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OPINION/ORDER Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor. Is GRANTED in part. 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) is amended as follows: 3046 SALGADO DIAZ v. Which was completed after he returned to the United States. |
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OPINION/ORDER SalgadoDiaz alleges that his due process rights have been violated because he has been repeatedly denied an evidentiary hearing on his allegations that U.S. border patrol agents unlawfully arrested him on the streets of San Diego. Even though he was in immigration proceedings at the time. ASHCROFT tion laws that likely would have entitled him to suspension of deportation.1 If Salgado Diaz's allegations concerning his arrest and expulsion are true. He would have a substantial claim that his constitutional rights have been violated. We hold that denying him an evidentiary hearing on those allegations is itself under the circumstances present here a due process violation. He lived in San Diego with his mother and has a daughter who was born in the United States in September 1996. He has one U.S. citizen sister and two other siblings who are legal permanent residents. While he was walking on a street in San Diego. He alleges that he was on his way to pick up orange juice from a local store for a family gathering when. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on the briefs. Were on the brief. It explains that appli cation of section 440(a) to LaFontant's petition is not imper missibly retroactive but is instead a permissible prospective application of a jurisdictional statute. We hold that section 440(a) of the AEDPA is not impermissibly retroactive as applied in this case.1 We therefore dismiss this case for lack 1 We do not pass on whether section 440(a) may apply. To bar review of a final order of deportation in a case in which a constitutional infirmity in the deportation proceed ing itself is alleged. I. Factual and Procedural Background Jean Fritzner LaFontant was born in Haiti on October 23. A copy of LaFontant's |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on the briefs for the petitioner. Were on the briefs for the respondent. We are without jurisdiction to consider either of these issues as Petitioner did not 1 11920 GRANADOS OSEGUERA v. We grant Granados Oseguera's petition as to the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen proceedings and as to his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim the two are related. In the limited situation where an alien is represented by the same allegedly incompetent counsel throughout agency proceedings including through the filing of his motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA and therefore cannot administratively exhaust2 a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to reopen. We will review to determine whether the denial of effective counsel rises to the level of a due process violation and was prejudicial. Counsel knew or should have known that Petitioner would be barred from relief if he failed timely to file the petition or motion. 1258 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the underlying final order upon petition for review of a motion to reopen where the petitioner did not earlier seek review of that underlying final order). |
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BRUNO, ROBERTO SAAVEDRA, ET AL. V. ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K. With him on the briefs was Max Stier. Meredith Manning. With her on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing an action for judicial review of the decision of the American Consulate in Panama refusing to issue a visa to Roberto Saavedra Bruno. Entitles him to put the government to its proof. I Saavedra is a Bolivian national. Was hired as the company's artistic director and interim manager. In May 1995. Seeking to have Saave dra classified as a managerial employee qualified for an L 1 visa. A month before this was to expire. As is required. He was detained briefly at the border but allowed to enter after an immigra tion hearing had been scheduled. The Consul General reviewed this information along with the classified reports and made a formal determination that Saavedra was ineligible to be ad mitted to the United States under s 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Max Stier. With her on the brief were Wilma A. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing an action for judicial review of the decision of the American Consulate in Panama refusing to issue a visa to Roberto Saavedra Bruno. I Saavedra is a Bolivian national. Was hired as the company's artistic director and interim manager. Seeking to have Saave dra classified as a managerial employee qualified for an L 1 visa. A month before this was to expire. As is required. He was detained briefly at the border but allowed to enter after an immigra tion hearing had been scheduled. The Consul General reviewed this information along with the classified reports and made a formal determination that Saavedra was ineligible to be ad mitted to the United States under s 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for respondent. He was convicted of possessing one half ounce of cocaine. Be deported if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens: . . . . (2) Criminal offenses. Mosquera was found deportable and. The BIA affirmed. is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry is deportable. . . . . Is deportable. 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii). Section 1158(d) was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Immigration Act of 1990. 3Asylum and withholding of deportation are distinct forms of relief for aliens facing persecution in the nation of origin. Is mandatory when deportation to a particular nation would threaten the alien's life or freedom on account of race. Withholding of deportation is |
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OPINION/ORDER The appeals raise essentially the same issues and have been consolidated for our consideration. Besem Selimi is an ethnic Albanian citizen of Macedonia. He was granted lawful permanent residence in the United States in 1991. As is recounted in an earlier case. When they arrived in New York they were detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). (2) were not in possession of valid nonimmigrant visas. (3) were not in possession of valid travel documents. (4) were not in possession of valid immigrant visas. They were ordered to present themselves for deportation on April 9. His request was summarily dismissed for failure to satisfy the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1). Except on one occasion when his house was searched. That he did not meet the essential statutory or regulatory requirements that the new evidence sought to be offered was material and not available at the former hearing. They argued that country conditions in Macedonia had changed to such an extent since their last hearing that they had a well founded fear of future persecution and that it was more likely than not that they would be tortured if they returned to Macedonia. |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.1 Because Mengistu has not shown that a reasonable fact finder would be compelled to find that he suffered past persecution or has a well founded fear of future persecution. Abebe's asylum claim is derivative of Mengistu's. Mengistu's father and stepmother were involved with the then controlling government in Ethiopia. Petitioner Mengistu's father and stepmother were imprisoned and stripped of their civil rights by |
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OPINION/ORDER With her on the brief were Linda Sher. With her on the brief were Jonathan P. When the Board learned that one of these employees was an undocumented alien. It denied him reinstatement and terminated his backpay as of the date the employer discovered he was unauthorized to work. Because the Supreme Court has held that undocumented workers are protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Because the limited reme dy awarded here is within the Board's discretion and furthers the purposes of both labor and immigration law. |
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OPINION/ORDER III was on brief for the appellants. Were on brief for the appellees. Who are of Irish birth and of dual Irish and American citizenship. I. The material facts are undisputed. The appellants have not pursued the claim on appeal. The Immigration Inspector position is a |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Ryan D. With her on the brief were Leonard R. With him on the brief were Jonathan P. When the Board learned that one discriminatee was an undocumented alien. Also to avoid violations of * Senior Judge Silberman was in regular active service at the time of oral argument. A compliance hearing was held before another ALJ. Not before Castro had stated that he was a Mexican national and that the birth certificate he had used to gain employment at Hoffman was borrowed from a friend. Arguing primarily that awards of backpay to undocumented discriminatees are barred by Sure Tan. That this case is controlled by a single sentence from Sure Tan: |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Ryan D. With her on the brief were Leonard R. With him on the brief were Jonathan P. Hiatt and Laurence Gold.  . When the Board learned that one discriminatee was an undocumented alien.
