 |
OPINION/ORDER
Are conceded to be) to collect any amount of money
|
 |
97-4045 -- SNOW V. RIDDLE -- 05/11/1998
The check was dishonored because of insufficient funds. 1994 for $23.12 was dishonored. If it is not paid. 76 6 505 that any person who issues a bad check knowing that it will not be honored is guilty of a crime. That statute also presumes criminal intent if the check is not paid within fourteen (14) days of actual notice. My client did not offer or extend credit to you. In his complaint Snow alleged that his action was based on that part of the Act
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Klee were on the brief for amici curiae Senator Robert G. With him on the brief were Christopher J. With him on the brief were Michael F. Is bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in bank ruptcy. Con gress also directed the Commission to
|
 |
NEXT WAVE PRSNAL COMM V. FCC
Olson argued the cause for petitioners/appel lants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The appeal is only from the dismissal of the counterclaim. The plaintiff is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will vacate in part and affirm in part the District Court's judgment. Which is now owned by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company. The loan was secured by his residence. Oppong appears to have been in default on the loan since 1997. Wells Fargo was substituted as a party in the foreclosure action. K.) The post verdict motion was denied on March 19. U.) The bankruptcy case was closed in March 2003. We affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of First Union and Hallinan but remanded the FDCPA claims against Wells Fargo because there was an issue of material fact about whether Wells Fargo was a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Many employers are required to withhold various taxes from the wages of their employees. Which the employers hold in trust until the taxes are paid over to the federal government. 902.24 that was paid to satisfy an assessment made against the late Willard R. It is not disputed that Bell was the largest stockholder (51.5% of shares) and chief operating No. 02 3295 Bell v. Nor is it disclaimed that Bell essentially ran the company on a day to day basis. Dyac was responsible for withholding federal wage. Dyac was struggling financially at and following its acquisition by Bell. The issue of who controlled Dyac's funds is paramount. As the same are set forth on the Budget. The timing of Bank One's cessation of trust fund loan advances is in dispute. 000 in FICA trust fund taxes that were in arrears for most of January. Denied the request because Bank One had already lent Dyac money for payroll taxes in January and this additional request represented an overadvance that was not covered by the Forbearance Agreement.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court found that the payments were not avoidable transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). We agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court that the trustee did not satisfy his burden of showing that TCFC received a greater amount by virtue of the payments than it would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. TCFC was one of Smith's primary lenders for almost a decade. TCFC's loans were secured by a first priority floating lien on the prime inventory and the proceeds from it.1 Thus. That lien was junior to the prime collateral liens of Smith's other secured creditors. 13137 Smith's. The Bank advanced new funds to Smith's if sufficient collateral was available. The case was converted to a chapter 2 Because of these procedures. Which we will describe below. Were not made directly from the proceeds of the sales of TCFC's collateral. 13138 7 liquidation and Batlan was appointed as trustee. Believing that the payments were preferential. That the trustee had failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that the payments were preferential transfers.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court found that the payments were not avoidable transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). We agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court that the trustee did not satisfy his burden of showing that TCFC received a greater amount by virtue of the payments than it would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. TCFC was one of Smith's primary lenders for almost a decade. TCFC's loans were secured by a first priority floating lien on the prime inventory and the proceeds from it.1 Thus. That lien was junior to the prime collateral liens of Smith's other secured creditors. 13137 Smith's. The Bank advanced new funds to Smith's if sufficient collateral was available. The case was converted to a chapter 2 Because of these procedures. Which we will describe below. Were not made directly from the proceeds of the sales of TCFC's collateral. 13138 7 liquidation and Batlan was appointed as trustee. Believing that the payments were preferential. That the trustee had failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that the payments were preferential transfers.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Chief Judge Debtor Samuel Jesse Fellner appeals from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court1 determining that certain debts he was ordered to pay pursuant to his divorce decree were excepted from his discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Because the Bankruptcy Court applied the correct legal standard and its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Factual Background Samuel Fellner and Kim Fellner were divorced on July 13. The divorce decree provided that each party was to pay certain individual and marital debts. The MBNA MasterCard account which Samuel was required to pay was actually in Kim's mother's name and Kim was an
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
These eleven consolidated[fn1] actions were brought by concerned Pennsylvanians who believed that they were being charged excessive fees and interest on their credit cards and that these charges violated Pennsylvania consumer protection laws. None of the defendants are Pennsylvania lending institutions. The cases were all brought in Pennsylvania state courts and then removed by the defendants to the federal system.[fn2] These cases require that we resolve the conflict between state consumer protection law and federal banking law. We will first consider the district courts' holdings that removal jurisdiction was proper. We will reverse the district courts on this issue. The Supreme Court's conservative extension of the complete preemption doctrine and the application of the Third Circuit's two pronged test establish that federal jurisdiction is lacking in those cases in which the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints to allege federal claims. We will next consider claims particular to these actions. We will affirm the district court to the extent that the court held that plaintiffs' state law claims regarding late charges and over limit fees were substantively preempted.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Fox (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This is a complicated diversity suit with a federal law counterclaim. Mid Atlantic (and an affiliate that we'll ignore) was one of the franchisees. (The various contracts recite that they are governed by Missouri law.). The counterclaims were then tried to a jury. Her damages were limited to guaranties of three debts that Moran might still try to collect because their collection was not yet barred by the judgment in this case or by the statute of limitations. Essentially Mid Atlantic is arguing that had it not been for Moran's breach (which by the way is conceded). It would not have run up any debt to Moran. In the last three quarters of 1998 that condition was bad. Mid Atlantic contends that had it been advised of the parlous state of its stores it would have taken steps to mitigate its losses by changing management or product mix. As a result it either would have had greater revenues or would have stopped buying groceries from Moran altogether and either way it would have avoided incurring the $1.3 million debt for unpaid groceries and thus the interest on that debt as well.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
LLC were on brief. DeGiacomo were on brief. This may not be the type of redemption agreement that section 722 contemplates have agreed to cancel that right of repossession on payment of an
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
BACKGROUND Camacho's debt of $42.57 was assigned to Bridgeport Financial by Into Video.1 In its initial collection communication. This office will assume this debt is valid.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With the district court's finding that the statement in the body of the letter is not deceptive and in violation of § 1692e(10). The letter leads an unsophisticated consumer to falsely believe that the settlement offer is a one time. It sent a collection notice letter to Goswami A second form letter was sent on January 25. The second letter was sent to Goswami in an envelope which bore a half inch thick blue bar across the entire envelope which contained the words
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
I. The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant was appointed Chapter 7 Interim Trustee. At the time the petition was filed. The home was valued at $266. Was subject to a lien in the amount of $56. An interest as a tenant by the entirety. . .to the extent that such interest. . .is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The two suits filed in the Central District of Illinois were dismissed. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that eBay was not Nos. 05 2450 & 05 3043 3 collecting debts but merely opting not to do business with McCready. EBay successfully caused the case to be remanded to state court where default judgment was entered against McCready. Was filed by McCready in the Western District of Michigan and involved an eBay transaction. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge. We need not consider whether the district court's decision was correct. He threatened the district court with promises to file for a writ of mandamus if his cause of action was dismissed. Was to preserve any issues for appeal. Appended to the defendants' appellate brief was a subpoena. McCready filed a motion for default judgment and motion for entry of default against Kamminga [who was proceeding pro se] for filing an inartful answer to the complaint. Dismissal is proper
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Joelson argues that the BAP erred because the representations that she made to Cadwell were statements
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We vacate the district court's judgment and leave in effect the state court judgment and the holding of the bankruptcy court that the state judgment debt was not dischargeable. 1988 declaring that the $7000 state judgment was nondischargeable.1 But. 1988 order of the bankruptcy court it also entered its own judgment in Dotson's favor for $7000 plus both accrued interest at the The bankruptcy court's determination that the state court judgment was not dischargeable is not an issue in this appeal. 1 IN RE: HECKERT 3 West Virginia rate of 10% per annum until June 15. Claiming the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction because the bankruptcy court entered a judgment on an already existing state court judgment. Which was beyond the scope of the bankruptcy court's powers in the proceeding to determine dischargeability of the state court judgment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
What is a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
That they were ineligible to receive a credit for the full amount. Were entitled to a credit of only $423.1 Accordingly. The Singletons reported that their total 1987 tax liability was $160. They reported that they were entitled to a refund of the $30. 291 difference. 1 A general business credit is limited to the smaller of three figures: (1) the amount of the carryforward. The Internal Revenue Service (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was secured by a mortgage on the Beatties' residence in Greenville. They claim to have made repeated attempts. Indicated that the Beatties' mortgage was satisfied. The Beatties concede that they have never paid all of the amounts due on the loan. NationsCredit attempted to collect the debt and informed the Beatties that their mortgage was in default. At some point after the LMS was filed. Revealed that their mortgage with NationsCredit was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were charged in an indictment with various drug and extortion crimes. They were convicted of one count of conspiring to distribute marijuana. We will affirm. The cases were consolidated for 2 1 I. Might have some. Kane did not have any marijuana. It is unclear whether Mussare and Bruce knew of the heroin buying scheme. They were present at the apartment when Taylor left with the money and when he returned with the heroin. Kane was unable to sell the remaining bags of heroin. Because these cases were not consolidated for the purposes of decision. We will not discuss the substance of those arguments here. Those arguments are unpersuasive. We will affirm Mussare's conviction even in the face of the additional challenges. 3 unable to sell the heroin. Informed Mussare and Bruce that he did not have the marijuana he owed them or the money they had given him. Taylor were together at Jason Tortelli's apartment. Several other people were also there. The group was drinking and smoking marijuana. Shay and Taylor were talking on the phone to Shay's girlfriend.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The Huntsmans believed the medical bill for the procedure was unreasonably high. This statement also indicated that the account was seriously past due and would be turned over for collection unless paid in full. Ozark then sent a second statement reflecting the balance due and acknowledging the Huntsmans were disputing the debt. The letter said Cox would file suit if the entire balance was not paid within ten days. The court found that the Huntsmans were consumers. 4 and Cox was a debt collector5 who participated in interstate commerce.6 The district court determined that Cox used a false and 2 3 4 5 6 Cox had been previously sued on two occasions for similar FDCPA violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 3 misleading name to collect its debts in violation of the FDCPA. Both parties were dissatisfied with the judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Tyrrell and Shafner & Gilleran were on brief for appellant. O'Toole and Quinn and Morris were on brief for appellee. Goodrich is not dischargeable in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy because it was obtained through deliberately false statements on which the bank relied. 000 of the debt was nondischargeable and the district court affirmed. We conclude that the entire debt is nondischargeable and remand. He was not asked for a personal financial statement at the time but agreed to submit such statements on request. The line of credit was to expire. Any outstanding principal and interest were payable. The line of credit 2 2 was renewed again on September 4. (B) use of a statement in writing (i) that is materially false. (iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money. As these findings are uncontested on this appeal. The bankruptcy judge also found that Shawmut had proved that it
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Judge) erred in concluding that a consumer debt collector's initiation of a lawsuit in state court seeking recovery of unpaid rent is an
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Judge) erred in concluding that a consumer debt collector's initiation of a lawsuit in state court seeking recovery of unpaid rent is an
|
 |
98-3049A -- ANDERSEN V. UNIPAC-NEBHELP -- 06/07/1999
We have jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C.
|
 |
98-3049 -- ANDERSEN V. UNIPAC-NEBHELP -- 06/07/1999
We have jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was secured by a mortgage on the Beatties' residence in Greenville. They claim to have made repeated attempts. Indicated that the Beatties' mortgage was satisfied. The Beatties concede that they have never paid all of the amounts due on the loan. NationsCredit attempted to collect the debt and informed the Beatties that their mortgage was in default. At some point after the LMS was filed. Revealed that their mortgage with NationsCredit was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue is rendered complex by an interrelated maze of corporations and partnerships devised by the limited partners and the general partner in their efforts to develop two separate real estate projects. Was aborted shortly after conception. The defendants appellants are limited partners of Red Hawk North Associates. G&A Development Corporation (G&A) is the general partner of Red Hawk. Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge are both general partners of Chestnut Woods. To have it furnish the labor. The court entered a default judgment which was not satisfied in whole or part. 1993 that Red Hawk was worthless. Henkels' counsel also had been advised that G&A was unable to pay the judgment out of its assets. Sixteen of the partners are parties to this appeal. 000 during the period that Cedar Ridge was obligated under its contract with Henkels to pay Henkels $300. Henkels alleged that the capital distributions were made in violation of the Red Hawk limited partnership agreement and S 42:2A 46(b) of the New Jersey Uniform Limited Partnership Law of 1976 (New Jersey ULPL). 3 After the district court denied both Henkels's and the Partners' motions for summary judgment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
A demand for immediate payment while a debtor is in bankruptcy (or after the debt's discharge) is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Triggered
|
 |
STDNT LOAN MKT ASSN V. RILEY RICHARD
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is substituted for her predecessor in office under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). 5943 5944 MCBRIDE COTTON AND CATTLE CORP. v. Or beneficiary who is a delinquent debtor on an agricultural loan administered by the USDA. None of the plaintiffs is a delinquent debtor. We hold that the exhaustion requirement of 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) is not jurisdictional. We further hold that exhaustion is excused because the plaintiffs' complaint alleges collateral. I Because it is relevant to our discussion of the jurisdictional issue. These contracts are seven year contracts. Plaintiff Running Water Land & Cattle Inc. is a corporation whose president is John Mitchell. Shareholders are members of the Mitchell family. Before Running Water was incorporated. Asserting that it was not timely. Plaintiff Thompson Farm is a Texas general partnership that was formed in 1975. Roger Thompson is a partner. As are two other family members. Are outstanding. There is no record that an administrative appeal was requested. Plaintiff Brandstatt Family Trust (the Trust) was created in January 1995 by J.M.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Appellee Jason Rutz was a listed creditor in his stepfather's appellant Lon McGhan bankruptcy proceedings. The state court in which that action was filed ruled that Rutz's action could proceed because Rutz had inadequate notice of the earlier bankruptcy proceedings. Reasoning that McGhan's desire to relitigate an issue already heard in state court was insufficient cause to reopen the case. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to decline to reopen McGhan's bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court was required to reopen the proceedings to protect its exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of its own orders. McGhan was charged with five counts of sexual molestation of Rutz. At the time the charges were 6703 filed. Rutz was 12 years old. Any creditor wishing to have a debt characterized as nondischargeable must file a complaint alleging nondischargeability of the debt. His claim is automatically discharged pursuant to § 523(c)(1). Although debts for intentional torts such as Rutz's claim ordinarily are not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the code.
|
 |
97-1147 -- LADICK V. GEMERT -- 06/09/1998
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is precluded from applying Chapter 13 plan payments from the Debtors' bankruptcy estates to postpetition interest on their nondischargeable student loan debts. Because we conclude that creditors are not precluded from applying bankruptcy estate payments to accrued postpetition interest on nondischargeable student loan debts. Which was confirmed on June 12. Will be paid in full through the Trustee.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We are asked to decide if a student's outstanding tuition balance at the university he was attending can be discharged in bankruptcy. Was therefore not dischargeable in bankruptcy. We will affirm.2 I. His loan application for the Fall 1993 semester was denied. 953.73 when interest and late fees were added. The bankruptcy court also ruled that the student's delinquent federally guaranteed loans were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Is therefore not before us. 2. Inasmuch as our inquiry is limited to the proper interpretation of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Our review is plenary. 000 of the outstanding balance was for a federally guaranteed educational loan that was not dischargeable. The court rejected BU's argument that the remainder of Mehta's debt was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents 11 U.S.C. Look to legislative history only if the text is ambiguous. Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous.
