Your search has returned a large number of results. You might want to
consider using additional terms to narrow it.
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Venue is proper pursuant to 26 U.S.C. We will reverse the Tax Court's decision. Leaving a will which provided that its
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Williams (the Commissioner) is the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Delaware. Asserting they were vicariously liable for the established criminal behavior of co defendant Sholam Weiss.2 The Global Defendants opposed the motion. This appeal followed.3 Weiss was convicted of racketeering and other charges in connection with this scheme. Was sentenced to a total of 845 years in prison. Factual Background NHL is a Delaware company with its principal place of business in Orlando. Which was responsible for regulating NHL. Informed NHL's chief financial officer he was negotiating the acquisition of up to $200 million in reinsurance for the company's annuity portfolio. Neither the company nor the escrow funds were used to fund a reinsurance transaction. They were used at least in part to purchase non performing mortgages. The Global Defendants were involved in purchasing these non performing mortgages. (Global Equities II) was formed by Messrs. Global Equities was dissolved for failure to pay taxes on June 26.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
With him on the brief were Everett C. With him on the brief were Peter D. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Federal Claims in a takings case. The United States and the plaintiffs have both appealed from that judgment. recalculation of damages. I A The plaintiffs are four owners of rental property in Los Angeles. When a large number of the mortgages were nearing the 20year mark. Was a temporary measure. When we were presented with the question whether ELIHPA and LIHPRHA had caused the plaintiffs to suffer a compensable temporary regulatory taking under the test established by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Would have applied to their property and limited the rent that they could have charged tenants after leaving the federal program. Holding that it was barred by this court's mandate and by the doctrine of law of the case from entertaining that contention. The court held that LARSO would not have reduced the amount of the award because it was expressly preempted by the preemption provision of LIHPRHA.
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: Page 50. Delete the sentence that starts with
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
McLaughlin was on brief for appellees. Lionel Bolduc was the sole applicant for the loans. BankEast's commitment letter was addressed only to him. The couple was not represented by counsel at the closing. They were told by the bank that requiring her signature was standard procedure. Although the Bolducs were apparently business partners and had extensive real estate interests. BankEast's insistence that Maureen Bolduc co sign the notes may have violated ECOA's bar on discrimination based on marital status. The Bolducs were unable to meet the repayment schedule on the 1987 loans. The FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC did not foreclose on the second mortgages secured by the Hudson home and the Merrimack land even though the proceeds from the original collateral were not enough to satisfy the balance due on the 1987 notes. The court found that an injunction was consistent with the equities and the public interest. That their suit is barred by the ECOA statute of limitations. That it is barred by the D'Oench.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Held that it had diversity of citizenship jurisdiction because the sole beneficiary of Emerald Trust was Emerald Investors Ltd. (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
(the
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Wistow & Barylick Incorporated were on brief for plaintiff. Allen & Snyder were on brief for defendant. Title Insurance Company (
|
 |
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Because we also conclude that none of the defenses asserted in the foreclosure action are covered by either of the two policies. Would furnish a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="662"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may95/93-4436.opa.html">LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Because we also conclude that none of the defenses asserted in the foreclosure action are covered by either of the two policies. Would furnish a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="640"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/08/98-6410.htm">98-6410 -- PALO DURO PRODUCTION CO. V. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. -- 08/26/1999<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Palo Duro Production Company brought this action alleging that the FDIC breached a contract by which the FDIC sold certain notes and their collateral to Palo Duro. Rambler owed approximately $4.2 million plus interest and was in default. One part ($1.3 million) was paid off. The second part ($1.4 million) was released in exchange for the absolute conveyance to the bank of 80% of Rambler's interests in the wells. These interests are referred to as the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="629"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-5050.html">CIENEGA GARDENS V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Everett C. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>David M. Director.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief were <u>Carole W. Rental rates were held below market rates.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>On exiting the programs. The trial court granted summary judgment solely on the basis of that decision.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This appeal is. We conclude a property right vested in the Owners that was temporarily taken.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>We also conclude that there is no reason this taking is not. Compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>We further hold with respect to at least the subset of Owners for whom there is a well developed record before us. That they are entitled to ". Mso bidi language:AR SA'>[3]</span></span><![endif]></span></span></a><span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This appeal is one in a series of proceedings.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="616"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/10/97-5186.htm">97-5186 -- BANCOKLAHOMA MORTGAGE CORP. V. CAPITAL TITLE CO. INC. -- 10/18/1999<BR></A><BR>
District Judge. <p> <center> </center> <p> <strong><center>Background</center> </strong> <p> Bancoklahoma Mortgage Corp. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="616"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5104.html">CIENEGA GARDENS V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="616"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-5126.html">CIENEGA GARDENS V. US<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="603"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1222.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Coffin & Rudman was on briefs for appellant. Was on brief for the United States. William Camuti was tried on 13 counts of mail fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors by obtaining their funds through false representations. 18 U.S.C. 1341. Camuti was sentenced on February 28. The first such pool was to be backed by a mortgage on the Loan Depot office building in Randolph. Camuti was represented to be a co manager of the pools. He signed a mortgage pool
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="603"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU1MTktY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5519-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Inc. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="603"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0153p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These are three consolidated appeals from judgments of the district court allowing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid mortgages held by the defendants. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Our review is de novo. I. We must decide whether the trustee was entitled to avoid the three mortgages under Ohio law. A bankruptcy trustee
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="603"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1758.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Snow & Hahn was on brief for appellant/cross appellee Focus Investment Associates. Sheehan and Wistow & Barylick Inc. were on brief for appellee/cross appellant American Title Insurance Company. Kelly & Murphy were on brief for appellees Tobak and Abrams & Verri. Bruzzi was on brief for appellee Owen B. 000 damage award on Focus's contract claim may have resulted from erroneous instructions and should therefore be vacated. Both motions are now known as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="588"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/April2004/031140p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is the right to foreclose on a Virgin Islands mortgage extinguished at the time the right to collect an in personam judgment expires? We conclude that it is not. Is an action brought by a successor in interest of the United States (as UMLIC was) governed by federal limitations periods or state/territorial (here. We hold that federal law supplies the statute of limitations in cases where the plaintiff is a 2 (Filed April 5. Is there a federal limitations period applicable to mortgage foreclosure actions? We conclude that there is not. The Loan The defendants in this case are the fee owners. Only the fee owners are participating in this appeal. They are Aretha Matthias and the heirs of Wesley Matthias (Michael A. Some chronology of the events is important. A loan was made on April 12. The principal amount of the loan was $550. Of which 85% was guaranteed by the SBA. The loan was secured by the personal guarantees of Aretha and Wesley Some appellants also claimed that the District Court erred in certain respects in computing the sum owing on the mortgages.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="588"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0221a-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These are three consolidated appeals from judgments of the district court allowing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid mortgages held by the defendants. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Our review is de novo. We must decide whether the trustee was entitled to avoid the three mortgages under Ohio law. A bankruptcy trustee
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2002/01-16353.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
As AGF's lien was secured by an interest in Debtors' primary residence. Are excepted from the general rule permitting modification of secured claims pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2002/01-16353.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
As AGF's lien was secured by an interest in Debtors' primary residence. Are excepted from the general rule permitting modification of secured claims pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1995/95a1188p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This breach of contract and fraud action is brought by real estate owners against the Resolution Trust Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5034r.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Everett C. With him on the brief were Peter D. This case involves a takings claim by low income housing providers who were barred by statute from prepaying their mortgages and leaving the federal low income housing program. That is not the way things happened. Declining to enter the use agreements at that time would not have left them free to prepay their mortgages and leave the low income housing program. As the plaintiffs have argued. 5035 continued to litigate their takings claims and the HOPE Act had never been enacted the government would likely have been able to argue that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the full measure of their damages in the takings case because they had failed to mitigate their damages by accepting the benefits of the use agreements. The state repeals the legislation requiring that the property be converted into a park and argues that there was no compensable permanent taking. Only a short interlude (or temporary taking) in which commercial use was not permitted.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTA2MzEtYmtfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-0631-bk_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the district court's jurisdiction. Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the court's jurisdiction. Millennium Seacarriers was formed to hold the capital stock of various vesselowning subsidiaries (collectively
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1848.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Inc. were on brief for American Title Insurance Company. Snyder & Comen were on brief for Bay Loan & Investment Bank. Ltd. were on brief for East West Financial Corporation. 2 3 BOWNES. Plaintiff American Title Insurance Company (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052032p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU0ODgtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5488-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the district court erred by concluding (1) that a warranty that individual loans were eighty percent secured by real property had
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-5145a.html">USA V. SPICER JOHN R.<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU0ODgtY3YgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/04-5488-cv%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the district court erred by concluding (1) that a warranty that individual loans were eighty percent secured by real property had
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971315.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 17 Amicus' name in the counsel listing is corrected to read
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/08/041038P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Olusoji Michael Agboola (Agboola) was indicted on forty three counts involving a real estate
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="540"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1447.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Winsor LLP</U> were on brief pro se.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="520"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042111p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Croix in the Virgin Islands secures a note made after the mortgage was satisfied. While this appeal's factual and procedural background is quite intricate. Its central legal issue is straightforward: Did the district court properly classify the mortgage as a future advance mortgage? We hold that the record cannot support the district court's legal classification and therefore we will reverse. Sought a declaration that a deed in which it was the grantor of certain real property in St. Croix was void ab initio and also sought an order directing the recorder of deeds to strike the deed from the public records. Asserting his claim against the property. 3 Wrobel was interested in Consolidated Realty because his mortgage was derived from the title that Consolidated sought to invalidate in that case. The real property at the center of this appeal is a luxury residence in St. For clarity we will refer to the Barclays Investments action as the Consolidated Realty action. The above referenced cases are consolidated and henceforth the caption shall be as above. 3.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="520"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/07/022445P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we hold that the state statutes are preempted. Facts & Background Forest Park owns an apartment building that was financed with a federally subsidized mortgage and has operated it for 25 years providing low income housing. Forest Park then commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the two Minnesota statutes are preempted by federal law. Hundreds of thousands of housing units were built under these programs in the 1960s and early 1970s. Was enacted for the purpose of preserving the nation's supply of low income housing. LIHPRHA contains an express preemption provision that prohibits state laws that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/002771.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Discovered after oral argument that he was disqualified. Particularly the strength of the rule that such exemptions are construed narrowly against the party seeking them. Inc. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan96/94-4093.man.html">DIETRICH V. KEY BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Dietrich v. 46 U.S.C.A.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan96/94-4093.man.html">DIETRICH V. KEY BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Dietrich v. 46 U.S.C.A.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981534.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding that Meyer's pre payment of mortgages on real property owned by himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety with funds he was bequeathed under the will of his father was an avoidable voluntary conveyance under Virginia Code § 55 81. We emphasize at the outset that the only question before us is whether or not the prepayment of the previously existing secured mortgage obligation is a voluntary conveyance which may be set aside under Virginia Code § 55 81. Transfer or charge which is not upon consideration deemed valuable in law. Or which is upon consideration of marriage. Or by a transferor who is thereby rendered insolvent. Shall be void as to creditors whose debts shall have been contracted at the time it was made. Be void as to creditors whose debts shall have been contracted or as to purchasers who shall have purchased after it was made. The trustee must demonstrate that (1) a transfer was made. (2) the transfer was not supported by consideration deemed valuable in law.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1241.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Page 13. Were on brief for appellant Samuel J. Was on brief for appellee. * Of the Second Circuit. Concemi was sentenced to 36 months of incarceration to be followed by two years of supervised release and ordered to pay restitution and a fine. Ribeck was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration to be followed by two years of supervised release and ordered to pay restitution and a fine. It was alleged that Concemi. Hajjar was a loan originator for ComFed. ComFed Mortgage Corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary of ComFed Savings Bank. 2 The
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2161.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Daley & White were on brief. Grasso and Mortensen were on brief. We hold that the FDIC has no such shield and is liable. The units in the Hotel were marketed and sold by the University Bank and Trust Company and the other defendants as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2392.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. Home Owners determined that the original property appraisals that accompanied some of the purchased mortgages were artificially inflated. The title insurance policies accompanying some of the loans included exceptions that Home Owners believed were inconsistent with representations made by Key in § 2.5(o) of the contract. The key representation was that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/09/006055P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the Chapter 7 Trustee's complaint to avoid preferential transfers to the Defendant is time barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) where the adversary proceeding was initiated more than two years after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Which was filed under Chapter 13 and later converted to Chapter 7. Or whether the statute of limitations was equitably tolled during the pendency of the Debtors' Chapter 13 case. We conclude that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled during the pendency of the Debtors' Chapter 13 case and the adversary proceeding is time barred by 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). The Debtors inserted the following language:
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1479.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dickson and Law Offices of George Dickson were on brief for appellants. Bass & Green were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge impression presented in this case is whether section 501(a)(1) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Is preempted by section 501(a)(1). Is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dime Savings Bank of New York. Was assigned to Dime Savings the day it was made. The interest rate was fixed at 7.75% for the first six months. The interest rate was capped. Including that (1) the SIS is preempted by 804(c) of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982. Is pre empted by section 501(a)(1).3 B. 'the question of whether federal law pre empts a state statute is one of congressional intent.'
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/991381.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The full outstanding balance of the mortgage is governed by the antimodification clause. Whether the antimodification clause applies to a second or junior mortgage if that mortgage is wholly unsecured by any remaining value in the residence.1 1. The second mortgage is now deemed wholly unsecured in 2 In interpreting Nobelman the Bankruptcy and District Courts both concluded that the second mortgage on the McDonalds' residence is subject to the antimodification clause. Even if the value of their home is less than the outstanding balance of the first mortgage. We will reverse. In the Bankruptcy Court the parties purportedly entered into a stipulation of facts specifying that the outstanding balance of the first mortgage is greater than the value of the McDonalds' home. Asserted that their
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/April1995/95a1029p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The question presented is whether mortgages held by the FDIC can be extinguished without the FDIC's consent through foreclosure of plaintiff's superior real estate tax liens. The loans were made respectively in March 1987 for $200. The Bank's assets were taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1976.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On page 10. Cullen & Resnick were on brief for 604 Columbus Avenue. Gottlieb were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. *Of the Third Circuit. This is a case involving a failed loan transaction that well illustrates Polonius' advice. Among which were the property owned by the Trust itself and properties of the Trust's principal beneficiary. Of which Millicent Young was sole beneficiary. The Young Family Trust was a named plaintiff in the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy and district courts below. The Bank was declared unsound by Massachusetts banking officials. The FDIC was appointed 7 receiver. In February 1991 was substituted as defendant appellant in the district court. That the FDIC was entitled to raise the defenses available to it under the doctrine of estoppel established in D'Oench. The district court vacated that part of the bankruptcy court's judgment that was premised on the secret agreement by one of the Trust's principals to provide kickbacks to a Bank officer.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1998/98a1980x.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which are amply supported by the record. ACM invested $175 million of its cash in private placement Citicorp notes paying just three basis points more than the cash was earning on deposit. Which is evident from the Tax Court's well supported factual findings. Is essential to assessing whether the transaction's tax consequences may be disregarded and lends significant support to the court's ultimate finding that ACM's transactions did not have sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. The consideration consisted of $140 million in cash and LIBOR notes whose present value was $34. Reduced by the transaction costs established by Merrill Lynch. 38 acquire an amount of LIBOR notes that was identical. To the amount of such notes that ACM could have acquired by investing its $35 million in cash directly into such assets. Just as the Gregory Court found that the intervening creation and dissolution of a corporation and transfer of stock thereto and therefrom was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/98opinions/98-5111.html">GREENBRIAR V. US<BR></A><BR>
On the brief was <U>R. With him on the brief was <U>David . Because the trial court correctly determined that the United States was not in privity of contract with the Owners and therefore could not be held liable for breach of such contracts. Correctly determined that the Owners takings claim is not ripe for review. The petition for class certification is moot.</P> <P ALIGN=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="477"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2184.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.A. was on brief for appellants. Hoag & Eliot was on brief for appellees Michael Hanna and Soundings Seaside Resort Realty Trust. 1 BREYER. The four appellants are plaintiffs in a lawsuit against a developer who had sold them. The plaintiffs told the district court they were providing the defendant with some financial security. Was to distribute the remaining rents to the condominium owners. 5. They argued that an attachment was not necessary to protect Hanna (in that event). For they had established a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2004/031303np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). I. Thies was convicted for his role in connection with a fraudulent mortgage transaction for two New Jersey properties. Also involved in the conspiracy were Lew Markus. A former title insurance agent whose license was revoked after he misappropriated trust fund assets. Markus was in dire need of cash but he was unable to sell the New Jersey properties because of Midlantic's foreclosures. Levie Mortgage was not aware that Midlantic had foreclosed on the properties' real mortgages. The value of the properties was mere fiction created to secure the cash Markus needed. Markus and Hildebrandt were indicted. Thies pled not guilty and was convicted by a jury. Thies contended that he was unaware that the New Jersey mortgages were fraudulent and that he signed the mortgage documents without reading them. The Government concedes that there is no evidence that Thies participated in this transaction.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1631.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellee. Contending that Appellee Internal Revenue Service (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/03/984155P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That it should have set aside the jury's damage award. The right to collect principal and interest on individual mortgage loans that have been collected or pooled together into packages. These packages are sold in the secondary mortgage market to servicing entities. The information contained in the circulars is supplied by the seller. The Government National Mortgage Association (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0285p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Sterling Bank & Trust (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3132_022.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The defendants in this class action have been permitted to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district judge's refusal to dismiss. Upon which the district court's jurisdiction was premised. These are claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The complaint is a hideous sprawling mess. We have found it difficult and in many instances impossible to ascertain the nature of the charges. It would have been better had the defendants deferred their motion. Until either the defendants served contention interrogatories designed to smoke out what exactly the plaintiffs are charging. The judge told the plaintiffs to specify the acts of the defendants that they are complaining about so that he could decide how much of the complaint was preempted. The principal defendant and the only one we need discuss (the other defendant is a law firm charged with having assisted Ocwen in the misconduct of which the plaintiffs complain). Was at the times relevant to this case a federal savings and loan association engaged in servicing home mortgages originated by other lenders.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTAzNjktYmtfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-0369-bk_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
B.J.) and finding that a confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is res judicata preventing a debtor from avoiding a mortgage on his property where the mortgage lien. Was identified in the Chapter 13 plan. We address the question of whether the order dealing with a debtor's mortgage obligations in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy confirmation order is res judicata with respect to a subsequent challenge by the trustee to the validity of the mortgage. We conclude that it is. The district court concluded that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy confirmation order was res judicata with respect to the validity of certain mortgage liens listed by the debtor in his Chapter 13 plan and therefore precludes the debtor's and the Trustee's subsequent attempt to avoid these liens on his property. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are drawn from the parties' stipulations and bankruptcy court filings. The first and third mortgages were satisfied and discharged. Only the second (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=88-2235.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Harry Anduze Montano with whom Pia Gallegos was on brief for appellant Jose Tormos Vega. Was on brief for appellee United States. That
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0083p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Union Planters soon discovered that Greatstone was at the center of an elaborate bank fraud. Union Planters was left with worthless collateral (i.e. the forged promissory notes. 269 in advances and was left emptyhanded for an additional $3. Two types of losses are relevant here: losses due to
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3E2FF1B72DB9A9E388256C33005B9183/$file/0035474.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appearing at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) is amended as follows: (1) Slip Opinion 5330 31: Replace paragraph beginning
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1998/98a1953p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They claim that they were deceived by a fraudulent marketing scheme which induced them to purchase residential lots and homes at inflated prices. This case and its related proceedings have a long and convoluted history. The present appeal is the third time this Court has considered this case. They also sought to represent a putative class consisting of all persons who purchased houses or homesites from GDC or GDV over the period from 1957 to 1990 and who are members of the North Port Out of State Lot Owners Association (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="450"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1971992101DD308D88256BC0007CE2BC/$file/0110438.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the briefs. Were indicted. Subsequently convicted after a bench trial.1 Weaver was a licensed real estate agent. Buschman was a licensed broker. Weaver and Buschman contacted homeowners in the Sacramento area who were in or near default on their mortgages. Claimed to have the ability to delay or to prevent foreclosure. Concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 7562 ority over the security interest in his home and prevent the secured party from foreclosing.2 Each homeowner was told that. The payments to the trusts were distributed among the defendants according to various fee splitting agreements. They were neither used to make payments on the homeowners' mortgages. None of the defendants is an attorney). In violation of 12 U.S.C. 2 Each of the documents purporting to claim a common law lien stated: Common Law Liens are superior to and supersede mortgages and equity liens. Otherwise they shall have been deemed to have waived any and all rights to such challenge.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2000/99-11895.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
In which the Supreme Court held that the rights of an undersecured homestead lender are protected from modification in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. 000.00 which was financed entirely by a mortgage from Inland Mortgage Co. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-1553.html">UNITED STATES V. KOEHN<BR></A><BR>
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court was warranted in applying the abuse of a position of trust enhancement. Appellant was the president of Executive Mortgage. These funds were intended to be held in escrow and disbursed to pay off existing mortgages. When the existing mortgages were satisfied. New notes and related papers were forwarded to the buyer. The purpose of wiring the funds was to pay off the existing mortgages on the thirteen loans U.S. Sokol that the loans were not due until later that month but that they would be sent in the near future. Mortgage was driven out of business. After Appellant's fraud was discovered. He was charged with and pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1343. It is clear that the predicate wire fraud act occurred when
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19954648.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude that materiality is an element of this crime. That failing to submit this element to the jury was harmless error. We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding Accordingly we a government investigation was not plain error. affirm. BACKGROUND De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was convicted of conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts. De Castro was a mortgage De broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans. Several putative
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1920.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Kellett was a closing attorney for a federally insured bank. He was indicted for making false statements to ComFed in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014 and for obstructing justice. A superceding indictment was returned. He was sentenced. Is now serving a term of supervised release. Kellett's trial allegedly would likely have ended in acquittal and he would not have pled guilty. We affirm.2 Because Kellett was never tried after his reindictment. Because this appeal is so clearly meritless and rendering a decision on the merits would not alter the result reached below. Is whether the withheld information was material to Kellett's defense. The test of materiality in evaluating a challenge to a guilty plea based on the withholding of exculpatory evidence is whether there is a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/33DAA86C85AF72D08825723E005EE5E6/$file/0455396.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: First Alliance Mortgage Company was driven into bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation by well publicized and justified allegations of fraudulent lending practices. One is a class action on behalf of First Alliance's borrowers seeking to impose liability for aiding and abetting the fraudulent scheme engaged in by First Alliance. (This group of unsecured creditors is essentially the same as the group of borrowers asserting their claims of fraud against First Alliance. As is explained in more detail below. These two separate actions were handled together by the same district court and have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. First Alliance Mortgage Company First Alliance was a lender in the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001036.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Section 1 the status is changed from
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb97/95-4648.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. DE CASTRO<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. We conclude that materiality is an element of this crime. That failing to submit this element to the jury was harmless error. We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding a government investigation was not plain error. Accordingly we affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was convicted of conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts.<p> The government's proof showed that De Castro and others submitted applications for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). De Castro was a mortgage broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans. The
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200415891.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
PER CURIAM: The question this appeal presents is whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the contemporaneous execution of a warranty deed to a tract of land and a contract giving the grantee an option to purchase the land within a time certain created a mortgage in which the grantee became the mortgagor and the grantor the mortgagee. The loan was made by AgSouth Farm Credit. 000 or more.2 The party receiving the buyout offer would have the option to purchase the offeror's interest for the price indicated in the buy out offer.3 On October 6. 000.4 As Cox was considering the offer. The property was being appraised at $2. The offeror had 90 days to close the transaction. 4 3 Banks was treating the property as a whole as worth $1.75 million. The record is silent as to why Banks did not consider Cox's November 16 exercise of the option a nullity. All we know is that he treated Cox's exercise as timely. 6 5 These figures are approximations. The exact amounts are not material for our purposes. 3 buy out.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/01-5011.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Of counsel was Charles L. With him on the brief were Peter D. The trial court determined that these claims are not ripe for suit because the parties have not obtained a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3363410FEA69347288256D9B005A91AA/$file/0256034.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was Los Angeles's Rent Stabilization Ordinance (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-2586_036.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a criminal forfeiture proceeding. Wells Fargo and Aurora claim that the property is not subject to forfeiture and that they did not have notice of the government's interest. Was the record title holder of the property. The lis pendens was recorded in the book of levies but did not name Bette Grossman. Jeffrey Grossman admitted that the property was subject to forfeiture and agreed to entry of a forfeiture judgment in the amount of $4. Nos. 06 2586 & 06 2587 3 Wells Fargo and Aurora filed petitions seeking a declaration that their mortgages from Bette Grossman were superior to any interest the government could take in its forfeiture action. This procedure is treated like a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate only where
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb97/95-4648.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. DE CASTRO<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. We conclude that materiality is an element of this crime. That failing to submit this element to the jury was harmless error. We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding a government investigation was not plain error. Accordingly we affirm.<p> BACKGROUND<p> <p> De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was convicted of conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts.<p> The government's proof showed that De Castro and others submitted applications for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). De Castro was a mortgage broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans. The
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2000/99-11895.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
In which the Supreme Court held that the rights of an undersecured homestead lender are protected from modification in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. 000.00 which was financed entirely by a mortgage from Inland Mortgage Co. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/96opinions/96-7082a.html">BASTIN THOMAS E. V. FED NATL MTGE ASSN<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0105n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellant Julie Jestice (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="422"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/06/076001P.pdf">C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\VELDE V. STENERSON-REVISED DRAFT OPINION.WPD<BR></A><BR>
I. We are able to glean the following factual allegations underlying Trustee's motion to compromise from our review of the record on appeal. Y Knot Construction (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0141p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the creditor because the security interest in the debtors' affixed mobile home was perfected properly under an amendment to the MHCA. Because the amendment clarified existing law and was not a new law. Especially when the security interests extended to the real property to which the mobile homes were affixed. Kroskie was a bankruptcy adversary proceeding in which a Chapter 7 trustee avoided a security interest in a mobile home by challenging the security interest as unperfected under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit held that the Kroskie security interest was avoidable. Security interests recorded as traditional mortgage liens were unperfected and were therefore subordinated in bankruptcy cases to other claims against the estate. Potential lenders could not detect existing security interests in affixed mobile homes by title searches because the security interests were no longer recorded as traditional mortgages. The Michigan legislature also included a statement of intent in the Enacting Section of the amendment: It is the intent of this legislature that a security interest or lien on a mobile home affixed to real property may be perfected in the manner provided under law for No. 05 1075 In re Oswalt.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/10/066048P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from a decision of the bankruptcy court1 which determined that a real estate transaction entered into between the debtors and Blue Heron. Was not a fraudulent conveyance under Minnesota law because the debtors were not insolvent at the time of the transaction and were not made insolvent as a result of the transaction. Those arguments were abandoned on appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW The bankruptcy court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. A bankruptcy court's finding regarding solvency is reviewed for clear error. They are referenced here as: The Honorable Dennis D. 800 Three of the four properties were real estate investments. The Hominy Path property was the Phongs' newly acquired homestead. The work was completed in the spring of 2003 and the amount was due in June. In the months shortly before the mechanic's lien was due. He was introduced to the defendant Mark Erjavec. Who was the owner of Blue Heron. Which was in the business of purchasing mortgages in foreclosure.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-3474.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
800.00 was executed between BNC and the McCarthys. Option One was designated as servicer of the loan. Just over one year after the loan was executed. 376.39 was assessed. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties to this action are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75. Alternative mortgages are mortgages in which the interest rate or finance charge may be adjusted or renegotiated. Fixed term transactions are involved. 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1).1 Although federally chartered lenders were previously permitted to issue alternative mortgages. The Parity Act's purpose is to
