were to be allocated first to partners with positive balances. The remainder of the loan was to be repaid in 1994. Two guaranty agreements were signed along with the promissory note. One agreement (the Principal Reduction Guaranty) stipulated that Midland would guarantee the $2.5 million substantial completion principal payment if it was not
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-2981_016.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Among other things.1 These family run ventures were sole proprietorships. Nick and Helen Kikalos (we will call them the taxpayers for shorthand) were no strangers to the IRS. The daily cash reconciliations were to include the amount of cash which was withdrawn from the business for whatever purpose. The 1997 audit was triggered in part when the Mercantile National Bank contacted the IRS to report unusual financial activity by Nick Kikalos.2 Kikalos had purchased thirty one cashier's checks from the Mercantile National Bank in 1997 in an amount totaling $809. Kikalos used cash and third party checks to purchase the checks. 1 2 We will refer to the four stores collectively as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jul1998/98a1918p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
District Judge: This appeal presents the question whether a suit in the District Court for the District of Delaware brought by certain Delaware property owners challenging assessments charged to them to provide for an expanded sewer system is barred either by the Tax Injunction Act. The plaintiffs appellants in this court are several persons owning real property in the expanded sewer district (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct98/92-2872.man.html">UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (10/26/1998, NO. 92-2872)<BR></A><BR>
Defendants were convicted of various offenses. That there was insufficient evidence on all of these counts to support their convictions. Was transported interstate. The conviction must sustain.</P> <P> There was. There were repeated references to certain record volumes at
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/014052.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which is principally owned by Thomas O. The substantive claims asserted by the parties are actually relatively simple: the Coffeys claim that Kool Mann owes them the balance remaining of the $5 million purchase price from the sale of LCSDI. While Kool Mann contends that it is entitled to a number of set offs against that balance because of alleged misrepresentations by the Coffeys as well as certain other deductions. It is the tortured procedural history of this matter which makes this appeal exceedingly and unnecessarily complex. We have detailed only those facts that bear on our current disposition.1 In light of the protracted nature of this litigation and the length of time and judicial resources it has consumed. We have taken it upon ourselves to determine the value of the Coffeys' proof 1. The facts of this case have been well documented in a number of previously published opinions. We have done so even though under normal circumstances we might have been inclined to remand to the District Court for a remand to the Bankruptcy Court to recalculate the damage figures.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1983.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Read</U> was on brief for appellant Wendy B. Biggs</U> were on brief for appellant Susan Otis.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct98/92-2872.man.html">UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (10/26/1998, NO. 92-2872)<BR></A><BR>
Defendants were convicted of various offenses. That there was insufficient evidence on all of these counts to support their convictions. Was transported interstate. The conviction must sustain.</P> <P> There was. There were repeated references to certain record volumes at
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-2082_021.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The notice was pretty important: it advised the Church of its right to redeem title to the 63rd Street property after the parcel was sold for delinquent taxes. Reasoning that Rooker Feldman was inapplicable because the Church never had an opportunity to challenge the City's acquisition of the tax deed in state court. The Church was not. Were assessed by Cook County against the property. The property was sold at a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/891B102EDC5F0E0988256C70005C7B68/$file/0155280.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. The plaintiffs are owners and operators of hotels in the city of San Bernardino. The plaintiffs were required to collect this tax from their customers and remit it to the city. Asserting that the tax was unconstitutionally vague on its face. The city ordinance itself is not in the record. Because the plaintiffs are appealing the dismissal of their complaint under Fed. The Court recognized that federal courts generally must abstain from suits that would intrude into the administration of state taxation: Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district court first determines that respondents' administration of the County tax system violated petitioners' constitutional rights. We are convinced that such a determination would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles of comity. 454 U.S. at 113. Taxpayers are barred
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021464.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
TRUST UNDER THE WILL OF JOHN STEWART BRYAN. Circuit Judge: Four federal taxpayers a trust and three of its beneficiaries appeal a district court's decision that they were not entitled to tax deductions for fees paid to investment advisors. The taxpayers maintain that a trust's investment advice fees should be fully deductible under § 67(e) of the Internal Revenue Code because such fees are incurred as a result of the fact that the income producing property is held in trust. We agree with the Government that such investment advice fees are not fully deductible. This appeal involves the Trust Under the Will of John Stewart Bryan (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-5113.html">CHICAGO V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E6F044B227DBBE2D88256D2E007BDE28/$file/0156644.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The sale was therefore void. Although the bankruptcy petition was later dismissed. The parties have been litigating for more than a dozen years. I. Background WSC was incorporated on February 20. Located on a property that was in tax default and was scheduled to be sold at a Riverside County tax auction. Finding that it was filed in bad faith. Is described in the most recent decision of the district court. A brief description of the federal litigation is all that is required here.1 The federal proceedings were initiated by WSC. The proceedings in federal court were stayed pending the outcome of the state court litigation. Allowed Lusardi to bring counterclaims under federal and Certain details of the state court litigation are relevant to WSC's arguments that Lusardi's claims for relief are both time barred and barred by collateral estoppel. Provides an exception to the automatic stay provision and is applicable to him as a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the bankruptcy petition. The district court further held that the state tax law provisions under which Lusardi seeks compensation are preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/08/962896P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because the position taken by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service was not substantially justified. The Coxes and the Commissioner agreed that there were no facts in dispute. Concluding that the Coxes were not entitled to their attorneys' fees and costs because the Commissioner's initial denial of the rent deduction was substantially justified. The issue is entirely one of state law concerning the nature of property held in a tenancy by the entirety. Cox to deduct rents paid for his law practice as long as he does not have title to or equity in the rented property. The Coxes argue that this marital community is separate from them. We reject the Coxes' argument that the building was titled to the marital community rather than to them. We recognize that decisions by some Missouri courts have stated that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/08/993307P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case is before the Court on appeal from the Tax Court. Rather than deducted fully during the year in which the salaries were paid. It is this Court's determination that the Tax Court is due to be REVERSED IN PART. The following are the facts. Which are made to facilitate continuity within this opinion. 1. General Information Norwest is a bank holding company that was incorporated in 1929. It is the parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations (Norwest consolidated group) that files consolidated Federal income tax returns. Norwest's stock is traded on the New York and Midwest Stock Exchanges. Is a member of the Norwest consolidated group. [Bettendorf] is a national banking association operating under a charter granted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). [Davenport] is an Iowa State bank that was incorporated in 1932. Its main office was in Davenport. It filed a consolidated Federal income tax return with two wholly owned subsidiaries. 2 [Davenport]'s only class of stock was thinly traded in the Davenport over the counter market.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1363.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
McIninch & Phillips was on brief. With whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on brief. Were on brief. Appellant Donovan was charged with. Appellants Aversa and Mento were charged with. The cross appeals (Nos. 91 1615 and 91 1616) are moot. They will. Although Donovan was the bank's legal compliance officer a status which presumptively suggests his familiarity with banking laws he did not prepare CTRs for any of these deposits. Donovan fended off his subordinates' concerns about the unorthodox way he was handling Saba's cash. Donovan admitted that he was aware of the law requiring him to file CTRs for cash deposits of $10. Insisted that he mistakenly believed Saba's deposits came within one of the law's exemptions.2 The district court 2
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/07/96-4109.htm">96-4109 -- U.S. V. VICTOR -- 07/11/1997<BR></A><BR>
The first sentence should read: <p> Sections 523(a)(1) and 507(a)(7) clearly instruct that tax debts are nondischargeable only if characterized as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981386.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
No. 98 1386 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court holding that the Hewitts were not entitled to certain charitable contribution deductions. 000 shares of Jackson Hewitt stock were outstanding in the hands of approximately 400 organizations and individuals (including employees. In which hundreds to thousands of shares of Jackson Hewitt stock were traded between 1990 and 1992 for about 80 individual accounts. Was the company's stock traded on NASDAQ. The fair market values claimed by the Hewitts with respect to these gifts were based on the average per share price of Jackson Hewitt stock traded in bona fide. The Tax Court held that the Hewitts were not entitled to deduct amounts in excess of those allowed by the Commissioner. Whether the Hewitts' failure to comply with the appraisal requirements of § 1.170A 13 is fatal to their claimed deduction is a question of law. (B) to attach an appraisal summary to the return on which such deduction is first claimed for such contribution.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/july97/96-4109.wpd.html">UNITED STATES V. VICTOR<BR></A><BR>
The first sentence should read: Sections 523(a)(1) and 507(a)(7) clearly instruct that tax debts are nondischargeable only if characterized as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FEAC71F3B6100023882569EA00621DD3/$file/9856940.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the appellants have standing to challenge the adequacy of the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA. Have not established taxpayer standing sufficient to bring their state law claims in federal court. The Naval Station is located on Terminal Island in the Port of Long Beach. Several of the buildings on the Naval Station were designed by Los Angeles architect Paul R. At the time the complaint in this case was filed. Which is protected by the Migratory Bird Act of 1918 and has been classified by the California Department of Fish and Game as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0110p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I Chippewa is a corporation chartered under the laws of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (a federally recognized tribe) and located on an Indian reservation in Michigan. When the Michigan State Police stopped a truck containing tobacco products that were being shipped to Chippewa by UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT X No. 03 1445 > . The truck's driver was Andrew Arch. Which is a violation of TPTA. The TPTA statutory scheme requires police to give notice to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May2000/996020.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to determine whether certain costs incurred by banks for marketing. Researching and originating loans are deductible as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/09/02-8004.htm">02-8004 -- MIDKIFF V. STEWART -- 09/04/2003<BR></A><BR>
The plan included a provision that income tax refunds to which the Midkiffs would be entitled during the first thirty six months of the plan were to be deemed
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2001/996020.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to determine whether certain costs incurred by banks for marketing. Researching and originating loans are deductible as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1995/95a0981p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have found no helpful legislative history. Their Chapter 13 plans have been confirmed and are currently in place. The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A737B5D02249680988256E5A00707A2B/$file/9856940.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the appellants have standing to challenge the adequacy of the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA. Have not established taxpayer standing sufficient to bring their state law claims in federal court. The Naval Station is located on Terminal Island in the Port of Long Beach. Several of the buildings on the Naval Station were designed by Los Angeles architect Paul R. At the time the complaint in this case was filed. Which is protected by the Migratory Bird Act of 1918 and has been classified by the California Department of Fish and Game as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/01/012171P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. There is no dispute that the Kaffenbergers overpaid their tax liability for the years involved. Edward Kaffenberger was a partner in a partnership with his son. Edward was unable to obtain complete financial information about the partnership from his son. The Kaffenbergers filed their 1988 Form 1040 (which was due on October 15. Stating that they were due a refund of income taxes in the amount of $26. At the time the Form 4868 Automatic Extension Request was filed for 1990. The Form 1040 returns for tax years 1990 through 1992 were filed on March 14. Which are not in dispute. When the 1989 return was originally prepared by the IRS agent and signed by the Kaffenbergers. That claim was also denied as beyond the statute of limitations in a notice dated October 24. Refunds from 1994 through 1996 for the overpayments that were applied to the 1990 liability. An order that the 1990 taxes were paid in full. Based on the allegation that the suit was untimely filed. Based on the allegation that the administrative refund claims were untimely.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052307np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm the Order of the District Court.1 I. The Mollos filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition that was later converted to Chapter 7. No timely objection to the exemptions was filed and the property at issue became exempt as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0006p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Many employers are required to withhold various taxes from the wages of their employees. Which the employers hold in trust until the taxes are paid over to the federal government. 902.24 that was paid to satisfy an assessment made against the late Willard R. It is not disputed that Bell was the largest stockholder (51.5% of shares) and chief operating No. 02 3295 Bell v. Nor is it disclaimed that Bell essentially ran the company on a day to day basis. Dyac was responsible for withholding federal wage. Dyac was struggling financially at and following its acquisition by Bell. The issue of who controlled Dyac's funds is paramount. As the same are set forth on the Budget. The timing of Bank One's cessation of trust fund loan advances is in dispute. 000 in FICA trust fund taxes that were in arrears for most of January. Denied the request because Bank One had already lent Dyac money for payroll taxes in January and this additional request represented an overadvance that was not covered by the Forbearance Agreement.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1501.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Tax Deficiencies The root of the Geiselmans' claims is the government's seizure and sale of their home to satisfy unpaid tax debts. The IRS is barred from taking any action to collect the debt. He alleged that the government's lien on his property was ineffective because the government had committed procedural errors in determining the deficiency and assessing the tax liability. Valerie was not a party to this lawsuit. Valerie is. Where the two cases were consolidated. The judgment was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/19F4298821718589882571220083C50F/$file/0473237.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Concluding that Gwendolyn Ewing was entitled to relief under the so called equitable innocent spouse provision of the Internal Revenue Code (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1635.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A portion of the profits were distributed to investors as dividends or
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001915.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They were residents of Bethesda. David Hillman was the sole shareholder of Southern Management Corporation (SMC). Which were involved in real estate rental activities.2 At all times relevant to the issues in this appeal. Under which the corporation's profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on each shareholder's individual federal income tax returns. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A). 2 For purposes of federal income tax liability. Joint venturers and partners are taxed under a passthrough taxation system. 26 U.S.C. § 701 04. Each joint venturer or partner is individually taxed on his distributive share of joint venture or partnership income. The general partner of each limited partnership was either David Hillman or an upper tier partnership or Subchapter S corporation in which he owned an interest. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). 3 During taxable years 1993 and 1994. We are presented with the following question of law: May the Hillmans legally deduct their passive management fee expenses from their related nonpassive management fee income for purposes of lowering their taxable income for taxable years 1993 and 1994?