|
 |
02-2350 -- U.S. V. MYERS -- 03/29/2004
553 because the FSA did not have a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This case is one of hundreds of similar suits brought by the bankruptcy estate. That the late payment penalties are unreasonable. That Humboldt's claim is subject to various equitable defenses. That the bankruptcy court should have referred various issues to the Surface Transportation Board (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. The issues raised by this case will grow in importance. Was convicted of participating in a massive drug conspiracy. He was sentenced to 250 months imprisonment and six years of supervised release. The primary issue raised is that English language transcripts of the wiretapped conversations were neither marked as exhibits nor admitted in evidence. That the court reporter did not transcribe and translate the wiretapped conversations into the record as the tapes were being played. Morales Madera urges this court to adopt a bright line rule that where English transcripts of taped conversations conducted in Spanish are not admitted in evidence. There is such harm to the national interest in maintaining English as the language of the courts that any ensuing conviction should be overturned. Morales Madera also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict and that there were sentencing errors. In violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Morales Madera was tried alone in a four day jury trial that started on August 6.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The salient facts are as follows. The Plan also included a statement that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief for the United States. Kingsley was indicted on twenty two federal narcotics and tax charges. Kimberly Reynolds (who is not a party to this appeal). 5. the government would not prosecute Reynolds for any other federal offenses she may have committed in connection with her involvement with Kingsley's drug operation. The last three provisions are at issue in this appeal. Were forfeitable as proceeds from drug trafficking. Which funds the government claimed were also forfeitable. It was understood that Kingsley would forfeit the $160. Whatever of the loan funds it was able to recover. Kingsley's counsel objected to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are asked to imply a private right of action for a debtor discharged from bankruptcy to enforce an alleged violation of 214 11 U.S.C. § 524. The district court concluded that the remedy Congress intended for violations of the discharge injunction is contempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Hold that a private cause of action is not available under § 524. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Before and after her debt was discharged on January 2. To debtors who are current on their loan payments on secured property and who continue to make payments. That her debts were discharged giving rise to the discharge injunction pursuant to § 524(a)(2) and (c). Was prohibited by § 524 and was an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the FDCPA. Are before us on appeal. For violation of the FDCPA.1 1 A brief filed by amicus curiae American Financial Services Association supports the position taken by Wells Fargo. 216 II Although both parties agree that we have jurisdiction and a motions panel of this court ruled that we do pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Wyman and Lee contend the evidence was insufficient to convict them of mail fraud and contend that the district court improperly admitted hearsay and opinion testimony during trial. Contending that they were sentenced in violation of United States v. 1 and that their sentences were based upon unreliable evidence and factors not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyman was taught about implausible theories of private offset exchanges. Private offset exchanges were claimed mechanisms for individuals to access this Treasury held money. As these checks were Appellants raised this issue as a claim under Blakely v. Appellant's Blakely challenge will be treated under Booker. 3 1 written on closed accounts. The account on which the check was drawn could not provide the funds to pay for the goods. These offset checks were theoretically to be presented to the Treasury by the drawee bank or payee for reimbursement with the stockpiled funds. After the letter was sent. Included among these checks were a $121.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on the briefs. Were on the briefs. Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a law firm can bring an action against the United States to recover attorney's fees from monies that its client was awarded as a result of a settlement with the Federal Highway Administration. 037.20 were reasonable for the legal services rendered. Dunn & Black requested that the district court declare that the government's setoff was a violation of a property interest in the contingent fee and therefore an unlawful property taking without compensation and a violation of due process. 000 was DUNN & BLACK v. The government contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Dunn & Black's claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Plaintiff alleges that she was required to guaranty a loan for the benefit of her spouse in violation of the ECOA. That plaintiff's right to initiate an action for damages based upon such alleged violation is barred by the statute of limitations. Was required to sign the Guaranty Agreement (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Hall & Stewart were on brief for appellant. P.C. were on brief for appellee. As we conclude that Alletzhauser is not entitled to judgment pursuant to Fed. Laura Thorn was the principal shareholder in Thorn. Ltd. in turn was a general partner in HTRA. HTRA's loan obliga tion to Laura Thorn was subordinated to all existing and future HTRA obligations to Beverly National Bank or its successors.2 On December 31. 1Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2) (diversity) and 28 U.S.C. 1291. The party against which summary judgment was granted. 874 (1st Cir. 1993). 2The Note is set out in the appendix. HTRA and Alletz hauser declined on the ground that payment was not due. Asserted as an affirmative defense that legal action on the Guaranty was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are called on to decide whether a voluntarily joined foreign sovereign may remove a case from a territorial court to a federal district court when the foreign sovereign obtained the original defendant's interest by assignment after the commencement of the litigation. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY EIE Guam Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have consolidated for decision the appeals from the dismissal of two closely related cases under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The defendant was hired to collect credit card debt owed by the three plaintiffs. Your account may have or will accrue interest at a rate specified in your contractual agreement with the original creditor.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The central issue in this case is whether a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Education that allows the assessment of collection costs on defaulted student loans to be done on a formulaic basis was a permissible implementation of the governing statute. We agree with the district court that the regulation was a permissible one. (At the time Barnes's loans were issued. A borrower was in
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Harman's argument on appeal is that because his judgment debt to Davilla was discharged in his chapter 7 case. The judgment lien is no longer valid. 1 No. 04 8085 In re Harman Page 2 After examination of the record and the briefs. The Panel unanimously agrees that Harman does not have standing to challenge Davilla's foreclosure efforts because no interest of Harman was affected. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues presented are. Whether a judgment lien on real property not owned by the debtor at the time he filed bankruptcy remains valid after personal liability for the judgment debt is discharged. An order is final if it
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Richard Sherman (Sherman) was the attorney for several defendants in an enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in other actions in which those defendants were parties. Maintaining that there was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
GSB is a debt collection agency incorporated in Nebraska. The parties informed the court that there were fifty one other FDCPA cases against GSB in the district and that all would be affected by the decision in this case. The other cases were later gathered together for management purposes in a consolidated file and stayed pending the decision in this case. United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 2 2 Peters argued to the district court that his VA contained a literally false statement because service by constable was not GSB's
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Which is not a party to this litigation. The ACH authorization provides that an automatic debit will occur on a specified day of the month. Who acknowledges: I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING PAYMENTS ON THE NOTE BY OTHER MEANS IF MY PAYMENT IS NOT DRAFTED ON THE DAY SPECIFIED NO MATTER THE CAUSE. He would have made payment as scheduled. Ocwen further stated the loan was set up on the ACH program. The first automatic withdraw is effective on February 15. Ocwen also informed the Quinns that when the servicing of a loan is transferred to Ocwen. Automatic draft information is not transferred. A new application is necessary to begin an automatic draft program with Ocwen.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Several affiliates.1 Bruno's is based in Alabama and operates a chain of supermarkets in the southeastern United States. Huff was the holder of $290 million in Bruno's subordinated notes. HSBC was the indenture trustee for the subordinated notes (we refer to them together as Huff). They argue that the District Court should not have confirmed the plan for a host of reasons. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and are thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. Three separate interests have appeared to defend the plan: the debtors and debtors in possession (referred to throughout as the Debtors). Representing the group of banks (the Banks) that were the senior lenders to Bruno's before the reorganization. Together they contend that the plan does not violate the absolute priority rule because the releases were not granted
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in certifying a class when defendant asserted a defense unique to the claims of the class representative. We will vacate and remand. Beck did not have an outstanding loan with the Department of Education. Beck called Maximus to clarify she was not the debtor in question. She knew it was intended for the other Donna M. Beck and was sent to Inolex in error. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is intended to protect both debtors and non debtors from misleading and abusive debt collection practices. From
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Leppo was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. We do not address this argument. 2 2 which Wiltshire was required to pay 5% interest per week. When Wiltshire was late in making his loan payments. Peppe referred to his
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Determining that the debts owed her were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).1 Nangle appeals from this order. Which was entered on or about July 15. The appeal was thus stricken on or about December 8. Which is now final. 1 Because it was not necessary. Contacted her knowing she was represented by counsel. The judgment was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 5245 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 4557 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The BAP agreed that the County was liable for damages resulting from its violation of the automatic stay. The BAP held that the Brawders were not due a refund of the taxes paid in excess of the confirmed Plan amount. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We further elaborate upon the facts of the case and address the effect of the parties' stipulation in the current Chapter 13 adversary proceeding on the County's right to enforce its lien to recover the pre petition taxes that were not paid fully by the prior Plan payments. The Plan stated that the Brawders were in default to the County in the amount of $9. The County accepted them. (1991) (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Inc. to Stratos Product Development LLC shortly before Ahaza filed for bankruptcy were preferential payments that must be returned to the bankruptcy estate. Maintaining that they were preferential and therefore voidable under the Bankruptcy Code. Holding that repayment of a debt can be within the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 1 The Honorable Michael J. Appellants operate their stores under the business name
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
(4) correctly held that plaintiffs' statelaw claims were ripe for adjudication. We hold that the District Court's award of punitive damages was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause and with Illinois law. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal brought by individual and corporate defendants who. Defendants contend Plaintiffs have brought a motion to dismiss this appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. W e have d enied this mo tion. 1 2 that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over this case and the parties to it on multiple grounds. Assuming the case was not arbitrable. They claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial while an appeal was pending in this Court from the District Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. That the District Court abused its discretion by deciding unsettled questions of Illinois law after all the federal claims were dismissed. That the Illinois claims brought by plaintiffs were not ripe for adjudication. Arguing that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to reinstate RICO claims that were previously dismissed at the behest of this Court.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Of which Banco's share was $181. Provided that reinsurers expressly including Banco who failed to pay the award within 45 days would have to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
(4) correctly held that plaintiffs' statelaw claims were ripe for adjudication. We hold that the District Court's award of punitive damages was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause and with Illinois law. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal brought by individual and corporate defendants who. Defendants contend Plaintiffs have brought a motion to dismiss this appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Assuming the case was not arbitrable. They claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial while an appeal was pending in this Court from the District Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. That the District Court abused its discretion by deciding unsettled questions of Illinois law after all the federal claims were dismissed. That the Illinois claims brought by plaintiffs were not ripe for adjudication. Arguing that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to reinstate RICO claims that were previously dismissed at the behest of this Court.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
They were protected from liability by the bona fide error defense. Although it is unclear whether that was due to a mistake by the bank or Hyman. T & K also explained that although there was no formal agreement with Cross Country Bank. The district court concluded that even if T & K's collection letter technically violated the FDCPA because it was sent after her bankruptcy filing. It was a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Spinella & Angelone were on brief for appellants. Bomster and Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated were on brief for appellee. Who was also an officer and director of the bankrupt lender. Defendants argue that no fiduciary duty was transgressed. Counter that the Trustee committed waste and failed to mitigate damages to the bankrupt estate by allowing foreclosure on the properties which allegedly were conveyed in order to satisfy the debt. Defendants contend that they are entitled to a significant reduction of any outstanding debt because of the equity in. We now affirm the district court's partial summary judgment and hold affirm that final judgment certification was justified. Miscalculation of debt are unavailing as a matter of law. The nature of the business of Columbus Mortgage was to serve as a mortgage lending firm specializing in residential real estate loans secured by first and second mortgages on real estate. It is undisputed that Mr. Were in the business of selling and developing real estate: Defendants Appellants Muratore Agency.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
As Grin and Svetlana were talking. Defendants were charged by Complaint with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 894 (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction and affirm. Who were officers and/or directors of Boston Chicken. Inc. are the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Senior Circuit Judge. *Honorable Will L. Circuit Judge: The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). Or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed. Knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10. 000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity. The punishment for an offense under this section is a fine under title 18. Or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both. (2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction. .... (d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are (1) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States . . . . .... (f) As used in this section (1) the term
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Fulbruge III Clerk have appealed. clearly In this fact intensive case. We are bound by the standard question of of review. Which is particularly to defraud. erroneous on the important Hubbard's intent Accordingly. We are persuaded that the district court committed no reversible error in concluding that. I Rimade Ltd. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The remaining equity in the company was owned by Mary Beth's then husband Steven and by trusts benefitting their children. Who were beginning divorce proceedings. Judy Breeding (who was also a director of CHCC). Who was well known in Missouri as a successful manager of nursing homes. Gourley explained to the Userys that his assets were tied up because of continuing litigation relating to his divorce. The Userys and Breeding (who is not a party to this case) assured Gourley that. Even though 1988 financial results were not yet available. The homes' cash flow in 1988 was substantially the same as the 1987 cash flow. He was told that they totaled about $75. 000 and were current. The resulting drain on cash was exacerbated by Mary Beth's insistence. The Userys also represented that all of the long term debt that Gourley agreed to assume was business related debt. As the deal was structured. The amount of the note was to be adjusted after the closing to account for the difference between payables and Medicaid receivables.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Fulbruge III Clerk have appealed. clearly In this fact intensive case. We are bound by the standard question of of review. Which is particularly to defraud. erroneous on the important Hubbard's intent Accordingly. We are persuaded that the district court committed no reversible error in concluding that. I Rimade Ltd. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The defendants in this class action have been permitted to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district judge's refusal to dismiss. Upon which the district court's jurisdiction was premised. These are claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The complaint is a hideous sprawling mess. We have found it difficult and in many instances impossible to ascertain the nature of the charges. It would have been better had the defendants deferred their motion. Until either the defendants served contention interrogatories designed to smoke out what exactly the plaintiffs are charging. The judge told the plaintiffs to specify the acts of the defendants that they are complaining about so that he could decide how much of the complaint was preempted. The principal defendant and the only one we need discuss (the other defendant is a law firm charged with having assisted Ocwen in the misconduct of which the plaintiffs complain). Was at the times relevant to this case a federal savings and loan association engaged in servicing home mortgages originated by other lenders.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The consideration for the transfer was stated as ten dollars with love and admiration. The deed was not recorded. The deed was recorded on June 30. Was recorded on July 3. That after the transfer the debtor was left with an unreasonably small amount of capital with which to operate his farming business in violation of Ark. The state court found that the debtor was a single person when he transferred the property to his son in The Honorable Mary Davies Scott. That the conveyance was not ineffective as to Paula Marlar Davis and that there was no evidence when the deed was transferred in 1986 that the debtor intended to defraud his creditors. The state court opined: The fact that the deed from John Marlar to Brad Marlar was not recorded does not render it ineffective. If it was executed and delivered and for sufficient consideration then title to the land was effectively conveyed from the grantor to the grantee. The state court ruled that there was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Judge) vacating restraining notices and orders of attachment imposed with respect to an account of the Banco Central de la República Argentina at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the ground that those assets were protected from attachment by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. They contend that they are entitled to attach $105 million of BCRA's funds held in the FRBNY Account (the
|
 |
FREEMAN CLYDE V. FDIC
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: Page 8. Was on brief for appellees. Was indicted on one count of using two unauthorized access devices. Defendant was found guilty. She was sentenced to eleven months incarceration. We have consolidated them to five for purposes of our review. 2 2 whether defendant's conviction was due in part to the ineffective assistance of counsel. (5) whether there was error in applying the sentencing guidelines. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Our standard of review is firmly established: We assess the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. With a view to whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That is. There are four essential elements of the crime for which defendant was convicted: (1) that the two Discover credit cards specified in the indictment were
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
District Judge: We have before us the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing appellant debtors' complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that reaffirmation and settlement agreements entered into by appellantdebtors during prior bankruptcy proceedings bar their later action against the same creditor for alleged violations of the automatic stay and discharge provisions of the U.S. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We held that the district court erred in certifying two classes under Rule 23(b)(3)2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the plaintiffs had failed Our decertification of the class based upon predominance negates the need to address whether providing notice of this action by means of publication rather than by individual notice was proper. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class. (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 2 to demonstrate that common issues predominated.3 The first class of plaintiffs. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied. That a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
|
 |
SIKES V. TELELINE, INC.(2/13/2002, NO. 99-8007)
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
MA 02210 Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant pension fund against Holmes was untimely. As the complaint was filed seven years after the cause of action accrued. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Is the plan sponsor of a multiemployer fund established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Countrywide also represented that the balance due was $124. Countrywide was a mere third party debt collector. Or to make any effort to collect a debt once informed the debt is in dispute. She did not have to make payments. By continuing collection efforts once informed the debt is being disputed. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.4 We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo.5 We review the granting of a motion for relief from stay for clear error.6 3 Martens was represented by counsel at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition. Martens appeared pro se at the hearing and is appearing pro se in this appeal. (In re Swedeland 3 DISCUSSION We will first address the jurisdictional argument. It did not have jurisdiction to decide the motion for relief from stay. Or modify the automatic stay
|
 |
SIKES V. TELELINE, INC.(2/13/2002, NO. 99-8007)
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Smith & Cohen were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Defendant Pedro Arismendy Olivier Diaz appeals from the sentence he received after he was found guilty of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine. He claims for the first time on appeal that the court engaged in
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
District Judge: We have before us the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing appellant debtors' complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that reaffirmation and settlement agreements entered into by appellantdebtors during prior bankruptcy proceedings bar their later action against the same creditor for alleged violations of the automatic stay and discharge provisions of the U.S. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief for appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.A. were on brief for appellants. P.A. were on brief for appellants. Jr. with whom Wright & Cherry were on brief for Peter S. Jr. with whom Wright & Cherry were on brief for appellees. appellees. The loan was secured by a first mortgage on the Chroniak residence. The loan was repaid in full by June 1988. 000 within ninety days of its execution. 3 The loan was secured by a second mortgage on the Chroniak home. Chroniak made what she believed was a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee. That there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. I. Stanton Shifman and nine others were indicted on October 14. Was charged with violation of. He was also charged with four counts of aiding and abetting the making of extortionate extensions of credit. Shifman was tried separately from the others. The maximum legal annual rate allowed in Massachusetts is 20 percent. Shifman fell behind in his weekly payments and was threatened with physical injury by a Yerardi employee. Whose loans were all documented by entries in the records seized from Yerardi. Clearly conveying that Yerardi was a loan shark. The legitimate financing Shifman was allegedly procuring for LaChance never materialized. Gerald Moore testified that he too was introduced to Yerardi by Shifman. He also testified that he was paying 4 percent interest a week on the money he borrowed from Yerardi. When Moore was behind in his payments. That Yerardi was a loan shark. Both men testified that they were paying 3 percent interest a week on the money they borrowed from Yerardi.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Riley and Powers & Hall were on brief for appellee. The
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were retained by several banks to auction repossessed automobiles at the highest price and reimburse the proceeds. We consider whether there was sufficient 3 evidence to sustain the Defendants' convictions. We will affirm their judgments of conviction. Sentencing Guidelines (the
|
 |
GREER V. O'DELL (9/23/2002, NO. 01-15828)
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Richard Sherman (Sherman) was the attorney for several defendants in an enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in other actions in which those defendants were parties. Maintaining that there was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The order granted Shahrokhi summary judgment as to Jafarpour's claims that a default judgment entered in state court in his favor against Shahrokhi is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (6). I. BACKGROUND Shahrokhi was the principal and operator of a commercial enterprise. Shahrokhi was responsible for major repairs to the taxicab as well as the cost of insurance. Jafarpour was responsible for routine maintenance and any damage to the taxicab. Jafarpour stated that Shahrokhi told him that $120.00 of the weekly rent was to reimburse him for the expense of procuring and maintaining insurance for the taxicab. That the taxicabs would not be insured until the full amount of the down payment was paid to American Midwest. Was insured through Credit General Insurance Company (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The lawsuit was based upon allegations that PNC violated the Truth in Lending Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The financing order was modified to include a budget and to limit the disbursement for employee salaries and benefits. The principal balance due at that time was $220. It also is seeking interest as of January 21. The bankrupcy court granted the trustee's motion to amend the order and found that the section 364(c)(1) priority administrative expense claim is subordinate to Chapter 7 administrative expenses. The court then found that it was within its discretion to amend the order of November 15. To clarify that the Chapter 7 administrative fees have priority in payment above section 364(c)(1) priority. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.2 The decision to award administrative expense priority is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.3 We review such a decision for abuse Gourley v. N.Y. 1996). 3 3 2 of that discretion.4 A court abuses its discretion
|
 |
GREER V. O'DELL (9/23/2002, NO. 01-15828)
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Gilberto Mayo Pagan with whom Mayo & Mayo was on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellees. The defendants are the debtor. Arguing that the district court erred in holding that the FDIC's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. I. The facts are undisputed. The defendants in this case are: (1) Torrefaccion Cafe Cialitos (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' RICO claim because it lacked the specificity in pleading fraud that is required under Fed. 2001). 1 We agree that the RICO claim was properly dismissed. Because it is predicated on mail and wire fraud. It was not. The antitrust claim is also based on fraud on misrepresentations in the information given to consumers and on misrepresentations in the information ROTH. Gary Oriani have borrowed money from defendant banks pursuant to lending agreements with
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The confirmation order was vacated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Made applicable in bankruptcy cases by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.1 The bankruptcy court granted the Motion to Vacate on the basis that Educational Credit Management Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Because the Small Claims Court's judgment of civil damages for check deception is a valid state court judgment. Epps tendered a check of $330.00 to Creditnet in payment of an installment of his contract that was returned unpaid to Creditnet because of insufficient funds. Venable tendered a check of $280.38 to Creditnet in payment of an installment of his contract that was returned unpaid to Creditnet because Venable did not have an account at the drawee bank. The suits were filed under Indiana Code §§ 35 43 5 5. Knowing that it will not be paid or honored by the credit institution upon presentment in the usual course of business. Judgment was thereafter entered against Epps and Venable for treble damages. The court ruled that the IUCCC is concerned with charges in a consumer loan contract. A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Construing all facts and drawing all reasonable 3 (...continued) which the district courts have original jurisdiction. The district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Among Edwards' agent recruits was Don Clark. These increased amounts were not to be actually paid to Edwards. Rather were to be retained by LBL and credited against his debt balance. 713.77 in
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)
That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm. Bankruptcy Proceedings The essential facts are not in dispute. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on April 22. A trustee was appointed. Each parcel of property was encumbered as follows. 509 (3d Cir. 1997). 3 2 property was more than sufficient to satisfy Newcourt's claim on its business loan and thus there was no need to look to the residential property except in the event of a deficiency after liquidation of the business assets. The trustee requested that the automatic stay remain in effect until it was determined whether the administration of the estate might result in equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee concluded that there was no equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors and therefore consented to the entry of an order granting Newcourt's motion for relief from the automatic stay. Zinchiak argued that there was no need to grant relief with respect to the residential property until it became evident from liquidation of the business assets that a deficiency remained on Newcourt's claim.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Holding that Lewallen's claims were core bankruptcy proceedings. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on her trailer home. This arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce. Lewallen's loan was in default at the time of the transfer. Lewallen attempted to refinance the loan with a new lender but her application was denied. Her home was the primary asset in the bankruptcy estate. That Green Tree's attorney's costs and fees were not a proper claim because they were attributable to Green Tree's own billing mistakes and failure to respond to Lewallen's inquiries. Although a hearing on Lewallen's objection was scheduled in the bankruptcy court for September 2004. The matter was continued several times. Counsel for Green Tree stated that an adversary proceeding was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm. I. The parties are familiar with the facts. So we will only briefly revisit them here. When they were unable to repay their loans. We will refer to the Visconits in the plural. ECOA claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations. The ALJ concluded that the Viscontis' complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was not filed before July 1. The ALJ noted that those letters did not mention the word
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)
That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the
|
 |
GARGIULO V. G.M. SALES, INC. (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3646)
The principal of the loan was payable on demand. During which Biada told Holland that NTG was considering increasing GMS's credit line. Holland testified that it was his impression that GMS was still current on its credit with NTG at the time of the conversation. Holland also asserted that it was not until a month later that Biada informed him that NTG had declined to increase GMS's line of credit.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This case raises the question whether a judgment debt resulting from a medical malpractice action is dischargeable in bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus maintain that it is not. Because it is a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Whether the obligors on unmatured promissory notes can obtain declaratory relief against the obligees of those notes and have the notes declared void and unenforceable. Whether transactions involving investment securities are covered under section 9.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 2 Practices and Consumer Protection Law (
|
 |
GARGIULO V. G.M. SALES, INC. (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3646)
The principal of the loan was payable on demand. During which Biada told Holland that NTG was considering increasing GMS's credit line. Holland testified that it was his impression that GMS was still current on its credit with NTG at the time of the conversation. Holland also asserted that it was not until a month later that Biada informed him that NTG had declined to increase GMS's line of credit.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Ryan United States Court of Appeals. Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Ryan United States Court of Appeals. Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The landlords were the customers of the Water District and held the account for water service to the property. Page 2 District's policy that tenants and other non property owners cannot establish water service accounts in their own names because they are not property owners. We hold that the Plaintiffs have not established a due process or equal protection violation because they have not shown a legitimate claim of entitlement to water service and because Defendants' conduct does not shock the conscience. I. Background Because this matter is before the Court on an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss. The following facts are derived from the Midkiffs' First Amended Complaint and construed in the light most favorable to the Midkiffs. The Midkiffs have four young children. Monica Midkiff was pregnant and experiencing complications due to diabetes. The Water District is the exclusive supplier of water services to residents of Adams County. The Midkiffs contacted the Water District and requested that they be allowed to establish an account in their own names and have water service resumed.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Contending that the IRS should have followed their directions about application of the tax overpayment. Alternatively that the court erred in determining that the IRS was required to comply with the Ryans' instructions about how to apply their overpayment. I. BACKGROUND The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable.1 With the ultimate goal of applying their overpayment to the tax liability that was not discharged. The Ryans argued that because their 1990 overpayment was a voluntary payment of taxes. The IRS was required to follow their instructions about how to allocate that payment. The government responded that the Ryans did not have the power to control the application of their 1990 overpayment. 1988 were discharged. A determination that is not challenged here. The court found that the IRS should have honored the Ryans' request to apply the 1990 tax year overpayment to their 1989 tax liability.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
In which the precedential effect was limited. Was originally issued and filed on July 19. The court has now designated the opinion as one in which the precedential effect is fully precedential. * Michigan. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Mildred Caban with whom Jorge Souss and Goldman Antonetti & Cordova were on brief for Royal Bank of Canada. Vivian Nunez and McConnell Valdes were on brief for Seiko Time Corporation. Because Royal Bank was not a party to the underlying execution proceedings. The contempt order is considered a final decision appealable by Royal Bank under 28 U.S.C. 1291. I. The attachment order at issue here was entered on January 13. Initially Gemco was wholly owned and operated by Jos and Carmen Pascual. As was a related company. These transfers were recorded in Watch and Gem's books as intercompany accounts payable and in Gemco's books as intercompany accounts receivable. The amount owing to the bank from Gemco at the time of restructuring was $1.25 million. The award was confirmed by the district of New York on November 4. Judgment was entered for Seiko on November 12. The New York judgment was registered in the district court in Puerto Rico on December 16. Gemco's primary asset was the account receivable arising from the various intercompany loans it had made to Watch and Gem over the years.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
He was successful at using the float on the checks to appear to have a balanced account through the assistance of a Credit Union insider who processed Johnson's checks through the check clearinghouse system rather than as same day funds.1 As By sending the checks through the clearinghouse system. Johnson's accounts were given credit for the deposit of the checks on the day he deposited them. Johnson avoided detection that his account was overdrawn by appearing to have a positive balance at the end of each month. Although it was not filed in the office of the Minnesota Secretary of State. The retainer agreement provides: 5 We have discussed the retainer necessary for us to undertake your representation. We have requested and you have agreed to pay us a non refundable retainer of $72. Roach told Fabel he was interested in negotiating with Johnson to recover the assets because. At that meeting it was confirmed that the NCUAB was not aware of any written loan agreement or other formal security agreement covering the majority of Johnson's assets.
