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1000 OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse the order of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Overview of Affected Parties The underlying matter in this appeal is an accounting malpractice action. The Trustee's principal allegation is that Price Waterhouse erroneously reported in its audit that accrued interest on Litigation Trust accounts belonged to the debtor rather than to the Litigation Trust. Underlying this claim was a suit between the Litigation Trust and the debtor. Price Waterhouse's erroneous reports were relied on by the bankruptcy court to the Litigation Trust's detriment. Is not a party to the malpractice action. The Trustee alleges the debtor's estate would still be affected by the malpractice suit because the Litigation Trust is effectively a continuation of the bankruptcy estate. Who were former creditors of the debtor's estate. Is not a continuation of the bankruptcy estate for jurisdictional purposes. Price Waterhouse contends the debtor is only tangentially affected by this malpractice action after it assigned away its interests in the litigation claims.
974 OPINION/ORDER
ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the
914 OPINION/ORDER
The district court determined that a large payment made by the Talbots to the IRS for unpaid income taxes was improper because it was made outside of the confirmed plan of reorganization (the
912 OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellants.

905 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an IRS claim for delinquent taxes secured outside of bankruptcy by a lien on a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan is secured in bankruptcy
898 OPINION/ORDER
Nelson was awarded an interest in his former spouse's ERISA qualified retirement plan in the amount of approximately $71. Nelson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and asserted that the interest was either not property of his bankruptcy estate. That it was exempt under either 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) or 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). The bankruptcy court ruled that the interest was property of the bankruptcy estate and was not exempt except in the amount of $4. Which was the remaining sum available under the wildcard exemption set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Nelson appeals only from the bankruptcy court's ruling that his interest in the ERISA qualified retirement plan was property of the bankruptcy estate. Nelson was divorced from Denise Nelson in September of 2000. Which was the entire marital value of this asset.1 There is no dispute that this retirement plan is a qualified plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
889 OPINION/ORDER
Laher's TIAA CREF retirement annuity is excluded from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). We hold that it is. Will reverse the decision of the District Court and order that the case be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for entry of an order excluding the annuity from the bankruptcy estate. Pre tax contributions were taken from his paycheck and accumulated into a sum that would be used to purchase a contract that would pay him an annuity over time after retirement.1 Salary
887 OPINION/ORDER
1 was an Oregon investment management company that made investments for several hundred individuals. The employee plans are retirement and other employee benefit plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2 Under investment advisory agreements and powers of attorney. In some of the agreements discussed below CCI was the signing or designated party. Some of the ERISA plans were also multiemployer trust funds subject to the Labor Management Relations Act. The receiver also returned about $20 million in cash held in clients' custodial accounts.3 The publicly held securities and cash were
887 OPINION/ORDER
Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The priority scheme is so vital to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code that we remand this case to the bankruptcy court for further Page 1 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 review of the settlement and consideration of that aspect of the settlement that may deviate from the rule of priorities. Circuit Judge: There is little doubt that settlements of disputed claims facilitate the efficient functioning of the judicial system. Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme Page 2 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. It will be dispositive. Iridium Operating LLC (
878 OPINION/ORDER
Several affiliates.1 Bruno's is based in Alabama and operates a chain of supermarkets in the southeastern United States. Huff was the holder of $290 million in Bruno's subordinated notes. HSBC was the indenture trustee for the subordinated notes (we refer to them together as Huff). They argue that the District Court should not have confirmed the plan for a host of reasons. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and are thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. Three separate interests have appeared to defend the plan: the debtors and debtors in possession (referred to throughout as the Debtors). Representing the group of banks (the Banks) that were the senior lenders to Bruno's before the reorganization. Together they contend that the plan does not violate the absolute priority rule because the releases were not granted
878 OPINION/ORDER
The relevant facts are undisputed. Hechinger was a
866 OPINION/ORDER
Forbes (
862 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is a cautionary tale for ERISA administrators. We are met with three claimants to an ERISA governed life insurance policy held by the decedent. The two most basic components of any ERISA plan are the plan administrator and the plan documents. The plan administrator is a fiduciary charged with the duty to administer the benefit plan
857 02-1173 -- WALKER V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES -- 07/21/2003

The transfer of employees between covered Union positions and non covered management positions.

Ellsworth Walker and Virgil Salazar were employees of the Regional Transportation District and participants in the pension plan. The definition of

850 OPINION/ORDER
Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 4557 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization.
848 OPINION/ORDER
With whom Wolfe Associates was on brief. LLP was on brief. The parties have stipulated that Borden. Borden contends that the plaintiffs are only due reinstatement in the Plan. Reimbursement for expenses incurred that would have been covered by the Plan. Plaintiffs assert that this remedy is inadequate and that they are entitled to additional equitable relief. Even though the estate was no longer legally obliged to pay those costs. We deny the plaintiffs' appeal and rule for Borden on the cross appeal.

848 OPINION/ORDER
Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 5245 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization.
848 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge This is a battle for William Knapp's estate. It is in federal court because he kept much of his wealth in employee benefit trusts that were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
843 OPINION/ORDER
Facts White was president and sole shareholder of WCC.
832 OPINION/ORDER
Concluding the transfer of assets was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. We will affirm.
827 OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
827 OPINION/ORDER
The district court found that the Committee's claims were time barred. We agree that the Committee's claims are barred and affirm. I. The facts are undisputed. The Plan is an employer sponsored. Which is governed by ERISA and contains a reimbursement provision.3 The Plan is administered by the Committee in Rogers. Separate named defendant Evelyn Soles was never served with a summons or complaint in this matter. Patrick Hollander was a Wal Mart employee in Myrtle Beach. He was covered by the Plan. Hollander was struck by a car driven by J.W. Hollander died to comply with this request will entitle the Plan to withhold benefits due you under the Plan Document. You or your covered dependents may not do anything to hinder reimbursement of overpayment to the Plan after you have accepted benefits. .... These rights apply regardless of whether such payments are designated as payment for. Subrogation is when Wal Mart pays your medical charges relating to your accident while waiting for the responsible party to settle.
827 OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
825 OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1229. We reverse because we conclude that the transfer at issue in this case was necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Berkshire Mortgage Finance Corporation was the only lender willing to advance the debtors $23.5 million before August 31. Kissimmee's hotel was not subject to the RCAP mortgage. It was under no obligation to refinance its hotel at the time. In pertinent part: 3 Berkshire's willingness to make the loan to [the debtors] is contingent upon Kissimmee Lodge's agreement to refinance its hotel through Berkshire. Berkshire will not provide any financing to [the debtors] unless Kissimmee Lodge refinances through Berkshire. The Kissimmee Lodge refinancing therefore is incident to an a condition precedent to the reorganization of [the debtors] and that refinancing therefore is exempt from Florida documentary stamp taxes. The FDOR argued that the plan failed to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)1 because the § 1146(c) exemption the proposed plan conferred on the Kissimmee transaction was not available as a matter of law to non debtor entities.
822 OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended. 2003 are DENIED. No additional petitions for rehearing will be accepted in this case. Stern cross appeals the district court's determination that Stern's pension plan funds are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate. We must determine whether the transfer of proceeds from an Individual Retirement Account (
822 OPINION/ORDER
The BAP agreed that the County was liable for damages resulting from its violation of the automatic stay. The BAP held that the Brawders were not due a refund of the taxes paid in excess of the confirmed Plan amount. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We further elaborate upon the facts of the case and address the effect of the parties' stipulation in the current Chapter 13 adversary proceeding on the County's right to enforce its lien to recover the pre petition taxes that were not paid fully by the prior Plan payments. The Plan stated that the Brawders were in default to the County in the amount of $9. The County accepted them. (1991) (
818 OPINION/ORDER
Is the beneficiary of his son's life insurance policy. The plan administrator is Airborne Freight Corporation. Benefits under [the] Plan [are] paid only if the Plan Administrator. Decides in its discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.
816 OPINION/ORDER
Stern cross appeals the district court's determination that Stern's pension plan funds are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate. We must determine whether the transfer of proceeds from an Individual Retirement Account (
816 OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: p.9. P.C. were on brief for Monarch Life Insurance Company. P.C. were on brief for Ropes & Gray. We now affirm the district court on the ground that Monarch Life is collaterally estopped from asserting a state court challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enter the permanent injunction incorporated in the confirmed reorganization plan. This Order constitutes an injunction against all persons (other than the FDIC as Receiver) from taking any of the following actions (other than an 2Ropes & Gray was scheduled as a creditor in the chapter 11 proceeding. None are material to this appeal. 5Section 105(a) provides in relevant part:
816 OPINION/ORDER
This case is before us on the bankruptcy Trustee's appeal from a ruling of the bankruptcy court that the Debtors. Were the beneficiaries of trusts with enforceable transfer restrictions such that their beneficial interests in those trusts were excluded from their bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Because we conclude that the Debtors failed to carry their burdens of proof that they were beneficiaries of trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The principal issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred when it concluded that the Debtors' § 403(b) annuity plans constitute trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The bankruptcy court's determination that the assets of these pension plans were excluded from the bankruptcy estate by operation of § 541(c)(2) is a conclusion of law which is reviewed de novo. A court's findings of fact are accepted by appellate courts unless they are clearly erroneous. Both of which are qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) as tax sheltered annuity pension plans.
813 WILKES V. UNITED STATES (4/22/2002, NO. 00-16614)

The primary issue on appeal
813 WILKES V. UNITED STATES (4/22/2002, NO. 00-16614)

The primary issue on appeal
811 OPINION/ORDER
Is precluded from applying Chapter 13 plan payments from the Debtors' bankruptcy estates to postpetition interest on their nondischargeable student loan debts. Because we conclude that creditors are not precluded from applying bankruptcy estate payments to accrued postpetition interest on nondischargeable student loan debts. Which was confirmed on June 12. Will be paid in full through the Trustee.
811 OPINION/ORDER
The state and local taxing authorities who had received and refused or failed to refund the recordation and transfer tax proceeds were located in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Each of the taxing authorities was served with notice of the motion and each responded by filing motions for abstention. NVR was exempt from transfer and recordation taxes on any real property transfers completed between April 6. The date that its reorganization plan was fully implemented and the bankruptcy period ended. Specifically holding that
809 OPINION/ORDER
The Moore Plan canceled this coverage when it determined that Geissal was not entitled to continuation coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (
806 TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)

The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion.
806 TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)

The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion.
806 OPINION/ORDER
At issue in this case are the duties of disinterest and disclosure of an examiner appointed to facilitate a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Which was unable to meet obligations on $1.2 billion in debt and whose Nos. 02 6212/ 6213/6338/6340/ 6341/6344/6347 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro. As did the United States Trustee which is responsible for appointing bankruptcy examiners and trustees. The petition represented the largest bankruptcy case ever filed in Kentucky and at the time was one of the largest bankruptcy cases in the country. Schilling signed a document entitled
804 OPINION/ORDER
The primary issue on appeal1 is whether the district court abused its discretion making the award. Concluding that the government's position in the underlying estate tax case was lacking in substantial justification pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B). The other 13% were owned by Nolan Wilkes. The decedent also owned some real property that was used by Suwannee. The total tax liability was $515. The executor elected to have the provisions of IRC § 2210 apply. Are references to the Internal 2 2 1 provided that the executor was relieved of liability for a certain portion of the taxes owed by the estate if an ESOP bought the employer securities and agreed to pay that portion of the estate tax liability.3 The estate paid $168. 000 in estate tax when the return was filed. An appropriate election was made to pay this $347. The problems giving rise to this litigation occurred because the ESOP did not pay any of the installments and guarantor Suwannee was similarly unable to pay. The IRS responded to the TAO application and advised that the
804 OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. This is an appeal from a Tax Court determination unfavorable to the estate of Ida Abraham (the Estate). That the purchase of the decedent's interests by the children were not bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. That action was taken in order to ensure that Mrs. Which were owned by Mrs. Were transferred to three family limited partnerships (FLPs). Abraham and her children were partners in those FLPs. When the FLPs were set up. Abraham received from her husband were three pieces of commercial real estate located in Tyngsboro and Walpole. The Walpole property was leased to a lumber yard. The other properties were skating rinks leased to third parties. The leases on all of these properties were long term. The feud was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. The litigation was also draining Mrs. There was a separate estate plan. The family also understood that the FLPs were a means to protect Mrs. The protection was there for her as a guarantee that she would live status quo.