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-5052.html">NEW YORK LIFE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/05/02-8010.htm">02-8010 -- ZUBROD V. DUNCAN -- 05/29/2003<BR></A><BR>
No objections to his claim were filed. Claiming that Debtor is not entitled to the exemption proceeds because he voluntarily transferred the Property. We reverse and remand. <p> <center><strong>I</strong></center> <p> Debtor is a Wyoming attorney. Arguing that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court dismissed the wrongful death action a few months later based on the defendant's argument that it was time barred. <p> In 1996. He claimed that the Property was completely exempt under 11 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/06569880059B9A0888256E280083210B/$file/0256792.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The threshold issue is whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Because we find that our resolution of the central question on appeal will materially aid the bankruptcy court in reaching its disposition on remand and serve the interest of judicial efficiency. We will reach the merits of the appeal. We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court erred in rejecting the IRS's claims for unreported nonbusiness income and overstated business deductions after finding that the IRS's method of computing Olshan's unreported business income was flawed. We find that the undisputed evidence in the record will enable the bankruptcy court to compute the amounts of unreported business income. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Olshan was convicted of insurance fraud in 1996. R. Todd Neilson was appointed trustee. Neilson then brought this adversary proceeding for a judicial determination of Olshan's tax liabilities for the 1991 and 1992 tax years.1 He alleged that the IRS's claims were overstated. That the lien was invalid.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/01/00-9003.htm">00-9003 -- OLPIN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 01/25/2001<BR></A><BR>
The relevant facts are undisputed and we review the Tax Court's grant and denial of summary judgment <em>de novo.</em> <em>Tele Communications. The fundamental legal question we answer is whether. Olpin to sign his otherwise valid and processed tax return after he was notified of his inadvertent omission. Background facts and proceedings <p> The following facts are taken from unchallenged affidavits filed by Mr. . Olpin) were legally married throughout 1995 and were divorced in September 1996 after fifteen years of marriage. They are not tax protesters. The Olpins failed to sign the return before it was filed in October. Olpin testified that their failure to sign was inadvertent. Both of the Olpins testified that their intention in 1996 was to file a valid joint federal income tax return. Olpin testified that the IRS also informed her that its claim for deficiency was based in part on Mr. The IRS reversed its original processing of the Olpins' joint 1995 tax form to state that it was not a valid return for lack of the Olpins' signatures. <p> In May 1999 the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to Mr.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/024066.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Dougherty's role in this scheme was both to assist Blanchard in avoiding his existing tax liability and to limit Secor's tax liability. Secor had never been employed by Berryman Chemicals but was instead employed by a local real estate company in Virginia. He and Secor would open a new account in Secor's name and have his commission payments from Berryman Chemicals deposited into the new account. Which was actually income that was earned by Blanchard. Despite Blanchard's protestations that his income was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-60075.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Algerine Allen Smith (decedent) was one of multiple defendants in a lawsuit brought by Exxon Corporation to recoup excessive royalty payments. The Tax Court held that the deduction for Exxon's claim was limited to $681. A panel of this Court concluded that the estate was not entitled to deduct the full amount claimed by Exxon. The Commissioner presented the testimony of an expert witness that the value of Exxon's claim at the time of the decedent's death was not more than $681. Simply argued that it was entitled to deduct the full amount demanded by Exxon. The expert witness's testimony satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and is precisely the type of evidence that this Court instructed the Tax Court to consider. The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1106p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The genesis of this appeal is a decision by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0126p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Johnston appeals the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirming the Bankruptcy Court's denial of her claim that her 1997 earned income tax credit (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2158VOL1.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bicki</SPAN> and <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/06/001221P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2 appeals from the order of the District Court granting the United States summary judgment on IES's claim for tax refunds to which IES contends it is entitled as a result of securities trades that the court held to be sham transactions. That IES is entitled to deduct fifteen years' worth of environmental cleanup cost assessments in the tax year in which the amount of the liability was determined. Will affirm if the record shows no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The material facts are undisputed. The question of law before us is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/10/976010P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Eugene Janssen was elected president and treasurer. Eunice Janssen was elected secretary. Was elected vice president. In order to establish that REJ was effectively the alter ego of the Janssens. As well as to foreclose the federal tax liens on property formerly owned by the Janssens but which was subsequently titled in REJ. the United States Bankruptcy Code. That REJ is the alter ego of the debtors. Further sought a determination that the IRS claim was both valid and wholly secured by the federal tax lien which attached to all property and rights to property held by the debtors in their own name and in the name of REJ. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(1). avoid any They asserted that Section 545(2) of the Bankruptcy statutory lien that is Code not enforceable at the voids Code permits a trustee.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/04/98-9025.htm">98-9025 -- DRAKE OIL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 04/14/2000<BR></A><BR>
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument is not necessary. <em>See</em> Fed. The cases are therefore ordered submitted on the current record. <p> In these appeals. Which were then heard at oral argument in September. The remainder were abated.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Aug2004/Aug12/02-41655-CV1.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which we reproduce below: Carlton and Latanza Gaddis were stopped at a street intersection when a postal employee drove his government vehicle into theirs. Who was pregnant. Arguing that there was no allegation of a conflict of interest among the Gaddises nor of any prejudice to Courtlin's interests. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules. 5 and guardian ad litem fees are not included in § 1920. Bean's claimed expenses were for his legal work as an attorney on behalf of Courtlin. § 2412(a)(1) is the applicable provision governing costs to be taxed against the nonprevailing government in an FTCA case. 5 Section 1920. The court fully considered the government's arguments regarding the taxation of guardian ad litem fees and determined that it was bound to follow our post Crawford Fitting precedents in Dickerson v.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/05/012155P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That lien is a first lien which survived Bird Watchers's purchase of the property. Johnson County argued that it was never given notice of the motion which culminated in the February 17. Of Johnson County in personal property shall be deemed to have continued and to be enforceable in accordance with Nebraska laws.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E1839CBC4CB3521588256AD1005BB5F3/$file/9855853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Regula contends that the Delta Plan should have accorded deference to the opinions of his treating physicians and considered vocational evidence in making its benefits determination. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a determination as to whether the Delta Plan may have been acting under a conflict of interest. Thus whether the court should have applied a less deferential standard of review to the Plan's decision to discontinue Regula's benefits. I. The Delta Plan is a non contributory employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/51BFE3F68EDF896E88256B0300792F66/$file/9835154.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3B181A3BD78A945088256E5A00707D47/$file/9835154.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AF09CD9AE59BA0BD88256FBD00588E2C/$file/9956611.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Background Emma Mary Ellen Holley is African American. Is Caucasian and their son. Is African American. Triad agent Terry Stump informed them that the asking price for the house was $145. That the offer would have to go through Triad. One of whom was later identified as Grove Crank. 000 was insufficient to get the builder to hold the house for six months. On the grounds that they were barred by the 2826 HOLLEY v. Plaintiffs have not appealed this ruling. The district court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of Meyer on the claim that Meyer was vicariously liable as the designated officer/broker of Triad. We followed our own prior precedent and that of three other circuits holding that the duty to obey the laws relating to racial discrimination under the FHA is non delegable. Holding that the FHA is governed by traditional vicarious liability rules and tort principles and that the FHA did not create a non delegable duty not to discriminate based on race. The real estate corporation and employment relationship at issue are atypical because California law makes the designated real estate broker of a real estate corporation personally responsible for the supervision of the corporation's salespersons.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/release.pl?B1=Search+Month&month=05&date=01&year=04">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/March2004/021401p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The trusteeship was imposed pursuant to Title III of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1078.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C.</U> were on brief. Were on brief. BACKGROUND</STRONG></FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E8BDCCEA68EDC32E88256F38007C93A5/$file/9956611.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Background Emma Mary Ellen Holley is African American. Is Caucasian and their son. Is African American. Triad agent Terry Stump informed them that the asking price for the house was $145. That the offer would have to go through Triad. One of whom was later identified as Grove Crank. 000 was insufficient to get the builder to hold the house for six months. On the grounds that they were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs have not appealed this ruling. The district court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of Meyer on the claim that Meyer was vicariously liable as the designated officer/ broker of Triad. We followed our own prior precedent and that of three other circuits holding that the duty to obey the laws relating to racial discrimination under the FHA is non delegable. Holding that the FHA is governed by traditional vicarious liability rules and tort principles and that the FHA did not create a non delegable duty not to discriminate based on race. The real estate corporation and employment relationship at issue are atypical because California law makes the designated real estate broker of a real estate corporation personally responsible for the supervision of the corporation's salespersons.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5092C5F12159A34188256E5A00707CDA/$file/9855853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Regula contends that the Delta Plan should have accorded deference to the opinions of his treating physicians and considered vocational evidence in making its benefits determination. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a determination as to whether the Delta Plan may have been acting under a conflict of interest. Thus whether the court should have applied a less deferential standard of review to the Plan's decision to discontinue Regula's benefits. I. The Delta Plan is a non contributory employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/06/99-1127.htm">99-1127 -- GRANDOTE COUNTRY CLUB CO. V. GRANDOTE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CO. -- 06/14/2001<BR></A><BR>
Claiming it should be set aside under Japanese bankruptcy law and was fraudulent. As well as a subsequent tax sale arguing it was invalid under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Plaintiff appellant Kojima is the trustee in a Japanese bankruptcy proceeding concerning Grandote Country Club. Ltd. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0278p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On which Maloof was a co obligor and guarantor. The S corporations
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR>
Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR>
Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-3308.htm">96-3308 -- KAHN V. SCHIGUR -- 01/20/1998<BR></A><BR>
We conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct. <p> <center><strong>BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> The basic facts are not in dispute. Seitter was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200211727.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case is the consolidation of six separate appeals. Were targeted at avoiding the taxes the Republics placed on tobacco imported into their respective countries. The Revenue Rule The revenue rule is a long standing common law rule that prevents the courts of one sovereign from enforcing or adjudicating tax claims from another sovereign.1 Although 18th century English courts originally developed the rule to protect British trade. 2 it has a long history of recognition and application in this country.3 The rule was originally justified in England on the basis of nationalistic commercial protectionism. 4 but its application in this country is based and justified on the grounds of respect for sovereignty and the separation of powers. Substance over form We initially recognize that it is the substance of a claim. That is important under the revenue rule. 268 F.3d at 130 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/datefile/datefile.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2003/012132.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The District Court correctly held that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction over Pransky's adversary proceeding as it pertains to those tax years. Pransky did not file tax returns by the applicable due dates because he was under a criminal investigation at that time and feared that by providing certain information on the tax returns he might waive his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. His counsel advised him instead to remit money to the IRS 2 in an amount that would exceed any tax liability he might have. With letters directing that the money was to be applied to any income tax liability that he might have for those years. There is no dispute over this characterization. We will refer to the requests for credits made on Pransky's 1984 and 1985 tax return forms as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/20412228970C35F288256C76007C64F5/$file/0155953.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On slip opinion page 11556. Wright is distinguishable because. No assessment was made against the individual partners. Although an action against the partnership would have been timely. The only relevant question in Wright was whether the statute of limitations applicable to the partners should be tolled while the limitations period was tolled with respect to the partnership. Judges Kleinfeld and Graber have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. The United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed proofs of claim against Debtors for unpaid employment taxes assessed against a partnership in which Debtors were general partners. The IRS's claims were properly disallowed because (1) the IRS cannot collect a partnership's tax deficiency directly from the partners without first making individualized assessments against the partners or obtaining judgments against the partners holding them jointly and severally liable for the partnership's tax debts.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200411089.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which was later discharged in bankruptcy. Which were not discharged. The IRS determined that Meadows's wife held their residence as his nominee because she did not have enough income to pay the mortgage and the house was in her name alone. Representing that Meadows's equity interest in the home was only $10. All of these debts were actually secured debts. 3 2 asked whether the IRS had illegally placed a nominee lien on the residence held in his wife's name and second. 000 was wrongfully applied to a tax period that had been discharged. He revealed that he thought that the automatic stay only applied to the debts that would have been discharged later. The Appeals Office decision also declined to find a violation of the stay because the agreement to release the lien was reached before Meadows filed for bankruptcy. Which he asserted were unaffected by 4 the stay. That Meadows did not have the right to designate how his wife's payment should be applied. That no designation of payment was made. That the payment was made by a nondebtor so it did not violate the stay.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981499.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Lakewood is a Virginia general partnership. The property was zoned for agricultural use only. The referendum was held on March 7. Army Corps of Engineers (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/june97/96-9009.wpd.html">SYMPSON V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appeals the Tax Court's determination that she is ineligible for relief from tax liability. The Tax Court determined that petitioner was liable for a tax deficiency in the amount of $39. 806. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. 6653(a)(1) added a penalty equal to five percent of the underpayment if any part of the underpayment of tax due was the result of negligence. Substantial changes were made to 6653 in 1989 that apply to returns the due date for which is after December 31. The subsequent repealof 6661 applies only to returns the due date for which is after December 31. (B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse. That there was such substantial understatement. It is inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such substantial understatement. 26 U.S.C. 6013(e)(1). The only element of this