* Senior Judge Silberman was in regular active service at the time of oral argument. A compliance hearing was held before another ALJ. Castro appeared at the hearing. Not before Castro had stated that he was a Mexican national and that the birth certificate he had used to gain employment at Hoffman was borrowed from a friend. Arguing primarily that awards of backpay to undocumented discriminatees are barred by Sure Tan. That this case is controlled by a single sentence from Sure Tan: |
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OPINION/ORDER Different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on the merits. For the 82 civil cases during this period in which the United States was the appellee. Was 18 percent. Our criticisms of the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been severe. 610 (7th Cir. 2005) ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Noting that it was untimely. Adding: The new evidence presented by the respondent with regard to the physical and emotional difficulties faced by her mother and son might have caused us to consider a sua sponte grant of the motion. The Immigration Judge's decision in this regard has not been sufficiently challenged on appeal to warrant a finding by this Board that it was clearly erroneous. The government argues that we have no jurisdiction. Its decision whether to do so or not is unreviewable. On the ground that the decision to forgive an untimely filing is purely discretionary. All are cases in which the Board's order No. 05 2387 3 that was sought to be reviewed was indeed based on an exercise of uncabined discretion rather than on the application of a legal standard. The Administrative Procedure Act denies judicial review of agency action in cases where there is no law for a reviewing court to apply. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This is not such a case. The denial of the motion to reopen was based on a determination that a factual finding by the immigration judge was not clearly erroneous. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because she was hospitalized. Was unable to attend an INS scheduled interview. The adjustment was denied. He was found deportable by an immigration judge. The decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration appeals. From which the foregoing facts are taken. Agyeman was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. Several of his claims were dismissed by the court without prejudice. His motion to file a second amended complaint was affirmatively recommended by the magistrate judge to whom the case had been assigned. These recommendations were adopted by the district court on January 4. The magistrate judge stated: |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. June Virgil appealed the district court's The Government now suggests that the appeal is moot. We agree that the appeal is moot. 7 (1998) (throughout the litigation the plaintiff must have an actual injury likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the court). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. |
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OPINION/ORDER OPINION PER CURIAM: Melesio Carrillo Lopez is a 36 year old native and citizen of Mexico. Carrillo Lopez was convicted in Los Angeles County of felony spousal abuse and sentenced to a suspended sentence of 365 days in jail and three years probation. He was then formally removed by order of the Immigra 4 UNITED STATES v. He was arrested for possession of cocaine. His probation was revoked. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment for the 1995 spousal abuse conviction. Carrillo Lopez was removed again based on a reinstatement of his 1996 removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). He was once more found to be in the United States illegally in December 1999. 1. Carrillo Lopez contends that because he was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment until his probation was revoked in 1998. His 1995 conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (designating as aggravated felonies those crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year).1 We concluded in United States v. |
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OPINION/ORDER OPINION PER CURIAM: Melesio Carrillo Lopez is a 36 year old native and citizen of Mexico. Carrillo Lopez was convicted in Los Angeles County of felony spousal abuse and sentenced to a suspended sentence of 365 days in jail and three years probation. He was then formally removed by order of the Immigra 4 UNITED STATES v. He was arrested for possession of cocaine. His probation was revoked. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment for the 1995 spousal abuse conviction. Carrillo Lopez was removed again based on a reinstatement of his 1996 removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). He was once more found to be in the United States illegally in December 1999. 1. Carrillo Lopez contends that because he was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment until his probation was revoked in 1998. His 1995 conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (designating as aggravated felonies those crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year).1 We concluded in United States v. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We consider whether petitioner's conviction under California Penal Code § 452(c) for |
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OPINION/ORDER The immigration judge denied Firmansjah's asylum request on the ground that Firmansjah was firmly resettled in Singapore prior to her arrival in the United States. We have substituted the current Attorney General of the United States. I. BACKGROUND Yulia Firmansjah was born in Indonesia and is an Indonesian citizen. She is ethnically Chinese. When she was twelve years old. After her siblings finished high school and she was already living in the United States. After riots in Indonesia in May 1998 during which ethnic Chinese persons were harmed. She stated that she had a |