804 HUNT V. HAWTHORNE ASSOC.

This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Hunt v. Hunt is a retired Eastern Air Lines ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="804"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1284.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which dispute: (1) the district court's refusal to consider evidence beyond the claim record that was closed in 1997. The court's decision to award Ray benefits for the eight years after the record (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 32.1. <hr> was closed. (2) the district court's determination that working in a large office building environment was a material duty of Ray's occupation. (3) the district court's finding that Ray was totally disabled. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm. I. Ray was a partner at Gibson. She was insured under the firm's Group Long Term Disability Insurance Policy ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="804"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug97/95-2078.man.html">HUNT V. HAWTHORNE ASSOC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Hunt v. Hunt is a retired Eastern Air Lines ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="793"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1666.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Klickstein & Levy were on brief. Procter & Hoar LLP were on brief. The district court dismissed the suit after reviewing the trust agreement and concluding that the trustee was not subject to ERISA liability as a fiduciary or co fiduciary in respect to the harms alleged. The Bank wrote to Hawthorne stating that: Our appraiser is prepared to begin his review on Monday. If he is not permitted to begin his review by Friday. We believe that we have no recourse but to seek the advice of the Department of Labor as to our concerns about Hawthorne's instructing us to continue to report the real estate at values supplied by Hawthorne as investment manager. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="793"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4E85A3A3B45D62B588256D190053045C/$file/0255254.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> As Co Trustee of the Marital Trust Created under the will of Willet H. As Co Trustees of the Marital Trust Created Under the Will of Willet H. We must consider whether the IRS was entitled to apply the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2CE960676BCF075588256E5A00707CAE/$file/9917040.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="786"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1745550937F817BB88256ABF007BE07E/$file/9917040.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="781"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/10/053614P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Plan initially determined that Tracy was entitled to the benefits. James Marier was married to Kathleen Marier for twelve years and developed a close relationship to Kathleen's adult daughter. He named her as personal representative of his will in 2002 and 2003. He was not close to them. The record suggests that there was significant tension between Tracy and James's siblings. James had 2 decided to remove his siblings from his will and to name Tracy as his sole residuary beneficiary. Stating that he was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="781"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/431DFC64385683A788256DE20083365B/$file/0216990.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is the extent to which a reorganization plan proposed under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) preempts otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law. Section 1123(a) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="781"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C99FAD19E34AED5688256DF70004D6C2/$file/0216990.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is hereby amended as follows: 1. Circuit Judge: The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is the extent to which a reorganization plan proposed under 11 U.S.C. 17208 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC v. Section 1123(a) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="781"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/962484P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Magill as an active judge at the time this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. After the opinion was filed. Both of these obligations were secured by approximately 1129 acres of farmland owned by the Allens. United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. 3 3 of farmland was far less than the total amount that the Allens owed to the Banks. Was listed as an undersecured claim. None of the undersecured nor the unsecured creditors were to receive any payments for their claims. Richard Bjerk and Hoysler Associates were listed as having unsecured claims totaling $61. The Banks were listed as having an undersecured claim in the amount of $154. No mention was made of Eden Bank's undersecured claim. The treatment of claims section noted that Eureka Bank's secured claim was to be negotiated later. That Eureka Bank was also a possible undersecured creditor whose undersecured claim would be negotiated at a later time. That the results of any negotiations were to be included as part of the October 1987 amended plan. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="776"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011443.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Are reserved to the States respectively. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="776"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0407p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> DaimlerChrysler's secured claim was subject to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="770"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/05/953678P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who were originally named as defendants in the Complaint. One of the numerous documents he filed with the district court is a rambling. Thirty one page Answer recounting with chilling detail his version of the events which transpired on that summer day: The rifle was a semi automatic. The rifle was capable of holding 16 bullets . . . . In checking that a bullet was in the chamber. It was from the 22 1 pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated assault and spent twenty seven months in a Minnesota prison. Who was represented by the Firm. There were no more bullets left in the gun. There was no thought involved: I clipped on the safety mechanism of the rifle and placed it on the roof of Mr. Which was directly adjacent to us. The ambulance is coming! </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="770"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2003/0138052.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> MD 21201 Amicus Law Professors in support of Appellant *** Joining Professor Lipson on the brief are Professors Ralph Brubaker. Introduction This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court. The question on appeal is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. While the question in Hartford Underwriters was one of a nontrustee's right unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme. Our conclusion is consistent with the received wisdom that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="767"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/08/031786P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They were unsuccessful. This motion was opposed by the debtors. Who would otherwise be entitled to prompt distribution of the remaining cash if the case were conducted under Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11. 221 22 (2d Cir. 2000) (primary purpose of Chapter 7 trustee is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="763"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/03/036087P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 847.1 The judgment was duly docketed in Carlton County. Were never consolidated. AgStar is a secured creditor of both the Andersons and Andair. All of which are crosscollateralized. No documents were admitted into evidence. The scheduled combined value of the Andersons' and Andair's real and personal property is. This is in keeping with the Andersons' schedules. If the debt is cross collateralized. That the proceeds of the sale were to be applied first to costs of sale. At the hearing the court found that JaKS failed to prove its claim was secured. Which was denied on October 30. P. 8013. 4 4 3 de novo.5 Whether the bankruptcy court considered all of the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 1225 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) is subject to de novo review. Whether the court erred when it found JaKS failed to prove it held a secured claim is a factual finding. Nor did they file a proceeding to avoid JaKS' lien.6 A proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects.7 Thus. The court was required to deal with these matters at the confirmation hearing. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1613.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> were on brief for appellants.</P> <P> <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991990.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Line 2 the text is corrected to read </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="756"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0260p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Dow Corning argues in a crossappeal that the bankruptcy court should have ordered the payment of post petition interest at the non default variable rate required by the contracts. Since Dow Corning has always been fully solvent and is still solvent post bankruptcy. I. BACKGROUND Dow Corning is a joint venture wholly owned by its two shareholders. Dow Corning was fully solvent at the time it filed its bankruptcy case. The purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to enable prompt and uniform settlement of the numerous breast implant related lawsuits pending against Dow Corning at the time of the petition. When a reorganization plan was finally proposed in 1999. The majority of the unsecured commercial debt contracts would have required a rate higher than the federal judgment rate. These creditors are the appellants in this case. The following requirements are met: (1) under the plan. The class would receive an amount that is equal to or greater than the amount they would receive if the debtor's assets were liquidated. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="754"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981720.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The largest secured creditors were Southern Communications. Premier's loan was secured by a lien against all of Legend's equipment. 3 to Southern and Premier accounted for more than eighty percent of Legend's total liabilities. Among the larger unsecured creditors were Richard Edwards and his father. Not only was he an unsecured creditor. Edwards was required to make the loan payments to prevent Premier from seizing the collateral. Without regard to the actual value of the collateral securing the debt.2 The bankruptcy court was further concerned that there had been 2 The Edwards Plan. Both of these creditors were acknowledged to be </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="751"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/99-4230.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="751"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/99-4230.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="749"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/12/97-1149.htm">97-1149 -- BAYLY V. SKEEN -- 12/22/1998<BR></A><BR> The liability was not incurred by the bankruptcy estate and did not qualify as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="749"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/12/97-1149a.htm">97-1149A -- PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. V. SKEEN -- 12/22/1998<BR></A><BR> The liability was not incurred by the bankruptcy estate and did not qualify as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="744"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-1276.htm">97-1276 -- UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1992 BENEFIT PLAN V. RUSHTON -- 07/09/1998<BR></A><BR> Are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="742"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/03/022045P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> While the retirement plan was determining whether the DRO qualified as a QDRO. Ronald claimed in the bankruptcy proceeding that his pending distribution from the retirement plan should be excluded from his bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)1 because it was subject to ERISA's anti alienation provision. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="737"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0005p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court's order is AFFIRMED. The bankruptcy court's order denying relief from the automatic stay is a final. The order confirming the Debtor's chapter 13 plan over Tidewater's objection is also a final order for purposes of appeal. 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998). 2 Because the parties to this appeal have stipulated to the facts underlying this dispute. A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. FACTS The underlying facts are undisputed. The vehicle was the collateral that secured the Debtor's obligation under the Contract. The Contract was subsequently assigned to Tidewater and its security interest was duly perfected. The accelerated balance owed pursuant to the Contract as of the filing of the chapter 13 petition was $10. The Debtor proposed a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="737"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1996/96a1432p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Review of the grant of summary judgment is plenary. Factual Background Unisys is the product of the merger in September 1986 of the Burroughs Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="735"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200510143.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Thompkins ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="733"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1379.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: On page 20. P.C. were on brief for appellant. Stern were on brief for appellee Peter M. J. Daniel Marr with whom Hamblett & Kerrigan P.A. was on brief for appellees Robert and Frances Shaine. *Of the District of Maine. Argues that the bankruptcy court's order to pay over the disputed funds to the estate was an error of law. Appellee Robert Shaine continued to serve as president of SPM and was an unsecured </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="733"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/976090P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Claiming that Van Der Heide's plan did not satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)'s </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="733"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961557.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="733"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200611655.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This Hawaii debt was included among those to be paid in the Omines' Chapter 13 plan. The collection efforts were halted. The Florida DOR asserted that Omine's post petition income was not property of the estate. That sending debt collection letters was not an action against estate property. That 4 the collection efforts resulted from computer glitches and were therefore not willful. The district court found that the Florida DOR violated the automatic stay and the damages were actual. The district court also remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for the determination as to whether the debt was in the nature of support. Is essential to the Debtors' ability to make plan payments and therefore is estate property to which the [Florida DOR] is not entitled. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="733"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb2000/985509.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We consider the validity of a provision in Continental Airlines' plan of reorganization that released and permanently enjoined shareholder lawsuits against certain of Continental Airlines' present and former directors and officers who were not themselves in bankruptcy. We will reject Continental Airlines' contention that claim preclusion and the doctrine of equitable mootness prevent us from considering the merits of this appeal. We will reverse the District Court's order approving the validity of this provision. Which is legally and factually insupportable. I. Appellants are plaintiffs in several securities fraud class action lawsuits brought against directors and officers of Continental Airlines Holdings. That order was affirmed on appeal on June 28. The District Court decision noted that the injunction could have been more narrowly crafted to permit some portion of Plaintiffs' class actions to continue. Insureds and the Insurers will provide releases to each other. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="731"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/53333A1C2A376D138825723B005F9EE5/$file/0415044.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> He was denied entry. The Kamehameha Schools were created through a charitable testamentary trust. Plaintiff argues that he was denied admission because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Factual Background Historical Context2 The islands of Hawaii are geographically isolated in the South Pacific Ocean and were originally settled sometime between 1 and 750 A.D. The immediate result of that first encounter was that Native Hawaiians were introduced to Western goods and Western diseases. The first treaty was signed in 1826. Additional treaties were signed in 1849. Was commercially desirable. Western economic domination of the Hawaiian Islands was followed by an interest in establishing political control. Was overthrown by a small group of nonHawaiians. Who were assisted in their efforts by the United States Minister. Laws were then enacted suppressing the Hawaiian culture and language and allowing for the displacement of Native Hawaiians from their lands. The Hawaiian language was banned as a medium of instruction in schools. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="728"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BE55A0B16B61BC068825706D00570AFB/$file/0416443.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> So it is perhaps not surprising that litigation in the paper manufacturing industry would require a prodigious quantity of its product. Which itself was a byproduct of various corporate organizational fabrications and deconstructions. Fort James was eventually acquired by the Georgia Pacific Corporation. A large portion of this transaction was accomplished through various means. We shall refer to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="728"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/01/051139P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because the relief sought against Siade's employer sponsored health care plan was not available The Honorable Audrey G. The plan was governed by ERISA. Siade was diagnosed with non Hodgkin's lymphoma and sought GHP's pre approval for an allogeneic stem cell transplant. GHP denied coverage on the basis the procedure was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="728"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0309p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> His estate was worth approximately $10 million. Roughly $1.9 million in federal estate taxes was due as a result of Karam's death. Who are Karam's wife and children. The plaintiffs argue that Sagemark was untimely in seeking judgment as a matter of law and. Factual background Karam's trust agreement contained what is known as a tax equalization clause. The theoretical advantage of an equalization clause is that. Two smaller distributions on the deaths of each spouse will result in less total estate tax liability than would one large distribution on the death of the survivor. Are relatively uncommon in estate planning. More prevalent is the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2241.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Levinson LLP</SPAN> was on brief. P.C.</SPAN> were on brief. Because the charitable organization was still functioning as such at the time its entitlement to the bequest vested. BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="724"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/datefile/datefile.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> End page heading. > <div align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="719"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/feb97/96-3146.wpd.html">UNITED STATES V. MESSNER<BR></A><BR> The first was filed as a joint personal petition with Ruth Ann Messner. The second was a corporate petition in the name of Commercial Builders of Kansas. Messner was an officer and stockholder. The corporate reorganization was converted to a liquidating bankruptcy under Chapter 7. That case was still pending upon the date of the filing of the indictment. Messner was convicted on counts one. Although neither the real estate interest nor the bonds were disclosed in either of the bankruptcy cases. Messner concedes they should have been set forth in the statement of financial affairs of his personal petition.(1) Following the verdict. Messner asserts the district court should have dismissed counts six and seven because he had no duty to disclose his receipt of assets in 1992. Revesting all estate property even that which was undisclosed back to him. He was not a debtor in possession in 1992. He therefore insists he was under no duty to disclose his receipt of $20. Admitting the government could have charged him with not reporting the existence of his interest in the real estate contract and bonds in 1990. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="714"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F1B8D573A97829A2882570B20082B7D9/$file/0316538.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we conclude that the settlement agreement was valid. That enforcement of the agreement was proper. Although the district court erred in ruling that the appeal of the judgment enforcing the settlement was untimely. Rains is an attorney and a debtor in bankruptcy. Flinn is the bankruptcy trustee. A settlement conference was held on September 23. The agreement was reduced to writing and the parties (including Rains) and their attorneys signed it. Among the exemptions claimed by Rains was his interest in a retirement plan sponsored by the American Bar Association (retirement plan). The agreement alternatively provided that: [i]n the event that payment is not timely made by the defendants. 000 unless before the due date for payment the debtors have posted an irrevocable standby letter of credit . . . (or other instrument or collateral acceptable to the trustee and to [the creditor]) to support the $250. Rains drove himself to a hospital emergency room where he was admitted and diagnosed with a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="712"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1994/94a0806p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which is owned by Capital Health Systems. We hold that John Hancock is not responsible either for Capital Health's inaccurate representations made to its employees or for any additional recovery under John Hancock's clearly stated policy. We further hold that Capital Health is liable under the alternative theories of breach of fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel. I. The historical facts of this case are not in dispute. Up to the amount they were currently receiving. Curcio was not a member of this group.[fn2] One year later Capital Health wanted to extend to all employees the opportunity to purchase the same supplemental coverage from John Hancock as offered to the frozen group. The presentations clearly represented to the employees that this option was available </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="712"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062162p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It is common practice in bankruptcy cases for parties in interest to attack the validity and priority of the claims of creditors higher in the pecking order than they. It is not uncommon for debtors to use the Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is because Chapter 11 provides more flexibility and control in determining how to go about selling off the various aspects of the debtor's business and distributing the proceeds. A typical mechanism for effecting a Chapter 11 liquidation is the creation of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="712"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200415492.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal requires us to consider whether certain modifications to New Power's proposed plan were material and adverse to Enron's interests and whether a provision allowing for interim distributions to certain interest holders violates 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtors are liquidating. Enron's only remaining interest in New Power is an equity interest. Which may be satisfied from any cash remaining after New Power's senior creditors are paid. 6 are deemed not to be impaired. 3 1 authorized. Because the actual examiner was not specified until 17 January. Enron may not argue that it was unaware of issues concerning the timing and scope of the examiner's investigation. 4 2 Exh.2 637 at 7 9. If its secured Class 1 claim were recharacterized as a Class 9 equity interest. It would then be impaired and Enron should have the right to vote before plan confirmation. Because if it were reclassified. Any vote Enron might then have would concern confirmation of the plan as to Holdings leaving no barrier to confirmation of the plan as to the Operating Company (at least based on the only objections Enron made at that hearing). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="710"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec97/96-9390.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
710 OPINION/ORDER
The issue presented is whether the monies expended by the tenant before bankruptcy can be recouped or otherwise credited against rental payments due thereafter. Landlord Flagstaff Realty Associates was obligated to maintain the parking area and exterior of the building in good repair. The specific bases for rejection were that the rent provided in the lease was below market value and that tenant had asserted a claim for $477. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(d) and 1291 (West 1993). There are no disputes as to the material facts. Our first inquiry is what rent is reserved under the lease. Pa. 1989)(
710 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Stevens United States Court of Appeals. Among their assets was a 1992 pick up truck. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. The truck was completely destroyed in an accident. 852.83 more than what it should have received under the Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' discharge was entered on April 5. Ford's appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We first consider Ford's argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate. Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of
708 OPINION/ORDER
After ensuring that Tidewater Finance's security interest in the vehicle was adequately protected in the bankruptcy plan. Because we find that Moffett's right to redeem the vehicle under Virginia law was part of her bankruptcy estate. The automobile was Moffett's only means of traveling the forty miles from her home to her workplace at the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Tidewater Finance claimed that Moffett did not have any interests in the car other than bare legal title and an intangible right of redemption. The bankruptcy court properly required Tidewater Finance to 4 IN RE: MOFFETT turn over the repossessed vehicle once it was adequately protected in the reorganization plan. Or lease under the Bankruptcy Code is required to turn over or account for the property. Courts must ensure that the party's interest in the property is adequately protected. The central question here is whether Tidewater Finance and the repossessed vehicle are subject to these automatic stay and turnover provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
708 OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse and remand for further proceedings concerning the applicability of the discovery rule to the debtor's claims against its lawyer's law firm and the law firm's individual shareholders. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in Continental Bank's favor. We will also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and the debtor's law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. P.C. (
708 OPINION/ORDER
Chief Bankruptcy Judge Eugene Chamberlain (
708 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Would have corrected any alleged misstatements made by Karen Yates. Weeks argues that Defendants should not have been granted summary judgment because Advance Stores. Weeks also argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper because. Such a duty was created by Advance Stores' customary practice of informing employees about this right. Weeks argues that the district court erred by concluding that she and Weeks were not entitled to rely on Yates' alleged misstatements about the termination of coverage under Weeks' health and life insurance plans because Yates did not qualify as an ERISA fiduciary. I. Perry Weeks was a full time employee of Advance Stores from October 17. He was initially hired to work at Advance Stores' Roanoke distribution center but was later transferred to the road crew. Which contained her contact information should he have any questions concerning the information contained in the employee handbook. That
705 OPINION/ORDER
Winters was married to the late Ron Patel until early 1999. During their marriage Patel was an editor for The Philadelphia Inquirer. Was a participant in a 401(k) plan sponsored by Knight Ridder. While the two were married. Winters was the beneficiary of Patel's 401(k) account. Patel told Winters that he was having an affair with Mary Frangipanni and that he wanted a divorce. Winters was represented throughout the invasion of privacy litigation by the firm of Sprague & Sprague. Winters was represented by Gary Borger in these proceedings. In relevant part: It is further agreed and ordered as follows: 1. Winters under this stipulation of settlement are paid in full. (1)$100. Winters is paid in full. 3. Ronald Patel hereby waives any claim which he may have to seek consolidation of the Pennsylvania litigation with this matter or to assert the defense of the New Jersey Entire Controversy Doctrine in this action. Over thirteen months after the Consent Decree was entered. All claim set forth or which could have been set forth arising from or with respect to ...
705 OPINION/ORDER
INTRODUCTION Before the in banc court is an appeal by NationsBank of Tennessee (Collateral Trustee) and New Jersey National Bank. Who are collectively referred to in this opinion as the
705 OPINION/ORDER
Both LSS and WHO are non profit organizations which provide community services to residents of Westmoreland County in western Pennsylvania. LSS was selected by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to receive grant moneys under the federal Supportive Housing Program. Because WHO was one of LSS's largest creditors. WHO defended on the ground that LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Program grant relationship was not property of LSS's bankruptcy estate and thus did not trigger a fiduciary duty on WHO's part. We hold that LSS's interest in the grant r elationship with HUD is excluded from the definition of
703 OPINION/ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Armstrong Worldwide Industries. AWI's creditors were divided into eleven classes. AWI's equity interest holders were placed into a twelfth class. Relevant to this appeal are Class 6. The only member of Class 12 is Armstrong Worldwide. Which is in turn wholly owned by Armstrong Holdings. Have interests senior to those of Class 12. All three are impaired classes because their claims or interests would be altered by the Plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1124. All impaired unsecured creditor classes were required to approve the Plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). Then the Plan could only be
703 OPINION/ORDER
The federal agencies were treated as general unsecured creditors. Were entitled to recover approximately 4.8% of their total claims. Austin are not relevant to the issues raised on this appeal. 3 denied the Government's motion. This Court's review of a district court's disposition of a bankruptcy appeal is plenary. The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error. Legal determinations are subject to plenary review.
701 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Gen. The relevant portions of the district court's opinion are attached as an appendix.<p> AFFIRMED.<p> APPENDIX<p> <p> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <p> <p> SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA <p> <p> IN RE: GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 1993</i><p> <p> BEFORE THIS COURT is an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's Order Granting Atlantic Gulf's Motion to Enforce Executory Contract. Currently pending before the Court are three motions: (1) Appellee General Development Corporation's ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="701"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june96/95-4379.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Gen. The relevant portions of the district court's opinion are attached as an appendix.<p> AFFIRMED.<p> APPENDIX<p> <p> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <p> <p> SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA <p> <p> IN RE: GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 1993</i><p> <p> BEFORE THIS COURT is an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's Order Granting Atlantic Gulf's Motion to Enforce Executory Contract. Currently pending before the Court are three motions: (1) Appellee General Development Corporation's ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="701"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/08/97-4121.htm">97-4121 -- PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. V. CF&I FABRICATORS OF UTAH INC. -- 08/03/1998<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="698"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A294DE38BC83F75B88257051005488B8/$file/0415044.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Kamehameha Schools have operated as the charitable legacy of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop. The Kamehameha Schools give preference to students who are of native Hawaiian ancestry. Attendance at the Kamehameha Schools is effectively limited to those descended from the Hawaiian race. The issue considered here is a significant one in our statutory civil rights law: May a private. Purposefully exclude a student qualified for admission solely because he is not of pure or part aboriginal blood? The parties agree that this is a case of first impression in our circuit. He argues that he was denied entry to the Kamehameha Schools because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. I The facts are not in dispute. Nonsectarian schools which are dispersed among the Hawaiian Islands. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS 8927 The school system was founded in 1887 under a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0254p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is the beneficiary of that plan. Was an employee of the company and a plan participant until his death in 1995. Who were also parties to the action below. He was married to Brenda Fuston Petry Bryant ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/September2004/042411p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was never in financial distress and that the petition in this case was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord's claims and to increase the distribution of the Debtor's estate to Integrated's shareholders at the Landlord's expense. These contentions are corroborated by the record. Thus Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Which was capped at $25 million with Integrated's liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by insurance) was listed at its full alleged value. Integrated was still solvent at the time of filing. The issue on appeal is whether. With no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11 proceedings will maximize the value of the debtor's estate for creditors. We conclude that such a petition is not filed in good faith and will therefore reverse. I. Integrated was a supplier of software and equipment to the broadband communications industry. The Landlord was aware of the financial risks associated with Integrated's business and willingly accepted those risks. 2001 was a very poor year for Integrated. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0311p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Wagner was indicted in November 2002 after allegedly making false statements to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio during a Chapter 7 conversion hearing and changing the locks on several properties belonging to his estate. Which the trustee was attempting to sell. Arguing that he did not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042411p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was never in financial distress and that the petition in this case was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord's claims and to increase the distribution of the Debtor's estate to Integrated's shareholders at the Landlord's expense. These contentions are corroborated by the record. Thus Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Which was capped at $25 million with Integrated's liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by insurance) was listed at its full alleged value. Integrated was still solvent at the time of filing. The issue on appeal is whether. With no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11 proceedings will maximize the value of the debtor's estate for creditors. We conclude that such a petition is not filed in good faith and will therefore reverse. I. Integrated was a supplier of software and equipment to the broadband communications industry. The Landlord was aware of the financial risks associated with Integrated's business and willingly accepted those risks. 2001 was a very poor year for Integrated. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A Notice of the Right of Redemption was served on Ms. The plan provided that the trustee was to make payments to Advanta Mortgage to cure an arrearage in mortgage payments of $9. The trustee was directed by the plan to accumulate sufficient funds to pay Tax 58's claim in one lump sum prior to distributions of other claims except for the trustee's administrative expenses. Since the focus of this appeal is the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation and application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Our review is de novo. 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for the lower court's application of facts to the legal interpretation of a statute is de novo). The holder of the certificate of purchase may serve the property owner with notice stating that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="694"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/985245.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Plan sought a declaration that Robichaud was not entitled to pre retirement survivor's annuity benefits of her former husband. The district court held that the amended order was not a qualified domestic relations order capable of conferring on Robichaud the benefits she seeks. Robichaud and Samaroo were divorced on October 25. If husband were to retire at this time. He was covered under the AT&T Management Pension Plan. Which would have begun. There were. If there is no surviving spouse. There is no annuity. It was unclear whether state divorce decrees could effectively convey a share in one spouse's pension benefits to the other spouse. Although the Retirement Equity Act was not in effect on October 25. There was simply no pre retirement survivor's annuity payable in respect of Samaroo.2 2. She suggests in her reply brief that the original decree could have been read to give her that right. Robichaud tells us the only issue in this case is the validity of the amended order. Therefore we conclude that the adequacy of the original decree is not before us. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="694"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2001/993715.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Werner and as trustee of trusts created under the last will and testament of Anne L. Trusts created under the last will and testament of Leo L. Was the largest manufacturer and marketer of ladders and other climbing products in the United States. The plaintiffs are the Anne Werner Estate. Were minority shareholders of the Company. The ten individual defendants ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="691"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043609p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that evidence of pre petition conduct in this case by a law firm is relevant to a review of a debtor's application to retain the firm as special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted as counsel for the debtor pre petition in negotiating settlement arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by attorneys who were co counsel with the firm in insurance matters for those same claimants. Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess carriers.1 The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi. We take judicial notice of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of certain facts such as that a document was filed. Garnering support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success of a plan. A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="689"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/05/01-3129.htm">01-3129 -- TUTTLE V. U.S. -- 05/29/2002<BR></A><BR> Interest that accrued between the date her petition was filed and the date her plan was confirmed. 519.17 was for a priority claim. Tuttle's Chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in December 1999. 000 that accrued on its priority tax claim between the time she filed her bankruptcy petition and the time her plan was confirmed.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-9010.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was born on June 12. True (David). <hr> Dave was a successful entrepreneur and established a number of companies involved in oil and gas exploration. Companies which generated a substantial amount of revenue often provided the funds to support companies which were not as profitable. Dave developed a business philosophy which was guided by four basic principles. Buy sell agreements were necessary to avoid conflicts among owners and to establish clear (1) Of these business entities. The True Ranches were structured as partnerships under Wyoming law. White Stallion Ranch were structured as Subchapter S corporations. <hr> exit strategies. Each True company was governed by buy sell agreements which embodied these business principles. Disability were each treated as if the holder of the interest had notified the other owners of his or her intent to withdraw from ownership. The other owners were required to purchase the departing owner's interests at a formula price listed in the buy sell agreement. The formula prices in the buy sell agreements were derived from a calculation of the tax book value for the various True companies. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-3081.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Willard argues that the relief sought is not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-4142.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Federal courts have reviewed an ERISA health plan's denial of benefits for arbitrariness and capriciousness. Now we are called upon to decide whether a fiduciary's decision to delegate part of its Firestone authority to an independent claims administrator triggers de novo review. He was placed in intensive care. Andrew was taken the five hours from Grand Junction to Salt Lake City by ground ambulance. Was admitted to the neuroscience ward. Pain control a regimen she stated was medically necessary and typical for patients in Andrew's condition. The United Staffing Plan <hr> (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-4302.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The representatives of a class of employees and their dependents who were participants in a medical benefit plan sponsored and funded by their employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Were left with significant. Holdeman is the class representative of a group of employees. The hotel and casino were owned and operated by State Line Hotel. Claims for benefits were paid in the order in which they were received. Claims above a certain dollar amount were covered. Holdeman and the other class members were covered under the State Line & Silver Smith Casino Resorts Employee Benefits Plan (the Plan). Was self funded. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054805p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was obligated under the Confirmed Plan of Reorganization to fully fund its Pension Plan to cover an increase in benefits to beneficiaries of so called window pensions in 2000 and 2001 immediately upon Shenango's determination to grant the enhanced benefits. Shenango contends that the Confirmed Plan of Reorganization did not require full funding of the increase in benefits at the time the decision was made to grant the window pensions. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. ] shall have any funding obligations to the Pension Plan as a result of this section 4.04(h). No benefit increases may be provided for any participants in the Pension Plan who are not Class 4B Claimants. The total benefits to be paid to the window pension recipients were valued at $1. A second window pension was considered. Who was also on the Pension Board as the retiree representative. The benefits under this second window pension were valued at $766. The Class 4B retirees asserted that full funding was required under the terms of § 4.04(h) of the Reorganization Plan at the time the determination was made to grant this second window pension to non Class 4B retirees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E1839CBC4CB3521588256AD1005BB5F3/$file/9855853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Regula contends that the Delta Plan should have accorded deference to the opinions of his treating physicians and considered vocational evidence in making its benefits determination. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a determination as to whether the Delta Plan may have been acting under a conflict of interest. Thus whether the court should have applied a less deferential standard of review to the Plan's decision to discontinue Regula's benefits. I. The Delta Plan is a non contributory employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200702/05-5379c.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> William Perry Pendley was on brief. Was on brief. We hold that the IBLA's interpretation of FLPMA section 1714(b) to allow consecutive segregation periods with different purposes is reasonable. That the IBLA's conclusion that the two segregation periods were not identical was not arbitrary or capricious and that the Secretary's withdrawal was not arbitrary or capricious and does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A. Statutory Background FLPMA provides that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200415878.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The main issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed several claims of Daewoo Motor America. Were violated after a Korean bankruptcy court approved a sale of the assets and liabilities of the Korean parent company of Daewoo America and the defendants then sold in the United States automobiles manufactured by GMDAT. Daewoo America was a claimant represented by counsel in the Korean bankruptcy proceedings but. I. BACKGROUND Daewoo America was incorporated in 1997 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Daewoo Motor Co. The parties agree that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1083p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (2) that removal is proper under the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="687"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5092C5F12159A34188256E5A00707CDA/$file/9855853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Regula contends that the Delta Plan should have accorded deference to the opinions of his treating physicians and considered vocational evidence in making its benefits determination. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a determination as to whether the Delta Plan may have been acting under a conflict of interest. Thus whether the court should have applied a less deferential standard of review to the Plan's decision to discontinue Regula's benefits. I. The Delta Plan is a non contributory employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="685"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011072.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that appellant's lien was extinguished by confirmation of the underlying Chapter 11 plan. The entire claim was only entitled to allowance as an unsecured claim because a lien is secured only up to the value of the underlying property. It is undisputed that Universal knew of its claim against RBS. The plan did not provide for retention of Universal's lien even though the $5 million settlement was now available to satisfy the claim. A Plan Committee was formed to administer the covered properties. Holding that Universal's lien rights were extinguished upon confirmation of RBS' Chapter 11 plan. The bankruptcy court explained that any property of a debtor that is addressed by a Chapter 11 plan becomes free and clear of any claims not expressly preserved. Agreeing that Universal's lien was extinguished upon confirmation of RBS' Chapter 11 plan. The property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors. The plan was confirmed by an order of the court. The property to which Universal now seeks to attach its lien was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="685"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026005P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> These are two consolidated appeals. The first appeal is from two orders of the bankruptcy court. The second appeal is from the bankruptcy court's order of January 28. Which was adequately protected by an equity cushion in excess of $500. In its order the bankruptcy court found: MSB is a secured creditor who has not been paid its promised return from the proceeds of the farming operation. 000 of which was due and owing on March 15. The plan acknowledged that MSB's </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="685"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002111.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Realty Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="682"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1307.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Verrill & Dana were on brief for appellant. Hanson & DeTroy were on brief for appellee DN Associates. DN Associates was represented by James D. DN Associates' proposal would have retained the interests of the limited partners through a recapitalization proposal. The rationale behind Casco's opposition was its understanding that the debtor's continued opposition to Casco's perfectly reasonable plan and the repeated proposing of alternative plans by debtor's counsel to save the interest of the limited partners was adverse to the estate. Debtor's counsel insisted that his efforts were beneficial to the estate and expected to be compensated for his efforts by the bankruptcy court. That such rendered services were not necessary and did not benefit the estate as required by statute. Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions Section 323 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a trustee is the fiduciary of a bankrupt estate. Bankruptcy courts are given the discretionary authority to compensate professionals employed under 11 U.S.C. 327 by an estate trustee or debtor in possession for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/962256P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> His estate was substituted as a party defendant. Such as selfWhen these duties are breached. To restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2003/011351.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Staiano was the U.S. Her current replacement is Acting U.S. After concluding that it is not moot in either sense. We affirm the District Court's ruling that the indemnification provision is permissible. These affiliates are United Artists Theatre Circuit. Revoking the automatic reference means in practical terms that bankruptcy cases are assigned to the District Court unless. They are referred to the Bankruptcy Court. Which was filed while the reference revocation was in effect. 3 Houlihan Lokey's reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. The letter also contained an exception for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2001/002473.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Herr alleges that his right to substantive due process was violated by an eleven year campaign of the Township and its officers to delay and obstruct his development of an industrial park. While it acknowledged that Herr's project was grandfathered under the prior land use plan if he completed it within five years. Herr claims that the defendants' conduct with respect to his proposed development was motivated throughout by a strong desire to preserve agricultural land and restrain development in the Township. He has tendered evidence tending to show that the individual defendants had run for office on </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="678"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/94A3A232EF028C75882572920002E846/$file/0416911.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Placed the corporation into bankruptcy without considering other alternatives that may have yielded greater value for the corporation and its shareholders. Who were minority shareholders. The equity of the minority shareholders was wiped out and the assets of the corporation were sold to one of defendant Yageo Corp.'s subsidiaries. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to sue as assignees of the corporate claim and that their breach of fiduciary duty claims are preempted by federal bankruptcy law and barred by res judicata. The district court held that plaintiffs have standing and that their claims are neither preempted nor barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs cross appeal the district court's damages calculations and its determination that they did not have standing to assert the claims of minority shareholders. Was formed in 1996 by George Chen and George </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="678"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/dec95/94-2284.html">STARZYNSKI V. SEQUOIA FOREST IND.<BR></A><BR> Starzynski was appointed as liquidating agent of the debtor Sound Building Products. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceedings on the ground they were barred by the two year statute of limitations of 11 U.S.C. 546(a)(1) (1993) (amended 1994). We affirm after concluding an estate representative appointed under 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3) (1993) is not a trustee within the meaning of 546(a) whose appointment * After examining the briefs and appellate record. Oral argument was vacated and the case was ordered submitted on the briefs. would commence the running of the two year statute of limitations in which to file adversary proceedings. Adversary proceedings filed beyond two years after commencement of the Chapter 11 case are barred. Sound Building was experiencing financial problems and. A trustee was not appointed at any time. Arguing the claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations of 546(a)(1). Began to run on the date the order for relief was entered. A new two year period began to run upon his appointment as liquidating agent because he was the functional equivalent of a trustee. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="675"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-4558_049.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Emerald wanted the bankruptcy court to enjoin the IGB from revoking its gaming license and to require the IGB to drop the disciplinary proceedings that were pending against Emerald. We have consolidated the appeals for decision because of the close factual relation between them. The court had held that the IGB was required to grant Emerald's 1999 application for renewal and relocation of its license. Emerald which was then still operating in East Dubuque applied for a license renewal. While the appeal was pending. The new section permitted </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="675"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/March2003/014140p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal by a commercial landlord who contends a Chapter 11 bankruptcy was filed only to frustrate his collection of rent. At issue is an interpretation of Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(6) and the Code's good faith requirements. There are two debtors in these jointly administered cases: PPIE and Polly Peck Produce. Contemplate that these two estates will be consolidated upon the effective date of the plan. We will jointly refer to the two entities as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="673"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962046.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The first issue is whether ERISA § 514(a). Against a third party who is neither a fiduciary nor a party in interest with respect to the plan. The second issue is whether ERISA § 502(a)(3). Whose interests are adverse to the interests of a pension plan subject to ERISA. The third issue is closely related to the second and asks whether ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides a cause of action for appropriate equitable relief against a nonfiduciary. I. Appellant Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund (the Pension Fund) is a multi employer employee pension benefit plan. The Pension Fund is located in Alexandria. Inc. is an Iowa corporation engaged in the business of managing hotel properties and has its principal place of business in Cedar Rapids. Inc. were under the Holiday Inn flag. Inc. is wholly owned by two brothers. 000 in debt were offered to over 100 potential investors in 1988 through mid 1989 with the expectation of obtaining $40. Inc. was the limited partner in LHLP. Was the general partner in LHLP and initially owned the remaining one percent. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="673"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958347.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2). Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected debtor's argument and held that the IRA was included in her bankruptcy estate. We hold that debtor's IRA is excluded from the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) because of the restriction on its transferability. I. FACTS The facts are not in dispute. Included in debtor's schedules was an IRA. Which was opened in 1983 and valued Honorable John F. The parties stipulated that debtor's IRA was one defined by § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code [Title 26 of the United States Code].1 II. Standard of Review The sole question at issue in this case is whether 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) excludes from the property of a bankruptcy estate an IRA which is subject to a restriction on transfer by a state statute. Is a matter of law. novo review. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="671"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-5051.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief was Patrick Burkett. On the brief were Peter D. Plaintiff Appellant Laura Wilson is the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband. Wilson's estate services that were paid for by Medicare. brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital and two doctors. She contended that the government's claim against her husband's estate was improper and therefore constituted an illegal exaction. Wilson's claim1 arose under the Medicare statutes and because jurisdiction over such a claim is vested exclusively in federal district court. Some background will help the reader to understand the issue in this case. Medicare is a system of federally funded heath insurance for the aged. It is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. All statutory references are to the 2000 version of the United States Code. 3 For convenience. Medicare paid for medical services without regard to whether they were also covered by an employer group health plan. Which were designed to make Medicare a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="671"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051374p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We review the District Court's determinations that: (1) a debtor's right to a surplus generated by a pension plan is a property interest. (2) an amendment to that pension plan that irrevocably decreases the surplus is a transfer of the property interest. (3) the value surrendered and the value gained as a result of the transfer need not be precisely calculated in this instance in order to conclude that they are not reasonably equivalent. In 1995 Fruehauf entered into contracts with several of its top executives that would pay them significant benefits if the Company or its assets were sold. As the benefits would not accrue to the beneficiaries unless they were still employed by Fruehauf at that time. B. The Emergency Board Meeting Fruehauf continued to have financial difficulties. Although the parties dispute what was considered at this meeting. They discussed an amendment (known as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept2000/995383.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2000) * After this case was argued. We are now confronted with the inevitable question of whether a debtor's attorney remains eligible for compensation from the estate. We conclude that debtors' attorneys are still 2 eligible to receive compensation for fees and expenses reasonably likely to benefit the estate. We conclude that the debtor's attorneys' services were not reasonably likely to benefit the estate. We will. Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Our review of the District Court's determinations is plenary. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200214044.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The policy is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Barbara Kennedy was Clint Kennedy's second wife. They were married from 1983 to July of 1991. Mary Beth Kennedy was Clint Kennedy's third wife and was married to him from July of 1991 until the time of his death. BACKGROUND Clint Kennedy was employed by Georgia Pacific Corporation for more than twenty five years. His last position was that of Executive Vice President and. Naming his then wife Barbara as the sole beneficiary if she were still living at the time of his death. We will omit the word </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062226np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. The credit line was drawn down and the loan was in default. Were consolidated and administratively dismissed pending completion of the bankruptcy proceedings and related appeals. 144.54 and provided Fleet with a release and assignment of all claims that WebSci had asserted or could have asserted against it. The Trustee filed a supplemental certification clarifying which claims were included in the settlement and which were not. The hearing was continued on September 26. An Amended Disclosure Statement was filed on November 5. The order of confirmation was entered on May 18. Which was denied on March 31. The District Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Are not applicable because the settlement falls outside the scope of Rule 9019. That if they are applicable. The Bankruptcy Court summarized the settlement as follows: The Trustee in the terms of the settlement stated that he had entered into the agreement with the bank whereby the debtor's alleged setoffs and counterclaims ­ that is WebSci. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1997/97a1491p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case is before this court on appeal from an order of the district court entered April 1. Was incorporated in Pennsylvania in 1979 and was in the business of installing insulation for commercial and industrial establishments. Were Insulfoams' only shareholders. Dennis was Insulfoams' President and chief executive officer and Marion was its chief financial officer. The corporation is unable to afford the required monthly Plan payment the principals. Dennis and Marion Donaldson will guarantee that the payment is made by lowering their own salaries or by making a capital infusion into the corporation from their own resources. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="666"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2004/032431np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the standard applicable to substantive due process claims involving executive action in land use disputes is the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="666"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/011755.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Shareholders contend that they were deceived into relinquishing their ownership rights and that they could 1. The consortium of investors is referred to as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="666"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/04/036092P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court dismissing Appellants' adversary proceeding on the grounds that Appellants had not commenced an action in a court of competent jurisdiction within 120 days of the date of confirmation of Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan. Debtor's Plan provided that Class Four B consisted of the disputed and/or unliquidated claims of which Debtor had notice at the time of the filing of the petition and required that such claims would not be 2 deemed allowed and would receive no distribution under the Plan until the claims were estimated or liquidated. Richard Seeman were included as Class Four B(b). The Plan provided that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="666"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/dec95/94-1384.html">NINTENDO V. PATTEN<BR></A><BR> By Judge Moore Please be advised that pages 4 and 5 of the captioned decision have been amended. Attached are substitute pages. The question of standing is often dwarfed by the substantive issue we are urged to resolve. Ltd. is the proper party to reopen a confirmed plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Nintendo was neither a party in the confirmation proceedings nor was it dealt with in the plan. I. Background Alpex was a publicly held corporation which invested in and developed various patents for computer related technologies. Among those patents was U.S. All of Alpex's assets were to be transferred to the Trustee for distribution to Alpex's creditors and stockholders according to the claims and interests of the five classes created.2 It also authorized the Trustee to litigate the Alpex patent claims. When the Plan was confirmed. The estate's only assets were potential recoveries in Alpex's 555 patent infringement suits against Coleco. Nintendo offered $3.9 million in settlement of the patent infringement suit based on information in the Disclosure Statement3 that the claims of stockholders totalled approximately 2 The five classes are: Class 1. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="664"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0004p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court's jurisdictional determination is AFFIRMED in part. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are whether the bankruptcy court erred in holding: (1) that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Debtor's failure to object to a creditor's claim was entitled to preclusive effect in pending state court litigation. An order is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="662"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/012542.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Board of Trustees of the pension fund ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="659"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/976088P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we determine that 2 the bankruptcy court was without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the federal income tax liability for the 1990 through 1994 taxable years. The opinion below will be vacated. This Chapter 11 bankruptcy case was filed by the debtor on August 24. The taxes were based upon the additional $500. The debtor objected to the proof of claim on the basis that the funds were not income. An evidentiary hearing was held on the objection after which the bankruptcy court found. The IRS proof of claim was allowed in its entirety. That the debtor may have made restitution in subsequent tax years. No years were specified and the opinion does not indicate what tax years the Court believed would be in issue.1 Payments in the nature of restitution are deductible with respect to the tax years in which they are made. 26 U.S.C. § 165. He was entitled to claim a deductions of the amounts paid on his 1040 return for the 1991 taxable year. It appears that the delay was occasioned by settlement negotiations between the parties. 4 2 response objecting to the motion. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="657"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961592.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> For Appellee. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May2000/991619.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. They challenge the District Court's ruling that a legal memorandum they sought to discover was protected by the doctrine of work product immunity. We will affirm in part. Ostensibly raising an issue as to whether the District Court erred by concluding that Appellants were entitled to any interest at all. 165 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA permits actions to recover interest on wrongly withheld benefits even where the benefits were paid before litigation). We hold that the argument is not properly presented in this appeal. Are participants in. The Plan was amended so that the offset requirement applied only to non plan pension benefits </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2002/005049.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeals an order granting summary judgment to Prudential Insurance Company on her claim that Stanley Harrow and a putative class of plaintiffs were wrongfully denied insurance coverage for Viagra. We will affirm. 2 I. Stanley Harrow was insured under the Prudential HealthCare HMO Plan through his wife. Harrow was prescribed Viagra. She was informed by an unidentified person that the plan did not cover Viagra because it was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044080p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellant Credit Suisse First Boston ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/957FBD7CF1F5989B88256CDB000B2C44/$file/0016660.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The current action is a challenge to provisions of the Agency's 1987 Regional Plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043620p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was employed by Appellee New Jersey Natural Gas Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Oct2003/023381p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are once again called upon to determine whether a lawsuit claiming medical negligence is completely preempted by the civil enforcement provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1996/95a1238p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This consolidated class action is brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants breached section 1104(a)'s fiduciary duties and as to whether the defendants are entitled to section 1104(c)'s protection. We will. Vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor and will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Each plan permitted an employee to contribute a percentage of his or her compensation into an individual account and to direct that it be invested in any one or a number of funds that were comprised of different types of investments. A GIC is a contract under which the issuer is obligated to repay the principal deposit at a designated future date and to pay interest at a specified rate over the duration of the contract. The Sperry Plan and the BEST Plan were consolidated to form the Unisys Savings Plan. Was closed to new contributions. Assets invested in the Fixed Income Fund were reinvested in the new Insurance Contract Fund. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1998/98a1821p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court's grant of summary judgment was based on its conclusion that the FHC lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to maintain this suit. Because we are convinced by the unique set of facts surrounding the section 3604(c) claims that the FHC has failed to satisfy the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-7060.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The question in this case is whether the Earned Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) makes an employer a fiduciary to its employees if it agrees to make regular employer contributions to an ERISA covered employee benefit <hr> plan. The Plaintiff Appellants (Trustees) are trustees of various employee benefit funds (Funds) who sued the Defendant Appellees (the Lunas) to recover promised but unpaid monthly employer contributions to the Funds. The payments were owed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which the Lunas' company was a party. Finding that the Lunas were not ERISA fiduciaries. We AFFIRM the district court's ruling that the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Inc. was an Oklahoma construction company that employed workers represented by Local 584 of the International Association of Bridge. Employer contributions under the CBA were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTkwOThfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-9098_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because there is no demonstrated conflict with state law that would require federal common law rule making in this case. Federal common law rule making is only appropriate if the operation of state law would </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="655"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1067p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="652"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/05/056041P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND These are appeals from Orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri1 issued on July 6. Although this pleading was filed in only one of the cases pending before us. We find that these appeals were frivolous. That sanctions are warranted in this case. The Debtors listed a business debt owed to Bank of Cairo and Moberly (BCM) which was secured by the Debtors' business assets. At the time the bankruptcy Petition was filed. Which was the estimated equity in the property securing the claim. Tina Livestock also asserted that the Plan was not proposed in good faith since the Debtors were proposing to pay their long term real estate debt in full over the life of the Plan. Tina Livestock also said it was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="650"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011909.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: A month before they were married. Two years after Odom and Newton were married. I Toni Odom and Charles Newton met in 1983 while both were working as linemen and line splicers for BellSouth Corporation. Each was a participant in BellSouth's Employee Stock Ownership Plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="650"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/03/992705P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A reorganization plan was proposed by appellees William E. The Franke Gannon reorganization plan was approved over the objection of the Debtors. Finding that the estate indeed was insolvent and thus the Debtors' equity interests in the estate were without value and were properly extinguished. Arguing that the estate's assets actually exceeded its liabilities at the time of the reorganization and that they are entitled to the excess value of the estate because the creditors have otherwise been paid in full. Our standard of review is the same as that of the district court. A reorganization plan may be confirmed over the objection of equity holders whose interests are being eliminated as long as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/247AD8E3195E2C4A88256ABF004D0A31/$file/9956131.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2106. Is a professional musician. Cusano was the lead guitarist for KISS from 1982 until 1984. During which time Cusano co authored and performed 1 Cusano's claims were: (1) open book account songwriter/publisher royalties. Defendants Simmons and Stanley were listed as creditors possessing contingent and disputed claims in an unknown amount. The plan was confirmed in 1990 and Cusano was released from bankruptcy in 1993. The coffee table book entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/022AF3550BC8603288256E5A00707CA7/$file/9956131.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2106. Is a professional musician. Cusano was the lead guitarist for KISS from 1982 until 1984. During which time Cusano co authored and performed 1 Cusano's claims were: (1) open book account songwriter/publisher royalties. Defendants Simmons and Stanley were listed as creditors possessing contingent and disputed claims in an unknown amount. The plan was confirmed in 1990 and Cusano was released from bankruptcy in 1993. The coffee table book entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/40E591FE947FF24488256F79006F684C/$file/0256002.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The U.S. bankruptcy court and the U.S. district court have rendered conflicting judgments that decide the claims of the surviving spouse and that affect the distribution of the net property of the decedent's trust and probate estate. While active probate proceedings were pending in the courts of the State of Texas. In a cross appeal the surviving spouse seeks to reverse the district court's determination that the bankruptcy proceeding was not a core proceeding. Which reduced the sum she was awarded by the bankruptcy court. Incidentally we are required to determine whether the probate exception applies in a bankruptcy case. We have appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Are bound by the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction and that we are required to refrain from deciding state law probate matters. No matter how the issue is framed by the parties. Howard Marshall II were initially named as co trustees of the 1982 trust. They were married on June 27. Last will and testament or conveyance in which Vickie Lynn Marshall is identified as a legatee. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200315756.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Although it is unnecessary to refer to them by name. Recomm's business was carried on. The lease assignments were without recourse. The laws governing Chapter 11 proceedings are codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 1174. Several reorganization plans were proposed. Only the third and fourth plans are relevant here. Were served with a copy of the Third Amended Plan in June 1997. The Third Amended Plan purported to modify the leases of all </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="645"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1656.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.L.L.C.</SPAN> was on brief for appellant.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="645"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTMzMDAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-3300-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The District Court having determined that CareFirst is not a member of the class and therefore lacks standing and authority to object to the settlement agreement on its own behalf or to opt out of the Settlement Agreement. All portions of the brief of Linda Cahn except those related to her own claim for attorneys fees were stricken. Only those arguments put forward by the remaining Movants Appellants are considered in this Opinion as to the other issues. 4 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 amended Settlement Agreement. Assuming either of the preceding questions is answered in the affirmative. Serious questions have been raised as to whether four of the class action representative plaintiffs plan participants and beneficiaries who apparently suffered neither economic nor 1 2 3 4 5 6 Insured plans pay set premiums to an insurance company in exchange for full payment of their members' prescription drugs. Retain for themselves the obligation of paying for the prescription drugs provided to their beneficiaries and participants. 5 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 medical injuries resulting from the PBM's alleged wrongdoings have Article III standing to assert. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="645"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1996/96a1257p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> INTRODUCTION Before us is an appeal by NationsBank of Tennessee (Collateral Trustee) and New Jersey National Bank. Who are collectively referred to in this opinion as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="643"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/03/046009P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court held that Thousand Acres is entitled to judgment against Appellants for specific performance of the Purchase Agreement entered on May 10. Closing was subject to certain contingencies. Included in the motion was the 23 acres. The purchase price is $200. Trustee believes it is in the best interest of the Debtor's estate to accept the offer The Honorable Dennis D. Closing of the sale was delayed by two factors. The property was still subject to the probate process resulting from the death of Mr. Who may have had a marital interest. During the same period that the trustee was attempting to sell assets. The debtors were attempting to confirm a Plan of Reorganization (the Plan). Which was the effective date of the plan. After a prior appeal was dismissed. Thereby making the grant of partial summary judgment a final order over which this panel has jurisdiction.4 4 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (b)(1). 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.5 A grant of summary judgment is proper only where. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="641"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981967.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question before this Court is whether a claimant who never received written notice of his right of conversion as guaranteed by an insurance policy governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Is entitled to benefits. Canada Life first filed this action in district court seeking a declaration that at the time of his death Lebowitz was not covered by the Policy. Although Canada Life may not have been required by ERISA to provide Lebowitz with written notice of his right of conversion. The life insurance policy was a Policyholder Administered Group Life Benefit policy. WTP was designated the Policyholder/Plan Sponsor. Canada Life was designated the Claims Administrator. The Summary Plan Description document (SPD) of the Policy was distributed to all partners. Lebowitz was still considered a full time senior partner by WTP. III ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="641"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1395.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Krasnoo was on brief for appellants. Was on brief for appellee. On the day the joint chapter 11 petition was filed. We recite the facts as the jury reasonably could have found them. That the record on appeal is woefully incomplete. 383.66 were deposited in a bank account in the name of John Shepard. The fourth was the $8. Who was continuing to write checks on their joint checking account during this time. Were deposited in the Shepard account. 517.36 check was drawn on the Shadduck pension plan account. The Shadducks were indicted on January 19. Shadduck admitted making false statements but nevertheless insisted that he had not listed the pension plan funds on the schedules because they were exempt. Vouchsafed that his wife had not known what was going on. Who was sentenced to two years' probation. She nonetheless contends that there was insufficient evidence that she intentionally made a false statement. There was ample evidence to support the conviction. 000 withdrawal from the joint checking account on the eve of bank ruptcy was to prevent its disclosure to creditors. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="639"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B838643CB2C04F6788256EDE007565D4/$file/0256772.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Background AT&T Wireless of Santa Barbara ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="639"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/11/98-4106.htm">98-4106 -- KIMBER V. THIOKOL CORP. -- 11/10/1999<BR></A><BR> The Plan is managed and self funded by Thiokol and is subject to the requirements of ERISA. John Hancock Managed Care Group ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2A1FC286C642A49E88256C3E005824D5/$file/0017260.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is appealing the decisions of the district courts affirming: (1) the bankruptcy IN RE SMITH 14839 court's award of attorneys' fees to the law firm of Edwards & Hale. Much of the fee litigation was occasioned by a stubborn refusal of the debtor to recognize valid claims by attorneys. His continuing battles with his lawyers have been extraordinarily wasteful of the resources available in bankruptcy. E & H was retained for this litigation. If sufficient funds were not raised from either of these two sources within a specified time. His case was therefore converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding and a trustee was appointed. This order was carried out and the painting sold at auction for $3.9 million. Smith is to receive any funds in excess of bankruptcy claims and administrative fees and costs. These appeals have been unsuccessful. After the bankruptcy case was converted to Chapter 7. Shea & Carlyon was successful in defending E & H's fee awards against all challenges. P.C.) was contingent upon the award of fees to the IN RE SMITH 14841 other professionals in the case. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar98/97-6175.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar98/97-6175.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1998/98a2012p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This appeal is from a decision in an adversary proceeding brought by plaintiff appellant/cross appellee Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/953137P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Harold Arbeitman was employed by two Dodge dealerships. His first wife from whom he was divorced. Who was named as beneficiary in the Royal Parkway plan. Harold Arbeitman died in August 1992. and profit sharing plans.2 Harold and Patricia were married in October 1966. children. Tried the case by consent of the parties. 2 1 The terms of the Royal Parkway and Royal Gate plans are the 2 same. in December 1983. against his estate. The validity of which was The agreement listed the separate property of Donna and Harold. Neither plan was listed level of support for Patricia and his children. The Trusts brought this interpleader action to have the court determine who was entitled to receive Harold's benefits under the pension plans. The benefits from the Royal Parkway plan were The approximately $83. The magistrate judge rejected Patricia's contention that the plan was intended to take the place of the life insurance policy required by the separation agreement. ERISA defines the term qualified preretirement survivor annuity as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/981636.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before this court on an appeal from an order denying defendant ARCO Chemical Company's ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0104p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Reasoning that Crosby received all of the life insurance benefits she was due and that the company's conduct did not warrant monetary penalties. Which noted that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/995051.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The calculation of his sentence.1 We will affirm his conviction and sentence in all aspects. An understanding of the facts of the case is a necessary foundation for a discussion of the issues he raises. We have jurisdiction over Helbling's appeal over his conviction under 28 U.S.C. We have considered both his counseled and pro se submissions. We have denied Helbling's motions to file further supplemental briefs and appendices. 2 embezzlement of employee pension plan funds from an ERISA covered plan (18 U.S.C. The mail fraud counts were dismissed during trial.2 The jury convicted Helbling of twenty seven of the remaining twenty nine counts. Helbling filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the indictment was not timely. Helbling argued to the District Court that the waiver was invalid because he had been coerced into signing it by fraud and misconduct. That the government witnesses were lying. The witnesses explained that Helbling was the president. The plan was funded exclusively by Micro Products. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1976.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for appellant.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-20121.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. A Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on June 7. Such plan was consummated on April 27. A Final Closing Order nunc pro tunc was issued by the Bankruptcy Court on July 31. A partnership which was formed in 1975 between OMS and Digicon Marine. The Bankruptcy Court entered the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law: Ocean Marine Services Partnership No. 1 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0270p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an interlocutory appeal seeking reversal of the district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity to the defendant police officers. The right in this context was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="634"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972244.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who was Tom's widow. Betty's claim was based on a property settlement agreement that she entered into with Tom in connection with their divorce. The district court held that Betty's claim was preempted because it was based upon state law that related to an employee benefit plan. Her constructive trust claim is not preempted. Which was incorporated but not merged into their divorce decree. A separate QDRO that was entered by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. The transferred policies are not at issue in this appeal. Betty never received or requested such proof. 3 was maintained through his employer. Which was administered by MetLife. This life insurance policy was subject to the provisions of ERISA. It was not specifically mentioned in the property settlement agreement. The beneficiary designations on the policies were changed frequently. Betty was not named as the beneficiary of either the MetLife policy or any other policy that would fulfill the property settlement agreement's $200. The threshold question in this case is whether ERISA preempts the enforcement of a property settlement agreement against life insurance benefits paid through an ERISA governed plan. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="632"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/03/976066P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND The Hatchers are Iowa farmers. They owned farmland which was partly encumbered by a mortgage on which they fell delinquent. A sheriff's sale was set for January 6. Which consisted of 46 acres of land on which their residence and another building were situated. The Hatchers were able to locate yet another buyer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="632"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1997/97a1514p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeals from a final order entered by the district court in this bankruptcy case involving a claim by Barshak that his Individual Retirement Account ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="632"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/04/98-6063.htm">98-6063 -- WOODS V. KENAN -- 04/13/1999<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0882p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The underlying action is Acierno's request for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for the County's alleged violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994).[fn1] Presently before us is the County's appeal from an order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting Acierno's motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction directing the County to issue Acierno a building permit for development of a shopping mall. The district court also concluded that Acierno would suffer irreparable harm unless the County was compelled to issue the building permit and halt its interference with Acierno's development. The County argues Acierno failed to show he will be irreparably harmed unless a preliminary injunction issues against the County. A primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered. There is no evidence in this record to show that a delay in issuance of the building permit until this case can be decided on its merits would cause irreparable harm to Acierno. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0003n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court held that certain insurance proceeds were not property of a chapter 7 estate converted from chapter 11. The dismissal of the involuntary was reversed on appeal and an order for relief was entered. Held that recovery on all grounds was precluded by the previous order releasing the funds. The court concluded that recovery was not available under any of these provisions as a matter of law because the transfers occurred post petition. Is recovery of the excessive legal fees under 11 U.S.C. § 329 precluded because the payments to the attorney took place post petition or because of equitable concerns? 3. Is recovery of the funds under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544. The bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the adversary proceeding is a final. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Was the beneficiary under. The existence of the First Policy was not disclosed in TEI's bankruptcy schedules or in its plan of reorganization confirmed on September 1. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1040.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief for appellants. Desmery and Craig and Macauley were on brief for appellee. Jun iper's companion claim for cleanup related attorney fees was disallowed as well. The drums were still at the facility when DEQE conduct ed its last site inspection. Juniper contends that the area was sub merged at the time. The Hemingway Bristol chapter 11 reorganization proceeding was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. A chapter 7 trustee was appointed. Were dis covered at the facility. 391 U.S. 471 (1968)).3 2Juniper alleges that an engineering firm was paid $30. An environmental consulting firm was paid $7. A law firm was paid $54. When the trustee's motion for summary judgment on count I was denied the bankruptcy court allowed Juniper to amend count I to assert a claim for contribu tion under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). On the ground that Juniper was the holder of a contingent CERCLA contribution claim based on a debt owed EPA for which Juniper. Bristol were jointly and severally liable. The bankruptcy court ruled that Hemingway and Bristol were responsible parties </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D772F220FE8E9B7D88256B5D005C2711/$file/0015884.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is a participant in the UFCWNorthern California Employers Joint Pension Plan (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan97/95-8347.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Meehan United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge:

Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A.

627 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Meehan United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge:

Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A.

625 OPINION/ORDER
He is to pay the costs associated with obtaining the enforcement order. Because the fraudulent transfer claims asserted by Haskell in Alabama state court were extinguished by the Reorganization Plan and Confirmation Order. We will affirm the District Court's enforcement order in all respects. Which was financed by an equity contribution of $250 million by KKR. The indenture provides that the noteholders' claims are fully subordinated to the payment in full of the claims of the senior lenders. The total 3 financing of the leveraged recapitalization was approximately $1.25 billion. Were not viable against any of its participants. The affiliates are PWS Holding Corp. Inc. 4 were
625 OPINION/ORDER
The District Court found that neither plan was governed by ERISA and therefore dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As both plans were covered by ERISA. The Profit Sharing Trust was funded through a rollover of William's assets from profit sharing and pension plans from two prior jobs. The Profit Sharing Plan provided that distributions from the plan were to be made as a joint and survivor annuity. Distributions from the Pension Trust were to be made as joint and survivor annuities. The assets from these IRAs were distributed to the Insurance Trust. As well as an order compelling the trustees of the Insurance Trust to obtain a refund of inheritance taxes paid on the assets that were transferred to William's IRAs. The District Court held that neither the Profit Sharing Plan nor the Pension Plan was governed by ERISA and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by order entered August 15. Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend this order was denied on October 3. Was substituted for Evelyn as a plaintiff. 2.
622 OPINION/ORDER
O:\Slip\WP\2006\05 7140 Stewart7a.odl.wpd
622 OPINION/ORDER
We are asked to decide whether a franchise agreement involving a vehicle dealership had been terminated prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Because we find that the franchise agreement was still in effect when the petition wasfiled. It follows a fortiori that the vehicle franchise was an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Were made in violation of the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. Were not binding on the bankruptcy court. We will reverse the order of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court. Also owned and operated a Chrysler dealership at the same 3 Motors Corporation is a licensed vehicle manufacturer in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the appellee in this consolidated appeal.2 Krystal Cadillac operated the GMC dealership pursuant to the General Motors Corporation (Oldsmobile Division) Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. This franchise agreement was to remain in effect until October 31. It was assured the opportunity to enter into a new dealer agreement at the expiration date.3 In October of 1991.
622 OPINION/ORDER
Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court.
622 OPINION/ORDER
Into Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Program (VEBA) plans in excess of the cost of term life insurance were taxable constructive dividends to the physicians owning the corporations and their spouses rather than employer deductible expenses. The consequences of the decisions were substantial for the taxpayers inasmuch as the professional medical corporations were denied deductions they had taken for the contributions and the individuals were charged with significant additional taxable dividend income. The court held further that the individual taxpayers were liable for accuracy related negligence penalties under I.R.C. Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in 4 excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. These contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses. We will affirm the decisions of the Tax Court.
620 OPINION/ORDER
Holding that its mortgage lien on debtor Carl G. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 36.3.
Davis's principal residence was not avoided by the order of confirmation in Davis's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d) and we affirm. Davis included the following sentence in the paragraph of the Plan entitled
620 OPINION/ORDER
Which is to say damages stemming from sales between Caradon and Eagle Picher after Eagle Picher petitioned for bankruptcy relief in 1991. The bankruptcy court granted the stay motion on the independent ground that Caradon did not have a cognizable claim to bring in the Northern District of Georgia. Common law contribution and common law indemnification were not part of [the] day to day interaction
620 OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Was nondischargeable because Hines had been awarded a separate property interest in the Debtor's retirement account. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether a share of the Debtor's retirement plan awarded to his former wife in the parties' divorce decree is a dischargeable debt. (3) whether the bankruptcy court erred by denying confirmation of the Debtor's chapter 13 plan when the objector did not specify the Bankruptcy Code provision upon which the objection was based as required by the local rules of the bankruptcy court. An order is final if it
620 OPINION/ORDER
Van Der Heide claimed that he was entitled to deduct $9. 495 was subject to the bankruptcy estate. Of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . .
618 OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was
618 OPINION/ORDER
B.J.) and finding that a confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is res judicata preventing a debtor from avoiding a mortgage on his property where the mortgage lien. Was identified in the Chapter 13 plan. We address the question of whether the order dealing with a debtor's mortgage obligations in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy confirmation order is res judicata with respect to a subsequent challenge by the trustee to the validity of the mortgage. We conclude that it is. The district court concluded that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy confirmation order was res judicata with respect to the validity of certain mortgage liens listed by the debtor in his Chapter 13 plan and therefore precludes the debtor's and the Trustee's subsequent attempt to avoid these liens on his property. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are drawn from the parties' stipulations and bankruptcy court filings. The first and third mortgages were satisfied and discharged. Only the second (
618 OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was
618 OPINION/ORDER
The defendants have appealed the denial of their motions to dismiss on absolute and qualified immunity grounds. These appeals were first heard by a panel of this court. Which was bound by Prisco v. In that case it was held that a defendant may not appeal the denial of a claim of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine if the defendant would nevertheless be required to go to trial on a claim for injunctive relief. When the panel opinion was circulated to the full court before publication. The issues addressed in the remainder of this opinion have been considered by the panel only. We are called upon to decide whether the members of the County Council are entitled to immunity from suit for their actions of enacting two ordinances which down zoned Acierno's commercial property. We conclude that both the present and former members of the County Council are immune from suit because the actions they took with respect to Acierno's commercial property were either substantively and procedurally legislative in nature.
618 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Although she was Kirby's surviving spouse for the purpose of the Plans. She waived her rights to benefits under the Plans when she instituted a family court action seeking an equitable division of marital property and did not appeal from the ruling therein.2 We agree that Graef is a surviving spouse for the purpose of 1 For convenience. Because no issue has been raised regarding Albemarle's determination that Graef's claim for benefits under the Retirement Plan was materially similar to her claim for benefits under the Savings Plan. I. Kirby and Graef were married on May 10. Graef claimed that the 1987 divorce decree was null and void. Included among the assets considered as marital property was Kirby's
618 OPINION/ORDER
This litigation provides yet another reminder of why it is essential for individuals to review periodically the documents designating their beneficiaries. His wishes were very nearly frustrated. That decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. The date on which the proceeds of the SSIP were paid to the estate. The estate could have secured the assets of the SSIP in a more timely fashion. Among the benefits of a salaried Ford employee were a company sponsored group term life insurance program and SSIP. Their marriage was annulled in 1972. If the policy owner was unmarried. Although his will left his entire estate to his nephews.
618 OPINION/ORDER
1 under which Bedford was responsible for transporting the modular units manufactured by RBS to the Aspen Knolls building site. Then erecting and completing the structures.2 The subcontract provided that its terms were to be interpreted in accordance with New York law. 2 Bedford also performed work for RBS outside the subcontract. The work was separately invoiced to RBS as
618 OPINION/ORDER
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 dated September 19. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This is the tale of two bankruptcy cases: the first. That 1) if the bar was sold. If they were sold. If MSB's claim were allowed. If an objection were filed to the late filed claim of MSB. Holding that MSB's claim was a timely filed 3 informal proof of claim. That Debtor's plan could not be confirmed if the MSB claim was included. We also held that denial of confirmation of Debtor's plan was appropriate. Paragraph 3.04(g) of Debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided that
616 OPINION/ORDER
000 in
616 OPINION/ORDER
Litton maintains that the court erred in ruling that her proposed plan was an impermissible modification of a debt that she and her husband owed to Wachovia Bank. A cure is expressly authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).1 Pursuant to Chapter 13. Other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence.
616 OPINION/ORDER
000 in
616 OPINION/ORDER
Those are: class 1: administrative expense claims. These terms were accordingly so interpreted. 1 12078 IN RE: ALLEN Atalanta and Anatom appealed. DISCUSSION
611 OPINION/ORDER
The result of which was that less property was available to creditors in his bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court1 held that the tuition savings plans are assets of his estate. That they could not be claimed as exempt at the time the case was filed. The business was performing poorly and was unable to pay its debts. These payments were voluntary. Was approximately $22. Said they were not property of the estate. Asserted that the § 529 accounts were property of the estate and not subject to any exemptions. Legal conclusions de novo.3 The question of whether a § 529 tuition account is property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate is subject to de novo review.4 With regard to the homestead and IRA issues.
611 OPINION/ORDER
Because we conclude that Manus was entitled to relief because of excusable neglect on its part. We will reverse. 1. Is a corporation which. Appellees in this case are referred to as
611 99A2282 -- O'BRIEN ENVIRNMT'L V. NRG ENERGY

Because we conclude that Manus was entitled to relief because of excusable neglect on its part. We will reverse. 1. Is a corporation which. Appellees in this case are referred to as
611 OPINION/ORDER
We have found no helpful legislative history. Their Chapter 13 plans have been confirmed and are currently in place. The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (
609 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The issue in this case is whether the approved plan of reorganization of the A. The district court held that prejudgment interest is not authorized by the plan. The goal of the CRF was to pay claims 2 as quickly and efficiently as possible. Those who are dissatisfied with these amounts or who have suffered more severe injuries may choose arbitration or litigation against the Trust. The district court ruled that prejudgment interest is not permitted by the Plan.
609 OPINION/ORDER
Citing evidence in the record that the EBC had
609 OPINION/ORDER
Arnold LLP were on brief for appellee.


609 OPINION/ORDER
The principal issue is whether either the Property Settlement Agreement (
609 OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Abatie was employed by the Santa Barbara Medical Foundation Clinic (
609 OPINION/ORDER
When it vacated a restrictive covenant attached to their property that was designed to preserve the residential character of the surrounding neighborhood. Was unconstitutional because it does not require the Commission to follow the procedures set forth in the state's eminent domain statute for determining public use. William and Judy Daniels (
609 OPINION/ORDER
That the inter vivos transfer was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). At the age of eighty eight.1 She was survived by her son. Who is the executor of The facts we recite are undisputed facts. Was attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney from 1986 until decedent died. Is the attorney of record for this appeal. These gifts were in keeping with decedent's practice of making cash gifts to her children every year around Christmas. After she was released from the hospital. Which was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a first position deed of trust on the Padaro Lane property in favor of the bank. 2 whose stated purpose was to engage in the business of owning and operating residential real property.
609 OPINION/ORDER
Participants in an employee pension plan have appealed the entry of summary judgment against them on their discrimination claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
609 OPINION/ORDER
When both Congress and the terms of the ESOP provide that the primary purpose of the plan is to invest in the employer's securities. We will vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plan fiduciaries and will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. In this opinion we will refer to the plaintiff appellant Charles Moench. Statewide's Demise Statewide Bancorp was a bank holding company with its principal office in Toms River. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) informed the Statewide Board that
609 OPINION/ORDER
OPINION PER CURIAM: This case was argued before the en banc Court on February 27. (2) holding that the establishment of a magnet schools program was an ultra vires. King and Gregory in the affirmative) attorneys' fees for work done on the unitary status issue are denied. Nominal damages and attorneys' fees in that regard are denied. The injunction is vacated. The imposition of sanctions is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed on the finding of unitary status and the imposition of sanctions. The judgment of the district court vacating and dissolving all prior injunctive orders and decrees is affirmed. The Board is to operate the school system without the strictures of these decrees no later than the 2002 2003 school year. Circuit Judge: This case is hopefully the final chapter in the saga of federal court control over the Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools (
609 OPINION/ORDER
Judge: Plaintiffs appellants are former employees of the Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (
609 OPINION/ORDER
Judge Leval was thereafter added to the panel by random selection. Who received payments of disability benefits after the date he alleges they were due to be paid. The following facts were not in dispute: Plaintiff Douglas Dobson was employed as an anesthesiologist at the West Central Anesthesiology Group. The Plan was administered by defendant Hartford. Is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (
609 OPINION/ORDER
These are two class actions against Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (
609 OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse and remand with the direction that the tax court enter judgment in favor of appellant. I. The facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties. Decedent transferred her remainder interest in her shares to Vaparo in exchange for an annuity which was to pay her $296. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that she made this transfer in contemplation of death or with testamentary motivation. The parties stipulate that this was also the fair market value of the remainder interest. The tax court reasoned that the transfer of the remainder interest in the Vaparo stock was an abusive tax avoidance scheme that should not be permitted: In the instant case. Was excluded therefrom. Decedent's transfer of the remainder interest was of a testamentary nature. Made when she was 80 years old to a family owned corporation in return for an annuity worth more than $1 million less than the stock itself. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482. Both parties agree that our standard of review for this issue of law is plenary.
609 OPINION/ORDER
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service have violated numerous environmental and conservation oriented statutes. Background Fort Baker (
609 OPINION/ORDER
This case is an example of how the best laid plans of mice and men can often go awry. I. BACKGROUND The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. He was survived by his wife. Who were minors when he died. Of which he was both grantor and trustee. Three days before he executed his will. The allocation herein to the Marital Trust shall have a value equal to the smallest pecuniary amount which. Only to the extent that those state death taxes are not thereby increased. The Residuary Trust is established pursuant to section 4.2. The remainder of the trust estate not allocated to the Marital Trust or used for the payment of the debts and expenses of Lurie's estate was to be allocated into a Residuary Trust for the benefit of Mrs. Section 4.1 of the Revocable Trust instrument provides that if the residue of the probate estate was insufficient. Then any remaining expenses from the administration of his estate were to be paid from the Revocable Trust. To the extent that the assets of the Grantor's estate . . . are insufficient.
609 OPINION/ORDER
As follows: On page 3 the list of amici curiae is corrected to read
609 OPINION/ORDER
Which was filed before. Was incompatible with the confirmed plan. I. Issues on Appeal The central issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that confirmation of the Debtors' plan pretermitted the issues raised in the Bank's motion for relief from stay. A bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. The question of whether a confirmed plan pretermits a pending motion for relief from stay is a legal question reviewed de novo. 2 III. The motion was also viewed by both the Bank and the bankruptcy court as an objection to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. That the real property securing the Debtors' obligation to the Bank was fully encumbered and not necessary to the Debtors' reorganization. An agreed order was entered resolving the Bank's motion to dismiss and objection to confirmation. The Motion to Dismiss and Objection to confirmation filed by Salt Creek Valley Bank are resolved as follows. In the event that this Chapter 13 case is dismissed for any reason prior to February 3.
609 OPINION/ORDER
We consider whether certain fraudulent transfer claims arising from transfers made by Cybergenics Corporation were included in a sale of all assets of Cybergenics so as to foreclose its creditors from thereafter pursuing those claims on behalf of its bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the sale of all of Cybergenics' assets did not encompass these claims and we therefore will reverse the District Court's dismissal of the creditors' complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Was a successful marketer of body building and weight loss products under the Cybergenics name. L&S was sold in a leveraged buyout. The newly formed Cybergenics Corporation became burdened with more than $60 million of debt that was secured by substantially all of Cybergenics' assets.1 In August 1996. The original purchase price was over $110 million. The purchase price was later reduced to approximately $60 million. 3 1996. Another party who bid $2.65 million was the successful purchaser of all Cybergenics' assets. The sale order was not appealed and the sale was consummated.
609 OPINION/ORDER
The plaintiffs maintain that the Fines and PHP (1) failed to disclose to the employees that the Company was in dire financial straits and was therefore unable to make the payments necessary to support the Company's healthcare plan. The district court concluded that neither the Fines nor PHP were ERISA fiduciaries within the meaning of the statute. The plaintiffs maintain their argument that the Fines and PHP were ERISA fiduciaries. Arguing that those claims are preempted by ERISA. We (1) agree with the district court that the Fines were not ERISA fiduciaries. (2) conclude that the district court erred in ruling that PHP was not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the assets of the Company's healthcare plan over which PHP had control. (3) hold that all but one of the plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted by ERISA. Inc. was a manufacturer of clothing products. Finkel was asked
606 OPINION/ORDER
When Barbara Cler was terminated from her job as a schoolteacher. Cler hired an attorney at her own expense and was ultimately successful in her case. 000 she was forced to spend in retaining an attorney on her own. I. Background The first task in resolving this appeal is identifying the defendant(s) against whom the various claims in the complaint are asserted. Two of which are labor unions the Illinois Education Association (
606 OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The middle initial of Linda Hart according to the bankruptcy petition is
606 OPINION/ORDER
Are virtually the only significant competitors in the manufacture and sale of high performance electronic interface connector systems. MAC Panel alleged that the injunction was necessary to enable Craycroft to devote the time and attention necessary to prepare a plan of reorganization for the company. That complaint was later amended to extend the injunction request to include the claims against John Cray MAC PANEL CO. v. As well as those who were willing to reduce their claims to $2. Because implementation of the plan required that MAC Panel have $1. Of which MAC Panel projected to have only $430. The proposed plan for reorganization was denied. The principal problems were that the plan failed to pay VPC a sufficient rate of interest on the deferred part of its unsecured claim and that the provision releasing the Craycrofts was unacceptable. The only significant change in the amended plan relevant to VPC was the payment of 9% interest. A rate that was acceptable to VPC. MAC Panel is the only competitor of VPC.
606 OPINION/ORDER
CVC asserts that the finding that CVC made a profit on its note purchases is error. That the District Court's findings are not clearly erroneous. We will affirm.
606 OPINION/ORDER
A procedural chronology will help in framing them. When actually they were employees of the defendants and so were entitled to the health. The suit is certified by the district court as a class action with Morlan the only named plaintiff. Became an asset of the estate in bankruptcy and was not abandoned by the trustee. So when the class was certified. The named plaintiff (Morlan) had no standing to sue because he did not own the claim that he was suing upon. If it was assignable and assigned. If it was not assignable. Morlan rather than the trustee was entitled to sue to enforce it. ERISA requires pension plans to include a provision forbidding the assignment or alienation (these are synonyms. Some types of claim are nonassignable voluntarily but assignable involuntarily. Normally are not assignable. Morlan's claim is in part a claim for pension benefits. In part it is indeed nonassignable. So the dismissal of his suit was improper. It will make a difference on remand whether he can sue on all or only the pension part of his claim.
604 OPINION/ORDER
Trustee's (the
604 OPINION/ORDER
That its belated filing was the result of
604 OPINION/ORDER
That its belated filing was the result of
604 OPINION/ORDER
The question presented in this appeal is whether Kristin Kae Gowin. Although a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to litigate claims on behalf of the bankruptcy (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. The transaction was completed with three documents a sales contract. Gowin was required to make a $600 down payment on the car. Which was left blank. Autos did not have title documents for the car but appears to have received them on or around December 22. There are no written notes corroborating the conversation. The car was unlocked. The windows were rolled down despite the winter weather. The agent said the car appeared to have been abandoned. Gowin's version of events was slightly different. Alleging that the only conversation she had with Autos after the sale was to seek some minor repairs for the car. That she was dissatisfied with the car and had no desire to keep it by the time she filed for bankruptcy several weeks later. She claims to have last seen the car on January 1.
604 OPINION/ORDER
I. Background Kathleen Semien is a 54 year old woman who began working for BP Amoco in February 1989 as an environmental remediation manager. She was employed as a chemical engineer. Administrative Named Fiduciaries were granted the authority to
604 OPINION/ORDER
The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the
604 OPINION/ORDER
Smith's claims were merely a recasting of a claim for benefits. Smith was not required to avail himself of administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court alleging breaches of fiduciary duties as defined by ERISA. Because this case is on appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Or the date at which a loan agreement between McGraw and the ESOP was satisfied. Jr. was a trustee and fiduciary with respect to the 401(k) Plan within the meaning of ERISA and was also the President and Chief Operating Officer of McGraw. Kenneth Fisketjon was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of McGraw and served as co trustee of the 401(k) Plan. Which was delivered to Sydnor and McGraw in August 1996. That the fair market value of the preferred stock was $128.35 per share and that the common stock
604 OPINION/ORDER
This appeal involves an interpleader action filed by a pension plan seeking a declaration of which of two claimants is decedent. Finding that Rita is Douglas Durden's
604 OPINION/ORDER
We will reverse and remand. Distinguishes this case from prior decisions in which we have held a clause reserving the right to terminate or amend unambiguous and controlling. We hold on the facts of this case that the bankruptcy court should have permitted the appellants to present extrinsic evidence in support of their allegations. We will remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court to conduct the necessary evidentiary hearing. I. Appellants are former executives and highly paid personnel of Western Union Corporation (
604 OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The orders of the bankruptcy court are AFFIRMED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in finding that Buckeye violated Rule 9011 and awarding sanctions against it that were payable to the debtors' attorney. Is final if it
604 OPINION/ORDER
We conclude that this type of plan is not 6778 IN RE ENEWALLY permitted under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The property at issue in this case is located at 3380 Andy Street in Long Beach (
604 OPINION/ORDER
The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the
602 OPINION/ORDER
Asserting that the claims against it and related defendants were
602 OPINION/ORDER
Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939. 1 Smith defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage when he failed to pay the monthly installments when they were due. Argued that Smith lost his right to cure his default on This case originally was consolidated with In re Linda F. Although other circuits have held that the date of the foreclosure sale is the ultimate
602 OPINION/ORDER
DeFreitas and Saab Law Firm were on brief for appellant. This appeal presents issues regarding the scope of jurisdiction of federal courts over claims for benefits under an employee benefits plan that is subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Ordinarily the appropriate judgment for a district court to order is one or the other of two kinds. If the district court determines that the out of court decisions were arbitrary and capricious. The appropriate form of order is one remanding to the out of court decisionmaker for further proceedings to decide whether the claim or claims have merit. The usual form of order is a final judgment affirming the decisions of the out of court decisionmaker. Appellees assert that
602 99-4114 -- WINKEL V. KENNECOTT HOLDINGS CORP. -- 01/10/2001

Although individuals chosen by Kennecott to participate in the Severance Plan were terminated. Winkel attempted to return to his job in an effort to have the opportunity to be chosen as a participant in the Severance Plan. Refused to allow Winkel to return to his job and turned down his written request to be included as a participant in the Severance Plan.