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-5215.opa.html">ROBINSON V. GIARMARCO & BILL, P.C.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Robinson v. The district court's refusal to change venue will only be disturbed for a clear abuse of discretion. <i>Howell v. The standard by which to decide the issue of personal jurisdiction is clear:<p> [T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict. To the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. The defendants have alleged facts that either harmonize with or are not directly addressed in the complaint. The defendants reside and are licensed to practice only in Michigan. The Decedent resided in Michigan until 1980 when he and his wife moved to Florida.<p> Tootalian began providing accounting services to the Decedent in 1957 but it was not until 1980. Who is not a party to this litigation. The Decedent discharged his tax attorney and Tootalian contacted Hertzberg to assume representation of the Decedent in his estate planning matters.<p> In 1987 the Decedent requested that Hertzberg prepare a will and amend an existing trust agreement.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb96/94-5215.opa.html">ROBINSON V. GIARMARCO & BILL, P.C.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Robinson v. The district court's refusal to change venue will only be disturbed for a clear abuse of discretion. <i>Howell v. The standard by which to decide the issue of personal jurisdiction is clear:<p> [T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict. To the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. The defendants have alleged facts that either harmonize with or are not directly addressed in the complaint. The defendants reside and are licensed to practice only in Michigan. The Decedent resided in Michigan until 1980 when he and his wife moved to Florida.<p> Tootalian began providing accounting services to the Decedent in 1957 but it was not until 1980. Who is not a party to this litigation. The Decedent discharged his tax attorney and Tootalian contacted Hertzberg to assume representation of the Decedent in his estate planning matters.<p> In 1987 the Decedent requested that Hertzberg prepare a will and amend an existing trust agreement.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1464.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellant.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200005/99-5097a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
May were on the briefs. Were on the brief. Levin and Janet LaRue were on the brief for amici curiae Landmark Legal Founda tion and Family Research Council Ayesha N. Henderson were on the brief for amici curiae Americans United for Separation of Church and State and People for the American Way Foundation. (3) it was the victim of selective prosecution in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Because these objections are without merit. Contribu tions to such organizations are also deductible from the donating taxpayer's taxable income. Although most organizations seeking tax exempt status are required to apply to the Internal Revenue Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2469.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Snyder LLP</SPAN> were on brief. Were on brief. Mikutowicz is the sole shareholder of AGM Marine Contractors (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-5088.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Steven S. With him on the brief were Joshua P. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Doumani and Thrall were not parties to a contract with the Government. 553 was a cost of substituting tangible capital for the capital lost as a result of the breach of the Government's contract with BoA's predecessor in interest Honolulu Federal Savings and Loan (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb98/92-2872.amd.html">UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (2/23/1998, NO. 92-2872)<BR></A><BR>
All convictions and sentences WILL BE REVERSED AND VACATED.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0066p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court also found that the warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause for the crimes of bank fraud. The district court ruled that the warrant was not stale. The warrant was not general in nature. Even if the omissions were included in the search warrant. Probable cause would have still existed. Defendants' claim was that they were impermissibly indicted for each transaction of the bank fraud scheme. The district court found that the argument was substantively incorrect. The district court rejected Defendants' contention that expert witness testimony was improperly admitted. The district court reaffirmed its decision to exclude Defendants' evidence that they were the target of selective prosecution. Defendants alleged that they were targeted because of their Arab descent in the post September 11 landscape. That selective prosecution was not a matter for the jury. Defendants' Business Practices Defendants are brothers who own various
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-2329.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Page 16. PC was on brief for appellants. Friedman with whom Karen Frink Wolf and Friedman & Babcock was on brief for appellees. Because there is no need to distinguish Gregory W. That the property's cash flow was less robust than advertised. Made several lower offers that were rejected by Wainwright. Who is not a lawyer. Were to be completed 3 3 after Khanna closed the purchase of the apartments. 000 was to be paid to the contractors that completed the improvements. Thus the cost of the planned improvements was in no sense part of the bank's proceeds from the sale. Had Boulos add this term to the contract:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb98/92-2872.amd.html">UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (2/23/1998, NO. 92-2872)<BR></A><BR>
All convictions and sentences WILL BE REVERSED AND VACATED.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1882.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellee. Was convicted by a jury on all seventeen counts of the indictment against him. Twelve counts of the indictment were predicated specifically on illegal gambling allegedly in violation of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 271. The counts involving the Massachusetts statutes were: two RICO counts. Defendant mounts three challenges to his conviction: that there were no illegal gambling offenses under the Massachusetts statutes. If there were. The court's instruction on them was erroneous. That there were sentencing errors. 2 2 Most of the essential facts are not in dispute. Revere's income came from the operation of video poker machines that were placed in an assortment of bars. The machine was activated by inserting money into it. Credits were given for winning hands. The cash payment was made by the person in charge of the establishment in which the machine(s) was located. Defendant and/or his 3 3 employees visited the approximately seventeen places where the poker machines were located on a regular basis.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1398.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Niazmand is appealing certain adverse rulings by the Tax Court. Which were years in which Niazmand had neither filed tax returns nor paid any income tax. Which he sought to have carried back to years in which he had paid income taxes. Sought adjudication of two other issues: whether he was entitled to refunds for the 1975 78 tax years. What the amount and nature was of a loss he had incurred in 1979. Evidence on those issues was presented at trial. Since the IRS had not determined that there were any deficiencies in tax paid for those years. The court essentially said that the only question properly before it was whether Niazmand owed the IRS any income tax for the years 1979 83 and 1985 86. The court said that it was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/04/02-9000.htm">02-9000 -- COLORADO GAS COMPRESSION INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 04/06/2004<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar98/94-6400.man.html">JEFFERSON COUNTY V. ACKER (3/27/1998, NO. 94-6400)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P> The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated.</P> <P> The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. <EM>See Jefferson County v. We concluded that although the privilege tax is <EM>measured</EM> by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable <EM>event</EM> is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. <EM>See id.</EM> at 1572. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. <EM>See id.</EM> at 1573 76.</P> <P> Jefferson County then filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19946400.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Hull and Stanley Marcus became members of the court after this case was argued and taken under submission. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. We have summarized the facts briefly here. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.3 As no other circumstances exist that would support federal court jurisdiction. Our first inquiry is to determine whether § 1442 applies.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/may97/95-9006.wpd.html">JOHNSTON V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
I. Background The case was submitted to the Tax Court on fully stipulated facts. The sole question is whether expenditures on the renovation of residential rental property which is not a certified historic structure qualify for an investment tax credit. This is a question of law. The duplex was built in 1914. It is not a certified historic structure. Where a date parenthetical is not indicated. Is set out in relevant part in an appendix hereto.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1AA3EC90365C604A88256B7C000A9CBE/$file/9915827.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
SBE's claim for civil tax fraud was upheld. The primary issue that we must decide is whether under California law civil tax fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Which was the standard adopted in the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court. I. Renovizor's was an interior decorating and remodeling company that sold decorating products and provided residential remodeling services. Testified that her progress was made difficult by lack of documentation and records from Renovizor's. The audit report states that no work papers were attached to the sales tax returns and that sales invoices that were provided were impossible to reconcile with the returns.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar98/94-6400.man.html">JEFFERSON COUNTY V. ACKER (3/27/1998, NO. 94-6400)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P> The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated.</P> <P> The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. <EM>See Jefferson County v. We concluded that although the privilege tax is <EM>measured</EM> by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable <EM>event</EM> is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. <EM>See id.</EM> at 1572. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. <EM>See id.</EM> at 1573 76.</P> <P> Jefferson County then filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2314.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The purchaser of the debtor's property attempted to have the bankruptcy court resolve the tax matter by filing a motion to reopen. Which was hearing the tax foreclosure proceedings. The purchaser argues that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction and was required to act. Which was allowed by the court by endorsement order. The trustee stated that the sale was pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). That
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19946400.OP3.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hull and Stanley Marcus became members of the court after this case was argued and taken under submission. Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. We have summarized the facts briefly here. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. Stating that any holding with respect 2 to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. This is the first time that the issue has 3 been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.3 As no other circumstances exist that would support federal court jurisdiction. Our first inquiry is to determine whether § 1442 applies.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/08/982009P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellants are two brothers. Holding that the government was entitled to foreclose its tax liens upon appellants' property to satisfy their tax liabilities. Appellants argue that the district court erred in: (1) finding the collection action was not barred by the 6 year statute of limitations. (3) finding that the transfer of their property to Epsilon Co. was fraudulent because the transfer did not render them insolvent. Who are brothers. This collection action was filed in September 1989. The case was stayed pending a criminal tax investigation of taxpayers and James Noske and Joan Noske. Taxpayers were convicted on one count of conspiracy to evade income taxes with respect to some of the transactions in issue here. The trustees of Epsilon were taxpayers and their mother. The same farm property was Epsilon's only asset and Epsilon maintained no bank account. Taxpayers contested in tax court each of the notices and their petitions were dismissed for failure to state a 3 claim. The tax court noted that taxpayers were part of an unending parade of taxpayers bent on flooding the tax court's docket with frivolous claims.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov98/97-9285.man.html">CAPITAL ASSET RESEARCH CORP. V. FINNEGAN (11/13/1998, NO. 97-9285)<BR></A><BR>
Finnegan and Breen challenge the district court's finding that the information in question was a trade secret under Georgia law as well as the relief ordered by the district court. Are sizeable institutional players in the business of purchasing tax liens from state and local governments. CARC's business in Georgia consists primarily of purchasing tax executions (or liens) and tax deeds on real properties for which property taxes are owed. Or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which information:</P> <P> (A) Derives economic value. And</P> <P> (B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.</P> <P>O.C.G.A. § 10 1 761(4) (1997). Even if all of the information is publicly available. The district court concluded that</P> <P> Finnegan violated the Georgia Trade Secrets Act by misappropriating and using the property information concerning the $27 million portfolio that was available for purchase during the May 7.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/04/056035P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court allowing a claim by the Estate of Victor Litzinger in the amount of $130. Is Guy's estranged wife. Victor was an elderly man when. Victor executed a Last Will and Testament which named Guy as personal representative of Victor's estate. The will left all assets which Victor owned at the time of his death to Guy and Warren equally. Guy did sign a Substitute W 9 which indicated that the account was opened as a joint account and the brokerage company considered the account a joint account with the right of survivorship. No draws were made on the Victor/Guy account between the time it was opened and Victor's death. Most of these facts are from our earlier opinion. Were transferred to an existing account in the names of Guy and Louise jointly. Guy was the only person who could actually make the transfer. This is apparently the first and only time until the claim was filed in this case that Guy took the position that the money in the Guy/Louise account was an asset of Victor's estate.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/94-5211.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2003/022001.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I The facts in this case are undisputed. A federal search warrant was issued. It was executed at the Lamplughs' house on May 25. Numerous financial documents and firearms were seized during the search. Lamplugh was represented by Robert Sanders. Four days before the trial was scheduled to begin and four and a half years after the IRS and BATF searched the Lamplughs' house pursuant to a warrant. The Government was unaware of the existence of the box of documents during the presentation of its evidence on November 2 and 3. Lamplugh stated that federal tax returns were not filed in 1991 and 1992 because he did not receive any income during those years. This credit application was obtained 5 from the Commonwealth Bank in response to a Government subpoena. Immediately after court was called to order on the third day of trial. The defense intended to use the contents of the box to cross examine the revenue agent who was to be the Government's final witness. He also testified that included in the disclosed documents were what appeared to be partial or completed copies of federal.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTIxNjQtYmsucGRm/04-2164-bk.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 when it dismissed debtor's appeal for failure to include in the designation of record on appeal a transcript of a bankruptcy hearing without first giving the debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 8001 when it dismissed debtor's case for failure to include the June 23 transcript in the designation of record without first giving debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. The judgment of the district court is VACATED. Was then appointed. Concluding that the two Properties were not part of the bankruptcy estate and hence not subject to the automatic stay. J.) on the grounds that because the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548. Holding that it had erred by not considering whether the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under §§ 547 and 548 and entered a stay pending the lower court's decision on the transfer issue.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1871EA3FD22B816A88256C0F0056939F/$file/0155953.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed proofs of claim against Debtors for unpaid employment taxes assessed against a partnership in which Debtors were general partners. The IRS's claims were properly disallowed because (1) the IRS cannot collect a partnership's tax deficiency directly from the partners without first making individualized assessments against the partners or obtaining judgments against the partners holding them jointly and severally liable for the partnership's tax debts. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Debtors were general partners of Marina Cabrillo Partners (the Partnership). The IRS argues that its timely assessment of taxes against the Partnership allows it to collect taxes directly from the individual partners even though no separate assessment of tax liability was made against them. Only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun (1) within 10 years after the assessment of the tax[.]. So long as the IRS brings an action to collect the taxes within three years after the taxpayer's return was filed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july96/94-5211.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov98/97-9285.man.html">CAPITAL ASSET RESEARCH CORP. V. FINNEGAN (11/13/1998, NO. 97-9285)<BR></A><BR>