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/04/052603P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Alan and Nancy Bistrup were indicted on federal charges growing out of a fraudulent investment scheme and the related purchase of a townhouse. They went to trial before a jury and were convicted of mail fraud. Alan was also convicted of wire fraud. Alan raises sentencing issues while Nancy argues that the evidence was insufficient as to her and that she is entitled to a new trial because of trial rulings by the district court. Nancy was employed as a teller at U.S. It was substantially less than the amount invested. He was able to call a Canadian phone number for a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/03/042185P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we conclude upon de novo review that the plaintiffs have standing. Were registered members of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. Included among these lands were Allotments 3016 (a.k.a. It is undisputed that. It is also undisputed that the mortgages gave the FSA the right. Ernest was to receive Allotment 1366 consisting of five acres. Harry was to receive Mollie's interest in Allotment 176A consisting of 133.42 acres. Virginia was to receive Allotments 371 and 1357 collectively consisting of 80 acres. Were to receive the rest and residue of Virginia's estate. His estate was probated in 1997. It was determined that Ernest was Harry's sole heir. Land that Harry did receive or should have received from Mollie's estate passed or should have passed to Ernest. Probate proceedings regarding Ernest's estate were not commenced until 2003. Although the parties agree that probate is still open on Ernest's estate. The plaintiffs allege that Ernest's heirs are Virgil.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/08/006005P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Holding that the property so transferred is property of the bankruptcy estate.2 For the following reasons. 865.00 was to secure payment for future services to be incurred in relation to an anticipated bankruptcy filing. Kaler (the Trustee) was appointed as the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of North Dakota. 2 2 conceded that the transfers were preferential. Or encumber their homestead allowance is a fundamental right granted to the Debtors by state law. Thus it was no longer property of the bankruptcy estate. The Transferees argue that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit (the BAP) is not constrained by the Eighth Circuit's summary affirmance of In re Wegner. We will deal with the first two arguments simultaneously. There is no factual dispute. Such estate is comprised of all the following property. All of the Debtors' property became property of the bankruptcy estate on the date the case was filed. Which was less than $10. Have the right to exempt certain property from the estate based on either the Code or applicable state law. 7 Residents of North Dakota.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/07/041495P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The loans were based on falsified applications that overstated the value of the homes. Was based on the district court's assessment of the loss from the fraud. Carter was in the loan brokerage business in Little Rock. Carter and Kerrie Joiner falsified documentation on eleven loans to obtain greater loans than the lender would have otherwise lent on the homes being financed. Who was the escrow agent for Beach Abstract. Some of the proceeds were used to make the down payment and pay closing costs. Carter and Joiner were indicted together. Carter testified that the loans in question were subprime loans because the borrowers had low credit rating scores. They were generally not willing to lend more than 80 to 85% of the house's value. The government submitted an exhibit showing that the total amount of checks received by Circle CM was $149. 288.43 and the total fees received by Carter as broker on the loans was $32. Was $181. Carter contended that some of the moneys paid to Circle CM were used to pay down payments and other costs for the borrowers and some of the fees were paid to the lenders.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-4908.opa.html">RPM INVESTMENTS V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>RPM Investments v. Is not available under 12 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr97/95-4648.man.html">UNITED STATES V. DECASTRO<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Is withdrawn. The following opinion is substituted in its stead. </i><a href=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5018.html">ENERGY CAPITAL CORP V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiff appellee.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1074.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is ammended as follows: On the cover sheet. Sandoval were on brief for appellant. Sandoval were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. Padin was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay $825. Padin was charged in a thirteen count indictment with conversion of federal funds. Padin was Prudential's president and principal stockholder. Prudential was required to make monthly payments of principal and interest to holders of securities issued by Prudential and guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. Prudential was also obligated to turn over to individual investors lump sum payments by the federal government for defaulted government insured mortgages issued by Prudential. A portion of the funds was used to cover the monthly dividends owed to all of Prudential's Ginnie Mae investors. Padin masked the scheme by representing to the government that the monies paid for defaulted mortgages were being passed onto investors. He led investors to believe that the mortgages in default were still alive. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1376.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for the United States. With whom Carney & Bassil was on brief. With whom Foster and Peterson was on brief. The trial jury plausibly could have found that the scheme tracked the following script. When mortgages were written on that basis. The 3 developers set out to subvert the down payment requirement by orchestrating a paper shuffle designed to create the (false) impression that the buyers were putting 10% down in order to acquire the properties. When they were not. An inflated purchase price often caused the bank to approve a higher first mortgage loan than would have been forthcoming had it known the true purchase price. He had made no down payment at all. 2One vignette is particularly telling. The court factored in the defendants' criminal history scores all were first offenders and arrived at a GSR of 33 41 months at OL 20 and a GSR of 27 33 months at OL 18. It is well established that the sentencing guidelines apply to offenses that straddle the effective date of the guidelines (November 1.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb96/94-4908.opa.html">RPM INVESTMENTS V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>RPM Investments v. Is not available under 12 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1559.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Potash were on brief for appellant. Blankstein & Lund were on brief for appellee. Two principal issues are raised on appeal: first. Whether a nonclient can maintain an action against an attorney when that attorney negligently certifies to a mortgagee that the title is good. Milford was represented in the 1988 transaction by appellee Antonellis. The mortgagee [held] a good and sufficient record first mortgage to the property.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr97/95-4648.man.html">UNITED STATES V. DECASTRO<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Is withdrawn. The following opinion is substituted in its stead. </i><a href=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1584.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Brener and Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP were on brief. Were on brief for Sheils Title Company. Sheils was appointed a non exclusive agent of Commonwealth. Was authorized to solicit and issue Commonwealth title insurance policies in Puerto Rico. The majority of the policies issued by Commonwealth on the island were mortgagee policies. The purchasers of these mortgagee policies were institutional lenders. Sheils was authorized to issue policies under $1. Sheils was also authorized to collect the premiums belonging to Commonwealth on its behalf. Although the policies were issued by Sheils as Commonwealth's agent. At the time those policies were issued. Each title insurance policy insured that the mortgage acquired by Bankers Finance as security for the loan was the first and primary lien on the property. Because the vast majority of Bankers Finance residential mortgage loans were made in the context of a refinancing of an existing mortgage loan. It was often necessary for the existing mortgage loan to be discharged in order for the Bankers Finance loan to attain first priority.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/02/97-9016.htm">97-9016 -- PRESLAR V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 02/16/1999<BR></A><BR>
Owned the ranch and was a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Which had been experiencing serious financial difficulties and whose interest was subordinate to the other banks. Moncor Bank's actions were designed to avoid foreclosure and recoup as much of its loan as possible. <p> On July 12. The agreement expressly referred to the fact that Moncor Bank was financing the purchase. The Preslars were to pay fourteen annual installments of $66. The goal was to sell each cabin lot for approximately $16. There is no reference to this unique repayment arrangement in the loan documents. The arrangement is also discussed in an unsigned 1985
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1996/96a1473p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The underlying dispute is a state law claim involving a mortgage foreclosure action. Or proceeding to which the [Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)] is a party.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034625p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
PA 18235 Counsel for Appellee Judge Chertoff heard oral argument in this case but resigned prior to the time the opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C.§46(d). Because we conclude that the rents were not the property of the bankruptcy estate. The court of common 1 The mortgages specified that Lender shall have the right. Although the Appellee disputes whether the notice letters sent by the bank were correctly addressed or in fact received by all tenants. The mortgaged properties were sold to the bank for cost by the county sheriff. Schwab was appointed as bankruptcy trustee (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03b0005p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues before the Panel are (1) whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Bank One relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9014 and 9021 (or that certain of those rules were not applicable). 000 free and clear of all liens was proper. The final orders of a bankruptcy court are appealable orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). An order is final if it
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="389"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1956.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. were on brief. Albiani and Associates were on brief. At issue is the important LYNCH. That advantage is denied to resident single family homeowners by 1322(b)(2). Are nonetheless available to owner occupants of multi family housing. We hold that Congress intends exactly such different results and that the antimodification provision of 1322(b)(2) does not bar modification of a secured claim on a multi unit property in which one unit is the debtor's principal residence and the security interest extends tothe other income producing units. 1. The term
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2192.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hawkes & Goldings were on brief. Were on brief. First Mutual Bank for Savings (First Mutual) provisionally agreed to provide purchase money financing subject to certain conditions. 1The offenses of conviction were committed in 1986 1987. His approach was unorthodox: he pre sold the units on a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1998/98a1839p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal of a district court order denying a motion for reconsideration filed by Hudson United Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/99-8184.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which reversed the bankruptcy court's order finding that American General Finance Inc.'s (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/061388np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will vacate in part and affirm in part the District Court's judgment. Which is now owned by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company. The loan was secured by his residence. Oppong appears to have been in default on the loan since 1997. Wells Fargo was substituted as a party in the foreclosure action. K.) The post verdict motion was denied on March 19. U.) The bankruptcy case was closed in March 2003. We affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of First Union and Hallinan but remanded the FDCPA claims against Wells Fargo because there was an issue of material fact about whether Wells Fargo was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/061776np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This proof of claim was later amended to $61. The Bankruptcy Judge held that FBCC was a secured creditor of the debtor's estate as a lien holder on real property owned by the debtor. The Bankruptcy Judge later held that the interest and attorneys' fees added to FBCC's proof of claim were prohibited by Pennsylvania's Loan Interest and Protection Law (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/99-8184.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which reversed the bankruptcy court's order finding that American General Finance Inc.'s (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1230.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom Kevin Hensley and Needham & Warren were on brief. Paxman were on brief. As luck would have it. 12 U.S.C. 2 1814 1883 (1994)) was appointed as the receiver. Reiterating his view that the December transaction was accomplished merely as a means of mitigating the counsel that the sanctioned settlement called solely for the discharge of the indebtedness administered through the WCO. Regardless of what Callen may have stated. It was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. ANALYSIS The Civil Rules provide that summary judgment may flourish when
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1274.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief for appellee. I. Factual and Procedural History The jury was entitled to find the following facts. Graham originated the loans and was paid on commission. All mortgages were eventually assigned to Dime NY. Dime NY is a federally chartered savings bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Graham was charged in eleven counts of the indictment. Two of these counts were severed and later dismissed by the government. Graham was tried by a jury on the remaining counts. Selective Prosecution and Conflict of Interest Graham asserts that her conviction violated her right to due process because it was the product of selective prosecution on the part of the government. Graham points to the fact that Dime Bank New York was not indicted on criminal charges after it gave a $2. Further complicating this picture is the fact that Dime NY was partially owned by the FDIC and that the decision not to indict the bank came just before a successful public offering of shares in the bank.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19944908.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the relief The district appellants request specific performance is not available under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) of the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19954648.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is withdrawn. The following opinion is substituted in its stead. 1 we conclude that materiality is not an element of this crime. We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding Accordingly we a government investigation was not plain error. affirm. BACKGROUND De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false Honorable Thomas M. She was convicted of conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts. De Castro was a mortgage De broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans. Several putative
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2004/031045np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
First Eastern is the only remaining defendant. 2 Dongelewicz appeals a September 30. Are well known to the parties. We only discuss those that are relevant to our discussion of the issues on appeal. A 4000 acre tract of land We will refer to First Eastern Bank. First Eastern was acquired by PNC Bank. PNC was substituted for First Eastern. We will refer to the relevant party as First Eastern. Potential lot purchasers were told that the development would eventually include roads. These amounts were increased and by the end of 1989. The Development Loan was at $11. The Development Loan was secured by a first mortgage on the property owned by CBG. The primary collateral for the Receivable Line were CBG's accounts receivable on notes secured by purchase money mortgages. When mortgage payments were made to C&E Credit. Their inspectors found that the improvements described in the Property Reports filed by CBG with HUD were not completed by the dates specified in those reports. CBG failed to meet obligations under the terms of its loans from First Eastern because mortgagors were no longer making enough payments on CBG's purchase money 4 mortgages for the receivables to constitute adequate payment on the receivable loan.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june96/94-4463.opa.html">VEALE V. CITIBANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Veale v. The loan was secured by a first security interest in the Veale's primary residence. The rest of the loan was used to pay $269.05 to Epic Mortgage. The loan was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-41464.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. Moore and Hearn were both required to purchase primary mortgage insurance (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-5037.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel were Gerald M. Are the owners and managers of properties that have provided low income rental housing under several programs sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Once 20 years had passed since the mortgage was issued. HUD was required to ensure that the properties would continue to operate as low income housing and that the property owners satisfied certain other requirements. One of the requirements was that property owners had to be in compliance with all applicable HUD regulations governing the condition of the properties. 24 C.F.R. § 248.145(a)(12). The loans that HUD guaranteed were known as section 241(f) equity loans because the guarantees were authorized under section 241(f) of the National Housing Act. HUD refused to process the necessary paperwork on the ground that Carabetta was not in compliance with certain HUD regulations. Schedule D listed 25 properties the parties agree were to be insured under this provision. Another property was inadvertently omitted from 06 5037.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-5050.html">ARIADNE FINANCIAL V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19954648.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is withdrawn. The following opinion is substituted in its stead. 1 we conclude that materiality is not an element Honorable Thomas M. We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding a government investigation was not plain error. BACKGROUND De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was convicted of conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts. The applications contained false De Castro was a employment information regarding the applicants. mortgage broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans. The
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/06/056058P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from an Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas1 issued on November 29. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Debtor Eula Mystery Willis is the sole owner of three corporate entities: Mystery Properties. Many of the loans secured by the companies' various parcels of real estate were in default. Willis was also being sued by other creditors and at least one of them had obtained a judgment against her. Although Willis' name was typed on the signature line on the original Petition and Schedules. As is customary when a case is filed electronically. Nor was she able to review them prior to filing. Which was filed The Honorable Audrey R. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 2 1 inadvertently.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/982164.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to decide whether the affirmative defenses of setoff. This appeal raises a question as to whether the creditor whose affirmative defenses were extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale received constitutionally adequate notice such that failure to object would result in a waiver of its affirmative defenses and its deemed consent to the transformation of the debtors' contract claims into unimpeachable accounts receivable. Were not extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale. Was constitutionally inadequate. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Folger acquired substantially all of the assets of three bankrupt companies through a bankruptcy auction
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200513661.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The District Court determined that Stonewell lacked standing to claim an interest in a mortgage on the Center Mall property (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/943867P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They were unable to pay the Mairs the amounts called for under the purchase agreement. Schwartzes were converting FmHA's collateral that secured payment of the notes by commingling the collateral pledged to the FmHA with other collateral owned by another Schwartz entity known as Schwartz Farms. The Schwartzes agreed to resolve or cure any claim within ten days following receipt of a notice of claim as defined in paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement: Schwartzes will indemnify Mairs from any and all charges. Schwartzes shall have ten days following receipt of any such notice in which to resolve or cure the charge. Claim or liability to which reference is made.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU4MjQtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5824-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Three appeals have been consolidated in this case. A trial against defendant Robert Rosenstock and an inquest to fix damages against Briggs were scheduled to begin in August 1997. Briggs was a publicly held auto leasing company incorporated in New York. Robert Genser (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1994/94a0735p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On appeal Commonwealth argues a bifurcation that has this effect is contrary to the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Nobelman v. We will affirm the district court. The parties stipulated that the fair market value of the Hammonds' home is $25. The future earnings of the debtor are submitted to the supervision and control of the trustee and the debtor shall pay to the trustee the sum of $ 666 on a monthly basis for a period of 60 months. 2. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review The statute which governs jurisdiction over appeals from bankruptcy court decisions is 28 U.S.C.A. § 158. Section 158 provides in relevant part: (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments. Decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title . . . . * * * (d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions. We have jurisdiction over the district court's order under section 158(d).[fn5] Review of the district court order involved in this case presents questions of law.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6FB113670C2ECEC188256CD90080CAFB/$file/0216214.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We are called on to decide whether a voluntarily joined foreign sovereign may remove a case from a territorial court to a federal district court when the foreign sovereign obtained the original defendant's interest by assignment after the commencement of the litigation. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY EIE Guam Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5B79FA29E35D9FB38825717600570F6C/$file/0416244.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court held that these laws were preempted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA). That California's per diem statutes are not preempted by the DIDMCA. We affirm this conclusion because California's per diem statutes are not expressly preempted. The per diem statutes therefore are not preempted by the Parity Act. Hold that any facial claim was waived. I. Background Quicken Loans (Quicken) is licensed to engage in residential mortgage lending in California by the California Department of Corporations Commissioner. When the conditions required to close the transaction have been satisfied. The escrow company is instructed by Quicken Loans to disburse the funds to or on behalf of the borrower. Quicken admits that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042042np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
It is undisputed that Ortlieb paid the debt the mortgages secured in full and was entitled to have them marked satisfied as he originally requested in 2000. After the issue was joined the parties brought cross motions for summary judgment. Ortlieb died and his estate was substituted for him as a party. After our review of this matter we are in substantial agreement with the district court on the statutes of limitations issue and will affirm on the estate's appeal on that 1 The Bank does not rely on a statute for attorney's fees on this appeal. 3 basis.2 We do note. In its brief the estate does not challenge this finding beyond indicating in its statement of facts that the Bank's
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3370_025.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Despite the promising name First Choice Investment Capital First Choice should not have been the first choice for any investor. This is because it was a fraud.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0202p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is a security interest in a debtor's property a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1732.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1994 is amended as follows: On page 23. The text of the new footnote is as follows: Having stressed that post trial acceptance of responsibility is the exception and must normally be borne out by pre trial actions. We do think that unless some obvious basis is apparent from the record. Has nothing substantial in the way of pre trial conduct to show earlier acceptance of responsibility unless the district court is able to point to some persuasive reason for this determination. Cases like this one may present situations in which an explanation by the district court is as a practical matter essential to establish that the guideline's rather stringent standards for post trial conversions have been satisfied. Was on brief for appellant. Hawkes & Goldings were on brief for appellee. Was formerly a general manager. Bennett was also an attorney. Bennett was charged. He was also ordered to pay a special assessment of $450 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3013 (1988). Judgment was entered on May 24. The cross appeal was later voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Fed.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1154.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Spinella & Angelone were on brief for appellants. Bomster and Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated were on brief for appellee. Who was also an officer and director of the bankrupt lender. Defendants argue that no fiduciary duty was transgressed. Counter that the Trustee committed waste and failed to mitigate damages to the bankrupt estate by allowing foreclosure on the properties which allegedly were conveyed in order to satisfy the debt. Defendants contend that they are entitled to a significant reduction of any outstanding debt because of the equity in. We now affirm the district court's partial summary judgment and hold affirm that final judgment certification was justified. Miscalculation of debt are unavailing as a matter of law. The nature of the business of Columbus Mortgage was to serve as a mortgage lending firm specializing in residential real estate loans secured by first and second mortgages on real estate. It is undisputed that Mr. Were in the business of selling and developing real estate: Defendants Appellants Muratore Agency.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june96/94-4463.opa.html">VEALE V. CITIBANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Veale v. The loan was secured by a first security interest in the Veale's primary residence. The rest of the loan was used to pay $269.05 to Epic Mortgage. The loan was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1225.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Canders and Elizabeth Bordowitz were on brief for Finance Authority of Maine. Smith & Lancaster were on brief for Waterville Industries. Appeals from the district court's decision that it is responsible for 60 percent of those costs. We conclude that FAME is exempt from contribution under CERCLA and therefore do not reach the cross appeal relating to the amount of contribution. Although the genesis of the mill is neither clear from the record nor critical to the case. It appears that the First Hartford Corporation developed the mill in the early 1970's with state assistance.1 In or 1First Hartford's role was carried out by two related corporations. Loans in connection with the project were made to First Hartford by Society for Savings. The loans were guaranteed by appellant FAME. FAME's functions were carried out by the Maine Industrial Building Authority. That entity was later succeeded by the Maine Guarantee Authority which was in turn succeeded by FAME. We will for simplicity refer to the successive entities as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="348"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0001n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. It was not a party to the compromise and objected to its approval. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue presented is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it approved the compromise between Haven and OSB over Porter's objection. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's order approving a compromise is
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0004n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Which motion was filed almost two years after the alleged violations occurred and more than a year and one half after the debtor's chapter 11 case was dismissed for cause. The BAP has jurisdiction over core proceedings and issues related to the automatic stay are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Findings of fact by the bankruptcy court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may2001/99-11130.man.html">UNITED STATES V. 1461 W. 42ND ST., HIALEAH, FLORIDA (5/22/2001, NO. 99-11130)<BR></A><BR>
This appeal deals with the considerations that ensue when real property that the government has seized in civil forfeiture proceedings is foreclosed by the property's mortgagee so that when it is time to return the property. We are presented here with the task of tailoring an appropriate remedy under such circumstances when due process was violated pursuant to </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0002p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We find that the land installment contract is executory under controlling Sixth Circuit precedent and Ohio law and REVERSE the order of the bankruptcy court. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The sole issue on appeal is whether the land installment contract is an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1996/96a1372p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal by Tristram Coffin. Coffin was the owner of three parcels of real property on which Malvern Federal Savings Bank held mortgages to secure loans it had made to Coffin. The court found that [the Bank] is bound by the Debtor's Confirmed Plan with respect to the distribution to it provided thereunder and therefore relief from stay is not appropriate. We further find that [the Bank's] lien on the Gay Street Property is not discharged by this Chapter 13 proceeding and that upon lifting of the stay at the conclusion of this case or sooner. [the Bank] will be free to exercise its state law remedies under its mortgage and applicable law. Describing this motion as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034716p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
It applies only if the mortgagee's claim is secured
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov98/97-3286.man.html">UNITED STATES V. BEGIN (11/18/1998, NO. 97-3286)<BR></A><BR>
The United States' claim was barred by the six year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The note was secured by a mortgage on the commercial parcel and by a separate mortgage on the Begins' personal residence. The note and mortgages were assigned to the SBA.</P> <P> Between 1985 and 1992. 000.00 payment was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0702p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These loans were evidenced by the following seven promissory notes: 1. a $185. This letter is at the heart of this action. The letter was signed by William Carlough. The following are the most significant provisions of the letter: (1) the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-2319.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rich and Friedman & Atherton were on brief for appellants. Jr. were on brief for appellee. The loans were secured by mortgages on the properties to be developed and by Simon's personal guaranty. All construction loan requisitions by the Borrowers were honored in due course by the Bank until October 18. 657 was dishonored. The Bank closed and FDIC was appointed receiver. Alerting creditors that all claims against the Bank were to be submitted to FDIC by January 23. Notice of FDIC's appointment as liquidating agent of the Bank was mailed to plaintiffs appellants. They were aware prior to the bar date that FDIC had been appointed receiver of the Bank. Plaintiffs appellants informed FDIC that the Bank was in default under the Modification Agreements for refusing their October 18 requisition. The present action was commenced on April 21. The district court ruled that their claims were barred under 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). II II DISCUSSION DISCUSSION Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo to determine whether the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1996/95a1238p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This consolidated class action is brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants breached section 1104(a)'s fiduciary duties and as to whether the defendants are entitled to section 1104(c)'s protection. We will. Vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor and will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Each plan permitted an employee to contribute a percentage of his or her compensation into an individual account and to direct that it be invested in any one or a number of funds that were comprised of different types of investments. A GIC is a contract under which the issuer is obligated to repay the principal deposit at a designated future date and to pay interest at a specified rate over the duration of the contract. The Sperry Plan and the BEST Plan were consolidated to form the Unisys Savings Plan. Was closed to new contributions. Assets invested in the Fixed Income Fund were reinvested in the new Insurance Contract Fund.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19973286.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The United States' claim was barred by the six year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The note was secured by a mortgage on the commercial parcel and by a separate mortgage on the Begins' personal residence. The note and mortgages were assigned to the SBA. 000.00 payment was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19973286.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The United States' claim was barred by the six year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The note was secured by a mortgage on the commercial parcel and by a separate mortgage on the Begins' personal residence. The note and mortgages were assigned to the SBA. 000.00 payment was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-5070.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were John C. Of counsel was Thomas G. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Like others that have reached this court in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Because the failing thrifts were unattractive investment prospects on their own. Acquiring institutions such as CalFed were no longer permitted to include supervisory goodwill as part of their regulatory capital. They were required to write down their supervisory goodwill over a five year period. CalFed was one of the institutions that filed a breach of contract action based on the FIRREA provisions regarding supervisory goodwill. Would have produced substantial profits if CalFed had been able to retain them. Holding that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to foreseeability. Was foreseeable. (2) that CalFed had failed to prove that the ARMs and other assets were sold because of the breach. (3) that the method of calculating damages advocated by CalFed was too speculative to serve as the basis for a damages award.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1845.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lenehan & Iacopino were on brief. Was on brief. All references herein are to that edition unless otherwise noted. The reasoning and method of analysis that we propose for handling accomplice attribution in the relevant conduct context are fully applicable to the current version of the controlling guideline. The conspirators' plan was seductively simple: they secretly gave money. The other 60 odd closings were handled in much the same fashion by one or the other of appellant's coconspirators. The transactions were structured in such a way that. Were discussed and approved. Zsofka also gave instructions on how best to accomplish this furtive feat. 3 During the under three year period when the scheme was velivolant. Or was present at the discussion of. Losses of this magnitude are seldom unremarked. The trial judge convened a disposition 2The 24 specific offense counts have since been dismissed on motion of the prosecution. 4 hearing. 1041 42 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that a sentencing court should apply the guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing unless doing so will implicate ex post facto concerns).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/09/954206P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He was sentenced to 293 months in prison for the continuing financial crimes enterprise violation. Lefkowitz argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any crime. Lefkowitz was President of Citi Equity Group. Or acquire buildings in which a prescribed percentage of the apartment units are occupied by low income tenants. Money raised from limited partners was the project's equity. Remaining debts to the builder were paid. While CEG obtained permanent financing to replace the construction loan once a building was completed. 000 were unbuilt. Funds from limited partners and FSM investors were first deposited in an operating account for each particular investment. 000 was used to pay Lefkowitz's personal expenses. The black hole was $3. IRS agents traced new partnership deposits that cleared negative balances in the central CEG account and then were used to meet Lefkowitz's personal needs and to fund older projects. This practice was not disclosed to CEG investors. Lefkowitz denies that this was fraudulent.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F7BAB76020329B8388256C98007A5451/$file/0156950.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Nelson *The Clerk is directed to conform the docket for this case to the caption set forth above. **The Honorable William W Schwarzer. Which is entirely unsecured because the value of the first deed of trust exceeds the value of the home. Even where the lien is wholly unsecured. Joining with the majority of other jurisdictions in holding that a wholly unsecured lienholder is not entitled to the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). A deed of trust is similar to a mortgage in purpose and effect. The deed of trust was assigned to PSB Lending. The outstanding loan value was $37. Zimmer's residence was already encumbered by a first deed of trust securing a loan of $123. 000 that was used to purchase the property. There is an exception for homestead liens that attach only to the debtor's primary residence. 1 Zimmer argued that even though PSB Lending's claim was secured by her primary residence. Its lien was nonetheless avoidable because the claim was wholly unsecured. Concluding that it was not bound by Lam.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2983.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
James Farr was engaged in a scheme of defrauding banks while purchasing real estate and refinancing mortgages. He was charged in a four count indictment with one count of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344). Arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant the additional adjournment he requested and furthermore that his trial counsel was incompetent in failing to meet with him and failing to interview his alleged witnesses. James Farr was involved in a series of seventeen (17) fraudulent real estate transactions and one loan transaction in which he provided lenders with inaccurate financial information. Farr's scheme was relatively simple. Farr reported to Equitable that his monthly salary was $13. He refinanced loans for two properties (one of which was the Mequon property purchased three months earlier). Bankers Wholesale disbursed the loan to Farr from Indiana and the proceeds were deposited into his Wisconsin checking account. Farr was able to perpetuate his deceitful enterprise through March 1998.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/DFF8B8DC5853689588256E5A00707C27/$file/9956520.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
District Judge: Before the Court are an appeal and cross appeal from a final judgment in an ERISA2 action in which three employee benefit trust funds (collectively the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D2106220DBD7F65088256B96005AFE40/$file/0035474.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case turning on lien priorities. Fleet was a corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding was converted to Chapter 7. There has been no finding and no contention that Fleet was a sham or alter ego or that the corporate veil ought to be pierced for any reason. Fleet is a separate person from the Stantons. This appeal is a dispute between the trustee in the 1 Beeler v. 578 (9th Cir. 1998). 5326 Stantons' bankruptcy and the factor over which is entitled to the proceeds from that sale. The trustee's theory was that it was entitled to avoid International Factors' mortgage lien on the house. Because it was created when the Stantons mortgaged their house. Not when the advances were made. Because the advances were to Fleet. Applied and prohibited the factor's advances to Fleet.4 Violation of the automatic stay is a serious business. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/CFEC2DCBE4A930AF88256AA000569B99/$file/9956520.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
District Judge: Before the Court are an appeal and cross appeal from a final judgment in an ERISA2 action in which three employee benefit trust funds (collectively the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1571.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment denying the motion of appellant Thomas E. A client of Behenna (who is an attorney). Behenna was informed that these units could be purchased with almost no money down. Arrangements were made to have Dime New York. Eric Peach was the sales representative who handled the loans in question. Behenna and the other purchasers of the condominiums were informed that instead of cash. Peach was aware of the true terms of the financing and told him (Behenna) that Dime New York approved of this type of financing. Behenna prepared addenda to the P & S agreements which revealed that the second mortgages and the discounts were the sources of the down payments. After the loan applications were approved. Behenna signed Fannie Mae affidavits and HUD 1 settlement statements indicating that he had made 20 percent cash down payments.1 The HUD 1 forms stated that there was no secondary financing in connection with the purchases and. These forms required a loan applicant to attest that the statements contained in the forms were true and accurate and warned that making false statements was a crime. 3 3 affidavits failed to disclose the second mortgages and the discounts.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2293.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Baron & London were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. *of the Fifth Circuit. Which mandates such an increase when the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1959.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hoch & McHugh were on brief for appellant. P.A. was on brief for Portsmouth Harbor Towing. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The Sea Hawk is a forty five foot Hatteras sport fishing boat built in 1974. Atlantic eventually went into receivership and was taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov98/97-3286.man.html">UNITED STATES V. BEGIN (11/18/1998, NO. 97-3286)<BR></A><BR>
The United States' claim was barred by the six year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The note was secured by a mortgage on the commercial parcel and by a separate mortgage on the Begins' personal residence. The note and mortgages were assigned to the SBA.</P> <P> Between 1985 and 1992. 000.00 payment was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992331.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was included to
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200407/03-3059a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3856_031.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
(River East) is a real estate developer.1 Third party defendant Daniel E. McLean is the president of River East. Among the other terms of VALIC's offer was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may2001/99-11130.man.html">UNITED STATES V. 1461 W. 42ND ST., HIALEAH, FLORIDA (5/22/2001, NO. 99-11130)<BR></A><BR>
This appeal deals with the considerations that ensue when real property that the government has seized in civil forfeiture proceedings is foreclosed by the property's mortgagee so that when it is time to return the property. We are presented here with the task of tailoring an appropriate remedy under such circumstances when due process was violated pursuant to </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044298p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That provision protects a mortgagee from having its claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding modified if the mortgage is secured
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3738_017.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Incorporated (Globe) was liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Argued that the lien was avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 545(2). The facts of this case are not in dispute. The case was converted to Chapter 7. Gouveia was appointed Trustee for the Debtor's estate. The lien was properly perfected by its filing. The proceeds of the sale were paid to the trustee. The bankruptcy court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment to the trustee. The relevant language of § 545(2) provides: The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent that such lien ... (2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the commencement of the case. This power is not absolute. 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that (A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection[.].
