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FIRST SAVINGS BANK V. FIRST BANK SYS. (2) that FirstBank was. Further hold that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the FirstBank mark is confusingly similar to the 1971 federal registration |
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98-5243 -- STATE BANK & TRUST V. FIRST STATE BANK OF TEXAS -- 12/20/2000 The trial court granted summary judgment to State Bank on its claims and in a non jury trial held that State Bank was not liable on any of Bank of Texas's counterclaims. Only Bank of Texas's counterclaims are at issue. Payment was accomplished by means of a documentary draft. Once a draft was received by the buyer's bank. The buyer was required to verify the draft. Determine whether the title documentation was in order. Instruct the bank either to pay the draft or to return the draft unpaid. At issue in this appeal are seven documentary drafts drawn on Ventura's account and presented by Bank of Texas to State Bank for payment ( |
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MOTORCITY OF JACKSONVILLE V. SOUTHEAST BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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99-1465 -- ALLISON V. BANK ONE - DENVER -- 05/15/2002 The district court dismissed the RICO and COCCA claims prior to trial and they are not the subject of these appeals. Before us are the parties' appeals and cross appeals arising from the district court's rulings. Including its post judgment decisions regarding costs. | ||
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BANK OF AM. V. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (3/23/2001, NO. 99-14863) That specific question is one of those complicated and transitory regulatory banking issues that is of no immediate interest to anyone except those directly involved with it.
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LEDBETTER V. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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LEDBETTER V. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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BANK OF AM. V. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (3/23/2001, NO. 99-14863) That specific question is one of those complicated and transitory regulatory banking issues that is of no immediate interest to anyone except those directly involved with it.
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MOTORCITY OF JACKSONVILLE V. SOUTHEAST BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021) Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the |
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BLACKFEET NAT'L BANK V. NELSON (4/5/1999, NO. 96-3021) Seeking a declaratory judgment that its sale of the Retirement CD was authorized by the National Bank Act (the |
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UNITED STATES V. SCHLEI This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The major issue in this appeal is a troublesome question concerning the correct construction of the federal bank fraud statute. We are called upon to construe the breadth of a statute on which the Courts of Appeals are divided. The defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. The primary issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Thomas's conviction of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. These checks were used for various purposes. Weygandt was physically present at the bank with Thomas when the withdrawals occurred. Either Thomas or Weygandt would always respond that the money was for travel. It was not seriously contested that Thomas had acted wrongfully. The banks were not exposed to a loss as a result of honoring Weygandt's checks. Because the checks were properly made payable to Thomas or to cash. Only Weygandt suffered losses and the banks were not subject to any losses or potential liability for honoring the checks. Thomas contended that there was no material misrepresentation because Thomas had not affirmatively deceived the bank. |
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BUFMAN ORG. V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are faced here with the question whether claims for losses allegedly suffered at the hands of a Nazi puppet regime during World War II are cognizable in our courts today. It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that such claims are barred by the political question doctrine. That |
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OPINION/ORDER The question is one of first impression in this circuit. Are governed by the [Act]. The most prominent distinction between the procedures available under the federal Act and those available under Arizona law is that the latter provides for a judicial determination of the fair value of dissenting shareholders' shares. Section 215a(a) addresses the merging bank's requirement to notify its shareholders of a plan of merger and to have that plan ratified and confirmed by the affirmative vote of the shareholders of each such association or State bank owning at least two thirds of its capital stock outstanding. Or by a greater proportion of such capital stock in the case of a State bank if the laws of the State where it is organized so require . . . . 5878 COMMUNITY BANK OF ARIZONA v. Once the merger is approved. Section 215a(c) sets out the process by which the dissenting shareholder's shares are appraised. Any dissenting shareholder who is dissatisfied with the appraised value arrived at by this method has the right to appeal to the Comptroller of Currency. |
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OPINION/ORDER 2005 is amended as follows: 1. 2. Footnote six is deleted in its entirety. The first sentence of Part I ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Timmerman was terminated from her position as branch manager at U.S. A position in which she was responsible for managing (with co worker Chad Royle) several bank branches and supervising the branch managers at those locations. Was re titled. Timmerman and her male co worker were demoted to the position of branch manager. Bank was terminated. Timmerman was fifty two years old. Claims instead that she was not aware the refunds were made in contravention of company policy. That she was only looking out for the financial interests of her co employees. Bank sought and was granted leave to assert state law counterclaims against Ms. Timmerman sought and was granted leave to amend her complaint to add claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA. Bank's asserted legitimate reason for her termination is pretextual. Timmerman additional pages of briefing is best characterized as a |
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OPINION/ORDER Senior Circuit Judge: Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( |
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BUFMAN ORG. V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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UNITED STATES V. SCHLEI This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Because Regions Bank's security interest in the collateral was inferior to the perfected security interest of another lender. Regions Bank's security interest was of no value from its inception. Any injury to Regions Bank was complete when Regions Bank funded the loan. To the extent there was an injury. It was injury to the third party. Jones Realty was worth over $7.6 million. There is no documentation to memorialize any transfer of assets from J.R. Oil claims that this omission in its records is due to the fact that J.R. It is undisputed that Regions Bank knew that the guarantor on the loan. It is undisputed that Regions Bank knew at the time of the J.R. Regions Bank alleges in its current RICO claims that these payments were improper diversions of cash generated by assets that JTM misappropriated from J.R. Oil should have been operating the Cameron truck stop as the debtor in possession under Chapter 11. Is encumbered by liens which secure debt in excess of the value of such property. The remaining property of the Debtor is burdensome or of inconsequential value so that there is nothing to administer for the benefit of unsecured creditors. |
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OPINION/ORDER Daley & White were on brief. Grasso and Mortensen were on brief. We hold that the FDIC has no such shield and is liable. The units in the Hotel were marketed and sold by the University Bank and Trust Company and the other defendants as |
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OPINION/ORDER Pavlovich now is trying to blame defendant National City Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Ledbetter is the beneficiary of a written. Of which he is also the trustor. First State Bank and Trust Company is the trustee. Is a wholly owned subsidiary of First State Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction was based on 28 USC 1332. Inergy and the Bank being citizens (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Wachovia Bank was the commercial bank for Inergy and the Bank was the commercial bank for Powder Horn. 950 which it states was mistakenly given to the Bank. The gist of which was a denial that Inergy was |
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OPINION/ORDER While recognizing that the entities have undergone name changes and consolidation in the past. 2 1 I. Is a federally chartered bank holding company with its principal place of business in FBS owns banks in several states and provides Since the early 1970s. Credit cards even though FBS did not have an office in Iowa. The former Metropolitan Federal Banks in Iowa were renamed First Bank Iowa. Is an Iowa chartered bank with its principal place of business in West Des Moines. FB was a From 1938 to 1993. FB was known as First FB has never owned a registered FB relies instead on 2 the common law of trademarks for its claim of an exclusive right to use FIRST BANK in connection with banking services provided in these counties. Also testified that he referred to FB as |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that diversity jurisdiction is proper and that Kroske's age discrimination claim under the WLAD was not preempted. Is a federally chartered National Banking Association that was formed in accordance with the National Bank Act. The Bank is governed by a board of directors. Which is empowered by the Bank's bylaws to elect and discharge officers. Kroske was notified that her branch was not meeting the Bank's goals and quotas for business activity. Although Kroske contends that her branch was the smallest in the area with the fewest employees. That she was short staffed. The other branch managers in the region were in their twenties and thirties. While Kroske was fifty one years old. Kroske contended that she was replaced by an employee who was in his mid twenties and possessed less experience than Kroske. Filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Kroske's state discrimination claim was preempted by the National Bank Act. Contending that she was not an officer under § 24(Fifth) and. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are faced here with the question whether claims for losses allegedly suffered at the hands of a Nazi puppet regime during World War II are cognizable in our courts today. It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that such claims are barred by the political question doctrine. That |
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OPINION/ORDER Mildred Caban with whom Jorge Souss and Goldman Antonetti & Cordova were on brief for Royal Bank of Canada. Vivian Nunez and McConnell Valdes were on brief for Seiko Time Corporation. Because Royal Bank was not a party to the underlying execution proceedings. The contempt order is considered a final decision appealable by Royal Bank under 28 U.S.C. 1291. I. The attachment order at issue here was entered on January 13. Initially Gemco was wholly owned and operated by Jos and Carmen Pascual. As was a related company. These transfers were recorded in Watch and Gem's books as intercompany accounts payable and in Gemco's books as intercompany accounts receivable. The amount owing to the bank from Gemco at the time of restructuring was $1.25 million. The award was confirmed by the district of New York on November 4. Judgment was entered for Seiko on November 12. The New York judgment was registered in the district court in Puerto Rico on December 16. Gemco's primary asset was the account receivable arising from the various intercompany loans it had made to Watch and Gem over the years. |
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OPINION/ORDER With her on the briefs were John M. With him on the brief was Lloyd H. Corwin were on the brief for amici curiae The Inter American Devel opment Bank. Are immune from federal. The question in this appeal is whether a private contractor. I The World Bank is an international. The Bank is corpo rate in form. The Bank is empowered to provide financial assistance for the development of member countries. The vendor is responsible for paying the tax to the District. (The District's compensating use tax on retail sales of food and beverages is inapplicable when the sales tax is |
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INTL BNK RECONST V. DC GOVT With her on the briefs were John M. With him on the brief was Lloyd H. Corwin were on the brief for amici curiae The Inter American Devel opment Bank. Are immune from federal. The question in this appeal is whether a private contractor. Has derivative immunity from District of Columbia taxes on the contractor's sales of food and beverages.
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The World Bank is an international. The Bank is corpo rate in form. The Bank is empowered to provide financial assistance for the development of member countries. The vendor is responsible for paying the tax to the District. (The District's compensating use tax on retail sales of food and beverages is inapplicable when the sales tax is |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Torcise was one of the largest tomato farmers in South Florida. Torcise also was the sole shareholder of Growers. Were severely limited. $1.3 million. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: at slip Opinion page 6. The petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc is denied. The district court (1) found that the Ordinances were preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The district court (1) found that the Ordinances were preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We affirm the district court's conclusion as to preemption under the Bank Act but hold that the per diem loan interest statute is not preempted by the DIDMCA. The purpose of the audits was to ascertain whether the mortgage subsidiaries had overcharged interest and provided unduly low estimates of certain classes of settlement fees. 3 WFHMI was licensed to engage in real estate lending activities under the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA). Wells Fargo's claims as to WFHMI are not moot. Even if they were. There is no distinction between WFHMI and NCMC pertinent to our disposition. 4 Specifically. Unless a person or transaction is excepted from a definition or exempt from licensure by a provision of this law or a rule of the commissioner. The licensing requirements referred to in the section are discussed in more detail below. 5 The CFLL does not apply to any loans made pursuant to the CRMLA. BOUTRIS Commissioner is the state official charged with enforcing those laws governing licensed home mortgage lenders. |
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OPINION/ORDER Appeals from a summary judgment dismissing its complaint against Franklin National Bank (the Bank) that was brought under the anti tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act (BCHA). The lower court found that there was insufficient evidence of the connection required by Section 1972 between the loan and the stock purchase. We find that a claim under Section 1972 requires proof that the extension of credit was actually conditioned on the bank's customer obtaining some other product or service from the bank or one of its subsidiaries. Highland was controlled by its principal shareholder. None of the individuals who succeeded to control of the company were involved in the loan transactions at issue here. All of the personnel who were involved. Aver that no tying condition was imposed as a The Honorable David M. Told him that Highland was interested in purchasing the stock of the Bank's holding company. The Bank's decision is reflected on a pre printed form entitled |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Joel V. With him on the brief was Bridget M. The interest income is susceptible to tax in both the United States and the foreign state. Where the relevant tax rate in the U.S. was 50% and in the foreign country was 25% with a 10% refund. Were the foreign rate 50% with no refund. Thus the two countries are on a see saw: When one country's tax revenue goes up. Or rather this iteration of this case (for it is the third time we have heard an appeal from the Tax Court concerning the same transaction). Is a peculiar elaboration of these simple principles.1 During the 1970s and early 1980s. In an The previous iterations of this case are. Becoming a middleman on the old loans (paying the creditors what was owed to them from the original borrowers and in turn receiving payments from the original borrowers) and. This appeal is about the U.S. tax treatment of that $139. We will refer to appellant as PNC even when speaking of the Riggs I through V period. 4 First. PNC's loans to the Central Bank were |
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OPINION/ORDER That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the |
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OPINION/ORDER Seeking to have a tribal judgment of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals declared null and void. The bank now argues that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction over the Longs' discrimination claim and that it was denied due process by the tribal proceedings. I. The Long Company is a family farming and ranching business incorporated under the laws of South Dakota and located on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. Who are both enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (Tribe). Who was not a tribal member. The parties disagree about whether his shares were distributed to Ronnie Long. 2 but it is undisputed that the Longs have majority ownership of the company. In his will Kenneth purported to devise his interest in the company and his land on the reservation to his four children. Noting that it has filed a creditor's claim against the estate and asserting that Kenneth's interest in the company was never distributed by the probate court. The estate was still in probate at the time of the district court judgement. 22 1 The bank is a South Dakota corporation with its principal place of business outside the reservation. |
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BRANCH V. U.S. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 50. Delete the sentence that starts with |
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OPINION/ORDER Because Weisman is now in prison and insolvent. We must interpret several provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code affecting who will bear the loss in the absence of his ability to pay. The first question we must resolve is whether a drawee bank must verify illegible payee indorsements on checks received from a depositary bank before the drawee bank is entitled to assert the negligent drawer defense under S 3 406. They failed to comply with reasonable commercial standards and therefore are precluded from asserting the 3 drawer's negligence as a defense under S 3 406. We reverse the District Court's order and hold that as a matter of law drawee banks are not obliged to review payee indorsements on checks received from depositary banks. Having determined that the drawee banks were not required to review the payee indorsements. We are persuaded. That the bank's position is better supported and that only the drawee bank's conduct is relevant when that bank is asserting the defense. We will remand to the District Court for factfinding to determine whether the insurers were negligent and whether that negligence substantially contributed to the forgeries within the meaning ofS 3 406. |
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OPINION/ORDER These eleven consolidated[fn1] actions were brought by concerned Pennsylvanians who believed that they were being charged excessive fees and interest on their credit cards and that these charges violated Pennsylvania consumer protection laws. None of the defendants are Pennsylvania lending institutions. The cases were all brought in Pennsylvania state courts and then removed by the defendants to the federal system.[fn2] These cases require that we resolve the conflict between state consumer protection law and federal banking law. We will first consider the district courts' holdings that removal jurisdiction was proper. We will reverse the district courts on this issue. The Supreme Court's conservative extension of the complete preemption doctrine and the application of the Third Circuit's two pronged test establish that federal jurisdiction is lacking in those cases in which the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints to allege federal claims. We will next consider claims particular to these actions. We will affirm the district court to the extent that the court held that plaintiffs' state law claims regarding late charges and over limit fees were substantively preempted. |
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UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201) That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the |
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OPINION/ORDER American State Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND The Bank was founded in 1887 under the name Economy Federal. Both marks are used in conjunction with the Bank's characteristic wheat emblem. HHF is an Illinois corporation in the mortgage lending service business. |
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OXY USA INC V. FERC |
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OPINION/ORDER Line 17 Amicus' name in the counsel listing is corrected to read |
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OPINION/ORDER FDIC's determination 2 was based on an improper interpretation of federal law and unsupported by the record. Enforce the order if the FDIC made no errors of law and if its findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial evidence is |
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OPINION/ORDER Those one third interests were devised. Luthy's name.(1) The dispute we encounter is between Mr. Luthy was to have absolute control over the Lease and was to periodically disburse profits to the beneficiaries. His will named Albuquerque National Bank as executor of his estate and as trustee of his testamentary trust. Luthy's estate was his one third interest in the Lease. N.A. is the successor in interest to Albuquerque National Bank and a series of other banks that served as Mr. We will generally refer to a lone entity. Luthy's original one third interest is now held in equal one ninth shares by Mr. The consideration for said lease was furnished and paid by myself and Paul Butt. Buckley being carried for a one third interest for workwhich he was to handle in connection with sale or development of the lease. It was agreed between Paul Butt. Buckley and myself that I was to have complete control and final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease. Said lease was made to me. I was to have complete control and final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease. . . . |
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OPINION/ORDER Brown was on brief. Were on brief and Kirby A. Was on supplemental brief. It held that there was no plain error warranting reversal. See United States v. Kenrick. |
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UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201) That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the |
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OPINION/ORDER The plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of certain Connecticut banking laws against Wachovia Mortgage on the ground that the state laws are preempted by the National Bank Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The district court also found that the warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause for the crimes of bank fraud. The district court ruled that the warrant was not stale. The warrant was not general in nature. Even if the omissions were included in the search warrant. Probable cause would have still existed. Defendants' claim was that they were impermissibly indicted for each transaction of the bank fraud scheme. The district court found that the argument was substantively incorrect. The district court rejected Defendants' contention that expert witness testimony was improperly admitted. The district court reaffirmed its decision to exclude Defendants' evidence that they were the target of selective prosecution. Defendants alleged that they were targeted because of their Arab descent in the post September 11 landscape. That selective prosecution was not a matter for the jury. Defendants' Business Practices Defendants are brothers who own various |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d). I. The facts of this case are undisputed. A foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 16. The Trustee filed two concurrent motions in the bankruptcy court that are the subject of this appeal. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Trustee and State Bank stipulated at the hearing that the amount of State Bank's claim was $148. That the sum of secured and unsecured claims was $207. There was substantial equity in the property in excess of State Bank's $148. Once the automatic stay was again in place. State Bank asserted that because the value of the property was $170. There was not sufficient equity in it to merit enjoining the foreclosure sale to allow the Trustee to liquidate the property. State Bank contended that the bankruptcy court's finding in the order lifting the stay that the Debtors acted in bad faith was res judicata in the current proceeding. The question of determining value is difficult because it seems to me that there are some questions of credibility on both appraisals. . . . . |
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OPINION/ORDER The fundamental question in this consolidated appeal is when title to funds held in trust passes to a beneficiary. That question is broad. An imprecise resolution might have far reaching implications for. How to resolve this fundamental question in this particular situation is not easy. That terminal was to belong to United Air Lines. The issues on appeal are whether the district court correctly affirmed (1) the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to United with respect to its prepetition reimbursement for work completed prepetition. A. The Bond Agreements The 1997 and 2001 bond agreements share the same basic structure and are governed by California law. The money in these funds is pledged for the repayment of principal and interest on the bonds and is held in trust for the bondholders. United is obligated to make these payments. Were designed to reimburse United for construction costs it incurred on the LAX project. Although the structure of the funds is similar. Unless United is in default in its payment obligations. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee. Wilk were on brief for appellant Col˘n. Was convicted of misapplication of bank funds (five counts). A farm called La Esmeralda ( |
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97-9016 -- PRESLAR V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 02/16/1999 Owned the ranch and was a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Which had been experiencing serious financial difficulties and whose interest was subordinate to the other banks. Moncor Bank's actions were designed to avoid foreclosure and recoup as much of its loan as possible. On July 12. The agreement expressly referred to the fact that Moncor Bank was financing the purchase. The Preslars were to pay fourteen annual installments of $66. The goal was to sell each cabin lot for approximately $16. There is no reference to this unique repayment arrangement in the loan documents. The arrangement is also discussed in an unsigned 1985 |
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A I TRD FIN INC V. PETRA INTL BNKG CORP |
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OPINION/ORDER I. FACTS Appellant MCC was an Alabama construction company co owned and managed by Appellants Dewey Hamaker and Linda Hamaker. MCC's principal client was Community Bank. Who was the CEO of Community Bank. Patterson was the CEO and chairman of the board of Community Bank. Larry Bishop was Community Bank's Vice President of Construction and Maintenance and served as an |
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WINSTAR V. U.S. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were retained by several banks to auction repossessed automobiles at the highest price and reimburse the proceeds. We consider whether there was sufficient 3 evidence to sustain the Defendants' convictions. We will affirm their judgments of conviction. Sentencing Guidelines (the |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an order of the District Court denying the motion of Appellant NBT Bank. At issue is a claim by NBT under Article 4 of Pennsylvania's Uniform Commercial Code ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 10. Cullen & Resnick were on brief for 604 Columbus Avenue. Gottlieb were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. *Of the Third Circuit. This is a case involving a failed loan transaction that well illustrates Polonius' advice. Among which were the property owned by the Trust itself and properties of the Trust's principal beneficiary. Of which Millicent Young was sole beneficiary. The Young Family Trust was a named plaintiff in the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy and district courts below. The Bank was declared unsound by Massachusetts banking officials. The FDIC was appointed 7 receiver. In February 1991 was substituted as defendant appellant in the district court. That the FDIC was entitled to raise the defenses available to it under the doctrine of estoppel established in D'Oench. The district court vacated that part of the bankruptcy court's judgment that was premised on the secret agreement by one of the Trust's principals to provide kickbacks to a Bank officer. |
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OPINION/ORDER Which are small loans with interest rates averaging 400 500% APR due on the next payday. This appeal presents the question of whether the State of Georgia may regulate a narrow segment of agency agreements between in state payday stores and out of state banks or whether the Georgia Act in issue is preempted by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. * Of the Third Circuit. (collectively |
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OPINION/ORDER Weidner was the president. Although the government's case was largely circumstantial. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the jury instructions were adequate. Weidner was the president. Wittig was an established Capital City Bank customer with substantial assets: a March 2001 financial statement on file with the bank reported a net worth of $33.921 million. He was the chairman of the board. Weidner that he was not capable of making this investment. Wittig of the Arizona project and asked if he was interested. Wittig responded that he thought that the investment was a great opportunity but had other projects that he wanted to pursue instead. Weidner did not have the $1.5 million he needed to make the investment. Adding that |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Torcise was one of the largest tomato farmers in South Florida. Torcise also was the sole shareholder of Growers. Were severely limited. $1.3 million. | ||
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EL-FADL HASSAN V. CTRL BNK JORDAN |
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OPINION/ORDER Superior Bank argued that its mortgage was equitably subrogated to a prior recorded mortgage. After the appeal was filed in this Court. Empire National Bank's mortgage was recorded on December 17. Less than a month after the mortgage was recorded. Which was subsequently withdrawn on October 27. Superior Bank was placed in receivership pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA.1 On November 15. The bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the trustee and avoided Superior Bank's mortgage.2 After that judgment was affirmed by the district court on appeal. Nearly two years after the FDIC was appointed as receiver. The bankruptcy court concluded that it could not rule on Superior Bank's jurisdictional challenge because it was. A collateral attack on the judgment that was pending on appeal before this Court. 2001 order was entered by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and is entitled |
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OPINION/ORDER Sought other employment and was listed as the proposed president within the charter application forms for a new bank. Because of the comments made by the president that were contained within the reports of bank examiners. The Missouri Commissioner of Finance refused to grant the new bank charter as long as Gaia was listed as president. Its communications with bank examiners are protected by either an absolute or qualified privilege entitling the bank to immunity from civil liability. Rockwood Bank also contends that the communications were not defamatory. Gaia contends that the district court's instructions to the jury on the issues of illegal age discrimination were not correct statements of the law. Jurisdiction of this court is proper under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3). At the time Gaia was hired. He was fifty five years old and had twenty one years of experience as a bank officer and fifteen of experience as a bank president. Gaia was considerably older and more experienced than the acting president of Rockwood Bank. |
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OPINION/ORDER These loans were evidenced by the following seven promissory notes: 1. a $185. This letter is at the heart of this action. The letter was signed by William Carlough. The following are the most significant provisions of the letter: (1) the |
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OPINION/ORDER Bank One was not liable for the depreciation in value of the shares it held as collateral for a loan to Johnson. Johnson also argues that summary judgment is inappropriate with regards to Bank One's counterclaims against him. The grant of summary judgment to the defendants is AFFIRMED. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of two loan transactions made by Bank One to plaintiffs Johnson and Geoff Layne ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Determining that (a) Deutsche Bank was on notice in August 1999 of adverse claims to defendants' securities. (b) all interests in defendants' securities that Deutsche Bank obtained after it was on notice of adverse claims are invalid. (c) all margin loans extended by Deutsche Bank after it was on notice of adverse claims are unsecured. Circuit Judge: A lender holding securities as collateral for a loan is protected from adverse claims to those securities if the lender |
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UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342) BACKGROUND
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UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342) BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER Was on supervised release from a previous bank robbery conviction when he committed the robbery at issue in this case. One of Sandles' arguments concerning his conviction is meritorious: the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial that the Michigan National Bank's deposits were insured by the FDIC at the time of the robbery. 40 42 (1988) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrial if an appellate court concludes that evidence was erroneously admitted and that there would have been insufficient evidence to convict without that improper evidence). Give me the money or I will make it worse for you. |
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OPINION/ORDER Others whose identities are presently unknown. Robertson is the beneficiary of a testamentary trust that names the Bank as trustee. She asserts that the district court erred in holding that a will provision authorizing the Bank to retain its own stock protected it from liability for failure to diversify trust assets when she failed to show that the Trustee acted either |
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OPINION/ORDER Pressman was a limited partner. Pressman alleges that the Bank is liable for breach of contract. Inman the founder of the Bank and president of the Bank's parent company is liable for procurement of breach of contract and civil conspiracy. I. The Inglehame Farm partnership was formed to accomplish one purpose: to purchase from different sellers several tracts of land in Williamson County. |
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OPINION/ORDER In many instances the dealership's president forged customers' signatures on leases that were fabricated or altered. 06 1144 & 06 2044 policy Cincinnati had issued to the Bank was similar but not identical to an outdated version of the standard Bankers Blanket Bond. Because the Cincinnati policy covers the Bank's losses and statutory interest was properly denied. I. Background First National Bank of Manitowoc is a national bank headquartered in Manitowoc. Kust would call the Bank or fax it the lease terms and wait for the Bank's approval.1 Once the lease was approved (sometimes several days later). Including a business 1 Manitowoc is a small community. So many of the |
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OPINION/ORDER Howerter contends that his conduct is not proscribed by the federal bank larceny statute. We will REVERSE.1 I. Howerter was the treasurer of the Wuerzbur g American High School Parent Teacher Student Association ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Knapp seeking damages and a permanent injunction imposing a constructive trust on funds Union Bank exchanged for IMOs that were determined to be counterfeit. The issues on appeal are whether Laos is personally liable for Union Bank's losses and whether the district court erred by granting the Union Bank parties' motion for summary judgment on the defamation. Was formed in November 2000. Laos and Knapp were to share ownership of KBG. Have a majority ownership. Before the transaction was complete. Day inspected the IMO and saw that it was purportedly drawn on Security Pacific National Bank. 000 was deposited into the KBG account and $1000 was deposited into the Transphor account. The KBG account was then debited $17. 000 was wired to a KBGAustria account at Erste Bank in Vienna and $7000 in cash was given to Laos. The Transphor account was debited $850. Which was wired to a Transphor account in South Africa. The KBG account at Union Bank was credited $1. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER BACKGROUND The following summary is based largely upon the district court's statement of facts and the parties' Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. Executed a Certificate of Acceptance in which he represented that the individual pieces of equipment received pursuant to the lease purchase agreement were in good working order. Were suitable for the County's purposes. Were unconditionally received for all purposes of the lease purchase agreement. Hogge acknowledged that |
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OPINION/ORDER No. 04 2004 Bianucci was the controller for Erickson Cosmetics Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Pavlovich now is trying to blame defendant National City Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed individual plaintiffs' claims for negligence and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the banks in which those plaintiffs' funds were deposited and insofar as it dismissed plaintiff Regal Trade's claim for fraud against defendant Sterling Bank. Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs are investors who were defrauded by lawyer David Schick in the early 1990s as part of his multi 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 million dollar Ponzi scheme. Many of Schick's victims have tried with varying degrees of success to recover some of their lost investments from Schick's estate in bankruptcy. This is the second time we have considered these investors' claims against these defendants. 540 U.S. 1012 (2003). concluded that there was an adequate basis for diversity 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over non diverse parties. A plaintiff must make a different showing of proximate cause one that is often more difficult to make when bringing suit under the RICO statute than when bringing a common law cause of action. |
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OPINION/ORDER We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed individual plaintiffs' claims for negligence and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the banks in which those plaintiffs' funds were deposited and insofar as it dismissed plaintiff Regal Trade's claim for fraud against defendant Sterling Bank. Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs are investors who were defrauded by lawyer David Schick in the early 1990s as part of his multimillion dollar Ponzi scheme. Many of Schick's victims have tried 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 with varying degrees of success to recover some of their lost investments from Schick's estate in bankruptcy. This is the second time we have considered these investors' claims against these defendants. 540 U.S. 1012 (2003). concluded that there was an adequate basis for diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over non diverse 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 parties. A plaintiff must make a different showing of proximate cause one that is often more difficult to make when bringing suit under the RICO statute than when bringing a common law cause of action. |
