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OPINION/ORDER The Yousifs and Tanners filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and were represented before and after these filings by Halbert. Debtors claim that Halbert was not qualified under bankruptcy law and rules to serve as counsel in the Chapter 11 proceedings. Appealed to the that enables a court of appeals to determine whether the district court's order is a final and appealable order without having first to reach the merits of the appeal. 116 F.3d at 1192 ( |
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OPINION/ORDER 171 B.R. 387 IRS cross appeals the district court's award of We have resolved several issues which attorney fees under § 105. required clarification in this circuit. All citations are to the 1994 United States Code. Initially we conclude we have jurisdiction to review the district court's order as a |
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OPINION/ORDER The issue in these appeals is the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Was executed by Debtor and Safeco. Was renewable for four additional one year periods unless Safeco gave ninety days notice of its intent to cancel or not to renew. The ADM bond further provided: It is understood and agreed that [ADM] may recover the full amount of the Bond (less any previous amounts paid to [ADM] under the Bond) if [Safeco] cancels or nonrenews the Bond and. Because Debtor was now in bankruptcy. The agreement reflected in the Term Sheet was a post petition security credit agreement that required bankruptcy court approval. 3 In late July and early August. Although the new arrangements were later approved by the bankruptcy court. The ADM bond is in full force and effect. There have never been any claims against it. Safeco's original complaint sought a declaratory judgment determining that ADM was not entitled to forfeiture of the penal sum of five million dollars and an injunction preventing ADM from continuing to demand payment. |
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OPINION/ORDER The fundamental question in this consolidated appeal is when title to funds held in trust passes to a beneficiary. That question is broad. An imprecise resolution might have far reaching implications for. How to resolve this fundamental question in this particular situation is not easy. That terminal was to belong to United Air Lines. The issues on appeal are whether the district court correctly affirmed (1) the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to United with respect to its prepetition reimbursement for work completed prepetition. A. The Bond Agreements The 1997 and 2001 bond agreements share the same basic structure and are governed by California law. The money in these funds is pledged for the repayment of principal and interest on the bonds and is held in trust for the bondholders. United is obligated to make these payments. Were designed to reimburse United for construction costs it incurred on the LAX project. Although the structure of the funds is similar. Unless United is in default in its payment obligations. |
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OPINION/ORDER Mansur were on the brief for appellee. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Which created a presumption of abuse against debtors having primarily consumer debts who have sufficient income to repay their debts. Is that a bankruptcy court may not consider a debtor's income and expenses in deciding a motion to dismiss brought under section 707(a). It is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court to consider a debtor's monthly income and expenses together with any other factors relevant to a debtor's good faith in filing for bankruptcy. We will affirm the Bankruptcy Court's order denying Hitachi's motion to dismiss. Perlin is a licensed radiologist. They have saved more than $430. CMI's payments were due on a graduated payment schedule. The consultant determined that the original income projections were flawed. The Bankruptcy Court found that Hitachi had presented sufficient information to shift the burden to the Perlins to prove that their petition was brought in good faith. The Bankruptcy Court found that the Perlins's substantial expenses were |
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OPINION/ORDER 2004 is amended as follows: on slip Opinion page 5528. IT IS SO ORDERED. Holding that the bankruptcy court's surcharge remedy was a permissible equitable remedy under the Bankruptcy Code. Was not barred by election of remedies or res judicata. This ruling was affirmed by the district court on March 6. 000 of the value of these items) that the Latmans had previously exempted under § 522(d)(5).1 The ruling on this motion is challenged on this appeal. The Latmans were married and did not claim a homestead exemption. 1 7388 LATMAN v. Or have this amount also charged against their |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Placed the corporation into bankruptcy without considering other alternatives that may have yielded greater value for the corporation and its shareholders. Who were minority shareholders. The equity of the minority shareholders was wiped out and the assets of the corporation were sold to one of defendant Yageo Corp.'s subsidiaries. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to sue as assignees of the corporate claim and that their breach of fiduciary duty claims are preempted by federal bankruptcy law and barred by res judicata. The district court held that plaintiffs have standing and that their claims are neither preempted nor barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs cross appeal the district court's damages calculations and its determination that they did not have standing to assert the claims of minority shareholders. Was formed in 1996 by George Chen and George |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's award. The debtors were predecessors in interest to appellee. We will affirm. In September 1990 the plan was consummated. Zolfo Cooper was one of seventeen legal. The court noted its dismay over the behavior of the lawyers who |
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OPINION/ORDER Of which she was the executive director. Arising out of activities No. 01 1261 3 that she was alleged to have committed as Discovery's director. Process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the [Bankruptcy Code]. |
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OPINION/ORDER Ryan's complaint was untimely. That he could not have waived such an objection because Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a)'s time limit is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. Kontrick 2 No. 01 2683 contends that the bankruptcy court improperly granted summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact about his intent in transferring his paychecks to his wife in the year before bankruptcy. Were business associates. Each was a 50% shareholder in a professional corporation that Dr. The association of the two physicians in this arrangement was a short and unhappy one. The details of which are not material to this appeal. These disagreements were heard in two separate arbitrations. Ryan was awarded $47. Kontrick was asked about his family finances. Kontrick testified that personal expenses were paid from that account. I don't have that account anymore. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court further found that FE&B was motivated throughout its representation of the Debtor by subjective bad faith. Because we feel that the bankruptcy court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous. Neither a reorganization plan nor a large equity infusion was forthcoming by the end of March 1993. A meeting was subsequently arranged to discuss the future of the Debtor. Was attended by Mr. The representatives of the Committee indicated that the Committee was willing to work with the Debtor to solve its financial woes. Burke: If the Debtor's reorganization plan was hinged upon the long term viability of the Debtor. The Committee pledged to withhold its support unless the Debtor's top level management was replaced particularly Mr. The complaint was signed by Jeffrey Eichen of FE&B. Fellheimer characterized as essential to the complaint was out of the country and would not return before the hearing. Burke was not out of the country and Mr. Fellheimer was aware of Mr. The sanction motion alleged that sanctions were appropriate in that the complaint filed by FE&B lacked a reasonable basis in law and in fact and that the complaint was filed for improper tactical purposes. |
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OPINION/ORDER Dyer and Jeanie owned a house together when they were married ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Chief Judge: Debtor Norman Majewski incurred large medical expenses at the hospital where he was employed. Now contends that the firing violated the bankruptcy code provision barring termination of an individual who |
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OPINION/ORDER The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We are presented with the question of whether a bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction to enter a money judgment in a nondischargeability adversary proceeding where the underlying debt has been reduced to judgment in state court. The stay was granted subject to the condition that Sasson |
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OPINION/ORDER |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Appellee Jason Rutz was a listed creditor in his stepfather's appellant Lon McGhan bankruptcy proceedings. The state court in which that action was filed ruled that Rutz's action could proceed because Rutz had inadequate notice of the earlier bankruptcy proceedings. Reasoning that McGhan's desire to relitigate an issue already heard in state court was insufficient cause to reopen the case. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to decline to reopen McGhan's bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court was required to reopen the proceedings to protect its exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of its own orders. McGhan was charged with five counts of sexual molestation of Rutz. At the time the charges were 6703 filed. Rutz was 12 years old. Any creditor wishing to have a debt characterized as nondischargeable must file a complaint alleging nondischargeability of the debt. His claim is automatically discharged pursuant to § 523(c)(1). Although debts for intentional torts such as Rutz's claim ordinarily are not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the code. |
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OPINION/ORDER Thompkins ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank ( |
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NEXT WAVE PRSNAL COMM V. FCC Olson argued the cause for petitioners/appel lants. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland sitting as an appellate court in bankruptcy. Broumas was a banker with Madison National Bank of Virginia and a substantial shareholder in its parent company. James Koch was appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtors' bankruptcy estate. Lawton Rogers (Rogers) and the law firm of which he was a partner. Rogers was Broumas' lawyer. Broumas was Rogers' banker. The two were also friends and participated in several financial investments. The relationship between Rogers and Broumas was so close that Rogers allowed Broumas unlimited access to his accounts at Madison National Bank of Virginia as well as the Law Firm's account by giving Broumas signature authority over the accounts. No charges were brought against Rogers. There was sufficient equity in the residence to support them. Even though the residence was encumbered by a first and a second deed of trust. |
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OPINION/ORDER Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 4557 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization. |
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OPINION/ORDER Factual Background Landmark Community Bank ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an appeal by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Ricky Bracewell from an order of the district court excluding from the estate a payment Bracewell received under the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 for crop losses he had sustained. The appeal turns on the issue of whether a crop disaster payment is property of the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) or (a)(6) if the losses occurred before the bankruptcy filing or conversion date but the legislation authorizing the payment came afterwards. The bankruptcy court ruled that the payments were property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) but not under (a)(6). The district court ruled that the payment was not property of the bankruptcy estate under either subsection of § 541. This is the trustee's appeal from that ruling. I. The facts have been stipulated throughout these proceedings. He was unable to repay the debts he had incurred to produce the crops. While Bracewell's bankruptcy petition was pending. The Emergency Farmer and Rancher Assistance Act of 2002 was introduced in the House of Representatives. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding that CalFed's interest in the property was not being adequately protected during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Was less than the bankruptcy court had determined and was adequately protected. The district court also found that the debtor retained equity in the property and that relief from the automatic stay would therefore be unavailable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as well.[fn2] We will reverse the order of the district court and remand with instructions to return this matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Was formed to acquire a 176 unit garden apartment complex located in Florida. It is the debtor's primary asset. A third mortgage was held by FEC Mortgage Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Before the bankruptcy petition was filed. Done all that was necessary to obtain its lien against the debtor's after acquired property. Determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. We affirm. 2 I Dwight Avis was placed in an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding by a petition filed by his creditors on May 10. Under his will. Maureen was given a power of appointment to convey trust assets to the beneficiaries. Her own support and maintenance were administered by trustees. In Maureen's will. She exercised the power of appointment given to her by the Davis Weir trust by bequeathing whatever was left of the trust's assets to the beneficiaries. Because Avis' interest was contingent on (1) how the Davis Weir trust was administered. It was unclear to Avis what. The bankruptcy estate was closed on December 15. He timely moved to have the bankruptcy proceedings reopened in order to bring the inheritance within the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A). 819 of its claim was secured by a lien that it had obtained almost a year before Avis was placed 3 in bankruptcy. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are here asked to review a decision of the District Court of the Virgin Islands in an appeal from an order of a bankruptcy judge sitting in the Virgin Islands by designation of the Third Circuit Judicial Council under 28 U.S.C. It concluded that the order appealed from was thus entered without authority and was invalid. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. 2 I. In relevant part: (a) A bankruptcy judge may be transferred to serve temporarily as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial district other than the judicial district for which such bankruptcy judge was appointed upon the approval of the judicial council of each of the circuits involved. (b) A bankruptcy judge who has retired may. Be recalled to serve as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial district by the judicial council of the circuit within which such district is located. Cosetti is a retired bankruptcy judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. An order was entered by the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit memorializing its determination that there was an unmet need for the services of a bankruptcy judge in the Virgin Islands and recalling Judge Cosetti. |
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OPINION/ORDER Concluding that his case was a core proceeding and that it had authority to decide the matter. Dunmore consulted with his tax attorney to determine whether he should list these refund claims as assets on a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition he was preparing. Any potential waiver objection is now itself waived. 1 1212 DUNMORE v. Dunmore admitted he was not prepared to proceed with trial in the bankruptcy court. Whether Dunmore was entitled to a jury trial in federal court. Dunmore must have suffered an |
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OPINION/ORDER Was never in financial distress and that the petition in this case was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord's claims and to increase the distribution of the Debtor's estate to Integrated's shareholders at the Landlord's expense. These contentions are corroborated by the record. Thus Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Which was capped at $25 million with Integrated's liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by insurance) was listed at its full alleged value. Integrated was still solvent at the time of filing. The issue on appeal is whether. With no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11 proceedings will maximize the value of the debtor's estate for creditors. We conclude that such a petition is not filed in good faith and will therefore reverse. I. Integrated was a supplier of software and equipment to the broadband communications industry. The Landlord was aware of the financial risks associated with Integrated's business and willingly accepted those risks. 2001 was a very poor year for Integrated. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter. |
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OPINION/ORDER District Judge: This appeal raises the question: under what circumstances will a creditor be barred from later bringing an action against a co creditor based upon state law claims if. That Kodak was precluded from bringing the New York action by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of orders issued by the bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy filed by Atlanta Retail. We hold that res judicata does not bar the New York action because Kodak could not have received a full remedy in the contested Wolf bankruptcy proceedings and because the same nucleus of operative fact was not presented in the two actions. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the injunction is vacated. Entered into an agreement ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We are presented with two decisions of the district court dated May 18. We are asked to decide whether the district court erred in determining that the bankruptcy court was not authorized to compel the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate tax payments first to trust fund taxes. We will affirm the decisions of the district court. I. We feel compelled to set forth the facts in detail because these bankruptcy cases are so heavily fact intensive. KBS is a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring and operating a modular home manufacturing business. Were its sole owners. That payment was not accompanied by a quarterly return. 468 were |
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OPINION/ORDER The question presented in this case is whether various state law claims against a bankruptcy trustee in his individual capacity can be either a |
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OPINION/ORDER This Hawaii debt was included among those to be paid in the Omines' Chapter 13 plan. The collection efforts were halted. The Florida DOR asserted that Omine's post petition income was not property of the estate. That sending debt collection letters was not an action against estate property. That 4 the collection efforts resulted from computer glitches and were therefore not willful. The district court found that the Florida DOR violated the automatic stay and the damages were actual. The district court also remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for the determination as to whether the debt was in the nature of support. Is essential to the Debtors' ability to make plan payments and therefore is estate property to which the [Florida DOR] is not entitled. |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c). In which he and Ebeling were also co shareholders along with Richard E. Including advising against Kujawa's suggestion in August 1989 that he was considering filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Another creditor was granted permission to intervene and join in the involuntary petition on March 7. Schwartz was. Noting that Schwartz should have been apprised of the unethical nature of his attempt to intervene on behalf of the other creditors because he had been disqualified in two similar previous involuntary cases against his former clients. Schwartz was given five days thereafter to object to the requested fees and was advised that if no such objection was filed by him. While that appeal to the District Court was pending. All statutory references are to the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the petitioning creditors had met their burden under § 303 as to the appropriate number of petitioning creditors and the dollar amounts needed and further concluded that Kujawa was not generally paying his debts as they came due. |
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OPINION/ORDER Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the district court's jurisdiction. Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the court's jurisdiction. Millennium Seacarriers was formed to hold the capital stock of various vesselowning subsidiaries (collectively |
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OPINION/ORDER That abstention was not appropriate under The Honorable Jerry W. The order below will be reversed. The factual background of this case is set forth in detail in our prior opinion Williams v. Will be expanded upon below only to the extent necessary for the issues presently under consideration. The contractual monthly mortgage payments that came due postpetition were also to be paid through the Plan. The dismissal order directed the trustee to pay claims |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm. Bankruptcy Proceedings The essential facts are not in dispute. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on April 22. A trustee was appointed. Each parcel of property was encumbered as follows. 509 (3d Cir. 1997). 3 2 property was more than sufficient to satisfy Newcourt's claim on its business loan and thus there was no need to look to the residential property except in the event of a deficiency after liquidation of the business assets. The trustee requested that the automatic stay remain in effect until it was determined whether the administration of the estate might result in equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee concluded that there was no equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors and therefore consented to the entry of an order granting Newcourt's motion for relief from the automatic stay. Zinchiak argued that there was no need to grant relief with respect to the residential property until it became evident from liquidation of the business assets that a deficiency remained on Newcourt's claim. |
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OPINION/ORDER The first is whether a debtor in a Chapter 11 case can reject a collective bargaining agreement even after it has sold virtually all of its assets. The second is whether the court's denial of a debtor's application for leave to reject its collective bargaining agreement results. The CBA was to remain in effect for five years and provided that Debtor would pay certain of its union employees' medical and dental expenses. Debtor was in serious financial difficulty and fell behind in its payments of these expenses. It was clear from the beginning that Debtor could not rehabilitate itself. Matters were so bleak that for a time This number represents an estimate by the union. Debtor was in arrears in paying approximately $600. Will almost certainly receive no distribution at all. 2 1 the company shut down. One purchaser was willing to sign a letter of intent to purchase. It was Debtor's position that the value of the assets of the company could be maximized only if its assets were sold on a going concern basis. |
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OPINION/ORDER It alone was entitled to bring a Rule 9019 motion. Smart World also raises a number of specific challenges to the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement.2 Because we find that the bankruptcy court 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 There are two groups of creditors: The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Smart World Technologies. The Committee are all appellees. Was unable to run its business profitably and sought a purchaser for its most valuable asset. A competing internet service provider who was the sole bidder. Terms of which were set forth in a |
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OPINION/ORDER We are confronted with a tension between bankruptcy law and labor law. These claims were based on alleged seniority integration rights stemming from a pending labor arbitration dispute and were filed following Continental's acquisition of Eastern and subsequent refusal to bargain over the seniority integration of Eastern's pilots. Both of which are no longer represented by ALPA. Appealed to this court.1 Resolution of this dispute requires us to determine: (1) whether the bankruptcy claims that the LPP Claimants and the Group of 31 seek to enforce constitute |
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OPINION/ORDER ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Both LSS and WHO are non profit organizations which provide community services to residents of Westmoreland County in western Pennsylvania. LSS was selected by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to receive grant moneys under the federal Supportive Housing Program. Because WHO was one of LSS's largest creditors. WHO defended on the ground that LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Program grant relationship was not property of LSS's bankruptcy estate and thus did not trigger a fiduciary duty on WHO's part. We hold that LSS's interest in the grant r elationship with HUD is excluded from the definition of |
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OPINION/ORDER Artoc was a secured lender to Uni Refining. Notice of the assignment was placed on Uni's invoices to its customers along with instructions for them to send invoice payments to Artoc. The Debtor was both a customer and vendor of Uni. Artoc sued the Debtor and others in a Texas federal district court alleging that the offsets were in violation of its rights as assignee of Uni's receivables. 000 of this amount represents principal to which 10% prepetition interest is to be added. 850 is allowed attorneys' fees. 2 3 2 lack of notice to the Debtor of the assignment and estoppel. The Court later added the following instruction: If judgment is entered against Apex. These issues are not concluded by this opinion. No further order was issued by the bankruptcy court regarding the proceeding. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to permit supplementation of the summary judgment record. Courts of appeal will not interfere with a judge's exercise of discretion in this area except when abused. A trial court's exercise of 5 its discretion in refusing to accept late filed summary judgment evidence will not be disturbed on appeal even where a procedurally adequate motion had been filed before entry of summary judgment. |
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OPINION/ORDER Line 2 the text is corrected to read |
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OPINION/ORDER Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Klee were on the brief for amici curiae Senator Robert G. With him on the brief were Christopher J. With him on the brief were Michael F. Is bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in bank ruptcy. Con gress also directed the Commission to |
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OPINION/ORDER LLC were on brief for appellant. P.A. were on brief for cross appellant. It ruled that because the Advest IRA was in Cox's name when Cox petitioned for bankruptcy. Hence was not subject to the later judgment of the divorce court. We reverse the court's decision as to the Advest IRA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Laurie Davis and Thomas Cox were married on August 17. They have two minor children. Davis was a homemaker and. Cox was a successful commercial attorney. The court was required by Maine law to issue. The preliminary injunction was meant to keep intact. Is equitably divided by the court between the divorcing pair irrespective of in whose name it was held. |
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OPINION/ORDER The BAP agreed that the County was liable for damages resulting from its violation of the automatic stay. The BAP held that the Brawders were not due a refund of the taxes paid in excess of the confirmed Plan amount. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We further elaborate upon the facts of the case and address the effect of the parties' stipulation in the current Chapter 13 adversary proceeding on the County's right to enforce its lien to recover the pre petition taxes that were not paid fully by the prior Plan payments. The Plan stated that the Brawders were in default to the County in the amount of $9. The County accepted them. (1991) ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Richard Sherman (Sherman) was the attorney for several defendants in an enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in other actions in which those defendants were parties. Maintaining that there was |
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OPINION/ORDER Mansur were on the brief for appellee. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that section 510(a) was not inconsistent with the Rule of Explicitness and that the legislative history accompanying section 510(a) revealed no intent to repeal the rule. The Senior Creditors were not entitled to receive post petition interest from the Junior Creditors. Is the indenture trustee (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Dow Corning argues in a crossappeal that the bankruptcy court should have ordered the payment of post petition interest at the non default variable rate required by the contracts. Since Dow Corning has always been fully solvent and is still solvent post bankruptcy. I. BACKGROUND Dow Corning is a joint venture wholly owned by its two shareholders. Dow Corning was fully solvent at the time it filed its bankruptcy case. The purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to enable prompt and uniform settlement of the numerous breast implant related lawsuits pending against Dow Corning at the time of the petition. When a reorganization plan was finally proposed in 1999. The majority of the unsecured commercial debt contracts would have required a rate higher than the federal judgment rate. These creditors are the appellants in this case. The following requirements are met: (1) under the plan. The class would receive an amount that is equal to or greater than the amount they would receive if the debtor's assets were liquidated. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case turning on lien priorities. Fleet was a corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding was converted to Chapter 7. There has been no finding and no contention that Fleet was a sham or alter ego or that the corporate veil ought to be pierced for any reason. Fleet is a separate person from the Stantons. This appeal is a dispute between the trustee in the 1 Beeler v. 578 (9th Cir. 1998). 5326 Stantons' bankruptcy and the factor over which is entitled to the proceeds from that sale. The trustee's theory was that it was entitled to avoid International Factors' mortgage lien on the house. Because it was created when the Stantons mortgaged their house. Not when the advances were made. Because the advances were to Fleet. Applied and prohibited the factor's advances to Fleet.4 Violation of the automatic stay is a serious business. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 22. Harder and Sherin and Lodgen were on brief for appellee. were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. whether either the chapter 7 debtor or an unsecured creditor possesses standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order authorizing the chapter 7 trustee to settle an adversary proceeding to which the appellants were neither original nor intervening parties. The proceedings were converted to chapter 7. Was sold by the chapter 7 trustee for approximately $1 million. Whereby *The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief *The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief from the automatic stay were captioned judgments of |
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OPINION/ORDER Against a civil action in which Amedisys is the plaintiff. Amedisys is a Louisiana corporation supplying home nursing services. Because the Louisiana action is an |
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01-9009 -- KATZ V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/07/2003 Aron Katz (Taxpayer) was a partner in a number of partnerships that suffered substantial losses during a year in which he filed for bankruptcy. The question before us is whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can challenge that allocation in a proceeding involving only the Taxpayer. We hold that a partnership level proceeding is necessary.