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/014329.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
MCNEIL Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: Marcia Kirven McNeil was charged with mail and wire fraud in seven counts of an 18 count indictment stemming from a fraudulent real estate flipping scheme in Baltimore. That the evidence of the existence of a scheme to defraud was insufficient to convict her. McNeil's sole assignment of error is that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/9_opinions/92-5164.html">WINSTAR V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1658.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Edward Kelley was charged in a six count indictment of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 and making false statements to a federal agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Kelley was sentenced to 21 months incarceration. In the course of which he submitted a Personal Finance Statement stating that the vessel purchase price was $60. Both of these averments were false. This statement was also false. Kelley was subsequently indicted on the basis of the false statements contained in his Personal Finance Statement and his Progress Certification Report. Who testified that the vessel was worth between $18. The only evidence before the sentencing court on the value of the house was that a foreclosure proceeding would fetch an estimated $104. The court concluded that the S.B.A.'s loss was between $20. It concluded that his criminal history category was one. Kelley was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment. Which was within the guideline range. 000 was clearly erroneous in light of evidence adduced at trial.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1832.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Amerling & Burns were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Such a lien may have priority over even a pre existing mortgage. That statute makes invalid any
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/04/962173P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Wiegmans argue that summary judgment was improper because the plaintiff. The sale. the district court should have set aside We reverse and remand. Stating that the Farmers Home Administration had determined that they were not eligible for the debt restructuring because even with restructuring they would not have enough money to pay their loan off. therefore decided to foreclose. various options. Together with a letter explaining that the failure to check the appeal box the first time was an oversight. Which allowed an appeal to proceed despite a late request if the delay was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/03/972437P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The parties do not dispute that the net loan proceeds ultimately disbursed to the Chandlers were $57.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc2NjUgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/03-7665%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs allege that certain billing practices of the defendant home mortgage providers with respect to their provision of real estate settlement services to the plaintiffs were contrary to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Concluding that the practices in question were not prohibited by RESPA. Robert Schill are homeowners who obtained settlement services from the defendants while financing their purchases of homes in Brooklyn. Are wholly owned subsidiaries of the defendant Wells Fargo & Company. Which is in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of WFC Holdings Corporation.1 Defendants' corporate disclosure statement. Is a subsidiary of Wells Fargo Bank. Which is a subsidiary of WFC Holdings Corporation. Which is a subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Company. The parties' differing accounts of defendants' ownership structure are not material to our resolution of the questions presented in this appeal. 3 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 The complaint further alleges that between February and April 2002.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991990.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 2 the text is corrected to read
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2532.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom <SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/09/02-3424.htm">02-3424 -- U.S. V. BEYRLE -- 09/17/2003<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Defendants appellants Steven and Joyce Beyrle. Which is now called the Farm Service Agency (FSA). Their obligation was secured by mortgages on two tracts of land in Kansas. To have other interests in the land declared junior in priority. Describing the government's summary judgment motion as still pending and stating that the parties would pursue mediation after the dispositive motion was decided. The legal descriptions of the properties were incorrect. A mediator was to be employed to settle the matter. They were denied due process because they were discriminated against in the loan process and no attorney would represent them. The FSA would have accepted a different arrangement to settle the debt. The amount of the judgment was incorrect. <em>Id.</em>. The subject properties were sold at a Marshal's sale to the Seilers. Who are parties to this appeal. Which was granted on July 9. Which was amended on July 17. Because they were not served with a copy of the notice of Marshal's sale.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1905.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LLP</SPAN> were on brief. LLP</SPAN> were on brief. It appears that this is a case of first impression under Massachusetts law as to the revised § 9 204.</P> <P> Of primary concern here are revisions that altered § 9 204. Such as whether the obligations created along with the dragnet clause were of the same or similar type or class as other obligations.</P> <P> Our interpretation of the revised § 9 204 is informed by a second change to Article Nine that was also made by the 2001 amendments. It appears that this expansion of the definition of good faith has also not yet been addressed by Massachusetts' highest court.</P> <P> At stake is whether a commercial lender. Are primarily premised on CFC's unwillingness to release its first position security interest in Pride's assets. Pride argues that these contingent retail financing debts are not secured and thus that CFC has no right to insist on such a deposit before releasing the security interest. Contends that these future debts are indeed secured by a dragnet clause in its 1995 and 1996 wholesale financing agreements with Pride.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062155np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm. The property was also mortgaged in favor of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1976.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. were on brief. Were on brief. We have no detailed account of these debriefing sessions. The appellant states in a declaration (filed below in connection with his motion for an evidentiary hearing) that he furnished the government with whatever information he possessed concerning wrongdoing at the financial institutions with which he was associated. After the indictment was returned and the appellant entered a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1391.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom <SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1152.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The petition was filed jointly with his wife Donata Nelson. Among the assets of the estate is the Nelsons' interest in their Portland. Of which each is a 50 percent owner. In which the Nelsons are apparently domiciled. Even this modest amount is not automatically secure because the exemption. The exemption itself is not deemed to nullify liens that give secured creditors a security interest in property. Ordinary real property mortgages are not avoidable but among liens that may be avoided are most (although not all)
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1983.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Read</U> was on brief for appellant Wendy B. Biggs</U> were on brief for appellant Susan Otis.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc2NjVfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7665_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs allege that certain billing practices of the defendant home mortgage providers with respect to their provision of real estate settlement services to the plaintiffs were contrary to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Concluding that the practices in question were not prohibited by RESPA. Robert Schill are homeowners who obtained settlement services from the defendants while financing their purchases of homes in Brooklyn. Are wholly owned subsidiaries of the defendant Wells Fargo & Company. Which is in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of WFC Holdings Corporation.1 Defendants' corporate disclosure statement. Is a subsidiary of Wells Fargo Bank. Which is a subsidiary of WFC Holdings Corporation. Which is a subsidiary of Wells Fargo & 3 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 The complaint further alleges that between February and April 2002. Was required by the defendants to purchase certain
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034220p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Plaintiffs are persons who borrowed from the two banks and signed second mortgages. Appellees in this case are the settling parties. Appellants are a number of law firms and plaintiff class members who challenge the District Court's jurisdiction. The alleged mastermind of the scheme was the Shumway Organization (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1302.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Zimmerman</U> were on brief. Nelson</U> were on brief. <U>Senior Circuit Judge</U>.</STRONG> This is a fraudulent transfer action brought by the plaintiff appellant. The case was tried before a jury. Finding the plaintiff's evidence insufficient to permit a jury to conclude that there was value in the assets of the defendants' corporation which were over and above the amount of its secured debt. Which was the plaintiff's theory of the case. <STRONG><A HREF=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/014407u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was the president and 50% owner of Capital Resources Corporation (CRC). CRC was affiliated with Capital Financial Corporation (later changed to Capital Homeowners Corporation (CHC)) and Ready Capital Corporation (RCC). CRC was obliged to track the borrowers' payment history and issue monthly delinquency reports to the banks to show the status of each loan. A number of loans became more than ninety days delinquent but CRC did not have enough money in its operating account to repurchase all of the delinquent loans. The bankruptcy relieved CRC of its obligation to buy back the hundreds of delinquent mortgage loans it was obligated to repurchase. (4) that a three level downward adjustment was appropriate under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1 (a) and (b) (2). The sentencing judge was not bound by the plea agreement and was able to exercise his discretion with respect to Weir's sentence. Citing letters it received from seven banks who were defrauded by Weir. The Government initially asserted that Weir was responsible for a loss of $929.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/05/97-9022.htm">97-9022 -- BURKE V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 05/06/1999<BR></A><BR>
These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Petitioners Datha D. The sole issue is whether Mr. and Mrs. Burke are entitled to relief from the discharge of indebtedness income pursuant to <u>Bowers v. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. <u>See</u> 26 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-3.gif" ALT="300"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8008EBB80F5D3DFD88256E1400568BF6/$file/0216458.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I Thomas Price is a computer consultant. Because he was not paying his debts as they became due. 469 of which was secured debt. 511 is secured on Price's residence. Price's petition claimed that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5084.html">CAGUAS CENTRAL FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
With him on the brief was <U>Stavroula E. With her on the brief were <U>David W. With him on the brief was <U>Dorothy Ashley Doherty</U>. Of counsel was <U>William A. The background facts relating to the savings and loan industry s financial problems out of which this case arose are described in <U>United States v. Fixed rate mortgages created when interest rates were low. [T]he principal inducement for these supervisory mergers was an understanding that the acquisitions would be subject to a particular accounting treatment that would help the acquiring institutions meet their reserve capital requirements imposed by federal regulations . . . . [T]he overall regulatory response of the early and mid 1980 s was unsuccessful in resolving the crisis in the thrift industry. The impact of [the 1989 Act s] new capital requirements upon institutions that had acquired failed thrifts in exchange for supervisory goodwill was swift and severe. The United States is liable to respondents for breach of contract.". The RTC contends that these changes may have breached contractual obligations of the FHLBB to some institutions for which the RTC has been appointed receiver.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5020.html">DAVID CAIN V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Mso bidi font family:Arial'><span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Emmett B. Mso bidi font family:Arial'><span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With her o
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5137.html">THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for defendant appellant.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5042.html">CASA DE CAMBIO COMDIV S.A. DE C.V V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiff appellant.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-7129a.html">BURKA PAUL S. V. AETNA LIFE INS CO<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-5254a.html">CITYFED FINCL CORP V. OTS<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct96/94-3513.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. BECKLEY<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Appellant purchased single family residences for a nominal price from financially distressed homeowners whose mortgage loans were guaranteed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The homeowners would be better off than they would were the mortgages on their residences foreclosed. Appellant pocketed the portion of the rent that was to pay the mortgage. The mortgages were foreclosed.<p> For engaging in this activity. Appellant was indicted and convicted by a jury for equity skimming. She moved the district court for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish an intent on her part to defraud. Which is a matter of first impression in this circuit. That is worthy of discussion: whether. The Government was required to establish
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov2000/99-11687.man.html">UNITED STATES V. TRAVERS (11/21/2000, NO. 99-11687)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june97/95-5267.opa.html">ARANGO V. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Arango v. 1992 Customs informed Arango that the currency was subject to forfeiture under a money laundering statute and advised him of his right to seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture under 19 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june96/94-6802.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Smith United States Court of Appeals. Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939.
|
 |
WELZEL V. ADVOCATE REALTY INVESTMENTS (12/17/2001, NO. 99-14875)
If the fees were provided for in the loan contract under which the claim arose. The first issue concerns whether the bankruptcy court should apply the § 506(b) reasonableness standard to contractually set attorney's fees that vest pre petition and that are enforceable under state law. With the balance disallowed.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
|
SMITH V. FDIC
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Smith v. </i> that the district court correctly concluded that an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property is a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr96/93-4063.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct96/94-3513.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. BECKLEY<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Appellant purchased single family residences for a nominal price from financially distressed homeowners whose mortgage loans were guaranteed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The homeowners would be better off than they would were the mortgages on their residences foreclosed. Appellant pocketed the portion of the rent that was to pay the mortgage. The mortgages were foreclosed.<p> For engaging in this activity. Appellant was indicted and convicted by a jury for equity skimming. She moved the district court for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish an intent on her part to defraud. Which is a matter of first impression in this circuit. That is worthy of discussion: whether. The Government was required to establish
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May18/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june97/95-5267.opa.html">ARANGO V. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Arango v. 1992 Customs informed Arango that the currency was subject to forfeiture under a money laundering statute and advised him of his right to seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture under 19 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june96/94-6802.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Smith United States Court of Appeals. Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939.
|
|
WELZEL V. ADVOCATE REALTY INVESTMENTS (12/17/2001, NO. 99-14875)
If the fees were provided for in the loan contract under which the claim arose. The first issue concerns whether the bankruptcy court should apply the § 506(b) reasonableness standard to contractually set attorney's fees that vest pre petition and that are enforceable under state law. With the balance disallowed.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
|
|
SMITH V. FDIC
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Smith v. </i> that the district court correctly concluded that an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property is a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr96/93-4063.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/01/03-3018a.htm">03-3018A -- U.S. V. SWANSON -- 01/26/2004<BR></A><BR>
2004 is granted. A copy of the published opinion is attached. <p> Entered for the Court <p> PATRICK FISHER. Swanson was convicted of one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/01/03-3018.htm">03-3018 -- U.S. V. SWANSON -- 01/26/2004<BR></A><BR>
Swanson was convicted of one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/03/99-9031.htm">99-9031 -- MCMORRIS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/20/2001<BR></A><BR>
We reverse and remand with directions to vacate the deficiency assessment at issue here and to recalculate any remaining unrelated deficiencies owing. <p align=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/01/98-4008.htm">98-4008 -- SMITH V. TORONTO-DOMINION BANK -- 01/29/1999<BR></A><BR>
Who is trustee. Smith is also manager of First Heritage Financial Corporation. Whose stock is owned entirely by the Foundation and Trusts. <p> Smith formerly owned two pieces of Canadian real estate that are relevant here: a house (Maple Street property) used as his personal residence until at least April 1995<a href=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-3193.htm">97-3193 -- SBKC SERVICE CORP. V. 1111 PROSPECT PARTNERS, L.P. -- 07/30/1998<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/10/96-2165.htm">96-2165 -- QUINTANA V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SANTA FE -- 10/06/1997<BR></A><BR>
Quintana Sr. appeals and we affirm. <p> <center>I.</center> <p> Quintana Sr. is a real estate developer and investor who has been involved in a number of projects in Santa Fe. Quintana Jr. was also involved in the real estate development business. Was an officer. Francis and Cerrillos properties were actually owned by Quintana Sr. and were not conveyed to Quintana Jr. until September 4. 000) was used to pay a real estate commission to Grubesic Realty. Although Quintana Sr. was not a partner or a party to the loan. Quintana Sr. was claiming the income. More than seven months after the Vista del Monte loan was due. The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of First National on the grounds that the evidence presented was insufficient to raise a factual dispute concerning whether First National's practices were unusual or anticompetitive (as required by the BHCA). We concluded (1) there were factual disputes concerning whether Quintana Sr. and Quintana Jr. were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-5108.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Kathy Bailey. With her on the brief were Thomas L. Of counsel was Susan V. With her on the brief was Roger J. Did not have a cognizable property interest
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7E744E9E3C4158A18825714E007E3340/$file/0435647.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Peskind's law holds: When there is uncertainty about where to file a security interest in order to perfect it. A deed of trust securing Indian trust land was recorded in the Office of the Auditor of Pierce County. The county in which the land is located. A commercial lease of the land was recorded in the BIA Title Plant in Portland. Peskind's law is named after E.J. Peskind was a student of Professor James J. When Professor White called on Peskind and asked him what steps a party should take to perfect its security interest when there is uncertainty about where to file. Priority is obtained by recording in the county in which the land is located. Occupied a parcel of tribal land that was held in trust by the United States government. The Certificate of Approval provides that it
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/03/986085P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This matter is comprised of three consolidated appeals. For which he was the sole shareholder. Wintz Properties was engaged in the property management of commercial real estate. The Debtor was comprised of five operating divisions and owned interests in the three parcels of real property which are at the heart of these appeals. Only one of the loans was made directly to the Debtor. The Terminal Road Property is divided into two parcels. The first of which consists of approximately 28.48 acres and is abstract property. The second of which consists of approximately 0.67 acres and is Torrens property. 2 1 The Debtor did. As the tax liens were filed with the Minnesota Secretary of State and also with Hennepin. The divisions were sold to companies variously owned by Wintz's children and their relations. The real estate interests were conveyed to Wintz Properties and subsequently. The Debtor leased the Rosemount Property to Wintz It is unclear from the record whether the Debtor's interest in the Terminal Road Property was also pledged as collateral for the aggregate debt.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/09/974246U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The amount awarded was almost the precise damages sustained by the Powells less the amount State Farm paid on the Powells' mortgages.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/08/972938P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were charged in a seven count indictment with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). Convicted James Brekke of bank fraud and mail fraud.1 Both James and Lauree were sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. The Brekkes further represented that no payments of compensation in connection with the loan were made. The SBA discovered that the properties pledged as security were subject to a number of undisclosed prior liens. He is not a party to this appeal. 3 2 fraudulently obtained from Twin Valley. The indictment was dismissed and subsequently reinstated. The presiding magistrate judge held a hearing at which the Brekkes both were represented by separate counsel.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/08/963918U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The judgment of the district court1 is affirmed. lack of merit. 1. Specifically: All claims of appellants have been resolved by prior litigation. The state and federal courts have held that 606 Vandalia. Was entitled under Minnesota law to the rent until the contract was terminated. until May 5. JLT's claim is based entirely on what transpired in a prior lawsuit. All of the parties to the present action were Most of the activity was between 606 Vandalia JLT was the mortgagor of the mortgages RTC held. There was no termination was the vendor under the contract for deed with 606 mortgage current. 606 Vandalia refused to do so until the court made it clear that the payments were to be credited on the particular The Honorable James M. United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 2 1 mortgage that was senior in interest to the contract for deed. Not until the contract for deed was canceled. JLT did not object to this order and cannot now argue that the receiver should have collected the rent directly. was paying money to the receiver.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/04/961697P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who at that time was thirteen years old. Asserting that his vendor's lien arising by virtue of the contract for deed was inferior to the government's claim against the property. The FmHA was renamed the Farm Services Administration in 7 U.S.C. § 6932 (1994). 2 parties as defendants as well. The Chapter 12 case was dismissed The Fitzgeralds and judgment. Fitzgeralds argued that they were entitled to a right of redemption under South Dakota law. The district court issued an order and entered judgment were on not the motions. Theodore's vendor's lien was superior to the government's interest and would be satisfied from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 209.48 and Theodore was entitled to accrue interest at an annual rate of five percent until the balance was paid. (4) the FmHA mortgages were superior to all other potential claims. Any claims against the property by the remaining defendants were foreclosed. Was delivered to the Clerk of Court. Where it apparently remained unclaimed at the time this appeal was argued.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/04/952311P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Wicker was charged in a 23 count superseding indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and twentytwo counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. pursuant to a written plea agreement. That he was volitionally entering his plea. Who were behind in their mortgage payments and in danger of having their homes foreclosed by the bank. The misrepresentations included both false statements and omissions of material facts that would have affected the homeowners' decisions regarding their property. He is incorrect. Or other investors to whom Wicker owed money. enticing people to give him title to their homes This artifice of through material misrepresentations was driven. A presentence investigation ensued and a report was compiled. A sentencing hearing was scheduled. That the evidence presented at his plea hearing was insufficient to establish an adequate factual basis for his plea. Which rendered counsel ineffective. had written to the file upon becoming concerned As evidence of Wicker was a conflict.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/01/951086P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The wrap loan was made at a higher interest rate than the first mortgage loan. American Charter was not even aware of the bankruptcy until the borrower petitioned for approval of a third amended plan of reorganization. Which was approved by the bankruptcy court over American Charter's objection in mid 1989. American Charter objected that Rayman was not an authorized substitute servicer under Paragraph 9 of the Participation Agreement: In the event . . . Unless such substituted servicer is a subsidiary of Crest [Savings] or [Crest Mortgage]. The district court denied SPH treble damages and attorney's fees under HOLA on the ground that American Charter's violations were not the proximate cause of SPH's injury. A. Did Rayman or SPH Have a Right To Cure? Is governed by the default provisions of the Participation Agreement. There are two relevant paragraphs: 11. This should have been a reference to the servicer. One of the problems in construing the Participation Agreement is that Rayman's drafters repeatedly confused the roles of Crest Mortgage and Crest Savings.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/12/026075P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court denying the motion to reopen and imposing sanctions. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the court properly imposed monetary sanctions on the Debtors' counsel payable to Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/10/023842P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Ronald was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined $2.3 million for operating an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A Notice of the Right of Redemption was served on Ms. The plan provided that the trustee was to make payments to Advanta Mortgage to cure an arrearage in mortgage payments of $9. The trustee was directed by the plan to accumulate sufficient funds to pay Tax 58's claim in one lump sum prior to distributions of other claims except for the trustee's administrative expenses. Since the focus of this appeal is the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation and application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Our review is de novo. 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for the lower court's application of facts to the legal interpretation of a statute is de novo). The holder of the certificate of purchase may serve the property owner with notice stating that the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/10/013877U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The note was secured by real estate mortgages on two parcels of land. One of the above mentioned parcels of land was sold and the proceeds were deposited into the court registry. They argue that the reduction of the note to judgment in 1984 somehow invalidated the SBA's right to foreclose on the mortgage because the word
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/05/026006P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court denying the motion to reconsider. ISSUES The first issue on appeal is whether the Debtors' appeal was timely. We conclude that the appeal was not timely as to the bankruptcy court's original order declining to reopen the Debtors' Chapter 7 bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350 to permit the Debtors to pursue an action against Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/003611P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is the subject of this interlocutory appeal. Heartland brokered a mortgage for the Glovers with an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/02/002692P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Orion is entitled to a flat rate fee and
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/10/011501P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
As deficiencies were assessed against her because she filed a joint tax return with her husband. References to
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/07/003147P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This appeal revolves around a loan that was made by Brenton First National Bank (the Bank) to Audio Odyssey. Sitting by designation. 1 Ann Dincer (Audio Odyssey and the Dincers are referred to collectively as Audio Odyssey). The loan was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Insofar as is possible. The Dincers executed an SBA Note which stated: This promissory note is given to secure a loan which SBA is making or in which it is participating and. This instrument is to be construed and (when SBA is the Holder or a party in interest) enforced in accordance with applicable Federal law. The Authorization and Loan Agreement provides that it is subject to the provisions of the 1978 Guaranty Agreement. The loan was secured with. Who was responsible for managing the SBA's guaranteed loan program in the eastern 29 counties of Iowa. That it was overdrawn on its checking account. Bradley also told Hoffman that Audio Odyssey was going to hold a sale that weekend and Bradley feared that the profits would be applied to the withholding tax Audio Odyssey owed rather than to the loan from the Bank.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/04/04-8017.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The state claim is that by charging more than three points at closing Mortgage Capital exceeded a limit set by 815 ILCS 205/4.1a. Providing that a person
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-2953.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The lease was not terminated at that time. VistaCorp ended up transferring the property to VP Land Trust the legal beneficiary of which was J.D. Title was later transferred from VP Land Trust to Marion Castellano. The building was left in postaddition condition. I.e. it was missing one wall where it was attached to the adjoining property. A pair of letters were exchanged between the attorneys for Wal Mart and Castellano. This was after Castellano's attorney sent another letter to Wal Mart's attorney. Partial Settlement No. 03 2953 Castellano argues that the October 1998 letters constituted a binding settlement agreement that Wal Mart fraudulently refused to honor because it knew that Castellano was in a dire financial situation. Illinois law is clear that duress
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-2043.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was thus required to pay $828. His Chapter 12 bankruptcy petition was dismissed. Whereby he and his wife conveyed the farm to the FSA and were released from all personal liability on the mortgages. The FSA recorded the deed in its name and then claims to have rented the farm to others for a period of approximately five years. 1 Prior to October 1. The FSA was known as the Farmers Home Administration. We will refer to both agencies as FSA. He was sent a standard sales contract to sign and return to the FSA. A judgment was entered on April 10. Asserted in his schedules that he was the owner of the farm and that the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1970.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Boyd's loans were assigned to yet another entity. Which immediately removed the case to federal court once it was named as a defendant. Boyd was advised by Linda Orr. Which Boyd alleged had taken an assignment of
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1018.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The question presented by this appeal is whether the 1994 Act's regulation of all home mortgage lenders repeals the 1982 Act's rule of parity between state and federal institutions in alternative mortgage transactions. Regulations imposing extra restrictions on state chartered lenders in Illinois are valid. Implied repeal occurs only when the statutes are irreconcilable. Is that the 1982 and 1994 Acts concern the same subject matter. That is not. Substantive rules in one law are not logically incompatible with an equal treatment rule in another. What Illinois has done is to issue regulations that augment for state chartered lenders only restrictions of the kind imposed by the 1994 Act. A lender chartered in Illinois is forbidden to make either of these loans. It is unnecessary to detail them. Filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the state regulations are preempted by virtue of §3803(c) as applied to lenders that comply with all applicable federal laws and regulations. The point is uncontested on appeal.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-3487.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Fairbanks sent the Schlossers a letter asserting that the debt was in default. Fairbanks was mistaken. The Schlossers were not in default. Because the debt was not actually in default when Fairbanks acquired it. Fairbanks was not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. 10% of which were identified as in default. The Schlossers' mortgage was delinquent at the time of the transfer. Notifying the Schlossers that they were in default. This letter is a formal demand to pay the amounts due. In the event that these sums are not paid to Fairbanks Capital Corp. WILL BE ACCELERATED and foreclosure proceedings will be instituted. . . . You have the right to bring a court action if you claim that the loan is not in default or if you be No. 01 3487 lieve that you have any other defense to the acceleration and sale. . . . This letter is from a debt collector and is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. 3 When the Schlossers tried to make their regular monthly payment to Fairbanks.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3238_015.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
(The purchase price is being held in escrow.). The mortgage was not properly signed and attested. Their filings have revealed that (a) the adversary proceeding has been fully resolved (Fifth Third Bank made several claims in addition to the one about the Clinton Property). A final resolution of any adversary proceeding is appealable. As it is equivalent to a stand alone lawsuit. Counsel were mistaken to treat each separate claim in an adversary proceeding as appealable independently while the adversary proceeding as a whole is ongoing. Counsel could have saved both themselves and the judges valuable time by studying the jurisdictional rules and supplying all material information at the outset. Its president was Bruno Garzolini. Its vice president was Robert D. The signature block on the mortgage reads (with manuscript signatures in italic): THE BORROWERS HEREBY DECLARE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE BORROWERS HAVE RECEIVED. The next page contains a notary public's declaration that these signatures are genuine.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3003_013.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The pseudoephedrine was converted into almost a half million dollars' worth of methamphetamine. We agree with the district court that summary judgment for the government was required. One of these products is the cold medicine Release. The active ingredient in Release is pseudoephedrine. Which is a chemical regulated by the U.S. Global was registered and licensed with the DEA to distribute products containing pseudoephedrine. Which is above the sales amount that triggers compliance with the Drug Abuse Act. He claimed that he did not know proof of identity was required. Fatayer was making purchases under the name of Last Call Liquor. Which sets out a regulated person's obligations in ensuring and recording purchasers' identities before a sale of a controlled chemical is completed. It is important to define exactly what requirements the Controlled Substances Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3669_018.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is the second time we visit the fairness of a proposed class settlement stemming from Fleet Mortgage Corporation's (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0008p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