Finnegan and Breen challenge the district court's finding that the information in question was a trade secret under Georgia law as well as the relief ordered by the district court. Are sizeable institutional players in the business of purchasing tax liens from state and local governments. CARC's business in Georgia consists primarily of purchasing tax executions (or liens) and tax deeds on real properties for which property taxes are owed. Or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which information:</P> <P> (A) Derives economic value. And</P> <P> (B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.</P> <P>O.C.G.A. § 10 1 761(4) (1997). Even if all of the information is publicly available. The district court concluded that</P> <P> Finnegan violated the Georgia Trade Secrets Act by misappropriating and using the property information concerning the $27 million portfolio that was available for purchase during the May 7.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044721p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We agree with the Commissioner of the IRS that the lump sum consideration paid for the right to lottery payments is ordinary income. They did not then have the option to take the prize in a single lump sum payment. So they were entitled to 26 annual installments of $369. The Commissioner determined that this sale price was ordinary income. In December 2002 the Latteras were sent a notice of deficiency of $660. Because its decision was final. We have appellate jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). So venue is proper under I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A). We do not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Discussion The lottery payments the Latteras had a right to receive were gambling winnings. The parties agree that the annual payments were ordinary income. Whether the sale of a right to lottery payments by a lottery winner can be treated as a capital gain under the Internal Revenue Code is one of first impression in our Circuit. It is not a new question. Both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that such sales deserve ordinaryincome treatment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-2149_033.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Tax Track argues that whether it took reasonable measures to keep its information confidential 2 Nos. 05 2149 & 05 4287 (which is what Illinois requires before it will enforce a confidentiality agreement) is a factual determination that should have gone to a jury. Whether a party took reasonable steps to protect its confidential information is a fact question for the jury. Here no reasonable jury could conclude that Tax Track's meager and inconsistent protective measures were sufficient to protect its information. One of its products is called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200512/04-5257a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the briefs were Gregory G. With him on the brief was Rhonda M. Peter Buscemi was on the brief for amici curiae State and Local Bar Associations in support of appellees. Babb were on the brief for amicus curiae The Conference of Chief Justices in support of appellee American Bar Association. The Bar Associations sought a declaratory judgment that the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in the practice of law are covered by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/03/951742P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. BACKGROUND Chakales was among several thousand taxpayers who participated in a program operated by First Western Government Securities (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0576n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These errors were harmless and we affirm. Was owned by Appellant's father. Appellant was responsible for doing
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/DD6AB0C527B2573988256E5A00707CE8/$file/9971369.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
At issue is the taxpayer's liability for attorneys' fees paid pursuant to court order approving the settlement of two class actions brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the ADEA). Holding that such fees paid on the taxpayer's behalf are income to the taxpayer. FACTS In the 1980's James Sinyard was the division manager in Mobile. He was allegedly forced to resign. Winthrop & Weinstine will be paid one third (1/3) of the amount you obtain in the lawsuit. The suits were settled. The payment was to be made
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043408p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellants/Plaintiffs are physicians and their professional corporations who purchased life insurance through Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/20689F25B17CA82988256AD20058CE7D/$file/9971369.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
At issue is the taxpayer's liability for attorneys' fees paid pursuant to court order approving the settlement of two class actions brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the ADEA). Holding that such fees paid on the taxpayer's behalf are income to the taxpayer. FACTS In the 1980's James Sinyard was the division manager in Mobile. He was allegedly forced to resign. Winthrop & Weinstine will be paid one third (1/3) of the amount you obtain in the lawsuit. The suits were settled. The payment was to be made
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2000/98-4605.man.html">UNITED STATES V. PROSPERI (1/28/2000, NO. 98-4605)<BR></A><BR>
Also presented is the extent to which evidence. Admitted for charges that were later dismissed. Amaretto was beneficially owned by Donovan and his family. Prosperi was granted power of attorney with authority to conduct all the corporation's affairs on Donovan's behalf.</P> <P> During this period. Prosperi allegedly diverted the entire $3 million proceeds of the Holigolf transaction for his personal use<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/02-1191.htm">02-1191 -- SENDER V. BRONZE GROUP -- 08/26/2004<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/08/006006P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Peterson's business records were seized by the Nebraska State Patrol at the time of Peterson's arrest for the criminal tax charges. While his bankruptcy case was pending. Peterson pled guilty to one count relating to his failure to pay and file the sales tax returns and he was sentenced in the spring of 1998. The records were not released by the State Patrol until September 1998. Bachman was injured in August 1998 and was unable to effectively perform as Peterson's attorney until November 1998. Bachman's wife was able. The Department convinced Bachman that the assessments against the debtor were valid. Bachman attempted to informally negotiate reduced claims with both the IRS and the Nebraska Department of Revenue but was unsuccessful in his negotiations and the Nebraska Department of Revenue formally declined Bachman's offer in June 1999. The debtor was never able to propose a confirmable plan. Primarily on the ground that if payment were approved prior to plan confirmation. Bachman's total request was $7.
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We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
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We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0694p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will therefore affirm in part and reverse in part. We will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. It is important to emphasize at the outset that. Because we are reviewing the partial grant of a motion for summary judgment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/011923u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm. Which it contends was overvalued for 1995 tax purposes. Our review of the order is plenary. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Because this was a core proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code. At issue is whether a district court. Has the authority to redetermine a debtor's right to a tax refund under 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(B) where the refund was not first requested in accordance with state refund procedures. Time limits for requesting a refund under Texas law are inapplicable and are not dispositive of the District Court's jurisdiction to order a refund. We hold a debtor must properly and timely request a tax refund in accordance with state law governing tax appeals in order for a bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction under § 505(a)(2)(B). 11 U.S.C. § 505(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants broad jurisdiction to determine the amount or legality of a debtor's tax liability. Is limited by § 505(a)(2)(B). Or addition to tax if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this title.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2000/98-4605.man.html">UNITED STATES V. PROSPERI (1/28/2000, NO. 98-4605)<BR></A><BR>
Also presented is the extent to which evidence. Admitted for charges that were later dismissed. Amaretto was beneficially owned by Donovan and his family. Prosperi was granted power of attorney with authority to conduct all the corporation's affairs on Donovan's behalf.</P> <P> During this period. Prosperi allegedly diverted the entire $3 million proceeds of the Holigolf transaction for his personal use<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/06/986070P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The bankruptcy court held the accounts receivable were not the equivalent of wages or salary and therefore were not exempt under the Nebraska statute. Pruss is an attorney engaged in the practice of law as a sole practitioner. The scheduled value of these receivables was $41. Her claim of exemption was. The Chapter 7 Trustee of two other bankruptcy estates which are creditors of Ms. The
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042679np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have plenary review over the Tax Court's findings of law. The parties have stipulated to the key facts of this case. Which was owned and primarily operated by Charles N. Investors were told that CNC used their money to purchase food products each month for resale to food wholesalers and supermarket chains. Who were told that the distributions constituted one half of the company's profits. CNC was a Ponzi scheme. The IRS may seek a penalty for fraudulent underpayment of 3 taxes
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0005p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The bankruptcy court's order is AFFIRMED. The bankruptcy court's order denying relief from the automatic stay is a final. The order confirming the Debtor's chapter 13 plan over Tidewater's objection is also a final order for purposes of appeal. 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998). 2 Because the parties to this appeal have stipulated to the facts underlying this dispute. A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. FACTS The underlying facts are undisputed. The vehicle was the collateral that secured the Debtor's obligation under the Contract. The Contract was subsequently assigned to Tidewater and its security interest was duly perfected. The accelerated balance owed pursuant to the Contract as of the filing of the chapter 13 petition was $10. The Debtor proposed a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033392p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5032.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Ernest M. With him on the brief were Eileen J. This is the second appeal in an action by John Greene (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062483p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge This is a battle for William Knapp's estate. It is in federal court because he kept much of his wealth in employee benefit trusts that were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200410511.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Each of the Debtors is the subject of a separate Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Which is liquidated by the Trustee for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Which subsequently was converted to a Chapter 7 case. The Trustee acknowledges that the portion accrued after the original petition date is not part of the bankruptcy estate and objects only to the exemption of the portion accrued prior to the petition date. Although each of the Debtors is the subject of a separate. The cases all were before the same bankruptcy and district court judges. 4 2 1 estate includes
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962412.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 29 the cross reference is corrected to read
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5097.html">BAY VIEW, INC V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for defendant appellee.<span style=
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Which are virtually undisputed. Are largely taken from the district court's opinion. Residential customers in the District are charged a base rate for water and sewer services. Are charged the property taxes even though the District does not provide them with water or sewer service. Stated that it was aware
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19984605.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Also presented is the extent to which evidence. Admitted for charges that were later dismissed. Amaretto was beneficially owned by Donovan and his family. Prosperi was granted power of attorney with authority to conduct all the corporation's affairs on Donovan's behalf. Prosperi allegedly diverted the entire $3 million proceeds of the Holigolf transaction for his personal use1 while advising Donovan that these funds were invested in certificates of deposit (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19984605.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Also presented is the extent to which evidence. Admitted for charges that were later dismissed. Amaretto was beneficially owned by Donovan and his family. Prosperi was granted power of attorney with authority to conduct all the corporation's affairs on Donovan's behalf. Prosperi allegedly diverted the entire $3 million proceeds of the Holigolf transaction for his personal use1 while advising Donovan that these funds were invested in certificates of deposit (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/10/99-9021.htm">99-9021 -- CHAR-LIL CORP. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 10/25/2000<BR></A><BR>