Taxpayer's partnerships did not do well in 1990. Although he could have elected to bifurcate his 1990 tax year into two short years. The remaining partnerships of which Taxpayer was a member did not distinguish between pre petition and post petition items in the K 1 forms they prepared. Are not subject to the federal income tax. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 10. Cullen & Resnick were on brief for 604 Columbus Avenue. Gottlieb were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. *Of the Third Circuit. This is a case involving a failed loan transaction that well illustrates Polonius' advice. Among which were the property owned by the Trust itself and properties of the Trust's principal beneficiary. Of which Millicent Young was sole beneficiary. The Young Family Trust was a named plaintiff in the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy and district courts below. The Bank was declared unsound by Massachusetts banking officials. The FDIC was appointed 7 receiver. In February 1991 was substituted as defendant appellant in the district court. That the FDIC was entitled to raise the defenses available to it under the doctrine of estoppel established in D'Oench. The district court vacated that part of the bankruptcy court's judgment that was premised on the secret agreement by one of the Trust's principals to provide kickbacks to a Bank officer. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was never in financial distress and that the petition in this case was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord's claims and to increase the distribution of the Debtor's estate to Integrated's shareholders at the Landlord's expense. These contentions are corroborated by the record. Thus Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Which was capped at $25 million with Integrated's liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by insurance) was listed at its full alleged value. Integrated was still solvent at the time of filing. The issue on appeal is whether. With no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11 proceedings will maximize the value of the debtor's estate for creditors. We conclude that such a petition is not filed in good faith and will therefore reverse. I. Integrated was a supplier of software and equipment to the broadband communications industry. The Landlord was aware of the financial risks associated with Integrated's business and willingly accepted those risks. 2001 was a very poor year for Integrated. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court dismissed Rodney's case on the ground IN RE: MILES 16185 that he was generally paying his undisputed debts as they became due. One of which was that the petitions were filed in bad faith.1 The bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to determine the alleged debtors' rights to attorneys' fees. The causes of action asserted by Melinda and Kelly were based on the bankruptcy court's finding that the involuntary petition against their mother. Was filed in bad faith. On the basis that he was generally paying his undisputed debts as they became due. The causes of action asserted by Ann were based solely on the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the involuntary petition against her husband. While these motions were pending. Appellants moved for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) on the premises that the removal was untimely and that there was no federal jurisdiction over damages claims by third parties resulting from the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Holding that it had |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellants. Desmery and Craig and Macauley were on brief for appellee. Jun iper's companion claim for cleanup related attorney fees was disallowed as well. The drums were still at the facility when DEQE conduct ed its last site inspection. Juniper contends that the area was sub merged at the time. The Hemingway Bristol chapter 11 reorganization proceeding was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. A chapter 7 trustee was appointed. Were dis covered at the facility. 391 U.S. 471 (1968)).3 2Juniper alleges that an engineering firm was paid $30. An environmental consulting firm was paid $7. A law firm was paid $54. When the trustee's motion for summary judgment on count I was denied the bankruptcy court allowed Juniper to amend count I to assert a claim for contribu tion under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). On the ground that Juniper was the holder of a contingent CERCLA contribution claim based on a debt owed EPA for which Juniper. Bristol were jointly and severally liable. The bankruptcy court ruled that Hemingway and Bristol were responsible parties |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 20. P.C. were on brief for appellant. Stern were on brief for appellee Peter M. J. Daniel Marr with whom Hamblett & Kerrigan P.A. was on brief for appellees Robert and Frances Shaine. *Of the District of Maine. Argues that the bankruptcy court's order to pay over the disputed funds to the estate was an error of law. Appellee Robert Shaine continued to serve as president of SPM and was an unsecured |
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OPINION/ORDER Holding that the bankruptcy court's surcharge remedy was a permissible equi 5516 LATMAN v. Was not barred by election of remedies or res judicata. This ruling was affirmed by the district court on March 6. 000 of the value of these items) that the Latmans had previously exempted under § 522(d)(5).1 The ruling on this motion is challenged on this appeal. The Latmans were married and did not claim a homestead exemption. 2 It appears from the record that the subpoena issued ex parte for the Trustee against the bank. Or have this amount also charged against their |
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OPINION/ORDER MD 21201 Amicus Law Professors in support of Appellant *** Joining Professor Lipson on the brief are Professors Ralph Brubaker. Introduction This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court. The question on appeal is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. While the question in Hartford Underwriters was one of a nontrustee's right unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme. Our conclusion is consistent with the received wisdom that |
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OPINION/ORDER So it is perhaps not surprising that litigation in the paper manufacturing industry would require a prodigious quantity of its product. Which itself was a byproduct of various corporate organizational fabrications and deconstructions. Fort James was eventually acquired by the Georgia Pacific Corporation. A large portion of this transaction was accomplished through various means. We shall refer to |
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OPINION/ORDER Whether that litigation is pending at the trial level or on appeal. The terms of the agreement are not part of the record on this appeal. It is undisputed that as part of the deal. IN RE: HARBIN 5245 Harbin filed a cross complaint for a declaratory determination that he was not personally liable for any breach of the consulting agreement. While the trial court's ruling on Harbin's declaratory judgment motion was still pending. The trial court set aside the jury's original verdict and held that Harbin was not personally liable for breach of the consulting agreement. While his state appeal was pending. The bankruptcy court found the plan feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) because Harbin's allowed creditors were to be paid in full.2 Sherman. Sherman argued that Harbin's plan was not feasible under section 1129(a)(11) because it did not reserve an allowance for Sherman's claim should he prevail on appeal. Harbin would not have sufficient assets to cover Sherman's claim and would be forced into further liquidation or reorganization. |
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OPINION/ORDER The sanctions which were largely sustained by the BAP were based on appellants' misconduct in improperly invoking the processes of the bankruptcy court to block the progress of a state court civil action in which Smith was counsel for the defendants. One of whom was Miller. . . . those actions were spread out so as to maximize the delay. His orchestration of serial bankruptcy filings and removals by the defendants were all part of a scheme to cause unnecessary delay. The bankruptcy court found that Miller was significantly more than an innocent actor in the bankruptcy filing and the efforts to remove the Cardinale suit. The court reviewed Miller's attempt to remove Cardinale's suit to Daggett's bankruptcy case and indicated that his actions were taken without any legitimate purpose beyond stalling the litigation. While Smith was the |
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OPINION/ORDER We will reverse the order of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Overview of Affected Parties The underlying matter in this appeal is an accounting malpractice action. The Trustee's principal allegation is that Price Waterhouse erroneously reported in its audit that accrued interest on Litigation Trust accounts belonged to the debtor rather than to the Litigation Trust. Underlying this claim was a suit between the Litigation Trust and the debtor. Price Waterhouse's erroneous reports were relied on by the bankruptcy court to the Litigation Trust's detriment. Is not a party to the malpractice action. The Trustee alleges the debtor's estate would still be affected by the malpractice suit because the Litigation Trust is effectively a continuation of the bankruptcy estate. Who were former creditors of the debtor's estate. Is not a continuation of the bankruptcy estate for jurisdictional purposes. Price Waterhouse contends the debtor is only tangentially affected by this malpractice action after it assigned away its interests in the litigation claims. |
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OPINION/ORDER Appearing at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) is amended as follows: (1) Slip Opinion 5330 31: Replace paragraph beginning |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court held that certain insurance proceeds were not property of a chapter 7 estate converted from chapter 11. The dismissal of the involuntary was reversed on appeal and an order for relief was entered. Held that recovery on all grounds was precluded by the previous order releasing the funds. The court concluded that recovery was not available under any of these provisions as a matter of law because the transfers occurred post petition. Is recovery of the excessive legal fees under 11 U.S.C. § 329 precluded because the payments to the attorney took place post petition or because of equitable concerns? 3. Is recovery of the funds under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544. The bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the adversary proceeding is a final. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Was the beneficiary under. The existence of the First Policy was not disclosed in TEI's bankruptcy schedules or in its plan of reorganization confirmed on September 1. |
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OPINION/ORDER Which is principally owned by Thomas O. The substantive claims asserted by the parties are actually relatively simple: the Coffeys claim that Kool Mann owes them the balance remaining of the $5 million purchase price from the sale of LCSDI. While Kool Mann contends that it is entitled to a number of set offs against that balance because of alleged misrepresentations by the Coffeys as well as certain other deductions. It is the tortured procedural history of this matter which makes this appeal exceedingly and unnecessarily complex. We have detailed only those facts that bear on our current disposition.1 In light of the protracted nature of this litigation and the length of time and judicial resources it has consumed. We have taken it upon ourselves to determine the value of the Coffeys' proof 1. The facts of this case have been well documented in a number of previously published opinions. We have done so even though under normal circumstances we might have been inclined to remand to the District Court for a remand to the Bankruptcy Court to recalculate the damage figures. |
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OPINION/ORDER Wells Fargo was not. The call was intended to allow Wells Fargo to conduct a loan interview. A fact which M&M alleges Debtors were aware of given their past attempts to finance a vehicle purchase with M&M. Debtors believed the call was meant merely to inform them how to make loan payments. Wells Fargo either did not call Debtors or was unable to reach them. M&M refused because the vice president believed that the call was merely a ruse put on by Debtors in an attempt to illegally recover the pickup truck. Debtors were unable to retrieve the vehicle. The motion was rendered moot when. Debtors were unable to register and license the vehicle without providing the Wyoming motor vehicle department with a lien release or a copy of the security agreement. We questioned whether the BAP's decision was a final. Appealable order when further proceedings were required to resolve damages. We now hold that our jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 158(d). This conclusion is consistent with that of several of our sister circuits that have had occasion to examine the finality of bankruptcy orders where only attorney's fee calculations remain unresolved. |
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OPINION/ORDER The policy was set to expire on February 28. It was unable to do so because other insurance companies had no interest in doing business with an ailing telecommunications company whose financial weakness was known throughout the industry. IFCI was incorporated in Arizona. 12342 IN RE: INTERNATIONAL FIBERCOM the following provision: |
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OPINION/ORDER Appellees contend that this appeal is moot and that. BACKGROUND Focus was a media buying company that placed commercial spots for its clients on television and radio stations. Its two major clients were Sears. Alleging that funds it had paid Focus |
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OPINION/ORDER Classification of its claims in the Belgian proceedings and ordering that these issues be determined exclusively by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code was issued without consideration of all relevant legal principles. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. S 158(a) and we have jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. Have applied an abuse of discretion standard to entry of an anti suit injunction as 3 well. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the verdict. The advertisement was for a company called |
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OPINION/ORDER Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was |
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OPINION/ORDER At issue in this case are the duties of disinterest and disclosure of an examiner appointed to facilitate a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Which was unable to meet obligations on $1.2 billion in debt and whose Nos. 02 6212/ 6213/6338/6340/ 6341/6344/6347 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro. As did the United States Trustee which is responsible for appointing bankruptcy examiners and trustees. The petition represented the largest bankruptcy case ever filed in Kentucky and at the time was one of the largest bankruptcy cases in the country. Schilling signed a document entitled |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of |
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OPINION/ORDER Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was |
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OPINION/ORDER Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was |
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OPINION/ORDER Have intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that the corporations were Blatstein's |
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OPINION/ORDER Ellett seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Goldberg from collecting certain pre petition state income tax obligations that were allegedly discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. Ellett's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in April 1995 and was completed two years later. The FTB notice stated that such obligations were not discharged in bankruptcy and that collection action was |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were Richard S. With him on the brief was Steven E. Of counsel was Henri Frederic Hibon. 496 because these patents were licensed to Cambridge under a cross licensing agreement. All of which are assigned to Institut Pasteur. Are directed to structural components of and methods of detecting the presence of two types of Human Immunodeficiency Virus ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court found that the petition was filed in bad faith and awarded JRH costs. I. BACKGROUND We set forth here an abbreviated version of the material events addressed by the bankruptcy court in adjudicating the merits of JRH's claim that Adell's petition for involuntary bankruptcy was in bad faith. Contending that it was only worth $1 million instead of $1.75 million. All of which essentially rested on two allegations: (1) that Shekerjian and JRH had orally told Adell that the land was worth $1. That the home they would construct for him would have a value of $2. Even though they knew that was impossible because there were |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d). I. The facts of this case are undisputed. A foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 16. The Trustee filed two concurrent motions in the bankruptcy court that are the subject of this appeal. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Trustee and State Bank stipulated at the hearing that the amount of State Bank's claim was $148. That the sum of secured and unsecured claims was $207. There was substantial equity in the property in excess of State Bank's $148. Once the automatic stay was again in place. State Bank asserted that because the value of the property was $170. There was not sufficient equity in it to merit enjoining the foreclosure sale to allow the Trustee to liquidate the property. State Bank contended that the bankruptcy court's finding in the order lifting the stay that the Debtors acted in bad faith was res judicata in the current proceeding. The question of determining value is difficult because it seems to me that there are some questions of credibility on both appraisals. . . . . |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judges. 1 2 In re Fordu COUNSEL No. 97 3936 No. 97 3936 In re Fordu 31 will not disturb a lower court's findings with respect to sanctions unless a clear abuse of discretion is found. There was no abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court. There is no evidence. Sanctions under this provision appropriately may be awarded when an attorney advances an argument that is |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Richard Sherman (Sherman) was the attorney for several defendants in an enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in other actions in which those defendants were parties. Maintaining that there was |
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OPINION/ORDER Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.
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OPINION/ORDER Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.
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OPINION/ORDER Who are the beneficial owners of Brickellbush. N.V. and other persons who may be interested in this action and who are presently unknown to plaintiffs. Thus we conclude that their substantive RICO claims were properly dismissed. Because Plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claims are entirely dependent on their substantive RICO claims. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects.1 BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts giving rise to this appeal is assumed. As those facts are set forth in the District Court's comprehensive published opinions. We relate below only those facts and proceedings that are relevant to the present appeals. Sohrab was to pay FCAM $4.5 million in return for an interest in a new Delaware corporation called First Capital Corp. The action was commenced in December 1993. Found that Sohrab himself was not personally liable.1 NACI and NAP were shell companies. That dismissal was reversed as against Sohrab by the Appellate Division.3 In June 2001. Judgment was entered in Oost Lievense's favor. 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 See First Capital v. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: p. 931. The procedures that must be followed before an order for relief is granted in an involuntary case are similar to the procedures that must be followed before relief is granted in any other lawsuit. The procedures to be followed before relief is granted in a chapter 9 case. Last sentence: Change |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: IN RE: CASTILLO 13285 1. Parallel citations are added to the end of the first sentence in Part IV.C.iii. Trustee are enumerated in 11 U.S.C. §§ 704. A parallel citation is added to the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph in Part IV.C.iii. Because we further conclude that the giving of notice is a part of the discretionary scheduling function. Nancy Curry was appointed as 13286 IN RE: CASTILLO Trustee in Castillo's case. After Castillo's petition was filed. The confirmation hearing was actually set for December 3. Neither Castillo nor her counsel was notified of the rescheduled confirmation hearing date. A confirmation hearing was held. The debtor's Chapter 13 case was dismissed on December 16. Received notice of the dismissal sometime after it was served on December 19. Castillo contended that (1) the Trustee was negligent in scheduling the December 3. (2) the Trustee was not immune from suit. The court reasoned that the Trustee had a duty to |
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OPINION/ORDER Chief Bankruptcy Judge Eugene Chamberlain ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We are asked to decide whether the affirmative defenses of setoff. This appeal raises a question as to whether the creditor whose affirmative defenses were extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale received constitutionally adequate notice such that failure to object would result in a waiver of its affirmative defenses and its deemed consent to the transformation of the debtors' contract claims into unimpeachable accounts receivable. Were not extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale. Was constitutionally inadequate. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Folger acquired substantially all of the assets of three bankrupt companies through a bankruptcy auction |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. That the sale order was void. While we conclude that Mueller waived the jurisdictional argument and the sale order is not subject to collateral attack. We agree that the order of sale was not properly a basis for a finding of contempt and that Mueller's conduct was not contemptuous. The bankruptcy court's order of contempt and sanctions award will be reversed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding Mueller in contempt of the order approving the sale of the legal malpractice claim and imposing sanctions on him for violating that order. Is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Because we further conclude that the giving of notice is a part of the discretionary scheduling function. Nancy Curry was appointed as Trustee in Castillo's case. After Castillo's petition was filed. The confirmation hearing was actually set for December 3. Neither Castillo nor her counsel was notified of the rescheduled confirmation hearing date. A confirmation hearing was held. The debtor's Chapter 13 case was dismissed on December 16. Received notice of the dismissal sometime after it was served on December 19. Castillo contended that (1) the Trustee was negligent in scheduling the December 3. (2) the Trustee was not immune from suit. The court reasoned that the Trustee had a duty to |
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OPINION/ORDER That venue was proper only in the Southern District of Iowa and that the Lands had filed in the Northern District of Iowa for their convenience. The amount of the claim was shown as zero. Was also a creditor of the Lands as a result of a mortgage executed by the Lands in favor of Dan Bryan and Sharon Bryan. The address of the Bryans was shown as Sherwood Oaks. Inc. is the Bryans' wholly owned business and is a defendant. Time and place of the hearing on confirmation was mailed to each creditor at the address shown on the mailing matrix. The section 341 meeting of creditors and the confirmation 3 hearing were both held on May 6. The bankruptcy court confirmed the Lands' Chapter 13 The order confirming the plan was filed plan. The appellants filed an amendment to the May 14 motion in which they stated that the address for Dan Bryan was incomplete. In its order the bankruptcy court found and concluded in relevant part that: Evidence was presented that the Bryans' attorney contacted the Lands' attorney on April 16. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is whether an insurance company must turn over to its terminated agent $259. Because we recognized that this issue was one of first impression in New Jersey. Essentially at will or. That the termination was at will. The consequence of this ruling is that New Jersey's Agency Termination Statute requires Ohio Casualty to pay PIM commissions on all policies for one year following termination. PIM would have no right to these commissions. The remaining issues on appeal arise from the ruling that the termination was at will. (2) whether PIM is entitled to pre judgment interest on the commissions. We remand to the Bankruptcy Court to apply to the facts of this case the legal determination that the initial at will termination can become a termination for cause between the notice of termination and the effective termination date. The claims of constructive trust and contempt of court addressed by the District Court were not raised on appeal. Factual and Procedural Background The facts of this case are set out at length in previous opinions of this Court3 and the District Court. |
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OPINION/ORDER The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. A Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on June 7. Such plan was consummated on April 27. A Final Closing Order nunc pro tunc was issued by the Bankruptcy Court on July 31. A partnership which was formed in 1975 between OMS and Digicon Marine. The Bankruptcy Court entered the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law: Ocean Marine Services Partnership No. 1 ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Kistler is substituted for her predecessor as United States Trustee. Was affirmed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in approving a compromise pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 while sustaining an objection to such compromise. ReGen is the assignee of the AT&T claim. Were unimpaired by the Plan. The motion to compel and the Delaware Debtors' objection 2 thereto were settled pursuant to a stipulation and order approved by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on March 20. The Delaware Debtors were required to make payments to ReGen. ReGen registered the Judgment in those jurisdictions where assets of the Delaware Debtors were located. While such motion was pending before the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. A hearing on the Contempt Motion and the Rule 1014 Motion was scheduled before the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on January 4. That the Missouri Debtors acknowledge that the Allowed Claim is secured by valid liens on certain property. That the Stipulation shall be served on all creditors and parties in interest and any creditor or party in interest who fails to object to the Stipulation or whose objection is overruled shall be bound by the terms of the Stipulation. |
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OPINION/ORDER We encounter an appeal where just about everyone appears to have behaved badly. This is such a case. Myers was the president and sole shareholder. The couple was involved in the operations of AWI and earned income from it. Myers and AWI were the only remaining defendants. Myers was not present in court for this announcement. Who were both present. The day before the state court was to render its judgment. A preliminary injunction hearing before the same state court was scheduled for August 13. Their attorney was present and asserted that Mrs. The state court stated that it was aware of Mrs. It was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil of AWI and hold Mrs. The CP Court decreed that judgment was entered against Mrs. Will be [entered against her] in her individual capacity when the stay is lifted. Myers were not present in court to witness 5 these events. Myers was current on all of her debts other than her obligations to SMS. Myers and her husband were incarcerated for civil contempt by the CP Court until they could each pay $5. |
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JOVE ENGINEERING V. IRS This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This case concerns a bankruptcy court's refusal under 11 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER The court determined the entire fee was unreasonable under 11 U.S.C. 330 and reduced the amount to $904. In which it was joined by its wholly owned subsidiary. Also involved were various unsecured creditors who were represented by the Unsecured Creditors' Liquidating Trust (UCL Trust).(1) On January 7. The unsecured creditors were represented by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Official Committee was replaced by the Unsecured Creditors Liquidating Trust. We will refer to both entities as the UCL Trust. (2) |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This case concerns a bankruptcy court's refusal under 11 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER That its belated filing was the result of |