|
 |
99-6355 -- MASON V. YOUNG -- 01/16/2001
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief. Hawkes & Goldings were on brief. The restitution order was for an amount not to exceed $60. Although the total losses to the four banks were almost $3 million. That the FDCPA was not available to the United States since it was attempting to collect on private debts. To the extent that the United States was acting on behalf of the Resolution Trust Company. The FDCPA was still not available. Because the underlying contract was not entered into by the United States but by the bank when it was a private entity. The government is not left without recourse. Timilty argues that this civil judgment method is fairer in that it will give both sides the opportunity for discovery. Timilty's motion to dismiss was granted. The proper procedure for enforcing restitution orders is an issue of some importance and one of first impression for this court. That the VWPA is not preempted by the FDCPA as to such orders. We do so confident that there are adequate mechanisms available to the trial judges to allow for discovery and such process as is due.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL Whitehead was engaged in a farming enterprise in the 1980s. I warrant that all financial statements and information I provide to you are or will be accurate. Each of the three credit lines were in default by late 1987. Whitehead was able to borrow the $35. 000 loan was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Finding no genuine issue of material fact that C&W's action to collect on a matured promissory note was time barred. The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The following facts are undisputed. Both notes were payable to the First State Bank of Vega. First State Bank was declared insolvent. The notes were ultimately acquired by C&W through a series of assignments from the FDIC. C&W moved the district court for summary judgment on the notes sued upon and Knox defended on the basis that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations and laches. C&W moved the district court for a new trial on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to notify C&W of the district court's intent to grant summary judgment sua sponte and that the issue fully briefed on C&W's motion for summary judgment was not dispositive of the entire case. A policy of liberal construction of notices of appeals prevails in situations where the intent to appeal an unmentioned or unlabeled ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Finding no genuine issue of material fact that C&W's action to collect on a matured promissory note was time barred. The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The following facts are undisputed. Both notes were payable to the First State Bank of Vega. First State Bank was declared insolvent. The notes were ultimately acquired by C&W through a series of assignments from the FDIC. C&W moved the district court for summary judgment on the notes sued upon and Knox defended on the basis that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations and laches. C&W moved the district court for a new trial on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to notify C&W of the district court's intent to grant summary judgment sua sponte and that the issue fully briefed on C&W's motion for summary judgment was not dispositive of the entire case. A policy of liberal construction of notices of appeals prevails in situations where the intent to appeal an unmentioned or unlabeled ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Heather Gillespie and Angela Cinson each defaulted on a credit account and this fail 2 No. 06 1952 ure was noted in their respective credit files. If the account is delinquent. The disclosure states: Payment history on your credit file is supplied by credit grantors with whom you have credit. This includes both open accounts and accounts that have already been closed. The length of time information remains in your credit file is shown below: Collection Accounts: Credit Accounts: Remain for 7 years. (The time periods listed above are measured from the date in your credit file shown in the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Defendant Appellant Galen Renee Beach was convicted of two counts of mail fraud and one count of making a false claim on his bankruptcy petition. Beach challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. R. 32.1. each of the three counts on which he was convicted. Beach's social security number was reversed exactly. Beach's social security number was reversed with the exception of one number. The clerk's office soon discovered that the social security numbers were incorrect and contacted the Beaches to alert them to the deficiency in their filing. Who was responsible for gathering the Beaches' non exempt property for liquidation and distribution to their creditors. This letter was the beginning of a series of letters. Included in the trial record are letters from the Beaches to Mr. Morris that he is failing to comply with their demands.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Section 365(c)(2) (11 U.S.C. §365(c)(2)) is one: a debtor may not assume
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Ruling that the United States' setoff of payments owed by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is corrected as follows: On page 6. Sullivan & Worcester were on brief. Were on brief. Because we believe that the lower court was on the wrong track. Background Background The pertinent facts are largely undisputed. Plaintiff appellant Greenwood Trust Company (Greenwood) is a Delaware banking corporation. Its deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The terms and conditions applicable to use of the Discover Card are spelled out in a Cardmember Agreement. If the default is not cured within twenty days. A ten dollar late charge is automatically assessed. The Commonwealth and its Attorney General were named as defendants. The Massachusetts statute is straightforward. 2Endeavoring to ensure that its flanks are fully protected. It is not necessary for us to distinguish among them. 6 late charge. Section 521 is equally uncompromising: In order to prevent discrimination against State chartered insured depository institutions. Notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
No. 97 2220 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Allegedly on the basis of Ferry's continued agreement during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings and even after the Order for Relief was entered. Both actions were ultimately dismissed. 2 Credit Obligation and several letters sent by Hirschkop to Ferry and Robert Mayer. Ferry was subsequently granted a discharge on November 19. The Order of Discharge reads:
|
 |
OLSON STEPHEN S V. U.S.
With him on the brief was Teresa J. With him on the brief were Loretta C. Circuit Judge. This is a consolidated appeal from four summary judgments of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Penalties were improperly assessed simply because the Internal Revenue Service (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Petitioner spent 12 years in prison for conduct that is not a crime. The bank is liable. We do have to honor those checks.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
1 in which the Supreme Court tightened the requirements for finding that a defendant has 1 This decision is frequently abbreviated as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm the orders of the district court. Is the founder and majority shareholder of two small capitalization medical services businesses EquiMed. The average market price was computed by taking the average of the stock's closing prices for the five days immediately prior to the exchange request. The structure of the second note (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Richard Bondi argue that Scheidler II invalidates all of the Hobbs Act counts in this case that were premised on the extortion of intangible property rights. Which can be satisfied regardless of whether the property right at issue is tangible or intangible. We remand Peter Gotti's case for consideration of resentencing pursuant to This decision is frequently abbreviated as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: At issue in this case is whether a loan servicer may appear in Bankruptcy Court to protect a claim relating to the debt that it services. We conclude that a loan servicer is a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Doane did not seek to have her student loans discharged during the bankruptcy. For reasons that are not entirely clear. Even though such discharge was neither sought by Doane nor authorized by the bankruptcy code.1 See 11 U.S.C.A. The bankruptcy court appears to have used an outdated form discharge order. Id. was created at a time when the strictures applicable to the discharge of student loans were set to expire on October 1. The form order provided that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Appellant/cross appellee Berglee's petition for panel rehearing is granted. The clerk is directed to vacate the court's June 11. The clerk is directed to file the attached revised opinion and to issue a new judgment in accordance with the revised opinion. This case has a long history and is a somewhat tangled skein. Ruled the disbursements were unauthorized. Which were discovered at trial. This order solely addresses Berglee&s right to assert new claims for monetary relief in what was charged. Declaring the Bank was not entitled to a setoff against the unauthorized disbursements to Woehlhaff. The case was removed to the Montana federal district court on diversity grounds and transferred to the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Summarily concluding Berglee was precluded by res judicata from raising claims he had failed to raise in the prior declaratory judgment litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Montana explicitly stated that the court was not addressing Berglee&s right to bring these claims in a separate action.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. ROTHHAMMER
Circuit Judges. ž Because the facts and issues in these cases are similar. We have consolidated the cases for purposes of the opinion. The principal lender involved in the financing was Security Pacific Bank (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm. I. The facts are undisputed. Which was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. McCartney's Amended Plan for Reorganization was adopted as an Interim Plan. Asserting that Integra's claim on Lamar's underlying debt was satisfied as a matter of law because Integra failed to file a petition to fix the fair market value of the property within six months of the sheriff's sale as required under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act. Integra's claim against Lamar's is deemed released and satisfied as a matter of law. Is also discharged from any deficiency remaining on Integra's loan to Lamar's. The judgment creditor has six months after the debtor's collateral is sold in which to petition the court to fix the fair market value of the real property. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522(b). Failure to file a petition within this time period
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
000 at the time the note was due. Ndez
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Insurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehabilitation proceedings began. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. Hawthorne was insured by a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
2005 and appearing at 421 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005) is hereby amended as follows: 1) 421 F.3d at 852. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehaInsurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. The facts giving rise to the original settlement between Bazyler and Hawthorne are undisputed and were stipulated at trial. 4 HAWTHORNE SAVINGS v. Hawthorne was insured by a
|
 |
99-4092 -- HEARD V. BONNEVILLE BILLING AND COLLECTIONS -- 06/26/2000
Who was not the signer nor any longer on the account. We affirm. Nos. 99 4100 and 99 4202 Because the parties are familiar with the underlying facts. We do not reiterate them here unless they are necessary to explain our disposition. Heard was listed on the check as a joint account holder. Heard was liable for her daughter's bad checks. Was supported by Bonneville's failure to offer any evidence it maintained procedures designed to safeguard against collecting from joint account holders in all circumstances. The court found
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
From a subsequent determination that BancInsure is entitled to subrogation of one fourth of the proceeds from a settlement. BancInsure is a captive company for state bankers associations and provides insurance coverage for The Honorable Clyde H. That portion of the loss is not covered unless the Employee was in collusion with one or more parties to the transactions and has received. Gronlie was employed by BNC as a loan officer from May of 1991 until April of 1997. She was promoted to the level of senior vice president and was awarded a lending authority of $200. Subsequent transactions were also approved by the loan committee. Financing was arranged through a bank other than BNC. Various of the Harper loans and lines of credit were insufficiently secured and have not been repaid. A motion simulator is a large enclosed capsule with seats and a video screen in the capsule's interior. The capsule is individually mounted on a hydraulic or mechanical system that moves it in coordination with a video playing on the inside. 4 3 BNC counterclaimed against BancInsure and cross claimed against Gronlie.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question here is whether an unstayed state court judgment that is pending appeal can constitute a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The district court held that the action was not time barred and that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Gray LLP was on brief. Were on brief. Or reasonably should have known. That the tests were not reasonable and necessary for diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury of Medicare beneficiaries. Are the exclusive avenue for recovery by the United States of Medicare overpayments. The question presented is whether the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Medicare Act explicitly or implicitly repeals the grant of federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 or displaces the underlying common law causes of action over which § 1345 gives federal courts jurisdiction. Medicare is a federally subsidized health insurance program for the elderly and certain disabled individuals.
|
 |
MCMILLIAN V. FDIC
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > McMillian v. This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are
|
 |
MCMILLIAN V. FDIC
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > McMillian v. This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are
|
 |
RESOLUTION TRUST V. DUNMAR CORP.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Resolution Trust v. Two of which are at issue here. Both loans were evidenced by a standard note and mortgage. (FIRREA) the Resolution Trust Corporation (
|
 |
RESOLUTION TRUST V. DUNMAR CORP.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Resolution Trust v. Two of which are at issue here. Both loans were evidenced by a standard note and mortgage. (FIRREA) the Resolution Trust Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Michelson advised First Bank that Schmitt was unable to pay the debt. That Schmitt was advised of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy rights. Warning that interest will accrue on his account. Which prohibits a debt collector from contacting a debtor where the collection agency
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Following its determination that 50% to 100% of the Epogen it purchased from Dialysist West was counterfeit. AmerisourceBergen filed a reply to Dialysist West's counterclaim conceding that it had not paid for the non Epogen products (including Procrit) and that these products were genuine. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW We have subject matter jurisdiction over the final decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The denial of AmerisourceBergen's motion for leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The district court's Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to determine if it will lead to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was the appropriate basis. That Fleet Bank did not have the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Stated that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The surety was Lyndon. The principal was Wallace's. The obligee was the particular college defendant. Wallace's was required to make minimum monthly commission payments to EKU. EKU or its designee was to buy Throughout this opinion. The underlying agreements between the colleges and Wallace's are referred to as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Murray was on brief for appellants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: On page 10. Cullen & Resnick were on brief for 604 Columbus Avenue. Gottlieb were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. *Of the Third Circuit. This is a case involving a failed loan transaction that well illustrates Polonius' advice. Among which were the property owned by the Trust itself and properties of the Trust's principal beneficiary. Of which Millicent Young was sole beneficiary. The Young Family Trust was a named plaintiff in the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy and district courts below. The Bank was declared unsound by Massachusetts banking officials. The FDIC was appointed 7 receiver. In February 1991 was substituted as defendant appellant in the district court. That the FDIC was entitled to raise the defenses available to it under the doctrine of estoppel established in D'Oench. The district court vacated that part of the bankruptcy court's judgment that was premised on the secret agreement by one of the Trust's principals to provide kickbacks to a Bank officer.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The IRS determined that the Harkers were liable for income tax deficiencies and statutory additions to tax for 1985 through 1987. Found that Harker filed it
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.S.C. were on brief for appellants. Montanez Aviles with whom Montanez & Alicea Law Offices was on brief for appellee. This appeal is taken from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reversing a decision of the federal bankruptcy court. The background events are somewhat complicated. Colonial was engaged in the business of servicing mortgages. One of its clients was the Bowery Savings Bank (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
For reimbursements to Michigan's Unemployment Trust Fund is not entitled to priority status as an excise tax under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E). The bankruptcy court's decision will be affirmed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL Whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that reimbursement payments owed to Michigan's Unemployment Trust Fund by a nonprofit employer are not excise taxes within the meaning of § 507(a)(8)(E). Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6). An order determining that a claim is not entitled to priority status is a final order. 200 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 2000)(finding that a priorityfixing order is treated as a final order). 685 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005) (finding an order determining that a claim is not entitled to administrative expense priority constitutes a final order). The facts are not in dispute. The only issue before the Panel is the priority status of the Agency's claim. An order determining that a claim is not entitled to priority status is a question of law requiring de novo review on appeal.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Which was the bulk of his income. O'Hearn presented evidence that these funds should have been enough to pay his student loans in full. The loans would have been repaid upon his return from Africa. O'Hearn was 50 years old at the time of trial. His salary was $43. There was some evidence that his salary might increase eventually to $50. That he was eligible for future retirement contributions from his employer. O'Hearn might have a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Bankruptcy Judge: This is the second appeal by Greenwood Trust Company and Discover Card Services. Inc. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Because we find the bankruptcy court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter. The Goetzmans submitted The loan a plan of reorganization under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. obligation was renegotiated and the parties executed a stipulation in June 12. Which was made part of the Goetzmans' plan of reorganization. The stipulation provided both loans were secured by the mortgage previously given on the farm. Agribank forgave the remaining amount of Goetzmans' debt and the stipulation included a provision that allowed the Goetzmans to reduce the amount due on Loan No. 2 by making payments for Loan No. 1 on or before the dates the payments were due. 615.00 The claim is secured by a perfected interest in Debtor's real property. Is denied. 2 2 1 [AgriBank's] claim will be paid in accordance with the attached Stipulation and Addendum to Stipulation. The value of collateral ... securing the ... claim is $370. [AgriBank] will have an unsecured claim for the balance of their claim. Any payments received by [AgriBank] on account of its unsecured claim will be applied towards the principal balance of Loan No. 1 as described in the attached stipulation ... .
|
 |
03-3114 -- CHANUTE PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION V. SCHICKE -- 04/14/2004
Are essential to resolution of this case. We must accept that court's findings as true unless they are clearly erroneous. Yukon Self Storage Fund v. Beyerl was suspended from the practice of law. CPCA's last attorney of record in the fraud matter was Mr. CPCA was known by several names. Nor was the bank registered as a corporation with the Kansas Secretary of State. The only address provided by CPCA in the 1984 fraud proceedings was that of its attorney. Although the burden of proof was on CPCA to show it did not receive sufficient notice. The court found: That the bankruptcy of a notorious borrower whose liability exceeded $1.0 million at the time of his filing and who listed the [CPCA] in care of the lawyers who had acted to collect the judgment for several years and still represented the [CPCA] on other matters never came to the [CPCA's] attention is not likely. The Court is forced to conclude that [CPCA's] regular attorneys were aware of the filing and that notice to them was reasonably calculated to give knowledge of this case to the [CPCA]. Aplt.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
To whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 1 I. Eric Picht's paycheck was dishonored. This summons stated that the Pichts were in default pursuant After the Pichts filed this federal action in July 1998. Hawks claims that the District Court should have denied the Pichts' motion for partial summary judgment and granted Hawks's motion for summary judgment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Which are small loans with interest rates averaging 400 500% APR due on the next payday. This appeal presents the question of whether the State of Georgia may regulate a narrow segment of agency agreements between in state payday stores and out of state banks or whether the Georgia Act in issue is preempted by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
McLaughlin was on brief for appellees. Lionel Bolduc was the sole applicant for the loans. BankEast's commitment letter was addressed only to him. The couple was not represented by counsel at the closing. They were told by the bank that requiring her signature was standard procedure. Although the Bolducs were apparently business partners and had extensive real estate interests. BankEast's insistence that Maureen Bolduc co sign the notes may have violated ECOA's bar on discrimination based on marital status. The Bolducs were unable to meet the repayment schedule on the 1987 loans. The FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC did not foreclose on the second mortgages secured by the Hudson home and the Merrimack land even though the proceeds from the original collateral were not enough to satisfy the balance due on the 1987 notes. The court found that an injunction was consistent with the equities and the public interest. That their suit is barred by the ECOA statute of limitations. That it is barred by the D'Oench.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Defendant Appellant Hartford Fire Insurance Company is the surety on a labor and material payment bond purchased by Mele Construction Co. Hartford's bond required prospective claimants who were not in a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
No. 99 1944 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Alston was required to pay a ten percent fee for any late payments. Alston made late payments on several occasions and was charged a ten percent late fee. It is undisputed that under Virginia law. Crown Auto was not permitted to charge Alston a late fee in excess of five percent. Crown Auto repossessed Alston's car because she did not have required insurance. The district court found that Alston had produced no evidence to prove that the $85.00 fee was incident to the extension of credit and not charged in comparable cash transactions. The district court held that the fee was not a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Section 1 the status is changed from
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Appellees contend that this appeal is moot and that. BACKGROUND Focus was a media buying company that placed commercial spots for its clients on television and radio stations. Its two major clients were Sears. Alleging that funds it had paid Focus
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The district court (1) found that the Ordinances were preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Ricky Bracewell from an order of the district court excluding from the estate a payment Bracewell received under the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 for crop losses he had sustained. The appeal turns on the issue of whether a crop disaster payment is property of the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) or (a)(6) if the losses occurred before the bankruptcy filing or conversion date but the legislation authorizing the payment came afterwards. The bankruptcy court ruled that the payments were property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) but not under (a)(6). The district court ruled that the payment was not property of the bankruptcy estate under either subsection of § 541. This is the trustee's appeal from that ruling. I. The facts have been stipulated throughout these proceedings. He was unable to repay the debts he had incurred to produce the crops. While Bracewell's bankruptcy petition was pending. The Emergency Farmer and Rancher Assistance Act of 2002 was introduced in the House of Representatives.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The Creditors proved with sufficient evidence that the payments were entitled to the exception to avoidance under section 547(c)(2). We too will affirm. 2 I. Which is engaged in the paper products industry. Kimberly Clark informed Global Tissue that it was cancelling the SRM contract. A second payment was made to Eddy on April 25. The third payment was made to Domtar on May 8. Covering five invoices that were 45. The negotiations on May 8 with Kimberly Clark were unsuccessful. They were made within 90 days of filing for bankruptcy while Global Tissue was insolvent. The Creditors must prove three elements under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). 1 The Trustee concedes that element (A) under 1 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Following its determination that 50% to 100% of the Epogen it purchased from Dialysist West was counterfeit. AmerisourceBergen filed a reply to Dialysist West's counterclaim conceding that it had not paid for the non Epogen products and that these products were genuine. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW We have subject matter jurisdiction over the final decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The denial of AmerisourceBergen's motion for leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The district court's Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to determine if it will lead to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Gordon is the class representative for purchasers of lessons from the J. The state court entered a proposed order that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) and (c). 1 The Honorable Barry S. Debtor was now obligated under the terms of the Settlement Agreement to pay the attorneys fees that Ditto had incurred in obtaining that Settlement Agreement in the AABase Homes bankruptcy case. $346.10 of which was in arrears. All of which Ditto asserted were in arrears. Was secured under the terms of the Promissory Note. 733.89 was unsecured. We are to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review.
|
 |
PELFREY V. EDUC. CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. (4/6/2000, NO. 99-6189)
Because the defendant is a
|
 |
99A2278- DARDOVITCH V. HALTZMAN
The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. Haltzman challenges this reading of the Trust and contingent fee agreement. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Whalen argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellees/cross appellants. Was not the real party in interest under Fed. LP
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
(App. 16a) The dispute that remains is over the interest on the debt. Which was significantly higher than the rate usually charged by federal agencies to states. Claiming primarily: (a) that HHS's use of the private consumer rate was not only arbitrary and capricious but inconsistent with the common law and (b) that HHS did not follow the proper procedures in enacting its interest rate regulation. Were to be charged a rate of interest based on the prevailing private consumer rates. Op. at 2) HHS's action was in response to congressional enactment of the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment. This award was based on the conclusion that most of this work was necessitated by Haltzman's continued refusal to admit that Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust.