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OPINION/ORDER Fulbruge III Clerk involve at least two fraudulent schemes involving con artists who are now tucked away in jail. The Bank argues it is entitled to the money it loaned the purchaser. Which is proceeds in CNG's possession. CNG argues that the Bank is not entitled to these proceeds because it has unclean hands. Even before the sale was finalized. Montgomery and Berkich's scam was discovered before the sale was finalized but not before considerable sums of money had been looted. 2 Meanwhile. $4.5 million of which was paid to CNG in the purchase of Finity and Fi Scrip. Which were in fact nonexistent. Were to be used as collateral for his Bank loan. CNG was. The Bank alleges that CNG knew or should have known that Wilson could not obtain financing legitimately. At issue before the district court were the remaining claims by the Bank against CNG for misrepresentation. The district court granted the motion and made the 1) there was no misrepresentation by CNG following oral findings: to the Bank. 3) there was no joint venture between CNG and Wilson that would make CNG liable for Wilson's conduct. |
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OPINION/ORDER This appeal raises two FIRREA issues: (1) whether FIRREA bars the enforcement of severance pay agreements because they are |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Li Li Manatt is an American citizen of Chinese descent. Because Manatt's hostile work environment claim and one of her retaliation claims are time barred under Title VII. We must decide whether such claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Manatt overheard a conversation in which coworkers Barbara Green and Vincent Correia were laughing and saying |
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98-2073 -- FIRST SECURITY BANK V. PAN AMERICAN BANK -- 06/20/2000 She was assigned account number 033015363 and she designated the account |
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LONG V. BD. OF GOVERNORS |
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97-3073 -- WETHERILL V. BANK IV KANSAS -- 05/28/1998 Brown ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for FDIC. Motejunas & Doyle were on brief for Insurance Company of North America. Allowing forfeiture of coverage where notice to an insurer of a claim was late. At issue here is whether the notice due under a fidelity bond was late. The import here is whether a suit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Introduction and Facts This is an action to enforce a judgment. Was registered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on April 3. McMahan's efforts were largely unsuccessful. As is the standard procedure to challenge a bank's garnishment disclosure in Kentucky. P. 69 (a) (federal garnishments are to proceed according to the laws of the state in which the federal court sits). Finding that the Bank did not possess any Po Folks property on 1 date and the time the garnishment the orders were received. Discovery revealed that the reason the Bank did not satisfy the garnishment orders served by McMahan was because of the internal procedures of the Bank. The named accounts were |
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OPINION/ORDER Crockett were indicted for multiple crimes by a federal grand jury. A jury trial commenced in which all three defendants were tried together. Crockett was found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Was found not guilty of robbing two other banks with another defendant not involved in this appeal. Nos. 00 3617/3618/3741 All three defendants have appealed this verdict. Arguing that the evidence was not scientifically reliable and. Its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Arguing that the district court committed clear error when it granted the government's peremptory challenge against an African American who could have been seated on the jury panel. Is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Neither Rogers nor Warren are defendants in this case because they both entered into a plea agreement as part of a guilty plea to armed bank robbery. Rogers was dating Starla and he was planning on leaving for Disney World with her the next day. Rogers and Starla I This case is about a series of bank robberies that occurred in Ohio between September 1994 and November 1995. |
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OPINION/ORDER Regions seeks reversal on the ground that the district court erred in ruling that Regions's state law claims were preempted by Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code ( |
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GARGIULO V. G.M. SALES, INC. (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3646) The principal of the loan was payable on demand. During which Biada told Holland that NTG was considering increasing GMS's credit line. Holland testified that it was his impression that GMS was still current on its credit with NTG at the time of the conversation. Holland also asserted that it was not until a month later that Biada informed him that NTG had declined to increase GMS's line of credit. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER We vacate the judgment of forfeiture to the extent that it is premised on the vacated embezzlement convictions. Rumors of the Bank's financial success were. When bank examiners were subsequently unable to verify more than $515 million of loans reflected as assets on the Bank's books the Bank was closed. Because McConnell's assets were criminally obtained. It (i.e. the FDIC) was entitled to priority in obtaining restitution for its losses. CHERRY Cherry was McConnell's longtime companion. After the new accounts were opened. Cherry and Church also executed a fraudulent codicil to McConnell's will (the |
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OPINION/ORDER The dispute is an outgrowth of aggressive and expansionist banking f l o wi n g f rom the C ongressional liberalization in recent years of national banking laws. Citizens National Bank of Evans City (CNBEC) is a community bank founded in 1878 in Evans City. (CFG) is a subsidiary holding company of the Royal Bank of Scotland. CNBEC claimed that nine of these former Mellon Bank branches were located near CNBEC branches. In addition some of the branches in Butler County were located on the same streets. |
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GARGIULO V. G.M. SALES, INC. (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3646) The principal of the loan was payable on demand. During which Biada told Holland that NTG was considering increasing GMS's credit line. Holland testified that it was his impression that GMS was still current on its credit with NTG at the time of the conversation. Holland also asserted that it was not until a month later that Biada informed him that NTG had declined to increase GMS's line of credit. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The dispute is an outgrowth of aggressive and expansionist banking f l o wi n g f rom the C ongressional liberalization in recent years of national banking laws. Citizens National Bank of Evans City (CNBEC) is a community bank founded in 1878 in Evans City. (CFG) is a subsidiary holding company of the Royal Bank of Scotland. CNBEC claimed that nine of these former Mellon Bank branches were located near CNBEC branches. In addition some of the branches in Butler County were located on the same streets. |
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BAGGETT V. FIRST NAT'L BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:95 CV 684 FMH.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Provident Bank of Maryland was served with a summons and complaint in the case of Suriel Finance. Travelers also stated: As you are aware. The limit of insurance on this endorsement is $100. The total amount of damages sought by the plaintiff is in excess of your policy limits and. Any judgment rendered against you in excess of your policy limits will not be covered. The original insurer was a subsidiary of Aetna Life & Casualty Company. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP. 3 But a few weeks later Travelers wrote Provident Bank again and stated that it had reviewed the allegations and |
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BAGGETT V. FIRST NAT'L BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:95 CV 684 FMH.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Chen and Liu contend that the district court's instruction on the intent element of misapplication of bank funds was erroneous. They also argue that statements of non testifying codefendant Tu were admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause and that the evidence was insufficient to convict them. We also find that there was no Confrontation Clause violation. That the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to reach a guilty verdict. All three appellants were members of the Board and partners in Seven Giants. Tu were all experienced in business. The terms were supposed to be based on an independent appraisal created by Bradley & Co Appraisers. The lease |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the FDIC. A bridge bank is chartered by the FDIC. Is used by the FDIC as a transition bank until the FDIC can transfer the assets and liabilities of the failed bank to a healthy institution. The bridge bank is funded by the FDIC. The advantage of using a bridge bank is that it provides the FDIC with sufficient time to find a purchaser for failed banks. It is statutorily constrained to select the method which is |
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WALKER V. NATIONSBANK OF FL This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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WALKER V. NATIONSBANK OF FL This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER O'Neil and Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green Professional Association were on brief. P.A. were on brief. Raulerson & Middleton Professional Association were on brief. Pearson contends that the compromise settlement was the product of a fraud perpetrated upon the bankruptcy court by his former chapter 7 counsel. Who were represented by the Wadleigh Firm. The BWI condominium foreclosure sale was followed by a succession of lawsuits. No mention was made of any conflict of interest claim Pearson may have held against the Wadleigh Firm. There is no conflict of interest which prevents [me] from acting as Special Counsel to the Trustee . . . since the Special Counsel is not being retained to represent the Trustee in connection with the claims asserted against Bedford (sic) Woods and First N.H. The application to appoint Gannon special counsel to the chapter 7 estate was approved by the bankruptcy court on the following day in an ex parte order. Its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Nor have we found. The |
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OPINION/ORDER We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 14).1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 The unlawful activities whose proceeds were concealed or promoted were mail fraud. Also charged with conspiracy in the indictment were John Mamone. That charge was dismissed before trial. Is not relevant to this appeal. 2 1 of Count 14 explained that the purposes and objects of the conspiracy were: (a) to conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds of mail and wire fraud. Silvestri was charged in 30 substantive counts with money laundering. The essential facts in this complex fraud case are these. Buccinna and Weiss were also charged in the same substantive counts. Was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. 3 3 2 opportunities. Tang was left with a small clerical staff. |
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MCMILLIAN V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendants were convicted on various counts arising from a scheme to defraud a South Dakota bank. of all defendants. In First Federal Savings Bank (First 1989 the federal Office of Thrift Federal) is a now defunct bank that had its main office in Rapid Supervision (OTS) audited the bank and determined that it had a 2 large capital deficit and inadequate management. Federal was under the close supervision of OTS. It became Under the agency's One of the bank's clear that the bank would have to be sold. to be more attractive to potential buyers. it had purchased some years earlier. direction. The bank took steps to increase its liquidity in order assets targeted for sale was a portfolio of real estate loans that These loans. Were secured by commercial properties. |
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OPINION/ORDER Judge) vacating restraining notices and orders of attachment imposed with respect to an account of the Banco Central de la República Argentina at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the ground that those assets were protected from attachment by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. They contend that they are entitled to attach $105 million of BCRA's funds held in the FRBNY Account (the |
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MCMILLIAN V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Arising out of the making of a series of |
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GROSSMAN V. NATIONSBANK (9/6/2000, NO. 00-10730) In pertinent part (the printed form headings are underlined):
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GROSSMAN V. NATIONSBANK (9/6/2000, NO. 00-10730) In pertinent part (the printed form headings are underlined):
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OPINION/ORDER 000 in cash and checks from her employer (the First Union National Bank) was an aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Jerome Wayne Johnson | 03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM | 07 12 2004 |
| In re: Will C. Bowman | 02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E | 08 13 2003 | |
| In re: Will C. Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. | |||
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OPINION/ORDER Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman | 02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E | 08 13 2003 |
| In re: Will C. Cohen | 03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM | 07 08 2004 | |
| In re: Will C. | |||
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the District Court in all respects. Are straightforward. Was apprehended by police shortly thereafter. Although Williams initially denied involvement in the bank robbery and explained his flight from the police as a reaction to having an illegal gun in the car he was apprehended with a paper bag containing $822. [H]e was in another neighborhood other than his own so he had carried it the night before so he had had it with him. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: At issue today is whether the district court erred in dismissing. We conclude that the district court did indeed have subject matter jurisdiction. Have various usury laws that generally prohibit such high interest loans. No one doubts that when so called |
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BARRON BANCSHARES, INC., ET AL V. U.S. Et al. Of counsel on the brief were Mark J. Argued for plaintiff appellant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. On the brief were John V. Argued for defendant appellee. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Cl. 310 (2002). The |
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OPINION/ORDER A national bank is a citizen of each and every state in which it has a branch. Bank One immediately removed the case to Horton moved to remand arguing that federal district court. there was no federal jurisdiction because complete diversity of citizenship was lacking. It was |
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OPINION/ORDER Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellant. Aisenberg and Williams & Grainger were on brief for appellees. The warehouse covered 10 acres and the sale price was $7 million. The warehouse was then under lease to a tenant. It was intended that Fedders would make the roof repairs at its own expense. It 2 2 was intended. (The stated figures are approximate. As there were other minor adjustments involved in the closing.). It would be simpler to have the bank retain $250. Fedders was paid the $6.7 immediately due to it (the $7 million purchase less the $50. For reasons that are not explained. The bank appears to have recorded a draw down on the loan of only $6. The bridge bank was itself dissolved and the FDIC became its receiver. Was substituted for Liberty. 4 4 In April 1992. Was partly consolidated with the new Fedders action. The court found that Fedders was not a |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. With whom Edwards & Angell were on brief for appellee. Seeks to collect on a note that was part of a written settlement agreement containing a clause that precluded oral modifications. Interposes what he claims was a subsequent oral modification of the contract. Found that the oral modification was in fact agreed upon and was an enforceable contract under Massachusetts law. The court concluded therefore that the debtor was not liable to the bank. Holding that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. We affirm the court's conclusion that the oral modification was enforceable. This note was secured in part by a mortgage on a marina located in Falmouth. Who was a general partner of Pier 37. While the case was pending. The agreement contained a clause stating that it was complete and integrated. Krock first discussed this side agreement with Will Balthrope. 000 was $605. The court's decision turned on its finding that Krock was entirely credible in his testimony regarding the side agreement. |
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OPINION/ORDER We will reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss Fasano's Complaint. Federal Reserve Banks Because the nature of Federal Reserve Banks is at issue in this case. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( |
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02-6127 -- GUARANTEE STATE BANK V. FARM SERVICE AGENCY -- 06/04/2003 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 7 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER A national bank is a citizen of each and every state in which it has a branch. Bank One immediately removed the case to Horton moved to remand arguing that federal district court. there was no federal jurisdiction because complete diversity of citizenship was lacking. It was |
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OPINION/ORDER Arkansas (Bank) appeals the district court's order affirming the decision of the Rural Business Cooperative Service (the Agency)2 Mike Johanns is automatically substituted for his predecessor. The Rural Business Cooperative Service is part of the Rural Development Agency. Which is part of the United States Department of Agriculture. 2 1 denying the Bank's loss claim for loans guaranteed by the Agency. The purpose of these loans was. The Co op was delinquent in loan payments in the amount of $447. The accounting report also indicated Co op members made contributions in the form of notes receivable totaling $1.3 million that were used as collateral for the Co op loans. A portion of the notes receivable had been written off and some were past due. Finding the Bank was negligent in servicing the loans. |
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OPINION/ORDER Should form the continuation of the paragraph that currently is at page 6. Were on brief for appellant Penobscot Indian Nation and third party defendants appellees. Were on brief for appellee and cross appellant Key Bank of Maine. Were on brief for appellee Michael Marcello. Taintor & Abbott was on brief for defendants appellees and cross appellants. P.A. was on brief for defendant appellee and cross appellant. Hewey with whom Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon was on brief for appellees Consumers Water Company. It is not apparent from the record that the results of the investigation were set out in writing or were made known to the public. It is clear. The complaint alleged that the two Settlement Agreements signed by PIN and the Appellees were void because they did not receive the Secretary of the Interior's approval pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant bank accepted drafts drawn on plaintiff containing the direction |
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OPINION/ORDER The guard was patrolling in front of the bank near the parking lot. Strobehn was eventually apprehended and charged with armed bank robbery with forced accompaniment in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a). He was convicted and now contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the forced accompaniment charge under § 2113(e) because the asportation was insubstantial. Which is what § 2113(e) requires. STROBEHN 11959 [1] Strobehn maintains that forced accompaniment should not have been submitted to the jury in light of evidence that the security guard was moved for only a few seconds. What proves a forced accompaniment is an issue on which we have not yet directly spoken. [2] We have dubbed subsection (e) a |
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OPINION/ORDER Klickstein & Levy were on brief. Procter & Hoar LLP were on brief. The district court dismissed the suit after reviewing the trust agreement and concluding that the trustee was not subject to ERISA liability as a fiduciary or co fiduciary in respect to the harms alleged. The Bank wrote to Hawthorne stating that: Our appraiser is prepared to begin his review on Monday. If he is not permitted to begin his review by Friday. We believe that we have no recourse but to seek the advice of the Department of Labor as to our concerns about Hawthorne's instructing us to continue to report the real estate at values supplied by Hawthorne as investment manager. |
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OPINION/ORDER Willard & Redding was on brief for appellant. Gordon and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellee. Told him at the time he was hired that he would not become wealthy working for the Bank. Would have a job for life unless he committed a criminal act against the Bank. Providing administrative services relating 2Goldman recollects that similar representations were repeated by various supervisors throughout the course of his employment with the Bank. to the Bank's custodial security accounts.3 In 1989. 119 positions were eliminated. Determined that it was necessary to eliminate three of the fifteen positions in the Custody Administration Unit. Keane explained that the twenty four year old was suspected of misusing a corporate credit card. The thirty seven year old and Goldman were considered the 3The Bank is a custodian of securities for various clients. Keane represents that Goldman was responsible for the fewest customer accounts. All three positions were permanently eliminated and Goldman's duties were absorbed by the remaining employees in the Custody Administration Unit. |
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OPINION/ORDER Senior Circuit Judge: We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. ORDER This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Each Loan Status Report gave HLI the false impression that the funds originated from legitimate medical businesses as required by the written loan agreement between MPS and HLI. 2 (2) In the third sentence of the second full paragraph on page 14 of the slip opinion replace the term |
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OPINION/ORDER The primary question for this court is whether to reverse a jury's finding of a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Merchants & Planters Bank was founded in 1890 in Clarendon. Betty Simpson was hired by the Bank in 1977. Simpson alleged that she was paid less than J. That his job was equal to hers. Which are performed under similar working conditions.' |
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OPINION/ORDER Which it claims were devalued by the negligence of the Trust's Servicer. We will affirm. Facts The Trust was created on August 31. Defendant Republic's duties as servicer are defined by a Sales and Servicing Agreement ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Was surrendered HUYNH v. Among those banks were the three banks party to the instant appeal: Citibank. Claiming that the action was timebarred by the New York statute of limitations governing claims arising from contract and fraud. No other evidence of foreign law was offered before the district court. We must determine whether |
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OPINION/ORDER The district court1 concluded the funds flowing through the loan manager account were subject to garnishment and thus found the Bank failed to answer truthfully the interrogatories accompanying the writ of garnishment. The Note extended a one million dollar line of credit to Southwestern and stated the line of credit was only to be used for working capital. Southwestern established a commercial checking account (the loan manager account) on which Southwestern was the sole signatory. The Bank stated it did not hold any of Southwestern's property in its checking account and again stated the balance in the loan manager account was zero. The proceeds were Southwestern's property. The proceeds were subject to garnishment. The loan manager account was not a special deposit account. The Bank contends (1) the funds dispersed from the line of credit were not subject to 3 garnishment under the Arkansas Code. (2) the loan manager account was a special deposit account immune from garnishment. Proceeds From Southwestern's Line of Credit The Arkansas Code allows a judgment creditor to issue a writ of garnishment to any person the judgment creditor believes |
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OPINION/ORDER Eisenberg was the victim of a fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated by Douglas Walter Reid ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This appeal raises questions concerning the scope of the fiduciary duties of a plan trustee under ERISA when the trustee is resigning. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as this appeal is from a final order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The material facts are not in dispute. Ream was an employee of JLC Construction Co. Ream was a participant in the plan with a 100% vested account. The trustee's duties were limited to receiving contributions. The trustee could be liable for its actions |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant was sentenced to ninety six months' imprisonment some eighteen months above the Sentencing Guideline recommendation and ordered to pay $80. Defendant's first payment obligation to Bridgeview was due January 1998. These dividends were Defendant's sole source of income. Bainbridge informed Defendant that the loan reversal was not possible. A title was issued on January 12. Those loan officers both stated that because the amount of the loan was within Defendant's lending authority. To put Defendant's initials on the paperwork to signify that Defendant was in fact the loan officer of record. This distribution was recorded on several official bank forms as well as a nonstandard memorandum created by Mr. Machala for the express purpose of detailing the loan proceed distribution |
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OPINION/ORDER Which is our only source of 2 No. 03 3875 facts. Stamped each check PAY TO THE ORDER OF UNION PLANTERS BANK FOR DEPOSIT ONLY LINCOLN FIDELITY ESCROW ACCOUNT 074014213 0001266190 The number at the bottom is not Smith's. Bank account number (anyway his account is in another bank). Thus the check was not endorsed by the payee. The money was transferred to that account from the plaintiff's bank account when Union Planters Bank presented the plaintiff's check to her bank for payment. Was then checked out from Lincoln Fidelity's account to various of the schemers. No. 03 3875 3 The plaintiff's theories of the bank's liability are two: conversion and negligence. Obviously an endorsement signed not by the payee but instead by the person to whom the check is endorsed is ineffective to transfer rights over the check from the payee to the endorsee and thus to the bank in which the endorsee deposits the check. So Union Planters Bank was not a holder in due course of the money when it arrived and was deposited in the bank. |
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OPINION/ORDER FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 3 mary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Approximately twenty of these checks are stolen. Six checks were stolen from Dallas. Postal inspectors informed Wal Mart officials that the Dallas thefts were not part of an organized scheme but were independent criminal acts. Was stolen from Dallas in late 2000. A copy of the check was passed from the FRB to Wachovia at the time of presentment. 1 4 WACHOVIA BANK v. Their suspicions were aroused by his deposit of over $500. A hold was placed on the funds. The highest balance it had ever carried was $8. Who informed Lee that the check was |
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N:\DOCS\E-DOS\8-5\04-3000.RODGERS V. US BANK.OPN.FINAL.RWG.WPD Bank's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination. Was employed at the Picture Hills Branch of U.S. Bank's policy prohibiting employees from processing transactions on their own accounts and its policy on progressive discipline.2 Rodgers was trained on the proper way to do a |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an insurance coverage dispute arising from a fraud that caused a loss to the Private Bank & Trust Company. When the funds were cleared for use. The fraud was eventually discovered. The perpetrator of the fraud in this case was not present in the bank at the time he made the telephone withdrawal which caused the bank's loss. The bond's fraud coverage is expressly limited to losses that occur when the perpetrator of the fraud is present on the premises of the insured. We decline to adopt a rule of construction that would expand the bond's |
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CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357) Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site. Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a |
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OPINION/ORDER Mathias Pizano and Jessica Pizano are brother and sister. Celia Pizano is their mother. Jessica and Celia were convicted on all counts of a twenty count indictment. Jessica and Celia were convicted of the following: Mathias 2 was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (cocaine and marijuana) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846. Jessica was convicted of three counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Counts 8. Celia was convicted of five counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 2. Related facts will be grouped accordingly. A. In General Jessica is the mother of five children. Mathias's reported income in 1991 and 1992 was $2. The restaurant was in operation from early 2000 until 4 the end of 2001. It was not profitable. Jessica and Celia were living in Moline. Which was jointly owned by Mathias. Mathias was hosting a party for a drug dealer who had been sentenced and would be leaving for prison. Were present at the party. The police told Jessica that drugs were found at Mathias's house and that they were looking for him. |
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CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357) Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site. Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank had recently hired Frawley as the leader of a new management team that was working to improve the Bank's regulatory and financial situation after several tumultuous years under the prior management. Community Bank was operating under a cease and desist order and heightened scrutiny from regulatory authorities. In which he complained that the Bank's management was resisting his recommendations. Frawley and the six other board members have stated that Trotter never told them about Lippert's communications with the FDIC. Trotter was untroubled by Lippert's disclosures to the FDIC and Trotter revealed that he was considering discussing some of his own concerns with the FDIC and/or state 3 banking authorities. Lippert contends that the August 19 and August 20 memoranda were nearly identical. Six of the eight directors of Community Bank were present during the discussion after the August 21 Audit Committee meeting. The directors who were present told Frawley that they would support whatever action he took with regard to Lippert's employment. |
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OPINION/ORDER Thereby lowering production and increasing pay outs at the |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Anthony Zenone was convicted by a jury of two counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (f) and two counts of using and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Anthony Zenone was sentenced to 408 months of imprisonment. Michael Zenone was convicted of two counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 2113(a) and (f) and was sentenced to 144 months of imprisonment. Was included in an affidavit for a search warrant so as to establish probable cause. 2 hearing. Was robbed by two men. They were dressed in dark business suits and wore presidential masks. Both men were armed with shotguns. This bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This bank's deposits were also insured by the FDIC. Which was visible on the bank surveillance cameras and was recognizable by the victims. That he was willing and able to kill anybody who came after him. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Dossett is a resident of Holdredge in Phelps County. Dossett attended a public meeting held by the Phelps County R 6 School District where the issue of merging with the Loomis School District was discussed. The Loomis School District was one of the Bank's largest deposit accounts. Was upset by Dossett's remarks at the meeting. Also informed Nelsen that he was offended by Dossett's comments and would not be comfortable with her waiting on him as a teller. The Bank was on the verge of losing two large depositors and loan customers. Nelsen further advised Dossett that her employment was terminated because of |
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OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs Appellants ( |
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BRADSHAW V. UNITED STATES Jurisdiction in this court is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1291.2 I Plaintiff Appellee J. Larry Bradshaw was president of Heritage Building Products (HBP) during the last quarter of 1985 and the first three quarters of 1986. HBP was wholly owned by Heritage Corporation. Bradshaw was president of Heritage Corporation and owned 13% of its stock. Bradshaw was also on the board of directors of both corporations. We entered an order directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether we have jurisdiction |
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OPINION/ORDER McAllister and Cuddy Bixby were on brief for appellant. Peres and Riemer & Braunstein were on brief for appellee. Among the Seventeen Notes was a $290. All citations of statutory sections are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Bank claimed to have a |
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OPINION/ORDER The purchase was partially financed through a $200. Bank personnel came to believe that Audio Odyssey was failing to perform its duties under the loan and Agreement. Hand delivered a letter to Dincer stating that the Bank was accelerating the loan. Contending that Audio Odyssey was not in default. 3 The Bank was not persuaded. That (i) Audio Odyssey was delinquent in its loan payments and other obligations. (ii) the Bank was entitled to possession of the collateral under the Agreement. (iii) immediate action was necessary because the collateral might be destroyed. Or fraudulently transferred (Bank personnel had told Hofmann that an |
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OPINION/ORDER Are preempted by section 36 of the National Bank Act (NBA). I. Bank One is a national bank organized under the NBA. Its main office is located in Salt Lake City. Seeking a declaration that provisions of the Iowa EFTA restricting out of state banks from operating ATMs within Iowa are preempted by the NBA and praying for the issuance of a preliminary and permanent injunction. Finding that the challenged provisions of Iowa law were not preempted and concluding that Bank One was unlikely to succeed on any of its constitutional claims. 649 (8th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a district court grant of a preliminary injunction and granting a permanent injunction because all issues were questions of law). We must determine whether a permanent injunction is appropriate. 3 In determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. The balance between this harm and the harm to the other party if the injunction is granted. The standard for granting a permanent injunction is essentially the same as for a preliminary injunction. |
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OPINION/ORDER P.A. were on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. Patricia Nelson Reade and Verrill & Dana were on brief for appellee. The facts of this case are straightforward. It appears that Maine Savings Bank was in financial difficulty when the CDs were sold to the Lawsons and that the interest rate offered was a favorable one. Maine Savings Bank was declared insolvent on February 1. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed receiver. Or consent with respect to such transfer. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Defendant Rachel Jernigan was arrested on November 10. After Jernigan was placed in custody and awaiting trial. Two more area banks were robbed by a woman whose description bore an uncanny physical resemblance to hers: both women were roughly five feet tall. Jernigan's counsel argued at trial simply that his client was misidentified. The jury was not persuaded. Jernigan was convicted of bank robbery on March 23. We disagree with both the original panel and the district court and hold that the suppressed evidence was material to Jernigan's guilt.2 The district court's decision is hereby reversed. Arizona was robbed by a short. JERNIGAN between the FBI agent investigating the bank robbery and a postal inspector who was investigating Jernigan in connection with some shoplifting incidents at a local post office. No other eyewitnesses were shown the photospread or any other photographs of Jernigan until five or six months later. Two other bank robberies were committed one on November 28. One bank was located across the street from one of the banks allegedly robbed by Jernigan. |
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OPINION/ORDER Seeking a declaratory judgment that its Corporate Finance Division's 96 1844 and 96 1874 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. business is incidental to its banking business. Arguing that the agreement is unenforceable because Norwest's actions under the agreement were not incidental to the business of banking. That Norwest's acts were beyond its powers because it did not obtain prior approval from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to enter into the agreement. Even if the agreement is enforceable. Norwest cross appeals arguing that it is entitled to prejudgment interest on the award granted by the district court. Sween Corporation is a Minnesota corporation that develops and manufactures skin care products for the medical market. Norwest is a national bank established in Minneapolis. This division is not a separate legal entity. The common stock of Norwest is owned by Norwest Corporation. They do not have standing to appeal on any issue except for their dismissal. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because the district court did not commit plain error in imposing this sentence and because the sentence was reasonable. Bryan Oglesby then approached one of the tellers who was lying on the floor and demanded the keys to the vault. Another teller who was also on the floor. Oglesby grabbed her arm and pressed the gun he was carrying directly into her back as he escorted her to the vault area. Oglesby pressed the gun directly into the back of the teller's head as she opened the combination lock of the safe that was located inside the vault. Oglesby then emptied the money that was in the safe into a bag and ordered the teller back to the area where the other employees were still lying on the floor. As the teller responded that she was trying to comply. Defendant 2 grabbed the teller by the hair and the gun he was carrying discharged. The teller was injured with a gunshot wound to her head. When the supervisor indicated that she did not have the combination. As she was opening the vault. Who was in her office. |
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01-1204 -- REKSTAD V. FIRST BANK SYSTEM INC. -- 02/12/2002 We affirm because we find that Rekstad failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether First Bank's proffered reason for not permitting Rekstad return to work was unworthy of belief.
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UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (2/23/1998, NO. 92-2872) All convictions and sentences WILL BE REVERSED AND VACATED. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Von Struensee was on brief for appellant.
