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UNITED STATES CELLULAR INV. CO. V. SOUTHWESTERN BELL MOBILE SYS.
Background The Oklahoma City SMSA Limited Partnership (OKC Partnership) was formed among competing applicants to operate a cellular telephone system within the five county area of the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Statistical Area (Oklahoma City MSA). SBMS was the sole and managing general partner with a 40% interest as a general partner and a 22% interest as a limited partner. The remaining 38% interest was held by three other limited partners. The primary issue in this lawsuit is whether SBMS could expand into these rural areas on its own behalf. Or whether instead it was obligated to do so on behalf of the limited partnership. The central sections of the Agreement in dispute are 8.8 and 7.2(f).
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OPINION/ORDER
The issue is rendered complex by an interrelated maze of corporations and partnerships devised by the limited partners and the general partner in their efforts to develop two separate real estate projects. Was aborted shortly after conception. The defendants appellants are limited partners of Red Hawk North Associates. G&A Development Corporation (G&A) is the general partner of Red Hawk. Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge are both general partners of Chestnut Woods. To have it furnish the labor. The court entered a default judgment which was not satisfied in whole or part. 1993 that Red Hawk was worthless. Henkels' counsel also had been advised that G&A was unable to pay the judgment out of its assets. Sixteen of the partners are parties to this appeal. 000 during the period that Cedar Ridge was obligated under its contract with Henkels to pay Henkels $300. Henkels alleged that the capital distributions were made in violation of the Red Hawk limited partnership agreement and S 42:2A 46(b) of the New Jersey Uniform Limited Partnership Law of 1976 (New Jersey ULPL). 3 After the district court denied both Henkels's and the Partners' motions for summary judgment.
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OPINION/ORDER
The Stroud Group expelled the Riese Group from SALT due to alleged poor construction and financial The general contractor for the Lexington Project actually was Gibraltar Companies of Tennessee. Is not material. Violations of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (
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OPINION/ORDER
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. A Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on June 7. Such plan was consummated on April 27. A Final Closing Order nunc pro tunc was issued by the Bankruptcy Court on July 31. A partnership which was formed in 1975 between OMS and Digicon Marine. The Bankruptcy Court entered the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law: Ocean Marine Services Partnership No. 1 (
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OPINION/ORDER
That the inter vivos transfer was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). At the age of eighty eight.1 She was survived by her son. Who is the executor of The facts we recite are undisputed facts. Was attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney from 1986 until decedent died. Is the attorney of record for this appeal. These gifts were in keeping with decedent's practice of making cash gifts to her children every year around Christmas. After she was released from the hospital. Which was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a first position deed of trust on the Padaro Lane property in favor of the bank. 2 whose stated purpose was to engage in the business of owning and operating residential real property.
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01-9009 -- KATZ V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/07/2003
Aron Katz (Taxpayer) was a partner in a number of partnerships that suffered substantial losses during a year in which he filed for bankruptcy. The question before us is whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can challenge that allocation in a proceeding involving only the Taxpayer. We hold that a partnership level proceeding is necessary. - Background
Taxpayer's partnerships did not do well in 1990. Although he could have elected to bifurcate his 1990 tax year into two short years. The remaining partnerships of which Taxpayer was a member did not distinguish between pre petition and post petition items in the K 1 forms they prepared. Are not subject to the federal income tax.
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OPINION/ORDER
Will & Emery 600 Thirteenth Street. Venue is proper pursuant to I.R.C. We will affirm in part. Each of ACM's three partners was created as a subsidiary of a larger entity several days before ACM's formation. Southampton was incorporated under Delaware law on October 24. Kannex Corporation N.V. (
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OPINION/ORDER
Concluding the transfer of assets was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. We will affirm.
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SENDER V. SIMON
The scheme was masterminded and operated by a man named James Donahue. The corporation and the three limited partnerships are in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code. Harvey Sender is the trustee in bankruptcy for the four bankrupt entities. Sender claims the excess payments represent fictitious profits to which the defendants are not entitled. (1) A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which
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OPINION/ORDER
2 and that the partnership was dissolved only upon Victor's death. We will vacate the order of the District Court and will remand the case so that the District Court can properly determine. Who were then married. In his will. The surviving Partner shall have the right within ninety (90) days from the date of death of the deceased Partner to purchase the interest of the deceased Partner in the Partnership and to pay to the personal representative of the deceased Partner the value of that interest as provided in Paragraph 18 of this Agreement. . . . Leah advised the Woskobs that Victor's interest was negative in the amount of $33. That the Estate was not entitled to any payments for the purchase of Victor's partnership interest. The fixing of damages for amounts alleged to have been wrongfully taken from the partnership by Leah. Both actions were removed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 4 Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Woskobs contended that Leah's attempt to purchase Victor's interest after his death in 1999 was untimely because the Legends Partnership had already been dissolved in 1997 by any one of three events.
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REDWING CARRIERS, INC. V. SARALAND APTS.
