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• BACKGROUND

Laurie Davis and Thomas Cox were married on August 17. They have two minor children. Davis was a homemaker and. Cox was a successful commercial attorney. The court was required by Maine law to issue. The preliminary injunction was meant to keep intact. Is equitably divided by the court between the divorcing pair irrespective of in whose name it was held.

I

Beatrice and Mario Rosato were divorced in Connecticut on July 11. Rosato was entitled to certain benefits. Or legal separation.

5 U.S.C. 8345(j)(1) (1994).

It is well settled that section 8345(j)(1) ". Authorizes [OPM] to comply with an appropriate court decree of divorce or property settlement of an employee who is entitled to payments pursuant to the Civil Service Retirement System.". OPM has promulgated regulations that define when an order of divorce or property settlement is a ". The court order must identify the retirement system under which the annuity exists and expressly state the portion to which the former spouse is entitled under the court order. OPM will not supply missing provisions. The statute and rules are clear: OPM will not look behind a state court divorce decree or property settlement order to ascertain the intent of the parties. OPM will follow its prescriptions. An order lacking the requisite specificity will be rejected by OPM.

The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). Was forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 because it was acquired with proceeds of criminal activity.

The ultimate question in this case is whether a state divorce court can defease the United States of its interest in property forfeited under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). Was forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 because it was acquired with proceeds of criminal activity.

  With her on the brief were Robert D. Assistant Director.  Of counsel was James C. Hairston is entitled to receive the former spouse survivor annuity. Text indent:0in'>I.  BACKGROUND

Petitioner Bertha L. Because the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is legally correct. Petitioner claimed she was the widow of decedent. A hearing officer determined that petitioner was not the legal widow of decedent. His conclusion rested on two findings: (1) petitioner's marriage to decedent was void because decedent was already married to Donna Matlock (formerly Waldon) at the time. Petitioner's subsequent marriages and that of decedent were presumed valid. This petition for review followed.

Petitioner and decedent were both married on numerous occasions. Some of these marriages were valid. Others were not. Donna Waldon was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce from Robert Waldon in California. Donna Waldon and Robert Waldon were granted a final judgment of divorce in California.

August 27. Petitioner and decedent were granted a decree of divorce in Tulsa County. The divorce decree between petitioner and decedent was set aside in Tulsa County.

Petitioner and Respondent Lops were married in Germany in June 1991. Petitioner initiated divorce and custody proceedings in the German family court for the district that was the marital and habitual residence of the parties. Judge Giwitz's letter further states that Respondent Lops dispelled these concerns by arguing that he was firmly rooted in Germany and had no further connection with the United States.

Petitioner and Respondent Lops were married in Germany in June 1991. Petitioner initiated divorce and custody proceedings in the German family court for the district that was the marital and habitual residence of the parties. Judge Giwitz's letter further states that Respondent Lops dispelled these concerns by arguing that he was firmly rooted in Germany and had no further connection with the United States.

Thomas Berry appeals from a Tax Court judgment upholding the Commissioner's notice of deficiency for federal income taxes due on his 1996 return. He concludes therefore that it is tax deductible under section 215(a) of the Code. His payment is tax deductible. Berry died anytime after the parties' final divorce decree was entered. The narrow question before us is whether. He would have been liable had she died before the final decree was entered.

Oklahoma law creates and defines the liability arising from the state court order directing Mr. Once the breadth of that liability is established. Our task is the same as the Tax Court's. Such a prediction is necessary because no Oklahoma statute or court decision precisely addresses the issue.

We agree with the Tax Court's conclusion that Kelly v. Is an apt analogue. Berry liable for his wife's attorney's fees even if she had died before their final divorce decree was entered. Kelly held that a couple's voluntary dismissal of their divorce action did not prevent the court from enforcing its earlier ruling requiring the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees. Id. at 119.

Norton now seeks our review of the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over the case and the grant of summary judgment on the promissory estoppel and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Hoyt led Norton to believe that he was divorced. Norton discovered that Hoyt was actually married. Hoyt told Norton he was getting a divorce. Norton was employed as an elementary school teacher in the Bristol. She asserts that she would not have remained in the relationship with Hoyt if it were not for his frequent promises to divorce his wife. No child was born of the relationship because Norton suffered a spontaneous miscarriage.

In March 1998. Norton was distraught by this turn of events and sought counseling and medical attention to deal with the depression and anxiety she was experiencing. Norton reported that she was not able to resume work and that she possibly would not ever be able to commit to another relationship.

We have jurisdiction to review the tax court's decision under I.R.C.

Appellant Michael R. Read argues that the bankruptcy court should not have given full faith and credit to the default judgment entered against him in the state divorce proceeding because the notice by publication Dunn used for service was insufficient to vest the state court with personal jurisdiction over him. We have jurisdiction under 28 . Read and Dunn were married in 1987. Was born during the marriage. Arguing that he was never properly served in the divorce action and that the state court had no jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against him. The state court held in May 1997 that Read was properly served under state law and the divorce decree was valid. That Read had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the alleged jurisdictional defects in the state courts and was collaterally estopped from raising the same issues again in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 113 16. The bankruptcy court further concluded that Oklahoma laws providing for notice by publication are constitutional. See id. at 116 17.

A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue is subject to de novo review. United States v. Cl. 3 states that

The creditors and trustee objected to the claim of exemption for this property because the acreage exceeded the allowable amount under Florida law.

The creditors and trustee objected to the claim of exemption for this property because the acreage exceeded the allowable amount under Florida law.