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BROWN REGINA C V. BRODY KENNETH D With him on the briefs was Michael P. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the district court. We affirm the district court's order granting sum mary judgment for the Bank because Brown has failed to allege any legally cognizable adverse employment action and because her attempts to discredit the Bank's account of its employment decisions as a web of pretextual artifice is thor oughly unconvincing. I Brown |
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UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (2/23/1998, NO. 92-2872) All convictions and sentences WILL BE REVERSED AND VACATED. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER This breach of contract and fraud action is brought by real estate owners against the Resolution Trust Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Schnall had failed to show that he was misled by the advertised rates. This holding is buttressed by the letter brief of the Federal 2 Reserve Board of Governors. The Bank contends that even if there was a violation. Schnall may not recover statutory damages because he failed to establish that he was misled by or relied on the advertised rates or that he was financially harmed by the TISA violation. That he was misled by the advertised APY. Or that he was financially harmed by the TISA violations. We therefore conclude that Schnall is entitled to partial summary judgment on the question of liability and will remand for a determination of damages. The advertisements stated that |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the petitioner's conviction. The government elicited the following testimony from a bank teller who was working at the first bank branch at the time of its robbery: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Okay. Where were you working? Were you and was that located at 4595 West Charleston Avenue. It was. Is that particular bank in the state and federal jurisdiction of Nevada? It is. WARE 10131 Q: And is it insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation? It is. The signs are posted but it's also all banks are federally insured. A: Q: A: The government also elicited the following testimony from a teller who was working at the second bank branch at the time of its robbery: Q: All right. Were you working at the First Interstate Bank at 2100 West Charleston Boulevard. That bank in that area where that is. Is that correct? . . . is the your bank . . . insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation? Arguing for the first time that the government failed to establish at trial the element of the offense that the bank deposits were insured by FDIC at the time of the robberies. |
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OPINION/ORDER He also argues that his sentence was impermissibly enhanced based on judge found facts in violation of United States v. The district court should have taken into account his civil settlement with the bank he defrauded. None of these arguments is availing. I The facts of this case are rooted in an ill fated relationship between a banker of questionable ethics and Waldroop. Mayfield was an Executive Vice President at First State Bank. Mayfield was also involved in an enormous fraudulent loan scheme with a local businessman named Larry Paul that would soon be discovered. He was a respected banker and a man on the rise in the bank. Was successful. He was also well known in the literally fast paced world of competitive midget car racing. Mayfield recruited Waldroop to join the bank's |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Michael P. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the district court. We affirm the district court's order granting sum mary judgment for the Bank because Brown has failed to allege any legally cognizable adverse employment action and because her attempts to discredit the Bank's account of its employment decisions as a web of pretextual artifice is thor oughly unconvincing. I Brown |
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OPINION/ORDER With her on the brief were Ann S. Among these is the power to remove a bank officer from his position and to bar him from further participation in the operations of a federally insured depository institution. The case was forwarded to the FDIC's Board of Directors for a final decision. The principal issue for review is Landry's argument that the FDIC's method of appointing ALJs violates the 1 In the same proceedings. Lewis's petition for review is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. First Guaranty was in serious financial trouble. That it was still a candidate for near term failure. Found that Landry and his two associ ates were the incorporators of Pangaea Corporation. The board was misled because the plan was |
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OPINION/ORDER He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Department of Trade and Economic Development (MDTED) is the Minnesota agency in charge of disbursing these HUD funds. (CDI) was a Minnesota corporation established by two brothers. CDI would have to prove that the money from the private financing had been spent on CDI equipment and that the City of Clarkfield would be in the first security position on the CDI equipment. 2 The Field brothers proceeded to seek private financing for CDI. Because the City of Clarkfield was out of the bank's service area (90 miles away). CDI was a new company. Who was to run the operation. Minnewaska was a holding and leasing company for CDI. Oppegard and the Field brothers were convicted of conspiring to defraud the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The loan papers were signed by Gjerde. 000 of the bank loan was left in $173. The money was never available for use by CDI. Stating: This loan is being granted and security looked at only on the basis that the proceeds of this loan never leave[] accounts that have been set up at Bonanza Valley State Bank and security that is offered for them. |
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OPINION/ORDER |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that there was a sufficient connection between Gillett and the bank to justify the embezzlement charge. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Merchants who bank with Bank of America and have holiday or weekend deposits take their bank bags with the enclosed checks and cash to a night depository. If the following Monday is a bank holiday. Each Brinks |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that there was a sufficient connection between Gillett and the bank to justify the embezzlement charge. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Merchants who bank with Bank of America and have holiday or weekend deposits take their bank bags with the enclosed checks and cash to a night depository. If the following Monday is a bank holiday. Each Brinks |
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OPINION/ORDER Brown was supervised by the Banking Center Manager and evaluated pursuant to various objective criteria. Brown was rated as |
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RUPP V. MARKGRAF The cashier's check was purchased using Cowboy funds and it stated on its face that it was purchased by Cowboy Enterprises. This address was not Cowboy's business address. Davis was living at the time. The cashier's check was delivered to the Markgrafs. Which was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee brought this adversary proceeding in 1993 alleging that the transfer was fraudulent and seeking its avoidance and recovery against the Markgrafs under 11 U.S.C. 544(b) & 550. Was the |
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OPINION/ORDER Willard & Redding was on brief for appellant. Gordon and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellee. Ericson represented that Frankina would have a job for life unless he committed a criminal act against the Bank. Frankina became aware of no employee who was terminated except for criminal conduct. 119 positions were eliminated. Determined that it was necessary to eliminate two of the seven positions in the Control Unit to eliminate functional redundancy. That Frankina was the least qualified employee in the Unit. Was least well suited to perform the work duties in the reconfigured organization. Four of the five Control Unit employees who were retained were younger than Frankina.1 On May 19. Demone told Frankina that job applications from laid off employees would be given preferential treatment in 1One retained employee was forty nine years old at the time of the reorganization. Two were forty one. One was thirty seven. One was thirty one. Frankina suggests that the forty nine year old was not similarly situated because he served in a managerial capacity. 4 the Bank's hiring process. |
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OPINION/ORDER Lawrence Seidman ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Alleging that the property which was levied upon was held by her and Donald Gaster (the |
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OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. I. BACKGROUND Certain facts are not in dispute. Martinez is a former mortgage loan officer at (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. Martinez and she was the subject of a federal investigation into suspected embezzlement from the Bank. Again invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege: 1) |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on four of the five counts of misapplication of bank funds and order an acquittal as to those counts. The jury could have found the following. Was $555. Monserrate Usera and her sister Ana Usera were the first two. Although Monserrate Usera understood that Col˘n's obligation to the family was not due until the spring of 1988. The obligation for which was hers alone. Ana Usera also decided to contact Col˘n in an effort to obtain money to pay off her current debts since it was taking such a long time to complete the sale of the farm. Blasini was authorized to approve unsecured loans up to $50. The partial assignments were signed by both Blasini and Col˘n but were not included in the loan file. The stated purpose for the loans was personal. The means of repayment was the sale of a farm. Although the loan documentation was introduced at trial. Carmen Maduro died before trial and her testimony was never taken. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were either makers or personal guarantors. Whose president was Philip Burgess Jr. Was the principal obligor on three notes. 00 0.1 It is stipulated that Burgess Sr. Orders for involuntary chapter 7 relief were entered against Burgess Jr. and BEMC in April. Were secured by real estate mortgages on which the Bank foreclosed leaving a $35. The district court affirmed on the ground that the Bank had |
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OPINION/ORDER The district court denied the bank's motion for judgment as a matter of law. claims it is entitled to judgment. The bank was a creditor of the feedlot. The bank was generally aware of how the feedlot conducted its business and would periodically inspect the collateral offered to secure its loan. Part of this collateral was the feedlot's inventory of cattle. The check was When WLS redeposited the check. It was In the meantime. This second check was also returned and marked |
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OPINION/ORDER 1998) *Judge Sloviter was Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at the time this appeal was argued. Concurring: Although it is a close question. I also conclude that a downward departure is not authorized by S 5K2.13 in this case. S 5K2.13 is not controlled by the scope of the phrase |
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OPINION/ORDER Many employers are required to withhold various taxes from the wages of their employees. Which the employers hold in trust until the taxes are paid over to the federal government. 902.24 that was paid to satisfy an assessment made against the late Willard R. It is not disputed that Bell was the largest stockholder (51.5% of shares) and chief operating No. 02 3295 Bell v. Nor is it disclaimed that Bell essentially ran the company on a day to day basis. Dyac was responsible for withholding federal wage. Dyac was struggling financially at and following its acquisition by Bell. The issue of who controlled Dyac's funds is paramount. As the same are set forth on the Budget. The timing of Bank One's cessation of trust fund loan advances is in dispute. 000 in FICA trust fund taxes that were in arrears for most of January. Denied the request because Bank One had already lent Dyac money for payroll taxes in January and this additional request represented an overadvance that was not covered by the Forbearance Agreement. |
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OPINION/ORDER The police were called. 058 was missing from Smith's and Bollmeyer's teller drawers. She could not tell if funds were available for withdrawal. He approached Bank One teller Christina Will. As Will complied with his request. Pointed it at Will. After Will provided Perry with the money. Will also gave him a dye pack. Agents then discovered that Perry was living in Columbus. Agents discovered that Perry was carrying an empty gun holster and a 717 Credit Union ATM card in his wallet. Perry was separately tried and convicted in the Northern District of Ohio for armed bank robbery and using a firearm in a crime of violence. Perry was sentenced to serve forty one months incarceration on Count I (violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d)) and eighty four months on Count II (using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Perry was then transferred to the Southern District of Ohio on December 16. The district court held that evidence of the Bank One robbery was admissible on the issue of the robber's identity. |
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OPINION/ORDER With whom Rossell Rentas & Rabell M ndez was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Which was assigned to the Commissioner simultaneously with its purchase. The district court held that the FDIC properly relied on the books and records of an insolvent institution in making its determination that the Commissioner was not entitled to deposit insurance. The sole issue before us is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment against the Commissioner in his action against the FDIC in its corporate capacity.1 For the reasons stated herein. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The facts of this case are undisputed. Girod was not a party to the assignment. Another document was executed on the same date. The Certificate was itself given to. Was due on April 26. Was |
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OPINION/ORDER 1998) *Judge Sloviter was Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at the time this appeal was argued. Concurring: Although it is a close question. I also conclude that a downward departure is not authorized by S 5K2.13 in this case. S 5K2.13 is not controlled by the scope of the phrase |
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MURPHY BRUCE G. V. FDIC |
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OPINION/ORDER O:\Slip\WP\2006\05 3103 Rattler15a.odl.wpd | ||
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OPINION/ORDER She contends that she established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her relationship or association with her disabled newborn child was a motivating factor in the Bank's decision to eliminate her position and effectively terminate her employment. She argues that summary judgment was therefore improperly granted on several of her claims.1 For the reasons discussed below. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Background The following is a summary of the background facts as set forth in the district court's summary judgment order. When she was promoted to Senior Vice President (VP) of Operations and Information Systems. She was promoted to Executive VP of Retail Banking. Cherpes was engaged by the Bank to help stabilize and reengineer the Operations Department. Strate was granted permission to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank was dissatisfied with these recommendations. Alleging that it was entitled to the return of a retainer it had paid JMFA. Summary 2 judgment was therefore inappropriate on that claim. We will affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's decision. Our summary of the facts is brief. [JMFA] will identify each recommendation's impact on the bank[] . . . [. I]dentify those recommendations that are approved[. Which have been approved by management for implementation. Which have been approved for implementation. |
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OPINION/ORDER Holding that Huang is not collaterally estopped by her settlement with the Bank from denying the Bank's allegations of fraud. The Bank noted that it was wholly owned by the government of China and that its principal place of business was Beijing. The defendants were alleged to be California corporations or permanent residents of California. Pan and Huang were said to be husband and wife and the sole directors of SV. Pan and Huang were also said to be the only directors of Ruigao. Were alleged to be the 630 sole owners of ZP. They also were alleged to control another Chinese company. Over $110 million of computer diskettes were alleged to have been shipped to SV and ZP by Nantong Starvest at artificial and concealed prices. Was met by the defendants' denial of all claims. The defendants were represented by Manatt. Eventually 631 settlement negotiations began and were actively pursued during May. The Bank and the defendants entered into what was denominated a |
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OPINION/ORDER Is corrected as follows: On page 6. Sullivan & Worcester were on brief. Were on brief. Because we believe that the lower court was on the wrong track. Background Background The pertinent facts are largely undisputed. Plaintiff appellant Greenwood Trust Company (Greenwood) is a Delaware banking corporation. Its deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The terms and conditions applicable to use of the Discover Card are spelled out in a Cardmember Agreement. If the default is not cured within twenty days. A ten dollar late charge is automatically assessed. The Commonwealth and its Attorney General were named as defendants. The Massachusetts statute is straightforward. 2Endeavoring to ensure that its flanks are fully protected. It is not necessary for us to distinguish among them. 6 late charge. Section 521 is equally uncompromising: In order to prevent discrimination against State chartered insured depository institutions. Notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Background Green is an African American female who was employed by Franklin National Bank. Because we are hearing this case as the result of a grant of summary judgment. The factual background of Green's claims is complicated. She was transferred to the Washington Avenue location after complaining that a teller at the Blaisdell branch called her |
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OPINION/ORDER 1 all commissioners of insurance or Mike Pickens is a defendant on ly in the action brought by First Tennessee Bank. Therefore is a party only to Appeal No. 03 5521. 1 The Honorable Gordon J. Who were sued in their official capacity as receivers for various insolvent insurance companies (collectively. Because it lacked jurisdiction or because it should have declined jurisdiction in its discretion. While at the same time controlling the unregistered brokerage that was supposedly investing the large cash reserves that insurance companies typically have on hand. He was funneling the money to overseas bank accounts. Frankel was the subject of a four month. Bank accounts used in Frankel's money laundering scheme were held by the insurance companies at both AmSouth. The Receivers argue that the Banks were negligent in not realizing the massive fraud that those accounts were being used to commit. The Receivers concluded they might have claims against AmSouth. That tolling agreement was extended six times. Negotiations were ongoing. |
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LENZ V. DEWEY Lenz cross appeals arguing that the district court erred in holding that he had a property interest only in his position as an officer and director of the Bank's holding company and not in his terminable at will position as the Bank's director and president. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The Bank was chartered by the State of Wyoming and therefore subject to regulation by the state banking commissioner (formerly the State Examiner). It was also regulated by the Federal Reserve Board as a member bank. Both state and federal regulators examined the Bank's compliance with the Written Agreement and concluded that it was deficient. The regulators warned that the Bank was not in compliance with the Written Agreement. Each board member was potentially liable for up to $370. Lenz resigned from his |
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OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs are persons who borrowed from the two banks and signed second mortgages. Appellees in this case are the settling parties. Appellants are a number of law firms and plaintiff class members who challenge the District Court's jurisdiction. The alleged mastermind of the scheme was the Shumway Organization ( |
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RESOLUTION TRUST V. DUNMAR CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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RESOLUTION TRUST V. DUNMAR CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Roberts was sentenced to 112 months imprisonment and three years supervised release. He was ordered to pay a special assessment of $100. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Background The following summary of the background is based upon the evidence presented at trial. Shortly after Roberts was released from prison for 1992 bank robberies. Mitchell was having financial difficulties and suggested to Roberts that they rob a bank together. It was agreed that Mitchell would get 60% and Roberts would get 40% of the proceeds. Although he never displayed one and did not actually have one on his person. Placed a handgun in the glove box of the borrowed vehicle during the time the two men were preparing for the bank robbery and that the gun remained in the glove box while Mitchell robbed the bank. She showed him that the second drawer was empty. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Inc. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Rabell Mendez and Rossello Rentas & Rabell Mendez were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. The certificate was assigned to a third party. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. Puerto Rico insurance companies are first required by law to deposit funds with the Commissioner. Once these funds are deposited. Section 1823(e) is |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellant. Thomas Paul Gorman with whom Sherin & Lodgen was on brief for appellee. While this litigation was in process. 1The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. 1441a(11) while we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. 3 3 was returned for insufficient funds. The terms were changed in the preparation of the extension draft. The principal issues raised on appeal by Carr are: (1) The Bank agreed to extend the maturity date of the $243. 000 note. (2) The gap between the appraised value of the mortgaged property and the price obtained at foreclosure sale barred summary judgment against him for the deficiency because there were genuine issues of material fact whether the foreclosure sale was conducted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment may only be entered |
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OPINION/ORDER Beckett was found guilty of two counts each of robbery and armed robbery. Becket now argues that the District Court erred by (1) determining that he was a career offender. (8) allowing the guilty verdicts on the charges of robbery and bank robbery to stand when they were not supported by the evidence. S 2113(d) to stand when it was not supported by the evidence. We will reverse and remand for factual findings on the question of Beckett's ability to pay restitution. We will vacate the sentence imposed for the lesser included offenses of bank robbery. We will affirm the District Court as to all other issues. She estimated that he was between 5'6 |
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OPINION/ORDER That the provision is unconstitutional. The district court erred in suppressing Dickerson's voluntary confession on the grounds that it was obtained in technical violation of Miranda. Dickerson was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.§ 371 (West Supp. 1998). Although the district court specifically found that Dickerson's confession was voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. It nevertheless suppressed the confession because it was obtained in technical violation of Miranda.1 In ruling on the admissibility of Dickerson's confession. That |
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OPINION/ORDER The principal question we must decide is whether a commitment letter Mellon Bank issued in connection with a contemplated $53 million loan conferred |
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OPINION/ORDER McGovern with whom Indeglia & McGovern was on brief for appellants. Levine and MacAdams & Wieck Incorporated were on brief for appellee. The district court held that an earlier decision in a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding initiated by Belmont was res judicata as to Bogosian's counterclaims. Bogosian's and Belmont's appeals were consolidated. Bogosian was a partner with her brother in a real estate company called E&J. The parties have battled over these promissory notes in three separate arenas: the United States District Court. A default judgment was entered against her. Her attentions may have been on the bankruptcy court where. The court allowed her to file counterclaims against the Bank asserting what were in essence the same claims based on an alleged oral agreement by the Bank not to call the Belmont Note. The amended counterclaims were based on the same alleged oral agreement by the Bank. There were two cases pending in the district court relating to Belmont and the Belmont Note the Bankruptcy Appeal and the District Court Action. |
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OPINION/ORDER A deficiency judgment was entered against Hacker and Spears. Hacker and Spears allege that Overbey was negligent. They further allege that they would not have entered into the transaction if they had known that Overbey represented the bank in the past. Plaintiff Hacker is a citizen and resident of Mississippi and Plaintiff Spears is a citizen and resident of Arkansas. Defendant Overbey is a citizen and resident of Kentucky. Summary judgment is proper |
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OPINION/ORDER Was held up by a lone individual. There were no other customers in the bank. When he was standing within three feet of her. Kreamer said that the man told her that he was robbing the bank and directed her to give him her money. Colored shirt that was buttoned down. He wore sunglasses with yellow lenses and his mustache was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Colton's primary argument on appeal is that because the government offered no evidence that he made any affirmative misrepresentations or breached any fiduciary. He cannot be held to have violated the federal bank fraud statute. So that the district court can vacate two of the bank fraud convictions because they were multiplicious. 000 and so his sentence should have been enhanced. Which was originally titled the Dennis A. He removed Ellis Koch as a trustee because Koch was known to be closely associated with him. For payment because Riggs believed that the property value was insufficient to cover the loan in light of certain environmental and financial problems jeopardizing the Wal Mart contract. Who was now practicing law in Annapolis. Laskin testified that |
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OPINION/ORDER The principal question we must decide is whether a commitment letter Mellon Bank issued in connection with a contemplated $53 million loan conferred |
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OPINION/ORDER Waldon asserts the district court should have granted his motion for a mistrial. After two jurors observed him in handcuffs and shackles as he was being transported from the courthouse. Waldon's conviction and sentence are both AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The first four grounds for appeal listed above were raised by Waldon's appellate counsel. The only additional issue Waldon raised is whether the district court erred during 18 United States v. Or (c) above because such sentence was considered related to another sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence. That this item does not apply where the sentences are considered related because the offenses occurred on the same occasion. Which were consolidated for sentencing and treated as related. Applic. note 6 (providing an example that is virtually identical to this case). Pursuant to §4A1.1(f). find none of Waldon's assertions of error are well taken. Based on descriptions that were given by several bank employees. He was wearing a blue baseball cap. |
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OPINION/ORDER Reaume was convicted by a jury of committing bank fraud. After proceeding to trial on the theory that his scheme was not intended to defraud a federally insured financial institution. Reaume was found guilty by a jury. The final judgment of conviction and sentence was entered on January 3. Testimony was presented that Reaume opened two checking The Honorable Glen M. Accounts also were opened at the Bank by Adam Rodriguez and Danny K. The Bank flagged the five accounts early on and refused to honor the checks for which there were insufficient funds ( |
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01-5190 -- BANK ONE OKLAHOMA V. COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL SERVICES -- 07/30/2002 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This appeal requires us to determine whether the district court erred in affirming a judgment of the bankruptcy court denying appellant Bank One's |
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FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA V. THOMAS (7/31/2000, NO. 99-13824) Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
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OPINION/ORDER Holding that the bankruptcy court's findings that the bank did not establish reasonable reliance were not clearly erroneous. affirm. The notes and loans were secured by security arrangements covering all of Hardin Apparel's assets. of Hardin Apparel. It was required to submit to the Bank a borrowing base certificate ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Brought this action to assert his interest in real property that was mortgaged by the Cooks. Does not have a perfected security interest in the property that is superior to Rogan's interest as a judicial lien creditor. An |
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FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA V. THOMAS (7/31/2000, NO. 99-13824) Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
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OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. * The main issue in this appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that Dwight Myricks voluntarily and knowingly waived his pending claim of employment discrimination against the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta when he signed a severance agreement and general release to receive enhanced retirement benefits. Myricks is educated. Was represented by an attorney. While this first appeal was pending. Terminated employees who refused to sign the release were provided two weeks of salary. That the release was intended to settle the current case against the Bank: Dwight Myricks . . . will receive a notice that his job is being eliminated by March 31. He will be offered a severance package that requires the release of all claims that he has against the Bank. The Bank wrote another letter to Myricks's attorney to 3 confirm that Myricks was eligible for enhanced retirement benefits and to explain that the enhanced benefits were available only if Myricks executed the severance agreement and release: As stated in the letters to you and Mr. |
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03-4019 -- U.S. V. COOPER -- 07/19/2004 He announced that he was committing a robbery and ordered the bank tellers to place the bank's money on the counter. See id. After collecting $32. An Arizona Highway Patrol trooper received a tip from a motorist that a driver who appeared to be impaired was traveling erratically along northbound Interstate 15 in a black Camaro. See id. at 327 29. Learned from his dispatcher that the Camaro's Oregon license plates were registered to a Todd Cooper. See id. at 332. Because he was bleeding. Cooper challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the branch bank he robbed was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Claims he was unconstitutionally denied access to a law library and argues the district court erred in giving him a life sentence under the |
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DIBRELL BROTHERS INT'L S.A. V. BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Contending that the district court1 erred in denying his Batson2 challenge to the Government's use of peremptory strikes during jury selection and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the bank The Honorable Carol E. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). involved was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). He was directed to the customer service desk and walked away. While this was occurring. The bank alarm was activated by another bank employee. Witnesses reported seeing the man walking down the street carrying a backpack from which red smoke was billowing. No suspects were arrested in the time immediately after the robbery. They put out notice that Rusan was wanted for questioning regarding the bank robbery. One count of bank larceny was added in order to allow Rusan to argue for the lesser charge of bank larceny instead of bank robbery. Rusan was convicted by a jury on both counts. (2) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that the Southern Commercial Bank branch was federally insured. |
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DIBRELL BROTHERS INT'L S.A. V. BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Appellant Michael Mele alleges his employment was terminated in violation of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter. |
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OPINION/ORDER Moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed fifty five days after the judgment was entered. P. 4(a)(1)(A) a Notice of Appeal |
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CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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JOHN CHRISTO, JR., JOHN CHRISTO, , JAMES PHILLIP CHRISTO, IRENE LAURETTE CHRISTO V. KENNETH EARL PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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JOHN CHRISTO, JR., JOHN CHRISTO, , JAMES PHILLIP CHRISTO, IRENE LAURETTE CHRISTO V. KENNETH EARL PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Rogers argued the cause for appellee The Inter American Development Bank.* On the brief were Alexander E. Is not immune from garnishment proceedings under that Act. Concluding that the employer was entitled to immunity under the Act. Appellant was awarded alimony of $1. Kestell was named as a defendant in appellant's complaint in the district court. Appellant was the largest unsecured him all of his assets except one: the future wages that would be owed to him by his employer. Were Kestell's employer a run of the mine private firm located in the District of Columbia. The Bank is not a run of the mine firm. It is an institution that has been designated by executive order for protection as an interna tional organization under the International Organizations Im munities Act (IOIA). The IOIA entitles designated entities to |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter. |
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OPINION/ORDER BACKGROUND This bankruptcy proceeding is but one part of the litigation among these parties dating back to 1983 and arising from their participation in a real estate partnership. Limited II (Crossroads). the general partners partnership Plaintiff/appellant Nangle and others were limited partners in a Missouri limited partnership named Crossroads U.S.A. Defendant/appellee Lauer and Joseph Graves were of Crossroads. Bruce Nangle lacks standing to pursue this action and was dismissed from the case by order of the bankruptcy court. The two banks have been represented by one counsel on this appeal. In this opinion for convenience we sometimes refer to Mark Twain Bank generally as including both branch banks and at other points we refer to the separate sister banks where the conduct of one or the other but not both appears to be implicated. 22 1 were two interests in real estate: the Riverheights Retirement Center in Booneville. The Transfer of the partnership interests to Lauer and Graves was completed in November of former limited partners learned at the time of Graves' death that contrary to the representations made by Lauer and Graves in the contracts to buy out the interests of the limited partners general partners Lauer and Graves had previously sold the Riverheights Retirement Center property in return for an interest in an industrial development bond. |
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OPINION/ORDER No other Sioux Falls banks have used the names |
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CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Pease were on brief appellants. Grau was on brief for Amoskeag Bank Shares. Donald Dufresne was on brief for Allen. The question on this appeal is whether appellants' Third Amended Complaint states a claim for fraud under federal securities law. We have concluded that portions of it are entitled to survive. Defendant Amoskeag Bank Shares ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Rogers argued the cause for appellee The Inter American Development Bank.* On the brief were Alexander E. Is not immune from garnishment proceedings under that Act. Concluding that the employer was entitled to immunity under the Act. Appellant was awarded alimony of $1. Kestell was named as a defendant in appellant's complaint in the district court. Appellant was the largest unsecured him all of his assets except one: the future wages that would be owed to him by his employer. Were Kestell's employer a run of the mine private firm located in the District of Columbia. The Bank is not a run of the mine firm. It is an institution that has been designated by executive order for protection as an interna tional organization under the International Organizations Im munities Act (IOIA). The IOIA entitles designated entities to |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant argues that the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support the conviction and that errors in the admission of evidence warrant a new trial. We did not decide whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant committed an overt act that constituted a |
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OPINION/ORDER Is recalled. 2000 is amended as follows: I. Who testified that they could not say whether Henderson was the man who robbed their bank on West Sahara on January 16. He testified that Henderson was the man depicted in the photograph robbing that bank. Delete the first full paragraph and replace it with: 2682 Henderson contends no reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the crimes alleged in Counts Two and Three because the testimony at trial showed that those two robberies occurred at the same time. Campisi gave conflicting testimony as to when the Bank of America at 1380 East Flamingo was robbed. She first testified it was robbed at 5:45 P.M. Later testified it was robbed at 5:53 P.M. She ultimately admitted she was not certain of the time of the robbery. Testified on crossexamination that the Wells Fargo branch where she worked at 4720 South Eastern Avenue was robbed at approximately 5:54 P.M. She clarified on re direct that this was only an approximation. That she was only sure that the robbery occurred just before the bank closed at 6:00 P.M. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues before the Panel are (1) whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Bank One relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9014 and 9021 (or that certain of those rules were not applicable). 000 free and clear of all liens was proper. The final orders of a bankruptcy court are appealable orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER The primary issue in this case is whether such a certificate was required. Or whether the Bank's production of the Flowers' financial records pursuant to the subpoena was exempt from the RFPA. Is an investigative proceeding that is required under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) before a general court martial may be convened. FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK 9433 conduct in response to the Army's Article 32 subpoena was within the RFPA's exemption for information disclosed in the course of litigation between the government and a private citizen. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because subpoenas are not authorized in Article 32 proceedings. The subpoena was not lawfully issued. It acted at its peril and it is not entitled to the protection of the RFPA exemptions on which it relies. Judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. We also conclude that the district court should have granted the Flowers' motion for leave to amend. The Flowers' challenge to the denial of their motion for reconsideration is moot. |
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OPINION/ORDER The primary issue in this case is whether such a certificate was required. Or whether the Bank's production of the Flowers' financial records pursuant to the subpoena was exempt from the RFPA. Is an investigative proceeding that is required under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) before a general court martial may be convened. FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK 9433 conduct in response to the Army's Article 32 subpoena was within the RFPA's exemption for information disclosed in the course of litigation between the government and a private citizen. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because subpoenas are not authorized in Article 32 proceedings. The subpoena was not lawfully issued. It acted at its peril and it is not entitled to the protection of the RFPA exemptions on which it relies. Judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. We also conclude that the district court should have granted the Flowers' motion for leave to amend. The Flowers' challenge to the denial of their motion for reconsideration is moot. |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that the district court's decision was correct and we affirm. I. Background Because we have the benefit of two thoughtful and thorough opinions by the district court. 3 the background of this matter will be stated summarily. This is a breach of contract case involving a limited partnership agreement. The parties to the limited partnership agreement are Opus and IBM. It is undisputed that Minnesota law applies. A. The Recourse Issue The purpose of the limited partnership was to construct and rent a 50 floor office building known as |
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OPINION/ORDER Soler with whom Bufete Roberto Corretjer Piquer was on brief for appellant. Muniz & Goyco was on brief for appellee. *Of the District of Rhode Island. We determine de novo whether the moving party has shown |
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OPINION/ORDER RATIGAN Ratigan contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for the bank robbery and weapons charge because the government failed to prove the jurisdictional element of the bank's FDIC insurance at the time of the robbery. That challenges to a judgment that are based on subject matter jurisdiction are not barred by procedural default. Which charged him with the use and carrying of a firearm that is a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence. The jury was required to find that he used an explosive device in connection with the attack on the Planned Parenthood Clinic. Ratigan was sentenced to 55 years and 3 months of incarceration and over $100. Bank was insured by the FDIC on July 12. Bank |
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OPINION/ORDER Is recalled. 2000 is amended as follows: I. Who testified that they could not say whether Henderson was the man who robbed their bank on West Sahara on January 16. He testified that Henderson was the man depicted in the photograph robbing that bank. Delete the first full paragraph and replace it with: 2682 Henderson contends no reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the crimes alleged in Counts Two and Three because the testimony at trial showed that those two robberies occurred at the same time. Campisi gave conflicting testimony as to when the Bank of America at 1380 East Flamingo was robbed. She first testified it was robbed at 5:45 P.M. Later testified it was robbed at 5:53 P.M. She ultimately admitted she was not certain of the time of the robbery. Testified on crossexamination that the Wells Fargo branch where she worked at 4720 South Eastern Avenue was robbed at approximately 5:54 P.M. She clarified on re direct that this was only an approximation. That she was only sure that the robbery occurred just before the bank closed at 6:00 P.M. |
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OPINION/ORDER McLaughlin was on brief for appellees. Lionel Bolduc was the sole applicant for the loans. BankEast's commitment letter was addressed only to him. The couple was not represented by counsel at the closing. They were told by the bank that requiring her signature was standard procedure. Although the Bolducs were apparently business partners and had extensive real estate interests. BankEast's insistence that Maureen Bolduc co sign the notes may have violated ECOA's bar on discrimination based on marital status. The Bolducs were unable to meet the repayment schedule on the 1987 loans. The FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC did not foreclose on the second mortgages secured by the Hudson home and the Merrimack land even though the proceeds from the original collateral were not enough to satisfy the balance due on the 1987 notes. The court found that an injunction was consistent with the equities and the public interest. That their suit is barred by the ECOA statute of limitations. That it is barred by the D'Oench. |
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OPINION/ORDER Leo Kirch is the founder of KirchGroup. Who was the chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank. Stated during a German language interview by a journalist in New York City that Breuer doubted whether the financial community was willing to lend KirchGroup the money it needed to survive the liquidity crisis it faced. Kirch asserts that this statement was Less false and that Breuer knew it was false when he made it. 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 than three months later. The complaint was amended to add as a plaintiff International Television Trading Corp. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Whose primary assets are voting and nonvoting stock in Ervin Industries. Who have interests in two of the three trusts. Are the other beneficiaries of the voting stock trust. The essence of her claim was that Bank One's lending relationship with Ervin Industries caused Bank One to have a conflict of interest and abdicate its responsibilities as trustee in the course of three business transactions. We conclude that dismissal was proper. The Trusts and the Parties There are three trusts involved in this litigation. Two of these trusts are testamentary. The first testamentary trust was created by John Ervin. Ervin Industries is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. Is its current president. The primary asset of Ervin's testamentary trust was Ervin Industries' Class A voting stock. His daughter and four grandchildren are the income beneficiaries. Are parties to this suit. This substantial trust was divided into five separate trusts in 1987 so that each beneficiary had his or her own trust. |
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OPINION/ORDER No. 99 1330 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Dalton's ( |
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OPINION/ORDER In which Judge Beam joined. *This appeal was initially assigned to a panel consisting of Judge Traxler. The appeal was heard and decided by a quorum of the assigned panel. I. Brandon was charged with. Each of the six counts of bank fraud charged in the indictment is based on a single stolen check that Brandon negotiated in exchange for merchandise. Brandon argued that |
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OPINION/ORDER Evelyn Silinzy were convicted of bank fraud charges. I. The appellants were charged. The altered checks were then passed to title insurance companies in connection with real estate transactions involving inflated land prices. Where the |
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OPINION/ORDER The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' RICO claim because it lacked the specificity in pleading fraud that is required under Fed. 2001). 1 We agree that the RICO claim was properly dismissed. Because it is predicated on mail and wire fraud. It was not. The antitrust claim is also based on fraud on misrepresentations in the information given to consumers and on misrepresentations in the information ROTH. Gary Oriani have borrowed money from defendant banks pursuant to lending agreements with |
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OPINION/ORDER Leo Kirch is the founder of KirchGroup. Who was the chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank. Stated during a German language interview by a journalist in New York City that Breuer doubted whether the financial community was willing to lend KirchGroup the money it needed to survive the liquidity crisis it faced. Kirch asserts that this statement was 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 false and that Breuer knew it was false when he made it. The complaint was amended to add as a plaintiff International Television Trading Corp. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Two 1930 era Mercedes Benz Roadsters (of which a total of 114 were ever manufactured). There were thousands of loose parts. Which were no longer manufactured and which were themselves extraordinarily rare. One of the automobiles and some of the parts repossessed from Gohlike were allegedly owned by the Estate of Herman Quante (Quante Estate). By late 1987 or early 1988 the vehicles and parts were worth over three million dollars. Finding that because a condition precedent was not satisfied. The sellers were not obligated by the contract. The trial was conducted from February 28. The court permitted the fraud claim to be tried to the jury to forestall the necessity for a later trial in the event the 3 fraud dismissal was reversed on appeal. First Bank contends the relevant market was the market of |
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OPINION/ORDER Leo Kirch is the founder of KirchGroup. Who was the chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank. Stated during a German language interview by a journalist in New York City that Breuer doubted whether the financial community was willing to lend KirchGroup the money it needed to survive the 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 liquidity crisis it faced. Kirch asserts that this statement was Less false and that Breuer knew it was false when he made it. than three months later. The complaint was amended to add as a plaintiff International Television Trading Corp. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The statements were allegedly made in connection with a request to stop payment of an official bank check. He argued that the indictment was insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege that his false statements were intended to influence a loan or other extension of credit. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing |
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OPINION/ORDER That plaintiffs' claims under the Truth in Lending Act ( |
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ARKWRIGHT MUT. INS. CO. V. NATIONSBANK (5/25/2000, NO. 99-11396) Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company is a commercial crime insurer that reimbursed Florida Power and Light (FPL) for the forged check losses. We must decide whether this interpretation of the banking contract is correct and whether summary judgment was properly granted. The record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether NationsBank acted with ordinary care. A drawee bank is absolutely liable to its customer for payment of a forged check. Because a forged check is not a |
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SHIPSTON ASSOCS. V. ESSELTE PENDAFLEX CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > I.