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OPINION/ORDER 2 Barger signed a Statement of Financial Affairs which declared under penalty of perjury that she read the bankruptcy petition and that its contents were true and accurate. Sam Grove asked Barger to list any legal proceedings to which she was or had been a party and to describe the nature of the proceedings. Since it was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Relying on 11 U.S.C. § 303(c) which allows joinder at any time |
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OPINION/ORDER That its belated filing was the result of |
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OPINION/ORDER We must determine whether a non profit organization's obligation to reimburse the New Jersey Department of Labor ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Carter and McKool Smith were on brief for appellants David C. Madoff and Cohn & Kelakos LLP were on brief for appellee. Senior Circuit Judge. appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by approving a settlement between the chapter 7 trustee for Healthco International. Three months later an interim trustee was appointed and the reorganization was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. By the time the chapter 7 trustee ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Arguing that section 1800 was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. For or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the assignor before the transfer was made. Made while the assignor was insolvent. Whether Congress has done so in a particular instance is a matter of congressional intent. This intent is most easily detected where the statute expressly preempts other laws. Preemption may also be inferred where it is clear from the statute and surrounding circumstances that Congress intended to occupy the field. ' because `the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. |
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OPINION/ORDER [Debtor] may not have filed income tax returns with either the IRS or the State of Missouri for the years. [Debtor] wishes to have [Snyder] represent him. Does not have the present cash with which to pay [Snyder]. [Snyder] is willing to represent [Debtor] based upon [Debtor's] proposal to give him a Second Deed of Trust in the property. ... *** 17. This Note was for Snyder's |
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OPINION/ORDER Which is now bankrupt. Because we conclude that the District Court committed errors of law in ruling that the Bankruptcy Code's mandatory abstention provision was inapplicable to a case of this kind. We will remand for further consideration of whether 3 the District Court must abstain from hearing Stoe's case. I. Stoe was formerly the president of Zinc Corporation of America ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We hold that when a debtor applies for a 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) preliminary injunction to stay a proceeding in which the debtor is not a party. I. BACKGROUND Hoffman is the founder and a major shareholder of both Indivos and Excel. One of the main purposes of these agreements was to separate Hoffman from the management of Indivos. Which was controlled by Hoffman and separately owned Indivos shares. Was not a party to the Settlement Agreement or the Pledge Agreement. Excel was a party to the Voting Trust and Standstill Agreement. Including whether their positions on patent ownership were taken in good faith. Ruling that all of the patents Excel accused Indivos of infringing were actually owned by Indivos. The parties were attempting to schedule additional hearing dates to finish the proceeding. Hoffman's bankruptcy petition was dismissed in September 2004. Hoffman argued to the arbitrator that the stay established by Excel's bankruptcy petition applied to Indivos' claims against him because those claims were intertwined with Indivos' claims against Excel. |
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OPINION/ORDER Citation alleges that Miller Buckfire should have disclosed its prior dealings with Kelso & Company. Debtors argued the services provided were much less extensive than originally expected and. The bankruptcy court first found that Miller Buckfire did not suffer under a conflict of interest because it lacked final decision making authority and was insulated from any potential influence by the unsecured creditors' committee and its counsel. Found |
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OPINION/ORDER We have found no helpful legislative history. Their Chapter 13 plans have been confirmed and are currently in place. The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority ( |
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OPINION/ORDER While many observers have touted Congress's recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code as a major overhaul of the law in this area. Faye Rasmussen should not have received a discharge of her debts. We hold that the bankruptcy court was authorized to take the action that it did. Among the business's woes were the inability to obtain credit and a pending default on two bank loans due at the end of the month. 000 of this amount was obtained through loans and lines of credit that Disch secured with his own collateral and personal guarantees. The complaint alleged that the debt was based on Rasmussen's dishonesty in obtaining the loans. Reserving the determination of Disch's § 523(a) claims until after an adversary hearing was conducted. Though she was certain that she paid herself back. She was unable to explain what she did with the funds in excess of the allocation. Rasmussen contacted one of the banks with whom Disch obtained a loan for the business to request that the address on file be changed from Disch's address to Faval's so that Disch would not be notified when she was late in making a payment on the loan. |
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OPINION/ORDER The question is simple: did the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Illinois err when it dismissed the petition of Maurice J. Defending the court's judgment is Michael Neshewat. That the bankruptcy court's actions were correct. That judgment was recorded against a rental house Salem owned located at 7 Gellatly Drive. One outcome of those proceedings was a holding that Neshewat's judgment against Salem is nondischargeable. The plan he offered was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Summary judgment is proper only when all the evidence presented demonstrates that |
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OPINION/ORDER BACKGROUND The material facts are not in dispute. The debtors' primary business is the manufacturing of cutting and welding equipment. The Estates shall reimburse the Indemnified Parties for any legal or other expenses reasonably incurred by them in respect thereof at the time such expenses are incurred. Damage or liability which is finally judicially determined to have resulted from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of any Indemnified Party. 3 To resolve numerous objections4 from the U.S. Contribution or reimbursement therefore are approved by the Court. (b) The Debtors shall have no obligation to indemnify Houlihan Lokey. For any claim or expense that is either (i) judicially determined (the determination having become final) to have arisen solely from Houlihan Lokey's gross negligence. Stating it was excessive. Stated that the portion of the indemnification provision that releases Houlihan for any liability arising from its engagement other than that judicially determined to be willful misconduct or gross negligence is inappropriate. |
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OPINION/ORDER Friedman LLP were on brief. Ray and |
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OPINION/ORDER Although it is unnecessary to refer to them by name. Recomm's business was carried on. The lease assignments were without recourse. The laws governing Chapter 11 proceedings are codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 1174. Several reorganization plans were proposed. Only the third and fourth plans are relevant here. Were served with a copy of the Third Amended Plan in June 1997. The Third Amended Plan purported to modify the leases of all |
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OPINION/ORDER Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Other damages recoverable at law. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Other damages recoverable at law. |
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OPINION/ORDER The issue is whether plaintiffs should have obtained a stay under S 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code before appealing an assumption and an assignment under S 365. This appeal arises from the District Court's affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court's order approving the assumption of eight physician employment contracts by the Chapter 11 Trustee of a bankrupt health care system and their assignment to another hospital.1 Contending their employment contracts were not assignable. Our review of its decision is plenary. The other plaintiffs are Bonnie K. The defendants appellees are AHERF 's Chapter 11 trustee and the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance along with Allegheny General Hospital. 3. The acquisition of a nonprofit corporation's membership interest is comparable to the purchase of stock in a business. AHERF was the sole member of its affiliates and the sale of its memberships interests to the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance effected a complete change of control. 5. AUHS is substituted for MCP HU in their contracts. 5 contesting Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance's financial viability. |
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OPINION/ORDER We will reverse and remand for further proceedings concerning the applicability of the discovery rule to the debtor's claims against its lawyer's law firm and the law firm's individual shareholders. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in Continental Bank's favor. We will also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and the debtor's law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. P.C. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Bankruptcy Judge This is an appeal of Man Financial. Are pending. Holding that the Minnesota Lawsuit was subject to mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2). Since the Minnesota Lawsuit is intertwined with the pending Bankruptcy Cases of Refco. Certain undisputed facts of the Bankruptcy Cases are set forth as background. The Debtors were engaged in the commodities futures and options clearing business. Which is due approximately August 31. The amount of that payment is to range from $67. Which is due on August 31. Although these accounts were subject to the Exclusivity Agreement. Cargill asserted that the Exclusivity Agreement could be enforced neither by Refco (because Cargill's accounts were no longer at Refco) nor by Man (because Cargill had objected to the assignment of the Exclusivity Agreement). The gravamen of its Complaint is that Man |
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OPINION/ORDER Miller was a beneficiary. Of which she was trustee and Mr. Miller was a onethird beneficiary. Miller's request for attorney's fees in the Montana bankruptcy court because the |
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OPINION/ORDER The question presented in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that a court approved stipulated waiver of discharge of a specific debt. Was a valid. The Bankruptcy Court held that the stipulated waiver was valid. That case was dismissed on Dr. Barbanel may have arising out of their pending state court divorce action. Lichtenstein] entering into a Stipulation of Nondischargeability (a copy of which is attached hereto) and the filing of such Stipulation with this Court simultaneously with the tendering of this Agreed Order. She will withdraw all pending Motions and Objections filed on her behalf in connection with this case (including her Objection to Exemptions filed on November 13. This order was affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 2000 was the last date Dr. Hearing date was set by the state court. 4 On January 12. Was a valid waiver of discharge under § 727(a)(10) and thus excepted from discharge in his second Chapter 7 bankruptcy case under § 523(a)(10). Lichtenstein |
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OPINION/ORDER For Appellees. 2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. P/T was responsible for the insurance premiums and the property taxes. Performance of P/T's obligations under the lease was guaranteed personally by Norman Lindsey (Lindsey). Both P/T and Lindsey were in default under the lease. P/T was insolvent at the time Cutler filed suit. 3 Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. He argued that: (1) Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(6) does not apply when the debtor is a guarantor not a lessee. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Bankruptcy Code § 502(b) provides: (b) [I]f . . . objection to a claim is made. Shall allow such claim in such amount except to the extent that *** (6) If such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property. Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(6) is |
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OPINION/ORDER A plan was first filed on February 2. The plan was amended and re filed on April 10. The plan was amended a second time and re filed on April 18. Of the work for which Boone sought additional compensation was performed after the date on which the no look fees were awarded. Took the matter under submission when no objection to the application was filed. The first category was compensation for work involving |
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OPINION/ORDER Forbes ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The issue on appeal is whether. This case also presents the threshold issue whether we will adopt a |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court's decision is VACATED and REMANDED. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an interlocutory appeal in a bankruptcy case. BACKGROUND The Whiting Turner Contracting Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Associates were on brief. The debtor now appeals.
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OPINION/ORDER Kelakos LLP were on brief for plaintiff.
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OPINION/ORDER The Petitions asserted that disqualification was also wa r r a n te d u nder 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) as a result of ex parte communications among Judge Wolin and his advisors. Our decision was |
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OPINION/ORDER Which were allegedly operated as a |
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OPINION/ORDER Bennett argues that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that an award of attorneys' fees was unavailable under federal law and that the attorneys' fees provision in the contract at issue did not provide for fees incurred after the filing of a lawsuit. We find that the bankruptcy court did not err in excluding the Renwicks' proffered parol evidence and determining that there was no enforceable promise by Appellee to pay a debt which was discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court erred in failing to consider whether attorneys' fees and sanctions were available under federal law and whether the attorneys' fees provision in the Settlement Agreement was enforceable against the Renwicks. BACKGROUND Factual Background Appellee Roberta Bennett and Diane Abbitt ( |
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OPINION/ORDER McKay was avoidable for several reasons and that the money should be returned to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to all creditors. That the payments were made in the ordinary course of business. The trustee was not entitled to recover them. The bankruptcy court concluded that the trustee was entitled to recover $22. Which authorizes the avoidance of transfers through which a transferee obtains more than he or she would have received in a chapter 7 (1) The late Honorable Oliver Seth. The court also held that the trustee was entitled to recover the entire $43. The effect of the bankruptcy court's rulings was a $22. After the Ponzi scheme was discovered. She filed the instant (1) We have defined a Ponzi scheme as an investment scheme in which returns to investors are not financed through the success of the underlying business venture. Are taken from principal sums of newly attracted investments. Investors are promised large returns for their investments. Initial investors are actually paid the promised returns. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge:
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract |
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OPINION/ORDER Litton maintains that the court erred in ruling that her proposed plan was an impermissible modification of a debt that she and her husband owed to Wachovia Bank. A cure is expressly authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).1 Pursuant to Chapter 13. Other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Johnson Blakely removed the malpractice action to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.1 Johnson Blakely subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that the claims asserted in Alvarez's complaint are property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The trustee is an indispensable party to the litigation. Johnson Blakely argued that unless the trustee is joined. The bankruptcy court held that the claims in Alvarez's complaint are not property of the estate and that. The trustee is not an indispensable party to the litigation. Holding that the malpractice action is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy trustee is indispensable to maintenance of the action. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is property belonging to him as an individual or is property of his bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the malpractice claim is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The crux of Alvarez's malpractice claim is his allegation that Johnson Blakely negligently disregarded his instructions to file a reorganizational bankruptcy case (Chapter 11) on his behalf and instead filed a liquidating bankruptcy case (Chapter 7). Johnson Blakely removed the malpractice action to the United States 2 Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.1 Johnson Blakely subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that the claims asserted in Alvarez's complaint are property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate. The trustee is an indispensable party to the litigation. Johnson Blakely argued that unless the trustee is joined. The bankruptcy court held that the claims in Alvarez's complaint are not property of the estate and that. The trustee is not an indispensable party to the litigation. Holding that the malpractice action is property of Alvarez's bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy trustee is indispensable to maintenance of the action. |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Which motion was filed almost two years after the alleged violations occurred and more than a year and one half after the debtor's chapter 11 case was dismissed for cause. The BAP has jurisdiction over core proceedings and issues related to the automatic stay are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Findings of fact by the bankruptcy court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is the extent to which a reorganization plan proposed under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) preempts otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law. Section 1123(a) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because he was not physically residing at the 875 Laurel address at the time he filed his Chapter 13 petition. Which was the address of the property where he was living while he and his wife were separated and when he filed his bankruptcy petition. This time on the ground that Alexander was not physically residing at that property when he filed his petition and. Granting the Trustee's objection and ruling that 875 Laurel was not exempt in Alexander's case because he was not physically living in the residence on the day he filed his bankruptcy petition. While the appeal was pending in the Eighth Circuit. While the appeal was pending in the Eighth Circuit. That Alexander was not residing at the 875 Laurel address when he filed his original petition. While all this was going on in Alexander's case. She was living at 875 3 Laurel Avenue with their minor son and Alexander was residing at the 175 North Lexington address. 175 per month which she said was the result of an agreement between Alexander and herthat she pay him rent while they were separated. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge:
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the appointment of the trustee and reverse the order denying Gibbons's motion for an order authorizing employment of the Firm as his counsel. Two groups loomed large in the bankruptcy proceedings: one was an Official Bondholders' Committee and an indenture trustee. Under which the holding companies would have infused $100 million into Marvel in return for priority recognition of the Lenders' debt claims. The Icahn interests contended that the Perelman controlled Marvel debtors were favoring their |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: p.9. P.C. were on brief for Monarch Life Insurance Company. P.C. were on brief for Ropes & Gray. We now affirm the district court on the ground that Monarch Life is collaterally estopped from asserting a state court challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enter the permanent injunction incorporated in the confirmed reorganization plan. This Order constitutes an injunction against all persons (other than the FDIC as Receiver) from taking any of the following actions (other than an 2Ropes & Gray was scheduled as a creditor in the chapter 11 proceeding. None are material to this appeal. 5Section 105(a) provides in relevant part: |
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OPINION/ORDER Rockwell prevailed and was awarded attorney fees and costs by the state court. The BAP majority held that the entire award was encompassed in the discharge. We hold that the fees and costs incurred post petition were not discharged. The bankruptcy court ruled that the cause of action was exempt. Section 1033.5(a)(10) states that attorney fees are allowable costs under § 1032 where they are authorized by contract. 030.78) was not discharged. It held that Rockwell was free to collect this |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether a district court may authorize the rejection of an executory 2 contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization. The district court held that a FERC proceeding was the proper forum for Mirant to seek relief from any of its power contracts. We find that the district court's jurisdictional ruling is erroneous. I Mirant is one of the largest regulated public utilities in the United States. PEPCO is also a regulated public entity responsible for servicing the power needs of residential and commercial consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The Schedule 2.4 payments relating to these unassigned PPAs are referred to by the parties. The parties agree that the Back to Back Agreement's rate for electricity is higher than the market rate. The PPAs are long term fixed rate contracts to purchase electricity from outside suppliers that PEPCO used to supplement its energy needs before deregulation. 4 1 First. To require or coerce [Mirant] to abide by the terms of any Wholesale Contract |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: 1. Circuit Judge: The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is the extent to which a reorganization plan proposed under 11 U.S.C. 17208 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC v. Section 1123(a) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. |
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OPINION/ORDER Frisoli was on brief. Ragosa contends that the bankruptcy court should have abstained from hearing this case. That the court should never have included the disputed parcel in the bankruptcy estate. Was deeded to Michael and Mary Colarusso in 1992. Both the Canzanos and Ragosa were neighbors of the Debtors. Stating:
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Herbert Collins was once a bail bondsman in Virginia. He and his wife filed for bankruptcy in 1990 and were released from all of their legally dischargeable debts. The Collinses moved to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination that the bail bond debt was dischargeable. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was discharged. We hold (1) that the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated because there was no suit against the Commonwealth and (2) that Mr. Collins's obligation as surety on the forfeited bail bonds is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Collins was a (licensed) professional bail bondsman in Norfolk. His premium or fee was based on a percentage of the face amount of the bond. Collins failed to pay off the bonds of some defendants for whom he was surety after they skipped their court appearances. Listed on their schedule of unsecured liabilities was a debt of $37. (This was a noasset bankruptcy.). In August 1996 the Collinses filed a motion to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination of whether the judgment debt from the bail bonds was dischargeable. |
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OPINION/ORDER When it became apparent that the appeal was untimely. Appellee's motion to waive oral argument is granted. Appellant's motion for oral argument is denied. The case is ordered submitted on the briefs. (1) The BAP issued a show cause order and then dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 8002(c) Ruling |
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OPINION/ORDER 1999 memorandum order concluding that they were liable to the debtor for fraud and breach of an asset purchase agreement involving the sale of their computer software business to the debtor. That they committed neither fraud nor breach of contract and that it was improper for the bankruptcy court to grant rescission of the asset purchase agreement. James was chiefly responsible for Abacor's operations and owned most of its stock. Was a minor shareholder and kept Abacor's books. The |
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OPINION/ORDER The state and local taxing authorities who had received and refused or failed to refund the recordation and transfer tax proceeds were located in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Each of the taxing authorities was served with notice of the motion and each responded by filing motions for abstention. NVR was exempt from transfer and recordation taxes on any real property transfers completed between April 6. The date that its reorganization plan was fully implemented and the bankruptcy period ended. Specifically holding that |
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OPINION/ORDER With whom |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a district court's order1 dismissing two appeals from a bankruptcy court for lack of standing. I. BACKGROUND The Westwood Community Two Association ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Holding that its mortgage lien on debtor Carl G. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 36.3. Davis's principal residence was not avoided by the order of confirmation in Davis's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d) and we affirm. Davis included the following sentence in the paragraph of the Plan entitled |
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N:\DOCS\SUSAN\06-1878 NEAL V. THE KANSAS CITY STAR. OPN CIRC 8.22.WPD Which was filed under seal. Neal's gambling addiction became public after Neal was caught in an early morning raid on a Kansas City. She was sentenced to 28 months' imprisonment. The Star all mentioned that Neal may have provided favorable treatment to some The Honorable Scott O. OCDC is the arm of the Missouri Supreme Court that investigates disciplinary matters involving licensed attorneys in the State of Missouri. The OCDC is currently conducting an investigation into these attorneys' conduct. Neither the United States Attorney's Office nor the OCDC have released the names of the attorneys implicated. The order was not final. |
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OPINION/ORDER We hold that evidence of pre petition conduct in this case by a law firm is relevant to a review of a debtor's application to retain the firm as special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted as counsel for the debtor pre petition in negotiating settlement arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by attorneys who were co counsel with the firm in insurance matters for those same claimants. Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess carriers.1 The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi. We take judicial notice of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of certain facts such as that a document was filed. Garnering support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success of a plan. A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellants.