000 down payment on the Lodi property was. That the Versailles property was property of the Debtor's estate.1 For the reasons that follow. The bankruptcy court's judgment is AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether a loan in the amount of $157. 000 loan
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0538n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On which were. The majority explained:
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0259p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lanesky was an employee of a mortgage company who participated in a propertyflipping scheme by obtaining fraudulent mortgages. She was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and launder the proceeds. That she was entitled to a downward departure of three levels. Because her acceptance of responsibility was timely. Nor did it determine that the matters to which she objected were not material to and would not be considered in calculating the sentence. Although the court made clear that it was not relying on the guidelines in determining her sentence. Was not using either. The court said that it was using the money laundering guideline because
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0073p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs appellants are four title insurance companies that do business in Michigan: First American Title Company (a subsidiary of First American Corporation). The defendants appellees are the Registers of Deeds of five counties in Michigan: Lapeer. First American contends that this no resale condition is an anticompetitive practice that violates the Sherman Antitrust Act. We affirm the dismissal of the Sherman Act claims with regard to the challenged practices of the Tuscola County Register because those practices are covered by state action immunity from antitrust liability. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A register of deeds (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0284p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Brought this action to assert his interest in real property that was mortgaged by the Cooks. Does not have a perfected security interest in the property that is superior to Rogan's interest as a judicial lien creditor. An
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0184p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which were consolidated for oral argument. Stem from a program under which the United States Department of Agriculture (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053744np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Anderson claims that the District Court failed to adequately consider the factors enumerated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and erred in calculating the loss for which Anderson is responsible. We will affirm the order of the District Court. Though his sentencing hearing was scheduled for October 15. After hearing testimony from the officer of 2 the Federal Bureau of Investigations (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053477p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm. Four groups are relevant to this appeal. Kemp was charged with two counts of honest services mail fraud for his role in an asset locator business that he created and operated with his friend. Holck and Umbrell were charged with eight counts of honest services wire fraud concerning their role in corrupting Kemp. Hawkins was charged with two counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud. Hawkins The defendants were initially indicted on June 29. All references to the indictment refer to the superseding indictment. 2 1 White passed away before trial. 6 was charged with four counts of perjury stemming from false statements that Hawkins allegedly made while testifying before a grand jury investigating this case.3 B. Central to the government's case were tape recordings of scores of conversations between the defendants. These are but a selection of the charges included in the indictment. Kemp was charged with one count of conspiracy. Hawkins was charged with one count of conspiracy. Knight was charged with one count of conspiracy.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044198np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellants are Robert E. and Lynne K. They appeal the Order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the Weedlings were equally at fault in perpetuating the impasse over payment to PNC Bank. The Court also found that PNC was not 2 the proximate cause for any losses that the Weedlings may have suffered on the sale of their business.1 PNC cross appeals on the failure to enter judgment for it for attorneys' fees. James and Donna were not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding but rather were guarantors of certain indebtedness owed by LCI. PNC was the principal secured creditor of Robert and Lynne with respect to a $2. Which was then implemented in the form of an Order of the Bankruptcy Court entered August 11. Throughout the Opinion we will refer to the business as Gateway. 3 1 attorneys' fees. Robert and Lynne filed an Amended Plan that was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in 1996. The liens were to be secured by two new mortgages with the same existing lien priority. The problem that is the subject of this appeal arose because none of the parties ever executed new documents.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034573np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
James argues that the Territorial Court erred in holding that the statutory period of redemption was six months whereas. It was twelve months. There are two relevant provisions in the Virgin Islands Code. Together with the amount of any taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase. Provides that: A judgment of foreclosure shall not have the effect of barring the equity of redemption. Together with the amount of any taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase. Debtors attempting to redeem after a judgment of foreclosure only have a redemption period of six months. This is clearly incorrect. There is no merit to James' argument that the court erred in denying his Rule 60(b) motion on that ground. James next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the Order Confirming the Sale when he presented evidence that the value of the property far exceeded the sale price and that the amount owed at the time of the Marshal's sale was significantly less than the amount for which judgment was granted.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200611105.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which is detailed herein. Irwin's yield spread premium payments were illegal under RESPA. We conclude that two exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply and that the district court acted properly in applying HUD's test for liability to the facts of appellants' case and in concluding that Irwin was entitled to summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND This is the fourth time we have had cause to review the appellants' RESPA action against Irwin. The procedural backdrop leading to the present appeal is. Our review of this backdrop is as follows. A yield spread premium (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200517045.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which is an issue that has divided not only our sister circuits but panels of our circuit as well. The question presented is whether an acquittal on a charge of an attempted drug offense requires. The dismissal of a charge of a drug conspiracy on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Binyamin Ohayon was tried on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and attempt to possess with intent to distribute MDMA. Ohayon is an Israeli citizen who has difficulty communicating in English and was in the United States on a valid visa. Ohayon was arrested after he took a bag of drugs from a hotel room occupied by a confidential informant and placed the bag in the trunk of a car. Ohayon's only defense was that he was unaware of the contents of the bags. A jury acquitted Ohayon of the attempt count but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the conspiracy count. Because it is clear that the jury found reasonable doubt that Ohayon knew that he was acquiring drugs. A conviction for 2 conspiracy would require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ohayon knew that he was acquiring drugs.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200512559.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND Lynn Soreide is the former wife of Arne Soreide. Arne Soreide was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The criminal forfeiture statutes provide for forfeiture of substitute assets of the defendant if the property involved in or traceable to the crime is not available for forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). 341 (4th Cir. 2000). 3 1 Lynn Soreide was not implicated in Arne Soreide's criminal activity. Lynn Soreide was not employed but held the title of president of Accutel. Her only income was an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200510862.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We consider whether United States law was properly applied to govern a transaction between a Liberian shipowner and a Greek travel agency for travel services benefitting a Greek flagged cruise vessel while it was in a United States port. We find that Greek lawnot United States lawshould have been applied. Background Aktina is a Greek travel agency. Claiming that it was entitled to a maritime lien under the Commercial 3 Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200312820.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 14).1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 The unlawful activities whose proceeds were concealed or promoted were mail fraud. Also charged with conspiracy in the indictment were John Mamone. That charge was dismissed before trial. Is not relevant to this appeal. 2 1 of Count 14 explained that the purposes and objects of the conspiracy were: (a) to conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds of mail and wire fraud. Silvestri was charged in 30 substantive counts with money laundering. The essential facts in this complex fraud case are these. Buccinna and Weiss were also charged in the same substantive counts. Was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. 3 3 2 opportunities. Tang was left with a small clerical staff.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19955267.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Documents attached to and incorporated into the complaint were properly before the district court on a motion to dismiss. 1992 Customs informed Arango that the currency was subject to forfeiture under a money laundering statute and advised him of his right to seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1618. Its letter stated that judicial forfeiture proceedings were available if Arango filed a claim for the property and posted a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19946802.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Both the district court and bankruptcy court found that the debtor's attempt to reinstate his mortgage through a Chapter 13 plan was proper. 939. 1 Smith defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage when he failed to pay the monthly installments when they were due. Argued that Smith lost his right to cure his default on This case originally was consolidated with In re Linda F. Although other circuits have held that the date of the foreclosure sale is the ultimate
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19943513.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellant purchased single family residences for a nominal price from financially distressed homeowners whose mortgage loans were guaranteed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The homeowners would be better off than they would were the mortgages on their residences foreclosed. Appellant pocketed the portion of the rent that was to pay the mortgage. Mortgages were foreclosed. Appellant was indicted and eventually. She moved the district court for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish an intent on her part to defraud. Which is a matter of first impression in this circuit. That is worthy of discussion: whether. The Government was required to establish as an element of the offense that appellant intended to defraud the United States. Willfully engages in a pattern or practice of (1) purchasing one to four family dwellings ... which are subject to a loan in default at time of purchase or in default within one year subsequent to the purchase and the loan is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust insured or held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1589.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellees. This case is related to a lengthy and bitterly fought divorce proceeding in New Hampshire between plaintiff Annette B. It would appear that the divorce proceedings were precipitated when Annette discovered that Joseph was having an affair with the household maid. Inter alia: What I cannot find is a pattern of racketeering activity as defined by the RICO statute. [W]here this complaint is deficient is that it does not allege false or fraudulent pretenses. Those allegations are not made with the specificity required by Rule 9(b). Although RICO is silent about what limitations period governs the filing of civil RICO claims. The Supreme Court has held that civil RICO actions are subject to a four year limitations period. 183 (1997)(holding that civil RICO claims are subject to a four year limitation period contained in 4B of the Clayton Act the statute of limitations that governs private civil antitrust actions seeking treble damages). The first requirement that the plaintiff must establish in order to survive a motion to dismiss is the existence of an enterprise.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-2330.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. Robert Rowe was convicted on two counts of bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 152. I. Background The facts of this case are not in serious dispute. Doing so obligated him to file with the bankruptcy court a number of bankruptcy schedules that are designed to profile a chapter 7 petitioner's financial situation.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1831.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. were on brief. Were on brief. Was charged with five counts of wire fraud. The charges are based on five wire transfers made in June 1988. The transfers were to pay liens and costs on properties owned by Reeder which had been posted as collateral for the purchase of two insurance companies. Reeder was convicted of all ten counts. An insurer that was licensed in Arizona and had its principal offices in California. Was a shell company. Diamond was to receive about $29.4 million in cash from LACOP. $18 million was to be delivered to Diamond at closing. The total was about $17 million. Those preexisting liens were significant because they meant that American's and Diamond's security interests would be subordinated to other mortgages on the properties. At the same time that these representations were being made. Reeder was repeatedly advised that Resolute had no means by which to pay the debt. The Rhode Island regulators were particularly concerned about the encumbrances on the property securing the promissory note to American.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1111.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hostage and Reed & Hostage P.C. were on brief for appellant. Department of Justice were on brief for appellee. Christopher was convicted after a jury trial in the district court on eleven counts of wire fraud. (American was a Rhode Island corporation. Diamond was an Arizona corporation subject to jurisdiction of both Arizona and California.). That capital was to come from business entities controlled by George W. Three of the notes are relevant here. The first was payable to American for $50 million and was executed by Hilltop Developers (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2331.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellees. Plaintiffs are the developers of the subdivision. Defendant is the title insurance company which. It is the enforceability of these various agreements that is at the heart of this action. Defendant responded with a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that a 1991 agreement between the parties was valid. Holding that the 1990 agreement was an unenforceable
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2009.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Barron & Stadfeld were on brief for appellee. The Gens Note was secured by a third mortgage on real property in Barnstable. Although the Barnstable Property was subject to two prior mortgages. Home Owners was declared insolvent and the Resolution Trust Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1845.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rosenthal P.C. were on brief for appellant. Gross & Pabian were on brief for appellee. Which was to engage in the plumbing and heating business. The principal lenders for the various real estate development projects undertaken by Realty were Commerce Bank & Trust Co. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1642.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Davis and McGovern & Associates were on brief for appellant. Crisafulli were on brief for appellees Fleet National Bank and Fleet Credit Corp. With whom McGair & McGair was on brief for appellees C & J Jewelry Co. The facts are related in the light most favorable to appellant Peters. At 6 (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1363.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A Rhode Island accounting firm with whom he was employed as a certified public accountant. Was responsible for losing an investment of $130. Held that Cottrill was a fiduciary of the Plan within the meaning of ERISA. Therefore was responsible to Plan for the loss. Two further counts have been dropped. As a result of which SJU is no longer a party. 3 for Cottrill on his complaint. 000 of the SJU Plan's assets were invested. In which Cottrill was a partner. The assets had apparently disappeared.2 Because both the claim and counterclaim turn on whether Cottrill was a fiduciary with respect to the $130. The court found that Cottrill was a fiduciary because he exercised
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1674.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
McAllister and Cuddy Bixby were on brief for appellant. Peres and Riemer & Braunstein were on brief for appellee. Among the Seventeen Notes was a $290. All citations of statutory sections are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Bank claimed to have a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1509.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1994 is corrected as follows: On page 2. Meyer & Solomon were on brief. Clarifying the source and extent of bankruptcy courts' powers to manage the estates of debtors whose fates are intertwined with the affairs of failed financial institutions. Background Background The facts essential to an understanding of this appeal are not disputed. The debt (much of which remains unpaid) is evidenced by three promissory notes. The notes are cross collateralized and secured by mortgages encumbering all three pieces of property. First Service was declared insolvent. The FDIC was appointed as liquidating agent (and thereby became the owner and holder of the notes). The appeal (which we shall term
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-2049.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellees. The form of Grande's claims is substantively driven by his desperate attempt to avoid the reach of D'Oench. Manchester Properties Limited Partnership (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1684.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dempsey & Brodigan were on brief for appellant. Pincus were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. loan proceeds embezzled with intent to repay are taxable in the year of the embezzlement. Sharon was designated sole trustee and Ronald received title to all transferable Trust stock. Applicants must have owned (or contracted to buy) the property before the proper ty damage occurred. Webb was required to submit receipts evidencing payments for marina repairs. The diverted funds were not reported on Webb's 1978 federal income tax return. Webb was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts of making false statements on an SBA loan application. See 26 U.S.C. 1The loan was personally guaranteed by Webb and one John McNamara. 3 7422(a). That evidence of Webb's intent to repay the embezzled SBA loan proceeds was immaterial as a matter of law.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2408.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellees. Background Background The Nelsons were married on February 2. Mark was obligated to pay Paula $200 weekly as child support for the benefit of their eight year old daughter.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2073.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mann with whom Mann & Mitchell was on brief for appellant Joseph Cassiere. Fishman & Leonard were on brief for appellant Janet Dolber. Was on brief for appellee.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1613.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
DeMallie & Lougee were on brief for appellants. DeMallie & Lougee were on brief for appellants. Were on brief Section Tax Division and David I. Were on brief for appellee. for appellee. A closely held corporation of which Ralph and his three brothers were the only individual shareholders. The IRS determined that the alleged loans were taxable as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1238.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Code permits the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tocollect a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1917.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Charset=utf 8
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1333.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief. Which was entered 127 days after sentencing. Was invalid. Any error that the district court may have committed by entering Cheal's restitution order after the 90 day period did not constitute plain error. Nancy Cheal was 60 years old and lived in a five bedroom double wide trailer home along with her second husband and four great grandchildren. Although the purpose served by these clubs is not clear. Cheal organized and began to advertise the investment scheme that led to her criminal convictions.<A HREF=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2003/023989p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that the lien of a mortgage was not affected by the fact that the notary public's embossed seal was not visible in the acknowledgment on the document filed in the County Recorder of Deeds Office. We will affirm the summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee. Schwab was appointed Trustee. Asserted that it was the holder of a mortgage on the debtor's premises. The Trustee argues that the mortgage on record was thus invalid and did not give cognizable notice to creditors of the existence of the lien. The embossment need not have been capable of photographic reproduction. That the mortgage was validly recorded. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the mortgagee GMAC. The validity of the lien in this case is governed by Pennsylvania law. Is to give notice of the incumbrance.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032729np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to review the district court's judgment for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation acting as the receiver for Bell Savings Bank following a trial in which the plaintiffs claimed that the FDIC was liable for damages stemming from Bell's failure to maintain their line of credit. We will affirm. Finding that the Cohens had not established The claim was originally filed in Pennsylvania state court and removed to the district court. It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law applies to the state law issues. 2 1 that their alleged compensatory damages resulted from Bell Savings' actions. They argue that the court erred in dismissing their claim for failure to make out any compensatory or punitive damages because they were. They argue that the court should have allowed them to seek punitive damages against the FDIC. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who failed to establish compensatory damages was not entitled to nominal damages absent a request for them. Pennsylvania courts have only reversed a trial court's failure to award nominal damages if the plaintiff has.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Apr2002/982130u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will vacate the order awarding attorneys' fees and remand in order to afford the district court an opportunity to clarify. As well as their claim that United was engaged in a pattern or practice of making loans without regard to consumers' repayment ability. An assertion that would have constituted another violation of HOEPA. The court concluded it was not necessary to reach the state claims. United alleged that this
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1997/97a1702p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to decide whether a highly structured securitization transaction negotiated between Citicorp and an investor in a limited partnership constitutes an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1995/95a1044p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The debt was therefore dischargeable. Because the bankruptcy court based its decision upon facts that were not in the record. We will remand the case to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further fact finding. David Cohn was involved in a business relationship with a financial consultant. Cohn was required to sign a promissory note for his share. 500 which was to be executed between Cohn. Schedule No. 5 required as follows:
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb2000/986368.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
F&D asserts that the district court's ruling on the discovery issue is correct. It is entitled to summary judgment because the loss City Federal sustained is not covered by the bond. We will reverse the district court's order of summary judgment. In view of the circumstance that all of the relevant deposition testimony is not in the record before this court. We have relied on those factual statements and other portions of the record in deciding this appeal. To the extent that the parties' briefs indicate that there are disputed facts. We will refer to the RTC's version because we must view the facts in the light most favorable to it. Because this appeal is intensely fact driven. It is necessary to set forth the factual background in some detail. City Collateral was City Federal's mortgage warehouse lending operation.3 Among other things. Lyndon Merkle (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/993856.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which have been consolidated before the district court for pretrial purposes. Which is in the business of purchasing such delinquent claims from municipalities in several states. Appendix references are to the appendix filed in Nos. 99 3858 and 99 3859. 4 September 1996. The City and the School District entered into a Purchase Agreement whereby existing claims and liens for unpaid taxes and sewer charges were assigned to NTF.2 App. at 517. Ltd. (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981153.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
No. 98 1153 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The instant case is a landlord tenant matter over which the federal courts have jurisdiction by reason of diversity. The landlord's 1995 agreement with the assignee to permit termination on 120 days notice of a lease agreement originally scheduled to end in the year 2000 was a material alteration that relieved the assignor of its contractual duties under the lease. The assignor still owes the rent that was not paid by the assignee when it became insolvent. The issue is a novel one under Virginia law. Are the following: There was a lease agreement entered into on July 15. Which was an unincorporated division of Grace. Tenant shall have the right. To assign this Lease to a corporation or other business entity acquiring all or substantially all of the assets of Tenant's Herman's World of Sporting Goods division . . . provided that Tenant shall give to Landlord due written notice and provided that such assignee shall assume this Lease in writing and will fully and punctually perform.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031473.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. National Home Loan Corporation (National) was in the business of providing individuals with loans secured by second mortgages on real property. The principal amount of the loan was $26. The disclosed Annual Percentage Rate of the loan was 15.952%. The current holder of Faircloth's note is Financial Asset Securities Corporation Mego Mortgage Home Owner Loan Trust. The non holder trusts are the entities that Faircloth alleged are the holders of the notes of the other members of the putative class as a result of National's sale of those loans. Faircloth alleged that each of the 29 defendants is liable under North Carolina law for National's conduct in selling the original loans. Were liable for the acts of National as holders of the notes securing the class members' respective mortgages. None of which are North Carolina residents. Faircloth filed an amended complaint that was substantially similar to the original complaint. If Faircloth were to prevail on her individual claims in the original complaint.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001360.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will refer to Defendants collectively as DMAS. 1 HCMF CORPORATION v. Reasoning that the claim HCMF sought to add to its complaint was indistinct from its original claim. Thus the amendment was futile. We nevertheless agree with the district court that the amendment was futile. The construction of the nursing homes was financed by bonds authorized by Industrial Development Authorities (IDA). The FHA mortgages have a slightly higher interest rate than the IDA bonds. Medicaid is a joint federal state program under which federal funds are made available to states that provide medical services to eligible recipients. The federal Medicaid requirement relevant here was contained in the Boren Amendment: Each state was required to assure the federal government that under its Medicaid program the state reimbursed nursing facilities at rates that were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-1212.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court sentenced her to 18 months in prison and (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> restitution of $41. All of the mortgages were insured by the Federal Housing Administration. Soehnge was not alone in preparing fraudulent applications. All but one Mendez employee was aware of the fraudulent mortgage applications permeating the office. The application was prepared by Soehnge's co defendant. We will not disturb the district court findings unless they are without support in the record or. We are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We are reviewing whether support exists in the record for the district court's finding Soehnge jointly undertook criminal activity with her co defendants for which she is responsible due to the reasonably foreseeable nature of her co defendant's crimes. Nor that the losses were reasonably foreseeable. The court felt Soehnge mutually assisted and was assisted by her co defendants through the Mendez operation's joint advertising.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-6214.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Holding that its mortgage lien on debtor Carl G. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 36.3. <hr> Davis's principal residence was not avoided by the order of confirmation in Davis's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d) and we affirm. Davis included the following sentence in the paragraph of the Plan entitled
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May19/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-2.gif" ALT="237"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov2000/99-11687.man.html">UNITED STATES V. TRAVERS (11/21/2000, NO. 99-11687)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/05/972522P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a class action securities fraud case against KPMG Peat Marwick (KPMG) as auditor of the Piper Funds Inc. We will call these investment restriction claims the noncompliance claims. Thus was riskier. KPMG argued anything it omitted to say would not have significantly altered the mix of available information. So the claimed omissions were immaterial as a matter of law. Some explanation of the Fund's investments will help orient the reader to this factually complex case. These securities are issued by federal entities that assemble pools of mortgage loans. Some of the Fund's CMOs were floating rate CMOs. Others were inverse or reverse floating CMOs. The Fund's derivatives were highly sensitive to interest rate change. The Fund was heavily invested in principal only SMBSs and inverse floating CMOs. Both of which are especially hard hit when interest rates go up. A security is bought or sold at a fixed price. Payment is delayed until a future date. Repurchase agreements were disclosed by the Fund. The Fund was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0005n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which was recorded first. Was not released even though the outstanding balance on the promissory note secured 1 FNB has since merged with Fifth Third Bank. Which is named as defendant in this action. N.A. by FNB's deed of trust was paid in full at the time Redick entered into a subsequent deed of trust with Chase. Failed to follow up when confronted by information that should have raised concerns. Because our holding is grounded on the language of the deeds of trust and their accompanying promissory notes rather than upon the circumstances surrounding their negotiation. A lengthy factual recitation is unnecessary. It was recorded in Williamson County two days later. This statement is underscored in the following paragraph: 2 No. 06 5012 JPMorgan Chase. Whichever is greater. 000 that was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0003p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He was the chairman of the board and a member of the five person financial management committee). Quinlan was responsible for
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0011n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Howard Shanker asserts that the bankruptcy court's factual findings on several issues are erroneous. 3 there are only two issues in this appeal relevant to deciding whether the McIntyre Mortgage is a valid first mortgage: (1) whether the bankruptcy court's factual finding that Carol Shanker's signature on the McIntyre Mortgage was not a forgery is clearly erroneous and (2) whether the bankruptcy court's factual finding that Howard Shanker was not fraudulently induced to execute the McIntyre Mortgage was clearly erroneous. The bankruptcy court's opinion indicates that Howard Shanker is a law school graduate who is not admitted to the bar. A copy of the bankruptcy court's order is attached to the motion. That the appeal is not moot because the issue of the validity of the McIntyre Mortgage directly affects how the proceeds from the sale of the Real Estate should be disbursed. An order by a bankruptcy court determining the validity of a lien is a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0007p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
An order is final if it
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06b0006p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Presently before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/02/973684P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The property was eventually forfeited. The Watkins' action was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Where it was referred for early mediation. Terry Lundell was also required to obtain a life insurance policy naming the Watkins as beneficiaries. The life insurance policy was never obtained. This action was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The Lundells were personally served and read and understood the summons and complaint. Being informed that an answer was due. An answer was never filed. While doing so were contacted by an Arizona attorney representing the Lundells. The Arizona attorney indicated that the Lundells were contemplating bankruptcy and were prepared to offer the Watkins a quitclaim deed to some property. This offer was to be in settlement of all the Watkins' claims. Default was entered against the Lundells. The action was referred to a magistrate judge for a determination of damages. At which the Lundells were not present.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/03/981962P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
HUD was assigned mortgage liens against the property. McNeill alleged the district court had
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0651n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The surety was Lyndon. The principal was Wallace's. The obligee was the particular college defendant. Wallace's was required to make minimum monthly commission payments to EKU. EKU or its designee was to buy Throughout this opinion. The underlying agreements between the colleges and Wallace's are referred to as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0397p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Ernest and Shirley Bergman were involved in an automobile accident. The issue in the present action is whether Anthem. The decision of the District Court is affirmed. Which provides: We [Anthem] have the right to recover payments we make on your behalf from any party responsible for compensating you for your injuries. The following apply: We have first priority for the full amount of benefits we have paid from any recovery regardless of whether you are fully compensated. The issue presented is whether an insurer's contractual subrogation rights create a property right in the insurer. So that this contractual right is not properly included in the bankruptcy estate. Unless a federal interest is at issue. Property rights are defined by state law. The other party to the accident was not insured. Rejecting Hrenko's arguments that his medical insurer's subrogation rights existed exclusively against the tortfeasor or tortfeasor's insurer and that the insurer's subrogation rights were contrary to public policy.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0336n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint on the basis of res judicata. Plaintiff LaSalle Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200507/04-5171a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. The appellants are farmers whose discrimination claims were denied in adjudications conducted pursuant to a Consent Decree and whose petitions for review of the adverse adjudications were rejected as untimely because they were filed after the stipulated deadlines that the parties negotiated and the court approved in a Stipulation and Order (S&O). Such a claimant