A.
The essential facts are not in dispute. The loan was structured so that it would be paid off by Esselte's lease payments and a balloon payment due from Dursley at the end of the lease term. The parties disagree over whether those conditions were present. The lease provided that Esselte could offer to purchase the property during the first quarter of 1992: | ||
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. Carried with this appeal was Padgett's motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction due to the Christos' lack of standing to assert any claims that became property of the estate. This argument is merely I. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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UNITED STATES V. GREEN Vincent Berry and William Leroy Harding were jointly charged in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma with various criminal acts arising out of two robberies. All three were convicted on all counts wherein they were charged. All were sentenced to imprisonment. Green (No. 96 6042) and Berry (No. 96 6043) have appealed their respective convictions and sentences. Their separate appeals were companioned for purposes of briefing and oral argument. All three appeals were set for oral argument before this panel of the court. The panel has now determined that these three appeals should be consolidated for disposition in one opinion since they are interrelated and there is. Berry and Harding were charged with conspiring from December 23. Were charged with robbery by force. They were also charged with putting in jeopardy the life of Allison Ammer by the use of a firearm. Were charged with robbery by force. They were also charged with putting in jeopardy the lives of Paula Enix and Julie Cooper by the use of a firearm. |
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OPINION/ORDER Amerling & Burns were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Such a lien may have priority over even a pre existing mortgage. That statute makes invalid any |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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ARKWRIGHT MUT. INS. CO. V. NATIONSBANK (5/25/2000, NO. 99-11396) Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company is a commercial crime insurer that reimbursed Florida Power and Light (FPL) for the forged check losses. We must decide whether this interpretation of the banking contract is correct and whether summary judgment was properly granted. The record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether NationsBank acted with ordinary care. A drawee bank is absolutely liable to its customer for payment of a forged check. Because a forged check is not a |
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SHIPSTON ASSOCS. V. ESSELTE PENDAFLEX CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > I.
A.
The essential facts are not in dispute. The loan was structured so that it would be paid off by Esselte's lease payments and a balloon payment due from Dursley at the end of the lease term. The parties disagree over whether those conditions were present. The lease provided that Esselte could offer to purchase the property during the first quarter of 1992: | ||
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OPINION/ORDER I. Facts and Procedural History In May 2002 Miller Douglas was hired through a temporary employment agency as a customer service representative at Citizens Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER PA 18235 Counsel for Appellee Judge Chertoff heard oral argument in this case but resigned prior to the time the opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C.§46(d). Because we conclude that the rents were not the property of the bankruptcy estate. The court of common 1 The mortgages specified that Lender shall have the right. Although the Appellee disputes whether the notice letters sent by the bank were correctly addressed or in fact received by all tenants. The mortgaged properties were sold to the bank for cost by the county sheriff. Schwab was appointed as bankruptcy trustee ( |
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OPINION/ORDER V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct. |
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OPINION/ORDER V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct. |
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02-3063 -- PEOPLES MORTGAGE CORP. V. KANSAS BANKERS SURETY CO. -- 03/26/2003 Holding it was entitled to indemnification to the extent it settled the litigation in good faith and for a reasonable amount. The district court ruled that the amount paid was reasonable and entered judgment for the full settlement amount plus interest. The court also awarded attorneys' fees under a Kansas statutory provision that permits a court to award an insured attorneys fees if the court concludes an insurer's refusal to pay a claim was without just cause or excuse. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER Entities with whom it contracts are often adversely affected. The degree to which an entity is adversely affected will usually depend upon the contractual safeguards bargained for and secured by the entity. Joining Highland Community Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Robinson claims that the Government's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aiding and abetting the use of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. Robinson contends that the Bank Robbery Statute is unconstitutional on The Honorable Karl S. Because we are not persuaded by Robinson's arguments. Grundy and Johnson drove Robinson's car to Grundy's house where the money was divided. Smith watched the floor of the bank while Grundy and Johnson were taking the money. Robinson was indicted for these crimes on November 29. Requesting that the jury |
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OPINION/ORDER Smith were on brief. Snider were on brief. Ethiopia announced that a vast number of Eritreans living in the country |
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PHARAON GHAITH R. V. FRS |
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OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. claims and was dismissed from the case. Although Doe settled his claim and was dismissed from Roe's Br. at 1 n.2. This action was the case. Doe is no longer a party to this action. This case remains a We will therefore In 1989. United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 2 Insurance on property I [Roe] give as security is required. If insurance is required. I promise to keep the property insured throughout the term of my loan and to deliver a certificate of insurance to you that shows I have purchased insurance of this kind. ... I will immediately repay you for any amounts you spend in purchasing that insurance. In force during the term of the loan and will furnish Norwest . . . with a loss payable endorsement upon each renewal of said insurance. Which indicated that only Norwest's interest in the vehicle was insured. The same process was repeated. Which is otherwise similar to ordinary comprehensive and collision coverage. Is limited to either the damage to the collateral or the balance of the customer's loan. |
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OPINION/ORDER Durham argued the cause for appellant. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank's employee handbook stated that raises were not tied to a specific timetable. Rather were to be awarded based on an employee's performance appraisal. Those reviews were completed by two different supervisors. Were also signed by Bank President Thurman |
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FIRST NAT'L BANK OF BOSTON V. THOMSON CONSUMER ELECT., INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > On July 29. The court did not allow Thomson to recoup the value of shipments that were lost after January 3. Argues that the applicable rules are found in N.C.Gen.Stat. |
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OPINION/ORDER Angela Khorozian appeals her conviction on the ground that she could not have conspired to commit. Could not have committed. Bank fraud by negotiating counterfeit checks because she did not know that those checks were counterfeit. Khorozian was approached with a moneymaking opportunity by her longtime acquaintance Eduardo Queirolo. Camilo said the checks needed to be negotiated in the United States to avoid high taxes that would result were 3 they negotiated in Brazil. It was agreed that Khorozian would receive $3 million of the commission. Her statement is significant because a wire transfer is an instantaneous transfer of funds and thus would pose no financial risk to Hudson United. He would not have opened the account because of the increased risk. One was allegedly drawn on the account of Costco Wholesale Corp. and the other on Liberty Carton Co.'s account. The checks were both payable to an individual named Luiz Carlos Teixiera. Queirolo testified that he verified that the checks were not the result of drug or arms trafficking. |
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OPINION/ORDER Carter and McKool Smith were on brief for appellants David C. Madoff and Cohn & Kelakos LLP were on brief for appellee. Senior Circuit Judge. appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by approving a settlement between the chapter 7 trustee for Healthco International. Three months later an interim trustee was appointed and the reorganization was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. By the time the chapter 7 trustee ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This is a lien priority dispute between a perfected security interest held by Bremen Bank and Trust Company (the Bank) and a federal tax lien. The Bank claims the IRS's levies against Ingredient's contractual customers were wrongful because the tax lien was junior to the Bank's prior perfected security interest in the proceeds of Ingredient's contract rights. Because that money was subject to the Bank's automatic right of setoff under Missouri law. Was a trucking company that transported general commodities. The price of shipping was to be determined by Ingredient's attached schedule of rates. Payment was due upon the completion of Ingredient's performance. Two of the contracts were minimum requirements contracts under which Ingredient's customers. Were required to tender to Ingredient a minimum quantity of goods to be shipped during the contract period. These contracts were effective for a term of one year and were automatically renewed after that from year to year. The third shipping contract was a three year. |
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FIRST NAT'L BANK OF BOSTON V. THOMSON CONSUMER ELECT., INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > On July 29. The court did not allow Thomson to recoup the value of shipments that were lost after January 3. Argues that the applicable rules are found in N.C.Gen.Stat. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. This is the third appeal that Ramiro L. N |
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OPINION/ORDER Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company is a commercial crime insurer that reimbursed Florida Power and Light (FPL) for the forged check losses. We must decide whether this interpretation of the banking contract is correct and whether summary judgment was properly granted. The record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether NationsBank acted with ordinary care. A drawee bank is absolutely liable to its customer for payment of a forged check. Because a forged check is not a |
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OPINION/ORDER Gipson was sentenced to 78 months imprisonment on each count. He was ordered to pay $24. (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's finding that he used intimidation to commit the offenses. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Background The following summary of the background facts is based upon the evidence presented at Gipson's trial. Two female tellers were working behind the counter and no one else was in the main area of the bank. Stated: |
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OPINION/ORDER Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company is a commercial crime insurer that reimbursed Florida Power and Light (FPL) for the forged check losses. We must decide whether this interpretation of the banking contract is correct and whether summary judgment was properly granted. The record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether NationsBank acted with ordinary care. A drawee bank is absolutely liable to its customer for payment of a forged check. Because a forged check is not a |
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DAVID CAIN V. U.S. Mso bidi font family:Arial'> With him on the brief was Emmett B. Mso bidi font family:Arial'> With her o |
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WELLS FARGO BANK V. U.S. |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendants were tried together. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rashid told Stinson that they wanted to open the account with $15 million and presented him with what was purported to be a $15 million Bank of America cashier's check. The cashier's check was made payable to |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction to review the district court's preliminary injunction order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Only one is directly relevant here: a |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a case of identity theft. McNeil was convicted of one count of bank fraud. Which was denied. Because we conclude that McNeil's convictions for bank and wire fraud are sound. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts are as follows: In October. Although the transfer was sent. The money was returned to First Interstate Bank by State Street Bank because there was neither a full name nor a valid account number to which to credit the transfer. While McNeil was in prison in the New Hampshire State Penitentiary. 788 was filed with the IRS in the name of Ian P. Rowe Price account in McNeil's name bearing an account number that was involved in the unsuccessful wire transfer. McNeil was indicted for one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) and one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The government presented evidence that Kimionakis was incarcerated in the New Hampshire State Penitentiary from 1997 through 2001. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The main question for decision is whether. The Government is required to prove that the money taken by the defendant was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Or whether the Government is required 8480 UNITED STATES v. BLAJOS to prove only that the institution from which the money was taken was FDIC insured. We hold that the latter interpretation is correct and. The ATM was owned by Cedars Bank. He called Blajos when employees from First Line Courier were delivering cash to service the Cedars Bank ATM located at the Bingo Club. Was arrested and charged in this case. The vice president of Cedars Bank testified that Cedars Bank was insured by the FDIC on the date of the robbery and. The Government introduced into evidence the FDIC certificate showing that Cedars Bank was insured on the date of the robbery. Not a specific depositor |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: On page 10. The petition for rehearing is DENIED. Arguing (1) the district court should not have dismissed defendant Alliance Bancorp (Alliance) on the ground that Alliance had not been properly served with a Truth in Lending Act rescission notice. THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUSTEE was not the original creditor. (3) the district court erred by holding that Miguel's right to rescind the security interest was conditioned on her repaying the loan proceeds. (4) the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Miguel was able to refinance. We have jurisdiction to review the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Miguel learned that Countrywide was merely an agent for the lienholder Bank. There is no evidence in the record to show that the Bank had any notice of the motion or the existence of the lawsuit. Marked the 120th day after Miguel's suit was filed. Permission to file the second amended complaint was granted on May 28. If proper notice of recission rights is not delivered to the consumer at the time of closing. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judges ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the dissent and concurrence in the slip opinion in the above case. Is the exclusive remedy for borrowers to enforce the terms of 12 U.S.C. §85.3 5. Change sentence to read: We could not expect the Congress which enacted the National Bank Act to have discussed the federal question jurisdiction or removal implications of 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 86. Change sentence to read: Section 521 of DIDA was specifically intended to have congruent scope with the National Bank Act with respect to the coverage of 12 U.S.C. § 85. 15. Circuit Judges ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the dissent and concurrence in the slip opinion in the above case. Is the exclusive remedy for borrowers to enforce the terms of 12 U.S.C. §85.3 5. Change sentence to read: We could not expect the Congress which enacted the National Bank Act to have discussed the federal question jurisdiction or removal implications of 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 86. Change sentence to read: Section 521 of DIDA was specifically intended to have congruent scope with the National Bank Act with respect to the coverage of 12 U.S.C. § 85. 15. |
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OPINION/ORDER With her on the briefs were Gregory G. With him on the brief was Rhonda M. Peter Buscemi was on the brief for amici curiae State and Local Bar Associations in support of appellees. Babb were on the brief for amicus curiae The Conference of Chief Justices in support of appellee American Bar Association. The Bar Associations sought a declaratory judgment that the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in the practice of law are covered by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are called on to decide whether a voluntarily joined foreign sovereign may remove a case from a territorial court to a federal district court when the foreign sovereign obtained the original defendant's interest by assignment after the commencement of the litigation. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY EIE Guam Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm in part. I. Albert Lawrence was hired by Citizens First National Bank of New Jersey. In 1985 he was promoted to the position of Senior Vice President/Chief Investment Officer. Lawrence was injured in a car accident and sustained severe back injuries. Lawrence was terminated for sub standard performance and |
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OPINION/ORDER Cox's front pay in a manner DB&T contends was improper. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. I. Because the Bank has appealed on the grounds it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cox was born on June 20. She was working as a loan officer and financial service counselor at the Plaza Branch. While she was working at the Plaza Branch. Cox was ten years older than Ms. Cox was in her mid forties. She was asked or heard comments about her retirement plans almost every week for more than two years. Cox that it would have no position for her after the branch closed. Was the only Bank employee working at the Plaza Branch who was not offered another position at DB&T when it closed the branch. Cox introduced evidence from which a jury could infer that the animosity was based on age. Cox's decades of banking experience were |
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OPINION/ORDER Sawyer & Nelson was on brief for appellants. Benjamin Zuckerman and Verrill & Dana were on brief for appellees. Of which Harvey Prawer was the president. Of which Harvey Prawer was president. Limehouse Corporation is not a party to this action. The total cost of the project was estimated to be $2. The Letter specified that interest payments were to be made monthly. With a final payment of interest when the indebtedness evidenced hereby is paid in full. 3. Such default is continued for a period of one (1) month. Were consistent with the terms outlined in the First Commitment Letter. The Bank and Limehouse entered into a Mortgage and Security Agreement whereby the property to be purchased by Limehouse for the Coulthard Farms project was mortgaged to the Bank. 000 in funds was advanced by the Bank to Limehouse. The Second Note's terms were consistent with those outlined in the Second Commitment Letter. Except there was no mention of repaying the interest from the refinancing of the debt. The Bank notified Limehouse that it was in default. |
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MELLON BANK V. US Font family:Arial'>for plaintiffs appellants. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a district court order denying the bondholder plaintiffs' motion to certify a class action and dismissing their complaint without prejudice on the grounds that they. Their case is not yet ripe. Of the dismissal. 2 1 issue was governed by a trust indenture.2 The bondholders were the intended third party beneficiaries of the trust indenture. A master trustee was appointed to oversee the transaction and collect payments as they became due. 1998.3 It is alleged that. It claims that it was unaware that the bondholders' perfected security interest had lapsed. S. Bank The security interest was perfected when the original UCC 1 financing statement was filed on December 22. It was effective for a five year period. Within six months prior to the expiration of the five year period beginning on the date the original financing statement was filed. The UCC 3 was due to be filed anytime from June 22. This was considered an event of default under Section 801 of the bond trust indenture. |
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OPINION/ORDER The question before us is whether the National Bank Act and regulations promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency preempt 1 No. 04 2257 Wachovia Bank. Watters Page 2 Michigan banking laws concerning operating subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks.1 The district court held that the Michigan laws are preempted and granted summary judgment in favor of Wachovia. I. The parties agree that no material facts are disputed. Michigan has enacted a series of banking laws that are enforced by the defendant. Two Michigan statutes are at issue. Is not required to obtain a license to operate. Michigan's regulatory scheme permits it to investigate a specific consumer complaint if the complaint is not otherwise being pursued by the Comptroller. LAWS § 445.1663(2) ( |
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UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (10/26/1998, NO. 92-2872) Defendants were convicted of various offenses. That there was insufficient evidence on all of these counts to support their convictions. Was transported interstate. The conviction must sustain. There was. There were repeated references to certain record volumes at |
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OPINION/ORDER Arguing (1) the district court should not have dismissed defendant Alliance Bancorp (Alliance) on the ground that Alliance had not been properly served with a Truth in Lending Act rescission notice. (2) the district court erred in denying Miguel her attorneys' fees from defendant Bank of New York (Bank) on the ground that it was not the original creditor. (3) the district court erred by holding that Miguel's right to rescind the security interest was conditioned on her repaying the loan proceeds. (4) the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Miguel was able to refinance. THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUSTEE We have jurisdiction to review the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Miguel learned that Countrywide was merely an agent for the lienholder Bank. There is no evidence in the record to show that the Bank had any notice of the motion or the existence of the lawsuit. Marked the 120th day after Miguel's suit was filed. Permission to file the second amended complaint was granted on May 28. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Missouri The district court1 Refacciones en Generales S.A. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
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97-2087 -- U.S. V. DURAN -- 03/16/1998 We remand to the district court with directions to enter judgment against Duran for the lesser included offense of bank robbery.
David Duran was charged in an indictment with armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. |
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00-1209 -- U.S. V. PHELAN -- 01/11/2001 Only the specific facts surrounding the Women's Bank loans are relevant. Women's Bank decided not to exercise its right of set off because Paradise Casino's success was the bank's only hope of recovering the full amount of the loan. Seizing the casino's bank account would have destroyed that possibility. The Women's Bank loan was never repaid.
First. The privilege |
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OPINION/ORDER To which this case was removed from state court. The case was removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). 1 I. The contract was On later extended for another year. The case was converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation and a trustee was appointed. Before the settlement was approved. The case was subsequently removed to the district court. The court did not allow Thomson to recoup the value of shipments that were lost after January 3. 595.82 claim to take into account discounts that Brown had awarded Thomson and unpaid shipping invoices that were issued outside of the statute of limitations period. |
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UNITED STATES V. ADKINSON (10/26/1998, NO. 92-2872) Defendants were convicted of various offenses. That there was insufficient evidence on all of these counts to support their convictions. Was transported interstate. The conviction must sustain. There was. There were repeated references to certain record volumes at |
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UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556) The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Joel V. Gardner was on the brief for amicus curiae National Foreign Trade Council. With him on the brief was David English Carmack. We conclude that official tax receipts that the Central Bank submitted on behalf of Riggs Bank are entitled to the pre sumption of regularity. We reverse the decision of the Tax Court and hold that Riggs is entitled to the tax credits. I. Background and Prior Proceedings The origins of this case are set out more fully in our prior opinion Riggs National Corporation & Subsidiaries v. Will not be repeated at length here. These loans were of the |
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UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556) The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. |
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03-3018 -- U.S. V. SWANSON -- 01/26/2004 Swanson was convicted of one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. |
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OPINION/ORDER P.A. were on brief for appellant. Pandolph and Sulloway & Hollis were on brief for appellee Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. P.A. was on brief for appellees Bank of California. Is not a party. Seeks to recoup her losses from the institution ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The sentencing court must ordinarily calculate the amount of the loss as it exists at the time the crime was detected. We will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. I. The facts giving rise to Franklin Shaffer's conviction and sentence are relatively simple and largely undisputed. Shaffer formerly led several engineering and construction firms which were engaged in large construction projects in central Pennsylvania. After the companies' line of credit was canceled. Shaffer attempted to keep his businesses afloat by kiting checks for large sums of money between his personal bank accounts and the various business accounts.[fn1] At the time he was writing checks. Shaffer did not have sufficient funds in the accounts to cover the check amounts. Shaffer was charged with executing and attempting to execute a check kiting scheme from July through September. Ordered him to pay the victim banks the interest each would have earned on the money Shaffer had borrowed through the check kiting scheme. A motion was filed with the district court requesting that Shaffer be removed from pre trial diversion. |
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03-3018A -- U.S. V. SWANSON -- 01/26/2004 2004 is granted. A copy of the published opinion is attached. Entered for the Court PATRICK FISHER. Swanson was convicted of one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were Thomas J. With her on the brief were Frank W. Attorney at the time the brief was filed. Were on the brief for amici curiae Maxxam. What if an appointee resigns or dies while the Senate is in session? A dispute about the meaning of the Vacancies Act is at the center of this case. The orders they signed are therefore null and void. Extensions of time were sought and opposed. Motions and memoranda were exchanged. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The judgments of conviction are affirmed. One of whom was noticeably taller and larger than the other. One of the men was wearing a sweatshirt with a |
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97-3250 -- U.S. V. BINDLEY -- 10/13/1998 Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER Those proceedings were stayed because the Mathises filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. If the mortgagee . . . has notified us . . . of any . . . foreclosure . . . of which the mortgagee was aware prior to loss. |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
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OPINION/ORDER At which he was found guilty on one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371. 541 U.S. 36 The jury was unable to reach a verdict on substantive charges of bank robbery. (2) the receipt into evidence of items seized during a warrantless search of the apartment where Snype was arrested violated the Fourth Amendment. (a) was not supported by the record evidence. (b) violated his Sixth Amendment right to have findings of fact resulting in a higher maximum sentence made by a jury rather than the trial court. (c) was the result of an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. We conclude that the alleged errors are without merit or. B. The Robbers' Shootout with the Police While the robbery was in effect. Which was in fact responding to a radio alert about the crime. Because Partlow and Snype were masked. No teller or bank customer was able to identify them as the robbers. Shots were fired from that vehicle at the officers. The four confederates drove to Telephone records showed that all five conspirators were in constant contact with one another in the hours during the July 6. |
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BEL-BEL INT'L CORP. V. COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD (12/15/1998, NO. 96-4598) Circuit Judge: This case is one of many arising out of the bankruptcy of a Florida tomato farming operation owned by Joe Torcise. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court issued a consolidated opinion holding that Debtor's two payments to Ganis and two payments to Bank of the West were avoidable as preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Ganis now appeals from the BAP's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's decision that the lien payoffs of two tradein vehicles were not made according to ordinary business terms as required by § 547(c)(2)(C). The bankruptcy court's findings as applied to trade ins are erroneously limited to the average transaction in the industry rather than encompassing the broad range of practices that are not unusual in the industry. Bank of the West appeals from the district court's decision (1) affirming the bankruptcy court's finding that the lien payoff of a consignment vehicle was not made according to ordinary business terms. INC. 405 finding that the refund of a mistaken double payment with regard to the financed sale of a new vehicle was made according to ordinary business terms. Hold that no further evidence of industry practices was required. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank was required to arbitrate its disputes with Kvaerner and Jones. The joint venture was formed by Kvaerner Environmental Technologies. Construction and acceptance testing on the project were completed in 1996. The project was unable to make payments on the banks' financing. The New York Appellate Division dismissed the action against Jones because it was without personal jurisdiction over Jones. The 1 Because the provisions relevant to the present case are identical. We will refer to both the Kvaerner Guaranty and the Jones Guaranty collectively as the |
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OPINION/ORDER Joe Leon Mulder was convicted of one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Mulder was in the business of feeding cattle and raising calves. The backside of the financial statement recorded that Mulder's liability to Krog was secured by 106 steers valued at $62. E. The appraised value was lower than any value recorded on Mulder's financial statements. Which was not signed by Mulder. The promissory note was not signed by Mulder. These promissory notes were also not signed by Mulder. Was not signed by Mulder. The case was tried to a jury which found the defendant guilty of one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The document titled |
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UNITED STATES V. GREGG (7/2/1999, NO. 98-2347) Gregg was the president and sole shareholder of TEY Productions. While foreclosure proceedings were pending. Gregg was charged with bank fraud. Sufficiency of Evidence on Bank Fraud Conviction Gregg argues that the government failed to prove that the false representation he made to the bank was |
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UNITED STATES V. GREGG (7/2/1999, NO. 98-2347) Gregg was the president and sole shareholder of TEY Productions. While foreclosure proceedings were pending. Gregg was charged with bank fraud. Sufficiency of Evidence on Bank Fraud Conviction Gregg argues that the government failed to prove that the false representation he made to the bank was |
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OPINION/ORDER Employees were to arrange time off for personal business and medical appointments in advance. If the leave was not predictable. The employee needed to provide as much notice as was practicable. Spangler was absent for family or medical reasons for 32 days in 1993. A member bank1 Spangler was responsible for providing with cash services complained that Spangler's absenteeism was interfering with its business. Some of Spangler's duties were then reassigned to another employee. Spangler's many unscheduled absences and her persistent tardiness were routinely noted by the Bank. Each morning when she was absent. Spangler was warned that she needed to be on time to work and to talk to someone instead of leaving voice mail messages when she was unable to make it to work. Her 1997 performance appraisal noted that her 21 absences that year were excessive and that absenteeism was a problem for Spangler. Spangler was warned and put on a six month probation during which she was not to be absent more than twice at the risk of termination. |
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OPINION/ORDER Much of this information was culled from confidential financial statements. Imploring Banaitis to keep the financial information with which he was entrusted confidential. Banaitis' refusal to disclose was apparently not well received by Mitsubishi Bank or the Bank of California. Banaitis was placed on work probation. His pension for 1987 would have vested for that year. Merten was authorized to |
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OPINION/ORDER By failing to disclose information prior to trial that was relevant to her defense. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Was robbed on September 20. The robber was a short. There was also a surveillance video of the robbery which the jury watched four times. Jernigan's defense was that the witnesses misidentified her and she was not the robber shown in the surveillance video. The other two bank robbery charges were dismissed by stipulation. The November 28 robbery was similarly generic. The victim teller was Kathleen Golliher. 2001 robber was a short. Rodriguez Gallegos pleaded guilty to the firearm offense and the three bank robbery charges were dismissed. 2001 robberies (both of which she witnessed) were committed by different women. 1 7106 UNITED STATES v. A defendant |
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BEL-BEL INT'L CORP. V. COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD (12/15/1998, NO. 96-4598) Circuit Judge: This case is one of many arising out of the bankruptcy of a Florida tomato farming operation owned by Joe Torcise. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The dissent states |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank filed an adversary proceeding seeking to have the Vaughans' debt to it excepted from discharge or to have discharge generally denied. [the Bank] is entitled to recover its reasonable (1) After examining the briefs and appellate record. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. The parties later entered into a stipulation that the amount of costs and attorneys' fees owed by the Vaughans pursuant to the Personal Guarantees was $440. The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section. If such lien isÄ (A) a judicial lien . . . [.]. The bankruptcy court held that the Vaughans were entitled to avoid the Bank's lien and that any proceeds from a sale of the property would also be exempt if reinvested in another homestead within six months from the sale date. The Bank first argues that its lien was a consensual lien and not a |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: The Slip Opinion at 415 16. Beginning at line 28: [REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH: As we have held. While we hold to the rule that evidence as to the range of industry practice is ordinarily required. The problem of refunds of mistaken payments is exceptional. Bank of the West was subject to a legal obligation promptly to refund the money. Which would clearly have fallen within the ordinary range no matter what the relevant industry or practice. The |
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OPINION/ORDER We consider whether a class arbitration waiver in New Cingular Wireless Service Inc.'s standard contract for cellular phone services is unconscionable under California law. Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a holding that the waiver is unenforceable. We hold that the waiver is unconscionable. That the invalidation of the contract provision is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Alleging that he and similarly situated plaintiffs ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellant. Sherden and Peabody & Arnold were on brief for appellee. *Of the Third Circuit. The district court was to certify these findings and rulings to the Clerk of this court. At the time this action was brought. Rather the magistrate judge found that Montle was by then physically residing in Houston. Resided by the time this action 2 was commenced within the same state as plaintiff. Diversity of citizenship was entirely lacking. As the district court was without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. It should have granted Montle's original motion to dismiss on that ground. Was on brief for appellant. Sherden and Peabody & Arnold were on brief for appellee. *Of the Third Circuit. While not specifically alleging |
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OPINION/ORDER Morrissey and Quinn & Morris were on brief for appellant. Mandel and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellees. Was involuntarily retired from his position as Executive Vice President for Corporate Affairs on November 1. It is undisputed that the Bank forced Morrissey to retire because of his age. The question before us is whether the Bank's action was lawful under a narrow exemption to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. If such employees are entitled upon retirement to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit of at least $44. At which time he was the fifth highest paid employee at the Bank. Morrissey reported directly to the CEO and was responsible for (i) monitoring state and federal regulations and advising the Bank with respect to the influence and effect of these regulations upon the business of the Bank. His role in the formulation of Bank policy was greatly diminished after Blampied took over as CEO. All high policy decisions were made by the Board of Directors. In view of the fact that his sixty fifth birthday was approaching. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND TeamBank is a national bank that was founded in 1874. Which is less than thirty miles from Paola. Both banks were wholly owned subsidiaries of Team Financial Acquisition Subsidiary. Which is itself a wholly owned subsidiary of a Kansas bank holding company. We assume the district court will have the clerk enter a judgment dismissing Driskill. 22 1 Inc. TeamBank was to be the surviving entity and First National Bank's charter was to be dissolved. TeamBank's main office was to return to Paola. Nebraska were to be part of the new bank. The RiegleNeal Act allows states to prohibit mergers between out of state banks and in state banks which have been in existence for less than five years. Before the merger was approved. The Director sent TeamBank a letter notifying the bank of the State's position that the merger was illegal. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Were on brief for amicus curiae. |
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OPINION/ORDER Remmel & Zimmerman was on brief for appellant. P.A. were on brief for appellee. Unitex defaulted on a $3 million bank loan owed to Indian Head National Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was convicted by a jury of three counts of armed bank robbery. Cleophus Davis was arrested and charged with all three robberies. He fired a shot but no one was injured. Ethel Griffin had been in her car in the plaza parking lot where the Mid City Bank is located. (There was testimony that it takes three to five minutes to travel by car to this location from the Mid City Bank on 74th Street.). Teller Susan Grow testified that the robber was an African American male she could see his skin through the ski mask eye holes. She estimated that he was approximately 5'5'' to 5'8'' tall and weighed approximately 140 pounds. Another employee testified that the robber was approximately 5'7'' or 5'8'' tall with a thin build. Fresh shoe prints were found in the snow along the path where the robber fled. An Omaha police senior crime laboratory technician testified that the prints found near the Streamliner Credit Union were similar to those found near the scene of the first robbery at the 74th Street Mid City Bank. John Coats was in his car at a stoplight on the intersection of 42nd Street and Farnum. |
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97-6067 -- U.S. V. TRUJILLO -- 02/23/1998 The Del City branch of the Bank of Oklahoma was robbed of $7550. She testified he was Native American. The robber was clean shaven. He was approximately 5'11 |
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OPINION/ORDER Security guard Richard Heflin was killed during an armed robbery of the Lindell Bank & Trust in St. Holder were charged and convicted in separate jury trials for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2. Allen was sentenced to life in prison on Count I and received a sentence of death on Count II. I. Background Holder was a regular customer of the Lindell Bank & Trust. Five hundred dollars was automatically deposited to his account each month from a legal settlement Holder obtained after losing the lower portion of one leg in a train accident. Allen and Holder were also seen together on several other occasions during the ten days leading up to the armed robbery. The night before the armed robbery two vans were stolen for use as the first two getaway vehicles after the robbery (Holder's mother's car was to be used as the third. The ballistics evidence showed that both rifles were discharged during the robbery and a total of sixteen shots were fired inside the bank. The remaining two could have come from either rifle. Was on fire and two park workers helped to extinguish the flames. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Two similar bank robberies are at the heart of this criminal case. The robber's identity and whether the same individual perpetrated each robbery were the central factual disputes at trial. |
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OPINION/ORDER (the |
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MONEY STATN INC V. FRS |
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OPINION/ORDER Robert Rollins was charged with four counts of bank robbery. Rollins pleaded not guilty and was convicted at trial on all counts. Missouri and was subsequently apprehended. Rollins was eventually indicted for the Chicago robberies and charged with four counts of bank robbery. The case was tried before a jury. We will describe chronologically the testimony and evidence related to each crime. Which was positively identified as a government exhibit after it was recovered from the Rollins' home. (4) the use of a handgun that was |
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OPINION/ORDER Mathis asserts that the District Court erred in admitting evidence that his picture was selected from a photographic array. Because the array was unconstitutionally suggestive. When the three were inside the bank. The prosecution's primary witnesses were Sergeant Gary Gubbei and one of Mr. Three men exited the Jeep while it was still moving the driver first. Sergeant 3 Gubbei testified at trial that he was able. The robbed banks were located near Camden. Seaberry jumped over the tellers' counters and placed money from the drawers in a bag they were carrying. The three men exited while the vehicle was still rolling forward. Or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. The disputed evidence was admissible. Mathis conceded that Rule 404(b) was satisfied. Gantt's testimony presented a risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value and was therefore barred by Rule 403. Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. |
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OPINION/ORDER Alleging that her termination was in retaliation for her complaint of discrimination fourteen years earlier. Holding both that Tinsley's filing of her charge was untimely and that there was no genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support her claim of retaliation. We hold that Tinsley's filing of her charge was timely because the Virginia Council on Human Rights is a |
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OPINION/ORDER Beaulieu was on brief. With whom Schacht & McElroy was on brief. The third time is not the charm: because the record shows beyond peradventure that the parties entered into a subsequent written contract. The text of which is reproduced in the appendix. Since the case was decided below on summary judgment. The foreclosure proceedings have been consummated. 3Because this appeal is susceptible to resolution on the ground that the letter exchange extinguished any oral agreement. The district court reasoned that whether an oral agreement existed was of no consequence. As any such agreement was |
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97-4131 -- RUSHTON V. STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH -- 01/20/1999 The loan was secured by a note and trust deed on the property. The judgment provided: The Defendants John Herbert Gledhill and Gloria Kay Gledhill are jointly and severally indebted to the Plaintiff. The service station property was sold for $57. 907.27 and the proceeds were applied to the judgment. As the sale proceeds were less than the balance due. The Gledhills filed for bankruptcy shortly before the sale was to occur. The Big Rock Candy Mountain property was sold for $299. Objected to the Bank's claim on the ground that the Bank was not entitled to any fees and costs under |
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02-1230 -- U.S. V. MARTINEZ -- 09/08/2003 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. |
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99-1089 -- U.S. V. AKERS -- 06/12/2000 Akers ( |
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UNITED STATES V. HUMBER (7/5/2001, NO. 00-11054) We conclude that the two sections are to be applied cumulatively. We affirm the decision of the district court.