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OPINION/ORDER We consider the validity of a provision in Continental Airlines' plan of reorganization that released and permanently enjoined shareholder lawsuits against certain of Continental Airlines' present and former directors and officers who were not themselves in bankruptcy. We will reject Continental Airlines' contention that claim preclusion and the doctrine of equitable mootness prevent us from considering the merits of this appeal. We will reverse the District Court's order approving the validity of this provision. Which is legally and factually insupportable. I. Appellants are plaintiffs in several securities fraud class action lawsuits brought against directors and officers of Continental Airlines Holdings. That order was affirmed on appeal on June 28. The District Court decision noted that the injunction could have been more narrowly crafted to permit some portion of Plaintiffs' class actions to continue. Insureds and the Insurers will provide releases to each other. |
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OPINION/ORDER The suit was later amended to name a total of twenty one plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were scattered across Ohio and as far away as Texas. That they were unaware that their illnesses were the result of Chemetron's conduct at the time Chemetron filed for bankruptcy. They therefore were discharged by the court's confirmation order. I. The underlying facts are set forth in this court's prior opinion in this case. It demolished a portion of its Harvard Avenue facility and placed a quantity of rubble from the demolition in the Bert Avenue landfill.2 This rubble was apparently contaminated due to radiation exposure. Chemetron was involved in periodic clean up efforts at both the Harvard Avenue and Bert Avenue sites at the direction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Bankruptcy Judge This is an appeal and cross appeal from a Judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska issued on February 3. We will deal with these issues seriatim. 2 I. The Events Leading up to the Debtors' Bankruptcy Filing and Foreclosure Schropp and Dahlke were partners in thirteen commercial real estate partnerships with Prime Realty. McCart and Prime Realty are collectively referred to as |
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OPINION/ORDER Because we conclude that Manus was entitled to relief because of excusable neglect on its part. We will reverse. 1. Is a corporation which. Appellees in this case are referred to as |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellant. Carens & DeGiacomo were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. is whether the bankruptcy court properly enjoined a state law based |
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OPINION/ORDER The court's jurisdictional determination is AFFIRMED in part. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are whether the bankruptcy court erred in holding: (1) that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Debtor's failure to object to a creditor's claim was entitled to preclusive effect in pending state court litigation. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER The District Court having found that the Bankruptcy Court's Order was a final order that. The District Court found that the Bankruptcy Court's Order was a final order that. Asserting that BFG was being operated as a Ponzi Scheme.2 On that same date. These bankruptcy proceedings were venued in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York ( |
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UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342) BACKGROUND
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UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342) BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER Are vendors who filed timely reclamation claims against the Debtor. Appellants now appeal the bankruptcy court's decision finding that their reclamation claims are not entitled to administrative expense priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2) and relegating their claims to the status of general unsecured. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL (1) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying administrative expense priority or a lien to reclaiming sellers whose goods were proposed to be consumed by the Debtor in its manufacturing activities. (2) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining the validity and priority of reclamation claims pursuant to motion rather than adversary complaint. (3) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the Appellants were not entitled to require a marshaling of the assets to protect their reclamation claims. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). The order and judgment on appeal are |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellants.
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OPINION/ORDER Richard Schwartz were on brief for cross plaintiff. Was indicted and convicted in 1985 of wire fraud. Serrano's misdeeds have been extensively chronicled elsewhere. 3 5 (1st Cir. 1989).1 The primary victim of Serrano's fraud was Home Federal Savings and Loan Association ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Dissent by Judge Winmill ORDER A misconduct complaint was filed against a district judge of this circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (now 28 U.S.C. § 351(a)) in February 2003. The claim asserted in the complaint is that the judge |
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99A2282 -- O'BRIEN ENVIRNMT'L V. NRG ENERGY Because we conclude that Manus was entitled to relief because of excusable neglect on its part. We will reverse. 1. Is a corporation which. Appellees in this case are referred to as |
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OPINION/ORDER Applied to the Bankruptcy Court and were authorized to serve as special counsel to the Debtor Fenasci in connection with particular matters relating to I.G. The bone of contention in this facet of the bankruptcy proceedings is the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. That Fenasci against and the Butler Debtor are for estopped assert claims prepetition attorneys' fees purportedly owed to Fenasci and Butler by the Debtor but not disclosed in counsel's applications to be retained. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Review of the denial of a claim on the basis of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.2 On the issue of judicial estoppel. Our opinion in Coastal Plains3 is central to the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court and the district court. We have carefully reviewed the holdings and implications of Coastal Plains. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended. 2003 are DENIED. No additional petitions for rehearing will be accepted in this case. Stern cross appeals the district court's determination that Stern's pension plan funds are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate. We must determine whether the transfer of proceeds from an Individual Retirement Account ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Shangra La also was granted the option to purchase the property within the first forty eight months of the lease for $700. Default under the lease was triggered by certain occurrences including: |
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OPINION/ORDER In an earlier order that was not appealed to this Court. The bankruptcy court had determined that the lien was without value. Because Brandon's interests were not adversely affected by the district court's ruling presently before us. The sale price was calculated by The Honorable Michael J. The trustee alleged that the debt was $250. Knudson was elected to Yukon's board of directors. Were involved in the negotiations leading to the settlement. Yukon was facing tough financial times of its own. The investors were told they would receive a new secured position. Which was released by the bankruptcy court on February 11. The Brandon shares were backdated to the date on which the investors had advanced the funds. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because Regions Bank's security interest in the collateral was inferior to the perfected security interest of another lender. Regions Bank's security interest was of no value from its inception. Any injury to Regions Bank was complete when Regions Bank funded the loan. To the extent there was an injury. It was injury to the third party. Jones Realty was worth over $7.6 million. There is no documentation to memorialize any transfer of assets from J.R. Oil claims that this omission in its records is due to the fact that J.R. It is undisputed that Regions Bank knew that the guarantor on the loan. It is undisputed that Regions Bank knew at the time of the J.R. Regions Bank alleges in its current RICO claims that these payments were improper diversions of cash generated by assets that JTM misappropriated from J.R. Oil should have been operating the Cameron truck stop as the debtor in possession under Chapter 11. Is encumbered by liens which secure debt in excess of the value of such property. The remaining property of the Debtor is burdensome or of inconsequential value so that there is nothing to administer for the benefit of unsecured creditors. |
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OPINION/ORDER I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case is before this court on appeal from an order of the district court entered April 1. Was incorporated in Pennsylvania in 1979 and was in the business of installing insulation for commercial and industrial establishments. Were Insulfoams' only shareholders. Dennis was Insulfoams' President and chief executive officer and Marion was its chief financial officer. The corporation is unable to afford the required monthly Plan payment the principals. Dennis and Marion Donaldson will guarantee that the payment is made by lowering their own salaries or by making a capital infusion into the corporation from their own resources. |
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OPINION/ORDER Kiwi made the payments in all three cases pursuant to a number of written agreements that were essential to its efforts to stay in business. The prepetition payments constituted preferential transfers and were thus voidable under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. These transactions are at the center of the dispute between the trustee and the defendants. Kiwi's assumption of these contracts is important because it enabled Kiwi to compel its creditors to continue performing under the assumed agreements. Potential preference claims against creditors were to be preserved for later prosecution by an estate representative such as the trustee. The Term Sheet provided that only preference actions against Northwest Airlines and Greater Orlando Airport were settled and that these creditors were to obtain releases from liability from KIH. The Creditors' Committee.1 All other preference actions were preserved by the Term Sheet. The settlement was never consummated. 6 motion with the Bankruptcy Court seeking appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or. |
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OPINION/ORDER The parties stipulated that the Preference Payments were preferential under § 547(b). The only issues tried were whether Access Air remitted the Preference Payments in the ordinary course and whether Airline Software provided new value to Access Air subsequent to receiving at least some of the Preference Payments. 3 Because the parties stipulated that the Preference Payments were preferential under § 547(b). Burroughs remarked that Access Air's payment pattern to Airline Software just prior to and during the preference period was similar to its payment pattern to other vendors. Rosen noted that the payment history of Midway and Presidential were generally similar to Access Air's payment history. Rosen noted that it was Airline Software's general policy not to provide services until the customer actually made the down payment. Rosen further testified that there is no record of Airline Software receiving the $1. The bankruptcy court additionally found the scant documentary evidence in the record demonstrated that Access Air's payment to Airline Software was 5 substantially more delinquent in the preference period (93 days from invoice) versus the pre preference period (23.5 days from invoice). |
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02-2350 -- U.S. V. MYERS -- 03/29/2004 553 because the FSA did not have a |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court overruled Debtor's Objection on the basis of a response filed by Morton who was at the time estranged from Debtor and had been dismissed from the case. The Debtor asserts that Morton did not have standing to file a response and that the bankruptcy court failed to provide her with an opportunity to present evidence prior to ruling on her Objection. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an appeal of the district court's reversing in part. There was a foreclosure sale of property owned by Cueva that was part of a bankruptcy proceeding and therefore subject to an automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. The following facts were found by the bankruptcy court in its Memorandum Opinion entered July 24. Are undisputed. The real property that is the subject of this appeal is located at 6006 Memorial Drive in Houston. The note was secured by a lien on the Property. The lien was assigned to Norwest Bank Minnesota. Cueva's bankruptcy proceeding actually was filed on On December 7. Settle & Pou were the attorneys and the authorized agents for Appellees Norwest. Thus those parties were charged with notice of the bankruptcy three to four hours prior to the foreclosure. Bustamante and Campbell were the successful bidders at the foreclosure sale. That the sale was subject to bankruptcy by the debtor. The Property was purportedly conveyed to Bustamante and Campbell by deed dated December 7. |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Trustee argued that Defendants had fraudulently misappropriated large sums of cash and inventory from Debtor while they were in control of its activities. I. Debtor was incorporated in October 1988. Its principal business was the manufacture and sale of T shirts. It was a closely held corporation with the sole ownership stake split between the company's president. Samuel's sister Hava Simchon was a commission salesperson but did not serve as an officer or director. Debtor was a very successful company. Virtually all of them were offshore. (STKH) was formed in March 1997. STKH was contractually obliged to pay Debtor $3. That rent was never paid. 000 and were valued in September 1997 at $107. Its revenues had fallen to $13 million and it was operating at essentially no profit. Samuel purchased products from Debtor and resold them to Debtor's customers when he was able to do so. The inventory that Samuel purchased was identified and physically segregated from Debtor's remaining inventory. |
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OPINION/ORDER A |
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OPINION/ORDER 500 are attorney's fees. The monthly payment is the disposable income of the Debtor and his wife after subtracting monthly expenses ($2. Hill alleges that Debtor made inappropriate and sexually suggestive remarks to her while she was a student at Winona State University. Hill further alleges that Debtor had non consensual sex The state court lawsuit was pending when Debtor filed his chapter 13 petition. Hill objected to confirmation of Debtor's proposed plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith. The plan is proposed in bad faith. [R]ecognizing what the Eighth Circuit did in LeMaire and Noreen was annunciating public policy. Whether ultimately it is physically abusive or abusive of a special confidential relationship as was the case in the Sitarz decision. If the debtor is 2 not proposing through a plan to make the claimant substantially 3 whole financially then bankruptcy affords no remedy. The Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the plan was not proposed in good faith as a matter of law. |
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OPINION/ORDER The district court held that the trustee should not have received compensation based 2 on a $7. The trustee argues that the district court's interpretation of S 326(a) was improper and that the determination of a fee award is not limited to the factors enumerated in S 330(a). Cain was subsequently appointed as Chapter 11 trustee. The debtor's principal asset was a parcel of property consisting of two office complexes in Marlton. Which was subject to a mortgage in favor of First Fidelity Bank. It was later appraised at a fair market value of $9. The trustee was awarded interim compensation of $28. The Chapter 11 proceeding was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding and Mr. Cain was reappointed as Chapter 7 trustee. Although the trustee alleged that he was prepared simply to abandon the property and allow First Fidelity to foreclose on it. Once the administrative expenses were paid. That at a sale |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an IRS claim for delinquent taxes secured outside of bankruptcy by a lien on a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan is secured in bankruptcy |
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CARTER V. RODGERS (8/2/2000, NO. 99-13703) BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by vacating its order of dismissal and allowing Debtor to resume performance of his confirmed Chapter 13 plan. |
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OPINION/ORDER The purchaser of the debtor's property attempted to have the bankruptcy court resolve the tax matter by filing a motion to reopen. Which was hearing the tax foreclosure proceedings. The purchaser argues that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction and was required to act. Which was allowed by the court by endorsement order. The trustee stated that the sale was pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). That |
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OPINION/ORDER 2 and that the partnership was dissolved only upon Victor's death. We will vacate the order of the District Court and will remand the case so that the District Court can properly determine. Who were then married. In his will. The surviving Partner shall have the right within ninety (90) days from the date of death of the deceased Partner to purchase the interest of the deceased Partner in the Partnership and to pay to the personal representative of the deceased Partner the value of that interest as provided in Paragraph 18 of this Agreement. . . . Leah advised the Woskobs that Victor's interest was negative in the amount of $33. That the Estate was not entitled to any payments for the purchase of Victor's partnership interest. The fixing of damages for amounts alleged to have been wrongfully taken from the partnership by Leah. Both actions were removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 4 Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Woskobs contended that Leah's attempt to purchase Victor's interest after his death in 1999 was untimely because the Legends Partnership had already been dissolved in 1997 by any one of three events. |
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CARTER V. RODGERS (8/2/2000, NO. 99-13703) BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER The conveyance was recorded on December 2. He conceded at trial that the transfer was fraudulent within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Admitting that the transfer was completed with actual intent to hinder. Discussion Discussion This case presents this Circuit with an issue of first impression: whether an admittedly fraudulent transfer of a debtor's property within one year before the filing of a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is cured for purposes of dischargeability pursuant to Section 727(a)(2)(A) by its re transfer to the debtor after the debtor files his petition. As we have stated previously. The statute's language is plain. 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' |
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OPINION/ORDER Was obligated under the Confirmed Plan of Reorganization to fully fund its Pension Plan to cover an increase in benefits to beneficiaries of so called window pensions in 2000 and 2001 immediately upon Shenango's determination to grant the enhanced benefits. Shenango contends that the Confirmed Plan of Reorganization did not require full funding of the increase in benefits at the time the decision was made to grant the window pensions. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. ] shall have any funding obligations to the Pension Plan as a result of this section 4.04(h). No benefit increases may be provided for any participants in the Pension Plan who are not Class 4B Claimants. The total benefits to be paid to the window pension recipients were valued at $1. A second window pension was considered. Who was also on the Pension Board as the retiree representative. The benefits under this second window pension were valued at $766. The Class 4B retirees asserted that full funding was required under the terms of § 4.04(h) of the Reorganization Plan at the time the determination was made to grant this second window pension to non Class 4B retirees. |
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OPINION/ORDER A statement reflecting the payments to Heavrin was submitted by the corporation's bankruptcy attorney as part of an accounting of payments to insiders. This order was reversed by the district court. Based on its reversal of its own prior determination that the services rendered by Heavrin were performed in connection with the bankruptcy petition. Defendant Donald Heavrin was acting as general counsel for the debtor. Was a 50 percent shareholder. The invoices were never for more than $2. Met with Heavrin and told him that Triple S was in dire financial straits. They believed that it was necessary for the corporation to file for Chapter 11 protection that same day. The defendant made a cursory review of Triple S's recent financial statements and determined that |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court determined that the Petersons failed to prove that Rothweiler was a creditor under TILA. The bankruptcy court also ruled that even if Rothweiler was a creditor under TILA. The Petersons were required to tender the loan proceeds to Rothweiler in order to effectuate the rescission. The Petersons assert that they presented sufficient evidence at trial which showed that Rothweiler was a creditor for purposes of the application of TILA remedies. That because they are in bankruptcy. Filed an amicus brief in support of Rothweiler in which he adopts the position that the confirmed Chapter 13 plan does not have res judicata effect on the treatment of his claim. The Petersons' Chapter 13 plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court on October 30. That this note was secured by a second deed of trust on their residence. The Petersons further alleged that this note was amended on May 17. The Petersons alleged that Rothweiler engaged in a practice of |
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OPINION/ORDER Klein were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER Read was on brief for appellant Wendy B. Biggs were on brief for appellant Susan Otis.