|
 |
PELFREY V. EDUC. CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. (4/6/2000, NO. 99-6189)
Because the defendant is a
|
 |
97-6146 -- U.S. V. JOHNSTON -- 06/05/1998
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on briefs for appellant. Dana & Gould were on brief for plaintiffs. The first suit was brought 2 2 against the Sterman entities by Xerox VKM in Illinois federal district court on February 27. The first of those two lawsuits was brought against the Sterman entities in the same Illinois court as the Pennsylvania hotels lawsuit on March 13. Sterman was domiciled in Massachusetts and. The three suits just described are the centerpiece of the present litigation but are not an exhaustive list of the disputes between the parties. Several other transactions between the parties had gone wrong and were the subject of litigation and workout related discussions between the parties. Was a lengthy document stipulating that it would be governed by Illinois substantive law. These were apparently properties in which Xerox VKM had security interests but for which they wanted clear title. The bonds were priced at nearly $5 million but Sterman apparently calculated that he could buy them at the stipulated price and 4 4 then resell them for a profit of more than $450.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a wholesale energy supplier is entitled to injunctive relief from orders issued by the Governor of California commandeering its contractual rights to deliver electricity to public utilities within the state. I A The electricity contracts at issue in this appeal are the products of the restructuring of the California electricity market. The CalPX was deemed a public utility under the Federal Power Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a wholesale energy supplier is entitled to injunctive relief from orders issued by the Governor of California commandeering its contractual rights to deliver electricity to public utilities within the state. I A The electricity contracts at issue in this appeal are the products of the restructuring of the California electricity market. The CalPX was deemed a public utility under the Federal Power Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question in this appeal is how the rule of single satisfaction for claims brought by a bankruptcy estate should be applied to 11 fraudulent transfers that were at least partially satisfied in a settlement of a lump sum of $3.9 million involving 377 transfers and several other parties. The debtor was purportedly in the business of leasing office equipment but was allegedly used to perpetrate a Honorable William H. Northern Trust was not a defendant in this first action but 11 of the 377 transfers concerned the funds transferred from the debtor to Northern Trust on the News' behalf. The settlement expressly contemplated as follows that the Trustee could pursue claims for fraudulent transfer against other parties: It is expressly understood between the Parties nothing in [the Settlement Agreement] is intended to in any way prejudice or limit the Trustee's ability to pursue any claims available to her against [other parties]. Northern Trust argued that it was not the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Delta Resources United States Court of Appeals. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Delta Resources United States Court of Appeals. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Richmond & Rothstein were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Holding that Progressive's mortgage was not entitled to priority over the federal tax liens under the Massachusetts common law doctrines of equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The mortgage at issue is secured by real property located in Marshfield. 000.00 mortgage note which was properly recorded in favor of the Miles Standish Federal Credit Union (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
That decision is the subject of the appeal in case No. 99 56498. MOD moved the district court for a determination that its judgment against Cubic was immune from attachment. JURISDICTION The denial of a motion to intervene as of right is an appealable final order. District court orders entered after the entry of judgment are generally reviewable by a separate appeal. We therefore have jurisdiction over the consolidated appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The judgment against the Iranian defendants was for Flatow sued under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The United States instituted an adversary proceeding against Gardner in the bankruptcy court by filing a complaint seeking a determination that his unpaid tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991 were excepted from discharge in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(1)(C) of the Code. The bankruptcy court determined the liabilities were excepted from discharge under that provision because appellant had willfully attempted to evade or defeat those liabilities. He was a partner in the law firm of Gardner. Gardner assured Thomas he was working on several cases that could settle within the following months for which his personal fees would be sufficient to satisfy the tax obligations. Except now one bank account reflected a zero balance and the other disclosed that it was overdrawn. Debtor also testified that he was aware of his obligation to pay his 1990 and 1991 federal income taxes. That he could have used some of the income he earned between 1990 and 1996 to pay those taxes. Thomas also testified that he would not have considered debtor's original offer in compromise to be bona fide had he known.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
District Judge: Appellant Evans was convicted of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The sole issue presented is whether the jury was entitled to find that Evans caused this telefax to be sent
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED. ISSUES ON APPEAL Whether the bankruptcy court's determination that excepting the Debtor's student loans from discharge will impose an undue hardship on the Debtor. Was clearly erroneous. 2. An order is final if it
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is recalled. 814 The Opinion cited at 262 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001). Is amended as follows: On page 996. It was agreed that this list could not be released without a court order. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court was required to notify each of the creditors on the list of the pending involuntary petition. If it appears that there are 12 or more creditors as provided in § 303(b) of the Code. The court shall afford a reasonable opportunity for other creditors to join in the petition before a hearing is held thereon. After an involuntary petition is filed but before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered. Unsecured claim may join in the petition
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
|
 |
ANDREWS V. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Andrews v.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: at slip Opinion page 6. The petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc is denied. The district court (1) found that the Ordinances were preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is recalled. 814 The Opinion cited at 262 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001). Is amended as follows: On page 996. It was agreed that this list could not be released without a court order. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court was required to notify each of the creditors on the list of the pending involuntary petition. If it appears that there are 12 or more creditors as provided in § 303(b) of the Code. The court shall afford a reasonable opportunity for other creditors to join in the petition before a hearing is held thereon. After an involuntary petition is filed but before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered. Unsecured claim may join in the petition
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Although the notice of appeal was filed on behalf of both Briand and Merino. No arguments have been presented on behalf of Merino. Any challenge Merino may have had to the judgment has been waived. The judgment is affirmed. BACKGROUND 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 to August The BIW Fund was an ERISA covered employee benefit plan established pursuant to a trust agreement among the International Brotherhood of Industrial Workers Locals 119 and 835 (collectively the
|
 |
ANDREWS V. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Andrews v.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (
|
 |
LABOVITZ PETER C. V. WA TIMES CORP
With her on the briefs was Alan B. The Labo vitzes contend that the district court erred in dismissing them under Delaware and Virginia law on the ground that they were derivative of losses suffered by DCI. the Times contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence relevant to its setoff defense that any injury Mr. Labovitz suffered from the alleged breach of the Times' contract with him was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With her on the briefs was Alan B. The Labo vitzes contend that the district court erred in dismissing them under Delaware and Virginia law on the ground that they were derivative of losses suffered by DCI. Labovitz suffered from the alleged breach of the Times' contract with him was
|
 |
98-5151 -- U.S. V. LORSON -- 04/13/2000
Lorson was convicted of multiple counts of conspiracy. Appellant alleges (1) that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove the requisite criminal intent. (2) that he was improperly denied a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Evans was hired by Collections and Receivables Worldwide Financial (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
2007) OPINION PER CURIAM This is an appeal from the District Court's dismissal of Keith Dixon's amended complaint against the Defendants. We will affirm. The District Court primarily determined that Dixon failed to state a claim because the promissory note stated that the proceeds of the note
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. Was on brief. Was on brief. Allegedly told Diamond's attorney that if the dischargeability issue was not resolved in Premier's favor. The bankruptcy court rejected the settlement and denied Premier's complaint on all grounds. Diamond filed a bankruptcy court complaint against both Premier and Pratt alleging that Pratt's statement was an improper attempt to collect. Holding that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Barron & Stadfeld were on brief for appellee. The Gens Note was secured by a third mortgage on real property in Barnstable. Although the Barnstable Property was subject to two prior mortgages. Home Owners was declared insolvent and the Resolution Trust Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are asked to determine whether and if so. Under what circumstances a criminal defendant's retirement benefits are available as a source of funds to compensate crime victims. Underlying each statute is a weighty policy determination: MVRA rests on the recognition that
|
 |
01-4043 -- MARKER V. PACIFIC MEZZANINE FUND -- 10/30/2002
PMF concedes that the interest charged on the loan was usurious and does not contest the district court's order to pay TTI double the interest that it paid on the loan. The loan was subject to the provisions of the SBIA. Any surplus from the sale is given to the borrower. The borrower remains liable for any deficiency if the sale's proceeds are inadequate to satisfy the debt. (Id.). PMF notified TTI that the loan was in default. That payment in full was due. The WHI Note was due on December 31. TTI argues that PMF's enormous gain on a usurious loan violates the SBIA and that return of the promissory notes
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Amerishare Investors1 was an insurance marketing company which had a national distribution system of independent sales agents. ITT Hartford is a life. Amerishare Investors was to meet certain production goals. ITT Hartford was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The only Minnesota license that FRA had was for its Denver.
|
 |
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\06-6004EM PYATT V. BROWN FINAL W AMENDMENT.WPD
This is an appeal of the bankruptcy court's order granting the chapter 7 trustee's motion for the turnover of funds transferred from the Debtor's bank account postpetition for the payment of checks delivered to creditors prepetition. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.1 The issue on appeal whether the Debtor is responsible for certain postpetition transfers of estate property is purely legal. Will therefore be reviewed de novo. BACKGROUND The relevant facts are undisputed and straightforward. Brown was appointed as the trustee (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Trust was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring its two notes from their prior holder. Trust and Atlantic Funding are related entities in that C.F. To
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We reverse the BAP and hold that the settlement agreement is valid and enforceable. This postpetition financing was approved by the bankruptcy court on a
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. KENNEDY (1/28/2000, NO. 98-3455)
Circuit Judge: The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). Was forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 because it was acquired with proceeds of criminal activity.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Dyer and Jeanie owned a house together when they were married (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
James Monroe was the general partner. Monroe and his associates siphoned off money that Gagan was entitled to. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.1 Monroe did not pay Gagan. Gagan was frustrated in his attempts to execute on the judgment. The district court held that the turnover order was a proper exercise of its jurisdiction over the judgment debtors through use of its contempt powers. The Seventh Circuit did not reach the issue whether the transfer from Monroe to his wife was fraudulent. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner. 9668 GAGAN v. Is a community property state. They have lived in Arizona. LaJunta claimed in moving to intervene that the property on which Gagan sought to execute is community property in which she has an interest. Her theory was that the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction. Because she was not joined in the Indiana action against her husband. So Gagan's judgment is void as to both of the Monroes for lack of due process.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
No. 04 3581 Darryl Carter and Todd Thompson were Milwaukee based drug dealers in the late 1980s. Diggs was the cousin of Carter's common law wife.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust Page 2 The district court found that Spectrum's lien on the proceeds of a malpractice settlement was valid and enforceable. Therefore is invalid. Spectrum argues that the issue of the validity of the lien is precluded by two prior state court judgments approving the malpractice settlement. We conclude that the issue is not precluded by either of the state court judgments. That the lien on the settlement is prohibited by federal and state Medicaid law. I. BACKGROUND The material facts in this case are undisputed. Bowling has little or no control of her limbs and is unable to speak. Spectrum is the parent company of a group of providers of sub acute rehabilitation and nursing services. Bowling was admitted to GVHC in December 1998. The total customary cost of Spectrum's services provided to Bowling during the time she resided at GVHC was $639. The 1 It is unclear from the record how Bowling's co payments factor into the shortfall. Spectrum states that its total customary cost was $639.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We reverse the BAP and hold that the settlement agreement is valid and enforceable. This postpetition financing was approved by the bankruptcy court on a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The defendants were charged with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) conspiracy and a RICO substantive count. Thefts of goods in interstate commerce were among the thirty six racketeering acts and thirty six counts charged. All of the seven defendants were convicted of at least some of the charged offenses. Alleging anything to do with murder or violent crimes in aid of racketeering and many of the numerous extortion racketeering acts and counts were found by the jury to be wanting and resulted in findings of
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. KENNEDY (1/28/2000, NO. 98-3455)
Circuit Judge: The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). Was forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 because it was acquired with proceeds of criminal activity.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellant. Aisenberg and Williams & Grainger were on brief for appellees. The warehouse covered 10 acres and the sale price was $7 million. The warehouse was then under lease to a tenant. It was intended that Fedders would make the roof repairs at its own expense. It 2 2 was intended. (The stated figures are approximate. As there were other minor adjustments involved in the closing.). It would be simpler to have the bank retain $250. Fedders was paid the $6.7 immediately due to it (the $7 million purchase less the $50. For reasons that are not explained. The bank appears to have recorded a draw down on the loan of only $6. The bridge bank was itself dissolved and the FDIC became its receiver. Was substituted for Liberty. 4 4 In April 1992. Was partly consolidated with the new Fedders action. The court found that Fedders was not a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.A. was on brief for appellants. Reed and Reed & Reed were on brief for appellees. That the damages awarded were improperly duplicative. This is a unusual case. Because none of these irregularities is material to the narrow issues on appeal. We merely point 2 2 was $229. No payments of principal or interest were due on the note until either the LaBarres sold certain other real estate or the passage of two years from the date of the note's execution.2 In October 1990. Shepard and Parks initiated foreclosure proceedings against the LaBarres for the balance then due on the mortgage note.5 A foreclosure sale was 3. This judgment is impossible to decipher. The judge then stated that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). 1 and two counts of * Honorable Will L. Or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed. Knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10. 000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity. The punishment for an offense under this section is a fine under title 18. Or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both. (2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction. .... (d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are (1) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States.... .... (f) As used in this section (1) the term
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Mitchell & Ross were on brief *p1764Y *p450Xfor appellant DeLuca. *p1864Y *p750XSara Rapport for appellant Ouimette. *p1964Y *p750XM *p+2Xa *p+2Xr *p+2Xg *p+2Xaret *p+16XE. *p+16XCurran. Were on brief for appellee. *p2564Y *p1800X *p2764Y *p1650X February 27 . When Gellerman reported back to Ouimette he was told to *p2364Y *p450Xstay away from Calenda and not go back to the factory. *p2564Y *p1050XA *p+2Xb *p+2Xo *p+2Xu *p+2Xt *p+2X *p+8Xthe *p+6Xsame *p+6Xtime. Their conversation was recorded by the *p4964Y *p450XFBI. As Ouimette and Gellerman were having *p4004Y *p450Xa *p+2X *p+16Xd *p+2Xr *p+2Xink *p+14Xwith *p+14Xcodefendant *p+14XKenneth *p+14XRaposa. *p5404Y *p450Xwhere *p+6XOuimette *p+6Xdemanded *p+6Xto *p+6Xknow *p+6Xwhy *p+6XDuxbury *p+6Xwas *p+6Xtrying *p+6Xto *p+6Xextort *p5604Y *p450Xmo *p 2Xn *p 2Xe *p 2Xy *p 2X *p 2Xf *p 2Xr *p 2Xo *p 2Xm *p 2X *p 2XD *p 2Xe *p 2XL *p 2Xu *p 2Xc *p 2Xa *p 2X *p 2XJ *p 2Xr *p 2X. *p 2X *p 2X *p 2XA *p 2Xf *p 2Xt *p 2Xe *p 2Xr *p 2X *p 2XD *p 2Xu *p 2Xxbury told Gellerman that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Truelove & Riley were on brief. We are reminded today that SELYA. There are. 2 1This epigram is often attributed to Lawrence P. Spurious Sayings and Familiar Misquotations 152 (1992) (noting that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
All defendants were charged with conspiring. Allen was in charge of the operation. Before the drugs were resold. Crack cocaine was referred to as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse. The Parties Keystone was a farm cooperative that processed and sold food products. Food products on Keystone's premises were not included in Keystone's inventory unless and until Keystone actually purchased them. It is undisputed that the Bank had first priority with respect to these items. Are Ontario Grape Growers' Marketing Board. The primary contract was the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Are vendors who filed timely reclamation claims against the Debtor. Appellants now appeal the bankruptcy court's decision finding that their reclamation claims are not entitled to administrative expense priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2) and relegating their claims to the status of general unsecured. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL (1) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying administrative expense priority or a lien to reclaiming sellers whose goods were proposed to be consumed by the Debtor in its manufacturing activities. (2) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining the validity and priority of reclamation claims pursuant to motion rather than adversary complaint. (3) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the Appellants were not entitled to require a marshaling of the assets to protect their reclamation claims. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). The order and judgment on appeal are
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Sons were on brief. William Loeffler and Troutman Sanders LLP were on brief. That is. Debtors have sought relief from both the federal bankruptcy courts and district courts attempting to put an end to this practice. The latest strategy for reform is to seek certification of a class of debtors against repeat offenders of the Bankruptcy Code that is. Specifically at issue in this case is the alleged misconduct of the appellee. Operating under a misunderstanding that it was powerless to provide a remedy to the appellant under the Bankruptcy Code. Because we have determined that a remedy was available through the court's equitable powers under § 105 of the Code. The reaffirmation agreement was not filed with the bankruptcy court and did not satisfy other general requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524. The appellant's primary theory was that § 524 provides a private right of action. She contended that the district court is authorized to grant relief via 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellants. Although we agree with the district court that summary judgment for the taxpayer was appropriate. Factual Background Factual Background The material facts are not in dispute. The IRS has three years from the date a return is filed to make an assessment of liability. 26 U.S.C. 6501. If the IRS discovers that an assessment
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The debt was not discharged. All of Bressner's attempts to collect have failed. I. The facts of this case are drawn from Bressner's second amended complaint. No payments have ever been made on this note. The assets of Jay's TV were seized to satisfy a third party's loan to Dennis. Dennis's debt to him is now approximately $1.2 million. Amzo is an Illinois corporation and Shirlee is its sole shareholder. Bressner alleges that Amzo is the successor to a business started by Dennis but unrelated to Jay's TV. Amzo was initially run out of the basement of the Ambroziaks' 3.5 acre home in Woodstock. The Chicago Property is held in trust with Harris Palatine. Are structured to prevent 1 The property was held in trust. That the success of Amzo is due to the work and efforts of Dennis. Dennis is the moving force behind the company and the de facto manager of the company's affairs. Is married to. 500 and that she was the sole shareholder. That Dennis is the moving force behind the operation and management of Amzo.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Because we conclude that the evidence of conspiracy was sufficient for a jury to convict Burgos. Francisco Burgos was a crack cocaine dealer in Allentown. Burgos and Vega were arrested together when they met Carresquilla (who had agreed to cooperate in the police sting) to collect on a debt for crack to Carresquilla. Burgos was charged with three criminal counts. Count 1 was conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Count 2 was distribution of crack cocaine. Count 3 was use of a gun during a drugtrafficking offense. Burgos was sentenced to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Holding that there are material issues of fact as to the existence and terms of a contract. They are as follows: On February 7. Richard Grimes indicated that he was a manager employed by the City of San Francisco. Was retired on Social Security. 000 from Ameriquest at 9.75% was stated to exist in a mortgage GRIMES v. Told them that his company could offer them the loan at a rate of interest in the range of 6% to 8% and that after paying off the existing mortgage and several unsecured debts they would have $7. Among the documents that the Grimeses signed was a typewritten Loan Application for a fixed rate loan for $252. Opposite
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This matter is comprised of three consolidated appeals. For which he was the sole shareholder. Wintz Properties was engaged in the property management of commercial real estate. The Debtor was comprised of five operating divisions and owned interests in the three parcels of real property which are at the heart of these appeals. Only one of the loans was made directly to the Debtor. The Terminal Road Property is divided into two parcels. The first of which consists of approximately 28.48 acres and is abstract property. The second of which consists of approximately 0.67 acres and is Torrens property. 2 1 The Debtor did. As the tax liens were filed with the Minnesota Secretary of State and also with Hennepin. The divisions were sold to companies variously owned by Wintz's children and their relations. The real estate interests were conveyed to Wintz Properties and subsequently. The Debtor leased the Rosemount Property to Wintz It is unclear from the record whether the Debtor's interest in the Terminal Road Property was also pledged as collateral for the aggregate debt.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The proponents of this view argue that the federal courts are overburdened. We have little doubt that this case would have been better brought in an Indiana state court. It was the appellee that chose to file its complaint in federal court and it was that complaint which sought novel remedies. Although we are not fans of delay. It is with limited sympathy that ultimately we must certify several of the questions raised in this appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. DFS purchased
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Kiwi made the payments in all three cases pursuant to a number of written agreements that were essential to its efforts to stay in business. The prepetition payments constituted preferential transfers and were thus voidable under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. These transactions are at the center of the dispute between the trustee and the defendants. Kiwi's assumption of these contracts is important because it enabled Kiwi to compel its creditors to continue performing under the assumed agreements. Potential preference claims against creditors were to be preserved for later prosecution by an estate representative such as the trustee. The Term Sheet provided that only preference actions against Northwest Airlines and Greater Orlando Airport were settled and that these creditors were to obtain releases from liability from KIH. The Creditors' Committee.1 All other preference actions were preserved by the Term Sheet. The settlement was never consummated. 6 motion with the Bankruptcy Court seeking appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Torcise United States Court of Appeals. BACKGROUND Torcise was one of the largest tomato farmers in South Florida. Torcise also was the sole shareholder of Growers. Were severely limited. $1.3 million.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Torcise United States Court of Appeals. BACKGROUND Torcise was one of the largest tomato farmers in South Florida. Torcise also was the sole shareholder of Growers. Were severely limited. $1.3 million.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