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UNITED STATES V. HUMBER (7/5/2001, NO. 00-11054) We conclude that the two sections are to be applied cumulatively. We affirm the decision of the district court.
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OPINION/ORDER Represented to them that he was the president of the corporation and that Humble and Gordon. Were directors. Humble and Gordon were informed that hurricane Mitch had destroyed substantial parts of the center. The loan Contracts were signed by plaintiffs under unusual circumstances. Humble received a telephone call requesting that he go to the bank to sign loan documents for what he believed was a loan to the corporation. He was surprised to learn that he was signing papers for a personal loan. Gordon was informed between surgeries that an emergency at the bank required his immediate presence. Was needed to sign a loan. He too was surprised to learn that the loan was for him personally rather than for the corporation. Who assured him the loan was not personal. Each was to begin making thirtyfive monthly payments on the principal. A merger clause was included in the Promissory Note. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. |
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OPINION/ORDER One of Jackson's duties as a bank teller was to close and secure the bank building at the end of the day. As Jackson was leaving a checkcashing establishment. Jackson was very frightened. Banks and Derrick telephoned Jackson and said they were on their way to pick her up. Inside the car were Banks. Put on gym shoes which were inside one of the book bags. The vehicle in which Jackson was riding pulled into the bank's parking lot. The bank building was used formerly as a mortuary and has a labyrinth of rooms in the basement. Believing the bank was empty. While the tellers were lying on the floor. There is no evidence weapons were used in the attempted robbery. 3 2 the vault. The plea agreement expressed the parties' belief that a sentencing range of 30 to 37 months' imprisonment was possible. Threat of Death Enhancement Jackson contends the unidentified male's threat of death to the bank tellers during the attempted bank robbery was not reasonably foreseeable to her. Whether a co conspirator's actions were reasonably foreseeable is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. |
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OPINION/ORDER Union Planters soon discovered that Greatstone was at the center of an elaborate bank fraud. Union Planters was left with worthless collateral (i.e. the forged promissory notes. 269 in advances and was left emptyhanded for an additional $3. Two types of losses are relevant here: losses due to |
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OPINION/ORDER Antonio Donaby was found guilty of bank robbery. Donaby asserts that it was improper for the district court to include the repair cost of the stolen getaway vehicle used in the robbery to increase the loss assessed under the Sentencing Guidelines. Donaby argues 1 A direct appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel was withdrawn by Donaby at oral argument. 2 No. 02 3144 that the lower court erred in awarding 18 U.S.C. § 3663A restitution for damage to a police car involved in the chase that followed the robbery. The first attempt to rob the bank was aborted as the group of men arrived too late in the morning to avoid customers. This van was used as the primary getaway vehicle during the robbery. No. 02 3144 3 The duo jumped into the stolen white van that was parked in front of the bank. Who happened to enter the bank as the robbery was ending. The van itself was valued at $34. Shiloh suffered $526.14 in damages to the vehicle driven by Officer Donovan in his pursuit of the white van. 2 A |
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OPINION/ORDER Represented to them that he was the president of the corporation and that Humble and Gordon. Were directors. Humble and Gordon were informed that hurricane Mitch had destroyed substantial parts of the center. The loan Contracts were signed by plaintiffs under unusual circumstances. Humble received a telephone call requesting that he go to the bank to sign loan documents for what he believed was a loan to the corporation. He was surprised to learn that he was signing papers for a personal loan. Gordon was informed between surgeries that an emergency at the bank required his immediate presence. Was needed to sign a loan. He too was surprised to learn that the loan was for him personally rather than for the corporation. Who assured him the loan was not personal. Each was to begin making thirtyfive monthly payments on the principal. A merger clause was included in the Promissory Note. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. |
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OPINION/ORDER 000 (and interest thereon) that was removed without his authorization from his bank account with CBNY in two wire transfers in March and April of 2001. Regatos signed an account agreement with CBNY in 1997.1 The agreement included the following language: The Bank will. The depositor will exercise reasonable care and promptness in examining such statement and items to discover any irregularity including. Any unauthorized signature or alteration and will notify the Bank promptly in writing of any such discovery. Describing only the most essential elements. 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 than fifteen (15) calendar days subsequent to the time that such statement and items were first mailed or available to the depositor. Regatos informed CBNY that the two transfers at issue were unauthorized. The transfers were effective. Meaning that they were executed pursuant to a security procedure upon which Regatos and CBNY had agreed.2 However. Article 4A's notice requirements can be satisfied at least if the parties have so agreed by constructive notice. |
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OPINION/ORDER Castellanos Law Firm were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER The check was presented to Schwab for deposit by a man who called himself James M. Whom investigators have been unable to track down ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER He argues that the district court erred in finding that he was not a party in interest with respect to all his claims. The |
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OPINION/ORDER The lawsuit was based upon allegations that PNC violated the Truth in Lending Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was prompted by the alleged failure of the Bank to comply with the MOU. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial evidence |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: At page 905. Do not have the option of receiving their benefits directly and do not voluntarily execute LOPEZ v. F.A. 5 contractual agreements regarding how overdrafts will be treated |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for the United States. Clary William Wester was formerly president. Wester was convicted by a jury of several different crimes. We begin by describing what the evidence would have permitted the jury to find. The three others were Robert Fredo. The loan was secured by land and future improvements and a personal guaranty of the debt from each of the partners. NEFR was concerned that Wester's and Fredo's participation in the partnership might create conflicts of interest. That the bank |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Roger J. With her on the brief were James V. Miller was on the brief for amicus curiae Ameri can Bankers Association Securities Association. Is not good enough. ICBA says that the Board's construc tion of s 20 imposing only a proportional limit on revenues from ineligible activities is too loose. We have jurisdiction to review under 12 U.S.C. s 1848 (1994). ... retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company or engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized under [the BHC Act] ... The Board is authorized ... to extend the two year period ... for not more than one year at a time ... but no such extensions shall in the aggregate exceed three years. 12 U.S.C. s 1843(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Was engaged in various activities. ICBA offers a series of arguments de signed to prove that this literal compliance with s 4(a)(2) is inadequate. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because this prior bad act evidence is neither admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) nor intricately related to the charged crime. Princeten Davis was apprehended by police while fleeing the scene of a bank robbery. That this earlier robbery was the idea of his cousin defendant Antonio Owens and that Owens made him do it. Owens was arrested on September 4. Owens woke Davis up and asked him if he was ready to rob a bank. |
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OPINION/ORDER ORDER Appellee's Petition for Rehearing is GRANTED. Is withdrawn. An Opinion will be filed contemporaneously with this Order. Circuit Judge: We must decide whether the statutory protections afforded Social Security and Supplemental Security Income ( |
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INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM With him on the briefs were Roger J. With her on the brief were James V. Mattingly. Miller was on the brief for amicus curiae Ameri can Bankers Association Securities Association. Before: Edwards. Is not good enough.  . ICBA says that the Board's construc tion of s 20 imposing only a proportional limit on revenues from ineligible activities is too loose. We have jurisdiction to review under 12 U.S.C. s 1848 (1994). ... retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company or engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized under [the BHC Act] ... (B) those permitted under [section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act].... The Board is authorized ... to extend the two year period ... for not more than one year at a time ... but no such extensions shall in the aggregate exceed three years. 12 U.S.C. s 1843(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Travelers. |
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OPINION/ORDER No. 00 4433 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: Daniel Quackenbush was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina as an accessory after the fact to a bank robbery after he assisted three bank robbers. Quackenbush was sentenced to sixty three months imprisonment. He was held jointly and severally liable for restitution in the amount of $26. Quackenbush argues on appeal that the district court committed plain error in assessing the full amount of restitution against him because the basis for his conviction was only as an accessory after the fact to the robbery. Quackenbush and Bishop were charged on a seven count indictment. The district court concluded that Quackenbush was jointly and severally liable for restitution and ordered him to pay a total of $26. This amount was based upon losses by the bank ($22. Quackenbush did not object to the amount of restitution. 1 Quackenbush was convicted of possessing $1. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The main question in this case is whether a debtor may recover damages for emotional distress under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) when a creditor violates the automatic stay that follows from the filing of a bankruptcy petition. We are persuaded that we erred and now answer |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant argues that the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support the conviction and that errors in the admission of evidence warrant a new trial. That there were no security guards. That there were four tellers. One of whom was an elderly woman. This is great. |
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OPINION/ORDER 761.48 made by Debtor to David Huddle and the Bank was an avoidable preferential transfer. The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the money paid by Debtor to Huddle and the Bank was held by the Debtor as an agent for its principal. It was therefore not property of the estate which the Trustee could recover under § 547. Background The underlying facts are summarized as follows. Debtor was a corporation in the business of auctioning personal property for its customers. Huddle's business assets were the security for a loan which had been made by the Bank to Huddle. Which was deposited in Debtor's general bank account. Seeking to set aside the payment made by Debtor to the Bank and Huddle on grounds that the payment was an avoidable preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).2 The Trustee maintained that Huddle was a creditor and the money in dispute was property of the bankruptcy estate which should be distributed in the normal course of the bankruptcy proceedings. Debtor and Huddle were in an agent principal relationship. |
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99-4174 -- MINERAL V. YUE -- 12/12/2000 The Bank was identified in the body of the complaint as a foreign banking institution doing business in the United States with its main office in Los Angeles. California. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Coughlin claims that the loan was secured by both his cash and Marine Bank's first priority interest in Health Management's accounts receivable. 2 No. 06 1805 that the loan was not secured by Health Management's accounts receivable. The term |
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OPINION/ORDER He was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each count. Patterson asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for The Honorable Richard H. That he is entitled to a new trial on counts one through four (conspiracy. False bank entries) because the jury's consideration of those charges was tainted by evidence related to counts five and six. That he is entitled to resentencing. The background facts are stated in a light favorable to the verdict. The name of the bank was changed in 1992 to the River Valley Bank & Trust. There was evidence relating to movement of funds within the bank by Patterson and others. The money was deposited into the EDC account on December 5. In 1992 there were unusual transactions related to a loan and the purchase of furniture. 000 credit was from a customer loan the bank had written off in 1989. 000 cashier's check was made out to the fictitious furniture company. The furniture was later sold for $35. The proceeds from that sale were put back into the bank. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND The origin of the present petition is the related federal case filed in 1989 by Society for Savings in the Southern District of Florida concerning a consumer loan. That case was settled by No. 89 6167 CIV PAINE (S.D.Fla.1989). surrender of the vessel to Society for Savings and the agreed payment of $13. Which he alleges is the successor to Society for Savings with offices in Palm Beach County. Bank of Boston represented that it is a national banking association with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. That Rogers is a Florida citizen. The district court determined that Bank of Boston's failure to allege the state in which it is incorporated constituted an inadequate showing of its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction: A review of the Notice of Removal reveals that Defendant has failed to adequately demonstrate that the controversy is between citizens of different states. Defendant merely alleges that it is |
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99-2234 -- ROSCOE V. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION -- 12/10/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Pro se plaintiffs Benjamin J. The crux of the Roscoes' complaint was that the defendants unlawfully |
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ANIXTER V. HOME-STAKE PROD. CO. 1996 by Judge Lucero Please be advised that the attached dissent was omitted from the decision as filed January 29. We are told. Investments made in later year Programs were paid to earlier year investors as |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. Dana & Gould were on brief for appellees. The result is that only the lead bank has a direct contractual relationship with the borrower. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND The origin of the present petition is the related federal case filed in 1989 by Society for Savings in the Southern District of Florida concerning a consumer loan. That case was settled by surrender of the vessel to Society for Savings and the agreed payment of $13. Which he alleges is the successor to Society for Savings with offices in Palm Beach County. Bank of Boston represented that it is a national banking association with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. That Rogers is a Florida citizen. The district court determined that Bank of Boston's failure to allege the state in which it is incorporated constituted an inadequate showing of its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction: A review of the Notice of Removal reveals that Defendant has failed to adequately demonstrate that the controversy is between citizens of different states. Defendant merely alleges that it is |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a consolidated appeal from two district court orders Honorable Wilbur D. We hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the statute of limitations ruling because it was not a final judgment properly subject to Rule 54(b) certification. We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of the averments that it held constitute a derivative action. Have jurisdiction over the final judgment dismissing the entire complaint insofar as it concerns two of the defendants. Holding that it is collaterally estopped by a holding in the first case. We have jurisdiction to review the judgment in the second case. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Southeast Banking Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER P.A. were on brief for appellants. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 1 Kroh's deposits were |
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OPINION/ORDER EVIDENCE AT TRIAL Whitehead was engaged in a farming enterprise in the 1980s. I warrant that all financial statements and information I provide to you are or will be accurate. Each of the three credit lines were in default by late 1987. Whitehead was able to borrow the $35. 000 loan was |
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OPINION/ORDER Was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio of mail fraud. In concluding the embezzled funds were the funds of a labor organization. Would have questioned the judge's impartiality. |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant was convicted of bank fraud. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty seven months and to three years of supervised release. Cambridge's clients and Bank One officials were led to believe that the collateral bonds were owned outright by Defendant. Cambridge's clients were required to sign |
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OPINION/ORDER With whom Madera & Toro was on brief. There is less to this jurisdictional conundrum than meets the eye. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss. The plans were changed to relocate the clinic and provide for a six story bank and commercial office building on the north side of the land. The project again was paralyzed with the clinic 90% complete when regulators placed First Federal under supervision. A First Federal client and a close personal friend of the loan officer with whom the plaintiffs were dealing (Luis Beauchamp). Kutcher acted on behalf of the corporation and was in total control of the clinic's affairs. The bankruptcy case was dismissed within eight months. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction is never presumed. Their premise is well taken. The Civil Rules provide an additional three days if service is by mail. The error was harmless. Though the district court should not have ruled on the dismissal motion until the time for lodging an opposition had expired. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The origin of the present petition is the related federal case filed in 1989 by Society for Savings in the Southern District of Florida concerning a consumer loan. That case was settled by surrender of the vessel to Society for Savings and the agreed payment of $13. Which he alleges is the successor to Society for Savings with offices in Palm Beach County. Bank of Boston represented that it is a national banking association with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. That Rogers is a Florida citizen. The district court determined that Bank of Boston's failure to allege the state in which it is incorporated constituted an inadequate showing of its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction: A review of the Notice of Removal reveals that Defendant has failed to adequately demonstrate that the controversy is between citizens of different states. |
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OPINION/ORDER Lines 1 2 the sentence is changed to begin |
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OPINION/ORDER This is a diversity of citizenship action by Elmer Ernest Romines and his wife and daughters (collectively. Included in these conditions was a provision that the Consulting Agreement would automatically terminate if Progressive Federal was ever determined by federal regulators to be in an unsafe and unsound financial condition. The annuities provided that Progressive Federal was The Honorable George F. Elmer Romines was designated the payee. Romines' wife and daughters were named as beneficiaries in the event of his death. Romines was paid under the annuities pursuant to the Consulting Agreement. Separate examinations of Progressive Federal by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) concluded that Progressive Federal was technically insolvent. Progressive Federal and OTS entered into a Consent Agreement under which Progressive Federal acknowledged that it was insolvent and could be placed in receivership and that both Progressive Federal and OTS would seek a healthier institution to merge with Progressive Federal. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Sornbergers were released. First Bank was robbed by a perpetrator wearing a baseball cap. Illinois Chief of Police Rick Pesci was the first law enforcement official to arrive at the scene. No eyewitness nor any other First Bank employee was able to identify the robber. Who was an acquaintance of Dugan and a former customer of First Bank. Dugan remarked that he was less sure of the likeness. Who was present intermittently while the employ 4 No. 04 3614 ees viewed the surveillance tapes. Both Sornbergers offered consistent alibis: They were together at Scott's parents' home. All of these officers are named as defendants in this action. Only Teresa was present. She complied and was transported to Galesburg in the front seat of a police car. Although the existence of the statement is undisputed. Exactly what occurred during Teresa's interview is the subject of intense dispute between the parties. She was 6 No. 04 3614 told immediately after arriving in Galesburg that she was a suspect in the robbery. Teresa claims that she was then psychologically coerced into confessing by Officer Sheppard who allegedly (1) falsely informed her that witnesses placed her at the scene of the robbery. |
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OPINION/ORDER Concluding that District Deputy Comptroller John Bodnar is entitled to qualified immunity regarding his action in approving Mr. That all defendants are entitled to absolute immunity regarding the other regulatory actions challenged in the amended complaint. Northwest National Bank was a distressed bank operating in Gravette. None of which was based on a comprehensive examination of the actual loan files. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The origin of the present petition is the related federal case filed in 1989 by Society for Savings in the Southern District of Florida concerning a consumer loan. That case was settled by surrender of the vessel to Society for Savings and the agreed payment of $13. Which he alleges is the successor to Society for Savings with offices in Palm Beach County. Bank of Boston represented that it is a national banking association with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. That Rogers is a Florida citizen. The district court determined that Bank of Boston's failure to allege the state in which it is incorporated constituted an inadequate showing of its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction: A review of the Notice of Removal reveals that Defendant has failed to adequately demonstrate that the controversy is between citizens of different states. |
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OPINION/ORDER Rich and Friedman & Atherton were on brief for appellants. Jr. were on brief for appellee. The loans were secured by mortgages on the properties to be developed and by Simon's personal guaranty. All construction loan requisitions by the Borrowers were honored in due course by the Bank until October 18. 657 was dishonored. The Bank closed and FDIC was appointed receiver. Alerting creditors that all claims against the Bank were to be submitted to FDIC by January 23. Notice of FDIC's appointment as liquidating agent of the Bank was mailed to plaintiffs appellants. They were aware prior to the bar date that FDIC had been appointed receiver of the Bank. Plaintiffs appellants informed FDIC that the Bank was in default under the Modification Agreements for refusing their October 18 requisition. The present action was commenced on April 21. The district court ruled that their claims were barred under 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). II II DISCUSSION DISCUSSION Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo to determine whether the |
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OPINION/ORDER At issue in this case are the duties of disinterest and disclosure of an examiner appointed to facilitate a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Which was unable to meet obligations on $1.2 billion in debt and whose Nos. 02 6212/ 6213/6338/6340/ 6341/6344/6347 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro. As did the United States Trustee which is responsible for appointing bankruptcy examiners and trustees. The petition represented the largest bankruptcy case ever filed in Kentucky and at the time was one of the largest bankruptcy cases in the country. Schilling signed a document entitled |
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OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Weaver was sentenced to 110 months imprisonment and three years supervised release and required to pay $8168 in restitution and three $100 special assessments. Weaver appeals a decision of the district court denying his motion to suppress evidence that was obtained as a result of a consensual encounter between himself and law enforcement officials. Weaver's final contention is that the district court violated his due process rights at trial by |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER After a three week trial in which 104 witnesses testified and approximately 200 exhibits were introduced. Defendants Craig Scott Keltner and Charles Bruce Nabors were convicted by a jury of a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Both defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and robbery and interstate transportation of stolen jewelry. Nabors was convicted of mail and wire fraud. Keltner was convicted of structuring a cash transaction. Fern Kilgore's Ford Bronco was stolen. Kilgore's Bronco was rammed into a Radio Shack store during a burglary in January 1991. Several compatible walkie talkies and police scanners were stolen from the store. A police scanner guide of the brand sold exclusively by Radio Shack was later recovered by law enforcement from Keltner's car. Where Nabors obtained the type of microphone for which he was looking. The internal components of one such microphone were identified as similar to the microphone used on a hoax bomb device involved in an extortion and robbery attempt of the Woodland Bank in Tulsa. |
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OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The engine of the car was running. The driver was looking in the direction of the door of the bank. It appeared to Detective Reyna that the driver was waiting for someone at the bank. Riley was carrying something in his hands that Detective Reyna could not see clearly. The car was at the station for less than a minute. Detective Reyna also called Detective Jeff Heist to inform Detective Heist that he was following a suspicious car. Detective Reyna radioed that he was going to attempt to stop the car because there was not a marked police car in the area. While the Lincoln still was stopped at the light. The driver's license that was produced had been issued to a |
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OPINION/ORDER Pia Gallegos with whom Harry Anduze Montano was on brief for appellants. Usera with whom Goldman Antonetti Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer was on brief for appellees. *Of the Ninth Circuit. I Julio Mercado Garcia ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Magill as an active judge at the time this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. After the opinion was filed. Both of these obligations were secured by approximately 1129 acres of farmland owned by the Allens. United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. 3 3 of farmland was far less than the total amount that the Allens owed to the Banks. Was listed as an undersecured claim. None of the undersecured nor the unsecured creditors were to receive any payments for their claims. Richard Bjerk and Hoysler Associates were listed as having unsecured claims totaling $61. The Banks were listed as having an undersecured claim in the amount of $154. No mention was made of Eden Bank's undersecured claim. The treatment of claims section noted that Eureka Bank's secured claim was to be negotiated later. That Eureka Bank was also a possible undersecured creditor whose undersecured claim would be negotiated at a later time. That the results of any negotiations were to be included as part of the October 1987 amended plan. |
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OPINION/ORDER At issue in this appeal is whether the Truth in Lending Act requires all pertinent credit information be disclosed by a 2 single creditor. Or whether the requirements of the TILA can be satisfied if some of the required credit information is disclosed by a third party. We address the question of whether a creditor violated the provisions of the TILA when it excluded certain debt cancellation fees from the calculation of the finance charge without disclosing the amount of the fees and that the debt cancellation coverage was voluntary. Despite the fact that the disclosures were ultimately made by a non creditor third party. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court. Fitts was not Sky Bank's agent and at all relevant times acted independently.1 1. It is undisputed that the loan entered into It appears from the record that there exists some confusion over Fitts' exact relationship with Sky Bank. That there was never any explicit agreement or implicit assumption that Fitts would act as Sky Bank's agent for the purposes of the loan. |
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OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit | ||
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OPINION/ORDER They ran to an adjacent restaurant where Gibson was waiting in a green Chevy Trailblazer. The Trailblazer's license plate number was traced to Gibson. 770 that was traced to the robbed bank. When she asked him if the money was intended to keep her quiet. The gun was black with vent holes in the barrel. Sykes told him it was too late to change their plans. Throwing away the one he thought was untraceable. Gibson was paid $40. Gibson left the state and shortly after was arrested by the FBI. Gibson was placed in the same holding cell as Johnson. Johnson told him he was aware that Gibson had been talking to the FBI and threatened that he (Johnson) carried a gun and Gibson should know what would happen No. 04 2371 5 if he testified. He claimed that only he and Brian Gibson were involved in the bank robbery. The court stated that if the guidelines were not in place. It would have sentenced Johnson to a total of 180 months. In response to a question about whether he might have any bias against a witness who cooperated with the government. |
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OPINION/ORDER In which the precedential effect was limited. Was originally issued and filed on July 19. The court has now designated the opinion as one in which the precedential effect is fully precedential. * Michigan. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( |
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FDIC V. HAMILTON This case is before us a second time. The facts of this case are set forth in that opinion and need not be restated here except to the extent necessary to our discussion of the issues. 000 in expenditures on the Hamiltons' fraud claim under the law of Oklahoma . . . even though the issue as to whether the Hamiltons are entitled to recover on their fraud claim was clearly presented. 000 in expenditures to which we referred in our prior opinion were not |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Tracey Hartz was licensed as both an attorney and a real estate broker in the State of Illinois. He was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Hawkes & Goldings were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for the United States. The gist of the events described in the indictment was that Medina had deposited a $365 check in his Bank of Boston account. Medina filed a number of motions that were subsequently resolved. Medina's trial date was repeatedly delayed. One of these motions with which this appeal is in part concerned asked that the case be dismissed on the ground that it was being pursued in breach of a promise by the prosecutor made in 1987 not to prosecute if Medina made restitution to the bank of $200. The court found the assertions made in support of the motion to dismiss were insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. Medina was tried in January 1993. In 1986 Medina was a research associate at a non profit research organization in Boston then known as the Eye Research Institute. Medina had been born and raised in Spain and was fluent in both English and Spanish. The check was a bank check prepared by Banco Central of Spain. Was made payable to Medina. |
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99-9002 -- SECURITY STATE BANK V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 06/07/2000 We are faced with precisely the issue decided by the Eighth Circuit in Security Bank Minnesota v. 7482 and affirm.