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/11/991007P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. BACKGROUND Popkin & Stern was a Missouri law firm in which Ronald Lurie (hereinafter Ronald) was a general partner. Ronald was to oversee the liquidation of the firm's assets in 1991. A Chapter 7 involuntary bankruptcy proceeding was initiated against the firm. Blackwell was appointed as trustee. Ronald's share of the contribution was to be $361. Which was evidenced by two promissory notes signed by both Ronald and his wife Nancy. The deed was third in priority to two mortgages. It provided that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/044751D9E25F695A882572CE004BE57F/$file/0510575.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Sine's role in the scheme was to reassure individuals that they were lending money to a legitimate real estate investor and that millions of dollars in legitimate collateral protected them in case of default. Once the scheme started to unravel and it became clear that the collateral was worthless. Claiming that it was as much of a surprise to him as to anybody else that the collateral was illusory. Such use of the judge's statements was highly improper. He convinced victims that they were lending money to fund various real estate projects conducted by Alpha Funding Group. Of which Panthaky was president. Sine was the trustee of Alpha Trust. The
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0081p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The bankruptcy court found that the petition was filed in bad faith and awarded JRH costs. I. BACKGROUND We set forth here an abbreviated version of the material events addressed by the bankruptcy court in adjudicating the merits of JRH's claim that Adell's petition for involuntary bankruptcy was in bad faith. Contending that it was only worth $1 million instead of $1.75 million. All of which essentially rested on two allegations: (1) that Shekerjian and JRH had orally told Adell that the land was worth $1. That the home they would construct for him would have a value of $2. Even though they knew that was impossible because there were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0013n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Provident Bank appeals from the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee avoiding a mortgage lien and preserving it for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate on the basis that the mortgage was not executed by two witnesses as required by Ohio law. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL There are two issues raised in this appeal: (1) whether the bankruptcy court's factual finding that only one of two required witnesses was present at the Debtors' mortgage closing is clearly erroneous. (2) whether the bankruptcy court improperly shifted the burden of proof from the Trustee to the Appellant in making the finding that only one of two required witnesses was present at that closing. An order by a bankruptcy court determining the validity of a lien is a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The Panel must
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0004p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The bankruptcy court found that the Debtor's proposed
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/04BD340382A7132288256F89005DDC55/$file/0315728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND PMI is a large financial institution that sells. This insurance covers a lender for losses incurred when a borrower defaults on the repayment of a mortgage loan and the collateral is not sufficient to make the lender whole. The Third Amended Class Complaint alleged that PMI was undercharging its lender clients for various insurance products and services in exchange for customer referrals on mortgage insurance. The Baynham complaint also alleged that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0501n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We rejected the farmers' contention that payment was not required because local representatives of the Department of Agriculture told them that they would not have to make such payments if they continued to operate their farms for the ten year term of the agreements. The farmers have now petitioned for panel rehearing. Asserting that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0249n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Metcalf was responsible for recording and indexing various legal instruments for the county. Which was public and well attended. The parties do not dispute that the Office Manager and Administrative Officer positions are functionally equivalent. The position will be referred to throughout this opinion as the Administrative Officer position. 2 1 No. 03 3946 Garvey v. Montgomery which was responsible for selecting which candidates would receive the state party's endorsement for elected administrative offices decided to endorse Montgomery for Franklin County recorder. Montgomery was appointed as interim recorder. Who was managing operations. Which was equivalent to the position held by Nichter prior to his resignation. Montgomery Montgomery was officially elected recorder of Franklin County in November 2000. Garvey was replaced by Joseph P. Clark was replaced by Jan Lamm. She was not entitled to relief under the First Amendment. Because political affiliation was an appropriate employment consideration for the position from which she was fired.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/059A7171201E1BD188256BFF00573DFA/$file/9970396.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Agyeman claims that he was denied a full and fair hearing because he was not given adequate instructions as to how to proceed with his applications for relief. That the denial of adjustment of status was predicated on his inability to procure his wife's attendance at the deportation hearing to testify on his behalf. Which was approved in 1992. Agyeman's application for adjustment of status was denied because the couple failed to attend the scheduled interview and submit Agyeman's medical examination. Levy was unable to attend the interview because she was hospitalized for bipolar disorder at the time. 10350 AGYEMAN v. The IJ instructed Agyeman that his wife's testimony was mandatory to determine the bona fides of their marriage. The IJ asked whether Levy was still hospitalized. The IJ stated that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/95opinions/95-5162a.html">VULCAN ARBOR HILL V. REICH ROBERT<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0141p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to determine the extent to which a judgment lien impairs a debtor's statutory exemption. LPP contends that the district court erred in concluding that Brinley's statutorily based exemption from bankruptcy estate property was impaired by LPP's entire judgment lien on Brinley's real estate. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties to this appeal have stipulated to all relevant facts underlying the litigation. 000 worth of property jointly with rights of survivorship (that is. The property is secured by a first mortgage held by PHH US Mortgage Corporation in the amount of $180. Was also placed against the property. The amount presently due and owing on that junior lien is $80. Stuart Brinley was ultimately forced to seek protection under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's right to his claimed exemption was seriously impaired. The bankruptcy court and the district court took different analytical paths when this case was before them. Should first be avoided in its entirety before LPP's judgment lien was partially avoided to reduce Brinley's indebtedness sufficiently to give effect to the exemption.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0074p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Superior Bank argued that its mortgage was equitably subrogated to a prior recorded mortgage. After the appeal was filed in this Court. Empire National Bank's mortgage was recorded on December 17. Less than a month after the mortgage was recorded. Which was subsequently withdrawn on October 27. Superior Bank was placed in receivership pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA.1 On November 15. The bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the trustee and avoided Superior Bank's mortgage.2 After that judgment was affirmed by the district court on appeal. Nearly two years after the FDIC was appointed as receiver. The bankruptcy court concluded that it could not rule on Superior Bank's jurisdictional challenge because it was. A collateral attack on the judgment that was pending on appeal before this Court. 2001 order was entered by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and is entitled
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0064p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This decision was originally issued as an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0054n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When Defendant was indicted. Defendant was arraigned on January 14. Defendant and his wife were tried jointly. Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on August 13. Defendant was the president and part owner of Fries Correctional Equipment of Kentucky. Defendant was also partner in the D&A Company (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0010p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bank One was not liable for the depreciation in value of the shares it held as collateral for a loan to Johnson. Johnson also argues that summary judgment is inappropriate with regards to Bank One's counterclaims against him. The grant of summary judgment to the defendants is AFFIRMED. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of two loan transactions made by Bank One to plaintiffs Johnson and Geoff Layne (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/08FBB64A028909358825707E004BBBC9/$file/0356547.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is withdrawn and replaced by the amended opinion filed concurrently with this order. The petition for panel rehearing is denied. The vessels were arrested pursuant to maritime procedure. The district court determined that in rem jurisdiction was lost because there was no res against which to enforce an eventual in rem judgment. The district court held that it was powerless to order the Owners to reinstate the security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Original District Court Action Ventura Packers is a corporation that provides stevedoring services in Ventura.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0C28F08F05E53FEA88256C310058FEB4/$file/0056448.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over its timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Which is now owned by Rose Lee LLC (collectively
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1C5285F8C8D98ADE88257067004C3F34/$file/0355548.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Insurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehabilitation proceedings began. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. Hawthorne was insured by a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0437p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The general question presented by the relatively bizarre factual background of this case is whether or not a core function of municipal government the provision of firefighting services impacts interstate commerce such that an individual can be indicted under a federal anti arson statute for destroying a fire station. Is whether the Henning. Tennessee Fire Station was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce such that the person charged with setting it ablaze can be indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). We hold that this particular fire station was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce and accordingly REVERSE the judgment of the district court dismissing the indictment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE Prometheus may have thought twice before handing down the gift of fire to humans had he imagined that those whom the mere mortals chose to steward the precious flame would use it to decimate the very mechanisms employed to control 1 No. 02 5185 United States v.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1CB92EF5AD825DA188256CCA0011916F/$file/0215416.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
AT&T appeals on the ground that the application of California's consumer protection laws is preempted by the Federal Communications Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The 1934 Act was intended to address the unique problems inherent in a monopolistic environment.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1F874BD6BAFF92EE88256F470054DDF7/$file/0330221.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Social Security cards and DD Forms 214 were a mix of the real and fictitious: Melendrez made up a fake name to go with each of the real Social Security numbers he used to produce those identification documents. MELENDREZ 15801 At issue is whether the district court correctly applied to Melendrez's base offense level a six level enhancement intended to target
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/24131F4B4D48DA4D88256E5A00707BA3/$file/9955851.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/061214np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm the District Court's judgment and its decision to issue an order enjoining further pro se filings by the Tilburys. The procedural background as well as the factual allegations underlying this cause of action are well known by the parties and need not be detailed here. We note that appellants have a long tortured litigation history regarding the amount due on their 1985 mortgage.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055455np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
His sentence is unreasonable in light of United States v. We will affirm the District Court's judgment of sentence. Who are familiar with this matter. We will forgo a lengthy recitation of the facts. Claiming that he was unable to work as a result of various medical conditions. Shough was initially granted disability payments in the amount of $460 a month. Suspicions were aroused when attendees heard Shough being referred to as both Ken and Leonard. Pennsylvania police and the Social 2 Security Administration that Shough was assuming Green's identity. The District Court granted the motion and Shough was sentenced to a term of 84 months of imprisonment. The Government once again moved for a five level enhancement on the same grounds as before and the motion was granted. The advisory Guidelines range was 63 78 months of imprisonment. The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction over the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Was unable to purchase a home.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055407np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. Our standard of review over the Bankruptcy Court's decision is the same as that exercised by the District Court. The Factors moved to reopen their closed bankruptcy case in order to file adversary proceedings against appellees.1 The undisputed purpose of the adversary proceedings was to defeat appellees' foreclosure actions against the Factors' residential and commercial property. Whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055017p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the adverse action notice provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054023np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we find that this was error. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. Which was handwritten by Jonas and signed by both Jonas and West. The agreement provides: IDT and Alfred West agree that 1) IDT will pay West $200. 000 per year for 5 years 2) Alfred will work exclusively for IDT for 5 years 3) IDT will in six months buy
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053927np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The government appeals the District Court's dismissal of counts of an indictment that was returned against Thomas P. Freebery charging them with honest services fraud.1 Gordon is the County Executive for New Castle County. Freebery is that county's County Chief Administrative Officer (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200106/00-1402b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Klee were on the brief for amici curiae Senator Robert G. With him on the brief were Christopher J. With him on the brief were Michael F. Is bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in bank ruptcy. Con gress also directed the Commission to
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2F3D0EAED61F52D5882571B10081495F/$file/0435210.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Plaintiffs' homes were built with wood foundations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The MHHO Program was designed to These facts. Are taken from Plaintiffs' complaint. Which is presumed true for purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding. The families were required to contribute land. Each family was required to make monthly payments in an amount calibrated to their income. The homebuyers were made responsible for maintenance of the house. When the program was formalized in the Indian Housing Act of 1988. The Blackfeet Housing Authority was charged with
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200104/00-1141a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Stephen L. With him on the brief were Debra A. The Federal Trade Commission determined that these lists were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/340ABB926DF09C948825735600531093/$file/0575957.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the inter vivos transfer was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). At the age of eighty eight.1 She was survived by her son. Who is the executor of The facts we recite are undisputed facts. Was attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney from 1986 until decedent died. Is the attorney of record for this appeal. These gifts were in keeping with decedent's practice of making cash gifts to her children every year around Christmas. After she was released from the hospital. Which was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a first position deed of trust on the Padaro Lane property in favor of the bank. 2 whose stated purpose was to engage in the business of owning and operating residential real property.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051409np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
(2) the District Court's adverse credibility finding following trial was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore Ricciardi should have prevailed on his claim under the Truth in Lending Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3470A4422044C7EA88256A6200834EE3/$file/9956856.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: As is often true in the field of intellectual property. The question that we decide today is whether 35 U.S.C. § 261 of the Patent Act. Matsco Financial Corporation (Petitioners) have a security interest in a patent developed by Cybernetic Services. The patent is for a data recorder that is designed to capture data from a video signal regardless of the horizontal line in which the data is located. Petitioners' security interest in the patent was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200101/99-5327a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was David E. With her on the brief was Craig Goldblatt. With him on the brief was Ann M. Emotional or nervous diseases or disorders of any type.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043374p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
PA 19103 Counsel for Appellee Sun Ship Inc. *This case was argued before the panel of Judges Fuentes. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 USC § 46(d) **Judge Roth assumed senior status on May 31. 2 alleging both false claims and
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3C48384B12A4F727882570F500059764/$file/0355548.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2005 and appearing at 421 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005) is hereby amended as follows: 1) 421 F.3d at 852. Reliance2 was placed in rehabilitation proceedings. Reliance's principal argument is that the district court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Hawthorne's suit once the rehaInsurance companies are expressly excluded from federal bankruptcy laws. Charging substantial fees and interest.4 After the period in which Bazyler could have rescinded the loan without penalty passed. Braly decided to have Hawthorne bid against Bazyler at the foreclosure sale. Even though there was no doubt that Bazyler had the necessary collateral for the extra funds. The facts giving rise to the original settlement between Bazyler and Hawthorne are undisputed and were stipulated at trial. 4 HAWTHORNE SAVINGS v. Hawthorne was insured by a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/50ED5D88FD07F49C8825707A007D8401/$file/0310548.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the convictions in all respects and remand on sentencing pursuant to United States v. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The government brought Smith and Bates1 to trial for Smith and Bates were tried as co defendants with another alleged participant in the conspiracy. Wadsworth was acquitted by the jury. 1 13076 UNITED STATES v. Probably certain personal items were not exempt. Numerous clients testified at trial how defendants (usually Smith2) advised them that they did not have to pay taxes once they paid the defendants to establish a UBO. Bates told Denby and her husband that no taxes need be paid on
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/71A061C7705237C3882571FC004939A4/$file/0436066.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the briefs. Was on the brief. Was on the brief. Appellants are residents who presently live in this housing property. We affirm the district court's denial of appellants' motion to intervene in the quiet title lawsuit because their interests are sufficiently protected by their APA lawsuit. Kimberly merely held that certain defenses were not available to the government in a quiet title action brought by Section 515 borrowers to enforce their contractual right to prepay their loans. Ours is an APA case brought by residents challenging the agency's noncompliance with the Emergency Low Income Housing Protection Act. Kimberly did not hold that ELIHPA was invalid or that the Department of Agriculture was free to violate it. I. Background The facts are not disputed. Section 515 of the National Housing Act of 1949 was enacted by Congress to encourage private investment in housing for elderly and low income individuals in rural areas. Which was later subsumed into RHS. UNITED STATES the housing owners agreed to rent to qualified low income tenants at affordable rates for as long as the loans were outstanding.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7DFE0CEAE02C4E5988256CEE00808B5A/$file/0136076.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to Trust One Mortgage Corporation (Trust One) in a class action involving residential mortgages. The class is composed of all mortgagors whose Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage loans were funded by Trust One and whose mortgage brokers were paid compensation in excess of 1% of the aggregate loan amount (the Bjustrom class). Bjustrom is the representative class member. Such claim was not contained in Trust One's motion for summary judgment. I. There are no disputed facts. Trust One is an Irvine. Mortgage brokers are paid for this work. The amount of compensation they receive is regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The charge not to exceed: (i) $20 dollars or one percent of the original principal amount of the mortgage . . . whichever is the greater. 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i). TRUST ONE MORTGAGE CORP. 3957 At issue are the lender paid broker fees denominated as yield spread premiums (YSP)2 and service release premiums (SRP).3 Both are disclosed to a borrower on a HUD 1 Settlement Statement.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/97-7211a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Mark L. With him on the brief was Laurie B. Because of its importance to local commerce and because there is no decision by the highest court in the District of Columbia precisely on point. We have decided to certify it to that court. We agree that such dismissal was improper and rein state these two claims contingent on a positive response by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to the question certified here. DeBerry that this grant was improper and accordingly reinstate the claim. DeBerry is a citizen of the District of Columbia. First Government is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland. Code s 28 3904 is entitled
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034273p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Esquire *Judge Chertoff heard oral argument in this case but resigned prior to the time the opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. §46(d). ** Honorable Joseph E. Santiago alleged that the reasonable value of the funding service was $20.00. Finding that Section 8(b) was intended to prohibit kickbacks and referral fees and does not include a cause of 4 action for the conduct alleged by Santiago. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The threshold question is whether the statute clearly and unambiguously allows Santiago's claims.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/81F608F9B1E4C9CF88256B7E006D3ADC/$file/0016772.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We are asked to decide whether the litigation position of the United States Department of Justice was substantially jus4381 tified when it continued to advance a forfeiture claim after the Supreme Court clarified the law to the contrary. Which was not recorded until January 24. The fair market value of the property was between $590. The purchasers then moved to dismiss the government's forfeiture complaint or for summary judgment under Rule C(6) of the Rules of Admiralty.2 Although the purchasers' claims were untimely. The United States's) 2 In rem forfeitures are conducted in accordance with the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Which was January 24. (3) they were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033552p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Since Knapper's attempt to void the default judgments is foreclosed by the Rooker Feldman 2 doctrine. We will vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A mortgage lien was placed on both parcels of real estate as a result of one or more loan agreements Knapper entered into with Amresco Residential Securities Corporation. It was served on September 7. Giacomelli's affidavit of service recited that the complaint was served on an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033101p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are satisfied that. Is entitled to recover both the collateral (an aircraft engine) and the proceeds. This conclusion is also supported: (1) by the language of the controlling agreements between Tower and FINOVA. We will therefore affirm the order of the District Court. The agreements specified that insurance proceeds of the engines were part of FINOVA's collateral.1 Tower also covenanted to maintain insurance on the aircraft. The engine at issue in this appeal was severely damaged in an in flight accident. The cross collateralization was created in page 2 of the Aircraft Mortgage. As 49 U.S.C. § 44107 is such a statute. Its UCC filings in New York were unnecessary. 503.26 was directly attributable to the accident. Was appointed Chapter 7 trustee. The engine was returned to FINOVA. Some of FINOVA's other collateral was apparently destroyed or impaired by Tower. There is no dispute that the engine was returned in fully repaired condition. FINOVA contends that the total value of all returned collateral was some $36 million.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDAzLTUwNzNfc28ucGRm/03-5073_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
03 5073 Page 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. Held that certain debts owed by Eberhart to First American Title Insurance Company (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDA1LTE1MTMtYmtfc28ucGRm/05-1513-bk_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/89DFDF5DEAB8CEB988256E8A0074327E/$file/0236018.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lashinsky is substituted for her predecessor. The issue we decide is whether Taub engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by interpreting the terms
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8E6D00949CDFE6D38825705B004F17C8/$file/0316194.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We affirm the district court's conclusion as to preemption under the Bank Act but hold that the per diem loan interest statute is not preempted by the DIDMCA. The purpose of the audits was to ascertain whether the mortgage subsidiaries had overcharged interest and provided unduly low estimates of certain classes of settlement fees. 3 WFHMI was licensed to engage in real estate lending activities under the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA). Wells Fargo's claims as to WFHMI are not moot. Even if they were. There is no distinction between WFHMI and NCMC pertinent to our disposition. 4 Specifically. Unless a person or transaction is excepted from a definition or exempt from licensure by a provision of this law or a rule of the commissioner. The licensing requirements referred to in the section are discussed in more detail below. 5 The CFLL does not apply to any loans made pursuant to the CRMLA. BOUTRIS Commissioner is the state official charged with enforcing those laws governing licensed home mortgage lenders.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTE1MzRfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-1534_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That he is entitled to a sentencing remand pursuant to United States v. That the restitution ordered by the district court was in error and unconstitutional. He is not entitled to a remand at this time under Crosby. (3) there was no error in the restitution order imposed by the district court. (ii) that he is entitled to a sentencing remand pursuant to United States v. (iii) that the district court's restitution order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A 3664 was in error and unconstitutional. Which stated that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTE0MzUtY3Jfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-1435-cr_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
J.) holds that (1) the government's alleged breaches of the plea agreement either were not breaches or were adequately cured. (2) sentencing enhancements for
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQ3NDQtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-4744-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: When a state is sued for allegedly impairing the contractual obligations of one of its political subdivisions even though it is not a signatory to the contract. The state will not be held liable for violating the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution unless plaintiffs produce evidence that the state's self interest rather than the general welfare of the public motivated the state's conduct. Plaintiffs have the burden of proof because the record of what and why the state has acted is laid out in committee hearings. The record of why the state acted is available. Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Plaintiffs are the Buffalo Teachers Union and a number of other unions in Buffalo. Defendants are the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority (Buffalo Fiscal Authority. The comptroller concluded Buffalo was not in a position to resolve its fiscal woes on its own. The board would have powers and duties similar to those given to boards that already oversaw the budgets of other fiscally troubled municipalities in New York State.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTI3MTQtY3Jfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-2714-cr_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We further hold that we have jurisdiction to review defendant's below Guidelines sentence. That defendant's sentence is reasonable. He further maintains that his below Guidelines sentence is unreasonable. Including that he was a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A83E77C287CE5F6588256C0C007F1641/$file/0130065.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the brief. Steve Huggins (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AA1F55BD132160858825705A000016EA/$file/0356547.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The vessels were arrested pursuant to maritime procedure. The district court determined that in rem jurisdiction was lost because there was no res against which to enforce an eventual in rem judgment. The district court held that it was powerless to order the Owners to reinstate the security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Original District Court Action Ventura Packers is a corporation that provides stevedoring services in Ventura.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BBCE2008CCBBBD1388256AAA007EEDD1/$file/9935188.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Argues that it is not 11158 barred from bringing a quiet title action against the United States on property subject to a government loan. Which was later subsumed into the Rural Housing Service (collectively referred to as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C37FE78EBE161BA088256FBF0077D03D/$file/0315728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: PMI MORTGAGE INS. v. For Certification of the Controlling Issue to the California Supreme Court and Appellees Columbia Casualty Company and Federal Insurance Company's Petition for Panel Rehearing are DENIED. BACKGROUND PMI is a large financial institution that sells. This insurance covers a lender for losses incurred when a borrower defaults on the repayment of a mortgage loan and the collateral is not sufficient to make the lender whole. The Third Amended Class Complaint alleged that PMI was undercharging its lender clients for various insurance products and services in exchange for customer referrals on mortgage insurance. The Baynham complaint also alleged that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTMxMzctY3Jfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-3137-cr_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That Condition 5 is an abuse of discretion. Brown was on probation as a result of a prior New York state conviction for felony drug charges. He was charged in the Northern District of New York with distributing cocaine base. He was not arrested until March 2003. He was found with a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTM3NzAtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-3770-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of certain Connecticut banking laws against Wachovia Mortgage on the ground that the state laws are preempted by the National Bank Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C58EEDE5499DB9F988256E5A00707B7F/$file/9956856.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: As is often true in the field of intellectual property. The question that we decide today is whether 35 U.S.C. § 261 of the Patent Act. Matsco Financial Corporation (Petitioners) have a security interest in a patent developed by Cybernetic Services. The patent is for a data recorder that is designed to capture data from a video signal regardless of the horizontal line in which the data is located. Petitioners' security interest in the patent was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C5AC0767DE802CAA88256D6C005A188F/$file/0156061.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The defendant in this case was entitled to the return of a parcel of forfeited real property but. We are called on to decide what date should be used for the substitute valuation. We agree with the district court that the appropriate yardstick is the property's value when the government sold it and that. The purchase price was $287. 000 was financed. MARSHALL 10109 Marshall was arrested in 1992 for distribution of heroin. Three automobiles belonging to Marshall were seized. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) provided: A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. If the motion is granted. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed. The claimant is entitled to recover the seized property or.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199801/97-5016a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the briefs. Amy Loeserman Klein and John McJunkin were on the brief. We hold that the contract language affords Beal a credit only when collateral property was sold between specified dates. Although the court recognizes that the contract was initially drafted and executed by its predecessor in interest. A warning that this information was liable to be inaccurate. Many of the loans involved were in default. This began a six month due diligence period during which Beal could determine if there were any breaches of the representations or warranties made with respect to the prop erty it acquired. That there were no undisclosed delin quent real property taxes on included properties. Beal closed the transactions but noted that it reserved the right to pursue (through the instant litigation) certain credits and back taxes it thought it was due under the contract. The FDIC has consistently asserted that Beal's only reme dy for allegedly defective mortgage loans is via recourse to the contract provisions for breach of warranty.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/994654.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because the district court failed to inform him that the Government must prove materiality for the bank and wire fraud charges. Because we find that the district court's error in failing to inform Strassini that materiality was an element of bank and wire fraud neither affected his substantial rights nor seriously affected the fairness. (6) his 1994 adjusted gross income was approximately $96. 500 check into his business account at NationsBank that was drawn on his MBNA America Visa credit card. Strassini made several withdrawals from the account before the check was returned for insufficient funds. (4) Elite Homes was worth $937. The proceeds of which were deposited into his personal checking accounts. Strassini stipulated that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea and that presentation of the factual basis was deferred until sentencing. Informed Strassini of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty by explaining the elements of bank fraud.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200514475.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is a huge. Sitting by designation. 4 cases were consolidated on appeal. Leonardo Nunez Virraizabal a/k/a Noel Chavez Moreno (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C67B3DB1B103443E8825731A008288C5/$file/0510575.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ORDER The government's Motion to Change Wording of Opinion is GRANTED. 2007 is hereby amended as follows: 1) On slip op. 4792. The final two sentences of the paragraph beginning
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992344.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Though MMG was successful in securing orders. JP nonetheless ran into financial difficulties and was unable to purchase materials or pay vendors. Edelman is the president and sole shareholder of Kimber. Inc. does not recognize nor does it have any obligation to you under the . . . MMG cross appeals the judge's calculation of prejudgment interest and the judge's refusal to grant MMG commissions on a sale that is currently the subject of litigation in Tennessee. A summary judgment motion should be granted only if there is no genuine dispute as to an issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The only remaining parties are MMG. 000 pistols purchased by Nationwide and Nationwide's repeat orders which were covered by section 6.8 of the Representative Agreement. 4 the evidence in the light most favorable to the non moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in the non movant's favor. Issues of contractual interpretation are reviewed de novo .