A close review of the record persuades that we should affirm. <p> <center><strong>BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> Char Lil is a closely held corporation formed in 1976 by Charles McKelvey with his wife and daughter. They are the sole stockholders. When two parcels were sold. <p> Char Lil typically would renovate the properties as needed. Reflecting a determination that the corporation was primarily in the business of buying and renting. Char Lil timely appealed that ruling to this court. <p> <center><strong>ANALYSIS</strong></center> <p> The Tax Court determined that the properties owned by Char Lil were purchased primarily for rental. That the deficiencies and penalties noticed were appropriate.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/995116.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They are entitled to an abatement of the penalties assessed under those provisions. Concluded that reasonable cause was not established by the Taxpayers because financial distress was the only fact and circumstance supporting their failure to pay and deposit employment taxes timely. Because we believe the Brewery bright line test is inconsistent with both Congress' creation of a reasonable cause exception and Treas. We believe the better reasoned approach is the one set forth in Fran Corp. v. We have concluded that reasonable cause existed for the Taxpayers' failure to pay and deposit their employment taxes timely. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for the Taxpayers. I. The following facts are undisputed and have been largely stipulated to by the parties. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Oct2001/001802.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200511/04-5190b.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With them on the briefs were Gary S. Price were on the brief for amici curiae District of Columbia Affairs Section of the District of Columbia Bar. With him on the brief were Peter D. Were on the brief of appellee Commonwealth of Virginia. Were on the brief for appellee State of Maryland. PER CURIAM: The local government of the District of Columbia is prohibited by Congress from imposing a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug95/94-2496.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9D2C9F8834EFC65F88256E7400749DB0/$file/0217073.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which he deems to have unambiguously indicated its intent to discharge any liability for gap period interest. Miller urges the panel to construe the language of the Chapter 11 plan and the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as excepting from discharge the interest which accrues on a tax debt only when the government's claim to that debt is unsecured. We have jurisdiction over the district court's order affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). I. BACKGROUND William Miller was the sole shareholder of Rosalie's Restaurant Associates. Miller was assessed a trust fund recovery penalty by the IRS. The IRS was granted an allowed secured claim against Miller's bankruptcy estate in the amount of $268. Was confirmed on April 4. The party in interest for this appeal is the United States of America. The defendants appellees will hereinafter be referred to as merely the IRS. 1 MILLER v.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/98-6069.htm">98-6069 -- MATTHIESEN V. BANC ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION -- 03/09/1999<BR></A><BR>
Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. <u>See</u> <u>id.</u> Having applied this standard. Included in her initial application were copies of her 1993 and 1994 income tax returns. 500 was capital gains from the sale of rental properties. <p> Plaintiff purchased properties. While her loan application was pending. Real estate property for rent or for sale. <p> Plaintiff's loan application was submitted to BOMC underwriters in Dallas for review. The loan was reviewed using the underwriting guidelines of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Plaintiff's application was initially denied because the underwriter was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/11/00-9003.htm">00-9003 -- OLPIN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 11/05/2001<BR></A><BR>
The relevant facts are undisputed. The issue is whether Mr. Background Facts and Proceedings</strong> <p> The following facts are taken from unchallenged affidavits filed by Mr. Olpin
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5144.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Michael B. This is a suit for a refund of patent fees alleged to have been unlawfully exacted. Because the statute was designed to generate revenue to fund federal programs other than the United States Patent and Trademark Office (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/964462.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Three decisions made by the district court are at issue in this appeal. The district court ordered the government to produce discovery related to Hastings' claim that he was selectively prosecuted because he is a Republican. The district court ordered the government to disclose certain documents which the government argues are protected by the law enforcement privilege. We decline to reach the issue of privilege because it is made moot by our decision that discovery regarding selective prosecution was not warranted. I Hastings is a prominent businessman and Republican Party leader in Boone. Hastings owed substantial taxes for some of those years and was entitled to a less substantial credit or refund in one of those years. That he is 2 partner in several business enterprises. The official referral to the criminal investigatory unit within the IRS was made in January 1993. The referral form was completed by Revenue Agent Tanya Schmidt. Schmidt acknowledged in the report that Hastings' income for two of the four years at issue was
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Harrington & Richardson was on brief. The fraud is alleged to have been committed by the purchaser and the debtor's former counsel in the acquisition of a mortgage against the asset. Were in prison. I. Bruce and Andrew Jeremiah are the partners of the debtor. Its business essentially was to lease space in this complex to retail. Hershel Smith to represent them in a dispute they were having with the Center's prior mortgagee. While Smith was representing the Center in the bankruptcy proceedings. It developed that he also was representing some of its creditors. RSS's principals are William Ricci and the Smith Family Trust. Of which attorney Smith's children are the beneficiaries. Also is a convicted felon. Seeking to have the Center placed in receivership. Were in jail for allegedly dealing drugs out of the Center. The Trustee sought to have the mortgage declared null and void. The Center was subject to (1) liens for $850. The Center is in deteriorating condition. Contend that the Center's financial picture is not quite so grim.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981939.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We will refer to Charles A. A certified public accountant who was retained to provide accounting advice. By the early 1980s Greene was earning a substantial six figure salary. Although Corman was not retained as an investment advisor. Satisfied that Corman was qualified to analyze investments.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199910/98-1227a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On the briefs were John McNish and Richard G. With him on the briefs were Gordon Gooch. With him on the brief were Jay L. With her on the brief were James D. Circuit Judge: Petitioners in these consolidated cases are natural gas producers. Four issues are pre sented. Although we will presuppose knowledge of our opinion in Public Service and its predecessor. Eliminating the price limitations Title I of the NGPA had imposed. the Kansas ad valorem tax was not the equivalent of a severance tax attributable to production and therefore pro ducers already charging the maximum price could not recover the tax from their customers. The date when all interested parties were given notice in the Federal Register that the recoverability of the Kansas tax under s 110 of the NGPA was at issue.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011075.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The second was for $541. The variance in numbers among the several proofs of claim is due solely to differences in the IRS's calculations of the penalties and interest owed for the 1984 tax year.1 The Mosers objected to the IRS's third amended proof of claim. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. Our review of the district court's order is de novo. When a claim is undisputed. When a tax claim is disputed in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Code is not interpreted to alter the traditional allocation of the burden of proof. In this case the IRS's task in proving its claim is akin to what it would be in a tax deficiency proceeding. Before the Commissioner is required to carry that burden. The taxpayer first must dispense with the so called presumption of correctness by carrying his own burden and persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment is arbitrary and excessive.2 We explained in Cebollero that the use of the phrase
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/April2003/021725p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. * Honorable William C. The Chapter 11 proceedings were converted to Chapter 7 proceedings. Cole Schotz advised the Debtor that all payments for future services would have to be paid from non estate sources. It is only the December 8. 218.57 that is at issue here. . . . if such payment . . . was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition. Newman & Schwartz was paid an additional $125. These payments are not at issue here. The Debtor's contingent interest in this trust was disclosed in the schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court on July 18. The Debtor testified concerning the terms of this trust at a hearing twenty days later that was attended by counsel for the Creditors Committee. The complaint was amended to seek recovery of the fees paid to Newman & Schwartz and to Cole Schotz on May 26. The claims against all other defendants were settled without a determination of whether the trust was part of the Debtor's estate. Which set forth the facts recounted above and averred that they had no knowledge that the Cook Islands trust was the source of the funds used by Stefanie to pay the fees at issue.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/01opinions/01-1045a.html">HERBERT L. MITCHELL V. COMMISSIONER IRS<BR></A><BR>
With her on the brief was David English Carmack. Circuit Judge:<span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-9025a.htm">97-9025A -- AMERICAN STORES CO. AND SUBSIDIARIES V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE - - 03/09/1999<BR></A><BR>
Contemplates this result. <p> <p> A copy of the corrected opinion is attached. <p> Sincerely. BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> American Stores is an accrual method taxpayer. The case was submitted on facts which were fully stipulated by the parties. <p> The Tax Court issued an opinion upholding the position of the Commissioner. <u>American Stores Co. and Subsidiaries v. The court held that pension contributions made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements that were based on units of service worked after the close of American's 1988 fiscal taxable year were not
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/12/036032P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Robert and Connie were married in November of 1987. Connie was not present. The Decree apparently provided that Connie's claim for maintenance was reserved retroactive to June 1. Stated: It's my understanding that one of the terms of the decree was that the issue of maintenance. Which would have been temporarily awarded at the rate of $4. Was reserved backwards to some time in `97. There is currently no maintenance obligation owing. Although there is a residual possibility of such obligation should Ms. We were not presented with a copy of the Decree. No proper Affidavit was attached. As is permitted by the judgment and decree. The court wishes to note that it is not inclined to grant spousal maintenance to a party evading a warrant for arrest. The court would be funding an illegal activity.4 We are unaware of any further proceedings in the District Court prior to the hearings at issue in these appeals. These payments were made outside the plan to satisfy nondischargeable priority tax obligations. The court found that under Minnesota law any claim for unpaid temporary maintenance is merged into the final decree.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199801/97-5016a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the briefs. Amy Loeserman Klein and John McJunkin were on the brief. We hold that the contract language affords Beal a credit only when collateral property was sold between specified dates. Although the court recognizes that the contract was initially drafted and executed by its predecessor in interest. A warning that this information was liable to be inaccurate. Many of the loans involved were in default. This began a six month due diligence period during which Beal could determine if there were any breaches of the representations or warranties made with respect to the prop erty it acquired. That there were no undisclosed delin quent real property taxes on included properties. Beal closed the transactions but noted that it reserved the right to pursue (through the instant litigation) certain credits and back taxes it thought it was due under the contract. The FDIC has consistently asserted that Beal's only reme dy for allegedly defective mortgage loans is via recourse to the contract provisions for breach of warranty.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5072.html">LTV STEEL COMPANY, INC. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
With him on the brief were <U>Mary B. With him on the brief were <U>Loretta C. The government appeals the ruling of the Court of Federal Claims that pension payments made to certain former employees of the taxpayer s predecessor companies were exempt from tax liability under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). (LTV Steel) is a subsidiary of LTV Corporation. LTV Steel was formed in 1984 from two other LTV Corporation subsidiaries. Those plans were the products of collective bargaining with the United Steelworkers of America. All four plans were qualified plans under 26 U.S.C. § 401 and therefore were eligible for the benefits of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Those basic benefits were substantially less. Those funds would then be used to pay most of the difference between the basic benefits that the PBGC was paying and the level of benefits required by the two terminated plans for hourly workers. Those employees who retired after the plans were terminated would receive payments making up about 75% of the shortfall.</P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA2LTAxMDYtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/06-0106-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
EDP's claim was barred by res judicata. The question this case presents is whether a bankruptcy court order allowing an uncontested proof of claim constitutes a final judgment on the merits that can be a predicate for res judicata. does and affirm. BACKGROUND The material facts are not in dispute. EDP employed a number of wage earners and consequently was required to file with the Internal Revenue 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0279n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The convictions are affirmed. Madison's sentence is affirmed. Madison's sentence is reversed and remanded. Was selfemployed as a minister. Madison's principal employment from 1996 1999 was as the executive director for Cherokee Children and Family Services. Was run under the umbrella of Cherokee Children and Family Services. The organizations collectively are referred to as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958347.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2). Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected debtor's argument and held that the IRA was included in her bankruptcy estate. We hold that debtor's IRA is excluded from the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) because of the restriction on its transferability. I. FACTS The facts are not in dispute. Included in debtor's schedules was an IRA. Which was opened in 1983 and valued Honorable John F. The parties stipulated that debtor's IRA was one defined by § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code [Title 26 of the United States Code].1 II. Standard of Review The sole question at issue in this case is whether 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) excludes from the property of a bankruptcy estate an IRA which is subject to a restriction on transfer by a state statute. Is a matter of law. novo review.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1702.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lorincz & Jacobi were on brief for appellee. Debtor's appeal from that decision asks us to do two things: reverse the district court's holding that federal credit unions are nonprofit organizations and hold that educational loans issued to him by creditor appellee TI Federal Credit Union are. We affirm the result achieved by the district court that debtor's loans are nondischargeable and elect not to reach the issue of federal credit unions' nonprofit status. From which DelBonis obtained no direct personal benefit and on which he is the sole obligor. Were acquired from the Texas Instrument Federal Credit Union. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972108.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. District Judge: Northwestern Security Life Insurance Company (Northwestern) was a North Carolina corporation specializing in life. State insurance insolvency statutes are not preempted by the federal priority statute to the extent that the state statutes afford a higher priority to policyholder claims and claims for administrative expenses than to claims of the United States. 508 U.S. 491. That he was entitled to a refund of the $159. The Internal Revenue Service informed the Commissioner that it would not allow his refund claim on the grounds that the federal income taxes that accrued during liquidation were 1 Specifically. Because no such claims were made during liquidation. Claiming that he was entitled to the refund. Such state statutes were preempted by the federal priority statute. Which provides that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200206/01-1045a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the brief was David English Carmack. Circuit Judge: This case is before us on appeal by the taxpayer from a decision of the Tax Court denying
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961557.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept2000/005042.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Several affiliates.1 Bruno's is based in Alabama and operates a chain of supermarkets in the southeastern United States. Huff was the holder of $290 million in Bruno's subordinated notes. HSBC was the indenture trustee for the subordinated notes (we refer to them together as Huff). They argue that the District Court should not have confirmed the plan for a host of reasons. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and are thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. Three separate interests have appeared to defend the plan: the debtors and debtors in possession (referred to throughout as the Debtors). Representing the group of banks (the Banks) that were the senior lenders to Bruno's before the reorganization. Together they contend that the plan does not violate the absolute priority rule because the releases were not granted