Winkel brought this suit alleging Defendants breached a fiduciary duty owed to him under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (

602 OPINION/ORDER
Whitman & Ranson were on brief for appellees. were on brief for appellees. Due to the fact that the State of New Hampshire had banned Seabrook construction cost recoveries through PSNH rate increases until after the facility was brought on line. PSNH was forced to seek chapter 11 protection prior to the completion of the second unit. The NHPUC order was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire on **NUSC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northeast Utility. A public **NUSC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northeast Utility. Appellants objected to confirmation of the reorganization plan on the grounds that the approved rate agreement on which the reorganiza tion was based would deprive PSNH of its prudent investment in Seabro ok and that the proposed reorganization therefore was not in the best interests of appellants. Who were cross examined by appellants. Since the rate agreement was within the range of results reasonably expectable in a litigated rate case. Which was denied by the bankruptcy judge after hearing.
602 01-1466 -- RAY V. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA -- 12/20/2002

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted judgment in favor of Ray on the ground that UNUM's decision to deny her claim for benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Reverse and remand for further proceedings.

602 OPINION/ORDER
We conclude that even though a bankruptcy court's post confirmation
599 OPINION/ORDER
Coal miners 4 who are now disabled. The main issue in this appeal is whether these miners are eligible to receive health benefits under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit (Coal) Act of 1992. The chief issue before us was addressed in recent decisions of the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits. The 1947 NBCWA was modified in 1950. Both the 1947 and the 1950 NBCWA's were financed by a per ton levy on coal produced by signatory operators that is. Were subject to the 5 NBCWA. The benefits were subject to cancellation or change depending on the discretionary judgment of the NBCWA's trustees. While the UMWA 1974 Benefit Plan and Trust (the
599 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Smith United States Court of Appeals. Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939.
599 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Smith United States Court of Appeals. Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939.
599 OPINION/ORDER
Claiming the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to severance benefits and that he was not terminated by Aventis with the intent to interfere with his ability to claim severance benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. He was terminated on October 14. Aventis was in the midst of reorganizing its corporate structure and operations as part of a merger. The reasons cited by Aventis for Koons' termination and its refusal to pay severance benefits under the Plan were violations of company policy that Koons committed in the months preceding the termination. The record is replete with praise and favorable performance evaluations. Koons first learned that his Kansas City office was going to be moved to New Jersey. Koons was made aware of the severance benefits that were available. A
597 OPINION/ORDER
Lapid's primary contentions on appeal are that: (1) because the Board failed to engage in the
597 96-4109 -- U.S. V. VICTOR -- 07/11/1997

The first sentence should read:

Sections 523(a)(1) and 507(a)(7) clearly instruct that tax debts are nondischargeable only if characterized as

595 OPINION/ORDER
Which are endangered or threatened species. The project was a hurried response to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Marilyn. The gravamen of the complaint is that the project would cause harm to the turtles and the Tree Boa species in violation of the ESA. This is the plaintiffs' second lawsuit. Instrumentalities of the Virgin Islands Territorial Government had violated the ESA as well 4 as the National Environmental Policy Act (
595 OPINION/ORDER
We will affirm the appointment of the trustee and reverse the order denying Gibbons's motion for an order authorizing employment of the Firm as his counsel. Two groups loomed large in the bankruptcy proceedings: one was an Official Bondholders' Committee and an indenture trustee. Under which the holding companies would have infused $100 million into Marvel in return for priority recognition of the Lenders' debt claims. The Icahn interests contended that the Perelman controlled Marvel debtors were favoring their
595 OPINION/ORDER
Who purchased or otherwise beneficially acquired securities that were incorrectly and misleadingly labelled or described as annuities from Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company during the period August 14. Because all of these claims were essentially grounded in fraud. Because federal jurisdiction over one of the claims is exclusive and there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the remaining claims. We hold that the district court erred when it concluded that there is an opportunity for timely and adequate state court review of Plaintiffs' federal securities claims. We will therefore reverse the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' case without prejudice and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[fn2] I. General Background Mutual Benefit was established in 1845. It was one of the country's largest life insurance companies. Until the late 1970's Mutual Benefit was a relatively conservative institution. These withdrawals were projected to reach $1 billion by the end of the year.
595 OPINION/ORDER
This appeal is taken from a March 18. Appellants challenge the reallocation to other creditors of stock warrants that were initially allocated to appellants under Metromedia's Plan. Without contesting that cash and stock allocated to appellants were properly reallocated to those creditors under the terms of a prior subordination agreement. Appellants argue that they are allowed to keep the warrants by virtue of an exception in that subordination agreement. Also argue that this appeal should be deemed equitably moot because numerous transactions have occurred since the Plan's September 8. Appellants' objections to the Plan were rejected on the merits by the bankruptcy court and the district court. the same time. The district court ruled that relief (if At 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 justified by the merits) would not have been barred by the doctrine of equitable mootness because effective relief could have been afforded without
593 OPINION/ORDER
The district court concluded that Integrated lacked standing to pursue the state law claims because its purchase of the claims from a trustee in bankruptcy was void ab initio under New Jersey law. We disagree and will affirm. 2 I. The debt was secured by separate security agreements in assets such as accounts. Certain individual defendants who were former Machine Technology employees entered Machine Technology's offices and took or copied various documents. Were unlawfully competing with Integrated. The district court denied Integrated's request for an injunction on the ground that Integrated was not
590 OPINION/ORDER
Who are the beneficial owners of Brickellbush. N.V. and other persons who may be interested in this action and who are presently unknown to plaintiffs. Thus we conclude that their substantive RICO claims were properly dismissed. Because Plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claims are entirely dependent on their substantive RICO claims. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects.1 BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts giving rise to this appeal is assumed. As those facts are set forth in the District Court's comprehensive published opinions. We relate below only those facts and proceedings that are relevant to the present appeals. Sohrab was to pay FCAM $4.5 million in return for an interest in a new Delaware corporation called First Capital Corp. The action was commenced in December 1993. Found that Sohrab himself was not personally liable.1 NACI and NAP were shell companies. That dismissal was reversed as against Sohrab by the Appellate Division.3 In June 2001. Judgment was entered in Oost Lievense's favor. 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 See First Capital v.
590 UNITED STATES V. VICTOR

The first sentence should read: Sections 523(a)(1) and 507(a)(7) clearly instruct that tax debts are nondischargeable only if characterized as
590 96-1470 -- GARRATT V. WALKER -- 12/09/1998

Because any contribution that an employer might make on behalf of employees (including himself) was completely discretionary. We view it in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Particularly given the employer's assertion in his answer that the plan was to be so construed. See Crouch v. We follow the panel's decision that a SEP is a pension plan within the meaning of ERISA. See Garratt. The employee requested whatever contribution percentage (based upon her salary) that the employer was making on his own behalf. Although it was suggested at oral argument that the employee was seeking an immediate contribution. Such an inference would be contrary to the standard by which we evaluate the record.

It is undisputed that the employee was eligible to participate in the SEP plan and that the employee was earning $24. 000 amount was below the employee's 1993 and 1994 compensation level and. The employer conceded that he was asking the employee to take a cut in pay and fund the plan. Id. at 51.

590 OPINION/ORDER
Line 4 the phrase
590 WRIGHT V. HANNA STEEL CORP. (10/25/2001, NO. 01-10371)

Their two minor children in this ERISA action.
590 WRIGHT V. HANNA STEEL CORP. (10/25/2001, NO. 01-10371)

Their two minor children in this ERISA action.
590 MCKAY PERRY S V. U.S.

On the brief were Lois J. Of counsel was Thornton W. Because when that is done there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Which was in that part of the buffer zone overlying the McKays' mineral estate. The sprayed waste was pumped from one of a complex of ponds that were used to hold waste water from several production buildings in Rocky Flats. DOE stated that it had preliminarily concluded from its studies of soil samples from the West Spray Field that there were elevated levels of nitrates and volatile organic compounds in the soil. The West Spray Field was designated a
588 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: A perceptive governor once noted:
588 OPINION/ORDER
The
588 OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellee. Promised as part of a reciprocal will agreement with their father that she would devise her estate in equal shares to them and their stepsister. The question posed by this appeal is whether the estate may deduct the settlement amount for purposes of the federal estate tax. The answer depends upon whether the mutual will agreement was
588 01-5133 -- U.S. V. BOTEFUHR -- 10/31/2002

The Appellants are precluded from litigating the value of the Hondo stock in the present action. 184 F.3d at 1179.

Less than two years after the sale and over four years before Davenport and Vestal were to commence paying their promissory notes. Her last will and testament were admitted to probate in Tulsa.

588 OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the Debtor's individual retirement annuity is an individual retirement account within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f) which the Debtor can exempt from property of his bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2).
586 02-8004 -- MIDKIFF V. STEWART -- 09/04/2003

The plan included a provision that income tax refunds to which the Midkiffs would be entitled during the first thirty six months of the plan were to be deemed
586 OPINION/ORDER
The
583 FRANKLIN V. QHG OF GADSDEN, INC.

This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Franklin v. Linda Franklin was substituted in as a party in her capacity as the administratrix of the Estate of Ronia Franklin. Fraudulent deceit were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov97/96-6652.opa.html">FRANKLIN V. QHG OF GADSDEN, INC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Franklin v. Linda Franklin was substituted in as a party in her capacity as the administratrix of the Estate of Ronia Franklin. Fraudulent deceit were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1994/94a0795p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appellants cross appellees are California Smoothie International. We sometimes will refer to CSI and CSLC singularly as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4F7778C44FE40B548825706D0056C41A/$file/0316791.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction and affirm. Who were officers and/or directors of Boston Chicken. Inc. are the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1994/94a0871p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That Talcott is entitled to receive one half of the pension benefits which Hullett has accrued as of December 31. If she remains unmarried at the time Hullett actually retires or is required to begin receiving pension benefits. I. Hullett and Talcott were married on August 19. Hullett was a fully vested member of Towers. Contending that the Agreement contained an error in that the pension was suppose to be valued as of December 31. Of which value Talcott was suppose to receive fifty percent. Talcott responded that the Agreement was correct as written. 100% of all income received from the pension plan was to be payable to Talcott upon Hullett's retirement and receipt of benefits. That the valuation date was deleted in return for Talcott receiving a full 50% of whatever pension was ultimately payable to Hullett. Whereby the parties agreed that Hullett would receive a pension equal to the one he would have earned under the Plan had he remained employed with Towers. Determined that the Agreement was a QDRO[fn3] within the meaning of ERISA. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2002/012879.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> After determining that the Pension Fund was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2001/99-12898.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Authorizes the United States Trustee (UST) to collect post confirmation quarterly fees from a Chapter 11 reorganized debtor until its Chapter 11 case is converted. Dismissed or closed.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/01/033917P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It was successful and enabled the Blodgetts to lead a lavish lifestyle. Blodgett as he was charged with and convicted of several counts of fraud. His wife was not charged with any criminal wrongdoing. Blodgett and the FTC reached a settlement which was memorialized in a consent order signed March 4. A receiver was appointed to liquidate the assets in both estates and disburse the money. The litigation estate was used to pay litigation expenses for the defense of actual or reasonably anticipated governmental enforcement actions against the Blodgetts. The settlement estate was used to pay claims of defrauded customers of the business. The litigation estate was established with $300. The remaining proceeds from the 2 liquidation of the Coin Fund were transferred to the settlement estate. The Florida condominium and Simbari painting each became parts of the bankruptcy estate and were not returned to the settlement estate. The trustee prepared and issued to the shareholders a notice indicating each respective share of the loss amount and the fact such loss was deductible only to the extent of shareholder basis in the corporation. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug97/95-2078.man_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/08/976019P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Debtors' lawsuit was dismissed by summary judgement. The plan is designed. 000 judgement that was entered against the debtors and in favor of the creditor in state court. The debtors have not been candid with the court. They argue that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that their original plan was not proposed in good faith because it sought to discharge a liability arising out of a civil judgement. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug97/95-2078.man_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/04/981493P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> DuMond was employed as a real estate broker and agent at the Minnesota division of Centex Real Estate Corporation. Centex Corporation and Centex Service are sponsors of an employee welfare benefit plan (Plan) that offers both short term disability (STD) and long term disability (LTD) benefits. DuMond was a participant in the Plan. The Plan defines totally disabled as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="581"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2001/99-12898.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Authorizes the United States Trustee (UST) to collect post confirmation quarterly fees from a Chapter 11 reorganized debtor until its Chapter 11 case is converted. Dismissed or closed.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7B94E384F727084988256C9D0000B932/$file/0057210.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> L.P. 5 reorganization was proposed in good faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) where its sole purpose was to enable the debtors to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0002p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court's decision is VACATED and REMANDED. An order is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200110371.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Their two minor children in this ERISA action.2 The district court determined that Hanna Steel was required to pay for a period of 18 months. Wright was excessive. There is no consistency among federal statutes. We will use the term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-1261.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Of which she was the executive director. Arising out of activities No. 01 1261 3 that she was alleged to have committed as Discovery's director. Process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the [Bankruptcy Code]. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982029.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Most of which were secured by liens on his property. For which the owners have a security interest. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/01/99-6355.htm">99-6355 -- MASON V. YOUNG -- 01/16/2001<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU5MDQtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5904-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> When he learned in 1989 he was suffering from a serious. Was still alive and applied for a pension benefit based on 34 years and four months of credit. Tocker was eligible for service credit only for the 22 years and six months from September 1967 until March 1. Plaintiff claimed he had not been told in 1990 that he was being terminated and would therefore be ineligible for pension benefits. The company name was later simplified to Kraft Foods Inc. in 1995. The plan is now administered by Kraft Foods North America. The merger and the name changes are irrelevant to the issues in this case. Tocker is now represented by counsel on this appeal. Giving deference to the administrative committee's finding that Tocker was terminated in March 1990. Where the administrators are given discretion under the terms of a benefit plan. As they are in this case. We refer throughout the opinion to the statute as codified prior to the enactment of the Pension Protection Act. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 a claim is not the applicant's to open. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/07/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 07/08/2003<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982000.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Shearson was sued on the theory that it was a controlling person by virtue of its ownership stake in First Capital. The deputy receiver 1 Foster was succeeded as deputy receiver by Alfred W. The counterclaims in this action were severed. There was also a nine day insolvency and rehabilitation proceeding before the State Corporation Commission. Gubar were directors and shareholders of First Capital. For $75 million.2 After First Capital bought Fidelity Bank 2 The acquisition was brought about as follows: First Capital Insurance Group. For these services First Capital was paid a sum equal to 0.5 percent of Fidelity Bankers' invested assets each month. The purchaser had the option to either keep the annuity at whatever rate Fidelity Bankers was then offering or get his money back. That is. These annuities were extremely popular. Life Insurance was merged into Fidelity Bankers. Non investment grade (junk) bonds in Fidelity Bankers' portfolio until 38 percent of Fidelity Bankers' assets were junk bonds. These investment decisions were approved by Fidelity Bankers' investment committee (Weingarten. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/11/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 11/04/2003<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-9025.htm">97-9025 -- AMERICAN STORES COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/09/1999<BR></A><BR> BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> American Stores is an accrual method taxpayer. The case was submitted on facts which were fully stipulated by the parties. <p> The Tax Court issued an opinion upholding the position of the Commissioner. <u>American Stores Co. and Subsidiaries v. The court held that pension contributions made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements that were based on units of service worked after the close of American's 1988 fiscal taxable year were not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-9025a.htm">97-9025A -- AMERICAN STORES CO. AND SUBSIDIARIES V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE - - 03/09/1999<BR></A><BR> Contemplates this result. <p> <p> A copy of the corrected opinion is attached. <p> Sincerely. BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> American Stores is an accrual method taxpayer. The case was submitted on facts which were fully stipulated by the parties. <p> The Tax Court issued an opinion upholding the position of the Commissioner. <u>American Stores Co. and Subsidiaries v. The court held that pension contributions made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements that were based on units of service worked after the close of American's 1988 fiscal taxable year were not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1081.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Harrington & Richardson was on brief. The fraud is alleged to have been committed by the purchaser and the debtor's former counsel in the acquisition of a mortgage against the asset. Were in prison. I. Bruce and Andrew Jeremiah are the partners of the debtor. Its business essentially was to lease space in this complex to retail. Hershel Smith to represent them in a dispute they were having with the Center's prior mortgagee. While Smith was representing the Center in the bankruptcy proceedings. It developed that he also was representing some of its creditors. RSS's principals are William Ricci and the Smith Family Trust. Of which attorney Smith's children are the beneficiaries. Also is a convicted felon. Seeking to have the Center placed in receivership. Were in jail for allegedly dealing drugs out of the Center. The Trustee sought to have the mortgage declared null and void. The Center was subject to (1) liens for $850. The Center is in deteriorating condition. Contend that the Center's financial picture is not quite so grim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14906.man.html">HARRIS CORP. V. HUMANA HEALTH INS. CO. OF FLORIDA (6/6/2001, NO. 99-14906)<BR></A><BR> The district court held that the plan of the Harris Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011305.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The IRS assessed additional gift taxes on the grounds that Armstrong undervalued the stock when the original gift taxes were paid. So </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/981677P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Of which Kerr is the president and sole shareholder. Worked on Vatterott & Co. projects as well as Legacy Homes projects and thus were eligible to participate in Vatterott & Co.'s 401(k) pension plan. Vatterott & Co. is the plan administrator and Commerce Bank is the trustee of the Vatterott & Co. 401(k) plan. The plan entitles a plan participant who is terminated prior to retirement to receive the net credit balance in his individual plan account. Kerr was fully vested in the 401(k) plan at the time of his termination from Legacy Homes. 1991 (the valuation date based on Kerr's October request) was $16. The 4 district court also declined Kerr's request for attorney's fees and costs because Kerr was unsuccessful on his ERISA claims. Arguing that lost interest is an appropriate equitable remedy under section 1132(a)(3) and proof of receipt is not an element of his claim under section 1132(c). Kerr does not dispute that he has received the funds in his account to which he is entitled under the plan. Argues instead that his recovery was inadequate because he had to wait three and a half years for his money and had to file suit before Vatterott & Co. finally paid the account over. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14906.man.html">HARRIS CORP. V. HUMANA HEALTH INS. CO. OF FLORIDA (6/6/2001, NO. 99-14906)<BR></A><BR> The district court held that the plan of the Harris Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Aug2004/Aug04/04-10094-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Aug2004/Aug04/04-10001-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Aug2004/Aug04/04-10004-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec2000/981776.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 we will affirm the remand to state court of the vicarious liability claims against U.S. We will. We will remand these claims to the District Court for remand to the state court. We will ther efore dismiss the appeal of sanctions for lack of appellate jurisdiction. She attempted suicide and was hospitalized for six months. She was dischar ged from the hospital in June 1993 but again began contemplating suicide. Healthcar e that under state law it was directly and vicariously liable for his wife's death because the HMO imposed financial disincentives on Dr. Healthcare argued that the denial of the hospitalization request was completely preempted by ERISA under S 502(a)(1)(B). Healthcare was decided after the District Court's opinions in this case. The District Court did not have that decision available to it. 4 remedy for claims alleging the denial of benefits guaranteed by that plan. The District Court dismissed the claims that were preempted by ERISA's civil remedy and remanded the rest of the case to state court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1355.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Latturner</SPAN> were on brief for appellants.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001115.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The claim secured by the stock was an allowed secured claim. The question before us IN RE: TRAVELSTEAD 3 is whether. 000 in January of 1995 and was to receive a 15% interest in Blockless. 000 in February of 1995 and was to receive an 11.25% interest in Blockless. Donnelly and Benner were to have acquired 10.5 shares of stock. Which was 32.8125% of Travelstead's interest. The deed of pledge by Travelstead asserted that no one other than Travelstead possessed any interest in the Shares or was entitled to demand such an interest. The Shares were to be sold by a liquidating agent and the proceeds used to pay Blockless the allowed amount of its secured claim. Identical language is used in § 4.1 of the Plan. Such action as is necessary to confirm that Patrick J.B. Benner ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/06/962285P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who at the time of his discharge was also insured under a group health plan sponsored by his wife's employer. Was not entitled to take advantage of the continuation coverage mandated by COBRA. Who was substituted as plaintiff upon James Geissal's death. James was a beneficiary under a plan provided by his wife's employer. James stated that he was unhappy about the circumstances surrounding his termination and even requested. James ultimately declined to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2003/012952p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We agree that judicial estoppel was properly invoked by the Bankruptcy Court. We will affirm the order of the District Court.1 I. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. Article 6.4.1 of the Dealer Agreement between Krystal and GM requires Krystal </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200411829.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (2) that the avoidance action was improperly brought because the Trustee did not first avoid the transfer to the initial transferees. Which were contained in IAS publications. Was that to be privy to this valuable information. Was the company's sole shareholder. A majority of the information was neither novel nor covert most of it was readily available and comprised common sense business practices. Eleven similar lawsuits were filed throughout the country. Another layer was added to IAS' troubles when the SEC targeted Givens and IAS as part of a securities fraud investigation in connection to a real estate venture. It 4 was clear that IAS' exposure to liability in these cases exceeded $10 million. Assets were transferred to various Tedder owned foreign and domestic entities. The Trustee's ability to investigate the transfers was hampered by Givens and his associates. The hearing in which the Special Master delivered his report was not concluded until September 3. The Special Master determined that the all important transfer documents did not appear to have been </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EAFDD8A9BDE435E788256AE700706B51/$file/0035075.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0887F68129B2298688256E5A00707D13/$file/0035075.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/03/006098P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeals from the Bankruptcy Court's ruling that she was only entitled to claim one third of the homestead exemption provided under Missouri law because she was one of three joint tenant owners of the real estate in which she claimed the homestead. Asserting that since she was one of three joint tenants in the property. She was entitled to claim only one third of the $8. The sole question is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law by limiting Ms. Our review is de novo. That the nondebtor's interest is not property of the estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/03/046059P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court allowing a claim by The Estate of Victor Litzinger in the amount of $130. We remand with instructions to the bankruptcy court to address a jurisdictional issue which was never raised or briefed before the bankruptcy court or this Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Was Guy's wife. Victor was an elderly man when. Victor executed a Last and Will and Testament which named Guy as Personal Representative of Victor's estate. The will left all assets which Victor owned at the time of his death to Guy and Warren equally. Guy did sign a Substitute W 9 which indicated that the account was opened as a joint account and the evidence showed that the brokerage company considered the account a joint account with right of survivorship. No draws were made on the Victor/Guy account between the time it was opened and Victor's death. 2 On January 7. Were transferred to the Guy/Louise account. The only evidence of Louise's complicity in this transfer was the testimony of both Guy and Louise that. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1996/96a1406p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge We are called upon to determine the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by a broker dealer of securities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/01/026041P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Finding that the 1994 judgment against Lurie was for a sum certain. Was not subject to modification or adjustment. Was not ambiguous. Was subject to collection and execution. Lurie was the managing partner of the firm at the time Debtor's creditors commenced an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case against the Debtor in March 1992. Appellee Robert Blackwell ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1956.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief. Albiani and Associates were on brief. At issue is the important LYNCH. That advantage is denied to resident single family homeowners by 1322(b)(2). Are nonetheless available to owner occupants of multi family housing. We hold that Congress intends exactly such different results and that the antimodification provision of 1322(b)(2) does not bar modification of a secured claim on a multi unit property in which one unit is the debtor's principal residence and the security interest extends tothe other income producing units. 1. The term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/12/066045P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND The debtors are farmers in Jefferson. The debtors have failed to make payments on the Commerce loan since November 2002. Creditors objected to both these plans on the grounds that they were not feasible and the bankruptcy court agreed. The court found that the plan was not feasible because the debtors failed to provide documentation of previous cash flows which would prove that the debtors were capable of making the required payments under the plan. Because the court believed that there was little chance of the case going forward. It is from these orders that the debtors appeal. The decision to grant a continuance of a hearing is within the discretion of the trial court and is only reversible upon showing abuse of discretion. The decision to grant a motion for relief of stay is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The debtors alone were responsible for their lack of counsel at the June 14 hearing. The bankruptcy court was within its discretion to deny a continuance of the confirmation hearing. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200216985.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sitting by designation. * PER CURIAM: The only issue that we will definitively resolve in this appeal is the appropriate standard for a district court's review where an ERISA fiduciary. Which is operating under a conflict of interest. Even though the fiduciary is under a conflict of interest. 2 was employed as a salesman with Brinks Home Security ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQ4NTMtY3YgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/05-4853-cv%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQ4NTMtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-4853-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962834.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This appeal was taken from a Final Order issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on November 7. The district court's dismissal was based on the preemption of state law claims by ERISA. We have reviewed the briefs and record in this case. We have heard oral argument. We conclude that the decision of the district court was correct. Asserting that the insurance policy in question was covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="565"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jul1998/98a1913p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from the approval of the settlement of a nationwide class action lawsuit against Prudential Life Insurance Company alleging deceptive sales practices affecting over 8 million claimants throughout thefifty states and the District of Columbia. The class is comprised of Prudential policyholders who allegedly were the victims of fraudulent and misleading sales practices employed by Prudential's sales force. Each cause of action is based on fraud or deceptive conduct. There are no allegations of personal injury. There are no futures classes. The relief awarded includes full compensatory damages consisting of what plaintiffs thought they were purchasing from the insurance agent. There is no cap on the amount of compensatory damages for those who qualify. Although punitive damages are not included in the settlement. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is properly grounded on the alleged violations of the federal securities laws. 6 supplemental jurisdiction is proper because all of the claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="565"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/04/042489P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Apex was reorganized and reincorporated during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Clark was fully merged into the new corporation. 502(i)) but that were not provided for in the plan. Whether the debt was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502. The John Doe defendants have allowed 4 million gallons of gasoline and other petroleum products to form an underground toxic plume beneath Hartford. Apex asserted that the appellees' claims arose prior to the confirmation order and thus were discharged by the 1990 bankruptcy plan. While the case was pending in the Southern District of Illinois. The The John Doe defendants are allegedly employees. The case was subsequently remanded to the Madison County court. Is currently pending there. Three additional suits have since been filed against Apex and Premcor in Madison County. 34 3 bankruptcy court denied the motion to reopen and therefore found it unnecessary to reach Apex's other asserted grounds for relief. We may not reverse the bankruptcy court's ruling unless we have a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/981459P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which are participating employers in the statewide plan. Each of the separate municipal plans in question was a defined benefit plan. The employee is entitled to the predetermined benefit regardless of the amount of contributions made to fund the plan. The new statewide plan is also a defined benefit plan. The plan's actuary determined that each of the appellee cities' plans was over funded. If the actuary had determined that any separate municipal plan was under funded at the time it was transferred to the statewide plan. (2) unconstitutionally deprived them of their property interest in the funds without due process of law.2 The cities' use of the excess funds allegedly reduced the value of the The members asserted at oral argument that they have maintained their Fifth Amendment Takings without just compensation claim on appeal. Finding that the statute was constitutional and did not violate state trust laws. Because the facts in this case are undisputed. We limit our inquiry to whether the cities are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1998/98a1989p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is the fourth installment in this lengthy and tortuous insurance saga. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. I. The Lake Erie Employers' Association ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/967623.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 000 Three Mile Island area residents who allege that they have developed neoplasms2 as a result of the radiation released into the environment as a result of the reactor accident. The first appeal is that of a group of ten trial plaintiffs who were selected by the parties after the District Court adopted the plaintiffs' case management order. The critical issue there is the trial plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate that they were exposed to doses of radiation sufficient to cause their neoplasms. Defendants challenged the admissibility of the experts' testimony and the District Court was therefore required to hold extensive in limine hearings pursuant to its </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/962080P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. The Wallers were injured in a head on collision with an automobile being driven on the wrong side of Interstate 35 in southern Minnesota. The Plan is funded by Hormel Foods Corporation. May have against any person or organization. The Wallers responded by commencing this action for a declaratory judgment </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/09/964166P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Judy and John Hill were married in 1970 in Missouri. John acknowledged in his deposition taken in this case that he was dealing with a drug problem when the couple separated. Which in turn was causing financial difficulties for the couple. John was unrepresented by counsel during the dissolution proceedings and did not appear or contest the divorce. The dissolution was granted as to him by default. Judy was diagnosed with breast cancer. She still was employed by AT&T at the time of her death. Both John Hill and Sharron Long claimed they were entitled to all the funds in Judy's employee savings plan. Long's competing claim apparently was based on the Hills' divorce decree and the fact that Hill was not Judy's spouse at the time of her death. By the time Hill was notified of the decision in September 1992. The letter was returned to the company. A copy of the June letter was sent to him via ordinary mail. 2 1 AT&T had disbursed the funds. Holding that they were preempted by ERISA. The issue of whether and how a divorce decree may divest a person of beneficiary rights is not explicitly considered in ERISA and thus is a question of federal common law.4 See Mohamed v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9D2C9F8834EFC65F88256E7400749DB0/$file/0217073.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which he deems to have unambiguously indicated its intent to discharge any liability for gap period interest. Miller urges the panel to construe the language of the Chapter 11 plan and the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as excepting from discharge the interest which accrues on a tax debt only when the government's claim to that debt is unsecured. We have jurisdiction over the district court's order affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). I. BACKGROUND William Miller was the sole shareholder of Rosalie's Restaurant Associates. Miller was assessed a trust fund recovery penalty by the IRS. The IRS was granted an allowed secured claim against Miller's bankruptcy estate in the amount of $268. Was confirmed on April 4. The party in interest for this appeal is the United States of America. The defendants appellees will hereinafter be referred to as merely the IRS. 1 MILLER v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/02/066061P.pdf">C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE V. NATHAN & CATHERINE OSBORN.BAP 06<BR></A><BR> Capital One Auto Finance ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1995/94a0970p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Philadelphia defendants have not contested the need for substantial and meaningful improvements. They entered into two consent decrees and stipulated revisions thereto in which they agreed to make massive improvements and agreed to have the district court supervise the steps they planned to implement those improvements. It is also not contested that Philadelphia did not meet the deadlines for some of the obligations it undertook in the consent decrees and stipulations. The district court entered the series of orders which are the subject of these appeals.[fn1] Before us in this opinion is the City of Philadelphia's appeal from the order of October 5. These appeals were consolidated for argument with three related appeals. The appeal from the injunction entered by the district court governing the occupancy and conditions of confinement of the City's newly constructed prison facility denominated the Alternative and Special Detention Central Unit (No. 93 2034) was remanded to the district court because the issues raised by the City on appeal had not been raised by it in the district court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-50273.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Romero's suit was pending at the time On March 17. All of Border's assets were purchased by a third party. Substantially all of the proceeds from that sale have been distributed to the claim 2 holders who were the beneficiaries of the plan. He was not listed among the creditors with allowed claims to the debtor's proceeds. Stating that: Debtors are non subscribers to the Texas Workers Compensation laws. Debtors carry employer's indemnity insurance with deductible amounts that have ranged between $25. Debtors believe they are adequately insured against any liabilities that may result from the employee lawsuits. Included in this jurisdiction is the power to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0097p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Caremark specifically challenges the district court's declaration that the Bureau of TennCare's third party claims for Medicaid reimbursement are not subject to certain </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/01/006065P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That abstention was not appropriate under The Honorable Jerry W. The order below will be reversed. The factual background of this case is set forth in detail in our prior opinion Williams v. Will be expanded upon below only to the extent necessary for the issues presently under consideration. The contractual monthly mortgage payments that came due postpetition were also to be paid through the Plan. The dismissal order directed the trustee to pay claims </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/00/00-4167.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was insufficient. It held that the proper interest rate was the prime rate plus a risk adjustment of 1.5%. SCS Credit Corporation was the only creditor to object to confirmation of the Tills' amended Chapter 13 plan. SCS is a secured creditor and holds a security interest in an automobile. The vehicle was valued at $4. SCS is a sub prime lender. The Tills are such borrowers. The interest rate on the Tills' loan was 21%. A bankruptcy plan will be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor if the creditor retains its lien on the collateral. The creditor receives cash payments over the course of the plan that are equivalent to the value of the collateral on the plan's effective date. The interest rate it would have No. 00 4167 3 earned if SCS had foreclosed on the vehicle. Both witnesses testified that SCS had received 21% interest on all of its loans because borrowers like the Tills are poor credit risks. SCS reasserted its argument that it was entitled to 21%. The court held that the bankruptcy court had misread Koopmans and that Koopmans required 4 No. 00 4167 that SCS receive the interest rate it would have earned on a new loan financed by the proceeds from the sale of its collateral. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0324p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Plaintiffs are or were members of the Defendant Transportation Workers Union of America ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0297p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I BACKGROUND VTC is an Ohio corporation that was formed on December 5. Mary Ann Rabin was appointed Chapter 11 Operating Trustee for VTC. VTC confessed that it was unwilling or unable to litigate to determine which of the two plans would survive the confirmation process. The parties met to determine whether it was more appropriate to sell VTC's assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 (providing that the bankruptcy trustee may use. Provided that: (1) the bankruptcy court would have confirmed the plan at least 11 days prior to that date. (3) the confirmation order would not have been vacated. [would] have been satisfied or waived. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1750.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: Page 22. Harder and Sherin and Lodgen were on brief for appellee. were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. whether either the chapter 7 debtor or an unsecured creditor possesses standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order authorizing the chapter 7 trustee to settle an adversary proceeding to which the appellants were neither original nor intervening parties. The proceedings were converted to chapter 7. Was sold by the chapter 7 trustee for approximately $1 million. Whereby *The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief *The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief from the automatic stay were captioned judgments of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/06/97-4079.htm">97-4079 -- UNITED STATES TRUSTEE V. CF&I FABRICATORS OF UTAH INC. -- 06/30/1998<BR></A><BR> We are asked to determine the effect of Congress' amendment of 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1995/95a1131p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PCUA claims the earlier contract is unenforceable because the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (DEP) did not grant the required approval. The parties and the court then plunged into a procedural miasma which is virtually impenetrable. Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court notified Chambers that they were considering granting summary judgment against Chambers or afforded Chambers an opportunity to present pertinent evidence in opposition to summary judgment. We are referred to none. It is undisputed that DEP had to approve the amendment to the Passaic County District Solid Waste Management Plan designating Chambers as the primary landfill system for Passaic County's waste disposal before the contract between Chambers and the Authority became enforceable. Is at issue in these proceedings. We will not review an order denying a motion for summary judgment. We will review the court's order entering judgment for the Authority on the issue of damages because it is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0006p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Presently before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2000/98-3747.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> R's services were conducted on behalf of its clients and not for the particular benefit of the estate. Several proposed plans for reorganization were put forward by the debtors in an attempt to achieve a consensual plan. R represented several individual property damage claimants.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2000/98-3747.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> R's services were conducted on behalf of its clients and not for the particular benefit of the estate. Several proposed plans for reorganization were put forward by the debtors in an attempt to achieve a consensual plan. R represented several individual property damage claimants.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032153np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The parties are familiar with the facts. Which will not be recited here in detail. The plan as confirmed ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="554"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/03/986061P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court dismissed that case because it determined the plan of reorganization was not feasible. Debtors have. Debtors have yet to propose a confirmable Chapter 12 plan. While the dispute was pending. Debtors have proposed seven different plans of reorganization. Debtors have either treated the Co op as wholly unsecured or as minimally secured. Or they have ignored the Co op's claim altogether. They have also commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to resolve the dispute over the quality of the seed and fertilizer. The Co op contends that the Debtors' plans have not been proposed in good faith and the bankruptcy court1 has agreed. The bankruptcy court has made crystal clear that it would not confirm any plan that did not propose to make the Co op whole or that was not consented to by the Co op.2 The Honorable Timothy J. The court stated: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="554"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0286p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court found that because the property at issue was sold to a good faith purchaser. The appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision confirming the Liquidating Plan of Reorganization was statutorily moot. We hold that the liquidation sale was to a good faith purchaser. The Property also contained several acres that were either wetlands or under water. Because of the delay in obtaining the necessary permits and the fact that it was not generating any other income. After its initial two plans were rejected by the bankruptcy court. The Kennedy loan was conditioned on (1) an up front payment by the Debtor of a non refundable commitment fee of $270. (2) an appraisal of the Property on an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="554"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1447.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: Page 50. Delete the sentence that starts with </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="554"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2004/034212p1.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Petitions asserted that disqualification was also wa r r a n te d u nder 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) as a result of ex parte communications among Judge Wolin and his advisors. Our decision was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="554"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/01/006076P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The first is whether a debtor in a Chapter 11 case can reject a collective bargaining agreement even after it has sold virtually all of its assets. The second is whether the court's denial of a debtor's application for leave to reject its collective bargaining agreement results. The CBA was to remain in effect for five years and provided that Debtor would pay certain of its union employees' medical and dental expenses. Debtor was in serious financial difficulty and fell behind in its payments of these expenses. It was clear from the beginning that Debtor could not rehabilitate itself. Matters were so bleak that for a time This number represents an estimate by the union. Debtor was in arrears in paying approximately $600. Will almost certainly receive no distribution at all. 2 1 the company shut down. One purchaser was willing to sign a letter of intent to purchase. It was Debtor's position that the value of the assets of the company could be maximized only if its assets were sold on a going concern basis. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/00-11187.opn.html">LEVINSON V. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. (3/30/2001, NO. 00-11187)<BR></A><BR> We consider three issues: (1) whether the district court erred in determining that Reliance's disposition of Levinson's claim was arbitrary and capricious. (2) whether the district court erred in failing to remand the case to Reliance after concluding that its claim decision was arbitrary and capricious. Filed a claim for benefits with Reliance under his law firm's group long term disability policy ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8D8E586240111EE68825718D0074F92F/$file/0415787.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/00-11187.opn.html">LEVINSON V. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. (3/30/2001, NO. 00-11187)<BR></A><BR> We consider three issues: (1) whether the district court erred in determining that Reliance's disposition of Levinson's claim was arbitrary and capricious. (2) whether the district court erred in failing to remand the case to Reliance after concluding that its claim decision was arbitrary and capricious. Filed a claim for benefits with Reliance under his law firm's group long term disability policy ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/03/026053P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the amount now due and payable was $937. The trustee responded that she was talking to several potential purchasers of the lease. She also stated that the lease was the only asset of value in the estate. No extension was necessary. The trustee stated that AgriProcessors was interested in purchasing the lease from the bankruptcy estate. In so doing the court noted that the lease was Tama's most significant asset. The Bankruptcy Estate agrees that if the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 8(d) above. AgriProcessors objected to the trustee's motion to amend the motion to assume and assign on the grounds that the negotiating procedures were not clearly spelled out in her motion. The court further noted that outside of bankruptcy AgriProcessors would not have been entitled to be paid its cost of making its offer if it lost the bidding. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.3 The decision to award administrative expense priority is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.4 We review such a decision for abuse No one questioned Iowa Beef's participation at the hearing of July 9. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-1901_041.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Facts The facts of this case are. F&G was a direct mail marketing company engaged in the marketing of gifts. A leveraged purchase of a large number of F&G shares by the ESOP was proposed. F&G had been enjoying record profitability for several years and was forecasted to continue this trend into the future. F&G's largest subsidiary was Michigan Bulb Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/013805.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to determine whether a creditor's committee may assert fraudulent transfer claims under S 544 of the Bankruptcy Code ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTIzMDMtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-2303-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That it is the obligation of his pension fund. We remand for a determination of whether Wilkins was prejudiced by this omission. If he was. For a determination of the amount of benefits he is due. 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 A. Which is administered by the Mason Tenders District Council ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054479np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will endeavor to recount no more details than necessary because the parties are familiar with the facts.1 W/B Associates is the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. Was sold. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/12/954114P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The sole issue in this consolidated appeal is whether under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) the percentage fee for a Chapter 12 standing trustee in a case filed under the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Is based on amounts the trustee receives from the debtor and disburses to creditors. Chapter 12 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011187.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We consider three issues: (1) whether the district court erred in determining that Reliance's disposition of Levinson's claim was arbitrary and capricious. (2) whether the district court erred in failing to remand the case to Reliance after concluding that its claim decision was arbitrary and capricious. Filed a claim for benefits with Reliance under his law firm's group long term disability policy ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="551"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May20/03-10529-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF RUTH A. Ltd (Partnership) was includible in her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 because the transfer was not a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration. (2) a transfer of assets in return for a pro rata partnership interest is not a transfer for full and adequate consideration. The district court also erred in failing to consider uncontroverted record evidence to support the taxpayer's position that the transfer was a bona fide sale. She was 96 years old. Is the Decedent's son and the executor of her estate. Which was a revocable living trust administered by Mrs. David Kimbell was the sole manager of the LLC. The oil and gas properties were a continuation of an oil and gas business that the Decedent's late husband had founded in the 1920's. Approximately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11%) and royalty (4%) interests. Kimbell's assets were conveyed to the LLC and the Partnership. The primary focus of this appeal is on this transfer from the LLC and the Trust to the Partnership. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-9006.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Slavitt LLP</SPAN> were on brief. Roddy</SPAN> were on brief. Was in the business of originating. Eagle and Newark were obligated to make monthly rental payments of $10. The manufacturer.</P> <P> Eagle and Newark were aware. It was agreed that Nortel would provide appellants with substitute </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/12/97-1328.htm">97-1328 -- U.S. V. STATE OF COLORADO -- 12/21/1999<BR></A><BR> 10<sup> 5</sup> cancer risk level was arbitrary and capricious. (2) the district court erred when it ruled that the EPA's failure to amend the Record of Decision for Operable Unit I when it encountered the unexpected rock content in the sludge was arbitrary and capricious. (3) even if the actions regarding the Record of Decision for Operable Unit I were arbitrary and capricious. The district court erred in not requiring BN to prove that the cost would not have been incurred in any event. <p> BN cross appeals. We conclude that the EPA's remediation decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and. Is not arbitrary and capricious. Performance or cost of the remedial plan was involved. The EPA was not required to amend the remediation plan in order to use the settling tank or to amend the plan. We agree with the district court that the EPA actions were arbitrary and capricious for failing to amend the plan. <p> Third. We hold that the district court erred in refusing to require BN to demonstrate that the EPA's errors resulted in expenditures in excess of those that would have occurred in the absence of the errors. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-1916_030.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> He was involved in an automobile accident while he was delivering boxes of tobacco to one of Lorillard's customers. Are disputed. Sperandeo also was treated by a neurologist. He was examined by several other neurological specialists. Sperandeo was covered by Lorillard's Group Disability Income Insurance Policy. Which is underwritten and administered by CNA. Disability or Disabled means that You [the Lorillard employee to whom the Certificate was issued] satisfy the Occupation Qualifier or the Earnings Qualifier as defined below. Injury or Sickness causes physical or mental impairment to such a degree of severity that You are: 1) continuously unable to perform the Material and Substantial Duties of Your Regular Occupation. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3752_036.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is a class action on behalf of participants and beneficiaries in a pension plan for employees of Guidant Corporation. Guidant was bought last year by Boston Scientific. As each share was worth $22.49) of stock in Boston Scientific. The fiduciaries are various employees and board members of Guidant. All of whom were under the company's control (as ERISA permits. As was the ESOP. So for the sake of simplicity we shall pretend that Guidant is the only defendant and the only fiduciary. October 2004 to November 2005 was a period. When according to the complaint the price of Guidant stock was inflated by a fraud committed by the company's management. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the named plaintiffs have no </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDA1LTI2ODBfc28ucGRm/05-2680_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/985222.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> New Jersey (the hospital where Michelina was born). Inc. (collectively </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/05/953249P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appellants are Be Mac Transport Company. The FDIC is a Be Mac creditor. Be Mac received a series of loans from Metro North which were reflected in various Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) filings and loan documents. The FDIC was appointed receiver. Attached to this claim were some fourteen documents. FDIC then discovered that its original claim had incorrectly included an unsecured portion and that it should have listed its entire claim as secured. Stated that it was still owed $1. The requested attachment of the writing on which the claim was founded. Paragraph 9 of the claim form stated that No security interest is held for this claim except [If security interest in the property of the debtor is claimed] The undersigned claims the security interest under the writing referred to in paragraph 4 hereof . . . . That the original claim form should have listed its entire claim as secured. Which was supplied sometime thereafter. a letter with an offer to settle the claim. proposing an offer of settlement. later. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1092p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issues raised in these appeals are whether the district court erred in determining that: (1) the FDIC's takeover and sale of Meritor was not a reorganization for purposes of the plaintiffs' separation pay plan. (7) the FDIC was not liable for a statutory penalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) as a result of its failure to respond in a timely manner to plaintiffs' request for plan documents. (8) the certification of three plaintiff classes was inappropriate. We will affirm the orders of the district court. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the FDIC is not liable for the statutory penalty prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). We will affirm the order of the district court pertaining to this issue. The FDIC was appointed as receiver for the insolvent bank. Eligible employees were entitled to severance pay based on their years of service and salary. Benefits were payable for involuntary termination due to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0078p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Constituted income from the trade or business of farming that was subject to the self employment tax pursuant to § 1401 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court agreed with the Wuebkers' position that the payments constituted </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/993320.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> On an alter ego theory because Eastern should have pursued this claim in the context of Delta's bankruptcy case. We will reverse the District Court's order granting Mahan's motion for summary judgment. Therefore we will affirm as to that order. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. Facts and Procedural History Eastern was party to a sales agency contract with Bestone. Which is solely owned by Mahan. Was one of a group of companies owned or partially owed by Mahan. The cases were administratively. Eastern was quite aggressive in challenging Delta and its dealings with affiliated entities at every turn of the bankruptcy case and repeatedly asserted that Delta had been used for the benefit of the affiliated companies. Arranged for employment of special counsel that was not disinterested by virtue of its prepetition claim against Delta. Asserting that counsel was a prepetition creditor of Delta and thus was not disinterested. Alleging that they were not disinterested because they previously had performed services for Millington. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0003n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The Panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed because the decisional process would not be aided by oral argument. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the Debtor's Second Amended Plan of Reorganization requires him to pay to Producers Credit Corporation. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). A bankruptcy court's interpretation of the provisions of a plan it has confirmed is entitled to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="544"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="544"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="542"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/09/066025P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from a decision of the bankruptcy court which denied the debtor. STANDARD OF REVIEW The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Secured claimants were paid $16. 449.81 and were paid in full. The Chapter 7 petition was filed on June 4. (ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith. Was the debtor's best effort. The bankruptcy court's interpretation of the statute is consistent with every reported opinion which has commented upon or mentioned the statute. None of these courts was actually interpreting the section in a Chapter 7 case in which this issue had arisen. If the statute's language is plain. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="542"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept2000/005031.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the August 10. Factual Background The historical facts in this case are rather straightforward and. Essentially are not disputed. Are related entities: USLR is the general partner in Black Horse. USRR is the general partner of USLR. Berger is the president of USRR.1 Appellees Essex and Dow also are related entities as Essex is Dow's wholly owned subsidiary by virtue of its purchase of all of Essex's stock in 1988. The parties do not dispute that appellants were aware of the Property's environmental problems at the time that USLR and Essex entered into the Agreement. Berger is a named partner in the lawfirm representing appellants. 3 respect to the remediation and detoxification of the Property: The parties acknowledge that the Subject Premises to be conveyed are subject to the provisions of the Environmental Clean Up Responsibility Act. Will implement the approved Clean Up Plan and complete the detoxification of the Subject Premises in accordance with and to the approval of the DEP. Seller will attempt to obtain the consent of the DEP to the conveyance of the Subject Premises. `ECRA Approval' will be deemed to have taken place upon the receipt by Seller from the DEP of the approval of the implementation of the Clean Up Plan and satisfactory detoxification of the Subject Premises or a consent from the DEP to convey the Subject Premises to Purchaser in the form of an Administrative Consent Order and bond securing the detoxification of the Subject Premises by Seller. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="542"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDA0LTA2OTAtY3Zfc28ucGRm/04-0690-cv_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="542"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982847.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The managed health care industry has drastically changed the way medical and pharmaceutical services are dispensed in this country. Competition is keen over what company will administer an employer's health plan. 2 In September 1995. Medco was required to assemble an extensive statewide network of pharmacies which would agree to fill prescriptions at a steeply discounted rate. The Maryland Plan was scheduled to go </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="542"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/04/951754P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is whether an amendment to a Minnesota statute. Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. The Association is a nonprofit Minnesota corporation created pursuant to the Minnesota Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act). The Investment Plus Plan of Honeywell the Honeywell plans is First Trust National Association. App. 1987). business in Minnesota are To provide this protection. Who was a Minnesota resident (as is the current trustee). GICs are unallocated annuity contracts. Or Id. annuity contracts </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/07/062217P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is not an exemption statute and there is no exemption for tax refunds under state law or applicable federal law. The Mohrhards and Benn ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001686.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The expenses were incurred for the assistance provided by an unlicensed caregiver to permit Wall to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971580.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Herbert Collins was once a bail bondsman in Virginia. He and his wife filed for bankruptcy in 1990 and were released from all of their legally dischargeable debts. The Collinses moved to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination that the bail bond debt was dischargeable. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was discharged. We hold (1) that the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated because there was no suit against the Commonwealth and (2) that Mr. Collins's obligation as surety on the forfeited bail bonds is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Collins was a (licensed) professional bail bondsman in Norfolk. His premium or fee was based on a percentage of the face amount of the bond. Collins failed to pay off the bonds of some defendants for whom he was surety after they skipped their court appearances. Listed on their schedule of unsecured liabilities was a debt of $37. (This was a noasset bankruptcy.). In August 1996 the Collinses filed a motion to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination of whether the judgment debt from the bail bonds was dischargeable. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2004/032176p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> MA 02210 Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant pension fund against Holmes was untimely. As the complaint was filed seven years after the cause of action accrued. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Is the plan sponsor of a multiemployer fund established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200106/00-1402b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Klee were on the brief for amici curiae Senator Robert G. With him on the brief were Christopher J. With him on the brief were Michael F. Is bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in bank ruptcy. Con gress also directed the Commission to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/04/02-1040.htm">02-1040 -- PATTON V. DENVER POST CORP. -- 04/23/2003<BR></A><BR> Patton sought a declaration in federal court that a state domestic relations order granting her survivor benefits in her former husband's pension plan was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-1402b.html">NEXT WAVE PRSNAL COMM V. FCC<BR></A><BR> Olson argued the cause for petitioners/appel lants.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/08/02-3044.htm">02-3044 -- SIMMONS FOODS INC. V. WILLIS -- 08/25/2003<BR></A><BR> Was a creditor of Teets Food Distribution Company. After a reorganization plan was confirmed. Teets defaulted on its obligations and its business was liquidated. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted by the district court and Simmons brought this appeal. <p> Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-4117.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Trustee stipulated the Plan was qualified under ERISA. Holding ERISA qualified plans are not part of the bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code. We have jurisdiction. The Trustee renews his argument that the Debtor's powers and rights under the Plan constitute property of the bankruptcy estate and therefore he can withdraw all the funds the Debtor has the power to withdraw from (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Contain a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non bankruptcy law. We too have held a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/982164.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to decide whether the affirmative defenses of setoff. This appeal raises a question as to whether the creditor whose affirmative defenses were extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale received constitutionally adequate notice such that failure to object would result in a waiver of its affirmative defenses and its deemed consent to the transformation of the debtors' contract claims into unimpeachable accounts receivable. Were not extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale. Was constitutionally inadequate. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Folger acquired substantially all of the assets of three bankrupt companies through a bankruptcy auction </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/06/046083P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 denying a motion to vacate an order which denied Debtor. While the facts are somewhat complicated. The legal issue is straightforward. The bankruptcy court determined that Needler was disqualified from serving as attorney for Debtor because Needler had been approved to represent the debtors in another pending Chapter 11 case in the District and it therefore denied the application for attorney's fees and expenses. The bankruptcy court was unquestionably correct in so holding and we affirm. Inc. and Its Bankruptcy Case Debtor was a family business engaged in selling boats and other marine equipment at retail. When it began operations in the early 1990s it was owned by Edward and Shirley Schmidt (the Schmidts). Its office and showroom were located in Ogallala. The details of the arrangement for sale between the Schmidts and Greg were not fully developed in the record. The Schmidts claimed to have taken back the stock in the company and become its sole owners. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="537"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-4484_012.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> GM had suspended the payment of these 2 No. 05 4484 benefits and was treating the amount otherwise due to the plaintiffs each month as reimbursement for past disability and pension plan overpayments. There is no dispute as to the essential facts. Smith were hourly employees of GM and. Were members of the International Union. Were governed under the collective bargaining agreements between GM and the UAW. Both pension and disability benefit payments otherwise due to plan participants were to be reduced by an amount equivalent to the federal social security benefits to which the employee was entitled. That award would be considered as having been received throughout the time period for which social security eligibility was established. The plan thus would be considered to have overpaid for that period. Recovery of Benefit Overpayments If it is determined that any benefit(s) paid to an employe[e] under a General Motors benefit plan . . . should not have been paid or should have been paid in a lesser amount. I immediately will furnish to the GM Pension Plan Administration Center evidence of the effective date of my entitlement to such benefit. .... </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="535"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb95/93-4950.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Seidler