An amended opinion is attached hereto. We have consolidated these cases for disposition on appeal. The New Mexico Name maintains that the English judgment stemmed from an action that is repugnant to New Mexico's public policy as the judgment: (a) violates New Mexico's securities laws. (b) is based on unconscionable contracts. (e) is based on illusory contacts. Because the English system of jurisprudence is incompatible with American standards of due process. Two Utah Names also contend that the district court's approval of the English post judgment interest of eight percent per annum was incorrect. We also hold that the Lloyd's judgments are not repugnant to New Mexico's public policy. We hold that the parties in this case are diverse. I. BACKGROUND Numerous courts have summarized the basic facts applicable to the underlying litigation. These facts are not in dispute. Lloyd's is not an insurer. Rather is the regulator of an insurance market located in London. Names are passive investors in the sophisticated scheme.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief. Was on brief. Umesh Patel was indicted for setting fire to his business and then attempting to collect insurance proceeds for the resulting damage. Patel was convicted on one count of arson. Patel was sentenced to 204 months of imprisonment: 84 months to run concurrently for arson and mail fraud and 120 months to run consecutively for using fire to commit mail fraud.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was transferred from TSR to a trust benefitting Heavrin and his stepsister. Heavrin and Bridges were ordered to pay the TSR Trustee the $250. Heavrin argues that the transfer was not fraudulent because all of the proceeds from the life insurance policy had previously been assigned by TSR to the McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation (MDFC). Therefore the policy was of no value to either TSR or the Trust. Was in settlement of unrelated lender liability claims that Harrod's estate had against MDFC. A Kentucky lawyer who was Harrod's stepson. When the loan agreement was actually executed three months later. TSR was substituted for S&B. TSR were all co signers on the $3.56 million loan from MDFC. For which all three were jointly and severally liable. (Four policies were also obtained on the life of Macatee. Although the details regarding these policies are not reflected in the record.). The Harrod policy from Transamerica was replaced by a $2 million policy issued by Jackson National. Shortly after the Transamerica policy was replaced by the Jackson National policy.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Rockwell prevailed and was awarded attorney fees and costs by the state court. The BAP majority held that the entire award was encompassed in the discharge. We hold that the fees and costs incurred post petition were not discharged. The bankruptcy court ruled that the cause of action was exempt. Section 1033.5(a)(10) states that attorney fees are allowable costs under § 1032 where they are authorized by contract. 030.78) was not discharged. It held that Rockwell was free to collect this
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Presently before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (
|
 |
BRADFORD MARINE, INC. V. M/V "SEA FALCON"
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Bradford Marine. The district court held that the Sea Falcon was properly liable for the fees because the repair contract at issue provided that the plaintiff would receive attorney's fees if it retained legal counsel to collect its repair charges. Because the repairs were
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We are asked to decide whether. If that sum was contemplated by the arbitral award. We hold that such an action by the district court is permissible under the limited circumstances here. I. BACKGROUND1 Defendant appellant William Webb (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We are asked to decide whether a highly structured securitization transaction negotiated between Citicorp and an investor in a limited partnership constitutes an
|
 |
99-3314 -- VANOVER V. COOK -- 07/31/2001
The award of attorneys fees was reversed on appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals. 646 was affirmed. Holding that Vanover was collaterally estopped from relitigating the propriety of the garnishments and that Vanover's complaint was insufficient to allege claims for wrongful garnishment. BACKGROUND Vanover and Cook were divorced in Gray County. 078.21.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Popp was known as LDB International Corporation. I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND We recognize that this case has been before assorted state and federal courts since 1992 and the chronology of events is thus well documented. A. The Business Relationship and the Merger The Dissenters are former stockholders in American Sharecom. King were the President. Every shareholder with the exception of Simon and
|
 |
BRADFORD MARINE, INC. V. M/V "SEA FALCON"
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Bradford Marine. The district court held that the Sea Falcon was properly liable for the fees because the repair contract at issue provided that the plaintiff would receive attorney's fees if it retained legal counsel to collect its repair charges. Because the repairs were
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Sharon Lang called the FBI to proclaim that executives of the Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation were lying to the Federal Reserve in order to obtain a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
While the garnishment proceedings were pending. She argued that her interest in the marital assets was a matter for the state court. I. Background In November 2004 Frank Kollintzas was convicted by a jury of converting money from the City of East Chicago. Sentencing was scheduled for February 24. Where Kollintzas's property is located. Served interrogatories on third party account holders (
|
 |
HALPERIN V. REG'L ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC. (3/15/2000, NO. 98-5917)
Multiple holders of defaulted student loans are subject to a cumulative garnishment limit of ten percent of the debtor's disposable pay and imposing an injunction against the Creditors. The district court did not have jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief against Education.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Who was governor. The trustee's first complaint was dismissed as to Morris and the Morris. Not to Senior Cottages itself because there was no allegation that Senior Cottages had a value in excess of creditors' claims against it. The complaint
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
These were to be paid over time some installments before the petition was filed. The cases were closed. Bankruptcy Judge Barliant concluded that attorneys' fees
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
No. 99 2093 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. A problem developed when Mobil became concerned that Earhart was trying to switch Mobil customers to a competitor's brand. Mobil sent a letter to Earhart's customers advising them that Earhart was no longer an authorized seller of Mobil products. At that time Earhart was in possession of Mobil products valued somewhere between $104. The distribution agreement provided that if Earhart was indebted to Mobil at termination. The balance of the inventory was later sold at a deep discount or discarded. That claim was dismissed by stipulation. 3 Section 9.2 of the agreement reads: Any other claim by Distributor of any kind [other than one having to do with defects or shortages]. The district court concluded that genuine issues of fact were in dispute and set the matter for trial. Two of these were in effect summary judgment motions because they argued that Earhart was not entitled to recovery as a matter of law. Required Earhart to give Mobil notice before selling or destroying goods that Mobil was obligated to buy.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Individuals on probation and supervised release who have committed certain qualifying offenses. While Paul Sczubelek was on supervised release. Sczubelek appealed on the grounds that the collection of a DNA sample is an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and also in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. We conclude first of all that this case is not moot. While Sczubelek was still serving his term of supervised release. The court issued a summons based on a violation of a condition of his release and the delay between the expiration of his term and the adjudication of the violation is
|
 |
97-8028 -- MEYER V. CONLON -- 12/21/1998
That they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Rain and Hail sold him the policy and was reinsured by the FCIC. A crop insurance policy sets a per acre crop production guarantee and pays the farmer for any difference between the guaranteed yield and the actual amount the farmer harvests. The per acre crop production guarantee is set by (a) considering the past production of the particular farmer or. (b) if there are no adequate past production records. Which is set by regulation. Paying the premium after the crop is sold creates the unusual contractual situation in which the farmer has insurance before he has paid his premium. On April 13. No evidence suggests that it was at more than 999 pounds per acre. On June 22. Meyer's crop was damaged by hail. Meyer that the crop was a total loss. Although the adjuster admits that the crop was damaged. Meyer that the beans were not going to make it and would have to be torn up. Meyer claims to have had a conversation with Mr. Meyer said he was going to plow under the crop and wanted payment under the policy at 999 pounds per acre.
|
 |
HALPERIN V. REG'L ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC. (3/15/2000, NO. 98-5917)
Multiple holders of defaulted student loans are subject to a cumulative garnishment limit of ten percent of the debtor's disposable pay and imposing an injunction against the Creditors. The district court did not have jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief against Education.
|
 |
COHEN V. UNITED AM. BANK OF CENTRAL FLA.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Cohen v. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Appellants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. 000 payment on her separate loan with United American. Andrea Ruff was an attorney representing Lake Tech. Was a stockholder. The parties agreed that KCB would bid on contracts that otherwise would have been bid by Lake Tech. Because Lake Tech was at risk of being converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Cohen and Artrip were unwilling to invest directly in Lake Tech. Ruff would then have funds to repay her debt with United American. Cohen and Artrip offered to have 2.5% of any loan advances disbursed directly to Ruff for immediate reduction of her debt. Such a requirement was not a
|
 |
COHEN V. UNITED AM. BANK OF CENTRAL FLA.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Cohen v. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Appellants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. 000 payment on her separate loan with United American. Andrea Ruff was an attorney representing Lake Tech. Was a stockholder. The parties agreed that KCB would bid on contracts that otherwise would have been bid by Lake Tech. Because Lake Tech was at risk of being converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Cohen and Artrip were unwilling to invest directly in Lake Tech. Ruff would then have funds to repay her debt with United American. Cohen and Artrip offered to have 2.5% of any loan advances disbursed directly to Ruff for immediate reduction of her debt. Such a requirement was not a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This proof of claim was later amended to $61. The Bankruptcy Judge held that FBCC was a secured creditor of the debtor's estate as a lien holder on real property owned by the debtor. The Bankruptcy Judge later held that the interest and attorneys' fees added to FBCC's proof of claim were prohibited by Pennsylvania's Loan Interest and Protection Law (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Appellants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. Andrea Ruff was an attorney representing Lake Tech. Was a stockholder. The parties agreed that KCB would bid on contracts that otherwise would have been bid by Lake Tech. Because Lake Tech was at risk of being converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Cohen and Artrip were unwilling to invest directly in Lake Tech. Ruff would then have funds to repay her debt with In addition. Cohen and Artrip offered to have United American. 2.5% of any loan advances disbursed directly to Ruff for immediate reduction of her debt. Such a requirement was not a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
171 B.R. 387 IRS cross appeals the district court's award of We have resolved several issues which attorney fees under § 105. required clarification in this circuit. All citations are to the 1994 United States Code. Initially we conclude we have jurisdiction to review the district court's order as a
|
 |
JOVE ENGINEERING V. IRS
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Jove Engineering v. We have resolved several issues which required clarification in this circuit. We remand to the district court to assess attorney fees consistent with 28 U.S.C.
|
 |
JOVE ENGINEERING V. IRS
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Jove Engineering v. We have resolved several issues which required clarification in this circuit. We remand to the district court to assess attorney fees consistent with 28 U.S.C.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Facts The essential facts are not in dispute. The total cost of the items purchased was $4. The contract stated that the Coontses would continue to pay $200 a week and that Potts and Long Dollar retained a purchase money security interest in all of the items until the debt was paid in full. The sheriff indicated that his office did not have the means to transport or store the items. Sheriff Koop asked Potts to transport and store the items for the sheriff's department until they could have an auction to sell the items at a later date. She was taken to the police station and charged. She was never prosecuted for this violation. The property was not collected at that time. Upon informing her that they were there to take the property. She was then arrested for interference with judicial process. I. Summary judgment is proper when the record. Shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is unnecessary. The gravamen of the Coontses' appeal is whether the appellees violated their civil rights under § 19832 by seizing the property via the writ of execution.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
WILL DONOVAN. John Stith* Pennsylvania Green Party and Will Donovan III. That the fee was constitutional as applied to Stith. Even if the fee was unconstitutional. The District Court's order was unduly broad and vague. Donovan were members. Have cross appealed the District Court's granting of summary judgment against them. Background The Commonwealth's Ballot Access Laws The Pennsylvania ballot access law requires candidates for various public offices to pay a filing fee in order to have their names placed on the general election ballot. Unless and until such filing fee is paid . . . .
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee. They are deemed to have waived review of the earlier motion. We note also that although defendants' motions for acquittal and new trial were filed more than seven days after the verdicts were rendered and the jury discharged. The motions were timely because. See id. at 1471 (explaining that a sufficiency challenge untimely brought in the trial court is subject to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Dishonoring the levy is not justified. He was its president and a director. He and his wife were its sole shareholders. Was also the 100% owner of our former customer. LIV was embroiled in litigation with the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: At issue today is whether the district court erred in dismissing. We conclude that the district court did indeed have subject matter jurisdiction. Have various usury laws that generally prohibit such high interest loans. No one doubts that when so called
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have consolidated these appeals for purposes of disposition. This case presents three issues: (1) whether the Cadle Company was properly made a party to the arbitration. N.A. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Their complaint was dismissed under Fed. We will reverse. That their amended complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. A. Whether the District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint Our review of the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is plenary. A complaint must contain
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Superior Bank argued that its mortgage was equitably subrogated to a prior recorded mortgage. After the appeal was filed in this Court. Empire National Bank's mortgage was recorded on December 17. Less than a month after the mortgage was recorded. Which was subsequently withdrawn on October 27. Superior Bank was placed in receivership pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA.1 On November 15. The bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the trustee and avoided Superior Bank's mortgage.2 After that judgment was affirmed by the district court on appeal. Nearly two years after the FDIC was appointed as receiver. The bankruptcy court concluded that it could not rule on Superior Bank's jurisdictional challenge because it was. A collateral attack on the judgment that was pending on appeal before this Court. 2001 order was entered by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and is entitled
|
 |
97-6329 -- U.S. V. BOOS -- 01/14/1999
Gunwall both were convicted of one count of conspiracy to impede and injure officers of the United States from discharging the lawful duties of their offices. (3) he was selectively and vindictively prosecuted. (4) a $9000 fine imposed by the district court was inconsistent with his ability to pay. Gunwall appeals his convictions on four separate grounds: (1) he was vindictively prosecuted. (2) the district court should have excluded evidence of his affiliation with
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Claiming that the property was. KACZYNSKI 8589 Because the government's plan is inconsistent with the purpose of victim restitution. With our precedent specifying what must be done with a defendant's property once it is no longer needed as evidence. Kaczynski was charged with numerous counts involving the transportation and/or mailing of explosives with the intent to kill. Kaczynski was sentenced to life in prison. Which will last until his restitution debt is satisfied. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c).2 Kaczynski then moved to have his conviction vacated under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs are a class of California residents who received debt collection letters from defendant Commonwealth Equity Adjustments. Were subsequently found in contempt for violating the injunction and sanctioned by the magistrate judge. Background Commonwealth is a debt collection agency located in California. Plaintiffs are a class of California residents who received form debt collection letters from Commonwealth. The plaintiff class was certified. The
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The District Court for the Southern District of California agreed with BSI that the property in question was not an asset of the judgment debtor FLATOW v. Was killed in an explosion when the bus in which she was traveling collided with a van loaded with explosives. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 statutory note.3 This provision is commonly referred to as the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
As anyone who has taken out such a loan is doubtless aware. Many of these forms are required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). One of whose requirements is at issue in this case: that a creditor clearly disclose to a borrower her right to rescind the loan within three days and provide the borrower with an appropriate form to 2 Nos. 04 3690 & 04 4042 accomplish the rescission. The period within which the borrower may rescind the loan is extended from three days to up to three years. One of which was inappropriate for her loan. Handy held a 30year variable rate mortgage on her home that was serviced by a company known as Homecomings. Handy was given five rescission forms. Four of these forms were identical.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Flegles was able to use the True Value trademark and to benefit from group buying power and group billing procedures. Additional contracts were executed to secure these advances in which Flegles agreed to maintain an acceptable credit history and to remain a member in good standing of TruServ. Flegles also alleged that the January 2000 execution of the member agreement was fraudulently induced. Flegles asked the No. 04 3819 3 court to issue a declaratory judgment and to find that the agreements between the parties are null and void because of fraud and breach of contract. Finding that TruServ was liable for $1.3 million in damages. TruServ attempted to collect the debt it was owed either from Flegles (the corporation). That abstention was not necessary or proper in this case. We review de novo the district court's decision regarding personal 1 The breakdown of the total award is as follows: $77. Flegle argues that the court below should have granted her motion to dismiss because TruServ could not prove that she had the requisite
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Two defendants pleaded guilty and the remaining twelve defendants were convicted by a jury on all charges following a joint trial. Defendant Rodger Yates was serving a sentence in federal prison for activities involving the
|
 |
96-6400 -- ADVANTOR CAPITAL CORP. V. YEARY -- 02/18/1998
James Yeary testified that no one was holding any property in trust for Sonitrol of Oklahoma City. Also represented there were no records of property being held in trust for Sonitrol of Oklahoma City by any third party. A garnishee summons was issued to Sonitrol of Oklahoma City and to Kline &. Counsel asserted the validity of the judgments in 86 2703 A was subject to the bankruptcy proceeding and that it held $150. There was evidence the money Kline &. Kline held in trust was for Sonitrol of Oklahoma City. The standard is essentially identical to the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
I. BACKGROUND PDQ is a manufacturer of car washes. Wash was PDQ's exclusive distributor for the St. Wash and Wallis were discussing a deal in which they would form a partnership to hold the exclusive distributorship. PDQ terminated Wash's agreement eight months before it was to expire. Wash and Wallis is explained more fully below. Louis region was a company known as Nu Look. Wallis was considering the replacement of numerous car washes it had purchased from Ryko. Wallis executives became convinced that PDQ's equipment and organization were far superior to Ryko. No cause was required for a party to elect not to renew the agreement. Brooks informed PDQ via letter that Wallis was committed to buying PDQ equipment from Wash for those locations. The two G 5s were plagued with the problems often associated with the roll out of new products. While the G 5s were not functioning as promised. That Wallis was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue in these appeals is the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Was executed by Debtor and Safeco. Was renewable for four additional one year periods unless Safeco gave ninety days notice of its intent to cancel or not to renew. The ADM bond further provided: It is understood and agreed that [ADM] may recover the full amount of the Bond (less any previous amounts paid to [ADM] under the Bond) if [Safeco] cancels or nonrenews the Bond and. Because Debtor was now in bankruptcy. The agreement reflected in the Term Sheet was a post petition security credit agreement that required bankruptcy court approval. 3 In late July and early August. Although the new arrangements were later approved by the bankruptcy court. The ADM bond is in full force and effect. There have never been any claims against it. Safeco's original complaint sought a declaratory judgment determining that ADM was not entitled to forfeiture of the penal sum of five million dollars and an injunction preventing ADM from continuing to demand payment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are asked to decide whether the decision of a state administrative law judge (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are asked to decide whether the decision of a state administrative law judge (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The proofs of claim were based upon a judgment rendered in favor of Normali against three corporations. The Debtors have a relationship with each of these entities as officers. Each of the O'Donnell Corporations is a debtor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Normali seeks to recover assets of the O'Donnell Corporations alleged to have been fraudulently transferred to the Debtors. He filed suit in state court to recover these assets before the bankruptcy cases for the O'Donnell Corporations were filed. Normali asserts that the conclusion of the bankruptcy court was error. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues raised on appeal are these: (1) Whether a judgment creditor with a claim against a debtor corporation has standing to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case of an individual debtor who is alleged to be a transferee of fraudulent transfers from the debtor corporation. (2) Whether standing may be considered by the Panel when it is raised for the first time on appeal. (3) Whether the Debtors have standing to object to proofs of claim in their individual bankruptcy cases.
|
 |
99-6396 -- SANDERS V. VAUGHN -- 03/29/2000
After learning the IRS was willing to offer him $30. In February 1995 Sanders wrote a letter to the IRS informing the agency that he was revoking Vaughn's power of attorney. Several days later. Vaughn was informed by IRS revenue agent Kathy Bird that Sanders had revoked his power of attorney and that she could not speak with him. On March 10. Sanders told Vaughn he owed him nothing and was not going to pay Vaughn's contingency fee. Vaughn filed suit against him in the District Court of Oklahoma County three days later. A trial was held on the narrow issue of whether Sanders's debt fell under that statute.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Factual Background Waymer was an elected member of the Atlanta Board of Education (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Latturner were on brief for appellants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was sharing with Mary Olivas (Olivas) and Donald Hayes (Hayes). Came from Scheetz's source in California and were delivered by way of Federal Express. The house in Fayetteville was searched by law enforcement officers who found marijuana and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy). Hayes and Benjamin Brooks were arrested and charged with violations of North Carolina state drug laws. Which they were both attending. Went to Scheetz's house to help breakdown mari1
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Trustee argued that Defendants had fraudulently misappropriated large sums of cash and inventory from Debtor while they were in control of its activities. I. Debtor was incorporated in October 1988. Its principal business was the manufacture and sale of T shirts. It was a closely held corporation with the sole ownership stake split between the company's president. Samuel's sister Hava Simchon was a commission salesperson but did not serve as an officer or director. Debtor was a very successful company. Virtually all of them were offshore. (STKH) was formed in March 1997. STKH was contractually obliged to pay Debtor $3. That rent was never paid. 000 and were valued in September 1997 at $107. Its revenues had fallen to $13 million and it was operating at essentially no profit. Samuel purchased products from Debtor and resold them to Debtor's customers when he was able to do so. The inventory that Samuel purchased was identified and physically segregated from Debtor's remaining inventory.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The representatives of a class of employees and their dependents who were participants in a medical benefit plan sponsored and funded by their employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Were left with significant. Holdeman is the class representative of a group of employees. The hotel and casino were owned and operated by State Line Hotel. Claims for benefits were paid in the order in which they were received. Claims above a certain dollar amount were covered. Holdeman and the other class members were covered under the State Line & Silver Smith Casino Resorts Employee Benefits Plan (the Plan). Was self funded.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Thus the evidence was insufficient to prove one large conspiracy. Because there was no single conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The jury's drug quantity finding was unsupported by the evidence. Esquivel testified Detweiler occasionally told Berner others were waiting to purchase the drugs. What is the definition of conspiracy?