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E6C74EBA1558CF09882570BC00779208/$file/0357052.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Eisenhower's fascinating written account of World War II is the subject of a more mundane. I was approached by representatives of various publishing houses. Are often inclined to use contemporary accounts as source materials . . . . Certain of these books on the African and European campaigns were riddled with inaccuracies. They contained conclusions that had slight basis in fact and were the hasty conceptions or mis 15370 TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX v. Who were functioning partners for the proposal. Pointed out errors in these publications and said that since these were written during my lifetime and were not denied or corrected by me.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-9025.htm">97-9025 -- AMERICAN STORES COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/09/1999<BR></A><BR>
BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> American Stores is an accrual method taxpayer. The case was submitted on facts which were fully stipulated by the parties. <p> The Tax Court issued an opinion upholding the position of the Commissioner. <u>American Stores Co. and Subsidiaries v. The court held that pension contributions made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements that were based on units of service worked after the close of American's 1988 fiscal taxable year were not
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2367.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellee. </SPAN></P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051459np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and will affirm. I. The facts are undisputed. An abbreviated recitation will suffice. The Department of Finance included Aubrey's interest in a listing of properties that were to be sold at public auction on May 31. The listing was published twice a week for three weeks in the Virgin Islands Daily News. 1995 tax sale and a Certificate of Purchase was issued and recorded. May redeem the same within one year from the date of sale at public auction by paying to the Department of Finance the full amount of all taxes and public sewer system user fees for which the property was offered at public auction. Plus interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum computed on the full amount of the purchase money to the date 30 days after tender is made to the Department of Finance. The redemptioner may have such release duly entered in the real property register against the certificate of purchase upon payment to the Recorder of Deeds of such fees as may be specified by Title 28.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200515900.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BTI seeks to recover certain standby letter of credit proceeds that were drawn down and retained by The CIT Group/Business Credit. Which was the assignee of BTI's lessor. Whose two general partners are David C. The standby letter of credit was created to secure BTI's obligations to Two Trees under a lease agreement that was part of a sale leaseback transaction. Factual Background Most of the facts in this case are undisputed. We largely adopt the bankruptcy court's statement of the facts in its 30 September 2002 order: BTI was in the trucking business. The bonds were paid. BTI was entitled to purchase the property for $1. BTI's primary lender was CIT. Which was thereafter amended from time to time. Dinstein was an officer and director of BTI's parent company. Was apparently the architect of the sale and leaseback plan involving Two Trees. That is. David Walentas was a general partner in Two Trees and Chairman of the Board of BTI Parent. That it is in the best interest of [BTI] to obtain a letter of credit in the amount of up to $1.6 million in favor of Two Trees . . . securing [BTI's] lease obligations to Two Trees.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C959F89D33ADCCDC88256D01007E813F/$file/0270457.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The notice is valid. The tax court's jurisdiction was proper. Indicating that he owed substantial additional taxes because the actual value of the gifted stock was more than twice what Elings reported. The notice was dated and indicated that Elings had ninety days in which to file a petition to contest the deficiency. Is that the Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1881.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
At issue here is whether an individual involved in a Massachusetts
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971510.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The issue is whether the tax court abused its discretion by finding the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) pre litigation position
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A0C0745D00D79B73882572A30077FE2E/$file/0535615.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Kenneth Reiserer was an attorney whose practice included tax planning services. The IRS alleged that he was involved in an abusive tax arrangement known as offshore employee leasing (OEL). Reiserer was an officer or director of several domestic leasing corporations involved in an OEL scheme. Under an OEL scheme a customer will terminate his current employment and enter into a contract with a foreign leasing corporation. The IRS published a notice stating that OEL schemes were abusive arrangements and persons involved could be subject to IRS investigation and possible liability. The case was referred to a magistrate judge. Who found: (1) the penalties under §§ 6700 and 6701 are not penal in nature and thus do not abate with death. Id. § 6701(a) & (b). [2] It is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1053.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mayotte & Singer were on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. The entire purchase price was financed through a mortgage loan in pounds sterling. It was increased to 330. No U.S. funds were used either to purchase or improve the residence. It was sold for 453. The mortgage loan was retired. The government responded that the total cost basis of the residence must be arrived at by utilizing the respective dollar pound exchange rates in effect when the residence was purchased and each capital improvement payment was made.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/02/01-2125.htm">01-2125 -- KLINE V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE -- 02/08/2002<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Debtor Karen Marie Kline appeals the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's approval of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) proof of claim. Appellee's proof of claim was valid until such time as Appellant filed tax returns. <p> R. The IRS states the only issue to be decided by this court is simply whether the federal income tax laws apply to Ms. The implication of that statement is that Ms. Kline is what was once designated by the IRS as an
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-9004.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Because the parties are familiar with the facts as set forth in the Tax Court's memorandum and opinion. Walford's deduction for losses in 1981 arising from the Sav Fuel investment was properly disallowed because the partnership did not have the requisite profit motive under 26 U.S.C. 183.(2) The court further found that Mr. Walford was liable for an addition to tax and increased interest. Walford does not argue that these penalties were erroneously assessed. We will consider only his arguments challenging the Tax Court's conclusion that the Sav Fuel partnership was not engaged in a profit making activity. We affirm.(3) Whether Sav Fuel was intended as a profit making venture is a question of fact that this court will not disturb unless clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when. We are definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We conclude that the Tax Court's finding that Sav Fuel lacked an actual profit objective is not clearly erroneous.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-9015.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Crook petitioned the United States Tax Court for redetermination of deficiencies in income taxes asserted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was not timely filed. Crook's petition was not filed until April 6. In response to Crook's assertion he had (1) The notice was mailed to Crook's last known address in Phoenix. Crook was incarcerated in New Mexico at the time the notice was mailed. We were unable to locate any correspondence from petitioner prior to the petition that was filed in this case on April 6. Discussion
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/953039P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which tax was paid. a refund. So that the tax on this sale was subject to The Bankruptcy Court held that the plaintiffs in this case. D & P decided that a self directed liquidation of its assets was its best alternative. Were entitled to the proceeds of that refund. The three offers were not identical. which offer they wished to accept. A problem was discovered. administrative expenses. The sales taxes on The balance in D & P's operating account was not sufficient to pay operating expenses. Would receive title to the assets free and clear of any 22 the sale if all of the proceeds were paid over to the creditors. offer. The Nath Group was asked to increase its Instead. The sale was closed on October 31. The Nath Group purchased two more restaurants from D & P The required sales taxes were paid over to the state of Minnesota for both sales. The sales tax statute was amended to exclude the sale of substantially all of the assets of a business from the list of taxable events. This amendment was retroactive to June 30.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-3873_016.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Timothy Dexter's income tax returns were deemed frivolous by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Dexter was given notice of the filings and a hearing on the matter but did not respond or appear before the court. Section 7463(b) provides that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1110p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Finding that CalFed's interest in the property was not being adequately protected during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Was less than the bankruptcy court had determined and was adequately protected. The district court also found that the debtor retained equity in the property and that relief from the automatic stay would therefore be unavailable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as well.[fn2] We will reverse the order of the district court and remand with instructions to return this matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Was formed to acquire a 176 unit garden apartment complex located in Florida. It is the debtor's primary asset. A third mortgage was held by FEC Mortgage Company (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/11/976050P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We further affirm the bankruptcy court's determination that a debtor is not entitled to a full judicial determination of the amount and validity of disputed claims where the debtor's schedules and proofs of claim on file reveal that debts exceed the eligibility limits of § 109(e). The Debtor's only scheduled claims were unsecured non priority claims owed to the United States Internal Revenue Service (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0580n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Norwest Bank appeals from an order in which the district court concluded that it was responsible for the 2003 real estate taxes covering a nursing home purchased by Extendicare Health Services. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0140p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case requires us to decide whether an affiliated group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a 10 year carryback for certain
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2455.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on the brief for appellant.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021169.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Section 1 the status is changed from
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021169.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jurisdiction in this court is invoked pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. I. Appellant Lewin was a partner in I Tech R&D Limited Partnership [hereinafter
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A number of business transactions whose tax consequences are at issue here. When the NFL injunction was lifted in 1982. The Raiders were to repay the loan from 12 percent of the net receipts from the operation of luxury suites to be constructed by the Raiders at the LA Coliseum. The repayment was to begin in the third year of suite rentals. The loan was secured by the tobe constructed suites. The LAMCC Agreement was the result of arm's length bargaining between the Raiders and the LAMCC. Plans to construct the suites prior to the 1984 Summer Olympics were abandoned after the Los Angeles Olympic Committee voiced concerns over the timing of the construction. Was halted on February 18 of that year. The Raiders responded that they were willing and able to provide the required bonds. Construction never resumed and the suites were never completed. The lawsuit was settled on September 11. The Commissioner disallowed the Raiders' rent deductions because the rent was not currently payable and was part of the loan from the LAMCC.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7090965863F018808825705B004F67A1/$file/0435028.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1346(a)(1). Although the levied upon funds were removed from the Steads' account. If in fact they were ever transferred from the bank. Is not disclosed by the record. The funds were not returned to the Steads. The IRS does not have any record of receiving the funds from First Interstate Bank or Wells Fargo Bank. For reasons that are unclear from the record. Neither the Steads nor the IRS appears to have attempted to recover the missing funds from First Interstate Bank or Wells Fargo Bank. The Steads' tax dispute was resolved to the satisfaction of the IRS. 1996 was remitted to the IRS. Even though the tax was assessed against a third party. 529 (1995). 2 Certain types of property are statutorily exempted from a § 6321 tax lien pursuant to I.R.C. § 6323. 1 STEAD v. Banks are subject to special rules and must wait twenty one days before relinquishing levied upon funds. A bank has only two defenses: 1) the levied upon property is not in its possession.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/05/99-9019.htm">99-9019 -- HANCE V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 05/25/2000<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Petitioner Lowell E. We must determine if we have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Hance's Tax Court motion to vacate was not timely filed. Was timely . We have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. <p> In reviewing Tax Court decisions. Have jurisdiction to consider Mr. It is authorized to send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. <em>See</em> 26 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B0021A36FCAE8E6088256D8E007DA95F/$file/0270421.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Much of this information was culled from confidential financial statements. Imploring Banaitis to keep the financial information with which he was entrusted confidential. Banaitis' refusal to disclose was apparently not well received by Mitsubishi Bank or the Bank of California. Banaitis was placed on work probation. His pension for 1987 would have vested for that year. Merten was authorized to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2003/02-10716.opn.html">BONE V. COMMISSIONER (3/21/2003, NO. 02-10716)<BR></A><BR>
The Tax Court concluded that the deductions were impermissible because the expenses benefitted the C corporations. Once the contracts were transferred. BACKGROUND</CENTER> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2003/02-10716.opn.html">BONE V. COMMISSIONER (3/21/2003, NO. 02-10716)<BR></A><BR>
The Tax Court concluded that the deductions were impermissible because the expenses benefitted the C corporations. Once the contracts were transferred. BACKGROUND</CENTER> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042931p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Argues that the Commissioner and Tax Court erred in concluding that those payments were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200016685.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
As the parent corporation was also an S Corporation. The gain passed through and was taxable to its shareholders. A company will typically obtain a private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service. Determining in advance whether such a spinoff will be taxable or not.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042798p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We disagree with Appellants on both points and will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 2 I. Sheila Popky had failed to pay employment taxes that were required to be withheld from the wages of the employees of Sheila's EMS. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that the federal tax lien here could attach to Sheila Popky's interest in the Narbeth property owned by her and her husband as tenants by the entireties. The nature of Sheila Popky's interest in the Narbeth property is crucial because federal tax liens attach to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991990.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 2 the text is corrected to read