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OPINION/ORDER Each interested party was to submit a written bid to Goss in advance of the auction along with an executed copy of an asset purchase agreement that Goss had prepared. Goss was in turn empowered to review these submissions and determine whether each bidder was |
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OPINION/ORDER He pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution to his creditors. Which affected both the prison sentence he received (under the Sentencing Guidelines a defendant's base offense level will be increased incrementally for the loss cause by his crime) and the amount of restitution he was ordered to pay to his creditors. Feldman contends that there was little if any actual loss that resulted from his crime and that the District Court erred in its calculation that his creditors lost over $138. Were entitled to restitution in that amount. He submits that most of the property he failed to report 3 was held by him and his wife as tenants by the entireties under Pennsylvania law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3664 (stating that restitution is limited to the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant's crime). Feldman claims that although he committed a crime (he acknowledges that he was obligated to report the property). The District Court did not determine whether or not the property owned by Feldman and his wife as tenants by the entireties would have been exempt from bankruptcy. |
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OPINION/ORDER Stern cross appeals the district court's determination that Stern's pension plan funds are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate. We must determine whether the transfer of proceeds from an Individual Retirement Account ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Magill as an active judge at the time this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. After the opinion was filed. Both of these obligations were secured by approximately 1129 acres of farmland owned by the Allens. United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. 3 3 of farmland was far less than the total amount that the Allens owed to the Banks. Was listed as an undersecured claim. None of the undersecured nor the unsecured creditors were to receive any payments for their claims. Richard Bjerk and Hoysler Associates were listed as having unsecured claims totaling $61. The Banks were listed as having an undersecured claim in the amount of $154. No mention was made of Eden Bank's undersecured claim. The treatment of claims section noted that Eureka Bank's secured claim was to be negotiated later. That Eureka Bank was also a possible undersecured creditor whose undersecured claim would be negotiated at a later time. That the results of any negotiations were to be included as part of the October 1987 amended plan. |
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OPINION/ORDER Rosenthal P.C. were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Participating hospitals which retain ownership of the capital assets used to provide services to their Medicare recipients are entitled to periodic reimbursement for estimated actual depreciation on those assets. A hospital which has closed would be eligible for further depreciation reimburse ments from HHS on a Medicare related capital asset which was sold within one year after its closure for less than its depreciated basis. HHS regulations allowed hospitals forty five days after their withdrawal from the Medicare program to submit a The HHS depreciation methodology is similar to that utilized for federal tax purposes. Since HHS already would have reimbursed the hospital $40. Were the asset to sell for only $500. The HHS regulations likewise allow hospitals a three year period within which to reopen and amend a final cost report which was timely filed. The Trustee obtained two extensions of the forty five day filing deadline from the bankruptcy court and the Hospital's final cost report was submitted to HHS within the extended deadline. |
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OPINION/ORDER BACKGROUND The Debtor was incorporated in 1973 and was solely owned by Steven Grohoski. This loan was evidenced by a promissory note made payable to Suburban Builders. Claim No. 19 was timely filed in the Debtor's case in the name of |
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OPINION/ORDER I. Schropp and Dahlke were partners in thirteen commercial real estate partnerships with Prime Realty. Were two of these partnerships. The properties were allegedly encumbered by liens held by Darland Construction Company and Prime Realty. Though there was some dispute as to the validity of these liens. Concerned that Schropp and Dahlke were unwilling to act in the estates' interests. McCart remained convinced that the properties were more valuable than Schropp and Dahlke had acknowledged. Was Phoenix Properties LLC. The purpose of both transactions was apparently to provide financing to Phoenix Properties to allow it to bid at the trust deed foreclosure sale conducted by the First National Bank of Omaha. Both of these transactions and the supporting documents were entered into between parties who are not parties to this bankruptcy proceeding. LLC to bid on and buy the real estate being sold at public auction have nothing to do with this bankruptcy case. Who were also counsel for the debtors. Was property of the bankruptcy estates and had been converted by Schropp and Dahlke. |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court found that Saxman would not suffer undue hardship if he was made to repay the $4. That he would suffer undue IN RE: SAXMAN 4855 hardship if he were held to his ECMC debt of $83. Who was 50 years of age at the time of trial. To reject ECMC's suggestion that the court discharge only the portion of the loan that Saxman was unable to pay. APPELLATE JURISDICTION Saxman initially contends that the district court's decision to vacate the bankruptcy court's order and remand for further proceedings was not a final decision and therefore not appealable. We summarized the law as follows: If the matters on remand concern primarily factual issues about which there is no dispute. Then the policies of judicial efficiency and finality are best served by our resolving the question now. The district court's decision is usually not final. We may nonetheless exercise jurisdiction if that issue is legal in nature and its resolution either (1) could dispose of the case or proceedings and obviate the need for factfinding. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge. The question presented in this appeal is whether Tonda Ford. Is entitled to keep a personal injury settlement arising from a claim she failed to disclose in her bankruptcy proceedings. Two issues are raised by the parties on appeal. What is the proper burden of proof in assessing whether a debtor has concealed assets in bad faith. Was the bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith clearly erroneous on this record? We conclude that the applicable burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard and that sufficient evidence supported the bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith. Factual Background Tonda Ford was seriously injured in a car accident in December 2003. Ford was treated for extensive head injuries which caused her to miss work as a paralegal and required followup therapy. She was working as a project assistant for a law firm specializing in medical malpractice. On the schedule requiring the Fords to disclose all of their assets including legal claims they might have against others Ford did not disclose her damages claim in the pending accident case.(1) During the pendency of her bankruptcy case. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding that there was no good cause under Rule 4(m) to extend the time period and that the excusable neglect provision of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) did not apply to a nondischargeability proceeding. Finding that the required motion was not made under Rule 9006(b) and. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Sheehan was the president of European Auto. That case was removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. Is proceeding in the separate bankruptcy case of European Auto. The original summons was issued on November 4. That service was defective. Sheehan filed a motion to dismiss for improper 1 The Ferrari eventually was completely restored in Japan. Oyama argued that there was good cause for the failure. That the court was therefore required to extend the time for service.2 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Stating that the excusable neglect provision was not applicable in the context of a nondischargeability proceeding. Agreeing that there was no good cause to extend. |
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OPINION/ORDER We are asked to determine whether a creditor's committee may assert fraudulent transfer claims under S 544 of the Bankruptcy Code ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Zepecki and Kania were granted a decree of divorce on September 28. The bankruptcy court became aware that the proceeds from the sale of the Illinois property were transferred to Steven C.R. The court found that he was entitled to The Honorable James G. The court found that the funds Brown received were proceeds from property owned by Zepecki as an individual. Zepecki was attempting to perform a tax free exchange of property under § 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. Wherein Brown was identified as the Escrow Holder. Zepecki was identified as the Exchanger and owner of the real estate. James Burch was identified as the Purchaser of the real estate. The bankruptcy court described the manner in which Brown allegedly received his attorney's fees as |
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OPINION/ORDER Appellant Credit Suisse First Boston ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The sole issue we must resolve in this appeal is whether TWA was insolvent on November 4. TWA was insolvent. We will reverse the district court's order. Eighty eight days after the deposit was made. Seeking a declaration that the $13.7 million deposit was a preferential transfer which was voidable under 11 U.S.C. (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. (3) made while the debtor was insolvent. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings The bankruptcy court held a four day bench trial in February 1994 to determine whether the deposit was indeed a preferential transfer. The court focused its attention on the statutory requirement that TWA was insolvent on the day of the transfer. Following the code's guidance that a corporation is insolvent when |
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OPINION/ORDER Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The priority scheme is so vital to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code that we remand this case to the bankruptcy court for further Page 1 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 review of the settlement and consideration of that aspect of the settlement that may deviate from the rule of priorities. Circuit Judge: There is little doubt that settlements of disputed claims facilitate the efficient functioning of the judicial system. Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme Page 2 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. It will be dispositive. Iridium Operating LLC ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We consider whether a group of former residents and occasional visitors to a neighborhood containing a toxic site were |
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98-5000 -- STEWART V. U.S. TRUSTEE -- 04/22/1999 707(b) is constitutional. In re Stewart. 707(b) is not void for vagueness and does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The monetary consequences of his entering a fellowship are appreciable. Perinatology graduate would have ranged from $100. |
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OPINION/ORDER Asserts that it was not doing so as a fiduciary and thus had no obligation to pay interest on those funds. BONY contends that they were inappropriate on several grounds. We are unpersuaded by BONY's arguments and therefore affirm. Part III addresses BONY's claim that it was an Indenture Trustee with contractual duties. The purpose of the Agreement was to establish an efficient method for paying the Debtor's general unsecured creditors ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court's order will be affirmed. Does Castle have standing to object to the Final Report and the Application for Fees? 3. The order on appeal is final and may be appealed as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). None of the parties have timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(c)(1). |
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OPINION/ORDER The BAP held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in not finding that an |
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OPINION/ORDER 761.48 made by Debtor to David Huddle and the Bank was an avoidable preferential transfer. The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the money paid by Debtor to Huddle and the Bank was held by the Debtor as an agent for its principal. It was therefore not property of the estate which the Trustee could recover under § 547. Background The underlying facts are summarized as follows. Debtor was a corporation in the business of auctioning personal property for its customers. Huddle's business assets were the security for a loan which had been made by the Bank to Huddle. Which was deposited in Debtor's general bank account. Seeking to set aside the payment made by Debtor to the Bank and Huddle on grounds that the payment was an avoidable preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).2 The Trustee maintained that Huddle was a creditor and the money in dispute was property of the bankruptcy estate which should be distributed in the normal course of the bankruptcy proceedings. Debtor and Huddle were in an agent principal relationship. |
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OPINION/ORDER We vacate the district court's judgment and leave in effect the state court judgment and the holding of the bankruptcy court that the state judgment debt was not dischargeable. 1988 declaring that the $7000 state judgment was nondischargeable.1 But. 1988 order of the bankruptcy court it also entered its own judgment in Dotson's favor for $7000 plus both accrued interest at the The bankruptcy court's determination that the state court judgment was not dischargeable is not an issue in this appeal. 1 IN RE: HECKERT 3 West Virginia rate of 10% per annum until June 15. Claiming the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction because the bankruptcy court entered a judgment on an already existing state court judgment. Which was beyond the scope of the bankruptcy court's powers in the proceeding to determine dischargeability of the state court judgment. |
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OPINION/ORDER Ethel Lowenbraun was married to Stanley Lowenbraun. Was hired by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate to investigate whether some of the transfers made from Stanley to Ethel pursuant to their legal separation constituted an improper 1 No. 05 6032 In re Lowenbraun Page 2 diversion of funds from the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court held as a matter of law that Canary was entitled to absolute immunity for his statements and. That Canary was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the case. This decision was affirmed by the district court. Which was valued at approximately $2.5 million. William Lawrence was designated as the bankruptcy trustee. Lawrence specifically requested that Canary investigate the IRA and stock transfers made from Stanley to Ethel to determine if the transfers were improper under either the Bankruptcy Code or Kentucky law. After concluding that the transfers were marked with |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The main question in this case is whether a debtor may recover damages for emotional distress under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) when a creditor violates the automatic stay that follows from the filing of a bankruptcy petition. We are persuaded that we erred and now answer |
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OPINION/ORDER Appeals three of those orders although she is only a party in two of the cases. Included in these assets were: a principal residence valued at $1.76 million. The aggregate value of the personal property listed by Conway was $1. Was required to |
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OPINION/ORDER This mortgage was executed in 1989. The Debtor or other defendants who are indebted to Nob Hill have made payments of $288. A closing on the sale was set for August 12. The three prior cases were each dismissed on the motion of Nob Hill. Her first case was a Chapter 13 Petition. Which was dismissed on December 14. Dietrich's second case was a Chapter 11 proceeding. Which was dismissed with prejudice on May 1. She claims the case was dismissed because she did not have a reasonable likelihood of proposing a successful plan and that Nob Hill would not accept a plan. Dietrich's third case was a Chapter 7 proceeding. Which was filed on May 21. That case was dismissed on August 27. |
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OPINION/ORDER In this case we must decide whether appellant Marjorie Jo Faish is entitled to have her student loan obligation discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. She is entitled to have her entire debt discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). |
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OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. * The dismissed complaint was styled |
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OPINION/ORDER An order is final if it |
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BURNES V. PEMCO AEROPLEX, INC. (5/20/2002, NO. 01-13865) Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. Factual and Procedural Background
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OPINION/ORDER Redlener were on brief. Kazarian were on brief. They now claim that the Membership Interests placed in escrow are part of the bankruptcy estate and not the property of the appellee. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court ruled that the escrowed assets were not part of the bankruptcy estate and were properly distributed from escrow to the appellee. While there is a long and complicated history between the parties. NTA) are holding companies. The Membership Interests were NTA's primary assets and entitled NTA to exercise total control over Concourse. (2) Holding Company would have the option to purchase NTA's Membership Interests in Concourse. Concourse commenced a civil action in Illinois state court seeking a determination that it was not in default under the terms of its loan agreement with Holding Company. The Standstill Agreement and the Escrow Agreement. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 when it dismissed debtor's appeal for failure to include in the designation of record on appeal a transcript of a bankruptcy hearing without first giving the debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. We hold that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 8001 when it dismissed debtor's case for failure to include the June 23 transcript in the designation of record without first giving debtor notice and opportunity to respond and without determining whether a lesser sanction would have been appropriate. The judgment of the district court is VACATED. Was then appointed. Concluding that the two Properties were not part of the bankruptcy estate and hence not subject to the automatic stay. J.) on the grounds that because the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548. Holding that it had erred by not considering whether the foreclosure action was a preferential or fraudulent transfer under §§ 547 and 548 and entered a stay pending the lower court's decision on the transfer issue. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge This is an appeal from the lower courts' holdings that a debt owed by defendant appellant Robert J. Young to plaintiff appellee Fowler Brothers is nondischargeable in Mr. Young(2) was dischargeable in Mr. Young's debt that was evidenced by a promissory note. Was nondischargeable. Young's debt was nondischargeable. Young's reply brief because it was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 31. Young under Bankruptcy Rule 8012 because |
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OPINION/ORDER That the amount now due and payable was $937. The trustee responded that she was talking to several potential purchasers of the lease. She also stated that the lease was the only asset of value in the estate. No extension was necessary. The trustee stated that AgriProcessors was interested in purchasing the lease from the bankruptcy estate. In so doing the court noted that the lease was Tama's most significant asset. The Bankruptcy Estate agrees that if the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 8(d) above. AgriProcessors objected to the trustee's motion to amend the motion to assume and assign on the grounds that the negotiating procedures were not clearly spelled out in her motion. The court further noted that outside of bankruptcy AgriProcessors would not have been entitled to be paid its cost of making its offer if it lost the bidding. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.3 The decision to award administrative expense priority is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.4 We review such a decision for abuse No one questioned Iowa Beef's participation at the hearing of July 9. |
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UNITED STATES V. MURDOCK MACHINE AND ENG. CO. Are. See 50 U.S.C. 1431 36 (granting agency head authority to provide extraordinary relief to a contractor when a contract is deemed essential to the national defense). The default clause provided that if the government's default termination was proper. That if the government's default termination was improper. They are the Rules pertinent to the instant case. References hereinafter will be to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Emerald wanted the bankruptcy court to enjoin the IGB from revoking its gaming license and to require the IGB to drop the disciplinary proceedings that were pending against Emerald. We have consolidated the appeals for decision because of the close factual relation between them. The court had held that the IGB was required to grant Emerald's 1999 application for renewal and relocation of its license. Emerald which was then still operating in East Dubuque applied for a license renewal. While the appeal was pending. The new section permitted |
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BURNES V. PEMCO AEROPLEX, INC. (5/20/2002, NO. 01-13865) Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. Factual and Procedural Background
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OPINION/ORDER The primary question is whether the District Court erred in affirming the Bankruptcy Court's order. ] |
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OPINION/ORDER A lawsuit filed by Dale LaBarge alleging retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim was pending against them and their corporation. A hearing was held in the state court lawsuit on LaBarge's motion for the entry of a default judgment. The state court expressly concluded that the legal basis for the underlying liability was retaliatory discharge in violation of Minn. The Vierkants have never asserted that the post petition entry of the default judgment violated the automatic stay. LaBarge filed an adversary proceeding against the Vierkants contending that the damage award was a nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court conducted a trial on the adversary complaint during which the state court default judgment was admitted as evidence. That on the basis of the state court's findings of fact and conclusions of law the debt was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6). That in the absence of the default judgment the debt would have been dischargable. If I'm wrong on [giving collateral estoppel effect to the default judgment] . . . then I am going to give you the findings that I would have come to had there been no prior state court judgment. |
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OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs are barred by res judicata from continuing their suit in this court. Have summarized the relevant facts of the present case. Because the principal issues on appeal are questions of law. A Reorganization Plan for New Vencor was proposed. Notice of the Plan was mailed to each of the Plaintiffs who had filed a proof of claim. A key component of the Plan was summarized as follows: As part of that Plan. Ventas was given a release of [Plaintiffs' personal injury and other] Nos. 02 5632/5638 Pratt. The district court held that Plaintiffs were barred from collaterally attacking the Confirmation Order issued by the Delaware bankruptcy court. Id. ((quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(a): |
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OPINION/ORDER Is precluded from applying Chapter 13 plan payments from the Debtors' bankruptcy estates to postpetition interest on their nondischargeable student loan debts. Because we conclude that creditors are not precluded from applying bankruptcy estate payments to accrued postpetition interest on nondischargeable student loan debts. Which was confirmed on June 12. Will be paid in full through the Trustee. |
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OPINION/ORDER O'Neil and Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green Professional Association were on brief. P.A. were on brief. Raulerson & Middleton Professional Association were on brief. Pearson contends that the compromise settlement was the product of a fraud perpetrated upon the bankruptcy court by his former chapter 7 counsel. Who were represented by the Wadleigh Firm. The BWI condominium foreclosure sale was followed by a succession of lawsuits. No mention was made of any conflict of interest claim Pearson may have held against the Wadleigh Firm. There is no conflict of interest which prevents [me] from acting as Special Counsel to the Trustee . . . since the Special Counsel is not being retained to represent the Trustee in connection with the claims asserted against Bedford (sic) Woods and First N.H. The application to appoint Gannon special counsel to the chapter 7 estate was approved by the bankruptcy court on the following day in an ex parte order. Its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Nor have we found. The |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court's order is AFFIRMED. The bankruptcy court's order denying relief from the automatic stay is a final. The order confirming the Debtor's chapter 13 plan over Tidewater's objection is also a final order for purposes of appeal. 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998). 2 Because the parties to this appeal have stipulated to the facts underlying this dispute. A bankruptcy court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. FACTS The underlying facts are undisputed. The vehicle was the collateral that secured the Debtor's obligation under the Contract. The Contract was subsequently assigned to Tidewater and its security interest was duly perfected. The accelerated balance owed pursuant to the Contract as of the filing of the chapter 13 petition was $10. The Debtor proposed a |
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OPINION/ORDER The church under 11 U.S.C. were not avoidable Minn. 1992). Minn. 1993). § 548(a)(2) because the contributions were not made in exchange for less than |
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OPINION/ORDER Revoking his discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2)and ordering Debtor to turn over to the estate certain funds Kasden has obtained.1 judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed. REVOCATION OF DISCHARGE The purpose of a discharge in bankruptcy is to relieve an honest debtor from his financial burdens and to facilitate the debtor's unencumbered |
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OPINION/ORDER Sea Hawk's motion for relief from the automatic stay was denied. The State was not a party to that agreement. With prejudice |
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OPINION/ORDER This claim was later adjudged to be a general unsecured claim. After the case was converted to Chapter 7. Before the case was closed. Neither party requested that the bankruptcy court determine whether the taxes accrued in 1980 84 were discharged. Alleging that the Department of Revenue violated the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending the demand letter for unpaid state income taxes. |
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OPINION/ORDER This claim was later adjudged to be a general unsecured claim. After the case was converted to Chapter 7. Before the case was closed. Neither party requested that the bankruptcy court determine whether the taxes accrued in 1980 84 were discharged. Alleging that the Department of Revenue violated the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending the demand letter for unpaid state income taxes. |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The orders of the bankruptcy court are AFFIRMED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in finding that Buckeye violated Rule 9011 and awarding sanctions against it that were payable to the debtors' attorney. Is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Was insufficient. It held that the proper interest rate was the prime rate plus a risk adjustment of 1.5%. SCS Credit Corporation was the only creditor to object to confirmation of the Tills' amended Chapter 13 plan. SCS is a secured creditor and holds a security interest in an automobile. The vehicle was valued at $4. SCS is a sub prime lender. The Tills are such borrowers. The interest rate on the Tills' loan was 21%. A bankruptcy plan will be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor if the creditor retains its lien on the collateral. The creditor receives cash payments over the course of the plan that are equivalent to the value of the collateral on the plan's effective date. The interest rate it would have No. 00 4167 3 earned if SCS had foreclosed on the vehicle. Both witnesses testified that SCS had received 21% interest on all of its loans because borrowers like the Tills are poor credit risks. SCS reasserted its argument that it was entitled to 21%. The court held that the bankruptcy court had misread Koopmans and that Koopmans required 4 No. 00 4167 that SCS receive the interest rate it would have earned on a new loan financed by the proceeds from the sale of its collateral. |
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OPINION/ORDER This appeal requires us to consider whether certain modifications to New Power's proposed plan were material and adverse to Enron's interests and whether a provision allowing for interim distributions to certain interest holders violates 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtors are liquidating. Enron's only remaining interest in New Power is an equity interest. Which may be satisfied from any cash remaining after New Power's senior creditors are paid. 6 are deemed not to be impaired. 3 1 authorized. Because the actual examiner was not specified until 17 January. Enron may not argue that it was unaware of issues concerning the timing and scope of the examiner's investigation. 4 2 Exh.2 637 at 7 9. If its secured Class 1 claim were recharacterized as a Class 9 equity interest. It would then be impaired and Enron should have the right to vote before plan confirmation. Because if it were reclassified. Any vote Enron might then have would concern confirmation of the plan as to Holdings leaving no barrier to confirmation of the plan as to the Operating Company (at least based on the only objections Enron made at that hearing). |
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OPINION/ORDER The Order of the Bankruptcy Court will be affirmed. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are straightforward and uncontroverted.3 The Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota on September 7. Wayne Drewes was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. Nearly five months after his bankruptcy petition was filed. The Trustee and the Debtor entered into a stipulation of facts which was incorporated into both of the parties' appellate briefs. 2 3 ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the MLAP and CDP payments received postpetition by the Debtor were or were not property of the bankruptcy estate.4 STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the findings of fact of the bankruptcy court for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. The determination of whether property constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate is a legal issue to be reviewed de novo. DISCUSSION The Trustee argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it determined that the CDP and MLAP payments received by the Debtor postpetition were not property of the bankruptcy estate. |
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OPINION/ORDER This case is one of hundreds of similar suits brought by the bankruptcy estate. That the late payment penalties are unreasonable. That Humboldt's claim is subject to various equitable defenses. That the bankruptcy court should have referred various issues to the Surface Transportation Board ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The show cause order was sent to all creditors. The four unsecured creditors argued that the debtor was |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief for respondents Surface Transportation Board and United States of America.
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OPINION/ORDER Since Knapper's attempt to void the default judgments is foreclosed by the Rooker Feldman 2 doctrine. We will vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A mortgage lien was placed on both parcels of real estate as a result of one or more loan agreements Knapper entered into with Amresco Residential Securities Corporation. It was served on September 7. Giacomelli's affidavit of service recited that the complaint was served on an |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellants.
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over the appeal of final orders issued by the bankruptcy court. ISSUES The first issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in disqualifying Sexton from representing McGehee. In connection with the bankruptcy of McGehee's son in law while Sexton was also representing McGehee's daughter. We conclude that an order disqualifying an attorney is not a final appealable order. The second issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in disallowing certain attorneys' fees as a component of McGehee's secured claim. While the Lake House foreclosure proceeding was pending against the Debtor and Griffin. The Debtor's case was converted to Chapter 7. Richard Cox ( |
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99-6355 -- MASON V. YOUNG -- 01/16/2001 Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER Is recalled. 814 The Opinion cited at 262 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001). Is amended as follows: On page 996. It was agreed that this list could not be released without a court order. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court was required to notify each of the creditors on the list of the pending involuntary petition. If it appears that there are 12 or more creditors as provided in § 303(b) of the Code. The court shall afford a reasonable opportunity for other creditors to join in the petition before a hearing is held thereon. After an involuntary petition is filed but before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered. Unsecured claim may join in the petition |
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OPINION/ORDER Which held that Laura Susan Reynolds's student loans were discharged in bankruptcy. Reynolds contends that undue hardship is not a strictly pecuniary test and that the bankruptcy court correctly held that the detrimental effect of the loans on Reynolds's precarious mental health warranted discharging the debts. She was treated by a psychiatrist for agoraphobia and depression. She was able to make up the missed coursework and to graduate cum laude in 1992. She passed the Colorado bar exam and was admitted to practice law in that state. She was never The Honorable Ann D. She is married. She was only able to make the payments by paying for |
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OPINION/ORDER Before us is her most recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Which was preceded by five separate voluntary filings under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. Craig J. Braunstein LLP was on brief for appellee.