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The parties' positions are based on several contractual arrangements. BPC was authorized to purchase paper only from SearsBPC would then charge Sears for both the At the same time. In order to obtain these discounted paper supply BPC was not a party to the agreements arrangements. Boatmen's argues that Sears does not have a right to offset Sears counters that the language of its agreement with In the alternative. It found Sears was Our standard of review is de novo. § 9 318 states: (1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in section 400.9 206 the rights of an assignee are subject to (a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom. Subsection (a) does not apply it says because Sears is asserting rights arising from third party agreements. Argues that its payments to the suppliers were permissible offsets under (a) because they were made pursuant to its contract with BPC.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Michael Segal and Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB) were charged in 27 counts of a 28 count fourth superseding indictment: Segal with racketeering. NNIB was ordered to pay a $1.4 million fine and pay restitution totaling 2 Nos. 05 4601 & 05 4756 $841. Segal was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. Segal was a licensed attorney. An insurance broker who began working for NNIB in 1964 when it was owned by George Dunne. By the early 1990s Segal was the owner and sole shareholder of the company. During the 1990s NNIB was earning close to $50 million annually. Required insurance brokers to maintain a premium fund trust account (PFTA) into which all premiums were to be deposited and held in a fiduciary capacity until the carriers demanded the premium payments. Brokers were required to maintain PFTAs in trust with sufficient funds to pay premiums. Failure to properly maintain a PFTA was grounds for suspension or revocation of a broker's license. Conversion of more than $150 was a felony. Everything was deposited in the PFTA.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The prior opinion in this case is hereby VACATED and the opinion set forth below is substituted in its place. The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and * Honorable John R. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The prior opinion in this case is hereby VACATED and the opinion set forth below is substituted in its place. The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the brief were Frank W. Attorney at the time the briefs were filed. With him on the brief was Ramon P. Was therefore invalid under Bowen v. Because we do not think OFAC's application of the new rule was retroactive in the sense in which Bowen uses the term. Had The Bank of New York agreed to such a role it would have substituted its credit for that of the Rasheed Bank. Although Bergerco is a Canadian corporation (i.e. Because its parent was a U.S. corporation and its U.S. affiliate was involved in the transaction. This was incorporated in a more formal set of rules adopted in January 1991. 31 CFR s 575.510(a) (1996). Because Bergerco's letter of credit was neither issued nor confirmed by a U.S. bank. Only the dispute with OFAC is on appeal.). There is an exception.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Castellanos Law Firm were on brief for appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
He presses three arguments: (1) his conviction must be vacated because his confessions should have been suppressed as evidence because they were made outside the six hour period in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and after the arresting officials violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) by unnecessarily delaying in bringing him before a federal magistrate judge. (2) remand is required because (a) he was sentenced prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Because we believe that the first contention is governed by our decision in Government of the Virgin Islands v. We discern no error in the District Court's determination that Corley's confessions were voluntary. The delay in presenting him to a federal magistrate judge beyond that provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) will not result in suppressing his confessions. He is not entitled to a remand because the District Court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Federal officials identified Johnnie Corley as a suspect in the robbery and were later informed of an outstanding bench warrant from a state court for him on a matter unrelated to the robbery.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Su and
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
(2) gave Congrove the right to occupy the Defendant McDonald's The facts in this case are largely uncontested. The franchise was also evidenced by a license agreement and a lease. The franchise agreement was amended to include a second restaurant. McDonald's issued a memorandum finding Congrove's financial position critical and suggesting that the total value of the two restaurants was $850. Three options were presented by McDonald's to Congrove to settle their mutual claims: (1) McDonald's could purchase both restaurants for $700. Or (3) Congrove could voluntarily terminate his franchises and then have McDonald's
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Was $748. 664.76) as attorney's fees. 3 bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
|
 |
PLANTE V. COMMISSIONER (3/5/1999, NO. 98-8298)
Appeal the tax court's decision that they are not entitled to a business bad debt deduction for 1991 and the associated carryover losses to later years. (BCBI): Plante was president and sole shareholder of BCBI. These advances were not recorded as promissory notes. BCBI suffered heavy losses. Accrued interest and capital lease due Shareholder as of the Closing have been tendered to Buyer in exchange for Buyer notes. In this appeal. 000 Plante advanced to BCBI was a loan or a capital contribution. 000 not evidenced by promissory notes was not deductible. This is the rule:
|
 |
PLANTE V. COMMISSIONER (3/5/1999, NO. 98-8298)
Appeal the tax court's decision that they are not entitled to a business bad debt deduction for 1991 and the associated carryover losses to later years. (BCBI): Plante was president and sole shareholder of BCBI. These advances were not recorded as promissory notes. BCBI suffered heavy losses. Accrued interest and capital lease due Shareholder as of the Closing have been tendered to Buyer in exchange for Buyer notes. In this appeal. 000 Plante advanced to BCBI was a loan or a capital contribution. 000 not evidenced by promissory notes was not deductible. This is the rule:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
A default judgment was entered against Charles T. Goldman is a debt collection organization that specializes in seeking restitution for its customers from individuals who make payment with nonsufficient fund checks. A form debt collection letter was sent to Davis. I have been retained by the above referenced client to assess the possibility of taking legal action against you. Issuance of fraudulent checks is a violation of criminal state statute. If you are prosecuted and convicted. You may have a permanent criminal record. No. 01 4189 3 This matter was previously placed with a collection agency that made numerous unsuccessful efforts at a resolution. This is a serious matter involving possible violation of state law and will be your last opportunity for amicable resolution. THE CHOICE IS YOURS. It is not entirely clear from the record why the action was filed only against Hutchins rather than against the company for which he allegedly worked. Hutchins disputes the fact that Goldman is a fiction. Hutchins was served with the complaint on August 6.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: p.9. P.C. were on brief for Monarch Life Insurance Company. P.C. were on brief for Ropes & Gray. We now affirm the district court on the ground that Monarch Life is collaterally estopped from asserting a state court challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enter the permanent injunction incorporated in the confirmed reorganization plan. This Order constitutes an injunction against all persons (other than the FDIC as Receiver) from taking any of the following actions (other than an 2Ropes & Gray was scheduled as a creditor in the chapter 11 proceeding. None are material to this appeal. 5Section 105(a) provides in relevant part:
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse the district court's order. We will remand the case to the district court for the proceedings we outline in this opinion. Which was the post petition portion of the fourth quarter wages it withheld for payment to the City of Farrell. The city contends that Begier held that a trust is created for the benefit of the taxing authority whenever an employer withholds a portion of an employee's wages as income taxes. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Clair was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. I. The government's key evidence was obtained by electronic recordings of Cunningham's statements at his principal place of business. The electronic surveillance was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a state court. This is the second time this case has come before us. Which was denied. They informed the court that the case would go to trial and that there were still suppression issues outstanding. It was his
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse and remand to the district court for entry of an order directing the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay for the limited purpose of allowing Baldino's appeal. Wilson's complaint was subsequently dismissed. The parties filed briefs on appeal and argument was scheduled for February 6. [S]imply because you prevail in the State Court does not necessarily mean that you will prevail in a non dischargeability action . . . there's no need to determine the extent and validity of claims unless there's going to be a distribution or unless the debt has been determined to be dischargeable. This premise is incorrect as a matter of law. The debtor was sued in New Jersey state court for malicious prosecution. The verdict included afinding that the debtor
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. We have not decided whether to view collection notices from the standpoint of the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. We have not decided whether to view collection notices from the standpoint of the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Defendants Gillian and Uwe Siemon Netto are two among the hundreds of
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: Page 8. O'Keefe and Packer & O'Keefe were on brief for appellant. Snow & Hahn was on brief for appellee. The R/V Endeavor is a vessel chartered by the National Science Foundation to URI's Graduate School of Oceanog raphy (GSO) for research purposes. Which are submerged in salt water during normal operation of the vessel. Is not a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Have jurisdiction to adjudicate a 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 taxpayer's challenge that the notice of foreclosure provided by the taxing authority of a state is constitutionally inadequate. We conclude that the district courts have jurisdiction. Whether the taxpayers in this consolidated appeal were provided with constitutionally adequate notice. The sole case to resolve the dispute on non jurisdictional grounds is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. A central Vermont town. plaintiff owned real property and was delinquent in paying property taxes. Plaintiffs assert that the local taxing authorities failed to notify them adequately of the pending foreclosure and subsequent public sale of their property.1 Plaintiffs complain that it is fundamentally unfair. Elizabeth Luessenhop Elizabeth Luessenhop (Luessenhop) was the owner of two parcels of land located in the Village of Champlain. Her permanent address was 2944 At times during 2002. It was her practice to pay a sufficient amount of the back taxes to avoid losing title to her property.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
In this case we are required to decide the constitutionality of Tennessee's statute making available the purchase of automobile license plates with a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This is an appeal from the United States Tax Court's decision upholding the Commissioner's determination that Mr. Mortensen is liable for a section 6662(a) negligence penalty of $784 for the taxable year 1991. The Hoyt Partnerships have generated litigation across the country. Commissioner Page 2 assessment was erroneous or that Mortensen did what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances. I. The history of these partnerships is complex. Courts have described the partnerships in varying degrees of detail. Hoyt's father was a prominent breeder of Shorthorn cattle and in the late 1960s began promoting cattle breeding partnerships. Hoyt acted as the tax matters partner on each of the partnerships that were subject to the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Hoyt was also the general partner and was responsible for the preparation of the tax returns for each partnership and he typically signed and filed each return. Was prepared and signed by Hoyt. Hoyt was also a licensed enrolled agent.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The distinction between a loan and an advance payment for the purpose of whether the funds received are to be treated as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Allen & Snyder was on consolidated brief for Woloohojian Realty Corporation. Goodale and MacAdams & Wieck Incorporated were on consolidated brief for Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank. Cannavino and Cummings & Lockwood were on consolidated brief for Elizabeth V. What could have been a relatively simple suit has been complicated by intervening actions by Bogosian's creditors. The original parties have been litigating for over ten years. The action was brought as a diversity suit in the federal district court. The defendants were the corporation and Bogosian's two brothers. Bogosian is entitled to the fair value of her shares as of January 19. Judge Boyle's first action was to provide interim relief to Bogosian. 000 monthly until the entry of a final judgment from which no appeal was taken. Judge Boyle appointed a special master to value the property and much of the next two years appears to have been spent in this exercise. It was sent back for adjustments. At least one objective was to stem the accrual of interest on WRC's debt to Bogosian.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant. Dana & Gould were on brief for appellees. The result is that only the lead bank has a direct contractual relationship with the borrower.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We hold that there is diversity of citizenship here. That the defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted. The notes were endorsed by Barrie Peterson. Who is now the sole shareholder of DEP. Both notes were secured by first lien deeds of trust on three pieces of real property located in Prince William County. The bank was repeatedly forced to pay long overdue sewer and water bills.
|
 |
UNITED STATES V. DESANTIAGO-FLORES
I. Defendant was indicted and tried on fourteen drug trafficking counts. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 511 months' imprisonment. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove the bombings in counts 12 and 13 were committed
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
1994 is corrected as follows: On page 2. Meyer & Solomon were on brief. Clarifying the source and extent of bankruptcy courts' powers to manage the estates of debtors whose fates are intertwined with the affairs of failed financial institutions. Background Background The facts essential to an understanding of this appeal are not disputed. The debt (much of which remains unpaid) is evidenced by three promissory notes. The notes are cross collateralized and secured by mortgages encumbering all three pieces of property. First Service was declared insolvent. The FDIC was appointed as liquidating agent (and thereby became the owner and holder of the notes). The appeal (which we shall term
|
 |
00-1357 -- SCHRODER V. BUSH -- 08/24/2001
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The primary issue presented in this case is whether an insurer of municipal bonds that becomes the owner of those bonds upon default has standing pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Appellant Louis Daidone was charged with racketeering. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Was charged in a five count indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Are straightforward. Was involved in loansharking operations. Were the Gilmore murder. The witness tampering conviction is based on the Facciolo murder. Was cooperating with authorities regarding an investigation in California into a murder orchestrated by the Luchese family. C. The Loansharking The government's evidence showed that as early as 1988 Daidone was extensively involved in making and collecting various extortionate loans. Even though Daidone was in prison. The government established at trial that between 1997 and 1999 Daidone was involved in a number of extortionate loans. Some of which are addressed below. Should be reversed because the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. Because the jury was not charged on the element of premeditation.
|
 |
00-6170 -- ELLIS V. CAC FINANCIAL CORP. -- 03/26/2001
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiffs Gloria F. Claud Ellis is Gloria Ellis's ex husband. Both Claud and Gloria Ellis represented that Gloria Ellis was not a guarantor for the debt owed by Claud Ellis. We must begin by considering whether we have jurisdiction over the claims raised. We will consider the issues concerning appellate jurisdiction first. See. They challenge the district court's order awarding Rule 11 sanctions to defendants. The jurisdictional facts are as follows. 2000 order became final and appealable when the Rule 58 judgment was entered. This is true in spite of the fact that it left the amount of Rule 11 sanctions undetermined. See Budinich v. 2000 notice of appeal from this order was timely. Their appeal from the summary judgment order therefore is now properly before us. 2. 2000 notice of appeal was ineffective to appeal from the order denying appellants' Rule 60 motion. Appellants were required to file an amended notice of appeal after the motion was resolved. See id. Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The question presented by this appeal is whether U.S. currency is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
McGovern with whom Indeglia & McGovern was on brief for appellants. Levine and MacAdams & Wieck Incorporated were on brief for appellee. The district court held that an earlier decision in a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding initiated by Belmont was res judicata as to Bogosian's counterclaims. Bogosian's and Belmont's appeals were consolidated. Bogosian was a partner with her brother in a real estate company called E&J. The parties have battled over these promissory notes in three separate arenas: the United States District Court. A default judgment was entered against her. Her attentions may have been on the bankruptcy court where. The court allowed her to file counterclaims against the Bank asserting what were in essence the same claims based on an alleged oral agreement by the Bank not to call the Belmont Note. The amended counterclaims were based on the same alleged oral agreement by the Bank. There were two cases pending in the district court relating to Belmont and the Belmont Note the Bankruptcy Appeal and the District Court Action.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief. With whom Sheketoff & Homan were on brief. LLP were on brief. Friedman was convicted of defrauding several federally insured banks and ordered at sentencing to pay restitution to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Because Unisource was not the victim of defendant's offenses. If they were actually raised by the facts of this case. Affirming the district court's order does not present the dangers the government fears because we do not agree that the district court's order releasing funds to Unisource was an order of
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We must decide whether an estate is entitled to a theft loss deduction under the federal tax code for funds wrongfully paid out from an estate and never returned. The bonds had been stolen from Meriano but were later returned to the estate. Excessive fees and costs were charged against the estate by the stockbroker and the attorney/investigator who had retrieved the bonds and administered the estate. Tax Court that the stockbroker and the attorney/investigator had committed theft under Pennsylvania state law and that 2 the estate was therefore entitled to a deduction for its loss pursuant to 26 U.S.C. We will reverse the tax court's decision and allow the estate its deduction. I. FACTS The facts of this case were set forth in great detail by the tax court. We will recount only those facts that are relevant to the issues on appeal. Meriano notified the Philadelphia Police Department that the bonds themselves were missing from a safe located in an area of the residence damaged by the fire. Was appointed administratrix of his estate.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Snow & Hahn was on brief for appellant/cross appellee Focus Investment Associates. Sheehan and Wistow & Barylick Inc. were on brief for appellee/cross appellant American Title Insurance Company. Kelly & Murphy were on brief for appellees Tobak and Abrams & Verri. Bruzzi was on brief for appellee Owen B. 000 damage award on Focus's contract claim may have resulted from erroneous instructions and should therefore be vacated. Both motions are now known as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Seeking a writ of execution against the Plan for the amount in which Myers was in arrears on his child support payments under the 1981 judgment. This order
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Pendent state law claims against Chase Manhattan Corp. and Hyundai Motor Finance Co. alleging that she was given false financing disclosures when she purchased an automobile. We will reverse. I. The essential facts are undisputed. This breakdown is mandated by 15 U.S.C. Which requires a creditor to disclose to a borrower
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is whether an insurance company must turn over to its terminated agent $259. Because we recognized that this issue was one of first impression in New Jersey. Essentially at will or. That the termination was at will. The consequence of this ruling is that New Jersey's Agency Termination Statute requires Ohio Casualty to pay PIM commissions on all policies for one year following termination. PIM would have no right to these commissions. The remaining issues on appeal arise from the ruling that the termination was at will. (2) whether PIM is entitled to pre judgment interest on the commissions. We remand to the Bankruptcy Court to apply to the facts of this case the legal determination that the initial at will termination can become a termination for cause between the notice of termination and the effective termination date. The claims of constructive trust and contempt of court addressed by the District Court were not raised on appeal. Factual and Procedural Background The facts of this case are set out at length in previous opinions of this Court3 and the District Court.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With whom were
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Seeking a writ of execution against the Plan for the amount in which Myers was in arrears on his child support payments under the 1981 judgment. This order
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse and remand for further proceedings concerning the applicability of the discovery rule to the debtor's claims against its lawyer's law firm and the law firm's individual shareholders. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in Continental Bank's favor. We will also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and the debtor's law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. P.C. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Capone LLP was on brief for appellants.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Who are the beneficial owners of Brickellbush. N.V. and other persons who may be interested in this action and who are presently unknown to plaintiffs. Thus we conclude that their substantive RICO claims were properly dismissed. Because Plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claims are entirely dependent on their substantive RICO claims. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects.1 BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts giving rise to this appeal is assumed. As those facts are set forth in the District Court's comprehensive published opinions. We relate below only those facts and proceedings that are relevant to the present appeals. Sohrab was to pay FCAM $4.5 million in return for an interest in a new Delaware corporation called First Capital Corp. The action was commenced in December 1993. Found that Sohrab himself was not personally liable.1 NACI and NAP were shell companies. That dismissal was reversed as against Sohrab by the Appellate Division.3 In June 2001. Judgment was entered in Oost Lievense's favor. 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 See First Capital v.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The full outstanding balance of the mortgage is governed by the antimodification clause. Whether the antimodification clause applies to a second or junior mortgage if that mortgage is wholly unsecured by any remaining value in the residence.1 1. The second mortgage is now deemed wholly unsecured in 2 In interpreting Nobelman the Bankruptcy and District Courts both concluded that the second mortgage on the McDonalds' residence is subject to the antimodification clause. Even if the value of their home is less than the outstanding balance of the first mortgage. We will reverse. In the Bankruptcy Court the parties purportedly entered into a stipulation of facts specifying that the outstanding balance of the first mortgage is greater than the value of the McDonalds' home. Asserted that their
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
It seeks to have the County's flow control plan declared unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. Pennsylvania was no exception. Methods less protective of the environment generally have lower capital and operating costs. Most waste disposal facilities were privately owned and operated.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This is an appeal by Robert Frank and Lorin Ahlers from their convictions and sentences. Frank was convicted on forty nine counts. He was acquitted on two counts. Ahlers was convicted on nine counts. He was acquitted on one count. Frank was convicted in federal court in 1988 for burning down the house of Iowa District Court Judge Thomas Nelson. The government's case against both defendants was premised largely upon the theory that they had agreed with others to hide Mr. After the verdict was returned against them. They contend that the district court erred in denying these motions because there was insufficient evidence to convict them of any offense. They argue generally that they committed no crimes because all of the assets that the government contends were owned by Mr. Frank were actually owned by others. Thus there could not have been any false statements. We
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Dunlap alleges that as part of the transaction he was required to sign a retail installment contract that included. That these insurance products were provided by American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (ABICF) and American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida (ABLACF). Or the validity of this Agreement . . . shall be resolved by arbitration in the state in which this Agreement is entered into . . . in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. While that motion and Dunlap's underlying claims were pending in state court. Is involved in this appeal. 1 4 FRIEDMAN'S v. Were the petition granted. Will not exceed eight thousand dollars ($8. We also conclude that federal jurisdiction is lacking. The district court concluded that the question of whether one of the abstention doctrines applied was moot since federal jurisdiction was lacking. DUNLAP 5 coming to this conclusion inasmuch as another jurisdictional defect exists.3 Despite getting in state court what it is now seeking in federal court an order that Dunlap's underlying claims be submitted to arbitration Friedman's still insists that we can and should permit his federal lawsuit to continue.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue before this Court is relatively straightforward: When marital assets have been awarded to the wife in a state court matrimonial proceeding. Are those assets nevertheless part of the husband's bankruptcy estate if a Chapter 7 petition is filed after the state court's decision but before the state court judgment is entered? Finding that the entry of the state court judgment is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Akorn's Financial Reports and SEC Filings Akorn is a corporation that manufactures and sells diagnostic and therapeutic pharmaceuticals. The company's profits were primarily from five major wholesale customers. Invoices were typically twenty to thirty pages long. A customer payment to Akorn was accompanied by a remittance advice of up to 400 lines in length. Akorn's invoicing system was a labyrinth in which the company billed customers and processed No. 05 3510 3 cash remittances and credit claims against invoices at three different finance offices that used different computer programs and record keeping mechanisms. Akorn's use of Macola was short lived. The result was a parallel system of bill tracking that used two different software modules. McConville was also.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Medina & Gorbea were on brief for appellant. Gelpi & Gotay were on brief for appellee. The note was secured with a mortgage on the Bayamon property. Union was ordered closed and the FDIC was appointed its receiver. That the FDIC was a holder in due course of a facially valid bearer note and. Was entitled to judgment on it as a matter of law. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate where
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We are confronted with a tension between bankruptcy law and labor law. These claims were based on alleged seniority integration rights stemming from a pending labor arbitration dispute and were filed following Continental's acquisition of Eastern and subsequent refusal to bargain over the seniority integration of Eastern's pilots. Both of which are no longer represented by ALPA. Appealed to this court.1 Resolution of this dispute requires us to determine: (1) whether the bankruptcy claims that the LPP Claimants and the Group of 31 seek to enforce constitute
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the briefs were Jeffery A. With him on the brief were Joel I. With him on the brief was Allen R. Hahn were on the briefs for intervenor Airports Council Interna tional North America. Reasoning that the City's attempt to recoup its
|
 |
99-6116 -- MANCHESTER V. ANNIS -- 10/19/2000
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The district court found that twenty two of the tribal accounts were subject to garnishment. The government also unsuccessfully sought to have the court hold members of the Tribal Council in contempt. The Tribe appeals the district court's A full account of the underlying facts of this protracted dispute can be found in this prior case. 2 1 findings that fifteen of the accounts are subject to garnishment. Is exempt. DISCUSSION The denial of a contempt order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. A district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. The Tribe's Appeal Case No. 00 1542 The district court issued writs of garnishment against twenty three tribal accounts utilizing the Act.2 This legislation was enacted in 1990 to address the need for a uniform procedure to collect over five billion dollars worth of non tax related civil debts. The Act is divided into four principal provisions: subchapter A (§§ 3001 3015) contains definitions and general provisions.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The original judgment was entered on July 15. Siemer alleged that the amount of the Illinois state court judgment was $42. Found that the debts were nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that Nangle was collaterally estopped from relitigating the matters that led to the Illinois judgment. We are unclear of the basis for her request. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that both the Illinois judgment and the Missouri judgment were nondischargeable. Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witness.4 We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo.5 In the United States the parties to litigation generally bear the cost of their own attorney's fees.6 Under this
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is corrected as follows: On page 36. Line 9: change
|
 |
00-1487 -- CURTISS SIMMONS CAPITAL RESOURCES INC. V. EDWARD KRAEMER & SONS INC. -- 12/03/2001
We affirm. BACKGROUND The origin of this case is a subcontract between Kraemer and Consolidated Landscaping. Who was the general contractor for the construction of the Twentieth Street Viaduct in Denver. Alleging that Kraemer was liable to Consolidated for $281. Would be determined in the second phase.