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court concluded the action was an in rem proceeding that did not seek the imposition of any personal liability and. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. The mortgage was recorded on June 1. The Bank One debt was among the debts to be consolidated. The satisfaction was recorded on or about June 19. That mortgage was recorded. Bank One specifically requested the state court adjudge the satisfaction was void and annulled and the underlying mortgage was revived. They alleged the commencement of the lawsuit violated the discharge injunction because it was an attempt to coerce them into paying the discharged debt rather than incur the expense of the pending litigation. Bank One's motion to dismiss the Annens' counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) was docketed in the bankruptcy court. Bank One argued the declaratory judgment action was an in rem proceeding to determine the existence and nature of its mortgage lien against the Annens' homestead and. |
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OPINION/ORDER They claim that they were deceived by a fraudulent marketing scheme which induced them to purchase residential lots and homes at inflated prices. This case and its related proceedings have a long and convoluted history. The present appeal is the third time this Court has considered this case. They also sought to represent a putative class consisting of all persons who purchased houses or homesites from GDC or GDV over the period from 1957 to 1990 and who are members of the North Port Out of State Lot Owners Association ( |
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USA V. BROUMAS JOHN G. |
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OPINION/ORDER States that he has a gun but makes no reference to his willingness to use it is subject to a two level sentencing enhancement for a |
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OPINION/ORDER Botti and Burns & Levinson were on brief. Craig and Macauley Professional Corporation were on brief. It is trite. A group of borrowers who complain that they were swindled. Negligence are barred by the D'Oench. Plaintiffs' affirmative defenses to the counterclaims are impuissant. None of the plaintiffs is entitled to benefit from a belated effort to interject into the decisional calculus an incorrectly computed figure contained in a writ of execution issued by a Maine state court in a related proceeding. Because two of the orders that we are reviewing arose under the aegis of Fed. The myriad plaintiffs in this civil action are bound together by what appears in retrospect to have been a serious error in judgment: they all borrowed money from the Bank in connection with the purchase of condominium units from Steven M. Although each plaintiff's predicament is slightly different. A plaintiff purchased a condominium based on multiple misrepresentations by Rostoff such as: that the unit had been completely renovated and was being sold at a substantial discount from market value. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This is a consolidated appeal from two district court orders dismissing certain averments brought by a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee on behalf of a bank holding company against former directors and officers of the holding company and its subsidiary bank. In the first case. We hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the statute of limitations ruling because it was not a final judgment properly subject to Rule 54(b) certification. We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of the averments that it held constitute a derivative action. Have jurisdiction over the final judgment dismissing the entire complaint insofar as it concerns two of the defendants. Holding that it is collaterally estopped by a holding in the first case. We have jurisdiction to review the judgment in the second case. The Bankruptcy Proceedings
Southeast Banking Corporation ( |
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96-2176 -- U.S. V. HAWKINS -- 12/11/1998
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JOHNSON JOHN W. V. OTS |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm. I. The Association is a non profit corporation dedicated to pursuing a proper settlement of the ancient estate of a Welsh seaman. They discovered that the most significantly involved financial institution was the North Georgia Savings and Loan Association. The proceeds of which were at least partly paid over to 3 Edwards. Wachovia Bank filed a second summary judgment motion arguing that the Association's claim against it was barred because no private cause of action exists under RICO for aiding and abetting. This argument was based on a case we decided during the course of the litigation. The Supreme Court had ruled that private aiding and abetting suits were not authorized by S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The District Court concluded that Rolo was controlling and granted summary judgment in favor of Wachovia Bank. We would have to resolve it. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. The record is judged by the same standard district courts use. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This is a consolidated appeal from two district court orders dismissing certain averments brought by a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee on behalf of a bank holding company against former directors and officers of the holding company and its subsidiary bank. In the first case. We hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the statute of limitations ruling because it was not a final judgment properly subject to Rule 54(b) certification. We do not have jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of the averments that it held constitute a derivative action. Have jurisdiction over the final judgment dismissing the entire complaint insofar as it concerns two of the defendants. Holding that it is collaterally estopped by a holding in the first case. We have jurisdiction to review the judgment in the second case. The Bankruptcy Proceedings
Southeast Banking Corporation ( |
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D & N BANK, A FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK V. U.S. Argued for plaintiff appellant. With him on the brief were Melvin C. Argued for defendant appellee. With him on the brief was Stuart E. Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Of counsel on the brief were Jeanne E. N has not demonstrated that there was a contract that could have been breached by FIRREA. Which was lengthy and had many attachments. Contained no specific reference to a commitment for long term amortization and gave no hint that assurances were requested against changes in the law or that anything was requested other than approval of the merger under the then current regulations. Nothing about the merger transaction suggests that plaintiff was looking for a guarantee. That the documents and the testimony support its assertion. It also argues that the circumstances involved in its merger were analogous to those in other cases in which this court and the Supreme Court found that the parties had formed a valid contract and were entitled to damages as a result of the passage of FIRREA. Finally. |
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OPINION/ORDER We accordingly issue the writ. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 1566 BACKGROUND This mandamus petition represents one more chapter in a long running dispute over the right to the assets of the estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. On one side is a class of plaintiffs who obtained a large judgment in the federal district court in Hawaii against the Marcos estate for human rights violations by the Marcos regime. The judgment included an injunction restraining the estate and its agents or aiders and abettors from transferring any of the estate's assets.2 On the other side is the Republic of the Philippines. Which independently has sought forfeiture of the Marcos estate's assets on the ground that they were stolen by Marcos from the Philippine government and its people. Which was seeking to recover them. Which was not a party to the litigation. Was an agent or aider and abettor of the Estate. The Philippine Supreme Court subsequently held that the assets were forfeited to the Republic of the Philippines. |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were John C. Of counsel was Thomas G. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Like others that have reached this court in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Because the failing thrifts were unattractive investment prospects on their own. Acquiring institutions such as CalFed were no longer permitted to include supervisory goodwill as part of their regulatory capital. They were required to write down their supervisory goodwill over a five year period. CalFed was one of the institutions that filed a breach of contract action based on the FIRREA provisions regarding supervisory goodwill. Would have produced substantial profits if CalFed had been able to retain them. Holding that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to foreseeability. Was foreseeable. (2) that CalFed had failed to prove that the ARMs and other assets were sold because of the breach. (3) that the method of calculating damages advocated by CalFed was too speculative to serve as the basis for a damages award. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is corrected as follows: On page 2. Line 6 (footnote 1) change |
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OPINION/ORDER Section 4 |
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02-6130 -- U.S. V. PAYNE -- 01/28/2003 (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (3) the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when a court security officer told a juror that the men seated behind the defense counsel's table were deputy marshals. The purpose of this scheme was to inflate an existing bank account artificially with the deposit of a worthless check. Thereby enabling the withdrawal of funds from the account before the worthless check was detected. With regard to this count. Payne was added as a signatory to the account on June 5. Had not filled out the rest of it. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Vincent Lane was charged with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and eight counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining three counts. Which were then dismissed. Lane was sentenced to 30 months in prison. I. Background Vincent Lane is a real estate developer who participated in several ventures during the 1980s and 1990s in both Illinois and in Texas. From 1988 through 1995 he was also the chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Lane's conviction is based on fraudulent statements concerning his financial stability made to bank officials at American National Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are principally called upon in this appeal to decide two issues of first impression in this Court. The first is one in a long line of post Lopez1 challenges to federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Eliot LLP were on brief. Lockhart LLP were on brief. SAB was the wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss American Holding Company. Which in turn was wholly owned by Bank of New York Inter Maritime Bank (IMB). He admitted that the funds deposited at SAB were drug proceeds that he had laundered through shell corporations organized with the help of Peter F. Notice of the impending forfeiture was published in the Antiguan Gazette and the Boston Globe. No competing claims were filed. The banks have been instructed by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda to freeze all of the assets . . . in issue in your Petition. Until the ultimate beneficial owners have been ascertained to the Government's satisfaction. This is a directive that the banks have to honor on pain of having their licences revoked and is a problem that you may well have to address on the successful conclusion of your litigation. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Is the FDIC required to pay the cost of lease mandated structural repairs and modifications to a building when it acts as a receiver for a failed lessee thrift and disaffirms its lease under FIRREA? We will reverse the district court's order rejecting the claim for these repairs. We also will reverse the district court's order rejecting the lessor's claim for the costs of making modifications to the building to comply with the ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act). We will remand the case to the district court to determine whether the obligation of repairing the building and complying with the ADA had matured by the date the thrift went into receivership. Was liable for sums due under a sublease of the historic PSFS building Meritor occupied at 12 South 12th Street. Meritor also was obligated to: comply with and cause the Premises to comply with (i) all laws. It is clear that the sublease put the risks and burdens of maintaining the building on Meritor. The FDIC was appointed its receiver on the same day. |
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OPINION/ORDER LLP were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for the United States. Parsons was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Was slated to do the construction. Financing was sought from First Service Bank for Savings. Some of this money was disbursed at once. Most was held back and payments were made over the succeeding months. These subsequent payments were partly based upon |
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OPINION/ORDER ERRATA SHEET It is ordered that pages 6 7 of the opinion. Are modified to include the following underlined language and the footnotes shall be renumbered as indicated: Following his release. Investigators 2Investigators also learned that James Hall is the brother of Lance Hall. Neither James nor Lance Hall were involved. Champion with whom Friedman & Babcock was on brief for appellant Aedan C. Were on brief for appellee. We recite the facts as found by the district court to the extent that they derive support from the record and are not clearly erroneous. Where specific findings are lacking. Each was 3 3 armed. Witnesses reported that a red Pontiac Sunbird bearing Rhode Island license plates recently had been parked near the spot where the abandoned GMC Jimmy was found. Indicating that the two suspects were now believed to be travelling in the red Pontiac Sunbird. The police cruiser's internal rear door handles were not functional and a plastic spit guard and a wire cage separated its rear and front seats. |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal by the government. Was eventually indicted on February 26. Briefing was suspended until March 22. I. The Affidavit for the Search Warrant A 13 page affidavit was sworn to by FBI Special Agent Christopher Gicking in support of the issuance of two search warrants. Lovelace was assigned to Chief Judge Todd. Judge Todd's order also indicated that after the motion to suppress was resolved. Paragraphs 3 through 17 pertained to claims that Riddick was involved with a Danny Cobb to obtain a $300. Dealt with the subject matter of the conspiracy count in the indictment and are included for emphasis: (33) Hutcherson stated [that] he had been told by someone that RIDDICK had approached an individual unknown to him (Hutcherson) about burning a house in order to collect the insurance proceeds. ]2 advised [Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Special Agent] Michael Frizzell that RIDDICK was involved with a house fire that occurred on 08/26/1998 at 561 Dogwood Drive in Decaturville. The CI stated RIDDICK had prior knowledge that the residence was going to burn. |
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OPINION/ORDER Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Ordered the sentence be served concurrently with the 180 month sentence if the bank fraud sentence is affirmed on appeal. Hacker was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for multiple counts of mail fraud. Hacker pled guilty to the federal charges and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. Hacker was released from prison and began serving his supervised release term. The Bank One account eventually was closed with a zero balance on January 23. Hacker withdrew funds from his BankWest account before the checks were returned for nonsufficient funds. Two levels were added for the use of sophisticated means to commit the offense. The court concluded such conduct |
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OPINION/ORDER The only issue that The merits discussion is one involving the § 5324(a)(1) counts. 1 parties phrase the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence to convict on the two § 5324(a)(1) counts. The facts the jury could find from the evidence are not really in dispute. The real issue is whether 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). Several of the district court's evidentiary rulings. 1 institution to fail to file a report required |
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UNITED STATES V. PHIPPS This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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UNITED STATES V. PHIPPS This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Appellant Yockel asserts the district court2 erred in (1) not holding intent was a requirement for the intimidation element of bank robbery. (2) finding the evidence was sufficient to prove the taking of money by intimidation. Requested after the jury was impaneled and sworn. His hair was unkempt. His eyes were black as if he had been beaten. The teller was unable to find an account under any of these names. I know I have money here. |
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UNITED STATES V. CHRISTO This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Background
Christo was the president of Bay Bank. Codefendant Maulden was also a member of the board of directors of Bay Bank until 1989. The NSF checks were recorded as overdrafts. Christo would personally intercede on a daily basis to ensure the procedure was followed. Many of the checks written to cover the NSF checks were drawn on accounts which also had insufficient funds. Because Maulden was not charged interest on these NSF checks. Defendant Maulden
Maulden claims insufficient evidence supported his conviction for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER Concluding: (1) that Locke's negligence claim against her employer was barred by the exclusivity provisions of Florida's workers' compensation laws. She was working as a manager at SunTrust's Recker Highway bank branch in Winter Haven. Because the teller's window glass was bulletproof. 2002 date she was shot. SunTrust was aware that a teller at the same bank had been pistol whipped by a bank robber. Locke was told that SunTrust had hired a security guard and that the security guard would be in place at the bank branch. There was no security guard in place at the branch. The district court concluded that Locke's claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Florida workers' compensation laws because her injuries were causally related to her employment as a bank manager. The parties do not dispute that Locke's Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty days after the entry of the district court's dismissal order on April 10. Locke's Notice of Appeal was due on or before May 10. This is sometimes known as the workers' compensation exclusivity bar. |
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UNITED STATES V. CHRISTO This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Background
Christo was the president of Bay Bank. Codefendant Maulden was also a member of the board of directors of Bay Bank until 1989. The NSF checks were recorded as overdrafts. Christo would personally intercede on a daily basis to ensure the procedure was followed. Many of the checks written to cover the NSF checks were drawn on accounts which also had insufficient funds. Because Maulden was not charged interest on these NSF checks. Defendant Maulden
Maulden claims insufficient evidence supported his conviction for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER He was caught. Freeman's job was to serve as getaway driver for the actual robbers. Smith's was to distract and obstruct the police from reaching the getaway car. Both of the guns the .45 used during the robbery and the Desert Eagle that was in the trunk of the car. (4) the court improperly instructed the jury that |
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OPINION/ORDER The primary question for decision is whether the Standby Options executed and issued by the First Bank of Philadelphia ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Boyd's loans were assigned to yet another entity. Which immediately removed the case to federal court once it was named as a defendant. Boyd was advised by Linda Orr. Which Boyd alleged had taken an assignment of |
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OPINION/ORDER Lloyd was sentenced to consecutive terms of fortysix and eighty four months. Lloyd filed a timely appeal arguing that the second count of the indictment was insufficient or duplicitous. Certain evidentiary rulings made during his trial were an abuse of discretion. This decision was originally issued as an |
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SMITH V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER The issues raised in these appeals are whether the district court erred in determining that: (1) the FDIC's takeover and sale of Meritor was not a reorganization for purposes of the plaintiffs' separation pay plan. (7) the FDIC was not liable for a statutory penalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) as a result of its failure to respond in a timely manner to plaintiffs' request for plan documents. (8) the certification of three plaintiff classes was inappropriate. We will affirm the orders of the district court. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the FDIC is not liable for the statutory penalty prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). We will affirm the order of the district court pertaining to this issue. The FDIC was appointed as receiver for the insolvent bank. Eligible employees were entitled to severance pay based on their years of service and salary. Benefits were payable for involuntary termination due to |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1346(a)(1). Although the levied upon funds were removed from the Steads' account. If in fact they were ever transferred from the bank. Is not disclosed by the record. The funds were not returned to the Steads. The IRS does not have any record of receiving the funds from First Interstate Bank or Wells Fargo Bank. For reasons that are unclear from the record. Neither the Steads nor the IRS appears to have attempted to recover the missing funds from First Interstate Bank or Wells Fargo Bank. The Steads' tax dispute was resolved to the satisfaction of the IRS. 1996 was remitted to the IRS. Even though the tax was assessed against a third party. 529 (1995). 2 Certain types of property are statutorily exempted from a § 6321 tax lien pursuant to I.R.C. § 6323. 1 STEAD v. Banks are subject to special rules and must wait twenty one days before relinquishing levied upon funds. A bank has only two defenses: 1) the levied upon property is not in its possession. |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this timely filed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Her diabetes is severe and life threatening. Her diabetes is |
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OPINION/ORDER Kellett was a closing attorney for a federally insured bank. He was indicted for making false statements to ComFed in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014 and for obstructing justice. A superceding indictment was returned. He was sentenced. Is now serving a term of supervised release. Kellett's trial allegedly would likely have ended in acquittal and he would not have pled guilty. We affirm.2 Because Kellett was never tried after his reindictment. Because this appeal is so clearly meritless and rendering a decision on the merits would not alter the result reached below. Is whether the withheld information was material to Kellett's defense. The test of materiality in evaluating a challenge to a guilty plea based on the withholding of exculpatory evidence is whether there is a |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over the challenges to the convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm. 2 I.1 In October 2001. At the top was Melvyn Waldron. In the middle tier of the conspiracy were the |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 dated July 15. The complaint was prompted by the Bank's belief that Richele intended to sue the Bank for release of its lien and for damages that she alleged she incurred as a result of the Bank's continued assertion of a lien against the property. Richele answered the complaint alleging that the Bank's lien was void. A cross claim against Richele for a determination that her lien was void as a preferential transfer. Finding and ordering that the Bank is the holder of a second priority lien on the Property. 2) that the statement of facts is insufficient for the bankruptcy court to make a determination on the issue of attorney fees. 4) that the December 1998 Deed of Trust was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Thomas appeal from the final judgments of the district court after they were convicted of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). Thomas was convicted of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(a) and (d). Was robbed by several individuals. It was robbed again on The two robberies were conducted in the same manner. The robberies were always executed extremely rapidly. Warfield was charged in the superseding indictment with one count of armed bank robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit The Honorable Joseph E. Thomas was charged with armed bank robbery in connection with the December 8. A jury found the Appellants guilty on each count with which they were After being sentenced by the district court. Ct. 453 (1994)). establish something more than the mere fact that his chance for acquittal would have been better had he been tried separately. demonstrate that the joint trial prejudiced his right to a fair trial. |
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OPINION/ORDER 1998) *Judge Sloviter was Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at the time this appeal was argued. The issue on appeal before the en banc court is the continuing vitality of our opinion in United States v. Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1997) which permits a downward departure based on diminished capacity where the crime is non violent. Contending the district court should have granted him a downward departure for diminished capacity under USSG S 5K2.13 because (1) the unarmed bank robbery was non violent and (2) he has a well documented history of serious psychiatric illness. Askari's mental illness at the time he committed the bank robbery is not at issue. The district court found that Askari was not mentally competent and committed him. Missouri certified that Askari had recovered and was again mentally competent. Edward Guy examined Askari to assess whether he was competent to stand trial. Guy initially concluded that Askari was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission. |
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S & DAVIS INT'L V. REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (7/21/2000, NO. 99-10880) Asserting that the General Corporation was controlled by the government. The district court held there was sufficient subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. The district court's interlocutory order denying immunity is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over the challenges to the convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm. At the top was Melvyn Waldron. In the middle tier of the conspiracy were the |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant Appellant Lynn Tran DeRosier was convicted of three counts of wire fraud affecting a financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.2 Appellant DeRosier's conviction stems from borrowing money under false The Honorable John F. BACKGROUND Appellant was a gambling addict. Some of whom she became familiar with because they were customers of her employer. While Appellant may have intended to abide by her promise to repay her victims. When TierOne was alerted to DeRosier's suspicious activity. DeRosier was criminally charged with a number of counts arising out of her fraudulent borrowing practices. The indictment was amended twice. The second superseding indictment was returned on May 9. Was dismissed. The defense made a few objections at trial that are now on appeal. Arguing that the use of the phrase |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 28. Were on brief. Were on brief. Was on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief. Will & Emery. (2) make findings regarding allegations of anticompetitive consequences of the merger that were unique to Holyoke. Northeast Utilities Service Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER One of which is an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether a state law claim alleging conversion of an idea is completely preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act. Cotham liked Dunlap's idea and was invited by Dunlap to become the co founder of G&L Bank. Offered her the position of A detailed discussion of the intricate facts involved in this case is unnecessary because the outcome of this appeal depends upon whether the district court properly exercised federal subject matter jurisdiction. 3 1 President of G&L Bank. After Cotham and Griffith were on board. Before his employment term was to end. Dunlap was terminated from his position. Dunlap's claims in this appeal are based on the alleged breach of this employment agreement and the ownership and use of the G&L Bank trademark. (2) whether Dunlap's federally registered trademark was valid under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051. That they stole his Bank idea by continuing to operate the Bank after he was terminated and that they fraudulently induced him to give up his rights in the G&L Bank trademark and then continued to use the mark after his termination ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Brian Herron was convicted by a jury of one count of attempted bank robbery. Herron was then sentenced to 420 months in prison. The teller asked to see the gun and Herron told her it was a Christmas joke and left the bank. Herron testified at trial that he was the man who attempted to rob the US Bank on December 23. The police were contacted by Gerald |
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S & DAVIS INT'L V. REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (7/21/2000, NO. 99-10880) Asserting that the General Corporation was controlled by the government. The district court held there was sufficient subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. The district court's interlocutory order denying immunity is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the |
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OPINION/ORDER Lloyd was sentenced to consecutive terms of fortysix and eighty four months. Lloyd filed a timely appeal arguing that the second count of the indictment was insufficient or duplicitous. Certain evidentiary rulings made during his trial were an abuse of discretion. Which was strapped together in 100 bill bunches. Into a blue pillowcase he was carrying. The police determined that Lloyd was a suspect and apprehended him. When Lloyd was taken into custody his shoes and clothes were secured as evidence. The sufficiency of an indictment is reviewed de novo. The first is using or carrying a firearm |
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SMITH V. FDIC This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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00-1007 -- U.S. V. EDWARDS -- 03/09/2001 The district court denied Edwards' motion to suppress certain evidence obtained by the police immediately following his arrest on the grounds that Edwards' warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause and the subsequent search of bags stored in his companion's rental vehicle was a search incident to that arrest. Edwards was subsequently convicted and. We find that the search of the rental car was not a valid search incident to arrest. An open camera bag was on the ground between them. Red smoke was coming from the bag. The inside of the bag was covered with red dye. That it was profits from his dog biscuit bakery in Boulder. That it was the proceeds from selling three oil paintings in California. Dittrich was also handcuffed and placed in the back of another patrol car. While Edwards was being held in the back of the police car. Before he was transported to the police station. The exact timing of this discovery is disputed. During the time period when it is unclear exactly who knew the City National Bank had not been robbed. |
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OPINION/ORDER Ghassem Oshrieh were associates in a real estate development and home building business. 000.00 was approved and was secured by the 26 acres of land. An appraisal was made. The amount of the loan was $100. 000.00.1 The draws were initiated by Crim's contacting a loan officer at the Bank via phone and requesting a draw of a particular amount. The loan officer then checked the computer system to verify that the funds were available. Because the funds were There were withdrawals of $10. There was also a withdrawal of $20. Nor was any inquiry made into the purpose of the draws or construction progress on the second house. Kinslow determined that a second house was not being built with the funds. All of the aforementioned notes have either been paid or waived by agreement. Conkwright also testified that the intent was to use the money from the loan to build the second house. That he understood that the sole purpose of the loan was for construction of the second house. That he did not change his mind about building the house until about forty days after the loan was obtained. |
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OPINION/ORDER 2004 is amended as follows: Slip opinion. Substitute for these 2 paragraphs the following: The first element was proved by Mitchell's statements to the banks that his customers were unable to make all the lease payments. That it was intended to defraud the bank. Strike: |
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OPINION/ORDER She informed the bank that she was participating in a Consumer Credit Counseling Service (CCCS) payment plan. As the homes Davis was interested in required more financing. That 28(j) letters are to be used only to call our attention to significant authorities unknown to the parties preargument. This letter is not to be construed as a commitment letter but a credit preapproval based on an in file credit report. After Cendant had become aware that the application was for a conventional loan instead of an FHA loan. Stating that Davis was ineligible because of her involvement in CCCS. He told Davis that his bank was trying to process an FHA loan but needed to address the seller's concerns about such loans. Davis declined the Home Advantage offer because it was a market rate loan and would require a higher monthly payment. A notice of adverse action was sent from Cendant on behalf of U.S. Indicating that the loan was not granted on the terms requested. Which was mailed to her former address. Which was removed to federal court. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The form letter was addressed |
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OPINION/ORDER Washington contends that he is entitled to have his convictions reversed because: 1) the district court improperly admitted into evidence statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. 2) Washington was prejudiced when the judge admitted hearsay into evidence. 3) Washington was prejudiced as a result of prosecutorial misconduct when the Government. Claiming that Washington should have been sentenced to seven years because there was brandishing of a firearm in furtherance of the armed bank robbery. There also was testimony that one UNITED STATES v. When Taglioretti told Washington that there were several people cooperating. Washington responded by saying that he was willing to listen to the agents without an attorney present. He also gave conflicting testimony about whether he made any statements after he was advised of his Miranda rights. Washington testified that he could not clearly remember the interview because he was under the influence of alcohol and |
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OPINION/ORDER These are adversary proceedings arising out of the personal bankruptcy of Leroy J. Who was a general partner in Crossroads U.S.A. Alleging it is still a Crossroads limited partner and seeking similar relief. Arguing that the district court erred in dismissing all claims by LIC because it was not a Crossroads limited partner. The applicable state law is the law of Missouri. Crossroads' share was reflected in a $450. The sale contracts recited that Lauer and Graves were acquiring all limited partner interests. The deferred payments to the Nangles were secured by a pledge of the |
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OPINION/ORDER He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. For which National paid Manufacturers a single premium. that he should be paid as follows: $500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. The Circuit Court issued a final order directing that Manufacturers fulfill the obligation under the assignment to the Bank and pay all future annuity payments until the judgment held by the Bank against Sloma was paid. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. Sloma agreed that he should be paid as follows:$500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. The Bank continued to receive monthly payments from Manufacturers pursuant to the assignment until Sloma's business venture failed and. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. |
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BARNETT BANK V. GALLAGHER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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UNITED STATES V. SPRING Spring and Matthew Corey Monitz were involved. Spring was arraigned on August 19. Monitz were tried separately. Spring was set for October 4. A superseding indictment was filed on September 8. The superseding indictment also alleged that several of the crimes charged in the original indictment were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. A new trial date was set for February 7. A hearing was held on the withdrawal motion on January 21. I think we ought to have new counsel appear as soon as that is reasonably possible so that we can have these new dates set. The order memorializing the court's findings in the January 21 hearing was not in fact entered until November 22. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that jury trial in this matter currently scheduled to commence on February 7. Is vacated and will be rescheduled upon appointment of new counsel for defendant. The continuance resulting from this appointment of new counsel is necessary to insure continuity of counsel for defendant and to allow reasonable time necessary for effective preparation by new counsel. |
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OPINION/ORDER Marshall Bank is a banking corporation based in Hallock. United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 1 faith belief that the loan was secured by a guarantor. Where the guarantor's signature was actually a forgery. Marshall Bank's policy limit for this type of loss was $500. Two days before the loan proceeds were scheduled to be disbursed. Have them execute their loan documents. The bank's president read in a newspaper that Forciea was under criminal investigation. Forciea sent Marshall Bank documents that were not satisfactory to the bank. Seeking a ruling that Marshall Bank's loss was not covered under the bond policy. Coverage only attached if Marshall Bank was in actual physical possession of the original guarantees before disbursing the loan proceeds. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no dispute as to any material fact. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
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BARNETT BANK V. GALLAGHER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER The expression |
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OPINION/ORDER Murray with whom Lorusso & Loud was on brief for appellant Brennan. Was on brief for appellee. Brennan was sentenced to forty one months in prison and McHugh was sentenced to a year and a day in prison. Their complaints can be loosely divided into two categories: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support certain of their convictions. Brennan also advances miscellaneous arguments that he was victimized by constitutionally infirm legal representation at trial and that his sentence was unlawful. Was otherwise denied. 2. As is always the case when we consider whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. McHugh was hired by CSB on May 24. McHugh was charged with increasing the volume of commercial loans. Contingent liabilities that were false both at the time they were submitted and throughout Brennan's relationship with CSB. McHugh and Brennan had a prior business relationship when McHugh was a senior lender at First Mutual Bank. 4 4 term sheet which was required for each loan made. 000 loan was |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. Sloma agreed that he should be paid as follows:$500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. The Bank continued to receive monthly payments from Manufacturers pursuant to the assignment until Sloma's business venture failed and. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. |
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OPINION/ORDER Asserting that the General Corporation was controlled by the government. The district court held there was sufficient subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. The district court's interlocutory order denying immunity is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the |
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OPINION/ORDER Asserting that the General Corporation was controlled by the government. The district court held there was sufficient subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. The district court's interlocutory order denying immunity is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the |
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UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was J. With him on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief were Richard M. Appellant Texas State Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 9. Were on brief for appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. No evidence of appellants' alleged settlement agreement was found in the Bank's records. A party may not defend against a claim by the FDIC for collection on a promissory note based on an agreement that is not memorialized in 2 Massachusetts uses the term |
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OPINION/ORDER He was arrested in the Southern District of Ohio for attempting a second bank robbery. A crime for which he was tried and convicted. He was then sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment. Khouri convinced Phares to assist him by falsely informing Phares that a person was threatening Khouri's life and was demanding payment of $100. Khouri was to enter the bank and pretend that he had been taken hostage and was being forced by another individual to rob it. |
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OPINION/ORDER This appeal revolves around a loan that was made by Brenton First National Bank (the Bank) to Audio Odyssey. Sitting by designation. 1 Ann Dincer (Audio Odyssey and the Dincers are referred to collectively as Audio Odyssey). The loan was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Insofar as is possible. The Dincers executed an SBA Note which stated: This promissory note is given to secure a loan which SBA is making or in which it is participating and. This instrument is to be construed and (when SBA is the Holder or a party in interest) enforced in accordance with applicable Federal law. The Authorization and Loan Agreement provides that it is subject to the provisions of the 1978 Guaranty Agreement. The loan was secured with. Who was responsible for managing the SBA's guaranteed loan program in the eastern 29 counties of Iowa. That it was overdrawn on its checking account. Bradley also told Hoffman that Audio Odyssey was going to hold a sale that weekend and Bradley feared that the profits would be applied to the withholding tax Audio Odyssey owed rather than to the loan from the Bank. |
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OPINION/ORDER Lenehan & Iacopino were on brief for appellant William F. Robert Sheketoff with whom Sheketoff & Homan was on brief for appellant Charles Flynn. Was on brief for appellee. Gary Neal were found guilty by a jury on a number of criminal charges stemming from a series of armed robberies that took place in New Hampshire. We find that the record indicates the district judge may have applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that various materials did not qualify as statements under the Jencks Act. We will remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether statements demanded by Appellant Flynn should have been disclosed under the Jencks Act and. We also remand to the district court on the issue of the order of restitution entered against Appellant Neal with instructions that a hearing be held to determine whether the full amount of monetary losses suffered by First New Hampshire Bank was caused by the conduct underlying Neal's convictions. We will retain appellate jurisdiction so that we may review the court's augmented record and subsequent determinations. |
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OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. Burton was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. was introduced at trial. As she was driving her son to the bank. Burton was wearing a black shirt with a backwards number |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: replace the second full paragraph on page 1358 of the slip opinion with the following text: Following this unfavorable outcome. Bank of America was again named a 3750 BANK OF LAKE TAHOE v. Appellants' and appellees' petitions for panel rehearing and the petitions for rehearing en banc are denied. We address this question only in the context of claims brought under state law because no valid federal claims have been brought against Nevada. Bourdeau is a former manager of Bank of America's Incline Village branch in Nevada. Bourdeau was forced to resign. Although Bourdeau was not authorized to serve in an executive capacity. BLT was chartered and eventually merged with another institution. Bank of America was again named a defendant. 684 (1982)). [1] Although a state is free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. The test for waiver is |
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OPINION/ORDER Was convicted of bank fraud. We also must determine whether the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was erroneous. Whether there was sufficient proof of fraudulent intent. Four of the accounts were with Atlantic Bank. Vavlitis was an authorized signatory on each of these accounts. Atlantic Bank's practice at all relevant times was to credit Vavlitis's accounts with funds equal to the face value of the checks he deposited. Without a delay to verify that these checks would be honored by the banks on which they were drawn. He withdrew money and wrote checks to third parties against funds he did not actually have. The result was that when his four Atlantic Bank accounts were frozen on May 14. There was a total overdraft of $1. There was a combined positive balance of $683. Vavlitis was arraigned on this indictment on March 5. Vavlitis was never arraigned on the superseding indictment. Which stated: |
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UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Berheide pled guilty to one count of making a false statement and overvaluing security to influence Peoples State Bank to defer action on the replevin of collateral for a loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.1 1 Kent Berheide and his wife Lisa Berheide were originally charged in an indictment alleging various fraudulent acts. The government and Berheide entered into an addendum to the plea agreement in which they agreed that |
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OPINION/ORDER Authorities received a 911 call from a person identifying himself as |
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OPINION/ORDER Chubrich & Harrigan was on brief for appellants. McGillicu ddy were on brief for appellees. Various entities that later acquired interests in the real property upon which the health club facility was located. The note was secured by a first mortgage on the Property. The Property was acquired by appellee A.B. Which was later converted to chapter 7. There is no evidence that appellants filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. 2 |
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JONES JOSEPH L. REV V. FRS |
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OPINION/ORDER The Board found that De La Fuente had used his position at FIB to secure several loans in excess of applicable limits for entities in which he and his close associates were interested. We have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Courts may set aside agency orders if they are |
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01-4240 -- U.S. V. ESPINOZA -- 08/07/2003 (2) the evidence of guilt was insufficient. (3) his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly adjusted upward on the basis of unreliable hearsay evidence. The robber was interrupted by Mr. . Saw a dye pack explode in a black pickup. Later that day the black pickup was found abandoned in a nearby church parking lot. That Blazer was gone when the black pickup was discovered. When he was taking the money from the other teller. When he was looking around for additional money. She explained that she was able to identify Defendant based on his eyes and the shape of his face. Despite his wearing a ski mask. Also testifying was a customer who witnessed the robbery from the bank's drive thru window. She noted that the robber in the tellers' station was taller and thinner than the robber who waited in the lobby of the bank (Mr. . (Defendant is. There was evidence tying Defendant to the black pickup. Was later seen carrying Ms. . Jensen's pickup was stolen. Sanchez were at the home of their friend. |
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OPINION/ORDER This matter is comprised of three consolidated appeals. For which he was the sole shareholder. Wintz Properties was engaged in the property management of commercial real estate. The Debtor was comprised of five operating divisions and owned interests in the three parcels of real property which are at the heart of these appeals. Only one of the loans was made directly to the Debtor. The Terminal Road Property is divided into two parcels. The first of which consists of approximately 28.48 acres and is abstract property. The second of which consists of approximately 0.67 acres and is Torrens property. 2 1 The Debtor did. As the tax liens were filed with the Minnesota Secretary of State and also with Hennepin. The divisions were sold to companies variously owned by Wintz's children and their relations. The real estate interests were conveyed to Wintz Properties and subsequently. The Debtor leased the Rosemount Property to Wintz It is unclear from the record whether the Debtor's interest in the Terminal Road Property was also pledged as collateral for the aggregate debt. |
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ANDERSON V. LA JUNTA STATE BANK Anderson's military pay check was being deposited into their account. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. They initially alleged the Bank had violated the RFPA because plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to challenge the subpoenas issued pursuant to the RFPA. Plaintiffs' appeal on this issue is properly before the court.(2) The RFPA was enacted in response to a pattern of government abuse in the area of individual privacy and was intended |
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00-3000A -- COMMERCE BANK V. CHRYSLER REALTY CORP. -- 03/22/2001 The first sentence of the opinion is corrected to read as follows: Plaintiff appellee Commerce Bank. N.A. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER That all statute of limitations defenses and other defenses were tolled from the effective date of the agreement. Arguing that the cross claim was barred by the applicable two year statute of limitations. The accounting firm was insured under a professional liability policy by Camico Mutual Insurance Company ( |
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UNITED STATES V. MITCHELL (7/24/1998, NO. 96-8891) Mitchell also contends that he was charged in a single count with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). The jury was not provided with instructions that would enable it to know that it could convict Mitchell of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) as a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). We affirm the rulings of the district court. A brief factual description of the robbery is necessary to our analysis. Shouted that they were robbing the bank. Were present. Jones enlisted the assistance of a uniformed police officer in a squad car who was responding to the bank robbery alarm. Were arrested. Just before their trial was set to begin. |
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ANDERSON V. H&R BLOCK, INC. (4/3/2002, NO. 01-11863) Circuit Judge:
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OPINION/ORDER Emory and Drummond & Drummond were on briefs for plaintiff. P.A. were on briefs for defendants. Many of its assets were purchased by Fleet Bank and the rest. The FDIC asserts that the Note was among the remaining assets transferred to it. That the original Note was in the possession of the FDIC at trial. Houde was a 50% shareholder. That were guaranteed by the Houdes. They have made no payments on the Note since June 1993. Concluding that there were genuine issues of fact as to the meaning and intent of the Conditional Agreement. A jury trial was scheduled for early June 1995. (2) the Houdes' signatures on the documents were authentic. The FDIC offered in evidence the original Note which was payable to MNB and had not been indorsed to any other entity. Golden testified to the series of events occurring after the failure of MNB up until the time of trial: (1) the FDIC was appointed receiver of MNB. Golden testified that the Note was not among the NMNB assets that Fleet Bank purchased from the FDIC. The FDIC did not offer or have with it any public or business records evidencing the transfers to which Golden testified. |
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OPINION/ORDER Other financial problems that have plagued the Bank since its purchase. Jerry Jubie was President and Chairman of the Board of the Bank for nearly twenty years. stock. health. The Bank was in trouble and Jerry Jubie was in poor The Bank's federal regulator. Was investigating its financial soundness and We modify the Retirement Agreement award and Corporation management quality. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 2 1 The Agreement was intended to pave the way for a management change and sale of the Bank. An Addendum to the Purchase Agreement was signed by the Jubies and by all four individual purchasers fixing the purchase price at $528. The Jubies now guaranteed portions of four troubled loans to All of these guarantees were secured With this outsiders. The case was submitted to the jury with an extensive special verdict form. The Purchasers first argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the issue of RICO damages. 506 U.S. 1051 (1993). 000 damages for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act but zero damages for RICO violations that were |
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OPINION/ORDER Arguing that the court should not have remanded several of Matheis's claims to state court. Their accounts were governed by agreements that stated that they v. Sitting by designation. 2 1 were governed by Missouri law and that provided for finance charges |
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OPINION/ORDER The enhancement was warranted. I have a gun. Who was standing between five and ten feet from the teller. Pike was not followed while riding his bicycle. While Pike was detained in the police car. He made the following unsolicited statement: |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a tax case regarding availability of a loss deduction to a company whose predecessor in interest left a |
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UNITED STATES V. MORRIS (3/28/2002, NO. 01-10955) Morris faces a three year term of supervised release and was ordered to pay $419. Morris also contends that the district court erred in imposing a sentence enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction to review thefinal orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. The Secretary of Banking at the time of the events we describe was Sarah W. This 1991 agreement was prompted when Meritor proposed that its 12% Subordinated Capital Noteholders ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: In this case we are asked to review the decision of the bankruptcy appellate panel ( |
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OPINION/ORDER With whom Twomey and Sisti Law Offices was on brief for appellant Bernard Michael McLaughlin. Was on briefs for the United States. *Of the Fifth Circuit. Was conducting an investigation into various illegal activities of one William Wood ( |
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ZIEMBA V. CASCADE INT'L (7/11/2001, NO. 99-14681) This motion was denied.