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OPINION/ORDER The cash price for the truck was $27. The rate of interest specified in the contract was 18% per annum. Which were considered as part of the claim. Coors is a liquor distributor which does business as R.C. Distributing and is referred to as such in some of the relevant agreements and the parties' pleadings. Coors and Ross Perry have the same principals and owners and many of the same shareholders. The agreement was later assigned to Coors. Ross Perry is crossed out as the seller and R.C. Distributing is hand written in. Indicating that perhaps this transaction was a direct sale. The assignments which took place in August 1996 and May 1997 are. They look more like intercompany transactions. 2 2 1 Debtors acknowledged that Coors was an oversecured creditor. Because Coors was not the seller nor a licensed sales finance company. Debtors maintained that Coors could not legally charge 18% interest and was thus barred from collecting any interest at all. Debtors sought to have Coors' claim reduced to the principal balance due on the debt at the date of filing. |
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OPINION/ORDER Inc. also contend that the bankruptcy court's dollar for dollar credit against any subsequent judgment entered against nonsettling defendants constitutes a fair and equitable judgment offset asserting that it does not have assets sufficient to satisfy a larger judgment against it. The nonsettling defendants contend that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to enter an order barring their state law claims of contribution and indemnity against VRC because these claims were unasserted. The nonsettling defendants also contend that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction over their contribution and indemnity claims because they could not have asserted these claims as cross claims in the adversary proceeding of the bankruptcy court's limited jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Although bankruptcy courts have limited jurisdiction. 787 (11th Cir.1990). |
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OPINION/ORDER Is recalled. 814 The Opinion cited at 262 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001). Is amended as follows: On page 996. It was agreed that this list could not be released without a court order. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court was required to notify each of the creditors on the list of the pending involuntary petition. If it appears that there are 12 or more creditors as provided in § 303(b) of the Code. The court shall afford a reasonable opportunity for other creditors to join in the petition before a hearing is held thereon. After an involuntary petition is filed but before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered. Unsecured claim may join in the petition |
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OPINION/ORDER Arguing that discharge of student loan debt is only available upon a finding of |
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OPINION/ORDER Before us is her most recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Which was preceded by five separate voluntary filings under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. |
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OPINION/ORDER The surety was Lyndon. The principal was Wallace's. The obligee was the particular college defendant. Wallace's was required to make minimum monthly commission payments to EKU. EKU or its designee was to buy Throughout this opinion. The underlying agreements between the colleges and Wallace's are referred to as |
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OPINION/ORDER Trustee argues that payments of fees by Pillowtex to Jones Day within the 90 days before bankruptcy may have constituted an avoidable preference and that the receipt of such a preference by Jones Day would constitute a conflict of interest with Pillowtex's 2 creditors and its bankruptcy estate. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was scheduled to end on August 7. Sent a letter to Lewis terminating her employment: Since we have not heard from you since mid August. We are forced to make the assumption that you have resigned. We are not obligated to hold a position for you beyond the 12 week time period. This letter is to inform you of your termination with Weyerhaeuser operated the plant under the trade name |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The question in this appeal is how the rule of single satisfaction for claims brought by a bankruptcy estate should be applied to 11 fraudulent transfers that were at least partially satisfied in a settlement of a lump sum of $3.9 million involving 377 transfers and several other parties. The debtor was purportedly in the business of leasing office equipment but was allegedly used to perpetrate a Honorable William H. Northern Trust was not a defendant in this first action but 11 of the 377 transfers concerned the funds transferred from the debtor to Northern Trust on the News' behalf. The settlement expressly contemplated as follows that the Trustee could pursue claims for fraudulent transfer against other parties: It is expressly understood between the Parties nothing in [the Settlement Agreement] is intended to in any way prejudice or limit the Trustee's ability to pursue any claims available to her against [other parties]. Northern Trust argued that it was not the |
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01-3129 -- TUTTLE V. U.S. -- 05/29/2002 Interest that accrued between the date her petition was filed and the date her plan was confirmed. 519.17 was for a priority claim. Tuttle's Chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in December 1999. 000 that accrued on its priority tax claim between the time she filed her bankruptcy petition and the time her plan was confirmed. |
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OPINION/ORDER Ronald Lurie (Ronald) was a general and managing partner of Popkin & Stern at that time. This deficiency judgment was based on the difference between the value of the property of Popkin & Stern's estate and the amount needed to pay all of the allowed claims against Popkin & Stern.2 On June 17. He was incarcerated. The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee to make a claim against a general partner of a bankrupt partnership if |
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OPINION/ORDER Is rightfully part of the bankruptcy estate. Weinschneider argues that his claim against Burton is not part of the bankruptcy estate and. Even if it is. Those homes were experiencing financial and regulatory difficulties. It was at this meeting that Behr suggested that the two involve Harold Geiser. Which was to be owned by Weinschneider. Burton was incorporated. Sometime in September or October 1989 the exact date is the subject of dispute while Weinschneider. Geiser were discussing the formation of Burton. The agreement that Weinschneider owned 23% of Burton was memorialized in a December 8. Weinschneider's Chapter 11 case was converted to a Chapter 7 case. Daniel Hoseman was appointed Trustee. The settlement agreement was approved by the bankruptcy court in an order dated July 28. After proper notice was provided to all creditors. Could or have against [Weinschneider. The amendment stated: Debtor amends his Schedule B 3 to list a post petition acquired claim that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. |
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97-4121 -- PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. V. CF&I FABRICATORS OF UTAH INC. -- 08/03/1998 Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER He argues that the bankruptcy court correctly held that Bankruptcy Rules 4004(a) and 4007(c) the rules governing the filing of complaints objecting to discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 and 727 are not jurisdictional in nature. Instead establish only filing deadlines that are subject to equitable tolling. The BAP's opinion finding that those rules are jurisdictional and reversing the bankruptcy court. Because we find that the precedent of this circuit compels us to conclude that these rules are not jurisdictional. We will reverse the order of the BAP and affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court. It became clear to Nardei that his investment was not being used to purchase gold coins. Was being used to purchase jewelry to be resold in Maughan's retail location. Finding that Maughan's debt to Nardei was obtained through false pretenses. Was therefore excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Holding that the time limits set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c)4 are jurisdictional in nature and not akin to statutes of limitation. |
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OPINION/ORDER Jr. cross appeal from a companion judgment that determined that the Debtors' debt to them was not the result of a willful and malicious injury to the Cepelaks or their property. Hence was not excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. I. BACKGROUND The Cepelaks and the Debtors are neighbors in Union. Claiming that the Debtors were maintaining a nuisance. It held that the Cepelaks were collaterally estopped from maintaining that the injury to them or their property had been |
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OPINION/ORDER Billups is judicially estopped from asserting any claims for monetary damages against Pemco. I. Factual and Procedural Background The facts of this case are straightforward. The debtor is allowed to extend or reduce the balance of his debts through a plan of rehabilitation. Asked Billups to list all suits to which he is or was a party within one year of filing for bankruptcy. Billups was not participating in a lawsuit and indicated that on his forms. He certified to the bankruptcy court that the schedules were true and accurate. Application to Monetary Claims Billups argues that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this case because: (1) Pemco was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings. (2) Pemco was not prejudiced by the omission of the claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. Judicial estoppel is raised in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding and a federal employment discrimination case. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked at a court's discretion. A party is precluded from |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. All of which were denied by the bankruptcy court's order entered July 8. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court should have allowed as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) and (4) the professional fees of the equity security holder's attorney on the basis that the attorney's services made a substantial contribution to the debtor's chapter 11 case. Denying the equity security holder's request for allowance of administrative expense under § 503(b)(3)(D) and (4) is a final. 234 B.R. 691 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (order denying administrative expense priority is a final. The bankruptcy court's denial of a claim for administrative expense priority pursuant to § 503 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Are reviewed de novo. 330 and 503 is reviewed de novo. |
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OPINION/ORDER Contending that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Custom's claim for refund and offset because Custom did not |
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OPINION/ORDER The confirmation order was vacated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Made applicable in bankruptcy cases by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.1 The bankruptcy court granted the Motion to Vacate on the basis that Educational Credit Management Corporation ( |
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OPINION/ORDER They argued that the transaction fee should be paid out of the recoveries of the unsecured creditors whose interests are represented by the Creditors' Committee rather than out of the general funds of the bankruptcy estate. Including whether or not the order appealed from is a final order. Like all courts we have a duty to review our own jurisdiction. The role of the bankruptcy court is to either approve the employment pursuant to the terms proposed by the applicant or disapprove it. It is not appropriate for the bankruptcy court to change those terms or otherwise dictate them. While we do not necessarily believe that this is the best approach. Because the issue of the appropriateness of the compensation to Houlihan Lokey was treated separately from the issue of its employment. We believe that the order appealed from is a final order. We reject the suggestion that Houlihan Lokey must wait until it files a fee application and have it denied before the committee can raise this issue on appeal.2 STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. |
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CHRYSLER FIN. CORP. V. POWE (11/19/2002, NO. 01-90036) PNC Mortgage Corporation of America are separately defendants in adversarial proceedings before a bankruptcy judge in which plaintiffs allege that petitioners violated the bankruptcy code by claiming and collecting attorneys' fees from them and other debtors. This is an issue of first impression. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Debtor claims the jewelry is exempt as |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Were on brief. Was the sole shareholder. The payment period was extended an additional ten years to cover the other half of the purchase price. A hearing on the appointment of a receiver was scheduled for March 17. 1999 but was continued by agreement of counsel to March 24. Although payroll was typically paid out every two weeks. Childrens Dental filed its Chapter 11 petition. |
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CHRYSLER FIN. CORP. V. POWE (11/19/2002, NO. 01-90036) PNC Mortgage Corporation of America are separately defendants in adversarial proceedings before a bankruptcy judge in which plaintiffs allege that petitioners violated the bankruptcy code by claiming and collecting attorneys' fees from them and other debtors. This is an issue of first impression. |
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GORDON MICHAEL V. GOULINE, JAY H. |
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OPINION/ORDER Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The sole question presented for review by the Court en banc is the threshold question of whether Hartford has statutory standing to surcharge Magna's collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1994). It was indebted to Magna in the amount of approximately $4.1 million. The Bankruptcy Court approved the loan agreement in its final financing order and authorized the Debtor to use the proceeds of the postpetition loan and the cash collateral that was subject to Magna's security interest to pay expenses set forth in an appended budget. Upon Magna is the successor in interest to Landmark Bank of Illinois. 1998 Magna was absorbed by merger into Union Planters National Bank. 22 approval of the loan agreement. When the Chapter 11 reorganization failed and the Debtor's case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. That non trustees have standing under § 506(c) to surcharge a secured creditor's collateral. That Boatmen's was controlling and that Hartford 3 therefore had standing to seek recovery under § 506(c). Is established by the Bankruptcy Code. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
A. Facts
The appellants are former limited partners in three New York limited partnerships: The Securities Group ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Braunstein LLP were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER With whom |
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OPINION/ORDER Pratt was on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER McGovern with whom Indeglia & McGovern was on brief for appellants. Levine and MacAdams & Wieck Incorporated were on brief for appellee. The district court held that an earlier decision in a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding initiated by Belmont was res judicata as to Bogosian's counterclaims. Bogosian's and Belmont's appeals were consolidated. Bogosian was a partner with her brother in a real estate company called E&J. The parties have battled over these promissory notes in three separate arenas: the United States District Court. A default judgment was entered against her. Her attentions may have been on the bankruptcy court where. The court allowed her to file counterclaims against the Bank asserting what were in essence the same claims based on an alleged oral agreement by the Bank not to call the Belmont Note. The amended counterclaims were based on the same alleged oral agreement by the Bank. There were two cases pending in the district court relating to Belmont and the Belmont Note the Bankruptcy Appeal and the District Court Action. |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
A. Facts
The appellants are former limited partners in three New York limited partnerships: The Securities Group ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We will dismiss the appeals. I. Background The background of the underlying action is extensive and well known to the parties. Thus we will only summarize the necessary facts for the appeals before us. Azmat Raza alleges she is the largest equity holder of the debtor. Rose Color was a dye manufacturer. The appellee Donald Biase was appointed as trustee ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding pursuant to § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code that the fee sought by Nischwitz was unreasonable. Was obligated to honor the agreement unless intervening circumstances had rendered the agreement |
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OPINION/ORDER Three days after notice of the bankruptcy was published in the local newspaper. The automobile issue may not have been the most significant factor in the employer's decision to let the couple go the bankruptcy court concluded that the employees had not been fired |
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OPINION/ORDER Nonstock one of which was herbicide for its crops. Several fertilizer liens were also filed in Madison and Pierce Counties. Negotiations were undertaken between DLC and Cooperative for damages. Finding that DLC was indebted to Cooperative on its open account in the sum of $15. The court also found that the affirmative defenses raised by DLC were conclusions of law and that no facts were alleged in support of the conclusions. Which was denied on October 12. This decision was appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. In 1995 the Court of Appeals found there were genuine issues of material fact for trial. This decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Demerath Land Co. v. After its RICO action was dismissed. The request was denied. Found that Cooperative was entitled to a judgment for $27. The appeal was summarily dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court on April 14. No deeds were prepared. Three lawsuits were filed by Fort Calhoun State Bank against DLC. Those suits alleged that the real estate conveyances were fraudulent transfers under the Nebraska Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. |
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OPINION/ORDER Fox ( |
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OPINION/ORDER No rent was paid on the premises postpetition. Was one of several automobile dealerships in Northern Virginia controlled by John W. The lease was thus rejected by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). The debtor's case was converted to Chapter 7. Trustee Hall was appointed to administer the estate. Was pursuing its own§ 506(c) action against Ford Credit. Reynolds was also permitted to surcharge Ford Credit to satisfy its claim. |
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OPINION/ORDER Where fee liability purportedly was discharged in bankruptcy. Binder brought this action to secure a judgment declaring that it was entitled to keep attorneys' fees paid to it by the SSA in connection with its representation of Gail S. The court having found that (i) Binder was not entitled to attorneys' fees under the Social Security Act in connection with its representation of Delnegro. We remanded to the District Court for a determination as to whether there was subject matter jurisdiction over Binder's claims. BACKGROUND Delnegro's application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act (the |
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OPINION/ORDER These were (1) the making of a transfer within one year of the bankruptcy with the intent to hinder. Our review of the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions is de novo. We are cognizant in our review of the requirement that the Bankruptcy Code must be construed liberally in favor of the debtor and strictly against the creditor. I. Brown's first contention is that the bankruptcy court erred by ruling that he should be denied a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(2)(A). It is clear on the record that all but the last of the four elements of this provision were proven.(1) Brown admits that he transferred a security interest in his antique car collection four days prior to filing bankruptcy. The contested issue is whether Brown had the intent to hinder. We believe the more correct term is that he transferred property. There is no evidence in the record that Brown had attempted to hide this transaction. There is no question that the grant of a security interest does constitute a transfer. This distinction does not affect the determination of whether the first element is fulfilled. |
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OPINION/ORDER Levinson LLP was on brief. P.C. were on brief. Because the charitable organization was still functioning as such at the time its entitlement to the bequest vested. BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Was on brief. Richardson was on brief. The bankruptcy court determined that the cost of sending the Watsons' two minor children to parochial school was neither a |
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OPINION/ORDER Debtors were authorized to reject executory contracts within ten (10) days after the Plan's July 1. Debtors argued that the Warrant Holders' damage claim was $0.00 or. The Bank argued that the Warrant Agreement was not an executory contract subject to rejection. The Bankruptcy Court found that damages should be allowed |
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OPINION/ORDER INTRODUCTION Before us is an appeal by NationsBank of Tennessee (Collateral Trustee) and New Jersey National Bank. Who are collectively referred to in this opinion as the |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Appeals from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of McDonald's Corporation on the basis that conveyances made pursuant to a franchise termination agreement were not fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers within the meaning of federal or state law. Whether McDonald's was an |
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OPINION/ORDER Friedman ( |
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OPINION/ORDER LLC were on brief. DeGiacomo were on brief. This may not be the type of redemption agreement that section 722 contemplates have agreed to cancel that right of repossession on payment of an |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUES The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it equitably subordinated the Claimant's administrative expense claim to the claims of all other creditors of RSI. We must also decide whether equitable subordination is consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that the Claimant's misconduct resulted in injury to the creditors of RSI and that equitable subordination is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. BACKGROUND The Claimant was the founder of RSI and its sole shareholder. The case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 15. Kaler ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Is a chiropractor who lost his license following allegations that he engaged in sexual conduct with several patients and employees. Background The parties are quite familiar with the facts of this case. Accordingly we will discuss the facts only as they are necessary to our decision. Based upon the documents that were received into evidence and reviewed. Gregory Fors' conduct in this regard was intentional in the sense that it was knowing and headstrong. Gregory Fors' conduct in this regard was malicious in that it was undertaken with the knowledge. Pertaining to and influencing all of the foregoing findings are these general findings. That he well understood that a major purpose of the prohibition is to protect patients such as the plaintiff Connie Johnson. That a major purpose of the prohibition is to protect patients such as this plaintiff who necessarily come under the professional influence and control of chiropractic care providers in their successful professional treatment. Toward and with respect to them was credible. |
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OPINION/ORDER Jacobs's federal income tax debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy and that Mr. We have jurisdiction over Mr. Sitting by designation. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) provides: |
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OPINION/ORDER That portion of the order is now moot. FACTUAL BACKGROUND We will first set out the facts relevant to our finding that the appeal of the bankruptcy court's orders of March 1. Was untimely. None of which was confirmed. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.2 We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo.3 DISCUSSION The issue on this appeal is whether Snyder preserved his right to file a timely appeal of the two orders entered by the bankruptcy court on March 1. We have previously dealt with this issue. The only issue on appeal was whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it denied the motions to alter Gourley v. 7 the Eighth Circuit held that the appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate is not the equivalent of an appeal from the order itself.8 As the Eighth Circuit explained. If this were not the law. Such a result would defeat the requirement that the party seeking review of a court's order must make such a request shortly after the order is entered.9 That is clearly the situation in this case. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is corrected as follows: On page 2. Jr. and Riemer & Braunstein were on brief. Lipson and Hill & Barlow were on brief. Circuit Judge. address a nagging question of bankruptcy law on which no court of appeals has yet spoken and on which lower federal courts are divided. A question arises: Is court approval a condition precedent or subsequent to the effective rejection of a nonresidential lease pursuant to section 365(a)? This question is of considerably more than academic interest. Time is money in the waiting game that Chapter 11 often entails. Holding that the rejection 3 was effective on the date that the debtor gave appropriate notice of its decision to reject.1 See In re Thinking Machines Corp. That the statute is most propitiously read to make court approval a condition precedent to an effective rejection of a nonresidential lease. BACKGROUND The material facts are undisputed. The environs were not sufficiently conducive to fertile thought. 915.89 1This date is sometimes called. Ambrose is reputed to have offered St. |
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OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was Sharon L. Circuit Judge: Appellants are nine professional tennis players (collectively |
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OPINION/ORDER This case raises the question whether a judgment debt resulting from a medical malpractice action is dischargeable in bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus maintain that it is not. Because it is a |
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OPINION/ORDER Unless a lien is avoidable and the debtor has taken timely steps to avoid it. An exemption is an interest of the debtor carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and thereby shielded from creditors' claims. provides: Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions. The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section. If such lien is (1) a judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1993). 2 Section 522(f) The referenced subsection (b) exemptions include the federal bankruptcy exemptions enumerated in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Its A discharge in bankruptcy |
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court1 found that Cline's student loan debt was discharged on the basis of undue hardship. Because the findings of the bankruptcy court are not clearly erroneous. BACKGROUND Cline is thirty five years old and single with no dependents. Cline's obligation is payable over ten years in monthly installments of $613. The loans are payable over twelve to thirty years in monthly installments of $394. Although Cline is highly educated and works in her field as a caseworker for the Missouri Department of Family Services. Her annual income was approximately $22. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. 2 1 her net monthly income is $1. Cline listed expenses that the court properly found were modest and reasonable. The determination that requiring a debtor to repay student loans would constitute an undue hardship is a factual finding and is reversible only for clear error. Unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). |
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OPINION/ORDER It held that Grand's obligation to fund an escrow account was a concurrent condition to Stratosphere's obligation to raise additional equity. Grand's obligation to fund an escrow account was discharged. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Between Stratosphere and Grand was to facilitate Stratospheres's public offering of $203 million of junk bonds. The agreement was a credit enhancement mechanism designed to reduce the perceived risks of Stratosphere's junk bonds.1 Stratosphere used the capital to finance the construction and development of the Stratosphere Tower. At issue is the determination of the obligations of Stratosphere and Grand under the Commitment and SL's rights thereunder: Was Grand's obligation to fund an escrow account under § 5(a) of the Commitment conditioned on Stratosphere's ability to raise equity? An official committee of Stratosphere Noteholders was created to represent the interests of the 1 11882 STRATOSPHERE LITIGATION v. It further held that Stratosphere and Grand's |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. That sale was never completed. The Bixby property was ultimately included in an auction sale of substantially all of the Debtors' assets. Foundry was the successful bidder at the auction sale. Because the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous when it found that Foundry purchased the Debtors' assets in good faith. ISSUE ON APPEAL The primary issue on appeal is whether Foundry purchased the Debtors' assets in good faith under § 363(m).3 II. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio has authorized appeals to this The Debtors are Lionheart Industries. The Bankruptcy Code is contained in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 1330. All future statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code. Sugarloaf's claims pertaining to compliance with and enforcement of the Bixby property sale contract are therefore irrelevant. The numerous other issues raised by Sugarloaf are addressed briefly at the end of this opinion. 23 2 1 Panel. |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court's order is REVERSED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue raised by this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in holding the Appellant in contempt for participating in a hearing before it while his law license had been temporarily suspended because he failed to pay an annual registration fee. The bankruptcy court's order holding the Appellant in contempt and imposing a fine is a final appealable order. |