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200510863.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For providing necessaries to a Greek flagged cruise vessel while the vessel was in a United States port. I. Introduction This case is properly introduced by another opinion of this court. 616.56 worth of existing food and beverage items already onboard the Vessel and in a shore side warehouse in Greece that were owned by OWC and ROC. Who was onboard for part of the voyage. Guglielmo provided food and beverage management services both while the Vessel was in Port Everglades. The Vessel made two cruises from Port Everglades: the first was from November 30. The second was from December 17. The proposed contract included several provisions that were either directly opposite Zernavi's proposals or had not yet been negotiated. Claiming that it was entitled to a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/99opinions/99-5327a.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Witmeyer III argued the cause for appellant. </P> <P>With him on the briefs was David E. With her on the brief was </P> <P>Craig Goldblatt.</P> <P> . With him on the brief </P> <P>was Ann M. Emotional or nervous diseases or </P> <P>disorders of any type.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200416650.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Asserts that it was not doing so as a fiduciary and thus had no obligation to pay interest on those funds. BONY contends that they were inappropriate on several grounds. We are unpersuaded by BONY's arguments and therefore affirm. Part III addresses BONY's claim that it was an Indenture Trustee with contractual duties. The purpose of the Agreement was to establish an efficient method for paying the Debtor's general unsecured creditors (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EA1F2864F834111D88256E5A00707C5F/$file/9935188.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Argues that it is not 11158 barred from bringing a quiet title action against the United States on property subject to a government loan. Which was later subsumed into the Rural Housing Service (collectively referred to as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200412420.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which are small loans with interest rates averaging 400 500% APR due on the next payday. This appeal presents the question of whether the State of Georgia may regulate a narrow segment of agency agreements between in state payday stores and out of state banks or whether the Georgia Act in issue is preempted by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200410012.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1229. We reverse because we conclude that the transfer at issue in this case was necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Berkshire Mortgage Finance Corporation was the only lender willing to advance the debtors $23.5 million before August 31. Kissimmee's hotel was not subject to the RCAP mortgage. It was under no obligation to refinance its hotel at the time. In pertinent part: 3 Berkshire's willingness to make the loan to [the debtors] is contingent upon Kissimmee Lodge's agreement to refinance its hotel through Berkshire. Berkshire will not provide any financing to [the debtors] unless Kissimmee Lodge refinances through Berkshire. The Kissimmee Lodge refinancing therefore is incident to an a condition precedent to the reorganization of [the debtors] and that refinancing therefore is exempt from Florida documentary stamp taxes. The FDOR argued that the plan failed to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)1 because the § 1146(c) exemption the proposed plan conferred on the Kissimmee transaction was not available as a matter of law to non debtor entities.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-5083.html">MARITRANS INC., V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Laurie Frost Wilson</u>. <st1:State>Virginia</st1:State></st1:place>.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief was <u>Arthur J. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Douglas N. Line height:200%'>Maritrans Inc. is a marine petroleum transport company.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Maritrans Inc. Mso bidi language:AR SA'>[1]</span></span><![endif]></span></span></a><span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Maritrans asserted that the vessels were taken by the double hull requirement imposed by section 4115 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (". As far as twenty nine of the single hull tank vessels were concerned. Maritrans' takings claim was not ripe for adjudication.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span><u>Maritrans Inc. v. </u><st1:country region><st1:place><u>United States</u></st1:place></st1:country region>.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116553.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
000 that had been transferred by the debtor to the defendants in an alleged FinFed and ABS were found to be so intertwined. They were deemed one entity by the bankruptcy court. 2 1 Ponzi scheme2 involving viaticated life insurance policies.3 The trustee's claims against Orlick were severed from the main case for non jury trial before the bankruptcy court. The facts involved in Orlick's case are straightforward. She claims that it was agreed that she would be compensated at the rate of one percent (1%) of the gross revenues generated by ABS. It is not disputed that her responsibilities included organizing the office by computerizing functions. The term generally describes a pyramid type investment scheme where investors are paid profits from newly attracted investors promised large returns on their principal investments. Typically it is not supported by any underlying business venture. An investor that does receive money is not receiving income on his or her investment. More and more investors are solicited in order that the investors at the top of the pyramid can be compensated.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FE9DB4596784BC4F88256A6F0081F41D/$file/9955851.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011663.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011663.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914875.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Was $748. 664.76) as attorney's fees. 3 bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914875.OP3.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
If the fees were provided for in the loan contract under which the claim arose. The first issue concerns whether the bankruptcy court should apply the § 506(b) reasonableness standard to contractually set attorney's fees that vest pre petition and that are enforceable under state law. The district court ruled that § 506(b) applies to attorney's fees that vest pre petition and that are enforceable under state law. We agree with the district court that § 506(b) is applicable. We conclude that bifurcation is the correct result. Welzel executed several promissory notes that were secured by mortgages on properties he owned in the historic district of Savannah. Darby Bank notified Welzel in writing that his indebtedness was in default and that. The notes were immediately due and payable. Which subsequently was converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation. 000 of these fees were actually incurred by Advocate. Provides that an 4 oversecured1 creditor is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as part of its allowed secured claim if the underlying loan contract provides for such fees.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914875.OP2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The prior opinion in this case is hereby VACATED and the opinion set forth below is substituted in its place. The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914875.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and immediately due and payable. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199914875.MA2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The prior opinion in this case is hereby VACATED and the opinion set forth below is substituted in its place. The issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts a Georgia statute authorizing a creditor to collect a fifteen percent attorney's fee upon default and with proper notice. The district court reversed and held that the Georgia statute is preempted. Advocate purchased the notes from the bank shortly after the bank had given written notice to Welzel that the indebtedness was in default and * Honorable John R. The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 799.71 in statutory attorney's fees.1 The bankruptcy court noted in its order that an estimate of the attorney's fees Advocate had actually incurred at the time of the hearing was $40. Therefore our review is de novo. Namely whether the amount of attorney's fees an oversecured creditor may recover is determined under state law or under the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199913381.OP3.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court determined that detrimental reliance was a necessary element to each of Turner's claims and. 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199913381.OP2.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The financing of the dish and the monthly service was to be provided through an agreement between Beneficial National Bank and Star Vision by way of an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199913381.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The financing of the dish and the monthly service was to be provided through an agreement between Beneficial National Bank and Star Vision by way of an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199913381.MA3.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court determined that detrimental reliance was a necessary element to each of Turner's claims and. 1369 (11th Cir.1993) (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199911372.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Alabama. From 1953 to 1973 Stylon discharged substances that are hazardous within the meaning of § 101(14) of CERCLA. Although Appellant apparently was not responsible for most of the pollution.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199911372.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Alabama. From 1953 to 1973 Stylon discharged substances that are hazardous within the meaning of § 101(14) of CERCLA. Although Appellant apparently was not responsible for most of the pollution. Was directed to clean up the facility under CERCLA. Holding that Appellee was exempted from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19975380.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled BFC's name has changed several times since its inception. Because we conclude that the district court should have granted ABC and Willson judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19975380.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. Because we conclude that the district court should have granted ABC and Willson judgment as a matter of law. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-5087.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Melvin C. Of counsel on the brief was Thomas R. With him on the brief were Stuart E. The plaintiffs argue that the 1993 legislation breached the contract because it changed the tax laws to abrogate tax benefits to which they were entitled at the time the contract was executed and because the legislation specifically targeted the benefits they enjoyed under the contract. Holding that under the pre 1993 tax laws they were entitled to the tax benefits in question and that * Paul R. The plaintiffs have cross appealed from the court's denial of their request for additional damages. Fixed rate mortgages created when interest rates were low. The acquisition was effected through a contract between FSLIC. FSLIC bound itself to make assistance payments to Texas Trust in an amount equal to the difference between the book basis of the covered assets and the value of those assets when they were sold or written down. The Consolidated Group expected to be able to take deductions for the built in losses on the covered assets as those assets were liquidated or written down.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-5036.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the brief was Monica A. Of counsel was Lesley A. Of counsel on the brief were Richard C. Of counsel on the brief were Melvin C. With her on the brief were Stuart E. Of counsel on the brief were Kenneth M. Because the Court of Federal Claims erred in holding that the Individual Plaintiffs have standing to sue for breach of contract. Although we agree that the Institutional Plaintiffs are entitled to the categories of damages awarded to them. There are issues with the calculation of those damages that require further fact finding to fully resolve. A. BACKGROUND Overview of Winstar Litigation This is a Winstar related case involving claims against the government stemming from Congress' enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform. FIRREA was passed as part of the government's response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. The circumstances surrounding the crisis in the savings and loan industry are well documented elsewhere. An understanding of the government's response to that crisis and the resulting litigation is.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19966159.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Whichever is later....
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19964225.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND The facts surrounding the formation and eventual failure of Sunrise Savings and Loan Association (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19964225.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND The facts surrounding the formation and eventual failure of Sunrise Savings and Loan Association (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19963556.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958215.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unless a lien is avoidable and the debtor has taken timely steps to avoid it. An exemption is an interest of the debtor carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and thereby shielded from creditors' claims. provides: Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions. The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section. If such lien is (1) a judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1993). 2 Section 522(f) The referenced subsection (b) exemptions include the federal bankruptcy exemptions enumerated in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Its A discharge in bankruptcy
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991744.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Entitles the borrower to sue for rescission of a loan upon the initiation of any foreclosure process on his principal dwelling if the lender's finance charge disclosure was not accurate. Payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended. When a loan is secured by an interest in real property. TILA specifically provides that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-1524.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On the brief were Peter D. Of counsel were Cristina C. HUD did not conduct in depth reviews of claims as they were filed. Pricing and other arrangements were to be negotiated separately for each task order. The regulations further state that the contractor is bound to perform all work called for in the task orders. 48 C.F.R. § 52.21622 (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-5088.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Steven S. With him on the brief were Joshua P. With him on the brief were Stuart E. Doumani and Thrall were not parties to a contract with the Government. 553 was a cost of substituting tangible capital for the capital lost as a result of the breach of the Government's contract with BoA's predecessor in interest Honolulu Federal Savings and Loan (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/11/98-2336.htm">98-2336 -- ALBUQUERQUE CHEMICAL CO. INC. V. ARNESON PRODUCTS INC. -- 11/30/1999<BR></A><BR>
Who were engaged in the business of building swimming pools. They discovered there were outstanding judgment liens on the house. As of the date their bankruptcy petition was originally filed in 1986. Was $91. 000. <p> Based upon the bankruptcy court's finding regarding the 1986 value of their residence (which was approximately $6. Brown in lieu of her homestead exemption was moved to another category of exemption (e.g. The objection was overruled by the bankruptcy court. <p> Ultimately. Could have been accomplished before the Browns' bankruptcy case was originally closed. Albuquerque Chemical argues it was prejudiced by the reopening of the case eleven years after it was originally closed. Albuquerque Chemical contends the long delay deprived it of the opportunity to conduct a proper appraisal to determine the value of the house as of the date the Chapter 7 case was filed. Albuquerque Chemical argues this
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-5188.html">CHRISTOPHER VILLAGE, L.P., ET AL. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief was <u>E. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel were <u>David M. </o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoBodyText2>This case presents the question whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment as to the government s liability for breach of contract solely in order to create a predicate for suit to recover damages in the Court of Federal Claims.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>We hold that district courts do not have such jurisdiction because the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. The predicate judgment was void.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>It follows that the Court of Federal Claims was not bound by this earlier judgment.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span></p> <p class=MsoBodyText2>On the merits. We affirm the Court of Federal Claims grant of summary judgment.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>We agree that the contract between the government and the appellants was unenforceable against the government because of a material breach by the appellants predating the government s alleged breach. </p> <h2 style='line height:200%'><span style='text decoration:none.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/99-6217.htm">99-6217 -- CANADIAN COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY V. CITY OF UNION -- 06/14/2000<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Plaintiffs Canadian County Water Authority and Canadian County Rural Water.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981396.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The corporation was formed in 1993 to engage in the business of purchasing model homes and leasing them back to the home builders for 2 the purpose of removing the home from the home builders' balance sheets and freeing up capital for paying down debt or other purposes. Some of whom were sent an information memorandum describing AMHC's business plan. Resource is a self managed real estate investment trust. Interested parties are expected to review independently all documents relating to this memorandum as to the accuracy and completeness of the information contained herein. The commitment it was seeking from lenders. The funds were used in sixteen different transactions between AMHC and various home 1 AMHC refers to this agreement as the Master Agreement. We will simply call it the letter agreement. 3 builders. The letter agreement was not renewed and the parties did not enter into a joint venture. The case was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia under the forum nonconveniens provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19942334.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellant further testified that in 1987 and 1988 he was involved in a beachfront condominium project known as Bac Bay Condominiums. Even though the Bac Bay mortgage was in foreclosure as of October 1988 and construction of the project had stopped in August 1988. Appellant also testified that not all of the values provided in his financial statements were correct. STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's resolution of whether a debtor has satisfactorily explained the loss of assets is a finding of fact.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19939263.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims. Contrary to Loyola's it is not argument a that of as a federally state for chartered diversity corporation citizen any purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/08/98-7076.htm">98-7076 -- NORTH TEXAS PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION V. MCCURTAIN COUNTY NATIONAL BANK -- 08/15/2000<BR></A><BR>
1994 loan was to enable the Clarks to purchase 1. When a financing statement is filed in McCurtain County. One copy is placed in an alphabetical index. Which is accessible to the public for purposes of conducting lien searches. One copy is placed in a numerical file located in the basement of the clerk's office. The alphabetical index copy in the public records is removed and returned to the secured party. The duplicate numerical copy in the basement is not. <p> NTPCA disputed MCNB's asserted priority in the remaining proceeds from the Clarks' sale of the cattle to Conley and brought the present action seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that it held a lien superior to the lien of MCNB on certain livestock owned by the Clarks. 1995<a href=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1708ORD.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We disagree and deny the petition.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-8019.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Article 1.3(i) of the Agreement provides:
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/99-2085.htm">99-2085 -- FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. V. SCHUCHMANN -- 12/19/2000<BR></A><BR>
Whether under New Mexico law the district court abused its discretion in failing to instruct the jury that the violation of federal regulations governing savings and loan institutions was negligent as a matter of law. It was put under the receivership of RTC. <p> In 1993. In 1996 FDIC succeeded to the interests of RTC as receiver and was substituted as plaintiff. <u>See</u> 12 U.S.C.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1122.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LLP</U> was on brief for Henry F. Were on brief for the United States.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/974511.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
No. 97 4511 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Brown asserts first that a search warrant authorizing a search of his residence was not supported by probable cause to believe that the items to be seized were located in his home. Agent Parker was assigned to one of the business locations. She discovered that the offices used by Brown and Clott were virtually empty. A computer brought to that location by Brown was missing. Files were gone. Brown told the receptionist that the business was shut down and that. They were to be directed to Brown's attorney. Agent Parker was advised by the seizing agents at Clott's residence and the other business address that only a small quantity of business records had been found. 2 After learning this information. There was no verbatim recording or transcript made of the conversation. The missing documents and computer were found in Brown's residence. Agent Parker testified that she told Judge Kenkel that Brown and Clott's offices were virtually empty.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-2273.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.S.C. were on brief for appellants. Montanez Aviles with whom Montanez & Alicea Law Offices was on brief for appellee. This appeal is taken from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reversing a decision of the federal bankruptcy court. The background events are somewhat complicated. Colonial was engaged in the business of servicing mortgages. One of its clients was the Bowery Savings Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/08/00-1357.htm">00-1357 -- SCHRODER V. BUSH -- 08/24/2001<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/03/02-9514.htm">02-9514 -- KUNZ V. SECURITES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION -- 03/28/2003<BR></A><BR>
Background <ol> <ol> <li><u>VesCor</u></li> </ol> </ol> <p> VesCor was in the business of originating. Southwick (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/06/02-3221.htm">02-3221 -- LAMPE V. WILLIAMSON -- 06/03/2003<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge.<a href=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1282A.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Brown</U> was on brief. Were on brief and <U>Kirby A. Was on supplemental brief. It held that there was no plain error warranting reversal. <U>See</U> <U>United States</U> v. <U>Kenrick</U>.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972549.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the title company on the ground that the title was marketable and the economic value of the timber was irrelevant to the question. We conclude that the loss sustained by Haw River Timber because of restrictions imposed by the municipal ordinance is not covered by the title insurance policy. It was informed by the Town of Garner that some of the property adjacent to Swift Creek was subject to municipal ordinances passed in 1988. The ordinances were enacted in response to a recommendation of the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development that the Swift Creek watershed be upgraded for environmental purposes. It states that the ordinances were not cross indexed in the Wake County Register of Deeds with the sellers or previous land owners in the chain of title. Central to the court's reasoning was the principle that zoning ordinances that affect all land generally are not
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1345.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mel ndez Albizu and S nchez Betances & Sifre were on brief for appellants. With whom Pietrantoni M ndez & Alvarez was on brief for Dean Witter Reynolds. With whom Luz Ivette Rivera and Luz Ivette Rivera & Asociados were on brief for appellee Ram n Dom nguez. Which was designed to create huge profits for its investor directors by leveraging its collateral with low interest loans in order to purchase higher interest mortgage obligations. PRIBANK was a virtually risk free investment which was projected to return 176% of the investors' principal in only two years. PRIBANK's strategy was relatively simple. PRIBANK would be permitted to leverage itself through these brokerage houses for 60 times its capital because it had the credit of Dean Witter to back it up and because funds provided to PRIBANK on its margin accounts were not allowed to be used for the purchase of credit risk assets. PRIBANK would be seen by the brokerage houses as a safe entity because its investments would be low risk and its credit with Dean Witter was trusted.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1306.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hacking & Neumeier was on brief for appellant Stephen A. Michel & McInnes were on brief for appellant Jonah Jacob. Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellee Mt. Senior Circuit Judge. sought a declaratory judgment that it does not have a duty to defend the named defendants in an underlying malpractice action against them. Hamelburg (the Law Firm).2 The factual allegations of Jacob's complaint as summarized by the district court are as follows. South Copley was created to acquire. Jacob was a passive investor who entrusted Greenbaum. That we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court made no findings justifying its exercise of its discretionary declaratory judgment authority. An insurance company's claim that it has no duty to defend in another action is the archetypal case for which a declaratory judgment is appropriate. 2 Other defendants are named in the malpractice action. Are not parties to this appeal. 3 Trust. Northeast Realty Investment Group was incorporated to manage the partnership's real estate holdings.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/apr96/94-2078.wpd.html">UNITED STATES V. AGRI SERVS., INC.<BR></A><BR>
The land is valuable primarily for its underground water rights. Defendant Four Way Cattle Company obtained an interest in 1978 in over 600 acres covered by the contract and assumed a promissory note owed to Hutchinson National Bank and Trust (Hutchinson) which was secured by a collateral assignment of the land contract in favor of Hutchinson. Four Way was also in default on its SBA loan. Apparently this request was denied because the SBA paid off the Hutchinson note in December 1984. The SBA was actively pursuing a sale of the property during this time. The SBA sent identical letters to Four Way and to Arlene Daniels as president of Four Way stating the SBA was accelerating both the SBA note and the Hutchinson note. The unpaid principal balance due on the contract was $203. The balance due from Four Way was $21. The contract was paid off in full. Which was recorded in October 1991. A patent for the land was in fact issued. Defendants likewise asserted the evidence showed that suit on the SBA note was time barred because the SBA had accelerated that note no later than January 1985 by its efforts to liquidate the collateral.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972215.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jones's complaint was amended on February 10. Are as follows. Largely because the closing costs for the loan were higher than Mortgage and Equity initially represented. The TILA docu2 ments given to Jones were defective because they under disclosed a $300.00 processing fee paid to Mortgage and Equity. Saxon would pay a bonus to Lenders if Lenders's loan was at a higher interest rate than the agreed par rate on loans Saxon agreed in advance to purchase. Since the loan was above par. Instituted foreclosure proceedings because Jones was in default. Jones's residence was sold at foreclosure to TCB. Jones was evicted from the residence in July 1996. Jones maintains that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment. That he is entitled to a return of record ownership of the subject property. 1992 loan transaction was a consumer credit transaction covered by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635. Jones's position was that his TILA action was timely filed. He reasoned that the time period for rescission under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 was tolled because of the doctrines of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972215.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Section 1 the status is changed from UNPUBLISHED to PUBLISHED. Section 6 the status line is changed to read
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972205.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 2 the word
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972185.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The relevant facts are undisputed. After the property was destroyed by storms in late 1991 and early 1992. NEI was the primary insured and thus entitled to full payment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the court. Finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SCIC contends that NEI is not entitled to payment of the proceeds because it was not an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1670.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Should form the continuation of the paragraph that currently is at page 6. Were on brief for appellant Penobscot Indian Nation and third party defendants appellees. Were on brief for appellee and cross appellant Key Bank of Maine. Were on brief for appellee Michael Marcello. Taintor & Abbott was on brief for defendants appellees and cross appellants. P.A. was on brief for defendant appellee and cross appellant. Hewey with whom Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon was on brief for appellees Consumers Water Company. It is not apparent from the record that the results of the investigation were set out in writing or were made known to the public. It is clear. The complaint alleged that the two Settlement Agreements signed by PIN and the Appellees were void because they did not receive the Secretary of the Interior's approval pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972108.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. District Judge: Northwestern Security Life Insurance Company (Northwestern) was a North Carolina corporation specializing in life. State insurance insolvency statutes are not preempted by the federal priority statute to the extent that the state statutes afford a higher priority to policyholder claims and claims for administrative expenses than to claims of the United States. 508 U.S. 491. That he was entitled to a refund of the $159. The Internal Revenue Service informed the Commissioner that it would not allow his refund claim on the grounds that the federal income taxes that accrued during liquidation were 1 Specifically. Because no such claims were made during liquidation. Claiming that he was entitled to the refund. Such state statutes were preempted by the federal priority statute. Which provides that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1556.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for FDIC. Motejunas & Doyle were on brief for Insurance Company of North America. Allowing forfeiture of coverage where notice to an insurer of a claim was late. At issue here is whether the notice due under a fidelity bond was late. The import here is whether a suit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-1474.html">HOXWORTH V. BLINDER<BR></A><BR>
Asking us to decide whether a judgment creditor may assert an equitable lien against assets excluded from a bankruptcy estate pursuant to a settlement agreement when the creditor was also an unsecured creditor of the estate and in privity with the trustee by virtue of the unsecured claim. We conclude the creditor is neither in privity with the trustee nor otherwise barred by the settlement agreement from asserting its secured lien. There are two issues pertinent to our resolution of this matter: first. Whether the Hoxworth Class was in privity with the bankruptcy trustee of the Blinder. Whether the Hoxworth Class' equitable lien was waived or extinguished when the class settled its unsecured claim with the trustee without asserting its lien against the estate. I. Meyer Blinder was the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-2191.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hawkes & Goldings were on briefs for appellant. Was on brief for the United States. He also challenges a restitution order that is part of his present sentence. The facts are set forth in detail in Judge Young's thorough opinion in United States v. Lilly was indicted in 1990 on 30 counts of bank fraud. Four charges were later dropped. He was convicted by a jury on the remaining 26 counts. This was a pre guidelines case. Lilly was sentenced to five years in prison on count 1. He was ordered to pay $5. On 1Former Rule 35(a) permitted the court to correct an
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan97/96-6020.wpd.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The core issues on appeal are: (1) whether the appellants. Return premiums are those premiums paid in advance by the insured. Unearned in the event the insurance coverage is reduced or canceled. The chronology of these transactions is important to determine the priority of the security interests. After the insurance policies were canceled. Was therefore bound by its terms. Was therefore not bound by.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1820.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Corey was on brief for Roy R. Phelan and Fitzhugh & Associates were on brief for Sun Company. Was on the property after the leak was discovered. Monitoring wells were installed and samples of groundwater were taken and analyzed. Whose name was given on the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1712.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Richmond & Rothstein were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Holding that Progressive's mortgage was not entitled to priority over the federal tax liens under the Massachusetts common law doctrines of equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The mortgage at issue is secured by real property located in Marshfield. 000.00 mortgage note which was properly recorded in favor of the Miles Standish Federal Credit Union (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr95/93-3303.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST V. FRAGETTI<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Resolution Trust v. If she or he are married. If she or he are married. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a consolidated appeal from district court orders remanding these six cases back to state court. The issue in each case is whether the district courts' decisions that the removal in each case had been untimely are erroneous in light of a 1991 amendment to the removal provision of the Financial Institutions Reform. We hold that these decisions are erroneous. Carteret Federal Savings Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr96/95-8215.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Holloway United States Court of Appeals. Unless a lien is avoidable and the debtor has taken timely steps to avoid it. An exemption is an interest of the debtor carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and thereby shielded from creditors' claims. The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section. If such lien is
|
 |
OPINION/ORDER
Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. The buyer was told not to mention the
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
|
|
ALDER V. US
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Was convicted of bank fraud. Since this argument will not be considered.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellants. Although we agree with the district court that summary judgment for the taxpayer was appropriate. Factual Background Factual Background The material facts are not in dispute. The IRS has three years from the date a return is filed to make an assessment of liability. 26 U.S.C. 6501. If the IRS discovers that an assessment
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Sultan with whom Rankin & Sultan was on briefs for appellant. Were on brief for the United States. William Walsh was charged with various offenses growing out of a bank fraud scheme and convicted on a majority of the counts. His present appeal is primarily directed at procedural issues. I. Walsh was indicted in 1992. The substance of the indictment was that Walsh carried out a scheme to defraud Dime Savings Bank of New York (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The FDIC insures deposits in financial institutions and is authorized by statute to act as receiver for insured institutions that fail and are closed by their chartering authority. 12 U.S.C. 1811. When the FDIC is appointed receiver for a failed institution. The FDIC is authorized to collect all obligations and moneys owed to failed institutions for the benefit of the institution's creditors and shareholders. The FDIC is empowered to avoid fraudulent transfers. Parks was a director of Olympic International Bank and Trust Company (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
P.C. were on brief for appellant. Richardson and Gelinas were on brief for appellee.
|
|
TURNER V. BENEFICIAL CORP. (12/21/2000, NO. 99-13381)
The financing of the dish and the monthly service was to be provided through an agreement between Beneficial National Bank and Star Vision by way of an
|
|
UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556)
The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. I SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE A.
|
|
HAVOCO OF AM., LTD. V. HILL (12/10/1999, NO. 97-2277)
(the
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
BIVINS Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jr. was convicted on federal charges of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Arguing that his convictions should be overturned because his indictment was defective and because the evidence was insufficient. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of various evidentiary errors and faulty jury instructions. Donald Osorio (Osorio) and Karen Bivins (Karen) were involved in a conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and heroin. Karen was the sister of Alton Bivins (Bivins). Osorio was buying and selling fifteen kilograms of cocaine a week and turning a profit of approximately $11. Karen was Osorio's
|
|
TURNER V. BENEFICIAL CORP. (2/22/2001, NO. 99-13381)
Also committed common law fraud in transactions related to its financing of Turner's purchase of a satellite dish.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
The bank failed and the Resolution Trust Corporation (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Is a fine art gallery located in the Eastgate Shopping Center in Chapel Hill. Studio Frames was required to purchase federal flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The terms of Studio Frames' policy were set forth in the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). Was invalid under the SFIP because Studio Frames did not own the building. Did not include damage that would have been covered under the SFIP's building coverage. A decision that its counsel now asserts was made
|
|
UNITED STATES V. SCHEER (2/25/1999, NO. 96-4225)
BACKGROUND The facts surrounding the formation and eventual failure of Sunrise Savings and Loan Association (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Botti and Burns & Levinson were on brief. Craig and Macauley Professional Corporation were on brief. It is trite. A group of borrowers who complain that they were swindled. Negligence are barred by the D'Oench. Plaintiffs' affirmative defenses to the counterclaims are impuissant. None of the plaintiffs is entitled to benefit from a belated effort to interject into the decisional calculus an incorrectly computed figure contained in a writ of execution issued by a Maine state court in a related proceeding. Because two of the orders that we are reviewing arose under the aegis of Fed. The myriad plaintiffs in this civil action are bound together by what appears in retrospect to have been a serious error in judgment: they all borrowed money from the Bank in connection with the purchase of condominium units from Steven M. Although each plaintiff's predicament is slightly different. A plaintiff purchased a condominium based on multiple misrepresentations by Rostoff such as: that the unit had been completely renovated and was being sold at a substantial discount from market value.
|
|
PATTON V. TRIAD GUAR. INS. (1/2/2002, NO. 01-11376)
Patton claimed that she was wrongfully required to obtain mortgage insurance from Triad as a result of the illegal kickback scheme between Premier and Triad. Because Patton was financing more than 80% of the home's value. Were never passed on to Triad's consumers. The district court determined that the claim was barred by § 1012 of the McCarran Ferguson Act. 694 (11th Cir. 1998).