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2003/023436p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He claims that he is entitled to the return of certain funds escrowed pursuant to the terms of a non prosecution agreement. Since we conclude that the agreement is ambiguous. We will vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings so that the district court can resolve the ambiguity. Those buildings were located at 311 S. That the returns he furnished to the bank were fictitious and contained inflated income. Was seized by the government pursuant to a seizure warrant executed at the real estate closing. The proceeds are currently worth $87. As will be explained later. In which he claimed to have filed federal income tax returns for the years. Pantelidis's former counsel 5 was aware by then that the government had the same forfeiture claim to the proceeds of the sale of this property: the building was improved using a $1. Which was also attended by an FBI agent. Agreed to have the proceeds of the sale of the building placed in escrow accounts. One of the plans was Pantelidis's. Pantelidis is accused of claiming to have
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1035.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Hanleys filed income tax returns indicating that they were entitled to a tax refund of $53.85 for the previous year. The Hanleys' calculation was based. Are questions left unanswered by the record.1 What does seem reasonably clear 1. The IRS is required by law to provide the taxpayer with a notice of deficiency. 1987 the Internal Revenue Service sent the Petitioner a is that on several occasions in 1988 and 1990. 217 figure stated in the notice of deficiency was. They asked the Tax Court to determine only whether the Hanleys were entitled to take a deduction for the allegedly worthless debt. He found that the Hanleys had failed to carry their burden of proving that the debt was worthless. Submitted their own computation which said that they were entitled to a refund of $849. The government acknowledges that the filing of a timely motion to vacate will re set the clock on the time to appeal. 895 (1st Cir. 1966) (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb97/95-2725.opa.html">LITTON INDUS. AUTOMATION SYS. V. NATIONWIDE POWER CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Litton Indus. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> The issue in this appeal is whether an unperfected security interest in interpleaded funds is entitled to priority over a competing federal tax lien. The district court held that the federal tax lien is entitled to priority. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The facts in this appeal are essentially undisputed. From which it was transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The real parties in interest are Highlander International Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200107/99-1252a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Kenneth L. (Cerand) appeals from a judgment of the tax court predicated upon that court's conclusion that payments Cerand made to three of its sister corporations were intended to be capital contribu tions rather than loans. Background Gerard Cerand is the president and sole shareholder of Cerand. Many of the airports at which Cerand provides services are small and are not served by regularly scheduled flights. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency based upon his conclusion that the initial transfers from Cerand to its sister corporations were capital contributions rather than loans. In determining whether the transfers were loans or capital contributions.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0007n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. That the sale order was void. While we conclude that Mueller waived the jurisdictional argument and the sale order is not subject to collateral attack. We agree that the order of sale was not properly a basis for a finding of contempt and that Mueller's conduct was not contemptuous. The bankruptcy court's order of contempt and sanctions award will be reversed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding Mueller in contempt of the order approving the sale of the legal malpractice claim and imposing sanctions on him for violating that order. Is final if it
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19952725.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The issue in this appeal is whether an unperfected security interest in interpleaded funds is entitled to priority over a competing federal tax lien. The district court held that the We affirm. federal tax lien is entitled to priority. I. BACKGROUND The facts in this appeal are essentially undisputed. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2002/012862up.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Before me is a motion under Rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae over the opposition of the appellants. Because it appears that the criteria set out in Rule 29(b) are met. That the amici have a sufficient
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1070.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Gross & Pabian was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Capeway's sole remaining asset at that time was a parcel of real estate located in Easton. The Capeway Property was subject to a first mortgage in favor of Wingate and Louise Chadbourne. Were individually liable for the tax liability. The proceeds were to be applied first to satisfy the outstanding mortgage on the Property. No further effort to sell the Property was ever undertaken.3 Over the 1. Edward Laffey was released from liability due to his inability to pay. 3 3 course of the next eight years. We assume that the taxes were not paid. Which stated that the sum due was $19. Though it is not entirely clear from the record. Government's counsel did not dispute this statement. 4 4 Property and its ordered sale should have rendered proceeds adequate to satisfy his tax liability. It is well settled that the United States. Our review is similar to that accorded a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec2001/00-16685.opn.html">MCLAULIN V. COMMISSIONER (12/21/2001, NO. 00-16685)<BR></A><BR>
As the parent corporation was also an S Corporation. The gain passed through and was taxable to its shareholders. It was equally owned by Douglas P. It was equally owned by Ridge and John L. Ridge and Hutto had tentatively agreed that a 50% interest was worth $825. The corporate return included a statement that no gain or loss was recognized because the spinoff qualified for nonrecognition treatment under section 355. Which was passed through in pro rata shares to the Ridge shareholders. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec2001/00-16685.opn.html">MCLAULIN V. COMMISSIONER (12/21/2001, NO. 00-16685)<BR></A><BR>
As the parent corporation was also an S Corporation. The gain passed through and was taxable to its shareholders. It was equally owned by Douglas P. It was equally owned by Ridge and John L. Ridge and Hutto had tentatively agreed that a 50% interest was worth $825. The corporate return included a statement that no gain or loss was recognized because the spinoff qualified for nonrecognition treatment under section 355. Which was passed through in pro rata shares to the Ridge shareholders. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb97/95-2725.opa.html">LITTON INDUS. AUTOMATION SYS. V. NATIONWIDE POWER CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Litton Indus. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> The issue in this appeal is whether an unperfected security interest in interpleaded funds is entitled to priority over a competing federal tax lien. The district court held that the federal tax lien is entitled to priority. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The facts in this appeal are essentially undisputed. From which it was transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The real parties in interest are Highlander International Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200210716.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Tax Court concluded that the deductions were impermissible because the expenses benefitted the C corporations. Once the contracts were transferred. I. BACKGROUND AJCS is an S corporation that was incorporated in 1987. AJCS was originally in the construction business. The income of a C corporation is subject to corporate tax and any distributions it makes to its shareholders will be subject to a second. Certain C corporations are permitted to elect to be S corporations. This corporate income is passed through to the S shareholders and taxed to them at their individual rates. AJCS was a calendar year taxpayer (i.e. The total income from a contract is recognized. The total costs of performance are deducted. In the taxable year in which the contract is completed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200410309.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that property owned by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor as tenancy by the entireties with a non debtor under Florida law is not part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore cannot be reached by creditors. It is exempt from bankruptcy administration under Section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. Claiming that certain real estate property and household goods and furnishings held with his non debtor wife as tenants by the entireties under Florida law was exempt from his creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). An interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B). The nature of a bankrupt's interest in property is determined by state law. Each spouse is seized of the whole. . . . [W]hen property is held as a tenancy by the entireties. The property is not divisible on behalf of one spouse alone. The Supreme Court then examined the IRS's powers granted by 26 U.S.C. § 6321 to determine if the IRS may pull any of the individual right
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0093p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
James Thomas McBride was convicted of (1) presenting a false claim against the IRS. (2) various obstruction of justice and bankruptcy fraud charges based upon certain financial transactions he initiated that were related to a tax evasion case against his girlfriend. McBride seeks to overturn his conviction on the basis that his waiver of counsel was ineffective and because the evidence against him was allegedly insufficient. We AFFIRM the district court's determination that McBride effectively waived his right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings and that there was sufficient evidence to convict him on Counts 2 6. REVERSE McBride's conviction on Count 1 because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on that charge. Factual background Katina Kefalos was convicted by a jury. Kefalos was McBride's girlfriend. Kefalos fired the two attorneys David Axelrod and Terry Sherman who were appointed to represent her. McBride knew that his check would
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr99/96-3021.man.html">BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021)<BR></A><BR>
Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1284.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which dispute: (1) the district court's refusal to consider evidence beyond the claim record that was closed in 1997. The court's decision to award Ray benefits for the eight years after the record (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 32.1. <hr> was closed. (2) the district court's determination that working in a large office building environment was a material duty of Ray's occupation. (3) the district court's finding that Ray was totally disabled. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm. I. Ray was a partner at Gibson. She was insured under the firm's Group Long Term Disability Insurance Policy (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr99/96-3021.man.html">BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021)<BR></A><BR>
Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972746.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: In this diversity case we must interpret the provisions of a will creating a testamentary trust. The district court declared that the will required the trustee to allocate all capital gains as income payable to the life beneficiary. Because the will grants the trustee authority to allocate capital gains as income or principal. I. Julia Tull Walker died in 1965 leaving a will that created multiple trusts. The income of each trust was granted to a series of life beneficiaries. The final life beneficiary in each trust was Julia Tull Walker's daughter in law. The will named John Walker. The parties have referred to the separate trusts created by Julia Tull Walker's will collectively as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/release.pl?B1=Search+Month&month=03&date=01&year=02">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1239.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The judgment at issue was the result of a jury verdict in a patent infringement suit filed against DeVilbiss's former owner. I. History The facts are not in dispute. DeVilbiss was a division of Champion in the 1970s. Lemelson was unlikely to succeed. That case was stayed shortly after filing. In his estimation the case was meritless. Division counsel and secretary of DeVilbiss at the time the Lemelson lawsuit was filed. No settlement was reached at that time. Although the damages claimed by Lemelson were described as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19948393.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Allen sued for the the district court concluded that the Commissioner's We agree and AFFIRM. action was proper and denied the refund. I. The material facts are not in dispute. Allen was convicted for willful failure to file federal income tax returns under the former 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Allen was required to file acceptable tax returns for Unless otherwise indicated. All statutory references to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1839.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. was on brief. Was on brief. This is an in rem action. 000 that it claims was derived from Whitey Bulger's illegal extortion. The only claimant is his brother. Details were given regarding two alleged criminal episodes. Purchased at a favorable price a retail liquor store then known as Stippo's Liquor Mart and the real property on which it was situated. Public documents show that the property was purchased by Kevin Weeks. The real property was resold to Weeks. Was established to do business at that location. The account was opened as South Boston Savings Bank Account (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/01/011087P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Philip Rosemann is a minority shareholder of Roto Die. Alleging that Roto Die is obligated to purchase his shares of Roto Die stock at their current fair market value. The stock's declared fair market value in 1978 when the Agreement was signed. That the price term in the Agreement is ambiguous. Roto Die is a successful family owned business that manufactures rotary dies. Before the Stock Redemption Agreement was signed in March 1978. 000 shares are now owned by a trust. The issue is whether any of the first three suits. Which were filed in Missouri state courts. Count X was dismissed without prejudice for lack of a justiciable controversy because Rosemann had made no demand under the Agreement that Roto Die redeem his stock. The remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. The third state court lawsuit was a pro se re filing of most of the second suit. The district court concluded this suit is barred by res judicata because Rosemann's claim under the Stock Redemption Agreement is merely a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1995/94a0930p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On behalf of themselves and all owners of real property that was constructed or rehabilitated in the defendant townships since July 1. On behalf of themselves and all owners of real property that was constructed or rehabilitated in the defendant townships since July 1. The central issues presented are whether this Court's review is barred by the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Whether the remand was proper. Because review of a district court's remand order is generally available. We will dismiss the appeal at 94 7338. Because remand should have been ordered. We will also deny the petition. The Balaziks made a timely motion to have the proceedings remanded to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981) (holding that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 damages actions in federal courts based on the administration of state tax systems). These actions have been consolidated. Swatara has argued that the remand order is (1) reviewable because it was predicated on McNary comity grounds.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7996903514AFB72A8825724300608048/$file/0510752.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude there is no reversible error. Boulware is the founder. Boulware was convicted on the tax counts and the conspiracy count. The government's theory was that during the period 19891997. He was convicted on all counts. II [1] Boulware first claims that the district court erred in excluding evidence that he contends would have shown that the funds he took from HIE were nontaxable returns of capital rather than income. An essential element of the crime of tax evasion is the existence of a tax deficiency. That distribution is normally not taxable. 26 U.S.C. §§ 301. Boulware sought to show that the money he received from HIE constituted returns of the capital he had invested as the corporation was. We held that constructive distribution rules applicable in the civil arena could not be automatically applied to a criminal tax matter in the absence of some demonstration on the part of the defendant or corporation that distributions were intended to be a return of capital. Boulware argued that whether corporate funds could be characterized as a return of capital is a question of fact for the jury.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0003n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court held that certain insurance proceeds were not property of a chapter 7 estate converted from chapter 11. The dismissal of the involuntary was reversed on appeal and an order for relief was entered. Held that recovery on all grounds was precluded by the previous order releasing the funds. The court concluded that recovery was not available under any of these provisions as a matter of law because the transfers occurred post petition. Is recovery of the excessive legal fees under 11 U.S.C. § 329 precluded because the payments to the attorney took place post petition or because of equitable concerns? 3. Is recovery of the funds under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544. The bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the adversary proceeding is a final. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Was the beneficiary under. The existence of the First Policy was not disclosed in TEI's bankruptcy schedules or in its plan of reorganization confirmed on September 1.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1103.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LLP</SPAN> was on the brief. Ltd.</SPAN> were on the brief. The bankruptcy court ruled that the escrow funds should instead be turned over to the debtor because the debtor's transaction at issue was not a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). We now reverse the district court and direct the bankruptcy court to award judgment to Fleet. </SPAN></P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200315455.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellant Cuvillier asks this Court to determine that the sale of her property was unconstitutional under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia. The statutorily required twenty day notice to the Rockdale property address on 13 May 2002.2 The letter returned to Georgia law requires tax commissioners' offices to notify taxpayers of a delinquency once payment is not received by the due date. Defendant Appellant Shawareb purchased the tax lien on the Rockdale property on 2 July 2002. taxpayer that the account is being managed by DTSI and that the taxpayer must make payment or the property will be subject to the levy process. If the taxes are still not paid. DTSI will send. This letter typically notifies the taxpayer that the property will be