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CASA DE CAMBIO COMDIV S.A. DE C.V V. U.S. Argued for plaintiff appellant. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank claims there was a genuine issue of material fact on its defense that Western fraudulently sought payment on one letter. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Western because the Bank did not proffer any evidence establishing the elements of fraud to create a genuine issue of material fact on that issue.1 The facts are not complex. Western posted performance bonds on behalf of Black Oak Construction Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The Matteis challenge the class certification on the grounds that: [1] the class contains members who have not yet been assessed tax penalties and who (according to the Matteis) therefore lack Article III and/or statutory standing. [2] the named representatives all of whom have been assessed tax penalties do not adequately represent the interests of all class members. Some of whom have not been penalized (at least as yet). P. 23(e) in failing to provide a second opt out period when the settlement terms were finalized. Deutsche Bank argues that the district court erred in approving a provision that extinguishes any claim of a nonsettling defendant or third party against a settling defendant that directly or indirectly arises out of the tax strategies and is for recovery of amounts the nonsettling defendant or third party paid or owes to the class. While bars on claims against settling defendants for contribution and indemnity are not uncommon. Which purports to compensate a nonsettling defendant or third party for the loss of claims against the settling defendants but which fails to specify the method by which the judgment credit will be calculated. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bank claims there was a genuine issue of material fact on its defense that Western fraudulently sought payment on one letter. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Western because the Bank did not proffer any evidence establishing the elements of fraud to create a genuine issue of material fact on that issue.1 The facts are not complex. Western posted performance bonds on behalf of Black Oak Construction Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The main question in this case is whether a debtor may recover damages for emotional distress under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) when a creditor violates the automatic stay that follows from the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Who were friends of Plaintiffs. The Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. A foreclosure sale was scheduled for early 1995 but Plaintiffs tendered payment to the Bank just before the date set for the sale. So the foreclosure proceedings were discontinued. A foreclosure sale was conducted. Was recorded. After the Dixons' foreclosure of the property was complete and title was vested in the Jamesons: (1) Plaintiffs would |
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UNITED STATES V. MITCHELL (7/24/1998, NO. 96-8891) Mitchell also contends that he was charged in a single count with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). The jury was not provided with instructions that would enable it to know that it could convict Mitchell of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) as a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). We affirm the rulings of the district court. A brief factual description of the robbery is necessary to our analysis. Shouted that they were robbing the bank. Were present. Jones enlisted the assistance of a uniformed police officer in a squad car who was responding to the bank robbery alarm. Were arrested. Just before their trial was set to begin. |
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ANDERSON V. H&R BLOCK, INC. (4/3/2002, NO. 01-11863) Circuit Judge:
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NTEU V. TIGERT RICKI R. |
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OPINION/ORDER Defendant White represented to certain individuals that he was |
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FIRST VA BNK V. USA |
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OPINION/ORDER The three banks used by the LeRoses were First Community Bank. Is a plan designed to separate the bank from its money by tricking it into inflating bank balances and honoring checks drawn against accounts with insufficient funds. |
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GENERAL AM. LIFE INS. CO. V. AMSOUTH BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
General American Life Insurance Company appeals from a jury verdict finding that it was estopped from asserting its claim that AmSouth Bank improperly paid checks payable to General American. Associates was licensed to sell. Land was the owner and proprietor of Land &. Though this account was a business account. Associates was a general agent of General American. Customers were supposed to write checks payable to General American. Would occasionally indorse and deposit customer checks when they were not for the exact amount owed to General American. Although only when the customer's check and his check were for a small amount. Associates checks were also always for small amounts. It was impossible for General American to know from processing the Land &. Which showed that less than all of their money was reaching General American. He would then falsify new statements and send those to the customers. Land paid back some of the money to his customers before he was caught. |
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OPINION/ORDER Taking Spillers with them as |
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UNITED STATES V. MORRIS (3/28/2002, NO. 01-10955) Morris faces a three year term of supervised release and was ordered to pay $419. Morris also contends that the district court erred in imposing a sentence enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER I Douglas is a wholesale grocery. Douglas's account was credited with only $24. Had quit in late 1999 and it was unable to find an immediate replacement. By the time a new controller was hired there was a three month backlog. CNB's employee testified she sent the request through the Federal Reserve hoping it would not notice it was untimely. CNB's president testified the information should have been verified. The adjustment request was received by Wells Fargo. Adjustment requests are handled by regional adjustment centers. When the request was received in Houston it was forwarded to Wells Fargo's Southwestern Adjustment Center (SAC) in Phoenix. There were occasions when USA's Wells Fargo account had sufficient funds to cover the discrepancy. The funds were transferred out of the account and there were no longer any funds to pay the adjustment request. As these events were unfolding. USA was sliding into insolvency. The parties agree Houston would have paid the additional $216. SAC notified CNB 4 there were no funds in the account and denied the adjustment request. |
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ZIEMBA V. CASCADE INT'L (7/11/2001, NO. 99-14681) This motion was denied.
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GENERAL AM. LIFE INS. CO. V. AMSOUTH BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
General American Life Insurance Company appeals from a jury verdict finding that it was estopped from asserting its claim that AmSouth Bank improperly paid checks payable to General American. Associates was licensed to sell. Land was the owner and proprietor of Land &. Though this account was a business account. Associates was a general agent of General American. Customers were supposed to write checks payable to General American. Would occasionally indorse and deposit customer checks when they were not for the exact amount owed to General American. Although only when the customer's check and his check were for a small amount. Associates checks were also always for small amounts. It was impossible for General American to know from processing the Land &. Which showed that less than all of their money was reaching General American. He would then falsify new statements and send those to the customers. Land paid back some of the money to his customers before he was caught. |
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OPINION/ORDER Dishonoring the levy is not justified. He was its president and a director. He and his wife were its sole shareholders. Was also the 100% owner of our former customer. LIV was embroiled in litigation with the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This is a bankruptcy contest over unregistered copyrights between a bank that got a security interest in the 13694 IN RE: WORLD AUXILIARY POWER CO. copyrights from the owners and perfected it under state law. These simple facts are all that matters to the outcome of this case. Although the details are complex. Some of these copyrighted materials were attached to the Supplemental Type Certificates. As is common. Their copyrights were among their major assets. Aerocon was working on a venture with another company. As this litigation was pending on that date. After this transaction was completed. Buying off the trustees' and the bank's interests in the copyrights would have been a sensible. (These adversary proceedings were later consolidated.). The appeal was transferred to the district court. ANALYSIS We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the district court13 and we review de novo.14 Copyright and bankruptcy law set the context for this litigation. The legal issue is priority of security interests. |
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OPINION/ORDER Nickl argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Nickl claims he was forced to defend against multiplicitous charges. Nickl claims he is entitled to resentencing under United States v. The district court's other rulings are affirmed. Meadowbrook Farms was Dr. Nickl was an authorized signer on both the Brooks and Meadowbrook Farm accounts (hereinafter the |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. The Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was left holding an empty bag. The practice was designed to forfend against the high social costs of blood feuds and the wreaking of personal 3 vengeance by compensating victims in a more civilized way. Federal judges were not able to impose criminal restitution as a condition of probation until 1925 when Congress passed the Federal Probation Act. Notable for the speed of its election year passage the legislation was introduced in the Senate on April 22. The congressional purpose that animated the VWPA is no secret: |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the Order of the District Court.1 1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 I. Michelle Williams was employed as an assistant in the payroll department of Cerberus Pyrotronics. Williams admitted that she had defrauded Siemens and was terminated. KPMG notified Siemens of its discovery that Williams had cashed all of the fraudulent checks at one of two local branches of PNC Bank and that the same teller had handled all 639 of the transactions.3 Cerberus was purchased by Siemens following the events giving rise to this litigation. As the parties have done in brief. We will refer to Williams's employer as Siemens throughout this Memorandum. Was not a customer of PNC. Had the discretion to cash noncustomer checks when she had reason to believe they were backed by sufficient funds. PNC was unable to locate. Was otherwise unaware of. Though PNC claims that Tanner's dismissal was prompted by the discovery of a $5. |
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OPINION/ORDER Appellant/cross appellee Berglee's petition for panel rehearing is granted. The clerk is directed to vacate the court's June 11. The clerk is directed to file the attached revised opinion and to issue a new judgment in accordance with the revised opinion. This case has a long history and is a somewhat tangled skein. Ruled the disbursements were unauthorized. Which were discovered at trial. This order solely addresses Berglee&s right to assert new claims for monetary relief in what was charged. Declaring the Bank was not entitled to a setoff against the unauthorized disbursements to Woehlhaff. The case was removed to the Montana federal district court on diversity grounds and transferred to the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Summarily concluding Berglee was precluded by res judicata from raising claims he had failed to raise in the prior declaratory judgment litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Montana explicitly stated that the court was not addressing Berglee&s right to bring these claims in a separate action. |
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OPINION/ORDER We affirm the district court's ruling that the compensatory damage award was not excessive. Because the punitive damages awarded in this case were unconstitutionally excessive. Bach is a seventy seven year old retired widow who resides in West Carrollton. Bach's name was added to the checking account. Funds were wired from Bach's accounts to the FUNB checking account. The account eventually became overdrawn and was closed. A credit card account was opened with FUNB in Bach's name but listing Heidi Bake's address. The credit card was issued by FUNB pursuant to a phone application based on Bach's clean credit history. The balance on the card was $20. Most of which was never paid. Bach's application was denied due to her credit report. Bach sent letters to FUNB and American Express seeking to inform them that the accounts in her name were opened fraudulently and without her consent. Bach stated that the address listed on the account was that of her granddaughter. These phone calls were harassing in nature. |
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OPINION/ORDER Debtors were authorized to reject executory contracts within ten (10) days after the Plan's July 1. Debtors argued that the Warrant Holders' damage claim was $0.00 or. The Bank argued that the Warrant Agreement was not an executory contract subject to rejection. The Bankruptcy Court found that damages should be allowed |
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OPINION/ORDER Because there is no evidence that the FDIC mailed the requisite notice. Four of the cashier's checks were in the amount of $100. 000 and were issued to Roberto Sanchez. The remaining cashier's check was in the amount of $50. 000 and was issued to Armando Caycedo. Juan Diaz claims to have received the cashier's checks from Sanchez. Acevedo claims to have received the cashier's 3 checks from Diaz to satisfy a debt. The court concluded that First Union was no longer liable for the cashier's checks because it had complied with the Assistance Agreement by returning the funds representing the unclaimed deposits. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when |
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OPINION/ORDER F&D asserts that the district court's ruling on the discovery issue is correct. It is entitled to summary judgment because the loss City Federal sustained is not covered by the bond. We will reverse the district court's order of summary judgment. In view of the circumstance that all of the relevant deposition testimony is not in the record before this court. We have relied on those factual statements and other portions of the record in deciding this appeal. To the extent that the parties' briefs indicate that there are disputed facts. We will refer to the RTC's version because we must view the facts in the light most favorable to it. Because this appeal is intensely fact driven. It is necessary to set forth the factual background in some detail. City Collateral was City Federal's mortgage warehouse lending operation.3 Among other things. Lyndon Merkle ( |
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OPINION/ORDER With whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. * Of the Eleventh Circuit. Was convicted after a jury trial in the District of New Hampshire of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344). Background Background The various charges against appellant were based on a series of different transactions. The purpose of which was to obtain funds from the United States Savings Bank of America (hereinafter |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm. Ramsdell Construction Company was engaged in the construction business in Machias. 000 of the loan proceeds was used to set off advances the Bank had made in the interim to finance the work. 2 Notwithstanding this infusion of funds. Foreclosure proceedings were brought in the state court against Mrs. Ramsdell and others who were borrowers or guarantors of the loans. Discovery taken in the state court action was later used by the parties in the instant action. Additional counts have been abandoned on appeal. The claims against the SBA were later dismissed. 1994 (the date on which it would have been due. Concluded that although the court is usually generous to those who miss by slight amounts various limitations on pleadings . . . Plaintiff s response to the Motion for Summary Judgment is properly stricken. Ramsdell offered in support of the opposition was not authenticated and ha[d] no evidentiary value and that the opposition was replete with immaterial. |
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OPINION/ORDER Altman & Owens were on brief. Dana & Gould were on brief. Was that the offering would be terminated and all investor deposits refunded if the aggregate amount of investments sold did not reach a minimum subscription level ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Suggs argues that the Court's rulings on the motions were erroneous and that its sentence violated the Sixth Amendment of our Constitution. I. Procedural Background Suggs was indicted for armed bank robbery (in February 2002) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (Count 1). The base offense level was 20 for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. The Court's calculation for Count 4 was the same as that for Count 3 minus the two level enhancement for a |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Appellant Brunswick County was the beneficiary of a letter of credit issued by appellee The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi. BCH was obligated to reimburse the County for part of the costs associated with the construction of a solid waste collection facility. BCH defaulted on this obligation and was later forced into bankruptcy. The County was required to produce either BCH's co signature or a written arbitration award. See also id. at 115 (stating that under New York law |
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OPINION/ORDER Lingley & Silver was on brief for appellant. Martin with whom Petruccelli & Martin was on brief for appellee. The loan was guaranteed by Falcon. Expired in 1990 and was not renewed. The certificate said that access to the property was via |
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OPINION/ORDER Trostle and Bingham Dana LLP were on brief. P.C. was on brief. P.C. was on brief. P.C. was on brief. Plaintiffs appellants Joseph and Patricia DiStefano are shareholders and creditors of JFD Enterprises. 000 of indebtedness owed by JFD to the Park West Bank and Trust Company (the |
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00-3188 -- U.S. V. RIGGANS -- 06/28/2001 Riggans was convicted of bank larceny. Was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because the jury was not instructed on all of the elements of bank larceny. He argues that he should be resentenced because bank larceny is not a crime of violence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was indicted by a federal grand jury on five counts of bank robbery. Bank employees could not identify Bowlson because he was wearing a ski mask over his face. At about the time Bowlson was leaving the bank. While Amont Jefferson and Marco Houston were supposed to |
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OPINION/ORDER Et al. were Thomas M. Et al. was Thomas R. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Of counsel were Delisa M. This is a Winstar breach of contract case. The primary question on appeal is whether. A subsidiary question is whether there was a contractual or third party beneficiary relationship with the government that would confer standing on the shareholders of the thrift holding company. BACKGROUND I Morristown Federal Savings and Loan Association ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Peters contends that he did not know that the check was counterfeit. The bank advised him that the check was counterfeit and he offered to repay it if he was responsible. He was indicted and convicted on both counts. P&M was a company that Peters had started. It was not registered or doing any business. 700 check was purportedly drawn by National States Insurance Company. His employer's only claim was one for property damage filed with a different insurance company. Was returning the check. Peters expressed surprise to the bank officer that the check was not valid. Explaining that he thought the check was a settlement related to the Arkansas automobile accident. He offered to repay Bremer Bank at the rate of $100 per week if he was responsible. Peters received a letter from Bremer Bank notifying him that it had determined the check was counterfeit. Two and a half years after the bank made its determination that the check was counterfeit. Peters told the FBI that the check was an insurance settlement from the Arkansas accident. |
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OPINION/ORDER Thomas was convicted of bank robbery in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Because we find that the unduly suggestive identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. That there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on the element of intimidation. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Ellis were convicted by a jury of four counts of armed bank robbery. I. Holmes and Ellis contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. We must sustain the jury's verdict |
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OPINION/ORDER Wood were on brief. Sullivan were on brief. Was on brief. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Guillemard were on brief. With whom | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The district court3 held that Gordon failed to state a substantive due process claim for which relief could be granted and that the Department officials were subject to absolute immunity on certain procedural due process claims and that Gordon failed to state a claim on the other procedural due process claims. Gordon was a member of the law firm McGrath. We will refer to both the state and federal defendants collectively as |
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OPINION/ORDER Is not a party |
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00-3000 -- COMMERCE BANK V. CHRYSLER REALTY CORP. -- 03/22/2001 Vacate the award of punitive damages and remand.
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OPINION/ORDER The defendant bank's parent was also joined as a defendant) against each other in a quarrel over liability for a forged or altered check. By the time this was discovered. The lawfulness of which is not questioned. Whether the image is of the original check drawn on Wachovia. Wachovia's suit is based on the Uniform Commercial Code's |
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OPINION/ORDER Morris faces a three year term of supervised release and was ordered to pay $419. I. BACKGROUND Morris and four others were indicted and charged with various counts stemming from investment fraud. The government responded that the enhancement was appropriate because Morris had used his attorney trust account to funnel the money in promotion of the fraudulent scheme and the other conspirators had informed the victims that Morris was a trader and an attorney. This court reviews the issue of a Rule 11 violation for plain error when it was not raised before the district court. Morris must show that there is (1) |
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BANCO INDUSTRIAL DE VENEZUELA V. CREDIT SUISSE This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This civil case based on diversity and federal question jurisdiction involves extensive fraud in international banking. A brief factual summary is necessary. Was established and is owned by the government of Venezuela. This was done by instituting a preferential currency exchange rate for U.S. The program was called RECADI. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER After this objection was overruled by the bankruptcy court. The agreement specified that monthly payments were to be made over a five year term. Claiming in their brief to have been |
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OPINION/ORDER Inc. were convicted of a variety of federal offenses stemming from an affirmative action fraud scheme they perpetrated regarding federally funded road construction projects. I. Because the defendants are challenging their convictions. The FDOT was contractually obligated to ensure that at least 12% of the USDOT's funds ultimately went to 2 |
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OPINION/ORDER This case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. The Pacific Rails Credit Union was robbed. That the witnesses' testimony is inconsistent and insufficient to support his convictions. Testified that three men |
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OPINION/ORDER Is invalid as applied to him because it violates his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. He further contends that the evidence presented at his revocation hearing was insufficient to convict him for violating the conditions of his supervised release. Conclude the evidence at his hearing was legally insufficient with respect to one of the findings of violation. Defendant was released from custody on July 24. A few days later federal authorities were approached by Keith Shaw. Who told him that Carlton had committed the Ardsley robbery and was planning a similar crime in the near future. Defendant was subsequently apprehended and detained on June 4. A revocation hearing without a jury was held on July 21. After advising Shaw that the plan was |
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OPINION/ORDER Who was judicially acquitted of two criminal charges. As |
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OPINION/ORDER A brief factual summary is necessary. Was established and is owned by the government of Venezuela. This was done by instituting a preferential currency exchange rate for U.S. Dollars administered by the government. * The program was called RECADI. 1 Under the Honorable Harlington Wood. Venezuela also developed another currency program which was intended to discourage nonessential imports and encourage exports. This program was seen as increasing Venezuela's foreign 1 program. Letters of credit were issued by BIV to facilitate the RECADI imports. Those with sophisticated criminal intentions saw substantial program. personal possibilities in the government's RECADI Instrumental in the abuse of this program was a man named Miralles was executive vice president of BIV. 000. was simple in concept. Miralles would approve the payment of BIV letters of credit for nonexistent RECADI imports that were shown to exist by false documents. government. false and BIV would then be reimbursed by the The letters of credit and the documents were patently inadequate. |
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OPINION/ORDER Senior Circuit Judge: Defendant was convicted on one count of tax evasion and two counts of tax perjury based on his failure to report and pay tax on funds he acquired by failing to distribute a liquidating dividend of a corporation he controlled. We determine that there was adequate evidence to sustain those judgments. Defendant was also convicted on one count of bank fraud arising from the liquidation. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $654. Was a substantial shareholder in Omni. Depository Trust was granted summary judgment. Asserting that the evidence was insufficient. Mueller & Sons was the new name given to an English |
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OPINION/ORDER She was later made director of marketing and a vice president of the bank. Tenkku learned from a former employee that she and two other female vice presidents were being paid about $10. |
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BANCO INDUSTRIAL DE VENEZUELA V. CREDIT SUISSE This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This civil case based on diversity and federal question jurisdiction involves extensive fraud in international banking. A brief factual summary is necessary. Was established and is owned by the government of Venezuela. This was done by instituting a preferential currency exchange rate for U.S. The program was called RECADI. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Jost used most of the net proceeds received from the sale of the Missouri home to purchase a home in Florida and to pay for moving costs to Florida. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER The issue in this diversity action is whether a federal court in Arkansas has personal jurisdiction over a Kentucky bank whose only contact with Arkansas was to issue a cashier's check payable to an Arkansas bank and then. It is alleged. Concluding that this contact was insufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Twin Valley State Bank did not close on the bank loan and instead informed the city attorney that the loan commitment letter from Oppegard was unauthorized. Because it purported to lend an amount that was beyond the bank's lending limit. Clarkfield was outside the Bonanza Valley State Bank's service area. Gjerde was not familiar with Clark. Which is within the Bonanza Valley State Bank service area. Richard was listed as the president of Minnewaska. A company whose sole purpose was to funnel money from the bank to Clarkfield Drying. The bank advanced the funds to a Minnewaska checking account with Bonanza Valley State Bank. were transferred to a Clarkfield Drying. 000 was immediately transferred back to the bank through the Minnewaska account. evidence that the loan had in fact closed. 000 of the loan funds had been used to purchase equipment as promised in the funding letter. that used the to Fields The false loan documents were provided as proof had obtained the In necessary reliance private on funding. false The balance of $119. |
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OPINION/ORDER Leke was indicted in January 2006 after he and a co conspirator allegedly took approximately $40. The Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal as to all three counts because the evidence presented by the Government was insufficient to support the convictions. The Defendant also argues that his conviction on Count Three was in error because the indictment did not allege whether the amount of money stolen exceeded $1. Because there is no merit to Leke's arguments. 000.00 was stolen from an ATM located at a branch of Regions Bank in Trenton. Ronnie Gross were the key Government witnesses at Leke's trial. That if one was absent. The cassettes containing the money in the machine were missing. Howard told them that he believed it had to be an inside job because |
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OPINION/ORDER Where Mayhue was also living. Walters was to put on a cap with fake braids and Calloway a cap and sunglasses. They were to enter the bank. Walters and Calloway were to return to the getaway car to be driven by Mayhue jump into the trunk. The robbery was executed according to plan. The car was stopped by the Ann Arbor police. Because the dispatch advised that the getaway driver was a black woman Mayhue is not black and did not mention that the two male robbers might be in the trunk. Further investigation revealed that the car was registered to Alberta Jean Williams Walters' |
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UNITED STATES V. MUELLER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Defendant was convicted on one count of tax evasion and two counts of tax perjury based on his failure to report and pay tax on funds he acquired by failing to distribute a liquidating dividend of a corporation he controlled. We determine that there was adequate evidence to sustain those judgments. Defendant was also convicted on one count of bank fraud arising from the liquidation. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $654. Was a substantial shareholder in Omni. Depository Trust was granted summary judgment. Asserting that the evidence was insufficient. Sons was the new name given to an English |
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OPINION/ORDER To whom Bestrom was already in default. Acquisition loans are specifically excepted from the recission provision of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § The Honorable Frank J. Was an active judge at the time that this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. Before the opinion was filed. Bestrom contends that the loan was not for the purpose of acquiring title to the property because First Bank never had legal title to the property in the first place. The Quality Mortgage loan that Bestrom used to pay down First Bank's mortgage could not have been an acquisition loan within the meaning of TILA. The transaction was a refinancing of the property. We find that First Bank did have legal title to the property. Who was represented by legal counsel at the time. The date that his state law six month period of redemption was due to expire. The bankruptcy court held that TILA did not apply to the Mortgage transaction between Bestrom and Quality Mortgage because the court found that the loan was excepted from TILA's coverage under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1)(A). |
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UNITED STATES V. COVER (1/4/2000, NO. 99-10286) He argues that he should not have received a U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement for brandishing. He argues that he should not have received U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). He argues that he should not have received a U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) enhancement for the unknown quantity of money that was in vault at the time of the robbery. Who were forced at gunpoint to lie on the floor. See PSI ¶ 4. Cover and Wilson were apprehended at the scene after they reentered the bank and exited through a side door. See PSI ¶ 5. The motorist was released unharmed. See PSI ¶ 10. Because |
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UNITED STATES V. COVER (1/4/2000, NO. 99-10286) He argues that he should not have received a U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement for brandishing. He argues that he should not have received U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). He argues that he should not have received a U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) enhancement for the unknown quantity of money that was in vault at the time of the robbery. Who were forced at gunpoint to lie on the floor. See PSI ¶ 4. Cover and Wilson were apprehended at the scene after they reentered the bank and exited through a side door. See PSI ¶ 5. The motorist was released unharmed. See PSI ¶ 10. Because |
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UNITED STATES V. MUELLER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
Defendant was convicted on one count of tax evasion and two counts of tax perjury based on his failure to report and pay tax on funds he acquired by failing to distribute a liquidating dividend of a corporation he controlled. We determine that there was adequate evidence to sustain those judgments. Defendant was also convicted on one count of bank fraud arising from the liquidation. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $654. Was a substantial shareholder in Omni. Depository Trust was granted summary judgment. Asserting that the evidence was insufficient. Sons was the new name given to an English |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel on the brief was Kathleen Hallam. These additional loans were guaranteed by the Small Business Administration ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Arguing that the statement was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and in violation of his entitlement to Miranda warnings under the Fifth Amendment. Bowdich's subsequent investigation led him to believe that |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Robert Darrah was a Certified Public Accountant ( |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were Alan M. Of counsel on the brief was James Hubbard. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Of counsel was Jonathan S. The issue is whether the Government is liable for breach of contract resulting in alleged losses sustained by plaintiff Fifth Third Bank of Western Ohio ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Jost used most of the net proceeds received from the sale of the Missouri home to purchase a home in Florida and to pay for moving costs to Florida. | ||
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USA V. BCCI (BANCO CENTRAL) |
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OPINION/ORDER We have combined these separate appeals solely for the purpose of disposition. Summers argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and Mr. Was later found in the Vista Montano Apartments located a short distance from the bank. The Vista Montano Apartments are adjacent to the Pinnacle View Apartments. She requested that the complex's maintenance workers |
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OPINION/ORDER We address this question only in the context of claims brought under state law because no valid federal claims have been brought against Nevada. Bourdeau is a former manager of Bank of America's Incline Village branch in Nevada. Bourdeau was forced to resign. Although Bourdeau was not authorized to serve in an executive capacity. BLT was chartered and eventually merged with another institution. Bank of America was again named a defendant. The district court granted Bank of America's motions for summary judgment and for attorney's fees1 and dismissed the The appeal of the summary judgment and attorney's fees orders with respect to Bank of America is addressed in a separately filed Memoran1 BANK OF LAKE TAHOE v. 684 (1982)). [1] Although a state is free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. The test for waiver is |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The genesis of this appeal is a decision by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Munnerlyn ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellee. Bruck was the President and principal stockholder of Advance Resins. Which was in the business of grinding. A passerby reported to the Chicopee Fire Department that Building Three was on fire. There was no evidence that the fire had a point of origin in the area of Building Three where the welders had been working. He indicated that Advance Resins was immensely successful. He told the agents that the replacement cost of the destroyed equipment and inventory was approximately $1.5 million. Contending that these two groups of counts were not properly joined under Fed. P. 8(a) ( |
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OPINION/ORDER 15 U.S.C. § 1.1 These policies are MasterCard's imposition of penalties for charges denied by customers of. BACKGROUND Because this is an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint under Fed. 52 (2d Cir. 1996). a) MasterCard MasterCard is one of four major payment card network service providers in the United States.2 United States v. MasterCard is a membership association operated as an open joint venture. MasterCard is funded primarily by service and transaction fees paid by its members. The |
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OPINION/ORDER Lloyd was sentenced to consecutive terms of fortysix and eighty four months. Lloyd filed a timely appeal arguing that the second count of the indictment was insufficient or duplicitous. Certain evidentiary rulings made during his trial were an abuse of discretion. This decision was originally issued as an |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Over Fujitsu's refusal to pay for funds missing from Carrollton Bank's automatic teller machines that were serviced by Fujitsu. Subcontractors or any third person authorized by FJICL had access to the ATM vault since that ATM was last balanced and that (ii) there is no credible evidence establishing that the loss resulted from mechanical. CUSTOMER AGREES THAT FJ ICL IS NOT TAKING ON THE OBLIGATION OF ABSOLUTE INSURER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. 7.2 FJ ICL shall not be liable for claims. Arising out of or in connection with any ATM loss to the extent such claim is the result of (a) currency dispensed due to AMT [sic] software or network malfunction. The contract also contained a |
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OPINION/ORDER Inc. (3D) entered into a series of written agreements by which 3D was to develop. Were successfully installed by 3D at the Bank and are not the subject of the litigation below. It is the third program. Which is at the heart of the lawsuit. Among the defenses asserted by 3D was the Bank's failure to give 3D the contractual opportunity to cure the alleged breach. Although there were several issues between the parties. Each of which was the subject of extensive testimony during the two week jury trial. The heart of this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Bank's assertion. No reasonable jury could have arrived at the conclusion that 3D had anticipatorily breached the contract with [the Bank]. |
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OPINION/ORDER On which were. The majority explained: |
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METROTRAFFIC V. SHADOW NETWORK |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief. Chanthaseng's job duties that were subject to supervisory review involved the method by which the bank accounted for cash deposits from its commercial customers. While the cash was in transit. The ticket was cancelled out of the accounting system and replaced with a corresponding entry for cash in the vault.