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Mildred Caban with whom Jorge Souss and Goldman Antonetti & Cordova were on brief for Royal Bank of Canada. Vivian Nunez and McConnell Valdes were on brief for Seiko Time Corporation. Because Royal Bank was not a party to the underlying execution proceedings. The contempt order is considered a final decision appealable by Royal Bank under 28 U.S.C. 1291. I. The attachment order at issue here was entered on January 13. Initially Gemco was wholly owned and operated by Jos and Carmen Pascual. As was a related company. These transfers were recorded in Watch and Gem's books as intercompany accounts payable and in Gemco's books as intercompany accounts receivable. The amount owing to the bank from Gemco at the time of restructuring was $1.25 million. The award was confirmed by the district of New York on November 4. Judgment was entered for Seiko on November 12. The New York judgment was registered in the district court in Puerto Rico on December 16. Gemco's primary asset was the account receivable arising from the various intercompany loans it had made to Watch and Gem over the years.
|
|
UNITED STATES V. MUSCATELL
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States v. These bonuses were not disclosed to the appraisers. This false income information was submitted on all eight loan applications. Which were made to separate federally insured financial institutions in an attempt to conceal Rico's true income to debt ratio. The applications failed to disclose the fact that Rico was attempting to purchase additional rental units. Each application was submitted. Bower generated false documentation in order to create the illusion that Rico was funding his own downpayment. Muscatell's commission rates were over twenty five percent of the inflated total sales price. Rico was able to borrow $1. The lenders foreclosed on the properties.<p> Muscatell and Bower were tried in federal district court under an eleven count indictment. At the direction of and under the control of Bower in order to avoid the appearance that they were buying property from themselves. Muscatell stated that a new
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-51024.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
T he Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Or mortgages that are in default or foreclosure. He claims that the fee was not for assistance in filing for bankruptcy. Petition preparers are also required to sign the debtor's petition. 2001.2 The bankruptcy court questioned Casey directly and determined that an injunction was warranted. Under which Casey was required to provide to the U.S. Trustee the names of any clients
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2001/00-11663.man.html">O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july95/91-5898.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. UNITED TRUST FUND<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Resolution Trust Corp. v. The case presents the following questions: whether a conservator as well as a subsequently appointed receiver of a failed financial institution each have an independent right to repudiate a lease under
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/024034.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Suddreth was indicted on two counts of willfully filing materially false individual income tax returns for tax years 1993 and 1994. Contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he willfully made false statements on his 1993 and 1994 federal tax returns. That Suddreth was scheduled to complete his community confinement on March 1. We consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. One of his primary ventures is Patapsco Excavating Company (PEC). Suddreth would often have the checks cashed for a fee at a check cashing company several miles away. Some of this cash was used to pay the wages of PEC employees. After the checks were negotiated. The cash was placed in separate envelopes and given to each employee. Suddreth would receive the surplus in an envelope after the processing fee was paid. These monies were placed in an envelope by the office staff and given to Suddreth at the end of each day.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1542.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF GROSVENOR PARK REALTY TRUST. Is amended as follows: Amend the cover sheet to show that Judge Jack E. Tanner is from the Western District of Washington and was sitting on the District Court of Massachusetts by special designation. AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF GROSVENOR PARK REALTY TRUST. With whom Beatrice & Beatrice was on brief for appellant. With whom Williams & Grainger was on brief for appellee FDIC. Argues that summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. Contends that Gleicher's conclusory remarks are insufficient to overcome the circumstantial evidence of fraud. FACTUAL BACKGROUND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed. The Note was secured by a mortgage on the Lynn property. 000 to a limited partnership (of which Gleicher was a general partner). 000 loan was in the form of an unsecured line of credit due to expire on December 30. 000 line of credit was fully drawn and had expired. It would have to be secured with. Stein reminded Gleicher that the Note was a demand note and would shortly expire.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july95/93-9263.opa.html">LOYOLA FED. SAVINGS BANK V. FICKLING<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Loyola Fed. Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes.<p> The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims.<p> <i>Jurisdiction</i><p> <p> In our <i>de novo</i> review of the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Loyola's argument that as a federally chartered corporation it is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1399.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the indictment is not multiplicitous and that the court below appropriately imposed the special assessment on a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2000/99-4371.man.html">SIERMINSKI V. TRANSOUTH FIN. CORP. (6/26/2000, NO. 99-4371)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1357.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court's denial of appellant Samuel Concemi's motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is affirmed substantially for the reasons stated in the district court's December 11. Ten of the claims advanced by Concemi in his 2255 petition were dismissed by the district court on the ground that they
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14762.man.html">PROFILES, INC. V. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE (6/5/2001, NO. 99-14762)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1122.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hawkes & Goldings were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. District Judge. was convicted of conspiracy to defraud two federally insured banks and to transport forged securities in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314 (Count 1). Jones argues on appeal that (1) a UCC 3 release of collateral form is not a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2467.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Valeriano Diviacchi with whom Diviacchi Law Office was on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. Hochadel & Libby were on brief for appellee. Cronkite arranged to sell a parcel of property that he owned (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021819.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeals from the district court's order reversing the bankruptcy court's order that held that debt arising out of a divorce settlement agreement was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(15) (West Supp. 2003). Because we find that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in determining that the debt was not dischargeable. I. Ferraro was legally separated from Ballard in 1995. Property issues in a written stipulation agreement and were subsequently divorced. If it was sold within three years IN RE BALLARD 3 of the stipulation agreement. Or 25% of the appraised value of the Chesapeake property if it was not sold within three years.1 Despite Ferraro's requests. The Chesapeake property was not sold within three years of the stipulation agreement and. Was obligated to pay support obligations in excess of $100. Ballard is also one of ten beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust with approximately $85. The property's appraised value was approximately $450.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5103.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were <U>Richard D. Of counsel on the brief were <U>Ronald W. Of counsel were <U>Bruce H. With him on the brief were <U>Jeanne E. Of counsel was <U>William F. With him on the brief were <U>Charles J. Of counsel on the brief were <U>Jerry Stouck</U>. With him on the brief were <U>John M. The issue in this case is how to measure the damages sustained by savings and loan institutions as a result of the breach by the United States of contracts it made with these organizations during the savings and loan crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The judgment of this court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The matter was remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for a trial on damages.</P> <P ALIGN=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14875.ma2.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1588.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dana & Gould were on brief for appellant. Gould were on brief for appellant. Young and Peabody & Arnold were Peter G. Young and Peabody & Arnold were on brief for appellee. on brief for appellee. *Of the District of Puerto Rico. On the ground that insurance coverage was excluded under the pollution exclusion clause. ALP purchased the Burlington site from High Voltage and leased back the portion on which High Voltage was to continue its manufactur ing operation. Hazardous materials were discovered in the soil. The contaminants were most conspicuous near a degreaser unit operated by High Voltage. The cleaning solvents utilized in the High Voltage degreaser unit were identical to the contaminants found in the surrounding area. High Voltage itself was insured under the policy for defending or indemnifying its officers and directors against third party claims. Seeking a judicial declaration that Federal was liable under the policy for losses incurred by High Voltage and its officers and directors in connection with the ALP action.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/99-14875.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar97/96-6159.opa.html">SMITH V. HIGHLAND BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Smith v. Whichever is later....
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1081.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for trustee. Ponce's claim was based on funds 1. To whom this case was originally assigned. The district's other bankruptcy judge was unavailable. The case was transferred to the district court. 2. We have previously held that when a district judge is sitting in lieu of recused bankruptcy judges. He is thereby exercising the district court's original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. The Oklahoma court was chosen for WPRV's bankruptcy proceedings because its financial records were kept there. 2 2 advanced under five promissory notes which were guaranteed by real estate and chattel mortgages on much of debtor's estate.4 By June 1989. The case was then transferred to the District of Puerto Rico because the majority of the assets relevant to the case were present there. Evangelina Vives was appointed operating and liquidating trustee of debtor's assets. Vives was given authority to operate the station until July 31. This authority was subsequently extended and continues through the present time.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may2000/99-11372.man.html">MONARCH TILE, INC. V. CITY OF FLORENCE (5/25/2000, NO. 99-11372)<BR></A><BR>
Is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Alabama. 000.</P> <P> From 1953 to 1973 Stylon discharged substances that are hazardous within the meaning of § 101(14) of CERCLA. Although Appellant apparently was not responsible for most of the pollution. Was directed to clean up the facility under CERCLA. Holding that Appellee was exempted from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1509 (11th Cir.1993).</P> <P><CENTER>II.</CENTER> </P> <P> CERCLA is a broad.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may95/94-2334.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Hawley United States Court of Appeals. Appellant further testified that in 1987 and 1988 he was involved in a beachfront condominium project known as Bac Bay Condominiums. Even though the Bac Bay mortgage was in foreclosure as of October 1988 and construction of the project had stopped in August 1988. Appellant also testified that not all of the values provided in his financial statements were correct. Appellant explained that he had been arrested on criminal charges in 1989 and that most of his financial records had been seized by the Florida Attorney General's Office at that time. STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's resolution of whether a debtor has satisfactorily explained the loss of assets is a finding of fact. In re Chalik.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
With whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. * Of the Eleventh Circuit. Was convicted after a jury trial in the District of New Hampshire of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344). Background Background The various charges against appellant were based on a series of different transactions. The purpose of which was to obtain funds from the United States Savings Bank of America (hereinafter
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
000 that had been transferred by the debtor to the defendants in an alleged Ponzi scheme
|
|
BRADFORD MARINE, INC. V. M/V "SEA FALCON"
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Bradford Marine. The district court held that the <i>Sea Falcon</i> was properly liable for the fees because the repair contract at issue provided that the plaintiff would receive attorney's fees if it retained legal counsel to collect its repair charges. Because the repairs were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2175.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Page 8. Silverman and Hebb & Gitlin were on brief for appel burgh. Silverman and Hebb & Gitlin were on brief for appel lants. lants. Bason and Edwards & Angell were on brief for appellees. were on brief for appellees. *Of the District of New Hampshire. Appellants argue that (1) Bankruptcy Code 550(a) does not permit direct recovery from the non insider transferees unless the transfers were made within the convention al ninety day preference period. (2) even assuming the transfers were directly recoverable from the non insiders under section 550.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept98/97-3182.opn.html">WILKINS V. COMMERCIAL INV. TRUST CORP. (9/4/1998, NO. 97-3182)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges.</P> <P>PER CURIAM:</P> <P> This is an appeal concerning admiralty jurisdiction. We conclude that admiralty jurisdiction is lacking.</P> <P><CENTER><STRONG>I. Which planned to operate the <EM>Sun</EM> as a cruise ship.<A HREF=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr95/93-3303.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST V. FRAGETTI<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Resolution Trust v. If she or he are married. If she or he are married. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a consolidated appeal from district court orders remanding these six cases back to state court. The issue in each case is whether the district courts' decisions that the removal in each case had been untimely are erroneous in light of a 1991 amendment to the removal provision of the Financial Institutions Reform. We hold that these decisions are erroneous. Carteret Federal Savings Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012491.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. NMS is a software development company whose business is to manufacture and sell Sales Force Automation and Call Center Management software to the telemarketing industry. Its operations are fully computerized. NMS's property was insured by Hartford under a Special Property Coverage Form (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1606.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were either makers or personal guarantors. Whose president was Philip Burgess Jr. Was the principal obligor on three notes. 00 0.1 It is stipulated that Burgess Sr. Orders for involuntary chapter 7 relief were entered against Burgess Jr. and BEMC in April. Were secured by real estate mortgages on which the Bank foreclosed leaving a $35. The district court affirmed on the ground that the Bank had
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1581.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Knauer and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. Young was the company's president. Which mortgage (perhaps through inadvertent misstatement) said that it was security for money advanced
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1393.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The remaining twenty two counts were dismissed by the government pursuant to the plea agreement. Appellant executed and submitted purchase money loan documents which concealed the information that the properties were encumbered by second mortgages. Appellant was sentenced to serve a concurrent twelve month prison term under each of the eleven 2 counts of conviction.1 On appeal. Appel lant contends that the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. 3E1. 1(a) by focusing on
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr96/95-8215.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Holloway United States Court of Appeals. Unless a lien is avoidable and the debtor has taken timely steps to avoid it. An exemption is an interest of the debtor carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and thereby shielded from creditors' claims. The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section. If such lien is
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Chief Judge: Plaintiff Tyna Boulware claims that § 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Knauer and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. 1 1 BREYER. Young was the company's president. Which mortgage (perhaps through inadvertent misstatement) said that it was security for money advanced
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Was on brief for appellee. Sheldon Yefsky was convicted by a jury of a dual object conspiracy. The Greater Boston Police Council (GBPC) was formed in the early 1960s as a mutual aid society for various metropolitan area law enforcement agencies. A primary concern of the GBPC was the inability of the member police departments to communicate with each other by radio. Of which Yefsky is president. CES was awarded a bid contract of $31. Which was available at a discount through a GBPC collective purchase contract. BAPERN was fully operational. Coogan was. Were charged with numerous criminal violations stemming from their involvement in the BAPERN project. The first scheme charged was a conspiracy involving all four defendants (Count 1). The goals of the conspiracy were to pay Coogan kickbacks for sending engineering work to CES and to help him hide that income from the IRS. The kickbacks were the payments ITS made to Coogan. The government explained that the kickbacks were financed by charging GBPC members for engineering services that were unnecessary or never were performed or by overcharging for work actually done.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
HAMER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: Brenda Joyce Hamer was convicted after a jury trial on six counts of bank fraud. When Hamer was attempting another wire transfer. Who asked whether she was attempting to telegraph money and if she was aware of the existence of a telephone account in her name in Dillon. Douglas told the validator that she was not attempting to wire money and had not authorized any telephone service in Dillon.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Chelsea was owed between $12.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
DesMarais acknowledged at trial that he did not fully\ understand why Trainor was re allocating the money he paid for the\ boat to the home purchase. He assumed Trainor was doing it to\ help DesMarais buy the house. The prosecutor suggested to the jury\ that Trainor was willing to
|
|
TURNER V. BENEFICIAL CORP. (12/21/2000, NO. 99-13381)
The financing of the dish and the monthly service was to be provided through an agreement between Beneficial National Bank and Star Vision by way of an
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
P.A. were on brief. Nelson were on brief.
|
|
UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556)
The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. I SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE A.
|
|
HAVOCO OF AM., LTD. V. HILL (12/10/1999, NO. 97-2277)
(the
|
|
FRANCONIA ASSOCIATES V. U.S.
With him on the brief were John F. With him on the brief was David M. Appellants are owners of low income rental housing units financed by mortgage loans from the Farmers Home Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
LLP was on the brief. Ltd. were on the brief. The bankruptcy court ruled that the escrow funds should instead be turned over to the debtor because the debtor's transaction at issue was not a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). We now reverse the district court and direct the bankruptcy court to award judgment to Fleet.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Were on the brief.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Marzelli were on brief. P.C. were on brief. We are asked to determine whether two Massachusetts homestead exemptions can be
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
LLP were on brief for appellant.
|
|
TURNER V. BENEFICIAL CORP. (2/22/2001, NO. 99-13381)
Also committed common law fraud in transactions related to its financing of Turner's purchase of a satellite dish.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
P.A. was on brief for appellants.
|
|
UNITED STATES V. SCHEER (2/25/1999, NO. 96-4225)
BACKGROUND The facts surrounding the formation and eventual failure of Sunrise Savings and Loan Association (
|
|
PATTON V. TRIAD GUAR. INS. (1/2/2002, NO. 01-11376)
Patton claimed that she was wrongfully required to obtain mortgage insurance from Triad as a result of the illegal kickback scheme between Premier and Triad. Because Patton was financing more than 80% of the home's value. Were never passed on to Triad's consumers. The district court determined that the claim was barred by § 1012 of the McCarran Ferguson Act. 694 (11th Cir. 1998).
|
|
UNITED STATES V. MUSCATELL
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States v. These bonuses were not disclosed to the appraisers. This false income information was submitted on all eight loan applications. Which were made to separate federally insured financial institutions in an attempt to conceal Rico's true income to debt ratio. The applications failed to disclose the fact that Rico was attempting to purchase additional rental units. Each application was submitted. Bower generated false documentation in order to create the illusion that Rico was funding his own downpayment. Muscatell's commission rates were over twenty five percent of the inflated total sales price. Rico was able to borrow $1. The lenders foreclosed on the properties.<p> Muscatell and Bower were tried in federal district court under an eleven count indictment. At the direction of and under the control of Bower in order to avoid the appearance that they were buying property from themselves. Muscatell stated that a new
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Nov2002/014495u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were indicted by a grand jury in the District of New Jersey on seventeen counts for conspiracy to commit mail. They were also charged with various other acts of mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. The only dispute was whether Igein should receive a 2 point level 2 enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) because he supervised Ayinde. That the enhancement was inappropriate here because. Although Igein was a workplace supervisor and the owner of the business. The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in applying to Igein a leadership enhancement adjustment of two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) as an organizer. Because the facts are well known to the parties. He also contends that the witnesses relied upon by the Government to show supervisory activity were not reliable. Is not equivalent to exercising managerial control over other participants. Stating falsely that the individual was employed at the defendant's electronics business. The defendant was in charge of the criminal enterprise at Power Electronics.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2004/033090np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Smiriglios contended that the amount recoverable was limited by New Jersey Court Rule 4:42 9(a)(4). Both the Bankruptcy and District Courts found that this was not a foreclosure action. So the Rule was inapplicable. A contractual provision for payment of attorney's fees will generally be deemed enforceable in New Jersey
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2001/00-11663.man.html">O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2002/011171up.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
New Jersey 07102 Counsel for Appellee OPINION OF THE COURT PER CURIAM: Background Defendant/appellant Martin Basroon (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/March2003/014516p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The District Court entered judgment for defendant under Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence law after a jury found plaintiff 's contributory negligence was greater than defendant's negligence and also found for defendant on the ERISA issue on the theory that the trustee was not a fiduciary within the meaning of that law. Srein is the sole stockholder and only employee 3 of R.J. A viatical settlement contract is. Pays the investor the money he advanced under the agreement and the balance is divided between the investor and the settlement company in accordance with their agreement.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/March2003/011788p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The primary question is whether the District Court erred in affirming the Bankruptcy Court's order. ]
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001115.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The claim secured by the stock was an allowed secured claim. The question before us IN RE: TRAVELSTEAD 3 is whether. 000 in January of 1995 and was to receive a 15% interest in Blockless. 000 in February of 1995 and was to receive an 11.25% interest in Blockless. Donnelly and Benner were to have acquired 10.5 shares of stock. Which was 32.8125% of Travelstead's interest. The deed of pledge by Travelstead asserted that no one other than Travelstead possessed any interest in the Shares or was entitled to demand such an interest. The Shares were to be sold by a liquidating agent and the proceeds used to pay Blockless the allowed amount of its secured claim. Identical language is used in § 4.1 of the Plan. Such action as is necessary to confirm that Patrick J.B. Benner (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july95/91-5898.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. UNITED TRUST FUND<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Resolution Trust Corp. v. The case presents the following questions: whether a conservator as well as a subsequently appointed receiver of a failed financial institution each have an independent right to repudiate a lease under
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july95/93-9263.opa.html">LOYOLA FED. SAVINGS BANK V. FICKLING<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Loyola Fed. Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes.<p> The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims.<p> <i>Jurisdiction</i><p> <p> In our <i>de novo</i> review of the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Loyola's argument that as a federally chartered corporation it is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Feb2002/011094.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The District Court dismissed plaintiff 's TILA count for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1 We will reverse and remand. 1. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Because this is an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We may affirm only if it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proven.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002a/021172.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
At which advanced point the four studies were unfit for Food and Drug Administration review. Therefore were worthless. It defended on the ground that the nurses' actions were not dishonest because they had acted on their belief that strict adherence to protocol was unnecessary. That while their actions might have been negligent. Federal also maintained that even if the nurses' actions were dishonest. Federal contended that even if it were liable for Scirex's losses. Because the losses across the four ruined studies were related. 2 Following a bench trial. The nurses'
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/011755.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Shareholders contend that they were deceived into relinquishing their ownership rights and that they could 1. The consortium of investors is referred to as the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/99opinions/99-5108.html">CALIFORNIA FEDERAL BANK V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiff cross appellant.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032263np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an individual retirement account (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2000/99-4371.man.html">SIERMINSKI V. TRANSOUTH FIN. CORP. (6/26/2000, NO. 99-4371)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-31093.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. It is not clear whether such liability could be found independent of a breach of fiduciary duty. Which would put the 1 * FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND SCDF Investment Corporation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-1102.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bank fraud in (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344. He was further sentenced to three years of supervised release on count 2. (3) applying a two level sophisticated means enhancement to a crime that merely used fictitious financial statements and several sham companies and that was so unsophisticated that a loan processor with only a high school education detected it. Which was the subject of counts 4 7 of the indictment. Once the property was purchased in the investors' names. Many of the homes purchased were structurally damaged but had been repaired cosmetically for the purpose of obtaining inflated appraisals. Hall was employed by Turner Group at a high salary as well as a false bank statement indicating that Mr. <hr> Hall had a high account balance. Some background is necessary. Which were backed by false financial statements prepared at Mr. The <hr> loan applications used either wholly fictitious names or the names of people who were neither applying for loans nor purchasing the homes listed in the applications.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1996/96a1412p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. INTRODUCTION Hyatt Corporation is the manager of a resort hotel on St. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (action between citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (action between citizens of different states in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties). We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the grant of partial summary judgment and abuse of discretion review over the court's transition order. Great Cruz was looking for a company to maximize the economic potential of the resort. Hyatt was reticent to commit the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1994/94a0829p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude that the district court correctly determined there was no existing lease with which the mortgagee could have tortiously interfered. No lease existed between WALP and Schulman because the draft leases on which all of the negotiations between Schulman and WALP were based explicitly required execution by the landlord. Schulman's alternate claim for interference with a prospective contractual relation between himself and WALP fails as a matter of law because Morgan and Widener were acting in good faith to protect their legal and financial interests as mortgagee of the premises Schulman sought to lease from WALP. We will affirm the district court's order in all respects. Jeffrey Kelter (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/99a2278.htm">99A2278- DARDOVITCH V. HALTZMAN<BR></A><BR>
The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. <p>Haltzman challenges this reading of the Trust and contingent fee agreement. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/981421.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment. This award was based on the conclusion that most of this work was necessitated by Haltzman's continued refusal to admit that Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14762.man.html">PROFILES, INC. V. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE (6/5/2001, NO. 99-14762)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1997/97a1725p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to review a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. We will not address the merits of this appeal. The property was purchased by Santiago Camacho. (2) even if Dodge was entitled to the homestead exemption. Which was less than the amount paid out by Camacho. To have an order confirming the sale. The appellate division therefore remanded the case to the territorial court to give Dodge
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1997/97a1725p.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to review a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. We will not address the merits of this appeal. The property was purchased by Santiago Camacho. (2) even if Dodge was entitled to the homestead exemption. Which was less than the amount paid out by Camacho. To have an order confirming the sale. The appellate division therefore remanded the case to the territorial court to give Dodge
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14875.ma2.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov2000/993994.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was convicted based on his false testimony before a federal grand jury. The grand jury was investigating a scheme wherein corporate political 1. We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. We conclude that we have no jurisdiction over the challenge to the recommendation of a place of confinement. 2 contributions were funneled through thir d party conduits in violation of federal election laws. Serafini had denied that he was r eimbursed for a contribution he had made to Senator Bob Dole's presidential campaign. Serafini maintains on appeal that (1) the prosecutor's questioning before the grand jury was insufficiently precise to support a perjury conviction. (2) the District Court was wrong to strike only one aspect of Serafini's indictment. Should instead have dismissed the indictment in full. (5) the gover nment's evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. Arguing that the facility recommended is not a proper location for
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-30533.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. We decline to consider the issues raised by the defendants in their letter submitted under Rule 28(j) that were neither raised in the district court or argued in their initial brief. 2 1 I. John and Martha Herring were charged and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy). Martha Herring was charged and convicted of two additional counts of bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 157(1) and (2). Were also charged with conspiracy. HCC served as the Agencies' home office and was owned by and employed the Herrings. A cost report was prepared by each Agency and submitted to Medicare. All costs associated with running the Agencies are included on the reports. Medicare reimburses only those costs that are reasonable. Certain employee appreciation expenditures are costs allowed by Medicare. The cost reports are used to derive pay rates for different care services.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0711p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we conclude that the ACGME's conduct was not state action. We will reverse. Which is commonly referred to as a residency. Is defined in the Act as training approved or recognized by the board which is either: (1) accredited as graduate medical education by any accrediting body recognized by the board for the purpose of accrediting graduate medical education. . . . Or (2) provided by a hospital accredited by any accrediting body recognized by the board and is acceptable to an American specialty board towards the training it requires for the certification it issues in a medical specialty or subspecialty. . . . Are
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/99-14875.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/04/046033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota This is an appeal of the bankruptcy court's June 10. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Kaler was appointed the chapter 7 trustee (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/12/046049P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bankruptcy Judge Debtor Phylis Michele Dove Nation (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/10/046026P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court2 approving the employment of Douglas S. Are not disinterested persons. We have determined that leave to appeal the interlocutory order was improvidently granted and that the appeal should be dismissed. The law firms are Heller. The rental amounts are based on the volume of business. All of the debtor entities are owned or controlled by Perry Beaton and Carol Beaton.4 Although the four companies arguably are
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/10/046016P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Debtors learned that their federal tax liability resulting from the ESOP liquidation was $150. Were only able to pay $20. The first debt was valued at $ 297. 000 and the second debt was valued at $32. The record indicates that Debtors have no equity in the Residence. Debtors' monthly payment on the first mortgage is $2. Their combined net income as of the petition date was approximately $7. The basis of the UST's motion was its argument that because Debtors had sufficient disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 plan. Debtors countered by arguing that their purchase of the Residence was as an investment. 000 debt that was secured by the Residence was utilized for investment purposes and was not a consumer debt. 3 Accordingly. Debtors maintain that their debts were not primarily consumer debts as required by § 707(b). Debtors testified at the hearing on the UST's motion that the reason they liquidated the ESOP and invested the proceeds into the Residence was that they believed that the Residence was a better investment than the ESOP.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/06/032814P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Varners were unable to meet their interest obligations with Decatur Bank. Judgments and decrees of foreclosure were issued in favor of Decatur Bank on February 16 and 20. The property was subsequently sold. The Varners were subsequently discharged from bankruptcy. The Varners claimed that this former loan officer indicated that the projected cashflow figures were false and misleading.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/03/036087P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
847.1 The judgment was duly docketed in Carlton County. Were never consolidated. AgStar is a secured creditor of both the Andersons and Andair. All of which are crosscollateralized. No documents were admitted into evidence. The scheduled combined value of the Andersons' and Andair's real and personal property is. This is in keeping with the Andersons' schedules. If the debt is cross collateralized. That the proceeds of the sale were to be applied first to costs of sale. At the hearing the court found that JaKS failed to prove its claim was secured. Which was denied on October 30. P. 8013. 4 4 3 de novo.5 Whether the bankruptcy court considered all of the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 1225 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) is subject to de novo review. Whether the court erred when it found JaKS failed to prove it held a secured claim is a factual finding. Nor did they file a proceeding to avoid JaKS' lien.6 A proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects.7 Thus. The court was required to deal with these matters at the confirmation hearing.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar97/96-6159.opa.html">SMITH V. HIGHLAND BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Smith v. Whichever is later....