United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge:

The question presented in this case is whether an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order in an adversary proceeding removing purchase money mortgage holders' lien is moot because the mortgage holders failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and the court confirmed the debtor's debt adjustment plan. The district court held that the appeal was moot. Seidler contended that the lien was satisfied by cash payment in 1989. Although no satisfaction of the mortgage was filed in the New York real estate records. The Russos argued that the payment to which Seidler referred was actually a down payment made in 1986 on the purchase of the house.

The bankruptcy court found that Seidler had satisfied the mortgage in 1989. DISCUSSION

A district court's decision that a question is moot is subject to plenary review on appeal. United States v. Guiding our mootness inquiry in bankruptcy cases is In re Club Assocs.

535 OPINION/ORDER
03 1954 and that was more favorable to him than the contested judgment. Are not in dispute. Lowe's wife was a retired employee of a company that was acquired by McGraw Hill. The company's retirement plan was merged into the McGraw Hill plan. The waiver that the plan had was signed by Mr. His signature was neither witnessed nor notarized. On his copy there was no check mark in the single life annuity box. As there was on the plan's copy. There was no response. It was not until March of 2003 that the judgment that the plan has appealed was entered. That determination is left to the discretion of the district judge. The plan's delay in giving Lowe documents to which he was clearly entitled was egregious. 03 1954 McGraw Hill plan is a substantial entity that cannot claim to lack the resources necessary for processing document requests expeditiously. The question is not presented be a mitigating circumstance. Lowe were
535 OPINION/ORDER
District Judge: This appeal raises the question: under what circumstances will a creditor be barred from later bringing an action against a co creditor based upon state law claims if. That Kodak was precluded from bringing the New York action by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of orders issued by the bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy filed by Atlanta Retail. We hold that res judicata does not bar the New York action because Kodak could not have received a full remedy in the contested Wolf bankruptcy proceedings and because the same nucleus of operative fact was not presented in the two actions. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the injunction is vacated. Entered into an agreement (
535 OPINION/ORDER
The Companies argue that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to them pursuant to Eastern Enterprises v. We conclude that the assignments are not unconstitutional as applied. It will be helpful to explain the historical background and context of this dispute. I. THE COAL ACT The Coal Act was enacted in 1992
535 ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536)

The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes.

535 ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536)

The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes.

535 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We are asked to review two or ders granting partial summary judgment to the defendant in this ERISA action. If found to have made material misrepresentations to the plaintiffs. I. The factual and procedural history of this case is extensive and has been recounted elsewher e in detail.1 We 1. 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995). 3 will explain only the status of the case as it comes to us on this appeal. This is a class action filed on behalf of retirees and disabled former employees of the Sperry. These lawsuits were eventually consolidated. Most of whom were former Sperry and Burroughs employees. The first was that. This was intended to convey not only that the existing plan provided such benefits for life but also that those benefits were vested. The second theory
535 OPINION/ORDER
Burton Chandler with whom Seder & Chandler was on brief for appellant. P.C. were on brief for appellee. The gravamen was Fallon's refusal to provide coverage for a treatment regime proposed by Charlotte Turner and her doctor to address her metastasized breast cancer. After the case was removed to federal district court. The pertinent facts are largely undisputed. Charlotte Turner was diagnosed with breast cancer. The disease was at first treated by surgery. Was beyond control by conventional therapies. Ronald Turner was employed by General Motors. Charlotte Turner was covered by the health coverage that Fallon provided for family members of General Motors employees. Fallon is a health maintenance organization that provides or reimburses health care for its members.
535 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Seidler

United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge:

The question presented in this case is whether an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order in an adversary proceeding removing purchase money mortgage holders' lien is moot because the mortgage holders failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and the court confirmed the debtor's debt adjustment plan. The district court held that the appeal was moot. Seidler contended that the lien was satisfied by cash payment in 1989. Although no satisfaction of the mortgage was filed in the New York real estate records. The Russos argued that the payment to which Seidler referred was actually a down payment made in 1986 on the purchase of the house.

The bankruptcy court found that Seidler had satisfied the mortgage in 1989. DISCUSSION

A district court's decision that a question is moot is subject to plenary review on appeal. United States v. Guiding our mootness inquiry in bankruptcy cases is In re Club Assocs.

533 OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellant. Carens & DeGiacomo were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. is whether the bankruptcy court properly enjoined a state law based
533 OPINION/ORDER
Haenn was on brief. Provides for what is commonly termed
533 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is the effect of a conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings on the priority status of a postpetition. They stated that they no longer operated their long term care facility and were now employed by others. To reflect additional interest and penalties which had accrued while the estate was still proceeding under Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court agreed and held that a tax claim filed during the pendency of a Chapter 13 petition must be prioritized as if the claim had arisen prepetition because § 1305(b) states that claims for taxes filed under § 1305(a) are allowed or disalUnless otherwise indicated. The bankruptcy court noted that filing a proof of claim under § 1305 is voluntary. Therefore the IRS could have avoided application of § 1305 by not filing a claim after the conversion. The district court found that § 348(d) is the only section that addresses the issue of administrative expenses in a conversion from one Chapter to another and that § 1305 did not apply.
533 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because the papers in question did not have to be signed by an attorney. The TIAA CREF annuity was listed in four separate places on forms filed with the petition. It was listed on Schedule B as personal property. It was shown on Schedule C as property claimed as exempt. With the notation that the exemption was provided under ERISA. The monthly income from the annuity was listed on Schedule I as
533 OPINION/ORDER
Including undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty as the executor of a will. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Appellant Robert Golden is a citizen of the state of New York and holds general power of attorney for Leah Golden. Appellant Donald Earwood is the personal representative of the estate of Helen Earwood. Golden and Darlene Koposko are both adult citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. King executed a Last Will and Testament (the
533 ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER

This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="533"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2309.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Either pays the subsidy to the service provider directly (if the approved schools have not already paid in full) or reimburses the schools for part of the cost (if the projects have been approved and the schools have paid the service provider for the work). Who in turn must pass the funds through to the school.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="533"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/94-5211.opa.html">ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="531"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1110p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Finding that CalFed's interest in the property was not being adequately protected during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Was less than the bankruptcy court had determined and was adequately protected. The district court also found that the debtor retained equity in the property and that relief from the automatic stay would therefore be unavailable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as well.[fn2] We will reverse the order of the district court and remand with instructions to return this matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Was formed to acquire a 176 unit garden apartment complex located in Florida. It is the debtor's primary asset. A third mortgage was held by FEC Mortgage Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="531"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2025.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief for appellant. Inc. was on brief for appellees. The Plan provides that Winthrop will retain all of its assets except for the Property. Which is to be transferred to a new entity apparently controlled by Winthrop's principal. Which will in turn lease it back to Winthrop. The Property is encumbered by a first mortgage in the amount of $287. Is owed approximately $576. If the Property is valued at fair market value. NBIS would have a secured claim in the amount of approximately $100. Citing a line of cases holding that fair market or going concern value is the appropriate standard in valuing collateral that a Chapter 11 debtor proposes to retain and use. Our review is de novo. Unless the bankruptcy court's analysis was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="531"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/012775.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Trustee argues that payments of fees by Pillowtex to Jones Day within the 90 days before bankruptcy may have constituted an avoidable preference and that the receipt of such a preference by Jones Day would constitute a conflict of interest with Pillowtex's 2 creditors and its bankruptcy estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="531"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/93opinions/93-5067.html">PRESEAULT V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="531"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/02/062854P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was never mailed to employees. His benefits were exhausted. Fairview argues on appeal that the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that: (1) Greeley's action was not barred by the applicable two year statute of limitations. (3) Greeley was prejudiced by the SPD. Because the district court erred in its determination that Greeley was prejudiced by the memo. Greeley must show that he was prejudiced by it. The court concluded that Greeley was prejudiced and explained the prejudice standard it applied as follows: It is not clear what showing of prejudice is required under Eighth Circuit law. The Second Circuit requires a plan participant to show that he or she </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="528"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1567.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. Were on brief. The claims are Massachusetts state law claims and jurisdiction is premised on diversity. They allege that the plan was managed by MassMutual in violation of the contract underlying the plan. McAdams and Odom allege that MassMutual unlawfully assessed a tax charge against participants' deferred compensation earnings that was designed to fully offset the tax costs to MassMutual from running the plan. The charge assessed by MassMutual was. MassMutual admits that such a tax charge was assessed but argues that the contract allowed it and that the amount of the charge was reasonable.</P> <P> After discovery. These general agents were not classified as employees of MassMutual and in fact were closer to independent contractors than to employees for example. The plan at issue here was created in 1970. All of the related plaintiffs (whose claims in the putative class have been joined in this consolidated appeal) were general agents who deferred compensation under this plan. At least 117 general agents were participants in this plan at some point. </P> <P> The deferred compensation plan was created and advertised as a perk for the general agents. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="528"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D390EBEB4E56813688256C71007CE22F/$file/0135509.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Duong knew his situation was critical. A Lucent employee told Duong that the return of his passport would take one to two weeks.2 The complaint alleges that Lucent never informed Duong that the return could have been expedited in an emergency. The date Duong's doctor had given him for surgery was at hand. 3 alleging that SOS's recommendation that Duong remain in Saudi Arabia was negligent and that. We conclude that summary judgment was proper as to the breach of contract claim against AT&T. Bui is a citizen of Oregon. AT&T is a New York corporation. Lucent and SOS are Delaware corporations. ERISA also does not preempt the claim for negligent medical advice and for negligent delay to the extent that the delay was based on actions taken during the course of medical treatment or consultation. In which ERISA would have preempted nearly everything. AT&T 9 [2] Medical malpractice is one traditional field of state regulation that several circuits have concluded Congress did not intend to preempt. Which made it clear that the goal of such interpretations was to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="528"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3200_013.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A major impediment to United exiting bankruptcy is its pension liability. Section 1341 is part of Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. A plan is terminated with sufficient assets to cover all future benefit payments. A plan is terminated without sufficient assets. United was obligated first to No. 05 3200 3 reject the CBA with AFA under § 1113(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. When a plan is without sufficient assets and is terminated under Title IV. Paying pension benefits on behalf of failed plans is part of PBGC's mandate from Congress. As PBGC is the governmental backstop for failed pension plans. A taxpayer bailout would be another source of funding if PBGC were otherwise unable to fulfill its mission. PBGC is already confronting a $23 billion deficit1 and is currently paying pension benefits to one million individuals while also insuring the pensions of some forty four million other individuals. The Supreme Court noted back in 1990 that PBGC was facing a deficit of less than $2 billion. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="528"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19945045.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="526"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/01/973282P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal involves two separate cases which were consolidated before the district court. Sitting by designation. 21 v. which is located in the Superior National Forest along the United States and Canadian border in Minnesota. Are articulated in the Forest Service's BWCA Wilderness Management Plan and Implementation Schedule of 1993 (the Wilderness Plan). Was among the initial wilderness areas designated for protection. It is a heavily visited wilderness area. Though motorized vehicle use is severely restricted. The only specific guidance given to the Secretary concerning these quotas was a statutory cap on motorboat use. Which is the challenged agency action in this suit. The Record of Decision explains that the available information indicated that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="526"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032263np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue presented by this appeal is whether an individual retirement account ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="526"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5072.html">LTV STEEL COMPANY, INC. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> With him on the brief were <U>Mary B. With him on the brief were <U>Loretta C. The government appeals the ruling of the Court of Federal Claims that pension payments made to certain former employees of the taxpayer s predecessor companies were exempt from tax liability under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). (LTV Steel) is a subsidiary of LTV Corporation. LTV Steel was formed in 1984 from two other LTV Corporation subsidiaries. Those plans were the products of collective bargaining with the United Steelworkers of America. All four plans were qualified plans under 26 U.S.C. § 401 and therefore were eligible for the benefits of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Those basic benefits were substantially less. Those funds would then be used to pay most of the difference between the basic benefits that the PBGC was paying and the level of benefits required by the two terminated plans for hourly workers. Those employees who retired after the plans were terminated would receive payments making up about 75% of the shortfall.</P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="524"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov2001/99-14563.opn.html">JOHNSON V. K MART CORP. (11/21/2001, NO. 99-14563)<BR></A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="524"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914563.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Robinson mandates the conclusion that Gonzales is no longer good law and must be deemed overruled. Appellant is eligible to file suit under Title I. Who was then the manager of a K Mart store in Tampa. Employees who are disabled due to a mental illness may receive salary replacement benefits for two years. After which K Mart responded by filing a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that appellant was not within the protective ambit of § 12112(a) because. He was not a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="524"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2054.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. Were on brief. As an administrative expense to an executive who was terminated after rendering postpetition services. To join Filene's at a time when it was already experiencing financial difficulty.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="524"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov2001/99-14563.opn.html">JOHNSON V. K MART CORP. (11/21/2001, NO. 99-14563)<BR></A><BR> We consider the question whether a former employee as against a current employee or an applicant is eligible to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="521"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/alpha-idx.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Eleventh Circuit
521 OPINION/ORDER
521 OPINION/ORDER
Eleventh Circuit
521 OPINION/ORDER
The primary issue remaining in the case was whether Scrufari. Who was also employed by the Funds. Are as follows. The Funds were established pursuant to trust agreements among the Fund Trustees. All of whom are fiduciaries of the Funds. Who was the General Business Agent of Local 280. Two votes were taken and both resulted in a deadlock. Sanoian raised again the possibility of appointing Scrufari as the Plan Manager of the Funds and noted that
521 00-6083 -- U.S. V. LOVE -- 06/20/2001