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The action was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Piney Creek Limited Partnership ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The bank contends both that it is a third party beneficiary of the letter contract by which Brandon retained GKCO to conduct the audit and that GKCO committed the tort of negligent misrepresentation. To be a third party beneficiary of a contract is to have the rights of a party. Which is to say the power to sue to enforce the contract. Parties to contracts are naturally reluctant to empower a third party to enforce their contract. So third party beneficiary status ordinarily is not inferred from the circumstances but must be express. The fact that Brandon wanted the audit in order to help it get additional loans from the bank doesn't show that GKCO consented to have the bank enforce the engagement letter. It was in late April of 1999. When Brandon was seeking the additional loan from the bank. It should have been classified as a |
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97-9515 -- CANDELARIA V. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. -- 02/03/1998 We affirm.
The basic facts in this case are undisputed. Petitioner had an unblemished reputation in the banking industry. The two loans which led to this action were approved by petitioner for his sister in law. Was approved on or about July 21. Was approved on or about February 3. Were endorsed by petitioner in Ms. None of the loan proceeds were ever disbursed to Ms. Aleman was the true borrower who intended the proceeds of the loan to go to petitioner as payment for existing debt. Aleman's debt to him was approximately $15. Aleman would have to repay the debt. Aleman did not have the resources to repay the debt. Both loans were thus repaid. The Board of Directors of the FDIC (the Board) issued a notice of intent to seek to have petitioner permanently prohibited from participation in the activities of any federally insured banking institution. With the reminder that the order was statutorily modifiable upon petitioner's application to the FDIC. Petitioner states his appellate issues as (1) the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Were on brief. Vinick appeals the district court's determination that he personally is liable for withholding taxes that Jefferson Bronze. Previously this court vacated a determination that Vinick was a |
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JEFFERSON COUNTY V. ACKER (3/27/1998, NO. 94-6400) Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. See Jefferson County v. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. See id. at 1572. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. See id. at 1573 76. Jefferson County then filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER With the information that was available to it. We will vacate the District Court's decision and remand for further factfinding.1 II. 234 (7th Cir. 1997) ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction was premised on both diversity of citizenship. Hence we will affirm. The plaintiffs are beneficiaries of trusts administered by Corestates which are subject to these fees. Because these amounts are far less than the $50. Plaintiffs assert that the jurisdictional amount is achieved either (1) via their claim for punitive damages. Which they allege the trustees have been mismanaging. Although plaintiffs have also brought this action |
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MOTORCITY OF JACKSONVILLE, LTD. V. SOUTHEAST BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Was required to pay Southeast Bank's insured deposits in cash or make such funds available to depositors in another insured depository institution. Including 1 It is unclear how Sanchez became the holder of all five cashier's checks. 2 outstanding cashier's checks. The FDIC also assumed control of Southeast Bank's records and was responsible for notifying Southeast Bank's depositors that they must claim their deposit. Depositors who had failed to claim their deposit were barred from asserting a right to the unclaimed deposits. So long as the claim was made prior to the termination of the receivership. The notices advised depositors that Southeast Bank was closed. Having failed to present the cashier's checks within eighteen months after the FDIC was appointed receiver. Was barred from recovering the deposits. Fritz attested that neither the five named payees nor the subsequent holders of the checks were listed as depositors of Southeast Bank. The district court concluded that mailed notice is required by the Due Process Clause only if a claimant's identity is known or reasonably ascertainable. |
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OPINION/ORDER Which was filed before. Was incompatible with the confirmed plan. I. Issues on Appeal The central issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that confirmation of the Debtors' plan pretermitted the issues raised in the Bank's motion for relief from stay. A bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. The question of whether a confirmed plan pretermits a pending motion for relief from stay is a legal question reviewed de novo. 2 III. The motion was also viewed by both the Bank and the bankruptcy court as an objection to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. That the real property securing the Debtors' obligation to the Bank was fully encumbered and not necessary to the Debtors' reorganization. An agreed order was entered resolving the Bank's motion to dismiss and objection to confirmation. The Motion to Dismiss and Objection to confirmation filed by Salt Creek Valley Bank are resolved as follows. In the event that this Chapter 13 case is dismissed for any reason prior to February 3. |
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OPINION/ORDER In 2002 Sullivan was indicted in connection with a string of twelve bank and credit union robberies in northern Kentucky resulting in losses totaling $107. It was the robbery of the Heritage Bank in Fort Wright. Sullivan was placed under arrest and later indicted by a federal grand jury on two counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). The robberies were charged as follows: Count 1. Sullivan was sentenced to 572 months in prison and ordered to pay $107. The decision as to whether to appoint new counsel at the defendant's request is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. The denial of a motion to substitute counsel will be reversed only upon an abuse of that discretion. |
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99-6387 -- U.S. V. SPARKS -- 05/02/2001 Circuit Judges.
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. This appeal is about the denial of EAJA fees to a plaintiff who was successful in a contract claim against the FDIC as receiver of an insolvent bank. 896.00 are sought for a judgment for plaintiff of $23. The district court denied the claim on the ground that the FDIC as receiver was not an agency of the United States. Old Stone was being run under the conservatorship of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Which provides a defense to |
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OPINION/ORDER The case was tried to a jury. The case was tried again and the jury again returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all four claims. BACKGROUND This is the fourth appeal in a thirteen year old case with a long and complex history.2 See Abbott Bank Hemingford v. Because the facts that gave rise to David and Hannah's bankruptcy are fully recounted in our opinion in Armstrong I. These were questionable transactions. Maverick is a closely held corporation in which David and Theodore were the sole shareholders. Note that the supplemental information was not relevant to our decision. 22 1 State Bank to secure the increased credit line. They purchased annuities that were exempt from execution in bankruptcy under Nebraska law. All of David and Hannah's previously unencumbered assets either were encumbered in favor of Omaha State Bank. Or were sold and the proceeds were placed in exempt annuities. Was a personal friend of Theodore's. He contends that the denial of the motions was in error. Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and New Trial The Trustee contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. |
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OPINION/ORDER Who was unmasked and carried a handgun. As the robbers were escaping. Which he believed was a late 1980's or early 1990's maroon Oldsmobile. He also indicated that another man was in the back seat. Wearing a checkered shirt and dark pants and their vehicle were dispatched to all local patrol units. Detectives did not dust the area for fingerprints because the men were wearing latex gloves. Which was a 1988 maroon Oldsmobile Cutlass Cierra. Because she was having car problems and needed him to repair it. Stephanie was not present during the time of the search. Who was incarcerated in a local jail. Shellee indicated that she believed that her daughter was with the Pughs. Shoes that matched the print were never retrieved. Officers conducted a surveillance of the home where Holston believed that the Pughs were located. Once the car was a safe distance from the house. Walter informed the police that Tyreese Pugh was asleep in the upstairs bedroom of the house and that he had a gun. Tyreese Pugh was pulled out of bed and had a shotgun beneath his body. |
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MOTORCITY OF JACKSONVILLE, LTD. V. SOUTHEAST BANK This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER |
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OPINION/ORDER Hull and Stanley Marcus became members of the court after this case was argued and taken under submission. Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. We have summarized the facts briefly here. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. Stating that any holding with respect 2 to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. This is the first time that the issue has 3 been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.3 As no other circumstances exist that would support federal court jurisdiction. Our first inquiry is to determine whether § 1442 applies. |
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JEFFERSON COUNTY V. ACKER (3/27/1998, NO. 94-6400) Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. See Jefferson County v. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. See id. at 1572. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. See id. at 1573 76. Jefferson County then filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue presented by this case is whether Jefferson County. Hull and Stanley Marcus became members of the court after this case was argued and taken under submission. Clemon are United States District Judges for the Northern District of Alabama who maintain their principal offices in Birmingham. The motion was denied. The cases subsequently were consolidated. We have summarized the facts briefly here. Stating that any holding with respect to the Compensation Clause was unnecessary. We concluded that although the privilege tax is measured by the income of the taxed individual. The taxable event is the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County. We held that the tax is unconstitutional as applied to the judges. This is the first time that the issue has been raised in this court. That removal of the case to federal court was therefore improper.3 As no other circumstances exist that would support federal court jurisdiction. Our first inquiry is to determine whether § 1442 applies. |
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OPINION/ORDER The debt was secured by pledged stock plus liens on other assets. Hovis Trust No. 90 is a second debtor. This was a little less than Hovis's estimate. So it is unsurprising that he did not protest. The Bank objected to the objection and argued that Hovis is estopped by confirmation of the plan to deny the amount of any creditor's claim. The accuracy of the creditor's claim was established. This is a normal application of preclusion. Adair and similar decisions that arise from sequential suits are irrelevant within one suit. What matter within a single suit are the deadlines set by statute and rule. Is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Leeway is sensible. Because sometimes the best means to administer an estate is to sell the assets quickly in order to maximize their value and only then turn to determining which creditors are entitled to how much. Is an example. Evaluation of some claims similarly is deferred until the cash flow problems have been solved by reducing payment obligations to the principal creditors. |
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OPINION/ORDER Hunter & Altshuler were on brief for appellants. Begel and Friedman & Babcock were on brief for appellee. Holding that because the notice requirement of Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not observed. Because Appellants provided strong evidence that the damage award was erroneously calculated. Particularly the licenses and inventory of a Maine corporation which was in default on its obligations to Plaintiff Appellee Key Bank of Maine ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because the district court failed to inform him that the Government must prove materiality for the bank and wire fraud charges. Because we find that the district court's error in failing to inform Strassini that materiality was an element of bank and wire fraud neither affected his substantial rights nor seriously affected the fairness. (6) his 1994 adjusted gross income was approximately $96. 500 check into his business account at NationsBank that was drawn on his MBNA America Visa credit card. Strassini made several withdrawals from the account before the check was returned for insufficient funds. (4) Elite Homes was worth $937. The proceeds of which were deposited into his personal checking accounts. Strassini stipulated that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea and that presentation of the factual basis was deferred until sentencing. Informed Strassini of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty by explaining the elements of bank fraud. |
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OPINION/ORDER Among the firm's accounts receivable was a contingency fee agreement. 000 was deposited into an escrow account. 000 from the Groton settlement was deposited into Schlichtmann's escrow account. A former co defendant who was dismissed from this case). The court concluded that because Schlichtmann's post bankruptcy work on the Groton matter was not performed on behalf of the dissolved partnership. He was entitled to a portion of the Groton fee to compensate for the work he performed in his individual capacity. Whether the two thirds portion of the Groton fee retained by Schlichtmann was a proper division between Schlichtmann and his former partners was to be resolved at trial.
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OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Gary Brinsfield was convicted by a jury of six counts of bank fraud and two counts of making a false statement in order to influence a bank. He was (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. Charles Huffman was a loan officer at Norman Bank of Commerce in Norman. His lending limits for secured and unsecured loans were $25. 000 and were used to purchase damaged vehicles for repair and resale. He was concerned that if he stopped making loans to Brinsfield. Although the loan was in the nominee's name. At all times Huffman understood that Brinsfield was the actual borrower and was obligated to pay off the loan. All of the nominee loans made to Brinsfield were at or below Huffman's lending limit ($25. Because the loans were processed under third party names. Republic was unaware that Brinsfield was the true borrower. Huffman often doctored the loans to make it (1) There were five nominees involved in Counts 1 6: James Wiseman (Counts 1 and 2). |
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C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\06-6004EM PYATT V. BROWN FINAL W AMENDMENT.WPD This is an appeal of the bankruptcy court's order granting the chapter 7 trustee's motion for the turnover of funds transferred from the Debtor's bank account postpetition for the payment of checks delivered to creditors prepetition. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.1 The issue on appeal whether the Debtor is responsible for certain postpetition transfers of estate property is purely legal. Will therefore be reviewed de novo. BACKGROUND The relevant facts are undisputed and straightforward. Brown was appointed as the trustee ( |
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99-4203 -- MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. U.S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS INC. -- 06/20/2000 Telephone service as a whole was viewed as a natural monopoly which needed to be regulated for the benefit of all users. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Two of the Bellamys were connected to law enforcement: Larry was a Lieutenant in the Myrtle Beach. A small pickup that was parked so that its occupant had a view of the bank's parking lot. Who was sitting in a parked vehicle in the bank's parking lot right before the robbery. Westraad also noticed that the driver was wearing a black and white checkered jacket. A forensic expert concluded that the checkered coat found in Claude's home and the checkered coat worn by one of the robbers caught on the bank's surveillance film were one and the same. A set of GM keys were found at Claude's Little River. The FBI was able to link the Bellamys to nine bank robberies in all. The FBI made the links by identifying distinct characteristics that were common in more than one of the robberies. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Leibforth began working for the Bank in 1980 as a teller/secretary and in December 1997 was promoted to the position of Branch Manager/Assistant Vice President. She 2 No. 02 3190 was terminated a year later. When she was 55 years old. The parties agree that Leibforth was performing her job in a satisfactory manner. Leibforth met with Metz and Senior Vice President Kim Larson to inform them that she was selling her house. As soon as her house was sold. She was going to retire and move to Tucson. Who claims to have been present at the May 28 meeting. Leibforth told Metz and Larson that her husband |
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OPINION/ORDER The Varners were unable to meet their interest obligations with Decatur Bank. Judgments and decrees of foreclosure were issued in favor of Decatur Bank on February 16 and 20. The property was subsequently sold. The Varners were subsequently discharged from bankruptcy. The Varners claimed that this former loan officer indicated that the projected cashflow figures were false and misleading. |
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OPINION/ORDER Hamada was the defendant in a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud action filed by his former partner in medicine. Sought a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the judgment while his appeal was pending. Indemnified Fidelity if the bond were to be called. The letters were issued. Michelson filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking a determination that his claims under the court judgment were non dischargeable. Punitive damages and prejudgment interest awarded in the state case were nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2)(A). The court held that the banks' claims were purely contractual and that they were not entitled to subrogation to the non dischargeability of the Michelson judgment. The court found that the banks' direct claims arising from the letters of credit were dischargeable and that their failure to file timely non dischargeability complaints precluded them from seeking non dischargeability |
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OPINION/ORDER We will reverse and remand for further proceedings concerning the applicability of the discovery rule to the debtor's claims against its lawyer's law firm and the law firm's individual shareholders. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in Continental Bank's favor. We will also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and the debtor's law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. P.C. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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UNITED STATES V. MILLER (9/17/1999, NO. 96-5491) Robert Wohlleber ( |
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UNITED STATES V. BURSTON (11/6/1998, NO. 96-8717) Terry Lewis Burston was convicted of one count of postal robbery. Contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and challenging the district court's denial of motions to suppress certain evidence and its limitation of the cross examination of one of the prosecution's witnesses. The robber was described by eyewitnesses as an African American male wearing a baseball cap and sunglasses. It was registered to Burston. Bank employees who were present during the robbery identified these items as the ones worn by the robber. Burston's build was similar to that of the robber. The Government also presented the testimony of one of Burston's accomplices. Burston was carrying substantial sums of money and told Wilson that he had |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant.
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LA VAN, ET AL. V. U.S. Argued for defendant appellant. With her on the brief were Stuart E. Schiffer. Director. The Government also presented the testimony of one of Burston's accomplices. Burston was carrying substantial sums of money and told Wilson that he had |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Kelt was to repay Horizon with interest. Horizon was to receive half of Kelt's profits. Deglau was to get an annual salary of $80. Kelt's stock and all of its assets were pledged as security for this loan. The Loan Agreement was negotiated by Deglau's lawyer. The terms of the loan agreement are disputed. Will be discussed below. 000 line of credit if it was personally guaranteed by Deglau and his wife. The note itself was signed in blank. It was eventually filled out to reflect a $200. He was personally liable for the additional $100. He tells us he was assured verbally that the Guaranty would apply only to the $200. Horizon was experiencing financial turmoil. Was 1. Citations to the Appellant's Appendix will be indicated by R.[page]. 3 eventually taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and later by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).2 In 1990. The FDIC advised Deglau that he was in default on the 1985 Kelt note for about $1.3 million. A familiarity with judgment by confession as undertaken in Pennsylvania is essential to the decision of this case. |
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OPINION/ORDER Dowell was on brief. Were on brief for appellee. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the district court's order. Wentz were directors of The Howard Savings Bank of Livingston. Which was declared insolvent on October 2. The FDIC was appointed receiver. Four purposes were cited in the order: (1) determining whether the individuals may be liable as a result of any action or inaction that could have affected the bank. Were served with notices to appear for depositions and ordered to produce documents in some twenty eight different categories covering the six year period preceding October 1992. Included were records in their possession pertaining to bank operations. It stated that the documents were necessary to enable the FDIC to determine the nature and extent of any losses sustained by the bank because of negligence or breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. That the deficiencies were not corrected. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER McIninch & Phillips was on brief. With whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on brief. Were on brief. Appellant Donovan was charged with. Appellants Aversa and Mento were charged with. The cross appeals (Nos. 91 1615 and 91 1616) are moot. They will. Although Donovan was the bank's legal compliance officer a status which presumptively suggests his familiarity with banking laws he did not prepare CTRs for any of these deposits. Donovan fended off his subordinates' concerns about the unorthodox way he was handling Saba's cash. Donovan admitted that he was aware of the law requiring him to file CTRs for cash deposits of $10. Insisted that he mistakenly believed Saba's deposits came within one of the law's exemptions.2 The district court 2 |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to convict him of either charge. They were followed by Bobby Marsh and Marvin Raines in a Ford Taurus rented by Williams in Atlanta. As he was leaving the bank. Womack ran from the vehicle but was quickly apprehended. That Nance was dead. That Womack was in jail. |
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OPINION/ORDER We agree with the district court that the federal securities claim of one of the investors is barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree with the district court's disposition of the federal securities claim and conclude that the investors have proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether the law firm made a statement containing a material omission upon which the investors relied. Even when the lawyer did not sign or endorse the document and the investor is therefore unaware of the lawyer's role in the fraud.1 We will reverse the judgment of 1. We later set forth the following specific requirements to hold such a lawyer liable: (1) the lawyer knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that 3 the district court insofar as it granted the law firm's motion for summary judgment on the federal securities claim as to three of the four investors. We will reverse the judgment of the district court on the investors' common law fraud claim. Which claim was timely as to all four investors. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. In May 1995 the Bank sold the car on terms that Amond contends were commercially unreasonable and that unfairly reduced the sale price of the car. After a bench trial in December 1996 the state court awarded judgment to Amond on the Bank's claim for the deficiency because the Bank was unable to rebut Amond's assertion that the Bank had sold her car as a less expensive model. Her appeal was untimely. That is. Confirming that the stated balance on the loan was accurate. Amond was unable to obtain the loan to buy the condominium. She claimed that the lawyers violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect a debt that was not owed and by verifying an $11. 777 balance on the loan that was in error. If the papers filed in district court show there is no |
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OPINION/ORDER It is undisputed that Ortlieb paid the debt the mortgages secured in full and was entitled to have them marked satisfied as he originally requested in 2000. After the issue was joined the parties brought cross motions for summary judgment. Ortlieb died and his estate was substituted for him as a party. After our review of this matter we are in substantial agreement with the district court on the statutes of limitations issue and will affirm on the estate's appeal on that 1 The Bank does not rely on a statute for attorney's fees on this appeal. 3 basis.2 We do note. In its brief the estate does not challenge this finding beyond indicating in its statement of facts that the Bank's |
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OPINION/ORDER 1993 is amended as follows: On page 4. Lawrence Sager were on brief for appellant. P.C. were on brief for appellee. Appellants in this case are former officers of a failed bank. Although the statute in question is not easily construed and the result is a severe one. Are simple. The four appellants in this case were officers of Eliot Savings Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for the United States. With whom Carney & Bassil was on brief. With whom Foster and Peterson was on brief. The trial jury plausibly could have found that the scheme tracked the following script. When mortgages were written on that basis. The 3 developers set out to subvert the down payment requirement by orchestrating a paper shuffle designed to create the (false) impression that the buyers were putting 10% down in order to acquire the properties. When they were not. An inflated purchase price often caused the bank to approve a higher first mortgage loan than would have been forthcoming had it known the true purchase price. He had made no down payment at all. 2One vignette is particularly telling. The court factored in the defendants' criminal history scores all were first offenders and arrived at a GSR of 33 41 months at OL 20 and a GSR of 27 33 months at OL 18. It is well established that the sentencing guidelines apply to offenses that straddle the effective date of the guidelines (November 1. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > | ||
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OPINION/ORDER At the heart of the matter are the questions of whether the defendant banks breached their contract with Acoustical or. Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. The facts that gave rise to this dispute are summarized below. Obaid required that Acoustical have a Saudi bank issue a performance guarantee to Obaid in the amount of 5% of the value of Acoustical's construction contract. The performance guarantee was like an insurance policy for Obaid. Which in turn Because First Westroads was unable First Westroads contacted its 2 contacted its correspondent bank. This second guarantee was to serve as a warranty for the work performed by Acoustical. The maintenance guarantee was to run for a period of fourteen months from the date of the completion of Acoustical's work and was to be issued by a Saudi bank in the same amount as the performance guarantee. dispute now before us. Both Acoustical and of Completion of the Works |
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OPINION/ORDER DICKERSON Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Virginia was robbed. Which was traced to Dickerson. During which time he was not formally placed under arrest or handcuffed. Dickerson was interviewed by Special Agent Lawlor and Detective Thomas Durkin of the Alexandria Police Department. Had admitted that he was near the bank at the time of the robbery. Dickerson was read his Miranda rights and was placed formally under arrest. Rochester was apprehended by the police and placed under arrest. Rochester also stated that Dickerson was his getaway driver in each of the Maryland and Virginia bank robberies and testified to that effect at Dickerson's trial three years later. Dickerson was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia for one count of conspiracy. Claiming that the identification was a result of the unlawful confession. Arguing that Rochester's testimony was tainted by Dickerson's unlawful arrest. Again arguing that Rochester's testimony was tainted by Dickerson's unlawful arrest. |
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OPINION/ORDER Anson was the manager of a branch bank located in a supermarket in Papillion. She was often the only teller on duty. Ashe had called Anson to tell her they were coming. McDonald entered the supermarket through the south doors (Anson had told them that there were no surveillance cameras at that entrance). 540.59 was missing from the teller drawer. 547.00 was to be divided four ways. She argues that the incident involving the customer account did not involve her employer and that the bank did not investigate the embezzlement until after her employment ended and that 3 she was never actually accused of embezzling this money. Anson argues that the government's cross examination improperly tried to show that she was a thief. Rule 608(b) permits cross examination about specific bad acts that have not resulted in felony convictions if those acts concern the witness's credibility. 540.59 was missing. The bank audit sheet was admitted as a summary exhibit pursuant to Fed. Bank vice president Susan Fleetwood testified that she was responsible for the oversight of accounting and operations of the bank and its branches. |
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UNITED STATES V. MILLER (9/17/1999, NO. 96-5491) Robert Wohlleber ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Nor is there any additional evidence. Wolfe was charged with one count of ar med bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. To sustain a conviction for armed robbery one of the elements the prosecutor must pr ove is that the defendant |
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OPINION/ORDER I. This case is another case arising from the fraudulent loan scheme orchestrated by Edward J. Reiners' fraud was uncovered Philip Morris was not involved in any way with Project Star and in fact there was no such project and the banks involved in the Project Star credit facility lost large sums of money. Because Signet was a lead bank and arranged for the participation of several of the other banks. Many of these banks have sued Signet. Although the facts behind Reiners' scheme have been described elsewhere. They are repeated here insofar as they are relevant to the present appeal. Nelson and Mooney were familiar with Reiners' name from prior deals in which Reiners had executed documents on behalf of Philip Morris for computer leasing transactions. Nelson repeated to Mooney the story that Reiners had told him that Reiners was still employed with Philip Morris and that Project Star was a top secret project being conducted offshore by Philip Morris which required large amounts of computer equipment. The participation of Philip Morris was a vital component of the security for the loans. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This appeal is the second in this case. The Republic of Congo is attempting to avoid its undisputed debt by claiming sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court concluded that the Congo was entitled to claim immunity under the provisions of the FSIA because the property at issue was not used for commercial purposes in the United States. In 1 This matter is decided by a quorum. 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). order to turn this foreign judgment into a United States judgment. The Garnishees are successors in interest to a 1979 joint venture (the |
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UNITED STATES V. DABBS (2/6/1998, NO. 95-2914) PST mailed certificates at random to prospective customers declaring that the recipient was eligible to receive one of four allegedly valuable awards. The merchant bank is only entitled to recoup its loss from the business. Lacks sufficient funds or is no longer a functioning enterprise. Studies have shown that telemarketing companies generate a substantially greater risk of charge backs. When the inspector called a third time to tell her that Barnett had discovered the scheme and advised him that factoring was illegal. Susan Dabbs falsely told the inspector that they were not violating the law and instructed the inspector to |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief. Carta & Edelberg were on brief for respondents Ariel and Enrique Gutierrez. Arroyo Alejandro was on brief. It is important to note the narrowness of the government's position: it does not contend that the judge has any actual bias or prejudice in this case and it does not seek her recusal under 28 U.S.C. 144 (1994). Thereby creating the illusion that the latter loans were performing well. The government alleges that one object of the scheme which supposedly persisted for almost the entire decade between 1980 and 1990 was to stave off regulatory intervention and keep Mu¤oz and S nchez in power. The record is tenebrous as to whether Mr. Cerezo's checking account was overdrawn. The loan contract and related documents were signed by Mr. Somohano sent a copy of the second letter to Judge Cerezo at the Cerezos' home address because he was concerned that. She might not have been aware that the loan even existed. Cerezo informed Caguas that he did not have liquid funds sufficient to repay the debt. |
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OPINION/ORDER Foster contends that the district court erred in finding that Neville was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. * further argues that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding his claims against Bank One. The loan was again renewed and extended in the amount of $523. Foster subsequently filed suit against Bank One and Neville in Texas state court alleging that the 2000 loan was illegal and unenforceable because it was not the loan Neville promised him and he agreed to it only as a result of economic duress. A declaratory judgment that the lien on his residence was illegal and unenforceable. The only jurisdictional issue is whether Neville has been properly joined as a part y. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bank believes it is entitled to the proceeds from the sale of these two items. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The trustee concedes that the notice of appeal was timely filed. Argues that the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee which was not paid until later. The record supports a determination that the fee was paid with the notice and we also note that the clerk of bankruptcy court's docket. We conclude that the notice of appeal was timely. Because the proceeds from the sale could be paid to the appellant if it was found that the 3 bankruptcy court erred.2 The Eighth Circuit agreed with us on the mootness issue. 223 F.3d 764. Only if ... (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute. The issue becomes whether there is a |
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OPINION/ORDER (2) his trial should have been transferred or the jury sequestered due to extensive media coverage of the crimes with which he was charged. BACKGROUND The facts are taken from the evidence presented at trial and are viewed in the light most favorable to the government. No. 04 5780 Goins and Justin Jones first met when the two were patients in the psychiatric ward of an army hospital at Fort Benning. Both men had gone AWOL and thought they were likely to be discharged from service in the army. Goins suggested that the two could rob a bank in Virginia once they were discharged. The loan was made in anticipation of a tax refund of the same amount. In testimony Goins contends should have been excluded. Goins represented that he was an undercover police officer investigating drug activity. Jones followed Goins's lead and pretended that he too was an undercover officer. Goins told Woltz he suspected the cash was drug money but told Woltz he could have the money back if his supervisor (Woltz worked at a nearby restaurant) confirmed it was actually tip money or wages. |
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OPINION/ORDER Allen & Snyder was on consolidated brief for Woloohojian Realty Corporation. Goodale and MacAdams & Wieck Incorporated were on consolidated brief for Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank. Cannavino and Cummings & Lockwood were on consolidated brief for Elizabeth V. What could have been a relatively simple suit has been complicated by intervening actions by Bogosian's creditors. The original parties have been litigating for over ten years. The action was brought as a diversity suit in the federal district court. The defendants were the corporation and Bogosian's two brothers. Bogosian is entitled to the fair value of her shares as of January 19. Judge Boyle's first action was to provide interim relief to Bogosian. 000 monthly until the entry of a final judgment from which no appeal was taken. Judge Boyle appointed a special master to value the property and much of the next two years appears to have been spent in this exercise. It was sent back for adjustments. At least one objective was to stem the accrual of interest on WRC's debt to Bogosian. |
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OPINION/ORDER Zimmerman were on brief. Nelson were on brief. Senior Circuit Judge. This is a fraudulent transfer action brought by the plaintiff appellant. The case was tried before a jury. Finding the plaintiff's evidence insufficient to permit a jury to conclude that there was value in the assets of the defendants' corporation which were over and above the amount of its secured debt. Which was the plaintiff's theory of the case. | ||
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NIPPON CREDIT BANK, LTD V. MATTHEWS (5/15/2002, NO. 98-8639) BACKGROUND
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COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD V. TORCISE (12/11/1998, NO. 96-4632) We hold that the defendant's claim is barred by the principle of collateral estoppel. In April 1989. The loan was secured by a lien on certain real property and farm equipment. That the proceeds from these sales were to be held in escrow pending the result of certain fraudulent transfer and preference litigation that Torcise's bankruptcy estate had brought against Community Bank. Community Bank foreclosed on Torcise's property in the Circuit Court of Dade County. The circuit court determined that Torcise was liable for the principal amount of the note plus interest at the contractual default rate accruing until the time of the foreclosure. | ||
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OPINION/ORDER Triggered |
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OPINION/ORDER Harrah's contends that the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith was not clearly erroneous. Murray Armstrong was a lawyer who practiced in the small Arkansas towns of Star City and Rison. His m | ||