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OPINION/ORDER Is not an exemption statute and there is no exemption for tax refunds under state law or applicable federal law. The Mohrhards and Benn ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The federal agencies were treated as general unsecured creditors. Were entitled to recover approximately 4.8% of their total claims. Austin are not relevant to the issues raised on this appeal. 3 denied the Government's motion. This Court's review of a district court's disposition of a bankruptcy appeal is plenary. The bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error. Legal determinations are subject to plenary review. |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's grant of judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking to have the bankruptcy court determine that she. The company was to engage in the business of trading river barge traffic. Who was in her late 30s. DeBold was encouraged to enter into this transaction by Phil Thornton. His projections were based on this assumption. Each was to own 50% of the company. Would have exclusive control of the company's day to day operations and that the manager need not seek the consent of the other members prior to making any decisions affecting the company which were 2 made in the ordinary course of business. Even though the market was not optimal. Within a year after the company was formed. Thornton also was able to persuade Tri River's bank to stop lending operating capital to the LLC. Plaintiffs were represented by Philip Corwin. DeBold stated that she was prepared to prove in her state court action that in December 2000 Jersey Grain sold its interest in Tri River to an employee of Jersey Grain for $1.00. |
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OPINION/ORDER Eugene Janssen was elected president and treasurer. Eunice Janssen was elected secretary. Was elected vice president. In order to establish that REJ was effectively the alter ego of the Janssens. As well as to foreclose the federal tax liens on property formerly owned by the Janssens but which was subsequently titled in REJ. the United States Bankruptcy Code. That REJ is the alter ego of the debtors. Further sought a determination that the IRS claim was both valid and wholly secured by the federal tax lien which attached to all property and rights to property held by the debtors in their own name and in the name of REJ. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(1). avoid any They asserted that Section 545(2) of the Bankruptcy statutory lien that is Code not enforceable at the voids Code permits a trustee. |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that even though a bankruptcy court's post confirmation |
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00-4071 -- GROETKEN V. DAVIS -- 05/24/2002 District Judge |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL This appeal raises the following issues: (1) whether a bankruptcy court is required to hold a separate hearing to determine the amount of sanctions to be awarded. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER PER CURIAM: This litigation concerns a dispute over which of two contracts for the carriage of goods by ship (known as |
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OPINION/ORDER Lurie was a general and managing partner of the firm. Debtor's bankruptcy case was commenced on March 26. Debtor then converted the case to one under chapter 11 and Appellee Robert Blackwell ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Apex was reorganized and reincorporated during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Clark was fully merged into the new corporation. 502(i)) but that were not provided for in the plan. Whether the debt was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502. The John Doe defendants have allowed 4 million gallons of gasoline and other petroleum products to form an underground toxic plume beneath Hartford. Apex asserted that the appellees' claims arose prior to the confirmation order and thus were discharged by the 1990 bankruptcy plan. While the case was pending in the Southern District of Illinois. The The John Doe defendants are allegedly employees. The case was subsequently remanded to the Madison County court. Is currently pending there. Three additional suits have since been filed against Apex and Premcor in Madison County. 34 3 bankruptcy court denied the motion to reopen and therefore found it unnecessary to reach Apex's other asserted grounds for relief. We may not reverse the bankruptcy court's ruling unless we have a |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This dispute between the Association of Flight Attendants ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee. Adams's principal complaint is that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final order discharging her claims. Expressly providing that the |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER I. The parties have stipulated to all relevant facts. Whether Amsouth's liens were void under § 506(d) because Amsouth had not timely filed its claims. Which was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. All of which were promulgated prior to Rule 7004(h). Congress could easily have included within Rule 7004(h) the same |
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OPINION/ORDER Eric Barnes ( |
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OPINION/ORDER 2000) * After this case was argued. We are now confronted with the inevitable question of whether a debtor's attorney remains eligible for compensation from the estate. We conclude that debtors' attorneys are still 2 eligible to receive compensation for fees and expenses reasonably likely to benefit the estate. We conclude that the debtor's attorneys' services were not reasonably likely to benefit the estate. We will. Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Our review of the District Court's determinations is plenary. |
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OPINION/ORDER Sons were on brief. William Loeffler and Troutman Sanders LLP were on brief. That is. Debtors have sought relief from both the federal bankruptcy courts and district courts attempting to put an end to this practice. The latest strategy for reform is to seek certification of a class of debtors against repeat offenders of the Bankruptcy Code that is. Specifically at issue in this case is the alleged misconduct of the appellee. Operating under a misunderstanding that it was powerless to provide a remedy to the appellant under the Bankruptcy Code. Because we have determined that a remedy was available through the court's equitable powers under § 105 of the Code. The reaffirmation agreement was not filed with the bankruptcy court and did not satisfy other general requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524. The appellant's primary theory was that § 524 provides a private right of action. She contended that the district court is authorized to grant relief via 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. |
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OPINION/ORDER Case was attempting to obtain a declaratory judgment that none of the debtors were owners of the real estate and improvements used by the debtors in the operation of their business. Because record title to the real estate was in one or more of the debtors. The default judgment was set aside. The debtors were ordered to post a bond in the amount of $1. The state court case was scheduled for trial to begin within two weeks of the bankruptcy petition date. Case explained the history of the state court litigation and explained that the real property at issue in the Pennington County lawsuit was the only major asset left in any of the debtors' estates. The hearing on the motion for relief from the automatic stay was held on September 3. Case took the position that the appropriate forum for litigating the ownership of the real estate in question was in the state court where the matter had been pending for some time and was ready for trial. Case emphasized in response to arguments by counsel for the debtors and counsel for another judgment creditor that The very purpose of our trial is to determine that Magnum Resources. |
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OPINION/ORDER Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act. |
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OPINION/ORDER 000 down payment on the Lodi property was. That the Versailles property was property of the Debtor's estate.1 For the reasons that follow. The bankruptcy court's judgment is AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether a loan in the amount of $157. 000 loan |
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OPINION/ORDER The remaining judges are unanimous in this decision. This Opinion and Judgment are therefore being filed by a quorum of the panel. 3 Michael S. The Bankruptcy Court rejected UFP's defenses that the transfers were either contemporaneous exchanges for new value under Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(1) or made in the ordinary course of business under § 547(c)(2). Hechinger was one of UFP's biggest customers. When Hechinger's demand for lumber products was the greatest. Hechinger agreed to a $1 million credit limit for future purchases and its credit terms were reduced to |
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OPINION/ORDER They have apart from their mortgage lender only individual creditors. We have before us consolidated appeals that arise from two bankruptcy cases. Who are husband and wife. Each claim is listed against either the husband or the wife. None is identified as a joint claim against both. 300 and is subject to mortgage liens. Each unsecured creditor is owed by only one of the debtor spouses. 000 and is subject to a mortgage lien of $7. Because the home is held as entireties property. In the Thomas case the estates of the two spouses were substantively consolidated by order of the bankruptcy court. The 4 IN RE: BUNKER estates of the two spouses are being jointly administered pursuant to local rule. Are assigned to the same bankruptcy judge. Who are unsecured. It is not available when spouses file jointly. P. 1009(a) (providing that a schedule |
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OPINION/ORDER We are confronted with a question of first impression for us: if a debtor. No bar date bankruptcy proceeding fails to list a claim on its schedule of creditors and the bankruptcy case is closed. Is the debt nonetheless discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b) and 523(a)(3). Dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling. After a case is closed. The debt in question was either discharged or excepted from discharge based on sections 523 and 727(b). The filing of a motion to reopen is not necessary to discharge the debt if the statutory exceptions to discharge do not apply. I.[fn1] Susan Judd and Lawrence Wolfe were married on December 27. 1990 and subsequently were divorced on April 26. Was listed under Schedule |
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SABER V. SALKIN (9/13/2001, NO. 00-12808) The deed was recorded on January 20. At a time when Saber was clearly insolvent. |
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OPINION/ORDER Because Vlasek was seventeen years old at the time. A minor estate was opened on his behalf and the settlement proceeds were delivered to the estate. The estate was closed. 561.88 was turned over to Vlasek. 2 No. 02 2062 Over the next few years. All four properties were mortgaged. She alleged Vlasek was the father. An Illinois state court found that Vlasek was the child's father and ordered him to make semi monthly $1000 child support payments. It appears that back in 1993 while his child's mother was still pregnant. Determined the transfers were voidable. He later claimed that at the time of the bankruptcy's filing in August 1996 he was mentally incompetent a result of a closed head injury suffered in the automobile accident. The orders that Vlasek also sought to void through dismissal would have included (i) the order setting aside the four real estate transfers. Pursuant to a motion to compel brought by the bank that was foreclosing on that property. Never sought to appeal or stay any of these individual orders at the time they were rendered. |
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OPINION/ORDER FACTS The Debtors in this case are Michael and Debra Bowman. Bowman is employed full time by a radio station equipment company in Ogallala. Approximately 60 miles from the Dundy property which is the subject of this appeal. Bowman is employed full time as a clerk at a lumber company. The Debtors' combined yearly income is approximately $60. When the bankruptcy petition was filed. The Dundy property was subject to numerous liens and mortgages totaling over $4 million. The bankruptcy court denied the Debtors' motion on grounds that it was too late in the summer to plant pumpkins. Debtors asserted that they were |
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OPINION/ORDER In which the precedential effect was limited. Was originally issued and filed on July 19. The court has now designated the opinion as one in which the precedential effect is fully precedential. * Michigan. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm in part and remand in part for entry of judgment in favor of District 1199C. The suit was filed as an adversary proceeding in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Allegheny H ealt h . Employees at four of the hospitals were represented by District 1199C and were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Tenet and District 1199C now contest whether Tenet is bound to pay sick leave benefits under the collective bargaining agreements between District 1199C and Allegheny. The collective bargaining agreements between Allegheny and District 1199C were listed on Schedule 2.01(e). 5 The asset purchase The Honorable Donald E. The related entities are Allegheny University of the Health Sciences. We will refer to the debtors collectively as |
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SABER V. SALKIN (9/13/2001, NO. 00-12808) The deed was recorded on January 20. At a time when Saber was clearly insolvent. |
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OPINION/ORDER Hoffman was one of approximately 950. Operated a risk retention group insuring group members who were obligated to contract holders that had purchased VSCs from those group members. National Warranty's primary place of business was Lincoln. Nebraska and all of its business and assets were located within the United States. We agree with the bankruptcy appellate panel there are three main issues: whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the matter. Whether injunctive relief was appropriate. Whether the injunction was too broad. There is also a secondary issue involving the bankruptcy court's denial of discovery. The first question before us is whether the bankruptcy appellate panel erred in upholding the bankruptcy court's decision to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the present matter. Ancillary jurisdiction is triggered by a foreign representative filing a petition showing the commencement of a foreign proceeding. Hoffman challenges the bankruptcy court's finding the Cayman Islands liquidation was a |
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OPINION/ORDER Jerry Waugh appeals the district court's judgment holding that his contingent debt to Reuben and Sandra Eldridge was non dischargeable under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code and reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court. Waugh argues that the bankruptcy court was correct in its determination that the debt was dischargeable because Waugh did not willfully and maliciously remove assets from Rising Fast Trucking Company in violation of the Eldridges' rights as creditors. of the district court. The Eldridges brought In the liability phase of a bifurcated Before the damages phase could Waugh was president of the company and a fifty percent The company grew from 5 trucks to approximately 150 trucks We affirm the judgment trial. Waugh filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy in February 1993 and was granted a discharge on July 7. No objections to his discharge or the dischargeability of any debts were filed within the time frame allowed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Asking the the bankruptcy court to find that any personal liability arising from state court action was discharged in bankruptcy. |
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OPINION/ORDER We must piece together what effect the rulings on relief have had as judgments were entered. As retroactive relief was granted. As appeals were filed. All three defendants have appealed the district court's order of February 26. Absolutely and irrevocably guarantee(s) and become(s) surety to Bank for the prompt payment of all sums now or hereafter due to Bank from Borrower . . .. * * * The Obligation of Guarantor hereunder shall continue in full force and effect until thirty (30) days after Bank shall have actually received written notice of Guarantor's intention to terminate this Guaranty sent by certified or registered mail. This Guaranty shall nevertheless continue in effect and Guarantor shall remain liable for any Obligation which was incurred by Borrower prior to such date of termination. Which is the result of any renewal. GWA was represented to ConBank as being a single accounting firm with offices in both New Jersey and Florida. GWA's two |
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OPINION/ORDER Created a novation substituting a contract debt which was dischargeable for the tort claims which arguably were not. There was included in the transaction a $70. 000 cash payment which was paid. An addendum to the settlement agreement specified that the agreement would be declared null and void if the criminal charges pending against Leonard Warner were not dismissed by the State of North Carolina. Was secured by two deeds of trust one on the Warners' home and another on business property owned by Hosiery Industries. There was no mention of bankruptcy in the settlement package. 1995.2 The suit was for collection on the note. While this collection suit was still pending. The second payment was due on May 11. Being in bankruptcy. 3 2 which was converted to a case under Chapter 7 on October 29. Seeking a judgment for the amount due under the promissory note and a determination that such indebtedness was non dischargeable under Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Archers incorporated by reference in the bankruptcy adversary complaint the multiple allegations contained in their suit in the state court.3 These were the only grounds there stated for asserting non dischargeability.4 Defendant 3 In the Archers' adversary complaint to determine dischargeability of debt. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Trustee for the Corporation filed an avoidance action against Funaro to recover what he alleged were the Corporation's right to commissions. Since that right was transferred to Funaro within a year of the Chapter 7 filing. Is fraudulent and avoidable. Did the Trustee prove that the Corporation had the right to receive insurance commissions and that the assignment to Funaro of that right was a fraudulent transfer? 2. The bankruptcy court then imposed sanctions against the Trustee at trial for filing a lawsuit that was wholly without merit and frivolous. The bankruptcy court was. The fact that the Trustee failed to sustain his burden of proof in this fraudulent conveyance action does not mean that the action was frivolous. Which means that the bankruptcy court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact to be decided at trial. Since there was a genuine issue of material fact. The bankruptcy court erred in finding that the Complaint was wholly without merit and frivolous. He was the sole shareholder. |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Inc. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The question for decision is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by disapproving the stipulation after a jury verdict was entered in favor of the debtors and against the Appellees in a non core proceeding in state court properly remanded there by the bankruptcy court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d). We therefore will reverse the district court judgment. After the contract was executed. That the septic system was in need of repair. Because the Martins were relying on the real estate sale proceeds to service accumulated debts. Both actions subsequently were labeled non core proceedings and were remanded to the Court of Common Pleas. Assuming that there was an open ended trial date for the state court action (as this had been true for approximately a year and a half). That delay was detrimental to the estate. The trustee believed that she was acting in the best interests of the creditors by entering into this compromise. The terms were memorialized in a written stipulation of settlement filed by the trustee and the Myers on December 17. |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm in part and remand in part for entry of judgment in favor of District 1199C. The suit was filed as an adversary proceeding in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Allegheny H ealt h . Employees at four of the hospitals were represented by District 1199C and were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Tenet and District 1199C now contest whether Tenet is bound to pay sick leave benefits under the collective bargaining agreements between District 1199C and Allegheny. The collective bargaining agreements between Allegheny and District 1199C were listed on Schedule 2.01(e). 5 The asset purchase The Honorable Donald E. The related entities are Allegheny University of the Health Sciences. We will refer to the debtors collectively as |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. These appeals were consolidated by order entered March 18. Related appeal is taken from the bankruptcy court's order denying Appellant's motion to compel service of process. The bankruptcy court's decisions are AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it approved the settlement and disbursement of funds in the Deere Credit adversary proceeding. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the chapter 7 trustee did not have standing to pursue the state law fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty actions against SunTrust Banks. We conclude that the debtor OBM did have an interest in the funds transferred and therefore the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the debtor did not have an interest in the funds transferred and as a result the trustee of its estate lacked standing to prosecute the state law fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a professional malpractice action filed by a Chapter 11 debtor against the law firm that represented him in his bankruptcy case. We affirm the district court's award of summary judgment to the law firm because the malpractice claim is barred on res judicata grounds by an earlier order of the bankruptcy court. I. The facts and procedural history are not disputed. Grausz was represented by Bradford F. One of Grausz's major creditors was John F. Who was acting in his capacity as liquidator of GFI Commercial Mortgage. Negotiated and entered into a settlement agreement with Sampson that was approved by the bankruptcy court on June 8. Several provisions of the settlement agreement are pertinent. The packing list which was prepared by others was supposed to be a list of households items allocated to him when (in September 1996) he and his wife divided the personal property in their California home pursuant to their separation. Grausz says that the household items not taken by his wife were shipped to a storage unit in Maryland to await his retrieval. |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court denying Debtor's motion to assume a real property lease. L.L.C ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Nelson was awarded an interest in his former spouse's ERISA qualified retirement plan in the amount of approximately $71. Nelson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and asserted that the interest was either not property of his bankruptcy estate. That it was exempt under either 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) or 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). The bankruptcy court ruled that the interest was property of the bankruptcy estate and was not exempt except in the amount of $4. Which was the remaining sum available under the wildcard exemption set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Nelson appeals only from the bankruptcy court's ruling that his interest in the ERISA qualified retirement plan was property of the bankruptcy estate. Nelson was divorced from Denise Nelson in September of 2000. Which was the entire marital value of this asset.1 There is no dispute that this retirement plan is a qualified plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( |
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OPINION/ORDER I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the appellant is not entitled to allowance of an administrative expense claim as a result of the debtor in possession's postpetition use of trucks in which the appellant holds security interests. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW An order determining that a claim is not entitled to administrative expense priority constitutes a final order. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6). |
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OPINION/ORDER A Notice of the Right of Redemption was served on Ms. The plan provided that the trustee was to make payments to Advanta Mortgage to cure an arrearage in mortgage payments of $9. The trustee was directed by the plan to accumulate sufficient funds to pay Tax 58's claim in one lump sum prior to distributions of other claims except for the trustee's administrative expenses. Since the focus of this appeal is the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation and application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Our review is de novo. 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for the lower court's application of facts to the legal interpretation of a statute is de novo). The holder of the certificate of purchase may serve the property owner with notice stating that the |
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OPINION/ORDER The threshold issue is whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Because we find that our resolution of the central question on appeal will materially aid the bankruptcy court in reaching its disposition on remand and serve the interest of judicial efficiency. We will reach the merits of the appeal. We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court erred in rejecting the IRS's claims for unreported nonbusiness income and overstated business deductions after finding that the IRS's method of computing Olshan's unreported business income was flawed. We find that the undisputed evidence in the record will enable the bankruptcy court to compute the amounts of unreported business income. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Olshan was convicted of insurance fraud in 1996. R. Todd Neilson was appointed trustee. Neilson then brought this adversary proceeding for a judicial determination of Olshan's tax liabilities for the 1991 and 1992 tax years.1 He alleged that the IRS's claims were overstated. That the lien was invalid. |
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OPINION/ORDER Shall be deemed not to have assumed. The cases are being jointly administered. The court went on to hold that United is not entitled to an order directing the state courts as to how its tax liability should be determined. STANDARD OF REVIEW The question of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to de novo review.4 When subject matter jurisdiction is at issue. We are required to reach the jurisdictional question before turning to the merits.5 3 Appellant's Appendix. Upon the concentrate so produced. |
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OPINION/ORDER While divorce proceedings between William Kasben and his former wife Beryl Wilson Hoffman were pending. After Kasben was successful in having the division of property set aside on appeal. The federal bankruptcy court then set out to determine the net amount that Hoffman's bankruptcy estate owed Kasben because her estate had in the interim sold the farms that were ultimately awarded to Kasben. Dery At issue on appeal is whether the costs associated with the sale of both properties should reduce the $288. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that Hoffman was entitled to receive her divorce award net of the selling costs. Also at issue is the allocation of interest and attorney fees. Allocation of the two farms The bankruptcy and divorce proceedings that give rise to this appeal have spanned a decade. These proceedings are fully detailed in several state and federal court opinions. Appellant Edwin Kasben (Edwin) is Kasben's father and Hoffman's former father in 2 No. 05 1701 Kasben v. The Kasbens both argue that Edwin is the rightful owner of one of the farms at issue in this case. |
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OPINION/ORDER Staiano was the U.S. Her current replacement is Acting U.S. After concluding that it is not moot in either sense. We affirm the District Court's ruling that the indemnification provision is permissible. These affiliates are United Artists Theatre Circuit. Revoking the automatic reference means in practical terms that bankruptcy cases are assigned to the District Court unless. They are referred to the Bankruptcy Court. Which was filed while the reference revocation was in effect. 3 Houlihan Lokey's reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. The letter also contained an exception for |
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OPINION/ORDER |
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OPINION/ORDER I BACKGROUND VTC is an Ohio corporation that was formed on December 5. Mary Ann Rabin was appointed Chapter 11 Operating Trustee for VTC. VTC confessed that it was unwilling or unable to litigate to determine which of the two plans would survive the confirmation process. The parties met to determine whether it was more appropriate to sell VTC's assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 (providing that the bankruptcy trustee may use. Provided that: (1) the bankruptcy court would have confirmed the plan at least 11 days prior to that date. (3) the confirmation order would not have been vacated. [would] have been satisfied or waived. |
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OPINION/ORDER The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the auction proceeds were held by Debtor as an agent for its principal. Therefore the funds were not property of Debtor's estate. We have simultaneously filed an opinion in an appeal from another adversary proceeding arising out of Debtor's bankruptcy filing. Background The underlying facts are summarized as follows. Debtor was a corporation in the business of auctioning personal property for its customers. Debtor deposited the proceeds from the sale in an account at the First National Bank of Omaha (hereinafter the First National account) which Debtor had specifically created for the purpose of holding auction proceeds. 2 The net proceeds from the Natkin auction sale were not remitted to Natkin within ten days after the sale. Since the date on which the proceeds from the Natkin sale were deposited in the First National account. Was $32. The balance in the First National account on the date of Debtor's bankruptcy filing was $45. The bankruptcy court stated that the relationship between an auctioneer and its customer is that of an agent and principal. |
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HUNT V. HAWTHORNE ASSOC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Which was filed after confirmation of the Debtors' chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court's decision is AFFIRMED. The majority of which were not raised before or decided by the bankruptcy court. This Panel will not consider |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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JOHN CHRISTO, JR., JOHN CHRISTO, , JAMES PHILLIP CHRISTO, IRENE LAURETTE CHRISTO V. KENNETH EARL PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Was judicially estopped from seeking to recover on those claims. We will reverse. Is in the business of constructing homes. The trim was manufactured by Bright Wood Corporation. Ryan began receiving complaints from homeowners that the paint and underlying primer were peeling off the Ponderosa Pine trim on their new homes. Ryan is currently engaged in the costly process of replacing the trim on Ryan homes in several states. Ryan did not mention any potential claims that it might have from the allegedly defective Ponderosa Pine trim. Among the |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