The parties are familiar with the facts. Love asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove the alleged offenses were committed or that Love conspired to commit the offenses. That counts 3 and 4 were barred by the statute of limitations. That the evidence was insufficient to support convictions on counts 5
521 OPINION/ORDER
Because Vlasek was seventeen years old at the time. A minor estate was opened on his behalf and the settlement proceeds were delivered to the estate. The estate was closed. 561.88 was turned over to Vlasek. 2 No. 02 2062 Over the next few years. All four properties were mortgaged. She alleged Vlasek was the father. An Illinois state court found that Vlasek was the child's father and ordered him to make semi monthly $1000 child support payments. It appears that back in 1993 while his child's mother was still pregnant. Determined the transfers were voidable. He later claimed that at the time of the bankruptcy's filing in August 1996 he was mentally incompetent a result of a closed head injury suffered in the automobile accident. The orders that Vlasek also sought to void through dismissal would have included (i) the order setting aside the four real estate transfers. Pursuant to a motion to compel brought by the bank that was foreclosing on that property. Never sought to appeal or stay any of these individual orders at the time they were rendered.
521 OPINION/ORDER
Eleventh Circuit
521 OPINION/ORDER
Eleventh Circuit
519 MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)

Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.
519 OPINION/ORDER
The issue on appeal is whether. This case also presents the threshold issue whether we will adopt a
519 MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)

Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.
517 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. L.L.C. (
517 OPINION/ORDER
Brown was admitted to the Fairfax Hospital emergency room for a perforated sigmoid colon and significant sepsis. Brown informed the intermediary that she had decided to
517 OPINION/ORDER
We are asked to decide whether a highly structured securitization transaction negotiated between Citicorp and an investor in a limited partnership constitutes an
517 OPINION/ORDER
Public housing rental units in which rent was a percentage of the occupants' income. Low income tax credit units in which rent was a percentage of the area median income. The infrastructure improvements were designed to eliminate the
514 OPINION/ORDER
Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors.

514 OPINION/ORDER
Senior District Judge: This is an appeal by Branchburg Plaza Associates. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. All of the remaining dates referred to here were also during 1996. There were consequently no objections to Fesq's proposal. An order of confirmation was entered on August 15. Asserting that its failure to make a timely objection was the result of a computer glitch at Siegelbaum's firm. Rather than the actual August 5 date.3 Branchburg argued that it would have objected to several substantive aspects of Fesq's plan but for the computer error. That ruling was affirmed on appeal by the district court in an unpublished memorandum opinion. All
514 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The issue in this appeal is whether a New Jersey statute. A trustee was appointed. The debtor listed the IRA as an asset but claimed that it was not part of the bankruptcy estate because of N.J.S.A. § 25:2 1(b). The trustee filed a cross motion seeking to have the IRA declared an asset of the estate. Subsection (c)(2) provides: A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The question before us is whether N.J.S.A. § 25:2 1(b) constitutes a
514 OPINION/ORDER
Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors.

514 OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief for respondents Surface Transportation Board and United States of America.

514 LASCHE V. GEORGE W. LASCHE PROFIT SHARING PLAN

This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Lasche v. We will decide whether a spouse legally waived her rights to her deceased spouse's retirement plan. Because the waiver language was too general to be effective. Because the district court was correct in concluding that the waiver failed to comply with the requirements of ERISA. We affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> George Lasche and appellee Madeline Baker Lasche were married in August of 1985. This plan was reformed several times mainly because George transferred his retirement funds to different financial institutions. Madeline was required to sign part four of the Form. My consent means that I give up rights I may have under the Plan and applicable law (other than rights I may later have as the survivor in a joint annuity with the participant) to receive those amounts payable under the Plan by reason of the participant's death to which I would otherwise be entitled if I were the Participant sole beneficiary.<p> <p> R2 49 Exhibit E Part 4. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="514"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116211.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors. Appellee is entitled to receive an annual amount equal to 7% of the net worth of the trust. The payments are due in monthly installments. Who is unemployed. Appellee is the only beneficiary currently entitled to receive income payments under the trust. Appellee's only rights are to receive the 7% income payments. Her powers are generally limited to directing investment decisions. She does not have the discretion to invade the trust corpus or to alter the amount of payments made to the trust beneficiaries. Appellee is prohibited from assigning or otherwise alienating her interest in the trust by virtue of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="514"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1997/97a1495p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are presented with two decisions of the district court dated May 18. We are asked to decide whether the district court erred in determining that the bankruptcy court was not authorized to compel the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate tax payments first to trust fund taxes. We will affirm the decisions of the district court. I. We feel compelled to set forth the facts in detail because these bankruptcy cases are so heavily fact intensive. KBS is a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring and operating a modular home manufacturing business. Were its sole owners. That payment was not accompanied by a quarterly return. 468 were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="514"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1995/95a0996p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Trustees of the Stock Trust Under Item Third of the Will of Rodman Wanamaker. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Leaving a will and codicils[fn1] that established trusts for his children and their descendants. At issue in this case is a $120 million trust created in Paragraph Third of his will. The stock was sold for $60 million. After the stock was sold. Holding that Wanamaker had intended to provide spendthrift protection for his great grandchildren and Kellogg's interest in the trust was protected. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Our review of the district court's construction of Pennsylvania law is de novo. Will be reviewed de novo. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="514"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may97/96-4277.opa.html">LASCHE V. GEORGE W. LASCHE PROFIT SHARING PLAN<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Lasche v. We will decide whether a spouse legally waived her rights to her deceased spouse's retirement plan. Because the waiver language was too general to be effective. Because the district court was correct in concluding that the waiver failed to comply with the requirements of ERISA. We affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> George Lasche and appellee Madeline Baker Lasche were married in August of 1985. This plan was reformed several times mainly because George transferred his retirement funds to different financial institutions. Madeline was required to sign part four of the Form. My consent means that I give up rights I may have under the Plan and applicable law (other than rights I may later have as the survivor in a joint annuity with the participant) to receive those amounts payable under the Plan by reason of the participant's death to which I would otherwise be entitled if I were the Participant sole beneficiary.<p> <p> R2 49 Exhibit E Part 4. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="514"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033552p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Since Knapper's attempt to void the default judgments is foreclosed by the Rooker Feldman 2 doctrine. We will vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A mortgage lien was placed on both parcels of real estate as a result of one or more loan agreements Knapper entered into with Amresco Residential Securities Corporation. It was served on September 7. Giacomelli's affidavit of service recited that the complaint was served on an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/323CC6184F0F6EE088256A55005A57A7/$file/9955756.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contend their IRAs are exempt as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5D0CEDD5D5C9DA3688256A01006040EE/$file/9935134.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is whether the United States is immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Arguing that the Forest Service's conduct is protected by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.1 We agree with the government. The extent and type of the Forest Service's flight training is a matter left to the agency's discretion and is susceptible to policy analysis. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs/appellees are the families and estates of two pilots. Who died in 1994 when the airtanker they were using to drop flame retardant on a forest fire crashed in the Lolo National Forest. Kelly and Lynn were employed by Neptune. Because the district court was without jurisdiction. Who were both well qualified. All but the first mission were to fires in the Butler Creek area. Kelly and Lynn were asked to perform a retardant drop on a small fire adjacent to the main fire. Is charged with administering and protecting the nation's forests. Critical directives relating to aviation management are in section 5700 of that manual. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3D9E77E9A92488B588256E5A00707B5A/$file/9955756.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contend their IRAs are exempt as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052032p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/02/972197P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Midland required Lenco to have all cash coming in to Lenco first available to Midland through what amounted to a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AA9EE3FD881D251588256E5A00707A6D/$file/9935134.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is whether the United States is immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Arguing that the Forest Service's conduct is protected by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.1 We agree with the government. The extent and type of the Forest Service's flight training is a matter left to the agency's discretion and is susceptible to policy analysis. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs/appellees are the families and estates of two pilots. Who died in 1994 when the airtanker they were using to drop flame retardant on a forest fire crashed in the Lolo National Forest. Kelly and Lynn were employed by Neptune. Because the district court was without jurisdiction. Who were both well qualified. All but the first mission were to fires in the Butler Creek area. Kelly and Lynn were asked to perform a retardant drop on a small fire adjacent to the main fire. Is charged with administering and protecting the nation's forests. Critical directives relating to aviation management are in section 5700 of that manual. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="512"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/06/036010P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nonstock one of which was herbicide for its crops. Several fertilizer liens were also filed in Madison and Pierce Counties. Negotiations were undertaken between DLC and Cooperative for damages. Finding that DLC was indebted to Cooperative on its open account in the sum of $15. The court also found that the affirmative defenses raised by DLC were conclusions of law and that no facts were alleged in support of the conclusions. Which was denied on October 12. This decision was appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. In 1995 the Court of Appeals found there were genuine issues of material fact for trial. This decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Demerath Land Co. v. After its RICO action was dismissed. The request was denied. Found that Cooperative was entitled to a judgment for $27. The appeal was summarily dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court on April 14. No deeds were prepared. Three lawsuits were filed by Fort Calhoun State Bank against DLC. Those suits alleged that the real estate conveyances were fraudulent transfers under the Nebraska Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="510"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1994/94a0758p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Most of Scott's efforts were aimed at exposing the fact that Mechem's officers and directors were engaged in fraudulent activity. The bankruptcy court's award was appealed by three other creditors of the estate. Holding that some of Scott's expenses were incurred either before the chapter 11 petition was filed or after the case was converted to chapter 7. The district court further held that Scott could not recover the expenses he incurred while the chapter 11 proceedings were pending because he was acting solely for his own benefit. The court held that the bankruptcy court's award was inequitable because Scott was an insider in the corporation that was committing the fraud. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. Mechem was founded in 1986 to manage pre need funeral trust funds for individuals and to provide these individuals with funeral goods and services to be paid for with the funds in trust. The funds were advanced from the participating individuals to Mechem through funeral directors. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="510"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043408p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellants/Plaintiffs are physicians and their professional corporations who purchased life insurance through Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="510"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQ3MTAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-4710-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was not a party to the litigation below. 2 would have rejected these exclusions. The district court remarked that the settlement was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/02/033335P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Experienced bankruptcy attorneys have ignored the fact that Congress has conferred broader appellate jurisdiction on the BAP than on this court. The bankruptcy court's order was issued prior to confirmation of Farmland's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Although the BAP's jurisdiction is not limited to final orders. The BAP concluded that the ruling was a final order because it finally determined one issue the manner in which The Honorable JERRY W. We have never suggested that any interlocutory order that resolves a single issue is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1998/98a1868p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the order of the district court dismissing Ford's complaint even though we differ with the district court by finding Ford eligible to file suit under Title I of the ADA. I. The facts concerning the plaintiff's employment and her disability are not in dispute. Ford was an employee of Schering from 1975 until May of 1992. When she became disabled by virtue of a mental disorder and was unable to continue her employment. The plan mandated that benefits cease after two years if the disabled employee was not hospitalized. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Our review over the district court's order is plenary. Because the facts of this case are not in dispute. Whether Ford is even eligible to sue under the ADA. We will address Ford's claims under Titles I and III seriatim. The defendants' group insurance plan is a fringe benefit of employment at Schering. We must first ascertain whether Ford is eligible tofile suit under Title I. The question of standing is not at issue in this case. Which is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5044.html">WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for defendant appellee.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-1920_024.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which is composed of the salvage value of the line's track and other materials plus the value of land owned in fee by TP&W. Were functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission[.] </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2000/98-3380.opn.html">LEE V. GTE FLORIDA (9/13/2000, NO. 98-3380)<BR></A><BR> Because the evidence Lee presented at trial to prove pretext was not legally sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. The cross appeal is moot.</P> <P> I.</P> <P> On September 18. Lee's only remaining cause of action was whether she was denied a promotion to the position of Manager Real Estate Services because of her sex and/or age.</P> <P> This matter was tried before a jury in December 1997. The court again denied the motion but observed that Lee's evidence was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/10/026031P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND The material facts are not in dispute. The debtors' primary business is the manufacturing of cutting and welding equipment. The Estates shall reimburse the Indemnified Parties for any legal or other expenses reasonably incurred by them in respect thereof at the time such expenses are incurred. Damage or liability which is finally judicially determined to have resulted from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of any Indemnified Party. 3 To resolve numerous objections4 from the U.S. Contribution or reimbursement therefore are approved by the Court. (b) The Debtors shall have no obligation to indemnify Houlihan Lokey. For any claim or expense that is either (i) judicially determined (the determination having become final) to have arisen solely from Houlihan Lokey's gross negligence. Stating it was excessive. Stated that the portion of the indemnification provision that releases Houlihan for any liability arising from its engagement other than that judicially determined to be willful misconduct or gross negligence is inappropriate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0346n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bauss does not have a cognizable constitutional property interest in the Township's master planning process. I. Background Master planning and zoning have different purposes and effects. In pertinent part: I have had an opportunity to review the record regarding the Bauss rezoning. In each case reference was made to the subject property being master planned for residential high density. It appears to me that there may have been a drafting error in regards to the subject property. It appears to me the residential high density classification for the adjacent condominiums was inadvertently carried to the abutting existing subdivision by the draftperson. This action would have inadvertently included the Bauss property into this classification. I am asking each of you to look at any and all historic information you may have on the approval of the future land use plan and master plan to determine if there was discussion regarding modifying the subject property and including it into the high density classification. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1996/96a1355p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from three orders dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims in a consolidated class action securities fraud complaint. The orders were based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiffs in this case are all purchasers of publicly traded Westinghouse Electric Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052927p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2000/98-3380.opn.html">LEE V. GTE FLORIDA (9/13/2000, NO. 98-3380)<BR></A><BR> Because the evidence Lee presented at trial to prove pretext was not legally sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. The cross appeal is moot.</P> <P> I.</P> <P> On September 18. Lee's only remaining cause of action was whether she was denied a promotion to the position of Manager Real Estate Services because of her sex and/or age.</P> <P> This matter was tried before a jury in December 1997. The court again denied the motion but observed that Lee's evidence was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C44B81CE10DDB4DF88256CCD0060AB82/$file/0116724.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1096p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue here is the assignment agreement. The major question for decision is whether the assignment was an absolute assignment. The rents are not property of the estate and are not available as cash collateral nor as a funding source for the debtor's reorganization plan. We will affirm the orders of the district court. The orders of the bankruptcy judge and the district court are final and appealable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Because there is no dispute as to the facts presented below. I. The contest here is between Jason Realty. Jason Realty is the owner of commercial real estate in Aberdeen. Receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. . . . the Assignor shall have the privilege to collect . . . all rents. The foreclosure action was stayed. First Fidelity filed an appeal to the district court which reversed the bankruptcy court's order and held that the rents were not property of the estate and could not be used as cash collateral. The issue before us is whether the assigned rents should have been classified as property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/06/951754P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which amendment At issue is whether an amendment to a Minnesota The Honorable Richard H. Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. The Association is a nonprofit Minnesota corporation created pursuant to the Minnesota Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act). The Investment Plus Plan of Honeywell the Honeywell plans is First Trust National Association. All insurance companies This Act has been repealed and was replaced in 1993 with Minn. Annuity contracts and elect to do business in Minnesota are required to join and contribute to the Association. Who was a Minnesota resident (as is the current trustee). GICs are unallocated annuity contracts. Or Id. annuity contracts </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2002/002149.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Appellants Anthony Gricco and Michael McCardell were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Anthony Gricco was the regional manager for private companies that contracted with the Philadelphia Parking Authority to operate the parking 2 facilities at the Philadelphia International Airport. Gricco was responsible for the general operation of the facilities. Was Gricco's chief assistant. A customer who had parked in the lot for a long period of time would have a real ticket reflecting a high parking fee. Flannery also disabled the fare displays on the ticket reading machines so that customers could not see that the parking fees that they were paying were higher than the fees recorded by the machines. More corrupt cashiers were enlisted. The rest was divided into four equal shares for Gricco. The cashiers waived their right to a jury trial and were convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Million were acquitted. The government submitted a sentencing memorandum asserting that the total amount stolen between 1990 and 1994 was $3.4 million and that the tax loss was $952. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1999/981894.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to decide whether the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FB418F69F649196D8825701F0015E13C/$file/0356514.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I Brent Boyd was drafted in the third round of the 1980 National Football League ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/03-5144.htm">03-5144 -- CUNNINGHAM V. ADAMS -- 08/10/2004<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Edward A. For seeking a history and/or accounting of the Plan. <p> The district court determined that since the Plan was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1999/985434.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court held that the trustee should not have received compensation based 2 on a $7. The trustee argues that the district court's interpretation of S 326(a) was improper and that the determination of a fee award is not limited to the factors enumerated in S 330(a). Cain was subsequently appointed as Chapter 11 trustee. The debtor's principal asset was a parcel of property consisting of two office complexes in Marlton. Which was subject to a mortgage in favor of First Fidelity Bank. It was later appraised at a fair market value of $9. The trustee was awarded interim compensation of $28. The Chapter 11 proceeding was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding and Mr. Cain was reappointed as Chapter 7 trustee. Although the trustee alleged that he was prepared simply to abandon the property and allow First Fidelity to foreclose on it. Once the administrative expenses were paid. That at a sale </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4316.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Have been audited by the Internal Revenue Service virtually. Every year since Richard Nixon was President. Kanter was a wellknown and accomplished tax and estate lawyer. Among Kanter's clients was the Pritzker family of Hyatt Corporation fame. Kanter was also an accomplished businessman. Was an expert on the subject of trusts and estate planning. His estate was subsequently substituted as the principal party to this litigation. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="508"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-1116.html">AK STEEL V. US<BR></A><BR> With them on the brief was <U>Michael H. With him on the brief were <U>David M. Of counsel on the brief were <U>Stephen J. With him on the brief were <U>Julie . By the revaluation provisions of the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Act (TERCL) Article 56 2.</P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="505"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTE0MzUtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-1435-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That no modification of the pension plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="505"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116536.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. The Tax Court found that no annuity payments were ever actually made to Atkinson from the assets of the annuity trust. The estate continues to claim that checks 2 were sent to Atkinson. That Atkinson saw no need to cash them because her material needs were amply met by non trust assets. This claim is undercut by the fact that the estate produced no copies of these checks or the cover letters that supposedly accompanied the checks to Atkinson. The non charitable beneficiaries next in line to the annuity trust's assets were compelled to make an election. The estate was required to file its federal estate tax return. Found that the estate was not entitled to take any charitable deduction because the annuity trust failed to comply with certain statutory procedures applicable to the deductibility of charitable remainders. Which agreed with the IRS that a charitable deduction was not appropriate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="505"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6566B768B9F1E5E9882570CA00000E81/$file/0335924.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Environmental Protection Agency ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="503"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962740.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> No. 96 2740 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Champion discontinued Smith's disability benefits after it determined that Smith was no longer </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041615p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that they were bound by the Stipulation. We will affirm. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 EFS is a former steel manufacturing company located in Erie. That Plan was eventually adopted by EFS after it acquired National Forge. Accurately reflect the record and are not in dispute. We have substantially excerpted this section of the District Court's decision. It was incorporated by reference into an October 1. The hourly employees are and/or were members of the USWA's local affiliates. All of the appellants were either active employees or they had previously resigned from EFS. Including those appellants who were still working at EFS. The Debtor's Plan of Reorganization was filed with the Bankruptcy Court on July 12. 2002 and was confirmed in an order dated August 26. The Park Corporation was to continue the business operations of EFS as a reorganized debtor free and clear of any claims or encumbrances by EFS's pre petition creditors. Including those persons who might have a claim to retirement benefits. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/08/942266P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The group policy was an employee benefit plan governed by Young America's Manhattan Life cancelled the the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Young America was the plan administrator. policy. later Stanley named his wife Selma as the beneficiary. transferred the policy to Union Central. When Stanley was approaching the maximum age of eligibility for the group policy. Claiming Stanley had not been eligible to participate in the group policy at the time of his death because he was not an active. Because the record shows there are material fact disputes about whether Stanley met the policy requirement of active. Fulltime employment and was eligible for coverage. The fiduciary's refusal to pay benefits under the plan is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (1989). The Finks do not dispute that standard of review on appeal. unreasonable.' </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972286.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Sugarloaf's sole asset is Sugarloaf Centre. Throughout the period when the Debtor was a debtor in possession. The property was encumbered by an $11.75 million first priority deed of trust and a second priority judgment lien in favor of Charles Vaughn ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2002/01-10417.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/11/016019P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the Creditor has standing to appeal from the bankruptcy court's order denying his Application for Order Reopening the Chapter 11 case. (4) whether Local Rule 5010 1 adopted by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota is unconstitutional because it allows the court to rule on the application without conducting a hearing. (2) a hearing is not required for a bankruptcy court to rule on an application to reopen a closed chapter 11 case. (4) Local Rule 5010 1 is constitutional. BACKGROUND Canal Street Limited Partnership ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C740557C88F27A1888256D3A00540B8C/$file/9956762.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on the briefs. Were on the briefs. Were on the brief. Were on the brief for cross appellees Jack Lawn. Were on the brief for amici curiae International Human Rights Organizations and International Law Scholars. That Alvarez </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july97/96-2145.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp. United States Court of Appeals. Senior Circuit Judge:

The issue here is whether the district court correctly ruled that when a corporate debtor's fiscal tax year straddles the filing of a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization. The portion of the year's income tax attributable to income earned during the prepetition part of the year is not allowable as an administrative expense under section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.

501 OPINION/ORDER
She next brought a cause of action in state court that was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. That the Board's decision that Lillie Horton had no right to survivor benefits was not arbitrary or capricious as set forth in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Page 2 The facts in this pension dispute are uncontested. We are to determine whether the district court properly interpreted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (
501 OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp. United States Court of Appeals. Senior Circuit Judge:

The issue here is whether the district court correctly ruled that when a corporate debtor's fiscal tax year straddles the filing of a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization. The portion of the year's income tax attributable to income earned during the prepetition part of the year is not allowable as an administrative expense under section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.

501 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge:

498 RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. FINANCIAL INST. RETIREMENT FUND

The issue presented by this case is whether the Resolution Trust Corporation. Is a multiple employer pension benefit plan under ERISA. The fund is a single plan. The plan was established in 1943. Its corpus is comprised of assets which fluctuate in value in accord with economic trends. Sooner was deemed to have withdrawn from FIRF. The value of Sooner's FECO credit was approximately $4.1 million. FIRF claimed it was prohibited by ERISA from distributing the FECO credits to RTC or any employer for non pension related purposes. Judgment in the amount of $4.6 million was entered in favor of RTC. 29 U.S.C. 1103(c)(1). stream of income for pensioners and their dependents.2 Because RTC will remove the FECO credits from the pension fund and place them in the U.S. FIRF asserts the exclusive benefit rule is violated. The district court held Guidry and Patterson were distinguishable because they involved the anti alienation rule. FIRF argues this distinction is irrelevant. Contending both the anti alienation rule and the exclusive benefit rule are designed to effectuate the congressional policy of assuring pension assets are used only for the benefit of employees and their families.
498 OPINION/ORDER
Judgment was then entered in Kent's favor for $4. Kent approached United later that year and it was agreed after negotiations that United would provide health insurance for ICB beginning in January 1990 and that it would designate Kent as the insurance agent for these transactions.1 Kent received an 8% fee from United for the ICB account. Kent did not tell ICB that he was discussing conversion of the health insurance plan with United nor did he inform United that he did not have authorization from ICB for the proposed conversion. They agreed that the plan sponsor At that time South Dakota required that insurers have policies
498 OPINION/ORDER
This is an ERISA case. GROSS (Argued) The question before us on appeal is whether Hartford wrongfully determined that McLeod. Who was neither diagnosed with nor treated specifically for multiple sclerosis (
496 OPINION/ORDER
Robert and Connie were married in November of 1987. Connie was not present. The Decree apparently provided that Connie's claim for maintenance was reserved retroactive to June 1. Stated: It's my understanding that one of the terms of the decree was that the issue of maintenance. Which would have been temporarily awarded at the rate of $4. Was reserved backwards to some time in `97. There is currently no maintenance obligation owing. Although there is a residual possibility of such obligation should Ms. We were not presented with a copy of the Decree. No proper Affidavit was attached. As is permitted by the judgment and decree. The court wishes to note that it is not inclined to grant spousal maintenance to a party evading a warrant for arrest. The court would be funding an illegal activity.4 We are unaware of any further proceedings in the District Court prior to the hearings at issue in these appeals. These payments were made outside the plan to satisfy nondischargeable priority tax obligations. The court found that under Minnesota law any claim for unpaid temporary maintenance is merged into the final decree.
496 01-4009 -- SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE V. NORTON -- 08/29/2002

The district court reasoned that as long as an agency is taking some action toward fulfilling mandatory. The court concluded that the BLM did not abuse its discretion in determining that a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was not necessary based on new information about increased ORV use.

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

496 OPINION/ORDER
PPMA is part of an umbrella of multinational and diversified entities organized under the British holding company Prudential plc. PPM Holdings (PPMH) is the direct parent of PPMA and the sponsor of the ERISA plan at issue. Who was PPMA's president until November 2000. Seegers and Knes met with Stark to tell him he had lost their trust and was being relieved of his job responsibilities. The offer was withdrawn because of the discovery of alleged misconduct by Stark. His demands were not met. Contending that he was entitled to severance pay and a bonus under the PPMH change of control severance plan. He says his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies must be excused because it would have been futile to go that route. Finding that there was no basis for severance pay or a bonus. He argued that the district court was powerless to reach the merits on his claim because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The judge then issued an order saying that the failure to exhaust was excused because
496 OPINION/ORDER
I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by vacating its order of dismissal and allowing Debtor to resume performance of his confirmed Chapter 13 plan.
494 OPINION/ORDER
Former employees of Hechinger Investment Company and related entities (
494 OPINION/ORDER
Recognizing that
494 OPINION/ORDER
Recognizing that
494 OPINION/ORDER
Included in the Huron National Forest is a forty acre parcel known as the Bull Gap Hill Climb Area (
494 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Inc. appeals the order of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's finding that Azalea was in default of its amended plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and of a related settlement agreement and authorizing the mortgage holder on Azalea's rest home to foreclose. Azalea contends that the bankruptcy court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter its order and that. Azalea's defaults were de minimis and therefore insufficient to justify foreclosure. After the mortgage was sold to WRH Mortgage. Blackwell to have him operate it. The payment was not received until after the February 10 due date. Advising it of certain of these defaults and noting in addition that Azalea's lease of the rest home to Blackwell may also have violated the amended plan. Invoking the bankruptcy court's
494 OPINION/ORDER
A title insurance company that satisfied its obligations to its insured following embezzlement by a mortgage broker is entitled to payment from the State of California Department of Real Estate Recovery Account to recover a portion of an unsatisfied judgment against the embezzling brokers. We hold that it is not. Is a title insurance company that insures the condition of real estate title for lenders. The new loans were to be secured by a first lien position. Mortgage Link was required to pay off existing liens on the refinancer's properties so that the refinanced loans would be secured by first trust deeds. Stewart Title was obligated to protect its insured against loss of priority to the full extent of loss up to the face amount of the policies. When the senior liens were not paid off by Mort gage Link. Each of Stewart Title's insurance policies also provided that Stewart Title was entitled to be subrogated to all rights of its insured. DISCUSSION The California Real Estate Recovery Account Fund exists to
494 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The Plan is a defined benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (
494 OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Circuit Judge: Nancy Gardner appeals the district court's dismissal of her statelaw claims against appellees on the ground that her claims were preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (
494 OPINION/ORDER
A title insurance company that satisfied its obligations to its insured following embezzlement by a mortgage broker is entitled to payment from the State of California Department of Real Estate Recovery Account to recover a portion of an unsatisfied judgment against the embezzling brokers. We hold that it is not. Is a title insurance company that insures the condition of real estate title for lenders. The new loans were to be secured by a first lien position. Mortgage Link was required to pay off existing liens on the refinancer's properties so that the refinanced loans would be secured by first trust deeds. Stewart Title was obligated to protect its insured against loss of priority to the full extent of loss up to the face amount of the policies. When the senior liens were not paid off by Mort gage Link. Each of Stewart Title's insurance policies also provided that Stewart Title was entitled to be subrogated to all rights of its insured. DISCUSSION The California Real Estate Recovery Account Fund exists to
494 OPINION/ORDER
Which money was never refunded by the proposed sellers when the conveyance was not completed. The agreement was only effective in the event The Honorable Richard H. United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 1 approval was received. 056.14 for the trust land even before Secretarial approval was obtained for the transfer. The Cudmores agreed to return Thorstenson's payments attributed to the trust land in the event that conveyance of the trust land was not ultimately approved by the Secretary. Was not part of this suit) for fraud and breach of contract over the land sale. After the evidence was presented to the jury. Were not recorded. Based upon his We have no information regarding the nearly fifteen year lapse between the originating contracts and the creation of the escrow account. 3 2 understanding that it was dismissed without prejudice. This ruling was never appealed. D. State Court Proceedings Against Virginia Cudmore Grover died in February 1997 and Virginia tentatively received a life estate in the trust property under the terms of Grover's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)approved will.
494 OPINION/ORDER
Against a civil action in which Amedisys is the plaintiff. Amedisys is a Louisiana corporation supplying home nursing services. Because the Louisiana action is an
494 CANNON V. GROUP HEALTH SERV.