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug96/99-12407.opn.html">CARL J. FABRY, PATRICIA P. FABRY V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/21/2000, NO. 99-12407)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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Line 4 the phrase
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C4B287CF80E85E5288257348005755CD/$file/0576004.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
California courts have recognized that an employee spouse like John might attempt to defeat a nonemployee spouse's community interest in a pension by continuing to work. Julie was not required to await John's actual retirement and instead demanded monthly payments in lieu of her community pension interest pursuant to In re Marriage of Gillmore. We must decide whether John was entitled to reduce his taxable income by the amount paid over to Julie in 2000.1 We conclude that he was not and reverse the Tax Court's contrary holding. Were divorced on August 19. John was employed by the Los Angeles Police Department (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-3638.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1 where such transfers were made subject to liabilities in excess of the taxpayer's basis in the property. The Seggermans argue that no gain should be recognized where they personally guarantied the debts to which the transferred property was subject. Are grain and cattle farmers residing in Illinois. Illinois.2 The stock of the Corporation was distributed as follows: 100 preferred shares and 38 common shares to Ronald Seggerman. They were not relieved personally from any debt that the Corporation assumed or to which the transferred property was subject or that was 3 Although neither Sally nor Linda Seggerman transferred any assets or liabilities to the Corporation. Therefore they should not have to recognize any gain on the amount of the liabilities that exceeds the adjusted basis of the transferred assets. The facts are not in dispute. As we have noted repeatedly. When we consider the application of the legal principle to the facts we will reject the Tax Court decision only if it is clearly erroneous.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug96/99-12407.opn.html">CARL J. FABRY, PATRICIA P. FABRY V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/21/2000, NO. 99-12407)<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-2086.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. The notice informed plaintiff that: (1) the IRS was intending to levy on his property thirty days after the date of the notice. Plaintiff sent defendant Apodaca a letter informing her that he was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/99-12407.opn.html">FABRY V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/21/2000, NO. 99-12407)<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053484p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were charged in a seventy eight count indictment with various criminal offenses. Conspiracy.1 In connection with There are seven defendants in this case: (1) United Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/99-12407.opn.html">FABRY V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/21/2000, NO. 99-12407)<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1807.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Was preparing to receive $72. 000 (and was ultimately appraised for the bankruptcy court at $102. Was sold to Bailey for $40. The bankruptcy petition was prepared by Attorney Evans. Cutter signed his name under the statement:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-3127.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The signs are everywhere:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2312.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rodriguez Suris & Godreau were on consolidated briefs. Lance Belsome was on brief. With whom Will Kemp and Monita F. Were on brief. Should expenses indigenous to a court's handling of mass disaster litigation be reallocated once the winners and losers have been judicially determined? Finding that the court's abrupt slamming of these doors was improvident. Among the many 2 successful innovations that brought the litigation to a celeritous conclusion were (1) the creation of a Joint Document Depository (JDD). Each of whom was responsible for dispersing filings among his or her constituents. The court periodically requisitioned fresh monies as funds on hand were depleted. The orders were silent as to (i) whether or not the court planned to readjust defendants' contributions in light of future developments. 1Because the mechanics of the allocation process are not critical for present purposes. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) and the defendant San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Corporation were assessed a total of $100.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1997/97a1514p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appeals from a final order entered by the district court in this bankruptcy case involving a claim by Barshak that his Individual Retirement Account (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/01/012203P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Did not plant a crop in 1999 because the soil was saturated. It is from the denial of his motion to compel Vote to turn over those payments that the trustee appeals. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Our standard of review is the same as that applied by the bankruptcy appellate panel.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/06/954061P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
KPERS filed the basic underlying suit in which recusal is sought in Kansas state court in 1991. These parties were Boatmen's First National Bank of Kansas City. Were probating his mother's estate. Of which Judge Bartlett was a primary beneficiary. Judge Bartlett explained that the estate planning work for him was substantially complete5 and that he was seeking no further legal advice from the firm. Judge Bartlett recused himself from deciding Boatmen's application because he owned stock in Boatmen's parent His disqualification from deciding Shook's and Blackwell's Boatmen's motion to intervene was See Boatmen's First applications stemmed from a concern that his rulings on these applications would affect Boatmen's application. eventually stayed. All that remained was a transfer of some insurance to a new trust. The court informed the parties that his daughter had accepted the offer from Shook and also that his son was probably a member of KPERS because he was the assistant city manager of the City of Hays.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199710/96-1253b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Franklin were on the briefs. Lobner were on the briefs. Were on the brief. I. Airports are required by statute to charge aeronautical users reasonable fees.1 Section 511 of the Airports and Airways Improvements Act. Requires an airport that accepts federal grant money (or land) to assure that the airport will be available for public use on reasonable conditions and without unjust discrimina tion. Or guidelines establishing ... the standards or guidelines that shall be used by the Secretary in determining under this section whether an airport fee is reasonable.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2239.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which we have consolidated for decision. Aurora Christian Schools Ocean Atlantic is a real estate development company that is incorporated in Virginia and maintains its principal place of business in Alexandria. Will Counties three of the suburban
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2062.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because Vlasek was seventeen years old at the time. A minor estate was opened on his behalf and the settlement proceeds were delivered to the estate. The estate was closed. 561.88 was turned over to Vlasek. 2 No. 02 2062 Over the next few years. All four properties were mortgaged. She alleged Vlasek was the father. An Illinois state court found that Vlasek was the child's father and ordered him to make semi monthly $1000 child support payments. It appears that back in 1993 while his child's mother was still pregnant. Determined the transfers were voidable. He later claimed that at the time of the bankruptcy's filing in August 1996 he was mentally incompetent a result of a closed head injury suffered in the automobile accident. The orders that Vlasek also sought to void through dismissal would have included (i) the order setting aside the four real estate transfers. Pursuant to a motion to compel brought by the bank that was foreclosing on that property. Never sought to appeal or stay any of these individual orders at the time they were rendered.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2640.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Pratt</SPAN> was on brief for appellant.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5110.html">LARRY J. CULLEY V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
On the brief was <u>David E. With him in the brief were <u>Loretta . Of counsel was <u>Joan . Culley failed to show that he was entitled to the favorable tax treatment provided under I.R.C. § . Culley was the owner and sole shareholder of Thrust Industries. S principal business activity was the die cutting of membrane spacers and faceplates for telephone sets. </p> <p ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/07/016005P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Trustee for the Corporation filed an avoidance action against Funaro to recover what he alleged were the Corporation's right to commissions. Since that right was transferred to Funaro within a year of the Chapter 7 filing. Is fraudulent and avoidable. Did the Trustee prove that the Corporation had the right to receive insurance commissions and that the assignment to Funaro of that right was a fraudulent transfer? 2. The bankruptcy court then imposed sanctions against the Trustee at trial for filing a lawsuit that was wholly without merit and frivolous. The bankruptcy court was. The fact that the Trustee failed to sustain his burden of proof in this fraudulent conveyance action does not mean that the action was frivolous. Which means that the bankruptcy court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact to be decided at trial. Since there was a genuine issue of material fact. The bankruptcy court erred in finding that the Complaint was wholly without merit and frivolous. He was the sole shareholder.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B2F27EFF2D8F1A2988256EB5004E2AED/$file/0215762.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The face of American poverty is changing dramatically. Minimum wage workers are unable to support their families' basic needs. At A1 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1998/98a1784p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The federal agencies were treated as general unsecured creditors. Were entitled to recover approximately 4.8% of their total claims. Austin are not relevant to the issues raised on this appeal. 3 denied the Government's motion. This Court's review of a district court's disposition of a bankruptcy appeal is plenary. The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error. Legal determinations are subject to plenary review.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011850.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Section 5 the section is corrected to read:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/04/00-1316.htm">00-1316 -- U.S. V. WALSH -- 04/02/2001<BR></A><BR>
Jr. was convicted following a jury trial on nine counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/07/992308P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
An involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Wintz Companies in August 1997 under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. After Charles Ries was appointed trustee for the bankruptcy estate. At the same time that the trustee was attempting to reclaim the estate interests in these properties. He was soliciting offers for them through a professional real estate agent. Prospective purchasers were given notice of the opportunity to submit written bids on the properties. The process also permitted a putative purchaser a `last look': the purchaser would be able to submit a new bid if there was an objection to the adequacy of the purchase price before the sale closed. The purchase price was reduced to $2.1 million. The notice of sale on the amended sales terms was served on September 4. A hearing was held on September 17. No new bids were submitted. The Terminal Road leasehold passed to American Freightways when that sale closed.4 The motion by Wintz and Wintz Properties for a stay pending appeal of the orders authorizing the sales was denied by the bankruptcy court on October 6.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1995/95a1151p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who are the debtors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The subject of the adversary proceeding is a prior transaction in which Debra Hayden. 000) to me paid in hand by [the medical defendants] . . . the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. The Haydens were experiencing financial difficulties. Hayden that although consolidation was not possible. Reliance explained that it was the owner of the annuity and that Ms. Hayden to change irrevocably the address to which the checks were sent to that of Western. Hayden also directed Reliance to have United irrevocably change the address to which the checks were sent to that of Western. 420.63 was used to satisfy the loans. The monthly payments were received and deposited by Western from the end of 1990 until August 1992. The Haydens argued that the annuity checks were property of the estate and that the court should order Western to turn over these checks to the estate. The Haydens maintained that Western was only an unsecured creditor of the estate for a sum equal to the value of its bargain with Ms.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/10/96-9019.htm">96-9019 -- THOMPSON V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 10/02/1997<BR></A><BR>
The tax court found that Thompson intentionally failed to file his 1981 federal income tax returns and was liable for penalties and interest as a result of his delinquency. Thompson claims that the district court erred in concluding that the Commissioner properly notified Thompson of the deficiency and in refusing to find that his failure to file a 1981 return should be excused for health reasons.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2124.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Was not required to pay taxes on the income derived from sources within the United States. Boyd final notices of (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Boyd's appeal concerning that penalty is the subject of Appeal No. 04 2124. <hr> intent to levy and of the right to a collection due process hearing under 26 U.S.C. 6330.(2) Mr. He specifically argued that the requested collection due process hearing should have been held. That he should have been allowed to record it. Boyd argues that the tax court: (1) should have set aside the notice of determination for lack of a 6330 hearing. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/032102p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Akrion in turn
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-20121.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. A Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on June 7. Such plan was consummated on April 27. A Final Closing Order nunc pro tunc was issued by the Bankruptcy Court on July 31. A partnership which was formed in 1975 between OMS and Digicon Marine. The Bankruptcy Court entered the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law: Ocean Marine Services Partnership No. 1 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0161E3B28A345F1288256E5A00707CD7/$file/0070173.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) and review United States Tax Court decisions in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district court in civil bench trials. Which are pure questions of law. The issues at trial were whether: (1) the Tax Court had jurisdiction to consider Crawford's constitutional claims. (3) Crawford's 1991 unemployment compensation should be included in his 1991 gross income and (4) Crawford was liable for an addition to tax for failing to file a 1991 tax return. I. Tax Court and Special Trial Judges The Tax Court is an Article I court created by Congress with limited jurisdiction to rule on deficiencies assessed by the government on taxpayers. |