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OPINION/ORDER Finding that the 1994 judgment against Lurie was for a sum certain. Was not subject to modification or adjustment. Was not ambiguous. Was subject to collection and execution. Lurie was the managing partner of the firm at the time Debtor's creditors commenced an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case against the Debtor in March 1992. Appellee Robert Blackwell ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Prior to the date she filed her bankruptcy petition and further determined that such wage payments were not preferences. Were served on Wade's employer on August 21. The return date on the writ was November 11. Three payments were made by Wade's employer. The remaining three payments were made by Wade's employer. No objections to such claim to exemption were filed. Allege or try any defenses that may have been available to it under § 547(c) of the Code. The bankruptcy court ruled that Wade was entitled to avoid Midwest's lien under § 522(f)(1)(A) as to the last. The debtor must have an interest in property at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Did have an interest in the fourth and fifth payments. Was not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). Wade was awarded judgment for the last three payments in the sum of $448.68 and Midwest was required to pay that sum to Wade. The court then held that Midwest had a lien on the first three payments as of the date the writ of garnishment was served. |
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OPINION/ORDER Which was unilaterally amended by the trustee. The Chapter 13 plan (the |
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OPINION/ORDER Were either makers or personal guarantors. Whose president was Philip Burgess Jr. Was the principal obligor on three notes. 00 0.1 It is stipulated that Burgess Sr. Orders for involuntary chapter 7 relief were entered against Burgess Jr. and BEMC in April. Were secured by real estate mortgages on which the Bank foreclosed leaving a $35. The district court affirmed on the ground that the Bank had |
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OPINION/ORDER They were unsuccessful. This motion was opposed by the debtors. Who would otherwise be entitled to prompt distribution of the remaining cash if the case were conducted under Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11. 221 22 (2d Cir. 2000) (primary purpose of Chapter 7 trustee is |
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OPINION/ORDER The transaction was a constructive fraudulent conveyance. As such it was properly declared void by the bankruptcy judge. It was unnecessary for the bankruptcy judge to rule on the matter of subordination. We will affirm the judgment as to the fraudulent conveyance and vacate the ruling on subordination raised in the cross appeal. This is an adversary proceeding brought by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Limited Partnership IV against D. Santucci and Guelich have since settled their disputes with the Committee and are no longer parties in this dispute. 2 partnership filed a petition under Chapter 11 in June of 1995. All of the assets were scheduled to be sold to Ebony Bull Capital Co. The allegations against Bohn are described in detail in the following excerpt from the state trial judge's opinion overruling preliminary objections: |
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OPINION/ORDER BACKGROUND National Warranty Risk Retention Group is incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands. The company was created under the provisions of the Liability Risk Retention Act. The principal activity of National Warranty consists of operation as a risk retention group that primarily insured group members who were obligated to contract The Honorable Timothy J. The statute authorizes the creation of companies which are to be incorporated in and regulated by foreign jurisdictions. Which are authorized to sell product liability insurance in the United States. National Warranty is an insurance company. The individual states which regulate domestic insurance companies that are licensed to do business in each state. Have limited authority over the business acts of entities such as National Warranty. 2 2 1 holders that had purchased Vehicle Service Contracts from those group members. The Vehicle Service Contracts that were issued by the various group members are more commonly known as Extended Warranty Agreements. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was dated April 21. Was dated and entered on May 13. Including findings that the core of the debtor's reason for filing bankruptcy |
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OPINION/ORDER Are the appellees. 2 On February 20. Acting through its own attorney who was independent of the trustee and apparently represented its prior management. American and Ranallo filed motions in the district court to dismiss PFB's appeal on the grounds that the appeal was moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) by virtue of PFB's inability to obtain a stay of the order approving the sale. Unless such authorization and such sale were stayed pending appeal. |
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OPINION/ORDER We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. Carried with this appeal was Padgett's motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction due to the Christos' lack of standing to assert any claims that became property of the estate. This argument is merely I. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: At issue in this case is whether a loan servicer may appear in Bankruptcy Court to protect a claim relating to the debt that it services. We conclude that a loan servicer is a |
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OPINION/ORDER That the challenges posed to its restructuring plan are |
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OPINION/ORDER |
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OPINION/ORDER The affidavit states that these claims may have resulted from |
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OPINION/ORDER Which was unilaterally amended by the trustee. The Chapter 13 plan (the |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. An involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed against the Popkin & Stern law firm. The case was converted to chapter 11 and a trustee. Was appointed. A chapter 11 plan was eventually confirmed that provided for the creation of a |
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97-3363 -- INNES V. KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY -- 08/24/1999 Sought to have their student loans discharged on the basis of undue hardship pursuant to 11 U.S.C. |
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OPINION/ORDER The order granting that relief was the subject of the parties' prior appeal and cross appeal. While those appeals were pending before this Court. Those appeals have been reinstated and consolidated with the City's present appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss the case. Asserting that it was entitled to possession of the leased property by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). Asserting that 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) governed the time for assumption or rejection of the marina lease because various items of personal property were included in the lease. We subsequently dismissed the appeals that were pending at that time as moot by order dated July 24. The debtor asserts that the bankruptcy court's dismissal should be affirmed and that the appeals concerning relief from stay are. Matters committed to the bankruptcy court's discretion will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. Or if the court bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. |
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CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The question before this Court is what administrative priority. Should be given to a Chapter 11 postpetition commercial lease that is subsequently breached after Chapter 7 conversion. We will continue to refer to the landlord as |
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OPINION/ORDER Which she asserts was caused by a malfunctioning store door. Notice of the Bar Date was sent to Simmons at her address as listed in the files of Kmart's third party claims administrator. The mailing was never returned to Kmart as |
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OPINION/ORDER Claims to have obtained the copyright in a bankruptcy sale. Is making and selling copies of a modified version of the program. The modified program is a derivative work. Which it does not have. From ITOFCA. 2 No. 02 1069 ITOFCA was in 1986 a cooperative corporation owned by Ford. Registration is no longer required for a valid copyright. Among the |
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OPINION/ORDER SNA was HD's exclusive supplier of nut products. The products that SNA sold to HD were manufactured according to unique recipes that were developed jointly by SNA and HD. The following five supply contracts are the subject of this litigation: Contract for: Diced Almonds Diced Walnuts Amount (Pounds) 630. Hank Rich notified HD in March 1994 that SNA was temporarily unable to process almonds and suggested that HD secure an alternate almond supplier. SNA expressed to HD that it was willing and able to resume fulfilling its obligations under the diced almonds contract. The district court concluded that an immediate appeal would not advance the litigation as trial was already set to begin shortly in the bankruptcy court. (3) showed that HD was partially excused from performance under the contract for diced almonds but was not otherwise excused. (4) demonstrated that HD was liable to SNA for damages in the amount of $921. The district court concluded that HD was excused from performance under the diced almonds contract for a longer period of time than the bankruptcy court concluded. |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm. The credit line was drawn down and the loan was in default. Were consolidated and administratively dismissed pending completion of the bankruptcy proceedings and related appeals. 144.54 and provided Fleet with a release and assignment of all claims that WebSci had asserted or could have asserted against it. The Trustee filed a supplemental certification clarifying which claims were included in the settlement and which were not. The hearing was continued on September 26. An Amended Disclosure Statement was filed on November 5. The order of confirmation was entered on May 18. Which was denied on March 31. The District Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Are not applicable because the settlement falls outside the scope of Rule 9019. That if they are applicable. The Bankruptcy Court summarized the settlement as follows: The Trustee in the terms of the settlement stated that he had entered into the agreement with the bank whereby the debtor's alleged setoffs and counterclaims that is WebSci. |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is the effect of a conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings on the priority status of a postpetition. They stated that they no longer operated their long term care facility and were now employed by others. To reflect additional interest and penalties which had accrued while the estate was still proceeding under Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court agreed and held that a tax claim filed during the pendency of a Chapter 13 petition must be prioritized as if the claim had arisen prepetition because § 1305(b) states that claims for taxes filed under § 1305(a) are allowed or disalUnless otherwise indicated. The bankruptcy court noted that filing a proof of claim under § 1305 is voluntary. Therefore the IRS could have avoided application of § 1305 by not filing a claim after the conversion. The district court found that § 348(d) is the only section that addresses the issue of administrative expenses in a conversion from one Chapter to another and that § 1305 did not apply. |
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OPINION/ORDER These liens were served on Wallace's and EKU. Which was determined to be $161. The proceeds from the sale (the |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court's order is AFFIRMED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue raised by this appeal is whether summary judgment was warranted on the Trustee's complaint to revoke or deny the Debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) and (a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court's final order granting the Trustee's motion for summary judgment states conclusions of law which are reviewed de novo. Sicherman ( |
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CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577) We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Inc. appeals a judgment that former United Healthcare employees are entitled to WARN Act back pay. Because we conclude United Healthcare was no longer an |
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OPINION/ORDER I. The facts below are from the bankruptcy court's December 21. Jackson would then explain that although he was preparing the documents. Walton is |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The debtors argue that the reopening was in error because the claim had in fact been scheduled and thus abandoned by the trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) when the case was closed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in reopening the bankruptcy case based upon its determination that the personal injury claim had not been previously scheduled. The bankruptcy court's order granting the trustee's motion to reopen the bankruptcy case to administer an asset is a final order. Because the determination that the trustee may administer the asset as property of the estate is conclusive on the merits. An order granting a request to reopen a case is reviewed for abuse of discretion. |
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OPINION/ORDER The petition and all subsequent filings were made without the benefit of an attorney. A meeting of creditors was scheduled for September 10. A notice of the commencement of the case and of the time and place of the meeting of creditors was sent to all creditors and to the debtor at the address listed on his petition. 766 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000). 2 There were various problems revolving around this application which are not germaine to this appeal. 3 4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341(a) and 343. 2 court issued an order to show cause which required the debtor to appear at a hearing and show cause why his case should not be dismissed. Alleging that the debtor was in prison and would be released on November 27. |
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OPINION/ORDER Found that judicial estoppel was proper because Parker failed to disclose the existence of her discrimination claims when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Because Parker's actions indicate that her omission in the bankruptcy court was inadvertent and because the equities balance in favor of allowing Reynolds to proceed. The case was set for trial. Parker's claims for monetary damages were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because she failed to disclose the existence of her discrimination suit to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy proceedings and that she would not have been entitled to a |
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OPINION/ORDER We reject Lamie's argument that § 330(a) included a |
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OPINION/ORDER Lorincz & Jacobi were on brief for appellee. Debtor's appeal from that decision asks us to do two things: reverse the district court's holding that federal credit unions are nonprofit organizations and hold that educational loans issued to him by creditor appellee TI Federal Credit Union are. We affirm the result achieved by the district court that debtor's loans are nondischargeable and elect not to reach the issue of federal credit unions' nonprofit status. From which DelBonis obtained no direct personal benefit and on which he is the sole obligor. Were acquired from the Texas Instrument Federal Credit Union. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellants. Cummings and Friedman & Atherton were on brief for appellee Peter Karger. Inc. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable. |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. The first issue is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that Mr. Gratton is not an insider of Rosen Auto or of Mr. Gratton is not an insider of the individual or corporate debtor and. The second issue is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that Rosen Auto received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for payment of a promissory note and. The third issue is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that Mr. Gratton is entitled to retain his lien on Mr. Gratton is not entitled to retain the lien on the condominium under Section 548(c). 2 BACKGROUND Rosen Auto was in the business of selling and leasing used cars. Rosen was a major shareholder and the chairman of the board of directors of Rosen Auto. The Corporate Note bore interest at the annual rate of 9.25% and was payable over eight years in monthly payments of principal and interest. The Corporate Note specified that interest was payable both monthly with principal and also on demand. |
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OPINION/ORDER P.C. was on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court determined that Fegeley's federal tax liabilities were dischargeable. Is insufficient to support the conclusion that he willfully attempted to evade or defeat his taxes for those years. The Government argues that the district court was correct in finding that the willful failure of Fegeley to file tax returns. We will affirm. |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court2 approving the employment of Douglas S. Are not disinterested persons. We have determined that leave to appeal the interlocutory order was improvidently granted and that the appeal should be dismissed. The law firms are Heller. The rental amounts are based on the volume of business. All of the debtor entities are owned or controlled by Perry Beaton and Carol Beaton.4 Although the four companies arguably are |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We are asked to imply a private right of action for a debtor discharged from bankruptcy to enforce an alleged violation of 214 11 U.S.C. § 524. The district court concluded that the remedy Congress intended for violations of the discharge injunction is contempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Hold that a private cause of action is not available under § 524. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Before and after her debt was discharged on January 2. To debtors who are current on their loan payments on secured property and who continue to make payments. That her debts were discharged giving rise to the discharge injunction pursuant to § 524(a)(2) and (c). Was prohibited by § 524 and was an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the FDCPA. Are before us on appeal. For violation of the FDCPA.1 1 A brief filed by amicus curiae American Financial Services Association supports the position taken by Wells Fargo. 216 II Although both parties agree that we have jurisdiction and a motions panel of this court ruled that we do pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. |
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00-6083 -- U.S. V. LOVE -- 06/20/2001 The parties are familiar with the facts. Love asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove the alleged offenses were committed or that Love conspired to commit the offenses. That counts 3 and 4 were barred by the statute of limitations. That the evidence was insufficient to support convictions on counts 5 |
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OPINION/ORDER We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL Whether the bankruptcy court's determination that cause existed for dismissing the Wellmans' chapter 13 case with prejudice was clear error. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 dated February 6. Was prior to the subordinated lien of the Appellant. GECC commenced an adversary proceeding against the Trustee seeking a declaration from the bankruptcy court that its lien was superior to the lien granted to Class 3 by the Plan. The parties filed a joint stipulation of material facts and informed the bankruptcy court that an evidentiary hearing was not needed. The bankruptcy court issued an order holding that the Trustee's lien was subordinated to GECC's lien by the terms of the Plan. We also review de novo the bankruptcy court's determination that the plan was unambiguous. If the plan was ambiguous. They added a sentence to section 9 403(2) that made it clear that a junior creditor who filed its financing statement before the lapse will move up in priority. All references to Article 9 are prior to revision. D. Minn. 1985) ( |
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OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 28. Were on brief. Were on brief. Was on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief. Will & Emery. (2) make findings regarding allegations of anticompetitive consequences of the merger that were unique to Holyoke. Northeast Utilities Service Company ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court avoiding the transfer of real and personal property to the appellant as a fraudulent transfer. Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6). An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The facts in this case were stipulated by the parties in the bankruptcy court and are not in dispute. 1988 income tax liabilities were discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523. Which they conceded was nondischargeable. |
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OPINION/ORDER The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED. ISSUES ON APPEAL Whether the bankruptcy court's determination that excepting the Debtor's student loans from discharge will impose an undue hardship on the Debtor. Was clearly erroneous. 2. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER I. The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant was appointed Chapter 7 Interim Trustee. At the time the petition was filed. The home was valued at $266. Was subject to a lien in the amount of $56. An interest as a tenant by the entirety. . .to the extent that such interest. . .is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law. |
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OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. * Honorable William C. The Chapter 11 proceedings were converted to Chapter 7 proceedings. Cole Schotz advised the Debtor that all payments for future services would have to be paid from non estate sources. It is only the December 8. 218.57 that is at issue here. . . . if such payment . . . was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition. Newman & Schwartz was paid an additional $125. These payments are not at issue here. The Debtor's contingent interest in this trust was disclosed in the schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court on July 18. The Debtor testified concerning the terms of this trust at a hearing twenty days later that was attended by counsel for the Creditors Committee. The complaint was amended to seek recovery of the fees paid to Newman & Schwartz and to Cole Schotz on May 26. The claims against all other defendants were settled without a determination of whether the trust was part of the Debtor's estate. Which set forth the facts recounted above and averred that they had no knowledge that the Cook Islands trust was the source of the funds used by Stefanie to pay the fees at issue. |
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OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. PNH objected to the settlement on the ground that the restrictive covenants were no longer property of the bankruptcy estate. The decision of the bankruptcy court is REVERSED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the trustee's settlement with PNH did not include the restrictive covenants from the Appellee's employment agreement with the debtor. An order is final if it |
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OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This appeal was filed by Wallace Resources. (Wallace) subsequent to the district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy court decision holding that the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS or United States) tax liens on the claim of Colstar Petroleum (Colstar) against ARC Energy Corporation (ARC) were superior to Wallace's judgment against Colstar (which arose from a default judgment). The company was required under a confirmed liquidation plan to pay $37. Wallace and the IRS are competing claimants and creditors of Colstar and both seek to enforce their claims by receiving Colstar's $37. The IRS included a letter stating that the notice of levy was not an accelerated demand for payment insofar as ARC was in bankruptcy. Notices of the liens were also filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Fairfax County. 797 is the amount claimed by both Wallace and the IRS. The United States filed a motion in bankruptcy court for summary judgment claiming that its tax liens were entitled to priority over competing creditors' claims to Colstar's funds. |
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OPINION/ORDER Was. Evidently is presently. Their motions were granted by the bankruptcy court. Limiting any recovery to insurance proceeds: (1) is void for lack of service on Travelers as a |
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OPINION/ORDER We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne ( |
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OPINION/ORDER These are two consolidated appeals. The first appeal is from two orders of the bankruptcy court. The second appeal is from the bankruptcy court's order of January 28. Which was adequately protected by an equity cushion in excess of $500. In its order the bankruptcy court found: MSB is a secured creditor who has not been paid its promised return from the proceeds of the farming operation. 000 of which was due and owing on March 15. The plan acknowledged that MSB's |
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OPINION/ORDER The Bankruptcy Court held that Banks' debt to Moore was non dischargeable because of Banks' defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity and embezzlement. Claiming that his right to due process of law was violated because the Bankruptcy Court allowed his counsel to withdraw. (4) Banks' purpose for conversion was improper and abusive. The Bankruptcy Court held that Banks' causes of action were barred under principles of res 3 judicata because they were compulsory counterclaims that Banks had failed to raise in the adversary action instituted by Moore. The Bankruptcy Court also held that dismissal was appropriate because Banks' causes of action arose pre petition. He argued only that the Bankruptcy Court should have granted his motion to convert because any money won in his adversary actions would have paid creditors of his estate. Neither of whom were parties in the Bankruptcy or District Courts. The latter of whom is named as a party on appeal. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1291. |
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97-8053A -- WYOMING DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION V. STRAIGHT -- 06/09/1998 Straight was certified by the State of Wyoming as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE). DBE Definition 1.A(b) states a |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge:
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER An obligation to pay for pre petition legal services is subject to automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727. We hold that the obligation to pay for pre petition services was subject to automatic stay and discharge. P.C. ( |
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OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order and judgment of the bankruptcy court. We affirm. 1 ISSUES The first issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred when it denied the Debtor's motion to remove the trustee for misconduct. The second issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred when it denied the Debtor's motion for an order requiring the abandonment of the property. The final issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in enjoining the Debtor from filing any further motions related to the trustee's administration of the bankruptcy estate and the property. The bankruptcy court ruled that the Debtor was not entitled to an exemption in the Laurel Property and converted the Debtor's case to Chapter 7. Which order was affirmed on appeal. Mary Jo Jensen Carter ( |
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N:\DOCS\E-DOS\5-12\05-1882 STALLINGS V. HUSSMAN.OPN REVISED 5.2.WPD Erred in concluding that Hussmann and Groninger were entitled to summary judgment on Stallings's FMLA claims. Were determined by a collective bargaining agreement between the United States Steelworkers' of America and Hussmann ( |
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OPINION/ORDER The sales are not reversible under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). We hold the appeal of that particular sale order is moot. One parcel was known as the |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge:
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OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court determined that Fegeley's federal tax liabilities were dischargeable. Is insufficient to support the conclusion that he willfully attempted to evade or defeat his taxes for those years. The Government argues that the district court was correct in finding that the willful failure of Fegeley to file tax returns. We will affirm. Fegeley is a 50 year old high school graduate who was employed as a salesman in the 1980s. He was paid both a salary and commission. Was also reimbursed for his expenses. At the time the taxes were due. Fegeley was communicated with by the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS in 1987. The Government determined that the returns were reasonably accurate and complete. Has not alleged that any of the returns are fraudulent. The remaining two counts were dismissed. Were thereafter granted a discharge in bankruptcy pursuant to § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. The matter was tried before the bankruptcy court. ] . . . was much too lavish[. The bankruptcy court entered judgment for the Fegeleys holding that the Government failed to prove that the Fegeleys attempted to evade or defeat their 1983 85 income taxes and that such taxes are not excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(C).1 The bankruptcy court held that Fegeley's knowing failure to file income tax returns. |
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OPINION/ORDER Which was granted by the bankruptcy court. Concluding that Reaves' claim of special exemptions was not precluded by her pre bankruptcy exemption filing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). The vehicle was placed in the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and a Sheriff's sale of the vehicle was noticed for November 11. Claims of exemption in the Los Angeles County Municipal Court under California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 704.010 and 704.060.1 A hearing on Reaves' claims was held on October 22. Her claims for exemption were denied. The Sheriff's sale of Reaves' vehicle was rescheduled for November 12. Reaves claimed an exemption for her vehicle under the special exemptions available for California debtors who have elected to file for bankruptcy relief. |
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OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Was preparing to receive $72. 000 (and was ultimately appraised for the bankruptcy court at $102. Was sold to Bailey for $40. The bankruptcy petition was prepared by Attorney Evans. Cutter signed his name under the statement: |
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OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: In this case we AFFIRM the district court's holding that a bankruptcy petition filed in violation of a court imposed 180day bar is properly excluded from the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code. This petition was subsequently dismissed because Umali failed to present a reorganization plan. After concluding that Umali was ineligible to file a Chapter 13 petition. Umali did not object to the order before it was signed. The motion for reconsideration was granted on November 15. The order dismissing the Second Petition was amended to remove the 180 day prohibition. I determined that the case should be dismissed because the debtor was not eligible to file a chapter 13 case . . . . I will. Less than thirty minutes before the foreclosure hearing was to begin. Which was still in effect. The district court held that filing of the Arizona bankruptcy petition was ineffective and |