|
 |
RICHARDSON V. MILLER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Richardson v. Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff appellant Darryl Richardson is a resident of the State of Georgia. Sims (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge. is left for distribution in the consolidated chapter 7 estate of Bristol Terminals. An applica tion for an order authorizing joint administration of the Bristol and Hemingway chapter 11 estates was immediately granted by the bankruptcy court. The Hemingway Bristol chapter 11 proceedings were voluntarily converted to negligence on its part or on the part of its agents. The mortgage unmistakably provides that the sale and mortgage of the Property were
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Griffin was on brief. Levinson LLP were on brief. We nonetheless reach the same ultimate conclusion and affirm the judgment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was 2 convicted by a jury for his participation in an illegal check cashing scheme involving fourteen fraudulent checks. Are deposit account numbers on the back of five of the fraudulent checks which are different from the deposit account numbers on the others. Indicating that the checks were cashed in a branch of the check cashing business other than the one in which he worked. Even if he had identified new evidence which would prove that the checks were endorsed at another branch. He has failed to establish that he was subjectively unaware of such evidence or that it could not have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence before the trial. We will reverse the order granting Cimera's motion for a new trial. I. Cimera was the general manager of Montclair Check Cashing in Montclair. He was indicted and charged with one count of conspiracy to transport stolen property 3 interstate and six counts of transporting stolen securities and money in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2312. The Government presented evidence that Cimera had conspired with Michael Ferrante and Frank Palmer to cash checks that Palmer had stolen from his employer.1 Ferrante was a New Jersey bookie.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm. Accompanying the Note was a mortgage on property located in St. On the same day that the Note was executed. Alleging that Milligan was in default. RTC was Fairbanks has undergone a corporate name change and is now legally Select Portfolio Servicing. Whose parent company is SPS Holding Corp. Milligan was again in default and on June 1. Fairbanks advised Milligan by letter that he was in default of the Note for failing to pay the monthly installments as they became due. The Court found that the default underlying the 1994 action was separate and distinct from the default underlying the Fairbanks' complaint. We have final jurisdiction over this appeal from the District Court's final order and judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The question of whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel apply to this second foreclosure action is a question of law. There appears no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment. Milligan argues that because the first action was dismissed with prejudice.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
An order is final if it
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Conclude that its explanation for the very large cut in the number of hours compensated was not adequate. The case against CCC was tried to a jury. 4368 Ferland prevailed at trial. Primarily on the basis that $160 per hour was the appropriate rate for an attorney of her experience level. The court also subtracted from the fee award time it believed was expended solely on the losing claim against Michel. Since Michel was a witness in Ferland's case against CCC. It is not clear to us how the district court. Percentage Reduction Much more consequential in terms of its potential impact on the total fee award is the controversy between the parties concerning the district court's determination that only 120 of the hours Ferland's attorney expended on the litigation should be compensated.3 The district court first found that Ferland's attorney lacked adequate experience to justify her requested hourly rate. It observed that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This is an appeal by defendant Ellwood Group. The most important issue involves the question whether the joint venture agreement was ambiguous as a matter of law as to whether Ellwood could properly claim rebates for its sales to third parties of ingots pr oduced by the Ellwood Uddeholm Steel Company (EUS). Or whether Ellwood was limited to rebates for sales by EUS to Ellwood for Ellwood's own use. We conclude that the District Court was correct in finding a contractual ambiguity. That it erred in instructing the jury that Ellwood had the burden of establishing the meaning of the disputed terms in the agreement because of the fiduciary relationship between the parties that was cr eated by the joint venture. Other important issues include: (1) whether Uddeholm's breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets claims were covered and thus precluded by its breach of contract claim. (2) whether Ellwood's potential liability on the civil conspiracy claim was for eclosed because the jury found no other conspirator.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We must determine whether the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (
|
 |
RICHARDSON V. MILLER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Richardson v. Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff appellant Darryl Richardson is a resident of the State of Georgia. Sims (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We must determine whether the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
He argues that his guilty plea was not knowing. We conclude that his plea was knowing. We conclude that the district court did err in not considering Mustafa's ability to pay the restitution that was imposed in the amount of $732. We will remand for resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each redemption certificate purported to verify that the food stamps Mustafa was depositing were obtained in a manner that was consistent with controlling USDA r egulations. The government also intr oduced the testimony of an employee who testified that Mustafa had attempted to persuade him to say that the fir e was caused by a pot of potatoes left on the stove. Testimony of witnesses regarding the food stamp fraud Mustafa was conducting fr om the 1. The supermarket was in serious financial trouble. Some of the income Mustafa was deriving from the supermarket was derived from a fraudulent food stamp scheme. Mustafa's only viable asset was the insurance policy on the building and the super market business. 3 supermarket.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue on appeal is whether. This case also presents the threshold issue whether we will adopt a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We affirm the district court's conclusion as to preemption under the Bank Act but hold that the per diem loan interest statute is not preempted by the DIDMCA. The purpose of the audits was to ascertain whether the mortgage subsidiaries had overcharged interest and provided unduly low estimates of certain classes of settlement fees. 3 WFHMI was licensed to engage in real estate lending activities under the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA). Wells Fargo's claims as to WFHMI are not moot. Even if they were. There is no distinction between WFHMI and NCMC pertinent to our disposition. 4 Specifically. Unless a person or transaction is excepted from a definition or exempt from licensure by a provision of this law or a rule of the commissioner. The licensing requirements referred to in the section are discussed in more detail below. 5 The CFLL does not apply to any loans made pursuant to the CRMLA. BOUTRIS Commissioner is the state official charged with enforcing those laws governing licensed home mortgage lenders.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This is an appeal by defendant Ellwood Group. The most important issue involves the question whether the joint venture agreement was ambiguous as a matter of law as to whether Ellwood could properly claim rebates for its sales to third parties of ingots pr oduced by the Ellwood Uddeholm Steel Company (EUS). Or whether Ellwood was limited to rebates for sales by EUS to Ellwood for Ellwood's own use. We conclude that the District Court was correct in finding a contractual ambiguity. That it erred in instructing the jury that Ellwood had the burden of establishing the meaning of the disputed terms in the agreement because of the fiduciary relationship between the parties that was cr eated by the joint venture. Other important issues include: (1) whether Uddeholm's breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets claims were covered and thus precluded by its breach of contract claim. (2) whether Ellwood's potential liability on the civil conspiracy claim was for eclosed because the jury found no other conspirator.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. They contend that at closing they were charged a number of fees including: a funding fee ($195). Their loan was allegedly assigned to GMAC Residential Funding Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The shippers have appealed. Are international metal traders. Both are incorporated in Switzerland and both are engaged primarily in the purchase and sale of aluminum. In order to have the aluminum transported to the United States. ICTS is a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiff appellant Darryl Richardson is a resident of the State of Georgia. Sims (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Conclude that its explanation for the very large cut in the number of hours compensated was not adequate. The case against CCC was tried to a jury. 4368 Ferland prevailed at trial. Primarily on the basis that $160 per hour was the appropriate rate for an attorney of her experience level. The court also subtracted from the fee award time it believed was expended solely on the losing claim against Michel. Since Michel was a witness in Ferland's case against CCC. It is not clear to us how the district court. Percentage Reduction Much more consequential in terms of its potential impact on the total fee award is the controversy between the parties concerning the district court's determination that only 120 of the hours Ferland's attorney expended on the litigation should be compensated.3 The district court first found that Ferland's attorney lacked adequate experience to justify her requested hourly rate. It observed that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Or city officer or employee where the officer's or employee's services are rendered within Jefferson County. 2 Id. § 1(C).3 It is undisputed Given the nature of the question presented in this case. Our discussion of the recusal issue is included as an appendix. Including any non resident of Jefferson County who is employed by any employer as defined in 3 that the ordinance facially applies to federal judges. Or other monetary payments of any kind which a person receives or is entitled to receive for work or services. Id. § 1(F).4 If compensation is earned from work both inside and outside Jefferson County. The privilege tax is based on the proportion of work performed within Jefferson County. Where the relationship between the individual performing the services and the person for whom such services are rendered is. Professions or occupations for which license fees are required to be paid under any General License Code of the County or to the State of Alabama or the County by any of the following [listing sections of the Code of Alabama].
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. This is the third appeal that Ramiro L. N
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the brief were Giovanni P. McCurdy's arguments are that the Commission improperly applied GAAS. That its finding of recklessness was not supported by substantial evidence. Bagwell served as the fund's chief executive officer and was a member of its board of trustees. Was the investment advisor of the fund. (We will refer to JWB Investment. The fund is now defunct. The arrangement was terminable at will. The unpaid balance in the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for Paul DeCologero. Were on brief and petition for a writ of mandamus for the United States.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Did not have to pay the difference between the amount obtained from the bus sales and the outstanding debt on the contracts. I. Navistar's Appeal Navistar claims that the jury's verdict was tainted by the trial judge's improper legal rulings and jury instructions. Navistar argues that the court erred in allowing the jury to find that the sales price for the nine buses in Idaho was not commercially reasonable and that Navistar was responsible for the inadequate proceeds. 9 504 is triggered only when a secured party disposes of collateral and not when a sale like the one at issue here is arranged 1 Three different contracts covered the 23 buses. 2 solely by the debtors or their agents.2 Consequently. Signed a stipulation specifically agreeing that the sale was. We believe the jury properly could have found that the long delay in the sale following default. Were directly traceable to Navistar's actions. Although the company did not physically
|
 |
97-3193 -- SBKC SERVICE CORP. V. 1111 PROSPECT PARTNERS, L.P. -- 07/30/1998
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The sole issue raised by defendant Andrew Lutyk is whether the record of a non jury trial justified piercing the corporate veil of the American Elevator Company to impose personal liability on him as its sole shareholder for unpaid contributions the corporation owed to health. We will affirm. I. Defendant Andrew Lutyk was the president. American was obligated to make monthly contributions to various benefit and pension funds. American was also required to make certain wage deductions from the employees' salaries. The
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Moore and Wyrick argue the evidence was insufficient to convict them of murder in furtherance of a CCE. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if a
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Defendant appellant Michael Don Greene was convicted by a jury of the two counts against him: Count One charged evasion of payment of taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201. Defendant was sentenced to 60 months on Count One and 10 months on Count Two. He also was fined $250. Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentence. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. He was released from prison on supervised release in early 1998. Which were described by the name of the bank. The account number and the balance as of (1) The allegations were later narrowed to cover only the years 1990 and 1991. The fourth omitted asset was described as a note in the amount of $85. We will provide only a general description of Defendant's conduct as it was established at trial. The allegations of Count Two concerning bank accounts and their respective balances on the date of the Defendant's submission of the false Form 433 A were proven through one IRS special agent's testimony that bank records. The records showed that one of the three accounts was in the name of Defendant Greene doing business as Delta Trading Group.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court finds that the debtor's request for conversion was made in bad faith or represents an attempt to abuse the bankruptcy process. A number of bankruptcy courts have held that the right to convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 contains an exception for motions filed in bad faith. A number of bankruptcy courts have held that the right is absolute. Ohio 2002) (
|
 |
BURNES V. PEMCO AEROPLEX, INC. (5/20/2002, NO. 01-13865)
Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. Factual and Procedural Background
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Appellants are Robert E. and Lynne K. They appeal the Order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the Weedlings were equally at fault in perpetuating the impasse over payment to PNC Bank. The Court also found that PNC was not 2 the proximate cause for any losses that the Weedlings may have suffered on the sale of their business.1 PNC cross appeals on the failure to enter judgment for it for attorneys' fees. James and Donna were not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding but rather were guarantors of certain indebtedness owed by LCI. PNC was the principal secured creditor of Robert and Lynne with respect to a $2. Which was then implemented in the form of an Order of the Bankruptcy Court entered August 11. Throughout the Opinion we will refer to the business as Gateway. 3 1 attorneys' fees. Robert and Lynne filed an Amended Plan that was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in 1996. The liens were to be secured by two new mortgages with the same existing lien priority. The problem that is the subject of this appeal arose because none of the parties ever executed new documents.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Associates was on brief for appellant.
|
 |
97-6241 -- U.S. V. FOWLER -- 07/27/1998
The petition is granted. Is withdrawn. The attached order and judgment is substituted in its place. Entered for the Court Patrick Fisher. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. The federal government filed suit to collect on notes in default held by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). We must consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. We deny the government's motion to dismiss. The next jurisdictional issue we must consider is mootness. We have no subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
000 down payment on the Lodi property was. That the Versailles property was property of the Debtor's estate.1 For the reasons that follow. The bankruptcy court's judgment is AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether a loan in the amount of $157. 000 loan
|
 |
96-3166 -- FLOYD V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE -- 08/10/1998
Circuit Judge.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The attempt to prove concealment was flawed. Because the government produced no evidence that the defendants failed to comply with SEC regulations governing the reporting of such personal use and the jury was never instructed regarding the SEC's reporting requirements. Transmission of a required report can serve as the predicate for a wire fraud offense only if the report is itself false or fraudulent. The government alleged that the reports were deceptive because they failed to disclose the great value to the defendants (about $1 million each) of their personal use of corporate aircraft. Were false. Further prosecution of these charges is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. If there was no wire fraud. There was no money laundering. They were based on the failure of the defendants to disclose their personal travel on corporate aircraft in various internal forms used to prepare reports for the SEC. The core issue with respect to these failures to disclose is the defendants' intent. They argued at trial that other Westar officers almost always failed to report such travel and that one could infer that they thought such disclosure was unnecessary.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Seeking a declaratory judgment that its Corporate Finance Division's 96 1844 and 96 1874 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. business is incidental to its banking business. Arguing that the agreement is unenforceable because Norwest's actions under the agreement were not incidental to the business of banking. That Norwest's acts were beyond its powers because it did not obtain prior approval from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to enter into the agreement. Even if the agreement is enforceable. Norwest cross appeals arguing that it is entitled to prejudgment interest on the award granted by the district court. Sween Corporation is a Minnesota corporation that develops and manufactures skin care products for the medical market. Norwest is a national bank established in Minneapolis. This division is not a separate legal entity. The common stock of Norwest is owned by Norwest Corporation. They do not have standing to appeal on any issue except for their dismissal.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With her on the brief were Kenneth L. On the briefs was Steven D. With him on the brief was Eric A. That its failure to respond earlier was due to
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The defendants are Instant Cash. A payday loan is a loan of short duration. It is a loan to poor or improvident borrowers who have no savings or credit and run out of money for their living expenses before they receive their 2 Nos. 02 2649. Since the annual percentage rate of the loans is disclosed to them in clear and conspicuous type on the loan instrument. (The status of the small claims litigation is unclear.). Indiana's supreme court has held that payday loans at the interest rates typically and here charged by the lenders are usurious and therefore unenforceable. The plaintiffs have other Indiana claims as well. It might seem that the defendants would have little to gain from arbitration. They may think that an arbitrator is more likely to ignore or mistake the law than a judge would be. Anyway there are other claims in the case besides the usury claim and the defendants may fear being dragged into class action suits if borrowers can proceed against them in state or federal court. The defendants' desire to arbitrate is therefore understandable on multiple grounds.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is corrected as follows: On page 16. Disch and Ross & Hardies were on brief for appellant. Pelczarski and Blish & Cavanagh were on brief for appellee. The plan was the brainchild of real estate developer Anthony DelVicario. Who was a general partner in a Massachusetts limited partnership called Commercial Associates (
|
 |
BEL-BEL INT'L CORP. V. COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD (12/15/1998, NO. 96-4598)
Circuit Judge: This case is one of many arising out of the bankruptcy of a Florida tomato farming operation owned by Joe Torcise.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question presented in this case is whether a non Indian plaintiff consents to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court by SMITH v. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE 107 filing claims against an Indian defendant arising out of activities within the reservation where the defendant is located. Who is not a member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Were tried by a jury for various offenses stemming from their involvement in a conspiracy to rig bids at real estate foreclosure auctions. Both Appellants were convicted of violating the Sherman Act. Romer was convicted of bank fraud. I. Appellants are real estate speculators who. The purpose of the conspiracy was to hold down the price of auctioned properties by agreeing not to bid against one another at auctions an activity commonly known as
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. I. Factual and Procedural Background The facts of this case are straightforward. The debtor is allowed to extend or reduce the balance of his debts through a plan of rehabilitation. Asked Billups to list all suits to which he is or was a party within one year of filing for bankruptcy. Billups was not participating in a lawsuit and indicated that on his forms. He certified to the bankruptcy court that the schedules were true and accurate. Application to Monetary Claims Billups argues that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this case because: (1) Pemco was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings. (2) Pemco was not prejudiced by the omission of the claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. Judicial estoppel is raised in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding and a federal employment discrimination case. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked at a court's discretion. A party is precluded from
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Will & Emery. Precedent that is available in analogous situations. Because
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With whom Law Office of William Aivalikles was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. * Of the District of Northern California. We have jurisdiction of the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The first was filed by First Service Bank for Savings (
|
 |
BURNES V. PEMCO AEROPLEX, INC. (5/20/2002, NO. 01-13865)
Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. Factual and Procedural Background
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is withdrawn and replaced by the amended opinion filed concurrently with this order. The petition for panel rehearing is denied. The vessels were arrested pursuant to maritime procedure. The district court determined that in rem jurisdiction was lost because there was no res against which to enforce an eventual in rem judgment. The district court held that it was powerless to order the Owners to reinstate the security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Original District Court Action Ventura Packers is a corporation that provides stevedoring services in Ventura.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Hardy United States Court of Appeals. The district court dismissed Hardy's action due to lack of jurisdiction after finding that there was no express unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity allowing recovery under
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. The debtor was self employed as a contractor in the construction business. That there was a first priority mortgage in favor of the debtor's mother on the property in the amount of $46. The section 341 meeting of creditors was conducted on July 12. No objections to the debtor's claimed exemptions were filed within the thirty days allowed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b). Arguing that his $1.00 exemption caused the entire parcel of real estate to become exempt after no objections were filed within the time allowed under Fed. Since the entire parcel is exempt. NAH's judicial lien should have been avoided in its entirety. NAH asserts that the bankruptcy court's lien avoidance order should be affirmed because the debtor's exemption is limited to the amount claimed as exempt in the debtor's schedules. Notice of appeal is timely when it is filed by the end of the following Monday. Because the order appealed from was entered on November 1.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The district court dismissed Hardy's action due to lack of jurisdiction after finding that there was no express unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity allowing recovery under § 524. Which was paid in full over the lifetime of the bankruptcy plan pursuant to the order of confirmation dated April 15. No factual findings were made. The facts as asserted by the debtor are. Hardy's account was settled. Hardy's account was clear. Hardy's Chapter 13 case was closed on April 11. The motion was granted on February 25. Relying on former bankruptcy code section 11 U.S.C. § 106 which delineates the waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases and finding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the imposition of monetary damages in this case where sovereign immunity was not unequivocally waived.