Cannon's claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). I Phyllis Cannon was diagnosed with acute myeloblastic leukemia in September of 1991. She was treated with chemotherapy. Contending the treatment was experimental during a first remission of leukemia. Saez requested the insurers reconsider his request and submitted medical literature in an attempt to demonstrate his proposed treatment was not experimental. Saez also informed the insurers his request needed urgent action because it was critical the ABMT be completed prior to any cancer recurrence. Cannon was not notified until October 10. None was ever administered. She was admitted into the hospital on October 12. Cannon was insured through her employer. Cannon was first diagnosed with leukemia in September 1991. The Blue Lincs HMO plan provided: The following services or procedures are not covered by BlueLincs HMO: . . . . (13) Organ transplants other than skin. Blue Lincs HMO issued an
494 OPINION/ORDER
We agree with the district court that relevant decisions regarding fire prevention were encompassed in the government's contracts with Fluor Daniel Hanford. The action is therefore barred by the independent contractor exception to the FTCA. We do not reach whether the suit is also barred by the discretionary function exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The wildfire was triggered by an automobile crash on Washington State Route 24 (SR 24). SR 24 is located on an easement over federal property granted by the United States 13002 AUTERY v. The ALE Reserve is an ecologically sensitive area with significant natural and cultural resources. The terms of the transfer are set forth in a June 20. Specific control of the ALE is important here because the fire started on the ALE or. Plaintiffs' primary FTCA claim is that the United States (either the DOE or the FWS) negligently maintained firebreaks near SR 24 along the ALE and such negligence caused fire to spread from SR 24 onto the ALE and ultimately to Plaintiffs' properties.1 The DOE had a large (over $2.8 billion.
489 OPINION/ORDER
With whom
489 OPINION/ORDER
Was a closely held corporation in Jackson. Mercantile Bank was the trustee of Lenco's Employees' Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). 2 alleging that Mercantile was liable under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Secretary alleged that Mercantile continued to have fiduciary duties to the ESOP despite the appointment of Mueller as successor trustee and thus was liable. Because Mercantile failed to take action to prevent it and also because Mercantile failed to ameliorate the buy back's consequences to the ESOP when it was reappointed trustee of the ESOP after Mueller's death in 1985. United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 23 2 Mercantile can be liable for the buy back only if the buy back was unlawful. The buy back was unlawful only if Mueller.
489 OPINION/ORDER
McAlpin
489 OPINION/ORDER
The issues raised in this appeal are whether the district court erred in determining: (1) that McCarron's severance agreements fell within the scope of the FDIC's valid repudiation of
489 OPINION/ORDER
Carter and McKool Smith were on brief for appellants David C. Madoff and Cohn & Kelakos LLP were on brief for appellee. Senior Circuit Judge. appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by approving a settlement between the chapter 7 trustee for Healthco International. Three months later an interim trustee was appointed and the reorganization was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. By the time the chapter 7 trustee (
489 OPINION/ORDER
489 OPINION/ORDER
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. That the sale order was void. While we conclude that Mueller waived the jurisdictional argument and the sale order is not subject to collateral attack. We agree that the order of sale was not properly a basis for a finding of contempt and that Mueller's conduct was not contemptuous. The bankruptcy court's order of contempt and sanctions award will be reversed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding Mueller in contempt of the order approving the sale of the legal malpractice claim and imposing sanctions on him for violating that order. Is final if it
489 OPINION/ORDER
Rockwell prevailed and was awarded attorney fees and costs by the state court. The BAP majority held that the entire award was encompassed in the discharge. We hold that the fees and costs incurred post petition were not discharged. The bankruptcy court ruled that the cause of action was exempt. Section 1033.5(a)(10) states that attorney fees are allowable costs under § 1032 where they are authorized by contract. 030.78) was not discharged. It held that Rockwell was free to collect this
487 OPINION/ORDER
Pollock was an account collector for Citibank Credit Services and a participant in the Plan. The employee will be deemed disabled if she cannot perform the job she previously held (the
487 OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
487 OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
487 OPINION/ORDER
Corning's motion is denied. The order appealed from is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Will & Emery (Richard B. Circuit Judge: INTRODUCTION Underlying this appeal are massive asbestos liability claims against appellee Corning. The immediate issues are whether a state or federal forum will determine certain insurers' claims that their policies do not cover asbestos claims against Corning and whether we have jurisdiction to review the determination of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denise L. Judge) that the claims belong in federal court because they are core to PCC's Pennsylvania bankruptcy proceeding. The appellants in this procedurally complicated appeal are insurers that issued liability coverage to appellee Corning. The London 3 Market Insurers as the affiliate insurers.1 The affiliate insurers wish to have their liability to Corning assessed in New York State Supreme Court while Corning prefers a federal forum. Corning removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania where PCC's bankruptcy proceeding was pending.
487 OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
487 OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
487 OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
487 OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
487 OPINION/ORDER
O'Neil and Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green Professional Association were on brief. P.A. were on brief. Raulerson & Middleton Professional Association were on brief. Pearson contends that the compromise settlement was the product of a fraud perpetrated upon the bankruptcy court by his former chapter 7 counsel. Who were represented by the Wadleigh Firm. The BWI condominium foreclosure sale was followed by a succession of lawsuits. No mention was made of any conflict of interest claim Pearson may have held against the Wadleigh Firm. There is no conflict of interest which prevents [me] from acting as Special Counsel to the Trustee . . . since the Special Counsel is not being retained to represent the Trustee in connection with the claims asserted against Bedford (sic) Woods and First N.H. The application to appoint Gannon special counsel to the chapter 7 estate was approved by the bankruptcy court on the following day in an ex parte order. Its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Nor have we found. The
487 OPINION/ORDER
We are satisfied that. Is entitled to recover both the collateral (an aircraft engine) and the proceeds. This conclusion is also supported: (1) by the language of the controlling agreements between Tower and FINOVA. We will therefore affirm the order of the District Court. The agreements specified that insurance proceeds of the engines were part of FINOVA's collateral.1 Tower also covenanted to maintain insurance on the aircraft. The engine at issue in this appeal was severely damaged in an in flight accident. The cross collateralization was created in page 2 of the Aircraft Mortgage. As 49 U.S.C. § 44107 is such a statute. Its UCC filings in New York were unnecessary. 503.26 was directly attributable to the accident. Was appointed Chapter 7 trustee. The engine was returned to FINOVA. Some of FINOVA's other collateral was apparently destroyed or impaired by Tower. There is no dispute that the engine was returned in fully repaired condition. FINOVA contends that the total value of all returned collateral was some $36 million.
487 OPINION/ORDER
Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was
487 OPINION/ORDER
Concluded that
487 OPINION/ORDER
PC were on brief. Works no such alchemy.

487 OPINION/ORDER
Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
485 OPINION/ORDER
Recognizing that
485 OPINION/ORDER
Brewster were on brief for appellee.


485 OPINION/ORDER
The asset at issue is a single premium variable annuity purchased by an elderly annuitant with the proceeds of her husband's estate for the purpose of using a subsequent bankruptcy to free those proceeds from the claim of a judgment creditor. The question is whether this asset qualifies for the exemption for
485 OPINION/ORDER
Whose employment was terminated without cause by debtorappellee Bethlehem Steel Corporation (
485 OPINION/ORDER
Recognizing that
482 OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for plaintiffs. P.C. were on brief for defendants. Plaintiffs each retired from defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (
482 OPINION/ORDER
This is a diversity insurance coverage lawsuit under Kentucky law arising from the October 2001 death of a teenage boy from injuries that he suffered while riding on a float that had just completed a town parade route in Nicholasville. That case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Among the week's events was the
482 OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether a Chapter 7 debtor's right to receive payments under a privately purchased disability insurance policy is fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate under W. Because we cannot assume that payments under this type of policy will be limited to amounts reasonably necessary for support. We hold that the payments are partially exempt under W. Morehead that the market had moved against his open positions and that the firm was making an $850. Morehead was unable to meet the margin call. Morehead was fired from his position as a surgeon at the Veterans' Administration Hospital in Clarksburg. 4 IN RE MOREHEAD the case was closed. Morehead was receiving payments of $10. They listed the disability policy as an asset but claimed that payments under the policy were fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate under W. He argued that the amendment should be disallowed because the Moreheads' failure to disclose the disability policy in their initial bankruptcy filing was a fraudulent effort to conceal an asset.
480 OPINION/ORDER
The question in this bankruptcy appeal is whether a Chapter 7 trustee may bring claims that a Chapter 11 debtor in possession could not. We conclude that the trustee is barred in the circumstances of this case from bringing a derivative claim on behalf of a creditors' committee after conversion to Chapter 7. Shortly after the bankruptcy case was filed. Akamai Technologies had previously helped finance MSHOW and was one of its secured creditors holding a pre petition security interest. Which is at the heart of this dispute. Carved out a narrow exception to this bar for an unsecured creditors' committee: The Committee shall have until the first date set by the Court for objections to confirmation of a reorganization plan in the Bankruptcy Case to deliver to Secured Creditors . . . [its] written notice of intent . . . to commence an (1)
480 OPINION/ORDER
Specifically they argue (1) that the injunction is overbroad as it relates to a book they sell. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). I. Background Irwin Schiff has a long history of opposition to the federal income tax laws.1 For over thirty years he has maintained that the federal income tax is voluntary. Co defendant Lawrence Cohen is an employee at Freedom Books. Is sold individually and as part of tax avoidance packages. Which authorizes a district court to enjoin any person from conducting activities that are subject to penalty under 26 See. Including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter. Including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income that they know or have rea (2) (3) UNITED STATES v. SCHIFF 10821 son to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter.
480 OPINION/ORDER
With whom Lawson & Weitzen was on brief. DeMallie & Lougee were on brief. This is an appeal from the LYNCH. As a defendant in a suit arising out of Paul Revere Life Insurance Company's refusal to pay disability insurance benefits to plaintiff's late husband when he was suffering from his final illness. Plaintiff sought to add a new party defendant on a state law claim in an action which the district court was simultaneously dismissing against the original defendants as being preempted by federal law. We review the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and conclude that there is no such abuse under the circumstances. We need not and do not reach the issue of whether the state law misrepresentation claim is preempted by the Employee Income Security Act of 1974. One month later he was diagnosed with bone cancer and sought disability benefits. His request was denied as being related to a preexisting condition for which he sought treatment during the enrollment period. Plaintiff contends that this pamphlet was misleading.
480 OPINION/ORDER
The court will collectively refer to the appellants/cross appellees as the class. The court will collectively refer to appellees/cross appellants as Farmland. ­2­ 4 3 2 1 I. A Jurisdictional Issue We have jurisdiction over final orders and certain types of interlocutory orders. A pretrial order dismissing less than all of a plaintiff's claims is interlocutory and cannot be appealed unless it includes the grant or denial of an injunction. Or the interlocutory order is appealable under the narrow. Though the two summary judgment orders were interlocutory. At the class' request the district court both directed the entry of judgment pursuant to a Rule 54(b) determination there was no just reason for delay. Explaining that its purpose was to
480 OPINION/ORDER
Inc. was on brief. LLP were on brief. Was on brief. A nursing home which is currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Was overpaid by Medicare because it took Medicare money for the expenses of third party provided services but then did not pay those third parties as required. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a). Alleging that this was an improper setoff within the context of bankruptcy. Is whether the government may recover the overpayments to Slater to put them back into Medicare or whether Slater's estate gets the funds to be distributed to its many creditors.

480 OPINION/ORDER
Deputy Eaton also ordered Revis to leave the residence and inquired about any cash that Revis was carrying on his person. Judgment was entered in November of 2003. An amended judgment was filed in August of 2004 that remitted the punitive damage award to $150. Revis and ORRI were held jointly and severally liable for the punitive damages. Meaning that Revis was personally liable for a maximum of $462. The date that the jury verdict was announced. Both writs were addressed
480 OPINION/ORDER
Was the holder of a Citibank Visa credit card when he died on August 29. His account balance was $889.58. Which were never mailed to George or Michael Hess. Citibank claimed that it was entitled to interest that had accrued during the two years between the date in February 1999. Whether the amount of interest was calculated according to the terms of the cardmember agreement attached by Hess to his complaint or under Missouri's statutory interest rate. The court calculated the amount of interest that would have accrued on the account through December 2000 employing three different potential methodologies. The court calculated the total interest that would have accrued under both variable and fixed rates. The balance on George Hess's account in December 2000 would have been greater than $974.96. The court observed that the cardmember agreement submitted by Hess states that finances charges continue to accrue until payment in full is credited to the account. Concluded that once Citibank was notified of George Hess's death.
480 OPINION/ORDER
Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the district court's jurisdiction. Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the court's jurisdiction. Millennium Seacarriers was formed to hold the capital stock of various vesselowning subsidiaries (collectively
478 OPINION/ORDER
The parties were subject to a collective bargaining agreement requiring the musicians to remain available for rehearsals and performances on a flexible basis. Regardless of whether their services were used by the Orchestra during that time. It continued to plan for concerts because it was actively seeking to reorganize its business. Although the concert schedule was uncertain during the post petition period. The Orchestra was unable to resolve its financial difficulties. I. Background The Colorado Springs Symphony Orchestra was a private. The collective bargaining agreement between the parties was set to run through August 31. The agreement was akin to a minimum quantity contract in that the musicians were guaranteed compensation for a certain number of pay periods. The amendment does not affect cases such as this one that were filed prior to April 20. The musicians were never called upon to play. The Association argues that the musicians' wage claims are given payment primacy by Congress under another provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
478 FLETCHER V. UNITED STATES

Some of whom were not entitled to vote in tribal elections or hold tribal office because they do not own an interest in the Osage mineral estate or headright. Because the district court proceeded without subject matter jurisdiction in light of the Osage Tribe's sovereign immunity and because the franchise was improperly extended in this case and a federal statute prescribed the form of tribal government for the Osage Tribe. It is a final appealable order. Each appendix is consecutively numbered. We will refer to the Appendix to Appellant Osage Tribal Council's Opening Brief as
478 OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant.

478 OPINION/ORDER
The Massey Plaintiffs maintain that their assignments of liability are unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Enterprises v. We conclude that these contentions are without merit. The Combined Fund is financed by annual premiums assessed against current and former coal operators. Among those assignments were several made to the Massey Plaintiffs. Was unable to agree upon the rationale for its ruling: a four justice plurality voted to invalidate the assignments on one constitutional theory. The events leading to the enactment of the Coal Act have been well chronicled by this and several other courts. These benefit trusts were financed by coal production royalties and by payroll deductions. The coal mines were returned to private control. Which was modeled on the Krug Lewis benefit trusts. The 1947 Fund was financed exclusively by royalties from coal production. Although the 1950 NBCWA was amended several times. The 1950 Benefit Plan covered coal miners who were already retired. The 1974 NBCWA constituted a significant break from the past in that it was the first agreement between the UMWA and the BCOA to provide lifetime health benefits for retirees and their widows (unless a widow remarried).
475 03-5124 -- MILLSAP V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. -- 05/21/2004

Any other damages based upon backpay) are available as
475 OPINION/ORDER
Dolan contends that the indictment was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. That there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Dolan is an attorney who represented businessman David R. This information was insufficient. Dolan testified at trial that he was also concerned about Anderson's failure to assert ownership of stock in a company with which Anderson was associated called Medical Devices. Anderson told Dolan that all the vehicles he drove were titled in various corporations and that he did not own any stock in Medical Devices. Dolan 2 testified that at the time the schedules were filed. He had no reason to believe that any information contained in the schedules was false. Although he realized that they may have been incomplete. Two omissions from Anderson's bankruptcy petition are relevant to Dolan's appeal. Ferrari was securing a promissory obtained note at Security loan that Dolan and Anderson filed the petition and accompanying schedules. Which was in Anderson's name.
475 OPINION/ORDER
We conclude that reformation is not available and that third party beneficiaries to the underlying agreement are entitled to rely on its plain language notwithstanding that such language was the result of the mistake or negligence of the contracting parties. McCormick argues that these funds are not delinquent because they are sought pursuant to a clause in a collective bargaining agreement that McCormick avers was the result of a
475 OPINION/ORDER
Contech was billed by and paid these carriers directly. Computrex's business was to provide these services to shippers using multiple carriers. Computrex was then to issue carrier checks Monday night and to mail the checks to the carriers on Tuesday morning. That is. By the time the involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Computrex. It was Computrex's practice. 414.04 were made to Contech's carriers within ninety days of the filing of the involuntary petition in this case. Contech's carriers were only owed approximately $300.00 while other clients' carriers were owed over twenty four million dollars at the time five creditors of Computrex filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against it on December 20. Page 3 (2) (3) (4) (5) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. 1 made while the debtor was insolvent. If such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider. That enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
475 OPINION/ORDER
Harris and Schwentker were romantically involved. Owners who were loyal to him.
475 OPINION/ORDER
He was covered by both an individual policy for management employees and a group policy as an employee benefit plan. I. Russell alleged in his complaint that he was employed by CPI in March 1990 as a Vice President and within the next two years became a participant in the Company's Individual Limited Plan and in its Group Limited Plan. He further alleged that the defendant Company is a fiduciary of both plans with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. He represented that about 5 to 10 hours per week were allocated to financial analysis. Which was defined as involving sitting. Both policies essentially provide that an eligible employee is entitled to disability payments if
475 OPINION/ORDER
Which we have consolidated for decision. Aurora Christian Schools Ocean Atlantic is a real estate development company that is incorporated in Virginia and maintains its principal place of business in Alexandria. Will Counties three of the suburban
475 OPINION/ORDER
The Appellant asserts it is entitled to prime plus interest in accordance with Till v. The Appellant's claim is secured by a vehicle purchased for the Debtors' personal use within 910 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court's order is REVERSED and REMANDED. The parties to this appeal have not raised any issues regarding the Panel's jurisdiction. We must independently assess whether we have jurisdiction.
475 OPINION/ORDER
Hender were on brief. P.C. were on brief. The verdict was affirmed on appeal in
473 MCMILLIAN V. FDIC