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/12/023746P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
One of FINB's most important customers was Thomas Jager. FINB was close to its legal lending limit and therefore unable to advance the entire amount requested. Because New Uchtorff's financial position was too precarious to support any lending. The remainder of the relevant facts are disputed by the parties. Northwest asserts that the information provided to it by FINB was false and misleading in several respects. The true purpose of the loan was to allow FINB to maintain a satisfactory federal bank rating necessary to service Whitehall's GNMA accounts. Northwest also asserts that FINB's conduct in servicing the loan was improper in several respects. FINB states that the materials it provided to Northwest were complete and accurate in all respects. That Northwest was not misled into signing the loan participation agreement. The omissions of which Northwest now complains could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence. FINB also states that the proceeds of the loan were properly applied.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/10/036046P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court 1 dated July 3. Green did not allege or present evidence that the mortgage of GMAC was a judicial lien. Only alleged that the lien was a nonpossessory. That issue was not raised before the The Honorable James J. United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 1 bankruptcy court and we will not address the issue here. The only issue before us is whether the the mortgage secured by Green's residential property constituted an avoidable security interest. Or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal. Mortgages on real property are not within this description. Since GMAC's lien is not the type that may be avoided under Section 522(f)(1)(B).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may2000/99-11372.man.html">MONARCH TILE, INC. V. CITY OF FLORENCE (5/25/2000, NO. 99-11372)<BR></A><BR>
Is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of Alabama. 000.</P> <P> From 1953 to 1973 Stylon discharged substances that are hazardous within the meaning of § 101(14) of CERCLA. Although Appellant apparently was not responsible for most of the pollution. Was directed to clean up the facility under CERCLA. Holding that Appellee was exempted from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1509 (11th Cir.1993).</P> <P><CENTER>II.</CENTER> </P> <P> CERCLA is a broad.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/07/022468P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. BACKGROUND The Bank was founded in 1887 under the name Economy Federal. Both marks are used in conjunction with the Bank's characteristic wheat emblem. HHF is an Illinois corporation in the mortgage lending service business.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/06/033654P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The appeals were consolidated. The Plan is obligated to pay a fixed level of benefits to its participants upon retirement. Are both Plan fiduciaries. A hedge fund that invested primarily in collateralized mortgage obligations fixed income securities that are derived from and secured by pools of private home mortgages. Granite was severely leveraged and brokerage firms began demanding additional money to serve as margin. Granite was forced to declare bankruptcy and was ultimately liquidated. Alleging that 3M was liable to the Plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1109 for breaching its fiduciary duties. The district court granted 3M summary judgment on the prohibited transaction claim because Participants presented no evidence that the compensation agreement 3 was unreasonable. Indicating that further discovery was needed to determine whether Participants could establish an essential element of their claim a loss to the Plan. To conclude that participants in defined benefit pension plans have no entitlement to surplus funds.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1998/98a1808p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who is the assignee of his former attorney's professional liability policy. Selko was the passenger in a car that struck a telephone pole. Also included was an investment clause. During which Signore stated
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1994/94a0750p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which the Salvation Army was holding. Were part of the estate in bankruptcy. We will reverse the order directing turnover to the Bank. We will therefore remand this issue to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings in this regard. Which was incorporated by reference into the bonds.[fn1] In March 1989. Modular also executed a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement which was filed on April 20. Modular commenced work on the Salvation Army project but was unable to complete all of its obligations under the contract. A Trustee was appointed. First Indemnity contends that the unpaid contract proceeds and retainage held by the Salvation Army were not properly characterized as accounts receivable owing to Modular so that the Bank's superpriority lien would apply to them. The Salvation Army was not obligated to make final payment to Modular until:
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may95/94-2334.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Hawley United States Court of Appeals. Appellant further testified that in 1987 and 1988 he was involved in a beachfront condominium project known as Bac Bay Condominiums. Even though the Bac Bay mortgage was in foreclosure as of October 1988 and construction of the project had stopped in August 1988. Appellant also testified that not all of the values provided in his financial statements were correct. Appellant explained that he had been arrested on criminal charges in 1989 and that most of his financial records had been seized by the Florida Attorney General's Office at that time. STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's resolution of whether a debtor has satisfactorily explained the loss of assets is a finding of fact. In re Chalik.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
As well as to other creditors who are not parties to these appeals. Tecumseh is trying to collect unpaid sewer and water bills. We must determine whether the bankruptcy court was correct in determining the relative priorities of the claims of these parties. Is the former owner of a chicken processing plant in Tecumseh. The first loan (the
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
000 that had been transferred by the debtor to the defendants in an alleged Ponzi scheme
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
These are two class actions against Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1988). We will affirm the conviction. The plans were marketed to small business employers. NIBA members were fully insured by NIBA's group insurance contract with World Life and Health Insurance Company (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Bankruptcy Judge This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 determining that Ideal Ag Corporation (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from three orders dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims in a consolidated class action securities fraud complaint. The orders were based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiffs in this case are all purchasers of publicly traded Westinghouse Electric Corporation (
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
HUD is obligated to ensure maximum returns to the Single The Honorable Charles B. The object is to protect assets of the federal government. HUD policies are to attempt to sell acquired houses as quickly as possible at affordable prices to owner occupants. Advise that the house was in a
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
At issue here is the assignment agreement. The major question for decision is whether the assignment was an absolute assignment. The rents are not property of the estate and are not available as cash collateral nor as a funding source for the debtor's reorganization plan. We will affirm the orders of the district court. The orders of the bankruptcy judge and the district court are final and appealable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Because there is no dispute as to the facts presented below. I. The contest here is between Jason Realty. Jason Realty is the owner of commercial real estate in Aberdeen. Receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. . . . the Assignor shall have the privilege to collect . . . all rents. The foreclosure action was stayed. First Fidelity filed an appeal to the district court which reversed the bankruptcy court's order and held that the rents were not property of the estate and could not be used as cash collateral. The issue before us is whether the assigned rents should have been classified as property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as Receiver for GNBT. Was granted leave to substitute itself for GNBT as an appellee in this case. Suits to which the FDIC is party are generally deemed to arise under the laws of the United States and. Is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
The issue before us is whether the district court2 properly granted American Heritage National Bank's motion for summary judgment in Karen Lunderby's age and gender discrimination suit. Was not selected. Who was under forty years of age. Lunderby alleged that this hiring decision was motivated by discriminatory animus based on her age and gender. Summary judgment is proper if the evidence. Demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Requiring Lunderby to state a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: 1) she is a member of a protected group. 2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants. 3) despite her qualifications she was rejected. 4) other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of a protected group were promoted at the time plaintiff's request for promotion was denied. Lunderby's claims survive a motion for summary judgment only by demonstrating that American's articulated reason is pretextual.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
FACTS The Debtors in this case are Michael and Debra Bowman. Bowman is employed full time by a radio station equipment company in Ogallala. Approximately 60 miles from the Dundy property which is the subject of this appeal. Bowman is employed full time as a clerk at a lumber company. The Debtors' combined yearly income is approximately $60. When the bankruptcy petition was filed. The Dundy property was subject to numerous liens and mortgages totaling over $4 million. The bankruptcy court denied the Debtors' motion on grounds that it was too late in the summer to plant pumpkins. Debtors asserted that they were
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
000.00 was stolen from the top of his refrigerator. The total length of Crawford's sentence was 120 months. Was an organizer of the crime. That the amount of loss was greater than $200. A. Crawford's objection to the enhancement based on the amount of loss is without merit. We have recently held that a fact in a presentence investigation report (PSR) not specifically objected to is a fact admitted by the defendant for purposes of Booker. (2) that is plain. If all three conditions are met. That he was an organizer of the crime. The first two Olano factors are satisfied. Whether the errors affected Crawford's substantial rights is another matter. That but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the Trustee should be compelled to abandon two parcels of real estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §554(b) as either burdensome or of inconsequential value to the bankruptcy estate. 000 and is encumbered by outstanding debts of $195. 000 and is encumbered by debts totaling $263. Each tract is encumbered by mortgages in favor of the Red River State Bank and the Farm Service Agency. Red River State Bank and the Farm Service Agency have assignment of rents clauses with respect to each tract. The obligations to Red River State Bank were current. The obligations to the Farm Service Agency were past due. All rents received by the Debtors on account of the 1999 leases were used to make mortgage payments to Red River Sate Bank. Neither property was leased in 2000. Where the bankruptcy court has determined that the factual predicates for abandonment are present. 217 F.3d 74 (2nd Cir. 2000)(order resolving motion to compel abandonment is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard).
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the Debtor's student loan obligation to Appellant should be discharged as imposing an undue hardship on the Debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). We conclude that under the totality of circumstances test such obligation will not impose an undue hardship on the Debtor and therefore should not be discharged. BACKGROUND The Debtor is a fifty one year old divorced woman with no dependents. The Debtor financed her education with the student loan which is the subject of this dispute. The Debtor's student loan obligation was $25. She was unable to obtain a teaching position until 1999. During that time the Debtor was unable to make her student loan payments and repeatedly sought and received forbearances and deferments of her student loan debt. During the summer months when she is not teaching. Or lie down for too long the pain is not too bad. The Debtor was unable to run or jump the horses after the accident.
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
Eddie and Susan Watt brought this class action on behalf of themselves and other homeowners whose mortgages are serviced by GMAC Mortgage Corporation. A factual question exists as to whether GMAC's fees were reasonable. To charge them fees for payoff statements that they requested through its website because such statements were made in response to
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
|
|
OPINION/ORDER
|
|
BRADFORD MARINE, INC. V. M/V "SEA FALCON"
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Bradford Marine. The district court held that the <i>Sea Falcon</i> was properly liable for the fees because the repair contract at issue provided that the plaintiff would receive attorney's fees if it retained legal counsel to collect its repair charges. Because the repairs were
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/09/061156P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Twymon was initially supervised by Laura Gillund. Whose office was in Minneapolis. Twymon alleges racial animus and retaliation were the real reasons for her termination. An employee informed Cerwick that Twymon was using her work computer to assist a co worker with his master's thesis As in many employment discrimination cases. There are a number of factual disputes. Wells Fargo's computer policy states that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb2001/991702.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He argues that his guilty plea was not knowing. We conclude that his plea was knowing. We conclude that the district court did err in not considering Mustafa's ability to pay the restitution that was imposed in the amount of $732. We will remand for resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each redemption certificate purported to verify that the food stamps Mustafa was depositing were obtained in a manner that was consistent with controlling USDA r egulations. The government also intr oduced the testimony of an employee who testified that Mustafa had attempted to persuade him to say that the fir e was caused by a pot of potatoes left on the stove. Testimony of witnesses regarding the food stamp fraud Mustafa was conducting fr om the 1. The supermarket was in serious financial trouble. Some of the income Mustafa was deriving from the supermarket was derived from a fraudulent food stamp scheme. Mustafa's only viable asset was the insurance policy on the building and the super market business. 3 supermarket.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-4217.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is granted. The Clerk is directed to reissue the Order & Judgment as a published decision. The published opinion is attached to this order. A default judgment was entered against Nightime on January 20. Some of these insurance payments were made pursuant to contracts between Nightime and various insurance companies (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept98/97-3182.opn.html">WILKINS V. COMMERCIAL INV. TRUST CORP. (9/4/1998, NO. 97-3182)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges.</P> <P>PER CURIAM:</P> <P> This is an appeal concerning admiralty jurisdiction. We conclude that admiralty jurisdiction is lacking.</P> <P><CENTER><STRONG>I. Which planned to operate the <EM>Sun</EM> as a cruise ship.<A HREF=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1689.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They probably think their names and addresses will not be released to a firm of private lawyers seeking fuel to propel a possible class action lawsuit. So it is with this case which deals with
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-1069.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Class members have appealed. The judge ordered the challengers to post a $3.15 million appeal bond on the ground that if the settlement were delayed Fleet would lose the ability to pay the amounts that it had agreed to pay in the settlement. There was no basis for this concern. We vacated the bond. 2 No. 03 1069 The suit was brought on behalf of approximately 1.6 million persons whose home mortgages were owned by Fleet Mortgage Corporation. The unauthorized transmission of the information to the marketers is alleged to have violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act along with state consumer protection laws plus state common law protections against invasion of privacy. While the use of the information to trick people into buying from the telemarketers is alleged to have violated both the federal Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act and state consumer protection laws. There are thus two plaintiff classes. 000 members of the first class who were victims of the telemarketers. As is common.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-4129.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The loan was accelerated and an action for foreclosure was ultimately filed. The action to foreclose was dismissed. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiffs' motion was denied. The relevant portions of the note are as follows: 3.). Payments I will pay principal and interest by making payments each month of U.S. $674.88 . . . . 4) Borrower's Failure to Pay as Required (A) Late Charges for Overdue Payments If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any of my monthly payments by the end of fifteen calender days after the date it is due. I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be 5.0% of my overdue payment . . . ... I will be in default. The Note Holder will have the right to be paid back for all of its costs and expenses to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. The relevant portions of the Mortgage are as follows: 17.). Borrower shall have the right to have any proceedings begun by Lender to enforce this Mortgage discontinued at any time prior to entry of a judgement enforcing this Mortgage if: (a) Borrower pays Lender all sums which would be then due under this Mortgage and the Note had no acceleration occurred.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-3595.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellees claimed that the wage lien was void ab initio because it was created after Debtor had filed its petition for bankruptcy. An interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are . . . subject to any generally applicable law that permits 1 Peltz is the named trustee of the AR Accessories Group. Was created pursuant. To the following Wisconsin statutory provisions: The [D]epartment . . . shall have a lien upon all property of the employer. A lien under this subsection takes effect when the [D]epartment . . . file[s] a verified petition claiming the lien with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the services or some part of the services were performed [and duly serves notice thereof upon the employer] . . . within 2 years after the date that the wages were due. . . . Stat. § 109.02(2).2 Because the Wisconsin statute was a generally applicable law. Finding that the language of 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) was ambiguous. The district court concluded that it was intended
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-3424.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That he is therefore a Moorish national. This view of legal obligations is espoused by many adherents to the Moorish Science Temple. Which was founded in 1913 by prophet Noble Drew Ali. Moorish Science is a heterodox Islamic sect based on teachings of Drew and his
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2634.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is rightfully part of the bankruptcy estate. Weinschneider argues that his claim against Burton is not part of the bankruptcy estate and. Even if it is. Those homes were experiencing financial and regulatory difficulties. It was at this meeting that Behr suggested that the two involve Harold Geiser. Which was to be owned by Weinschneider. Burton was incorporated. Sometime in September or October 1989 the exact date is the subject of dispute while Weinschneider. Geiser were discussing the formation of Burton. The agreement that Weinschneider owned 23% of Burton was memorialized in a December 8. Weinschneider's Chapter 11 case was converted to a Chapter 7 case. Daniel Hoseman was appointed Trustee. The settlement agreement was approved by the bankruptcy court in an order dated July 28. After proper notice was provided to all creditors. Could or have against [Weinschneider. The amendment stated: Debtor amends his Schedule B 3 to list a post petition acquired claim that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1662.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He was more than willing to do so. White and friends ran off with more than $2 million that never would have been available to them absent fraudulent appraisals that persuaded lenders to authorize mortgage loans on the properties. Who was a patent attorney at Motorola. The underwriters who approved the loans for UMG testified that UMG would not have made the loans if it had known the true nature of the purchases. Were charged along with six others in a seven count indictment. We will reverse their convictions only if we find a manifest miscarriage of justice. We can make that finding only
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1069.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Claims to have obtained the copyright in a bankruptcy sale. Is making and selling copies of a modified version of the program. The modified program is a derivative work. Which it does not have. From ITOFCA. 2 No. 02 1069 ITOFCA was in 1986 a cooperative corporation owned by Ford. Registration is no longer required for a valid copyright. Among the
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-6311.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court found that there were no facts suggesting he actually assumed his mother's mortgage or that Countrywide extended him credit. The district court found there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning Mr. The District Court order granting summary judgment to the defendants is VACATED for want of subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of Mr. Crutchfield purported to notify both Countrywide and MERS that he was exercising his right to rescission pursuant to TILA. The court held that the Oklahoma default judgment was not void for lack of proper service. Crutchfield's argument that there was insufficient evidence of the relationship between MERS and Countrywide to warrant summary judgment as a matter of res judicata. Crutchfield responded that there was sufficient evidence of a <hr> consumer credit transaction to survive summary judgment. Finding that there was no evidence of either a consumer credit transaction or a written assumption. Crutchfield would not have rescission rights under TILA.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4373.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Contending that the district court improperly admitted evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The scheme was a land
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4084.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Vincent Lane was charged with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and eight counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining three counts. Which were then dismissed. Lane was sentenced to 30 months in prison. I. Background Vincent Lane is a real estate developer who participated in several ventures during the 1980s and 1990s in both Illinois and in Texas. From 1988 through 1995 he was also the chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Lane's conviction is based on fraudulent statements concerning his financial stability made to bank officials at American National Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/993455.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Cefaratti pleaded not guilty and was released after executing an unsecured bond. The S 1957 charge is of a lesser offense than theS 1956 charge in the original indictment. S 3B1.1(c) and that the sentencing range of 51 to 63 months was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences 1. The court found that the two level adjustment for playing a leadership role was warranted and imposed a sentence of 51 months. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Cefaratti was an owner and also the president of the Franklin School of Cosmetology and Hair Design in Elizabeth. Students were eligible for federalfinancial assistance only if they had a high school diploma. A student was considered to be in default after a 180 day grace period if the student failed to make payments unless the student was granted a deferment or forbearance for his or her repayment obligations. Cefaratti implemented a scheme to manipulate Franklin's default rate by submitting false deferment and forbearance forms to student loan lenders and by making payments on behalf of student borrowers who were on the verge of defaulting.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/02/951856P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Seeking a declaratory judgment that they are exempt from state sales and income taxation and for an injunction prohibiting the state from imposing such taxes. The PCAs moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue The HONORABLE ADRIAN G. Sitting by designation. * of whether they were immune from state sales and income taxation because PCAs are statutorily declared instrumentalities of the United States and. Are entitled to immunity from such state taxation. The state responded that Congressional declaration of PCAs as federal instrumentalities was insufficient to confer tax immunity and that waiver of immunity should be implied. The state further argued that it was necessary to make a factual inquiry into the governmental nature of PCAs in order to determine whether they are federal instrumentalities immune from state taxation. Summary Judgment is appropriate if the record. Shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/03/952426P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on two claims and judgment as a matter of law (JAML) on the remaining claims following opening statements. Was the income beneficiary of The Brown the first trust. Were the remaindermen. the residual trust. on his own as long as children were also the beneficiaries of the second trust. Referred to as Maurice and United Missouri Bank (UMB) were cotrustees during Maurice's life. Although Maurice could conduct any business he was competent. One of the trust assets was the Maurice L. Brown Company was renamed Petroleum Production Management. Secured by junior mortgages on properties owned by Petroleum Production. notes were allocated to the residual trust. Maurice was diagnosed with brain cancer. Which was paid to Virginia. Finding that claims against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty are equitable and therefore not triable to a jury. That Count IV against Thomas was dependent on the equitable claims against UMB. Finding that both counts were dependent upon Maurice's competency at the time he signed the release and that the Brown children had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on the issue. between one of the Brown children and UMB employees.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/05/952768P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The classes claimed that the defendants had failed to properly refund or credit surplus funds and were violating federal law and the terms of the mortgage agreements by their ongoing A magistrate judge initially recommended denial of the fee request in each case. The law firm Zimmerman Reed represented the class The cases were assigned to then Chief Judge Diana Murphy of the District of Minnesota. The cases were reassigned to Judge David Doty. 27. 000 in the Comerica action.4 The settlements also provide Escrow accounts typically are maintained to enable the servicer to pay taxes. Enables the servicer to pay off expenses as they accrue without dipping into corporate funds if the customer is delinquent in paying. The extent of the allowable cushion is governed by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-1141a.html">TRANS UNION V. FTC<BR></A><BR>
With him on the brief was Stephen L. Argued the cause for respondent.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/09/953419P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mortgage A foreclosure sale was foreclosure sales on her home were pending. mortgage sometime after that. scheduled on her first mortgage for September 4. 816 in past due taxes and penalties. was her right to receive an unencumbered $50. She converted to Chapter Debtor's attempt Debtor was unable 11 in order to prevent foreclosure on her home and to work out a payment plan for her taxes once the Skyline funds were depleted. at Chapter 11 reorganization. Was unsuccessful. to confirm a reorganization plan. to fund a Chapter 11 plan due to insufficient funds and thus was never able Despite her inability to reorganize. Keate was able to renegotiate both mortgages on Debtor's home and Debtor became current on her mortgage payments during the Chapter 11 proceeding.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3867_022.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Perry sought to amend her complaint to allege that First National's offer of credit was a sham. First National was prohibited from accessing her consumer credit report. Finding that the credit offer was a firm offer and that amending the complaint would be futile. To support her argument that the Notice was not
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/10/953535P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case is on appeal and cross appeal from an order entered in the United States District Court1 for the Eastern District of *The Honorable James M. 1994) (hereinafter bankruptcy court order). argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that (1) PLPOA does not have equitable ownership of certain real property within Pagosa under either a promissory estoppel theory or a trust theory and (2) the disputed land is subject to a valid mortgage lien held by the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB) notwithstanding a restrictive covenant of use and enjoyment of the land for the benefit of Pagosa property owners. If PLPOA does have an ownership interest in the disputed property. Then that interest is avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 544. Pagosa is a 26. The Pagosa Lakes Property Owners' Association was originally named the Pagosa Property Owners' Association. 23 2 a wholly owned subsidiary of FCI. FPI was the indirect successor in interest to the original developer of Pagosa. FCI filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. was reorganization plan.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-1402b.html">NEXT WAVE PRSNAL COMM V. FCC<BR></A><BR>
Olson argued the cause for petitioners/appel lants.<span style=
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3459_011.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because the plaintiffs' claims are solely derivative claims and can only be brought on behalf of the corporation (Conseco). Conseco was a large scale Indiana corporation that sold. Merrill Lynch knew that its so called fairness opinion pertaining to Conseco's proposed valuation of Green Tree was
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/03/971946P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He was assigned to examine Marion County Mutual Loan and Building Association (MCM). Was not satisfied with the progress made toward restoring MCM's financial health by current management. Among the changes were (1) increased capital maintenance requirements. MCM was still below the standard in terms of its capital holdings. The OTS was concerned about its ability to meet these new requirements. The proposed stock conversion would involve a minimal insurance risk and was a feasible strategy for MCM to raise capital. The OTS did not believe the net worth certificates were convertible into any instrument that would qualify as core capital. Haley discovered that the certificates were indeed convertible into capital. Haley searched OTS files and found that the agency was determined to replace the current management at MCM. He also learned that Roosevelt 3 Federal Savings and Loan (Roosevelt) was the most likely acquiror of MCM. The Haley Memo was addressed to Maffitt. Although the OTS was unaware of it at the time.
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-3440_006.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Berheide pled guilty to one count of making a false statement and overvaluing security to influence Peoples State Bank to defer action on the replevin of collateral for a loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.1 1 Kent Berheide and his wife Lisa Berheide were originally charged in an indictment alleging various fraudulent acts. The government and Berheide entered into an addendum to the plea agreement in which they agreed that
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr2001/995602.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The pur chase was financed with a $12 million loan. Was held by Metro North State Bank (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0006n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court's order will be affirmed. Does Castle have standing to object to the Final Report and the Application for Fees? 3. The order on appeal is final and may be appealed as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). None of the parties have timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(c)(1).
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr2001/002881.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Have participated in the operation or management of a corrupt enterprise? We will affirm the Orders of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. To the effect that conspiracy liability under section 1962(d) extends only to those who have conspir ed personally to operate or manage the corrupt enterprise. Or otherwise suggesting that conspiracy liability is limited to those also liable. Is inconsistent with the broad application of general conspiracy law to section 1962(d) as set forth in Salinas. 3 I. Rejecting the Appellants' argument that the claims failed as a matter of law because the Appellants' conduct was not alleged to violate section 1962(c). 3 The 1. The additional defendants are Columbia National. Liability under section 1962(d) is met by
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0279n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The convictions are affirmed. Madison's sentence is affirmed. Madison's sentence is reversed and remanded. Was selfemployed as a minister. Madison's principal employment from 1996 1999 was as the executive director for Cherokee Children and Family Services. Was run under the umbrella of Cherokee Children and Family Services. The organizations collectively are referred to as
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/95opinions/95-1182a.html">MONEY STATN INC V. FRS<BR></A><BR>
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/973484P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which prohibits prepayment penalties and charges on a loan used in part for the purchase of agricultural land.2 Appellant seeks to have this Court find that § 535.9 also prohibits contractual language that forbids the prepayment of a loan. The full facts and history of the case are outlined in detail in the well reasoned opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 3 and this Court will not restate that history here. The necessary facts are as follows. The note was then assigned to Prudential Insurance Company of America (
</TD>
</TR>
<TR CLASS="swhit">
<TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-1.gif" ALT="150"></TD>
<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1996/96a1298p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). We will affirm the conviction. Inc. (
</TD>
</TR>
</TABLE>
<!-- End of real page content -->
<!-- kludgy empty paragraph acts as spacer -->
<P></P>
<!-- This is the place for the lower nav bar and footer -->
<!-- the following is Mason-included: footer.htm -->
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close extra div (opened in header.htm) -->
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close middle (opened in header.htm) -->
<div id="footer">
<div class="footerNav">
<div><!-- getting ridiculous, i know -->
<ul>
<li><a href="/lii.html" class="nav">about us</a></li>
<li><a href="/help/" class="nav">help</a></li>
<li><a href="/comments/credits.html" class="nav">© copyright</a></li>
</ul>
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close ridiculous div -->
</div><!-- close footerNav -->
</div><!-- close footer -->
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close collection (opened in header.htm) -->
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close ours (opened in header.htm) -->
<br class="clear" />
</div><!-- close container (opened in header.htm) -->
<!-- end of included footer -->
</BODY>
</HTML>
<!-- end of HTML -->
<!-- code from here on down -->
<!-- input arguments are:
a query (optional)
-->
<!-- to begin with...
This init block sets up and runs the query.
-->
<!-- select correct options based on scope -->
|