|
 |
MALOWNEY V. FED. COLLECTION DEPOSIT GROUP (10/29/1999, NO. 98-2610)
Are as follows. Which was directed to the Army National Bank where John Malowney and his wife. The Malowneys' funds were made unavailable to them and the Bank refused to honor checks written on their account. The complaint is void of any indication that the Malowneys received notice as mandated by the Florida post judgment garnishment statute. That he may have exemptions from the garnishment which can be asserted as defenses. The Malowneys did not become aware of the garnishment until they contacted the Bank concerning their returned checks. The only funds in the Malowneys' checking account at the time of garnishment were social security disability benefits and United States Army retirement benefits. Both of which are exempt from garnishment under federal law. All of the funds attached by the writ of garnishment were subject to exemption under federal law. Obtain dissolution of a writ of garnishment by proving that the attached funds are exempt from garnishment under federal or state law. Was dissolved on July 14.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Co Executor* of the Estate and Last Will and Testament of Frank S. Co Executor of the Estate and Last Will and Testament of Frank S. Co Executor of the Estate and Last Will and Testament of Frank S. Because prior administrative review of claims against the FDIC is a prerequisite to judicial review of such claims. Tri State mailed notice to Merchants that it was revoking the refinancing agreement due to Merchants' breach of the agreement. The FDIC was appointed receiver.2 In December. Because Tri State is a debtor of Although Tri State had Merchants. Notice was not mailed to Tri State. the FDIC for the breach of contract by Merchants. actual knowledge of the receivership. Tri State and the FDIC began a review of Tri State's obligations under the agreements between Tri State and Merchants. correspondence between Tri State and the FDIC. the loan agreements were enforceable. The FDIC finished its review and analysis of the agreements and concluded that At no time did the FDIC inform Trito the FDIC under a formal claims The FDIC was also appointed receiver for Metro North.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Hardy United States Court of Appeals. The district court dismissed Hardy's action due to lack of jurisdiction after finding that there was no express unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity allowing recovery under
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sitting by designation. 1 PER CURIAM: Plastipak Packaging Inc. (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Paul St. Godbout
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Are as follows. Which was directed to the Army National Bank where John Malowney and his wife. The Malowneys' funds were made unavailable to them and the Bank refused to honor checks written on their account. 2 The complaint is void of any indication that the Malowneys received notice as mandated by the Florida post judgment garnishment statute. That he may have exemptions from the garnishment which can be asserted as defenses. The only funds in the Malowneys' checking account at the time of garnishment were social security disability benefits and United States Army retirement benefits. Both of which are exempt from garnishment under federal law. All of the funds attached by the writ of garnishment were subject to exemption under federal law. Obtain dissolution of a writ of garnishment by proving that the attached funds are exempt from garnishment under federal or state law. Was dissolved on July 14. 1997.1 The only count relevant to this appeal is Count I. Because that is the only count the Malowneys discuss in their briefs to this Court.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The statements of fact in this opinion are drawn from the allegations in the complaint. Declared that it was a fraudulent conveyance with intent to hinder. The Morganroths allege that this action was a fraudulent effort to obstruct them from enforcing their judgment against DeLorean's CRISTINA stock. The Memorandum was created after the entry of the Michigan judgment. The Morganroths allege that the life lease was a fiction and that Norris. McLaughlin and Guadalupe knew it was. Two weeks before DeLorean was to be deposed. Which was controlled by DeLorean's brother. Elgort asked the attorney not to contact the Morganroths or the Marshal in connection with some furniture described in the writ of execution that was being removed by John DeLorean to a warehouse owned by DeLorean Cadillac for the purpose of escaping plaintiffs' writ of execution. McLaughlin and Guadalupe argued that the CRISTINA shares and Lamington Farm were not subject to the plaintiffs' writ of execution. Or should have known. That these transfers were made by DeLorean and others with the intent to hinder.
|
 |
MALOWNEY V. FED. COLLECTION DEPOSIT GROUP (10/29/1999, NO. 98-2610)
Are as follows. Which was directed to the Army National Bank where John Malowney and his wife. The Malowneys' funds were made unavailable to them and the Bank refused to honor checks written on their account. The complaint is void of any indication that the Malowneys received notice as mandated by the Florida post judgment garnishment statute. That he may have exemptions from the garnishment which can be asserted as defenses. The Malowneys did not become aware of the garnishment until they contacted the Bank concerning their returned checks. The only funds in the Malowneys' checking account at the time of garnishment were social security disability benefits and United States Army retirement benefits. Both of which are exempt from garnishment under federal law. All of the funds attached by the writ of garnishment were subject to exemption under federal law. Obtain dissolution of a writ of garnishment by proving that the attached funds are exempt from garnishment under federal or state law. Was dissolved on July 14.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
CVC asserts that the finding that CVC made a profit on its note purchases is error. That the District Court's findings are not clearly erroneous. We will affirm.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Henley was twenty four years old and had no prior criminal record. Among the issues at sentencing was the quantity of methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy. A base offense level of thirty six applies where the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to the defendant is between five and fifteen kilograms. Sufficiency of Evidence Establishing Henley's Participation in a Conspiracy Henley's primary argument is that the evidence adduced at his trial was insufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and. The evidence was insufficient to prove that he was a participant therein. Our review of the jury's finding that he participated in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine is strictly limited. The remaining count in the indictment was dismissed . Sanders was originally sentenced to 101 months of imprisonment 41 months on the first count and 60 months on the second. Six other co unts in the indictment were dism issed. Luy was originally sentenced to 136 months of imprisonment.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The statements of fact in this opinion are drawn from the allegations in the complaint. Declared that it was a fraudulent conveyance with intent to hinder. The Morganroths allege that this action was a fraudulent effort to obstruct them from enforcing their judgment against DeLorean's CRISTINA stock. The Memorandum was created after the entry of the Michigan judgment. The Morganroths allege that the life lease was a fiction and that Norris. McLaughlin and Guadalupe knew it was. Two weeks before DeLorean was to be deposed. Which was controlled by DeLorean's brother. Elgort asked the attorney not to contact the Morganroths or the Marshal in connection with some furniture described in the writ of execution that was being removed by John DeLorean to a warehouse owned by DeLorean Cadillac for the purpose of escaping plaintiffs' writ of execution. McLaughlin and Guadalupe argued that the CRISTINA shares and Lamington Farm were not subject to the plaintiffs' writ of execution. Or should have known. That these transfers were made by DeLorean and others with the intent to hinder.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Davis was Koch's
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Ronald Lurie (Ronald) was a general and managing partner of Popkin & Stern at that time. This deficiency judgment was based on the difference between the value of the property of Popkin & Stern's estate and the amount needed to pay all of the allowed claims against Popkin & Stern.2 On June 17. He was incarcerated. The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee to make a claim against a general partner of a bankrupt partnership if
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Denver agreed to have United build the facilities that United would be using. United sought to have the bond related portions of the agreement severed from the rest of the agreement and treated as a loan rather than a lease for purposes of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The agreement was a lease. It is helpful to explain briefly the importance of the lease versus loan distinction in this bankruptcy context. When a debtor's lease is at issue. If this is less than the balance due on the loan. The difference is an unsecured debt. The agreement is for a thirty one year term expiring on October 1. The primary purpose of the agreement was to facilitate United moving into and operating at the then new Denver International Airport for the aforementioned term. United's payments for its use of the ground are straightforward.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Are as follows. Which was directed to the Army National Bank where John Malowney and his wife. Sitting by designation. * Malowneys' funds were made unavailable to them and the Bank refused to honor checks written on their account. The complaint is void of any indication that the Malowneys received notice as mandated by the Florida post judgment garnishment statute. That he may have exemptions from the garnishment which can be asserted as defenses. The only funds in the Malowneys' checking account at the time of garnishment were social security disability benefits and United States Army retirement benefits. Both of which are exempt from garnishment under federal law. All of the funds attached by the writ of garnishment were subject to exemption under federal law. Obtain dissolution of a writ of garnishment by proving that the attached funds are exempt from garnishment under federal or state law. Was dissolved on July 14. 1997.1 The only count relevant to this appeal is Count I. Because that is the only count the Malowneys discuss in their briefs An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before this court on an appeal from an order for summary judgment in this diversity of citizenship commercial litigation dispute. The owner/developer of the project was American Power Recyclers. The general partners were American Power Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
L.L.P. were on brief. We agree that Salem's actions are entitled to protection under the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. Credit only those assertions that are supported by materials of evidentiary quality. Conscious that they are approximations. Salem was appointed trustee and he embarked upon the administration of the estate. Even this reduced amount was not free and clear. For the real estate was encumbered by a prior first mortgage that secured $100. LeBlanc maintained that the real estate was worth much more (say. Subject to the following proviso: If the gas station is sold within two years from [Oct. 19. The court will then either confirm or revoke its approval. The substance of the transaction is in dispute. The record on appeal is devoid of any satisfactory evidence of its terms. Salem asserts that the balance represented business assets of the Corporation and was paid out accordingly. LeBlanc contends that this allocation was a sham and that Lizotte fraudulently diverted $360. 000 that should have been available to his creditors (including Mailman and.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The sale of frozen peas and other perishable goods is regulated by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. I Crown is a defunct Illinois corporation that once operated as a federally licensed produce dealer. Eckert was Crown's president and had check signing authority.
|
 |
BEL-BEL INT'L CORP. V. COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD (12/15/1998, NO. 96-4598)
Circuit Judge: This case is one of many arising out of the bankruptcy of a Florida tomato farming operation owned by Joe Torcise.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was $11.16 per hour. Although the court held that the union's agreement with the City is not vitiated by the fact that Heder commenced his training before the details were ironed out. Plus whatever extra is required to raise his compensation for
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief for Edward Isaacs. Was on brief for the United States of America. The Government appeals both the decision of the court to entertain a collateral challenge to the constitutionality of a prior conviction at sentencing and the decision of the court that the prior conviction was constitutionally invalid. BACKGROUND Isaacs was convicted of one count of conspiracy and one count of using extortionate means to attempt to collect a loan. Racketeering and loansharking was something of a family business. Was 2 indicted. Isaacs' conviction is based on his dealings with one of his father's alleged loansharking victims. Isaacs was tried before a jury and convicted. There was proof that Isaacs broke into Ayala's home and threatened Ayala with a pistol in front of his three small children. The court allowed Isaacs 3 to challenge a 1980 burglary conviction1 that would have resulted in his being classified as a career offender. The district court found that Isaacs had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his prior conviction was unconstitutional and refused to consider either the conviction or the underlying conduct as a basis for changing Isaacs' Criminal History Category.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Nadzo and Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry were on brief for appellee Mid Maine Waste Action Corp. Kandutsch and Verrill & Dana were on brief for appellees Waste Management. Hochadel & Libby were on brief for appellee City of Auburn. Were seeking to monopolize the waste disposal business and otherwise acting in violation of federal and state law. I. THE BACKGROUND This case is one of several in which state and local communities have taken measures to cope with their waste collection responsibilities. Private haulers have been adversely affected and responded with antitrust suits. In this one the history is tangled and the claims numerous. As is customary in reviewing dismissals for failure to state a claim. Non stock corporation to assist in waste disposal. 2 2 The entity Mid Maine Waste Action Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The purpose of this rule is to give top corporate managers an incentive to use available corporate funds for the payment of wages and benefits rather than for some other purpose. The issue raised by this case is what happens when their company files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the employees seek to recover from the corporate managers for unpaid vacation and retirement benefits that were allegedly earned in the pre petition period. Is whether. The company's managers have no discretion to order payment of the amounts owed to the employees. I. The Shenango Corporation (
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
All qualified sellers were invited to 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 join the suit. Produce's assets were insufficient to pay the trust creditors in full. Only produce sellers were notified of the proceedings. On the ground that such costs were administrative expenses of the trust. The district court denied intervention on the grounds that transportation costs are not administrative expenses and Union Pacific was not entitled to be paid ahead of PACA trust beneficiaries. (4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the action.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
A
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
(2) he claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the District Court enhanced his sentence based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by him. Were we still in a pre Booker world. For any error the District Court committed in finding that Agudelo committed perjury was harmless in light of the independent basis for awarding the obstruction of justice enhancement. We are not in such a world. We must remand to determine whether the District Court would have sentenced Agudelo differently if it had known the Guidelines were advisory.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal. ISSUES The first issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the Debtor's purchase of certain annuities constituted a fraudulent transfer to Anderson pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that the purchase of the annuities was an avoidable fraudulent transfer. A second issue on appeal is whether the merits of Anderson's request for the imposition of a constructive trust should have been addressed by the bankruptcy court and should be included in this appeal because Anderson did not properly raise the issue as an affirmative defense. BACKGROUND Mark Anderson is the Debtor's nephew. Anderson was convicted of drug offenses and sentenced to prison. He owed past due child support which his ex wife was attempting to collect. A sheriff's sale was pending with respect to certain real estate owned by Anderson. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. 2 1 handle Anderson's business affairs while Anderson was incarcerated.
|
 |
03-1163 -- MERRILL LYNCH BUSINESS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC. V. NUDELL -- 04/12/2004
IT IS ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice. GTI's bankruptcy case was closed on May 6. That
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. He was subpoenaed for the first time to testify before a federal grand jury investigating illegal numbers gambling in the city of Boston. Which were common knowledge throughout his neighborhood. Is not about Scott's illegal activities. Jr.* Victor was charged in a two count indictment with tampering with a federal witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) and with retaliating against a federal witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1513. The district court judge entered an order informing this court that he was reconsidering the finding of guilty in this case in light of a motion for a new trial filed by appellant.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
DeJesus were convicted for the murder for hire of Richard Cohen. Balter and Cutler were also convicted on related counts of mail fraud. Although numerous allegations of error are raised. One issue whether New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 which prohibits an attorney from contacting a represented party applies to federal prosecutors acting in the course of a pre indictment investigation is a question of first impression for our court. I. Richard Balter was the president and sole shareholder of Northeastern Poly Products. Balter met Kenneth Cutler in the mid 1980's when Cutler was working for one of NPP's customers. The cash for these kickbacks was generated by issuing checks to the fictitious payee
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Because the plaintiffs' claims are solely derivative claims and can only be brought on behalf of the corporation (Conseco). Conseco was a large scale Indiana corporation that sold. Merrill Lynch knew that its so called fairness opinion pertaining to Conseco's proposed valuation of Green Tree was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
 |
97-6413A -- GAMBLE, SIMMONS & CO. V. KERR-MCGEE CORP. -- 04/22/1999
Is withdrawn. Is attached to this order. Entered for the Court PATRICK FISHER. Introduction Gamble Simmons is a tax consulting firm specializing in the review and evaluation of audits by state taxing authorities. Penalties and/or interest ... heretofore paid by Kerr McGee ... and/or assessed by the Department ... are refunded or reduced.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
97-6413 -- GAMBLE, SIMMONS & CO. V. KERR-MCGEE -- 04/09/1999
Introduction Gamble Simmons is a tax consulting firm specializing in the review and evaluation of audits by state taxing authorities. Penalties and/or interest ... heretofore paid by Kerr McGee ... and/or assessed by the Department ... are refunded or reduced.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
|
 |
97-6241 -- U.S. V. FOWLER -- 06/05/1998
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. The federal government filed suit to collect on notes in default held by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). We must consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. We deny the government's motion to dismiss. The next jurisdictional issue we must consider is mootness. We have no subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Dana & Gould were on brief for appellee. Gould were on brief for appellee. The
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
His claim that the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Have been audited by the Internal Revenue Service virtually. Every year since Richard Nixon was President. Kanter was a wellknown and accomplished tax and estate lawyer. Among Kanter's clients was the Pritzker family of Hyatt Corporation fame. Kanter was also an accomplished businessman. Was an expert on the subject of trusts and estate planning. His estate was subsequently substituted as the principal party to this litigation.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: On page 8. Wheatley and Gordon & Wise were on briefs for defendants. Hall & Stewart were on briefs for appellees. At issue in this case are two different appeals. Which we have consolidated. Whose source is a lawsuit over unpaid bank loans. The background facts are largely undisputed. The borrowers were licensees or had other ownership interests in radio stations in various cities. Fleet concluded that the borrowers were in default and brought suit in two different federal district courts to collect upon different notes made or guaranteed by the borrowers. The borrowers were required by that date either to have made a down payment of $6.4 million or to have in force purchase agreements with third parties obligating the latter to buy stations from the borrowers for that amount or more. The precise terms of the settlement agreement and other pertinent facts are set forth below. Giddens had an extensive background in appraising and selling radio stations and was a partner in a brokerage firm.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The issue before us on appeal is. As it was before the District Court. Is seeking to recover demurrage1 resulting from two Charter Party Agreements between Arcadia and Appellee. It is undisputed that. It is also undisputed that Sun has paid Arcadia nothing. The issue is whether. Or Demurrage is the parties' agreed upon amount of damages to be paid for a ship's delay caused by a default of the charterers at either the beginning or end of a ship's journey. 251 (1885)). 2 1. whether the resolution of this dispute is covered by the Charter Party Agreements' dispute resolution clause and its one year limitation of actions. The District Court concluded that Arcadia's claims against Sun were barred by the one year limitation in the original Charter Party Agreements. We will affirm. I. The facts are not disputed. Arcadia was the owner of the vessel. Sun was the charterer. The Charter Party Agreements were fairly standardized contracts on a form called the
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court also ruled that Swimmer's debt to the Manzonellis was nondischargeable. Rather than from only the policies which were in dispute. Some of which were undisputed and were to be paid to the benefit of the children. Manzonelli filed an adversary complaint seeking a judgment requiring Swimmer to release his liens and a determination that any damages Swimmer owed to her were nondischargeable. These orders were mailed to Swimmer and his attorney at their shared office. The court found that Swimmer's actions were willful and malicious and ordered compensatory damages in the amount of $21. Which was denied. The bankruptcy judge specifically stated that Swimmer was
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Berheide pled guilty to one count of making a false statement and overvaluing security to influence Peoples State Bank to defer action on the replevin of collateral for a loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.1 1 Kent Berheide and his wife Lisa Berheide were originally charged in an indictment alleging various fraudulent acts. The government and Berheide entered into an addendum to the plea agreement in which they agreed that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
I. Metro was a Minnesota corporation that provided waste disposal services to commercial customers in the Minneapolis St. William Butler was the founder of the company and its Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder during the relevant time. Butler was the sole shareholder until McGraw bought 49 percent of Butler's Metro shares in June 1988. He supervised the accounting department and was personally responsible for maintaining the general ledger and preparing the balance sheets. McGraw was aware that Metro's tax returns for the three year period did not include any gross receipts for the subcontracting work it performed for Poor Richards. The receipts were properly deductible from income by Metro as salary paid to Butler or business expenses of 2 Metro. Despite their contention that the cash was used for Butler's salary and Metro business expenses. The amount of each transaction was always less than $10. McGraw was aware that Metro's tax returns for the 1988 and 1989 tax years overstated the amount of deductions for subcontracting expenses.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Surratt Sales was appointed trustee. The proceeding was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. (2) an additional 10% of the proceeds from the home if it is sold for a sum greater than $350. (3) Jeanne Nangle may elect not to sell the home by paying the trustee an amount equivalent to the amount the trustee would have received upon its sale. (4) the Freda Brockman judgment will be transferred to the trustee and the proceeds from the sale of the The Honorable Barry S. United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 1 The debtor was a nominal defendant only. No relief was sought against him. 2 judgment or any collections on the judgment received by the trustee will be disbursed in the following order: (i) attorneys fees incurred in the collection of the debt. (5) the trustee's claim against the home will be secured by a Deed of Trust. The debtor was not a party to the proposed settlement agreement. The approval of a settlement is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
We must piece together what effect the rulings on relief have had as judgments were entered. As retroactive relief was granted. As appeals were filed. All three defendants have appealed the district court's order of February 26. Absolutely and irrevocably guarantee(s) and become(s) surety to Bank for the prompt payment of all sums now or hereafter due to Bank from Borrower . . .. * * * The Obligation of Guarantor hereunder shall continue in full force and effect until thirty (30) days after Bank shall have actually received written notice of Guarantor's intention to terminate this Guaranty sent by certified or registered mail. This Guaranty shall nevertheless continue in effect and Guarantor shall remain liable for any Obligation which was incurred by Borrower prior to such date of termination. Which is the result of any renewal. GWA was represented to ConBank as being a single accounting firm with offices in both New Jersey and Florida. GWA's two
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Either pays the subsidy to the service provider directly (if the approved schools have not already paid in full) or reimburses the schools for part of the cost (if the projects have been approved and the schools have paid the service provider for the work). Who in turn must pass the funds through to the school.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
While Morriss was subject to a large judgment. (2) the defendants should not be liable for the portion of the fraudulent conveyance that was transferred back into Steve Morriss's companies. Steve Morriss generally used the account as if it were his own for example. The signatories on the account were Amy Morriss Lowry. Much of the money appears to have been spent by the defendants. While having
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief. He was wrong. Reiterating its need for the information previously requested and mentioning that plaintiffs' claim forms were incomplete. The letter also stated: Please bear in mind that the claims must be substantiated and that we must have the information requested before a determination can be made by [the appropriate official]. 2 No further action will be taken on these claims until the information requested has been received (emphasis in original). This allegation was seemingly an endeavor to show that. Reported to the district judge that
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
The vessels were arrested pursuant to maritime procedure. The district court determined that in rem jurisdiction was lost because there was no res against which to enforce an eventual in rem judgment. The district court held that it was powerless to order the Owners to reinstate the security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Original District Court Action Ventura Packers is a corporation that provides stevedoring services in Ventura.
|