This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > McMillian v. This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1995/95a1151p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who are the debtors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The subject of the adversary proceeding is a prior transaction in which Debra Hayden. 000) to me paid in hand by [the medical defendants] . . . the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. The Haydens were experiencing financial difficulties. Hayden that although consolidation was not possible. Reliance explained that it was the owner of the annuity and that Ms. Hayden to change irrevocably the address to which the checks were sent to that of Western. Hayden also directed Reliance to have United irrevocably change the address to which the checks were sent to that of Western. 420.63 was used to satisfy the loans. The monthly payments were received and deposited by Western from the end of 1990 until August 1992. The Haydens argued that the annuity checks were property of the estate and that the court should order Western to turn over these checks to the estate. The Haydens maintained that Western was only an unsecured creditor of the estate for a sum equal to the value of its bargain with Ms. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/06/016008P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Louis was subject to at least three claims of security including a first mortgage which. At the time that the case was filed. 329.45.2 There is also a second mortgage on the debtor's home­a secured home improvement loan. The original mortgagee was Key Home Credit Inc. The mortgage was assigned to American General about November 10. Asserting that it has a secured claim for the full amount.3 There is also a disputed mechanic's lien filed by Thomas Construction Company. The validity and extent of the mechanic's lien was being litigated in state court at the time that the case was filed. It is somewhat unclear whether this claim is held by Chase Manhattan Bank or Cenlar Federal Savings. The identity of the holder of the claim is not germane since both parties agree that such a mortgage exists and that it is a first lien on the debtor's home. 3 2 The proof of claim has not been made part of the record on appeal. 2 The debtor filed a plan in which he treated both American General and Thomas as unsecured creditors. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/60edaec33213417188256a2d005af072/$FILE/0015006.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contended the quarterly payments were exempt from claims of their creditors. This appeal followed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Hold that the quarterly payments are not exempt as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/4ff6a0ed1f31de3188256e5a00707ae8/$FILE/0015006.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contended the quarterly payments were exempt from claims of their creditors. This appeal followed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Hold that the quarterly payments are not exempt as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0005p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the appellant is not entitled to allowance of an administrative expense claim as a result of the debtor in possession's postpetition use of trucks in which the appellant holds security interests. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW An order determining that a claim is not entitled to administrative expense priority constitutes a final order. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Apr2002/013065u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Burdge's claims in the District Court were consolidated with those of William Conery and Frank Fusco against Local 464A. Burdge's membership was suspended from February 1953 to July 1956. When he was reinstated. A hearing was held but Burdge and his attorney left before its conclusion. The pension plan modified the application he submitted previously and his pension benefits were recalculated. Burdge testified at his deposition that he believes that he is entitled to that amount because other retired union members received similar amounts. Burdge's calculations apparently included periods during which he was not a union member and may have included other errors. Although the union was overly cautious and may have been wrong in requiring specific authorization for release of pension information to a member's attorney. Burdge and his attorney received everything that was of any relevance far in advance of his retirement. Burdge's claims under 29 U.S.C. 501 relating to Local 464's breach of contract action against co plaintiff Fusco are also without merit for essentially the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of February 26. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/60EDAEC33213417188256A2D005AF072/$file/0015006.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contended the quarterly payments were exempt from claims of their creditors. This appeal followed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Hold that the quarterly payments are not exempt as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2179.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> was on brief for appellant.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034625p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PA 18235 Counsel for Appellee Judge Chertoff heard oral argument in this case but resigned prior to the time the opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C.§46(d). Because we conclude that the rents were not the property of the bankruptcy estate. The court of common 1 The mortgages specified that Lender shall have the right. Although the Appellee disputes whether the notice letters sent by the bank were correctly addressed or in fact received by all tenants. The mortgaged properties were sold to the bank for cost by the county sheriff. Schwab was appointed as bankruptcy trustee ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr96/94-5045.opa.html">MCMILLIAN V. FDIC<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>McMillian v. This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1995/95a1146p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Coyle was the Chief Financial Officer for Health Corporation of America (HCA) from December 1986 through October 1990. Was in the business of designing. HCA was awarded three contracts by the United Paper Convertors Local 286 Welfare Trust Fund to administer plans providing health care benefits to members of the Paper Convertors Local 286. These are employee benefit plans subject to Title I. The duration of these particular contracts is unclear from the record although it appears that the contracts were renewed prior to their eventual termination in 1990. The companies will be referred to collectively as HCA. Which were calculated at a fixed rate per covered employee per month. All premium payments not disbursed to participating physicians or laboratories or retained as administrative costs were to be returned to the Fund. There was no similar provision for refund of surplus premiums in the Pennsylvania dental contract although the contracts appear to have functioned similarly in all respects. There was no refund of any premiums under any of the contracts. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/09/01-1418.htm">01-1418 -- AGUILAR V. BASIN RESOURCES INC. -- 09/18/2002<BR></A><BR> INTRODUCTION</strong> <p> <strong> </strong>Appellees are the International Union. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4FF6A0ED1F31DE3188256E5A00707AE8/$file/0015006.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They contended the quarterly payments were exempt from claims of their creditors. This appeal followed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Hold that the quarterly payments are not exempt as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0427n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Concluding that the firm's services were not reasonably likely to benefit the estate because the unsecured creditors were unlikely to receive a distribution. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/05/996079P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over these appeals from the final orders of the bankruptcy court. Was an Air Force pilot and officer for many years. He was married to Sandra Vandiver. Finding that the original California divorce court had made a final adjudication with respect to Vandiver's claim and that Vandiver's suit was barred by res judicata. Holding that no adjudication of Vandiver's claim had occurred in the California divorce proceeding and that Vandiver's lawsuit was not barred by res judicata. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the prior rulings by the Arkansas Court of Appeals were the law of the case and that the trial court erred in dismissing Vandiver's lawsuit and in failing to award Vandiver 37.28 percent of the Debtor's military pension benefits. The Debtor was in good financial shape. The only other significant debt the Debtor had was a home mortgage loan guaranteed by the Veteran's Administration. Shortly after the petition was filed. The automatic stay was lifted so that any remaining issues regarding the liquidation of Vandiver's claim could be resolved in state court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/953039P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which tax was paid. a refund. So that the tax on this sale was subject to The Bankruptcy Court held that the plaintiffs in this case. D & P decided that a self directed liquidation of its assets was its best alternative. Were entitled to the proceeds of that refund. The three offers were not identical. which offer they wished to accept. A problem was discovered. administrative expenses. The sales taxes on The balance in D & P's operating account was not sufficient to pay operating expenses. Would receive title to the assets free and clear of any 22 the sale if all of the proceeds were paid over to the creditors. offer. The Nath Group was asked to increase its Instead. The sale was closed on October 31. The Nath Group purchased two more restaurants from D & P The required sales taxes were paid over to the state of Minnesota for both sales. The sales tax statute was amended to exclude the sale of substantially all of the assets of a business from the list of taxable events. This amendment was retroactive to June 30. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept98/96-6845.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/09/96-8083.htm">96-8083 -- PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL V. BABBITT -- 09/01/1998<BR></A><BR> </strong>Chief Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962412.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Line 29 the cross reference is corrected to read </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/02/96-8083.htm">96-8083 -- PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL V. BABBITT -- 02/09/1999<BR></A><BR> Public Lands Council concedes that the statutory citation is incorrect but contends that we should cite a different statutory provision rather than remove the highlighted portion of the sentence. <p> Upon consideration. The court grants the limited petition for rehearing and orders the highlighted portion of the sentence removed from the court's opinion so that the sentence will read: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/02/996071P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Confirmation of the plan was denied. Which was related to a state court lawsuit pending at the time of the bankruptcy petition. If these claims were allowed. Because the Debtors were not making any payments during this time period. The court based its decision on a finding that there had been an unreasonable delay in the case that was prejudicial to the creditors. Eide ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept98/96-6845.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-7043a.html">EDDY JAMES PETER V. COLONIAL LIFE INS<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2003/022708p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The District Court granted summary judgment on the ground that McCurdy was precluded from bringing his § 1983 action after he had entered into an agreement with Dawson's mother to share the proceeds from her settlement of a prior civil action against the same defendants here. That there is a controlling. Threshold issue which obviates the need to address preclusion: that is. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Donta Dawson was sitting alone in a parked car. The headlights and interior lights were on. The radio was audible. Officer Dodd inquired why Dawson was parked on the street and whether he needed any 4 assistance. Repeated demands to show his hands were met with Dawson's silence. A subsequent investigation revealed that Dawson was unarmed. Although the familial relationships between the decedent and his parents are important to this case. The factual record is disturbingly incomplete in material respects.1 Dawson was the son of Cynthia Dawson and Bobby McCurdy. These gaps in the factual record are directly attributable to McCurdy's failure to respond to their Requests for Admission. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/01/99-1547.htm">99-1547 -- WEINMAN V. FIDELITY CAPITAL APPRECIATION FUND -- 01/14/2004<BR></A><BR> P. 23(b)(1)(A) class was improper. (4) the settlement was not fairly negotiated. Is unfair. (6) the bankruptcy court erred in denying a dispositive motion seeking to dismiss this action on any of four separate grounds set forth in the motion (more specifically described below). <p> These issues are substantially identical to the ones raised in <u>Integra I</u>. The appellants here further assert that they and the <u>Integra I</u> appellants have </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="468"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2558.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that Howard's non compliance with the bankruptcy court's order to file state tax returns by a specified date provided an adequate ground for the court to dismiss her Chapter 13 petition and renders moot the issue of whether Lexington's proof of claim was valid in the Chapter 13 proceeding.</SPAN></P> <UL> <LI><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug96/95-9066.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. KUMMER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Which they assert was the charge and the plea to which they agreed. Defendants also individually allege various errors by the district court related to sentencing.<p> I<p> <p> Defendant Jernigan was the business agent and financial secretary for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 256 in Savannah. He was also trustee of the local's health and welfare plan. Oglesby was the general representative of the Brotherhood of Carpenters International Union in the southeastern United States. Oglesby told Jernigan about his associates Thomas Kummer and Edward Killian who were involved in the Tahoe Company. Kummer was general counsel of Tahoe. Killian was acting vice president and secretary of Tahoe. Tahoe was engaged in soliciting investments from business agents of union benefit plans in exchange for promoting union labor and construction projects developed by Tahoe.<p> Following Oglesby's advice. Oglesby then told Jernigan that Tahoe was receiving investments from local unions and that if an investment was made from Jernigan's local union it would increase the possibility that he would receive the personal loan he was seeking. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug96/95-9066.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. KUMMER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Which they assert was the charge and the plea to which they agreed. Defendants also individually allege various errors by the district court related to sentencing.<p> I<p> <p> Defendant Jernigan was the business agent and financial secretary for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 256 in Savannah. He was also trustee of the local's health and welfare plan. Oglesby was the general representative of the Brotherhood of Carpenters International Union in the southeastern United States. Oglesby told Jernigan about his associates Thomas Kummer and Edward Killian who were involved in the Tahoe Company. Kummer was general counsel of Tahoe. Killian was acting vice president and secretary of Tahoe. Tahoe was engaged in soliciting investments from business agents of union benefit plans in exchange for promoting union labor and construction projects developed by Tahoe.<p> Following Oglesby's advice. Oglesby then told Jernigan that Tahoe was receiving investments from local unions and that if an investment was made from Jernigan's local union it would increase the possibility that he would receive the personal loan he was seeking. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200010201.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2001/00-10201.opn.html">UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)<BR></A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0007p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> An order is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec2000/991821.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue on appeal is whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a non profit corporation pr oviding residential human services programs for mentally ill and mentally retarded adults. We will vacate the judgment and remand for further findings. I. Background Plaintiffs are current and for mer employees of Defendant Resources for Human Development. RHD is a Pennsylvania non profit corporation that pr ovides its clients mentally ill and mentally retar ded adults with human services programs such as community health 2 centers. Overtime pay is equal to 1.5 times an employee's regular pay rate. Both programs are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0E069879E5D2334A88257266007AEA0A/$file/0456982.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I This case involves a dispute between the trustees of two employee benefit plans over an agreement in which one plan was to provide certain benefits to plan participants of the other plan. While the total amount of claims paid to plan participants was $770. Death benefits payable to Bakery Drivers' plan participants were obtained through the purchase of a group insurance policy with an insurance carrier. 2 Bakery Drivers' original complaint included an additional claim that South Bay Teamsters violated the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="464"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2001/00-10201.opn.html">UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)<BR></A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982479.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Although generally a money judgment arising out of a Circuit Court proceeding will constitute a lien on the judgment debtor's land located in the county in which the judgment was rendered. Birney listed the Cecil County property as exempt because it was jointly owned as tenants by the entireties by the debtor and his non filing spouse. The trustee sent notification to creditors that the case was a no asset case. Birney received a discharge and the case was closed. No objections were filed to Birney's claimed exemptions or the trustee's reports. Also that the property was never captured by the bankruptcy estate and therefore could not be reached by Smith. Birney was still alive. Birney was alive. Is incorrect under our recent holding in In re Avis v. Is an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0752n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Again the plaintiffs have appealed. We are not persuaded that the township's site plan and </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/05/042752P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case is before us for the second time.1 Appellant. That are governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1997/97a1693p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are confronted with a tension between bankruptcy law and labor law. These claims were based on alleged seniority integration rights stemming from a pending labor arbitration dispute and were filed following Continental's acquisition of Eastern and subsequent refusal to bargain over the seniority integration of Eastern's pilots. Both of which are no longer represented by ALPA. Appealed to this court.1 Resolution of this dispute requires us to determine: (1) whether the bankruptcy claims that the LPP Claimants and the Group of 31 seek to enforce constitute </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/012109P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined the stock transfers were reciprocal cross gifts and assessed a deficiency of $215. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George. He and George had discussed with their insurance agent their desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The IRS denied annual exclusions for gifts made by Robert in 1994 and 1995 to members of George's family on the basis that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B1A43334A16E06FB88256A4C0057B941/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/50A03335A6C29F6188256E5A00707B46/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jun1997/97a1617p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The newly established Reading Company1 was given a fresh start by a consummation order which granted Reading protection from all pre consummation debts and liabilities. We will affirm the judgment of the district court. We will first have to determine what type of claim or claims appellants. We will refer to the bankrupt railroad as the Reading Railroad and the post bankruptcy. Or simply Reading. 3 will then consider how Reading's bankruptcy affects appellants' ability to enforce any claims. Wefind that Conrail's only viable claim against Reading is one for contribution under § 113(f). We also find that this claim was not discharged by Reading's consummation order. We determine that Conrail's claim fails as a matter of law because Reading is not liable to the United States under § 107(a) and consequently Reading cannot be liable to Conrail for contribution of the response costs that Conrail must pay to the United States. The result was the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/April1995/95a1009p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We find that the transfer was proper and therefore will affirm the order of the district court. As it concluded that the controversy arising from the ancillary case was essentially a shareholder dispute. We will deny the petition. Jurick was Emerson's chief executive officer. Donald Stelling was its board chairman. FIL was to receive 90% of the common stock of the reorganized Emerson and a $45 million promissory note. The refinancing is to be provided by FIL. Neither I nor the Stelling family have ever been personally liable for the obligations of FIL. I strongly encourage you to take all steps necessary to assure yourself that FIL will be able to perform its obligations to provide financing for the Emerson restructuring. Jurick was successful in this endeavor. The common stock in reorganized Emerson was not issued to FIL. The stock was issued to the following entities: 15. Certain of FIL's creditors who were also its shareholders. The New York bankruptcy court held a telephone conference and determined that Rule 1014(b) was inapplicable to the ancillary case. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0090p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> An individual becomes eligible for health and life insurance coverage when the individual: (1) is at least fifty seven years of age and has at least ten years of service with Local 284. An individual is permanently disabled for plan purposes if he or she is eligible to receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Local 284 reduced Donald Linville's coverage so that his retiree benefits were substantially less than those provided to active employees. Donald Linville was notified that he would be required to pay a monthly premium to continue receiving retiree benefits. Active employees were not required to pay a monthly premium for their health and life insurance benefits. The district court concluded that the plan is a welfare benefit plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §1002(1)(A). Because the plan is a welfare benefit plan. Outstanding medical expenses that would have been covered under the plan. The court also awarded damages to Donald Linville and enjoined Local 284 from terminating or changing the plan so long as Donald Linville was eligible for benefits. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="462"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/97-2136.htm">97-2136 -- CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. V. HEMPEL -- 02/22/2001<BR></A><BR> Hempel was the plaintiff in the state court proceedings against Mr. Alleging that his father was entitled to coverage for part of the state court judgment on the basis of a professional liability policy issued by that insurance company for the period from 1968 to 1969. <p> The insurers then filed crossclaims against Messrs. The district court ruled as follows: (1) it granted summary judgment to the insurers on their claim that the state court judgment was collusive and that. Westerfield's claim that he was entitled to coverage under the 1968 69 professional liability policy. <p> The losing parties as to all three of those rulings have now appealed. The dispute concerned Ada Mudge's rights under the will of her late husband Daniel Mudge. Mudge's estate was 23. 400 shares of common stock in what later became the Tandy Corporation. <p> Daniel Mudge's will directed his estate to be divided between Ada Mudge and Mr. The will appointed Eugene Graham. Graham as trustee. <p> Under the will. The Annuity Trust was to be funded with one third of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="459"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-1550.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bankruptcy courts have reached contrary results. The two circuit courts that have addressed this issue have both held that 546(a)'s language unambiguously provides for a single two year time frame. 1 These appeals do not concern the claims plaintiff asserts against Vincent Boryla individually. 2 The cases are unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument in accordance with the appropriate rules. on December 19. The case was converted back to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and. Jobin was appointed the Chapter 7 trustee. Arguing that they were barred by 546(a)'s two year limitations period running from Ms. We have no occasion. To address the issue of whether the trustees were subject to a single two year limitations period that began to run from the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. Vizcarra argued that she was not a creditor of the estate and. Our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) is not confined to the question certified for appeal. Which in this case is the issue of the application of 546(a)'s statute of limitations. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="459"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/lognameprint.php">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Jerome Wayne Johnson</td> <td align=left valign=top>03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>07 12 2004</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Bowman</td> <td align=left valign=top>02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>08 13 2003</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="459"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTIxNjQtYmsucGRm/04-2164-bk.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 when it dismissed debtor's appeal for failure to include in the designation of record on appeal a transcript of a bankruptcy hearing without first giving the debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 8001 when it dismissed debtor's case for failure to include the June 23 transcript in the designation of record without first giving debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. The judgment of the district court is VACATED. Was then appointed. Concluding that the two Properties were not part of the bankruptcy estate and hence not subject to the automatic stay. J.) on the grounds that because the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548. Holding that it had erred by not considering whether the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under §§ 547 and 548 and entered a stay pending the lower court's decision on the transfer issue. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="459"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0488p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> He claims that the materials comprising the Tax Toolbox were never introduced into evidence at the hearing on the injunction. Because the injunction's scope is appropriately tailored and does not unduly burden his livelihood. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="459"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/lognameprint2.php">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman</td> <td align=left valign=top>02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>08 13 2003</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align left valign=top>In re: Will C. Cohen</td> <td align=left valign=top>03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>07 08 2004</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align left valign=top>In re: Will C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051709np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/04/006002P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It is from that order that Schroeder appeals. The debtors' case was converted to a case under Chapter 11. Rouse was appointed the Chapter 7 trustee. The debtors agreed to have the automatic stay modified to allow Frank and Dorothy Dell to resume foreclosure on the debtors' apartment building. If counsel's total fee in a case is $1. The disclosure of fee in initial filings is sufficient and it is unnecessary to file any itemized application. That parties have 20 days to object. If no objections are filed the Court may enter an order. If objections are filed the Court may set a hearing. 3 Schroeder's representation of the debtors continued. The trustee's motion alleged that the payments made to Schroeder were cash payments from funds wrongfully diverted out of the bankruptcy estate (and then back to the debtors) by a transfer of more than $20. That the payments made to him were not from assets of the bankruptcy estate and asserted that the fees and expenses were reasonable and not excessive. Because he was not requesting compensation from the estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002343.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We have previously granted the motion filed by the Debtors. The lease agreement was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/06/022867P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Have you . . . had any diagnosis. Is any person taking medication prescribed by a physician? Shipley then signed the form which represented that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044198np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellants are Robert E. and Lynne K. They appeal the Order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the Weedlings were equally at fault in perpetuating the impasse over payment to PNC Bank. The Court also found that PNC was not 2 the proximate cause for any losses that the Weedlings may have suffered on the sale of their business.1 PNC cross appeals on the failure to enter judgment for it for attorneys' fees. James and Donna were not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding but rather were guarantors of certain indebtedness owed by LCI. PNC was the principal secured creditor of Robert and Lynne with respect to a $2. Which was then implemented in the form of an Order of the Bankruptcy Court entered August 11. Throughout the Opinion we will refer to the business as Gateway. 3 1 attorneys' fees. Robert and Lynne filed an Amended Plan that was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in 1996. The liens were to be secured by two new mortgages with the same existing lien priority. The problem that is the subject of this appeal arose because none of the parties ever executed new documents. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200305/02-7043a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-7008a.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With </P> <P>him on the briefs were Kevin C. Was on the brief for </P> <P>amicus curiae District of Columbia Financial Responsibility </P> <P>&. On the brief </P> <P>were Brendan V. </P> <P>the District of Columbia contends that the officers are enti </P> <P>tled to qualified immunity because. It was not </P> <P>clearly established prior to Eric Butera's death that the </P> <P>officers' conduct would violate these rights. </P> <P>the appeal presents two questions of first impression in this </P> <P>circuit: (1) whether the District of Columbia can be held </P> <P>constitutionally liable for failing to protect an individual who </P> <P>is not in custody from harm inflicted by a third party. </P> <P>through which Eric Butera might have succeeded in proving a </P> <P>constitutional violation. Was not clearly established prior to </P> <P>his death. The officers were entitled to qualified immu </P> <P>nity. We also hold that there is no parental due process right </P> <P>to the company of an adult child who is independent. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F316B7C5749B242D88256E5A00707B2E/$file/9817122.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: At slip op. p. 3651. Is a question that we leave to the district court to decide in the first instance. The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are denied. In accord with the long standing principle that default judgments are disfavored. Under her psychiatrist's care was taking powerful antidepressants. It was during the time that Janet was preparing to move. Thomas was an employee of Tele Communications. Janet was the designated beneficiary of the basic life insurance policy. Janet asserts that after she and Thomas were married. Although Janet was served with the summons and complaint on May 12. Who explained she had not retained counsel and did not know what she was going to do about the litigation. Janet was personally served with Kathleen's answer. Two days after Janet's answer was due. A hearing on Kathleen's motion was set for September 15. 1033 34 (9th Cir. 2000) (ERISA interpleader brought by fiduciary is cognizable cause of action). Which is the subject of this appeal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19953004.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge: Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1819.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Noonan was on brief for appellants. This appeal is from a district court judgment approving a bankruptcy judge's orders denying motions of appellant real estate brokers Gallivan and Smith (1) to compel the payment of a brokerage fee by appellees. Are the following. The remaining portion was leased under a ground lease to the other debtor. The president of both debtors was Melvin Getlan. A lease was signed by debtors on May 17. The lease was to commence after General Mills gave notice that all conditions had been met or waived. Although claiming to have 3 worked seventy or eighty hours on lease associated matters after the filing of the petitions. Were found to have </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/97-7211a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs was Mark L. With him on the brief was Laurie B. Because of its importance to local commerce and because there is no decision by the highest court in the District of Columbia precisely on point. We have decided to certify it to that court. We agree that such dismissal was improper and rein state these two claims contingent on a positive response by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to the question certified here. DeBerry that this grant was improper and accordingly reinstate the claim. DeBerry is a citizen of the District of Columbia. First Government is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland. Code s 28 3904 is entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03b0003p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court overruled Debtor's Objection on the basis of a response filed by Morton who was at the time estranged from Debtor and had been dismissed from the case. The Debtor asserts that Morton did not have standing to file a response and that the bankruptcy court failed to provide her with an opportunity to present evidence prior to ruling on her Objection. An order is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-30533.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. We decline to consider the issues raised by the defendants in their letter submitted under Rule 28(j) that were neither raised in the district court or argued in their initial brief. 2 1 I. John and Martha Herring were charged and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy). Martha Herring was charged and convicted of two additional counts of bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 157(1) and (2). Were also charged with conspiracy. HCC served as the Agencies' home office and was owned by and employed the Herrings. A cost report was prepared by each Agency and submitted to Medicare. All costs associated with running the Agencies are included on the reports. Medicare reimburses only those costs that are reasonable. Certain employee appreciation expenditures are costs allowed by Medicare. The cost reports are used to derive pay rates for different care services. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971589.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Tester at the time of her death and was of opinion that Reliance improperly denied Mr. She was on medical leave from her position as a creeler weaver at Bibb's plant in Greenville. The policy states: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7F7D4297CCF145E188256E5A00707AB0/$file/9817122.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In accord with the long standing principle that default judgments are disfavored. Under her psychiatrist's care was taking powerful antidepressants. It was during the time that Janet was preparing to move. Thomas was an employee of Tele Communications. Janet was the designated beneficiary of the basic life insurance policy. Janet asserts that after she and Thomas were married. Although Janet was served with the summons and complaint on May 12. Who explained she had not retained counsel and did not know what she was going to do about the litigation. Janet was personally served with Kathleen's answer. Two days after Janet's answer was due. A hearing on Kathleen's motion was set for September 15. 1033 34 (9th Cir. 2000) (ERISA interpleader brought by fiduciary is cognizable cause of action). Which is the subject of this appeal. 1266 67 (9th Cir. 1992) (person who claims to be the beneficiary of an ERISA plan has a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)).1 1 The interpleader plaintiffs have been dismissed from the case and. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2072.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.A.</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200101/00-7008a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs were Kevin C. Was on the brief for amicus curiae District of Columbia Financial Responsibility & Management Assistance Authority. On the brief were Brendan V. The District of Columbia contends that the officers are enti tled to qualified immunity because. It was not clearly established prior to Eric Butera's death that the officers' conduct would violate these rights. The appeal presents two questions of first impression in this circuit: (1) whether the District of Columbia can be held constitutionally liable for failing to protect an individual who is not in custody from harm inflicted by a third party. Through which Eric Butera might have succeeded in proving a constitutional violation. Was not clearly established prior to his death. The officers were entitled to qualified immu nity. We also hold that there is no parental due process right to the company of an adult child who is independent. The officers were entitled to summary judgment on all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. s 1983. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0887920540D4B95A88256A47005A6F89/$file/9817122.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: At slip op. p. 3651. Is a question that we leave to the district court to decide in the first instance. The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are denied. In accord with the long standing principle that default judgments are disfavored. Under her psychiatrist's care was taking powerful antidepressants. It was during the time that Janet was preparing to move. Thomas was an employee of Tele Communications. Janet was the designated beneficiary of the basic life insurance policy. Janet asserts that after she and Thomas were married. Although Janet was served with the summons and complaint on May 12. Who explained she had not retained counsel and did not know what she was going to do about the litigation. Janet was personally served with Kathleen's answer. Two days after Janet's answer was due. A hearing on Kathleen's motion was set for September 15. 1033 34 (9th Cir. 2000) (ERISA interpleader brought by fiduciary is cognizable cause of action). Which is the subject of this appeal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/10/006019P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> FACTS The Debtors in this case are Michael and Debra Bowman. Bowman is employed full time by a radio station equipment company in Ogallala. Approximately 60 miles from the Dundy property which is the subject of this appeal. Bowman is employed full time as a clerk at a lumber company. The Debtors' combined yearly income is approximately $60. When the bankruptcy petition was filed. The Dundy property was subject to numerous liens and mortgages totaling over $4 million. The bankruptcy court denied the Debtors' motion on grounds that it was too late in the summer to plant pumpkins. Debtors asserted that they were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961431.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> No rent was paid on the premises postpetition. Was one of several automobile dealerships in Northern Virginia controlled by John W. The lease was thus rejected by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). The debtor's case was converted to Chapter 7. Trustee Hall was appointed to administer the estate. Was pursuing its own§ 506(c) action against Ford Credit. Reynolds was also permitted to surcharge Ford Credit to satisfy its claim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051709npa.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B64EFCFC9161E29988256A1B0060358C/$file/9817122.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In accord with the long standing principle that default judgments are disfavored. Under her psychiatrist's care was taking powerful antidepressants. It was during the time that Janet was preparing to move. Thomas was an employee of Tele Communications. Janet was the designated beneficiary of the basic life insurance policy. Janet asserts that after she and Thomas were married. Although Janet was served with the summons and complaint on May 12. Who explained she had not retained counsel and did not know what she was going to do about the litigation. Janet was personally served with Kathleen's answer. Two days after Janet's answer was due. A hearing on Kathleen's motion was set for September 15. 1033 34 (9th Cir. 2000) (ERISA interpleader brought by fiduciary is cognizable cause of action). Which is the subject of this appeal. 1266 67 (9th Cir. 1992) (person who claims to be the beneficiary of an ERISA plan has a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)).1 1 The interpleader plaintiffs have been dismissed from the case and. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200515900.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BTI seeks to recover certain standby letter of credit proceeds that were drawn down and retained by The CIT Group/Business Credit. Which was the assignee of BTI's lessor. Whose two general partners are David C. The standby letter of credit was created to secure BTI's obligations to Two Trees under a lease agreement that was part of a sale leaseback transaction. Factual Background Most of the facts in this case are undisputed. We largely adopt the bankruptcy court's statement of the facts in its 30 September 2002 order: BTI was in the trucking business. The bonds were paid. BTI was entitled to purchase the property for $1. BTI's primary lender was CIT. Which was thereafter amended from time to time. Dinstein was an officer and director of BTI's parent company. Was apparently the architect of the sale and leaseback plan involving Two Trees. That is. David Walentas was a general partner in Two Trees and Chairman of the Board of BTI Parent. That it is in the best interest of [BTI] to obtain a letter of credit in the amount of up to $1.6 million in favor of Two Trees . . . securing [BTI's] lease obligations to Two Trees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/013636.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Classification of its claims in the Belgian proceedings and ordering that these issues be determined exclusively by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code was issued without consideration of all relevant legal principles. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. S 158(a) and we have jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. Have applied an abuse of discretion standard to entry of an anti suit injunction as 3 well. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0800n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Argued that as the named beneficiary at the time of the insured's death he was entitled to the entire proceeds of the life insurance policy. Sitting by designation. * and that they were entitled to equal shares of the policy proceeds. Ruling that the daughters are entitled to the proceeds of the policy. Because it is wellestablished in this circuit that we must determine the insured's intent by looking to the designated beneficiary in the plan documents at the time of the insured's death. Patricia Hardy Craig was covered by a contract for Group Term Life Insurance issued by Unicare pursuant to a contractual arrangement with her employer Ernst & Young Product Sales LLC ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2003/022178u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The plaintiffs are current and former newspaper haulers for the defendant. Alleging that they were improperly classified as independent contractors when in fact they were common law employees. Holding that plaintiffs' claims were time barred under ERISA's three2 year statute of limitations. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' alleged breach of the Plan could not give rise to fiduciary liability because Gannett's classification of defendants as independent contractors was made in a business management. Which are known to the parties. The most compelling and determinative of these is the District Court's application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 413's three year statute of limitations. This argument in the District Court in support of class certification properly was ignored by the District Court in light of plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Rule 23 requirements. 3 2 did not expressly include or exclude independent contractors. The original contracts are ambiguous as to whether the haulers were to be treated as employees or independent contractors.3 In 1976. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1996/96a1312p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is such a case. It is a class action that seeks to settle the claims of between 250. 000 individuals who have been exposed to asbestos products against the twenty companies known as the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR).[fn2] Most notably. These </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0024p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Whose primary assets are voting and nonvoting stock in Ervin Industries. Who have interests in two of the three trusts. Are the other beneficiaries of the voting stock trust. The essence of her claim was that Bank One's lending relationship with Ervin Industries caused Bank One to have a conflict of interest and abdicate its responsibilities as trustee in the course of three business transactions. We conclude that dismissal was proper. The Trusts and the Parties There are three trusts involved in this litigation. Two of these trusts are testamentary. The first testamentary trust was created by John Ervin. Ervin Industries is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. Is its current president. The primary asset of Ervin's testamentary trust was Ervin Industries' Class A voting stock. His daughter and four grandchildren are the income beneficiaries. Are parties to this suit. This substantial trust was divided into five separate trusts in 1987 so that each beneficiary had his or her own trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb2000/993280.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 brought by plaintiff Woodwind Estates. The central issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Woodwind's S 1983 substantive due process claim. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. Woodwind is a Pennsylvania limited partnership which at all times relevant to this action sought to build a subdivision development on seventy five acres in Stroud Township. Woodwind was awarded approximately $1.1 million in federal low income housing tax credits by the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/962573P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 holding that the claim of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) against debtor's estate is not discharged because the IRS did not receive proper notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. Debtor filed his Chapter 13 plan with the bankruptcy court debtor's tax liabilities were not specifically mentioned on June 3. Provided that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1452.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> were on brief for appellants and cross appellees</SPAN> <BR WP= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/976073P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The only issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Debtors' Motion to Alter and Debtors' Motion to Vacate. Demonstrated that the Plan was neither feasible nor proposed in good faith. It is from denial of confirmation of this Plan and from denial of subsequent motions to reconsider this order that Debtors appeal. Barger converted the Co op's collateral and that the Plan treatment afforded the Co op's claim was not made in good faith. Debtors proposed to set off any balance found due the Co op against any judgment Debtors obtained against the Co op in an adversary proceeding which Debtors filed seeking The sequence and descriptions of reorganization plans is somewhat confusing. Was filed on November 8. Which is the one at issue in the motions on appeal. That plan was denominated the First Amended Chapter 12 Reorganization Plan. These Debtors are not strangers to Judge Mahoney nor the bankruptcy court in Nebraska. Debtors have been under the protections of Title 11 almost continuously since May. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA2LTAxMTItY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/06-0112-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The District Court granted Swede partial summary judgment on his claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962354.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sitting by designation. *Judge Russell heard oral argument in this case but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The record before the court is simply not sufficient to permit a full understanding of all of the maneuvers in which the parties have engaged. The following recitation of facts is drawn. While this appeal is from actions of the district court in this suit. It is necessary for an understanding of the case to recite the bankruptcy court proceedings. Was sold in May 1987 to Rhema Development Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F37D428B8113024E8825733A004B6F53/$file/0416087.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The panel reasoned that Pallas no longer controlled because it was inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court authority governing retroactivity principles. Because we conclude that Pallas is not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/05/01-4119.htm">01-4119 -- HAYMOND V. EIGHTH DISTRICT ELECTRICAL BENEFIT FUND -- 05/28/2002<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Appellant Jason Haymond challenges the district court's order entering summary judgment in favor of appellee Eighth District Electrical Fund ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/00/00-3910.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brenda Combes was the insured person. Was surprised to discover that Brenda had changed the beneficiaries on these policies (or had tried to do so) from himself and the couple's daughter Ashley to Brenda's sister. The third policy was part of a benefit plan established under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. Since their interests are aligned for present purposes). Seeking a declaration that she was the sole beneficiary of that policy as well and demanding payment of the proceeds. The Pennsylvania and North Carolina actions were later transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. The three cases were consolidated. All contested proceeds were deposited with the court. While we do not doubt that David and Ashley were sympathetic figures. We conclude that the oral agreement is not sufficient under the law of Illinois to override a written designation of a beneficiary on an insurance policy. We also conclude that the flaws David identifies in the ERISA change of beneficiary form were not enough to defeat its effectiveness. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3757_016.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Concluding that Pioneer Ranch was responsible for the trucking company's liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/09/953419P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Mortgage A foreclosure sale was foreclosure sales on her home were pending. mortgage sometime after that. scheduled on her first mortgage for September 4. 816 in past due taxes and penalties. was her right to receive an unencumbered $50. She converted to Chapter Debtor's attempt Debtor was unable 11 in order to prevent foreclosure on her home and to work out a payment plan for her taxes once the Skyline funds were depleted. at Chapter 11 reorganization. Was unsuccessful. to confirm a reorganization plan. to fund a Chapter 11 plan due to insufficient funds and thus was never able Despite her inability to reorganize. Keate was able to renegotiate both mortgages on Debtor's home and Debtor became current on her mortgage payments during the Chapter 11 proceeding. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/10/023505P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The sole issue on appeal is whether the debtors' IRAs are exempt from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). We hold that the funds are not exempt. Included in their assets were two IRAs valued at $42. Both debtors have the ability to withdraw funds from their accounts at any time subject only to early withdrawal tax penalties. The bankruptcy court found that the IRAs were not exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Unless (i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose. (ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service. Payments from the debtors' IRAs are exempt only if (1) the IRAs are a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0564n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was scheduled to end on August 7. Sent a letter to Lewis terminating her employment: Since we have not heard from you since mid August. We are forced to make the assumption that you have resigned. We are not obligated to hold a position for you beyond the 12 week time period. This letter is to inform you of your termination with Weyerhaeuser operated the plant under the trade name </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/07/972779P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Melanjo is a Florida corporation. Is engaged in the business of real estate and investments. Melanjo was contacted by Ben Smith. The group policy also included the following conditions: The term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200612296.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This fund was created following the settlement of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit filed on behalf of inmates in the Glynn County Detention Center ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1996/96a1368p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1988). We will affirm the conviction. The plans were marketed to small business employers. NIBA members were fully insured by NIBA's group insurance contract with World Life and Health Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/27FFE6CC53BC27F988257209007F62BB/$file/0415328.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: We consider whether prescription drug plan participants who have suffered no judicially cognizable injury may sue their plans' fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/98-7022a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief was James W. The goal was to arrange a $122 million </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1335.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Meyer & Soloman were on brief for Conservation Law Foundation. P.A. were on brief for Town of Newington. Were on brief for the federal parties. Were on brief for State of New Hampshire and Pease Development Authority. Senior District Judge. whether defendants have complied with various federal environmental laws that apply to the conversion of land on Pease Air Force Base (Pease) in New Hampshire to civilian use incident to the base's closure. Several other interested parties have intervened and. Plaintiffs have appealed from the dismissal of their CAA claims and the denial of injunctive relief. The federal defendants have cross appealed from the finding that they violated CERCLA. Have not appealed the district court's order directing them to prepare a Supplemental FEIS. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Also before us are petitions filed by CLF and Newington to review an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approving PDA's airport development plan. We have jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. app. 1486(a) and deny the petitions with respect to the CAA claim and retain jurisdiction of the NEPA claim pending completion of the Supplemental FEIS. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTYzODItY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-6382-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The employer plan providing LTD benefits to Benesowitz is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/29D56C277CF48D238825734F0059E271/$file/0617288.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that when a debtor applies for a 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) preliminary injunction to stay a proceeding in which the debtor is not a party. I. BACKGROUND Hoffman is the founder and a major shareholder of both Indivos and Excel. One of the main purposes of these agreements was to separate Hoffman from the management of Indivos. Which was controlled by Hoffman and separately owned Indivos shares. Was not a party to the Settlement Agreement or the Pledge Agreement. Excel was a party to the Voting Trust and Standstill Agreement. Including whether their positions on patent ownership were taken in good faith. Ruling that all of the patents Excel accused Indivos of infringing were actually owned by Indivos. The parties were attempting to schedule additional hearing dates to finish the proceeding. Hoffman's bankruptcy petition was dismissed in September 2004. Hoffman argued to the arbitrator that the stay established by Excel's bankruptcy petition applied to Indivos' claims against him because those claims were intertwined with Indivos' claims against Excel. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-2100.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on brief. With whom Sheketoff & Homan were on brief. LLP were on brief. Friedman was convicted of defrauding several federally insured banks and ordered at sentencing to pay restitution to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Because Unisource was not the victim of defendant's offenses. If they were actually raised by the facts of this case. Affirming the district court's order does not present the dangers the government fears because we do not agree that the district court's order releasing funds to Unisource was an order of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972765.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The instant case is an appeal by certain creditors of Hatsy Heep ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="445"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2FE1B74785D8300A8825711C0077D4E5/$file/0435319.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sea Hawk's motion for relief from the automatic stay was denied. The State was not a party to that agreement. With prejudice </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="445"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/02/99-1178.htm">99-1178 -- DODGE V. COTTER CORP.-- 02/11/2000<BR></A><BR> After class certification was denied. Convinced a jury Cotter was negligent in operating the mill but failed to establish its negligence caused their exposure to hazardous materials which required future medical monitoring. <p> Now before us is a second group of fourteen plaintiffs who. Established Cotter's negligence caused their physical injuries and were awarded monetary damages. Is a mile and a half north of the Mill. <a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="445"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/release.pl?B1=Search+Month&month=03&date=01&year=02">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/05/026065P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is a manufacturer of above ground swimming pools. The debtor's principal manufacturing facility is located in West Helena. The motion was granted on March 6. The second motion was granted on May 29. JURISDICTION The order appealed from is interlocutory. An abuse of discretion may only be found if the lower court's judgment was based upon clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions. Longer period provided in the statute is to solicit acceptances. There are some situations where longer exclusivity periods are appropriate. The appointment of a trustee terminates the exclusivity periods. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1). 4 3 The factors that must be established to constitute </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0113p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Plaintiffs are barred by res judicata from continuing their suit in this court. Have summarized the relevant facts of the present case. Because the principal issues on appeal are questions of law. A Reorganization Plan for New Vencor was proposed. Notice of the Plan was mailed to each of the Plaintiffs who had filed a proof of claim. A key component of the Plan was summarized as follows: As part of that Plan. Ventas was given a release of [Plaintiffs' personal injury and other] Nos. 02 5632/5638 Pratt. The district court held that Plaintiffs were barred from collaterally attacking the Confirmation Order issued by the Delaware bankruptcy court. Id. ((quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(a): </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1994/94a0735p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> On appeal Commonwealth argues a bifurcation that has this effect is contrary to the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Nobelman v. We will affirm the district court. The parties stipulated that the fair market value of the Hammonds' home is $25. The future earnings of the debtor are submitted to the supervision and control of the trustee and the debtor shall pay to the trustee the sum of $ 666 on a monthly basis for a period of 60 months. 2. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review The statute which governs jurisdiction over appeals from bankruptcy court decisions is 28 U.S.C.A. § 158. Section 158 provides in relevant part: (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments. Decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title . . . . * * * (d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions. We have jurisdiction over the district court's order under section 158(d).[fn5] Review of the district court order involved in this case presents questions of law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971619.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was liable to FSP for damages arising out of Easton's breach of a commercial lease. The order provided that it was to be without prejudice to the rights. The bankruptcy court ruled that Easton had exercised reasonable business judgment in seeking to have the court approve the assumption of the lease. Are limited </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/05/026077P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court denying Debtor's motion to assume a real property lease. L.L.C ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200611209.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Return of Service filed by the process servers asserted that service of process was attempted in Martin's medical office in January 2000. A subsequent state court evidentiary hearing regarding the sufficiency of service revealed that Martin was treating patients at a hospital away from his medical office during the time the process server allegedly attempted to serve Martin. Martin's bankruptcy case was subsequently converted to a case under Chapter 7. Asserting that the default judgment was void for failure of service of process and that he never received the Note. An order is final and appealable if it resolves a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1800.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Associates</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-2780_012.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was unripe. The background to this offshoot of United's Chapter 11 proceeding is described in our decision of last March in In re UAL Corp. Which requires the bankruptcy judge's approval for contracts made by the debtor that are outside the ordinary course of business. As the Letter Agreement obviously was. Who again maintained that he should have allowed them to participate in the negotiations. Have resulted in their receiving replacement benefits too. The active pilots gave up what would have been their unsecured claims to these benefits in exchange for the replacement benefits. They would have been bound to receive less in the way of replacement benefits than the active pilots and indeed might well have received nothing. Because a retired pilot will have enjoyed the benefit of full pension payments since his retirement while an active pilot who is near retirement will have been contributing to the pension plan for many years without receiving any benefits. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="443"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr2001/993773.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal by defendant Ellwood Group. The most important issue involves the question whether the joint venture agreement was ambiguous as a matter of law as to whether Ellwood could properly claim rebates for its sales to third parties of ingots pr oduced by the Ellwood Uddeholm Steel Company (EUS). Or whether Ellwood was limited to rebates for sales by EUS to Ellwood for Ellwood's own use. We conclude that the District Court was correct in finding a contractual ambiguity. That it erred in instructing the jury that Ellwood