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Redwing Carriers. Redwing sued the Appellees claiming they are liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response. (Saraland) Site is a 5.1 acre parcel of land located within the southern Alabama community of Saraland. Redwing was in the business of hauling materials used in construction and other industries. Trucks were cleaned out. The ground at the Site became contaminated with hazardous chemicals which have combined to form a black. Bolton were partners in Saraland Limited. Meador completed construction of the Saraland Apartments complex in May 1974.<p> Construction of the complex was subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide low income housing. Marcrum denies Redwing's claim that the company is the daily. The complex's parking lot was repaved. Coit and Roar are responsible for managing the business of the Partnership. Meador were liable under
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Assessed $62 million in additional taxes based on a finding that the foreign banks to which the income was allocated were not bona fide equity partners. J.) ruled that the banks were bona fide equity partners. For which the taxpayer was the tax matters partner. Was drastically reduced by huge depreciation deductions which the IRS would not recognize. The effects of the ostensible allocation of the majority of the partnership's income to the non taxpaying Dutch banks were to shelter most of the partnership's income from taxation and to redirect that income tax free to the taxpayer. What the Dutch banks were in fact to receive from the partnership was dictated by provisions of the partnership agreement calling for the reimbursement of their initial investment at an annual rate of return of 9.03587% (or. The banks' reimbursement at the agreed rate of return was formidably secured by a variety of contractual undertakings by the taxpayer and its parent GECC. The effect of the reallocation was to assign a far greater percentage of Castle Harbour's income to the taxpayer.
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INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF RUTH A. Ltd (Partnership) was includible in her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 because the transfer was not a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration. (2) a transfer of assets in return for a pro rata partnership interest is not a transfer for full and adequate consideration. The district court also erred in failing to consider uncontroverted record evidence to support the taxpayer's position that the transfer was a bona fide sale. She was 96 years old. Is the Decedent's son and the executor of her estate. Which was a revocable living trust administered by Mrs. David Kimbell was the sole manager of the LLC. The oil and gas properties were a continuation of an oil and gas business that the Decedent's late husband had founded in the 1920's. Approximately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11%) and royalty (4%) interests. Kimbell's assets were conveyed to the LLC and the Partnership. The primary focus of this appeal is on this transfer from the LLC and the Trust to the Partnership.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept96/95-6198.opa.html">REDWING CARRIERS, INC. V. SARALAND APTS.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Redwing Carriers. Redwing sued the Appellees claiming they are liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response. (Saraland) Site is a 5.1 acre parcel of land located within the southern Alabama community of Saraland. Redwing was in the business of hauling materials used in construction and other industries. Trucks were cleaned out. The ground at the Site became contaminated with hazardous chemicals which have combined to form a black. Bolton were partners in Saraland Limited. Meador completed construction of the Saraland Apartments complex in May 1974.<p> Construction of the complex was subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide low income housing. Marcrum denies Redwing's claim that the company is the daily. The complex's parking lot was repaved. Coit and Roar are responsible for managing the business of the Partnership. Meador were liable under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/05/011875P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a dispute over the exercise of an option to acquire a 10% interest in a limited partnership. By that time it was too late for KUCC to obtain corporate approval. On KUCC's ability to transfer the interest after the option was exercised. LG&E was willing to deal. The date the option was to expire. The financial closing on the Grimes plant was just a week 3 away. Because it was concerned about the closing. After the material terms of the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1996/96a1416p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a diversity suit arising out of a dispute among the members of a small limited partnership. Although there is complete diversity among the three partners. Manchester argues that the Partnership itself which shares the citizenship of all of the parties is an indispensable party whose joinder destroys diversity jurisdiction. A limited partner is considered a citizen of each state in which its partners are citizens. Because all of the partners of this small limited partnership are before the district court. Joinder of the partnership entity is not required. Proceeding in the absence of the Partnership will cause no prejudice to Manchester. That the Partnership is effectively represented by the partners and consequently suffers no prejudice from its exclusion. That whether or not the plaintiffs' claims are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2002/01-12250.opn.html">SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)<BR></A><BR>
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2002/01-12250.opn.html">SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)<BR></A><BR>
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and </SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200112250.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and comment only on two issues discussed by our esteemed dissenting colleague: (1) whether the gift was properly characterized as one of interests in land instead of shares of the family partnership. (2) whether a 33.5 percent discount is inapplicable when valuing the land gifted in this case. I. GIFT OF LAND We agree with the Tax Court that the gift in this case was an indirect gift of We review decisions of the Tax Court
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-5100.html">TRANSPAC DRILLING V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1132.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
L.L.C.</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/06/96-3133.htm">96-3133 -- WILLIAMSON V. KAY -- 06/17/1998<BR></A><BR>
The first issue we must determine is whether the provision in the Villa West limited partnership agreement that governs calls for additional capital contributions allows the general partner. To bring a suit for money damages against a limited partner who fails to contribute when a call is made. Because the obligation to contribute is mandatory. Any limited partner who fails to contribute is liable for money damages. That a money damages suit was not one of the listed remedies. <u>Id.</u>. The second issue we address is whether. We conclude that there is no reversible error. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5045.html">WALTER PROCHORENKO V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for defendant appellee.<span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-2858.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Securities Grp. 1980 United States Court of Appeals. BACKGROUND A. Facts The appellants are former limited partners in three New York limited partnerships: The Securities Group (
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OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Securities Grp. 1980 United States Court of Appeals. BACKGROUND A. Facts The appellants are former limited partners in three New York limited partnerships: The Securities Group (
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OPINION/ORDER
Is amended as follows: On slip opinion page 11556. Wright is distinguishable because. No assessment was made against the individual partners. Although an action against the partnership would have been timely. The only relevant question in Wright was whether the statute of limitations applicable to the partners should be tolled while the limitations period was tolled with respect to the partnership. Judges Kleinfeld and Graber have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. The United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed proofs of claim against Debtors for unpaid employment taxes assessed against a partnership in which Debtors were general partners. The IRS's claims were properly disallowed because (1) the IRS cannot collect a partnership's tax deficiency directly from the partners without first making individualized assessments against the partners or obtaining judgments against the partners holding them jointly and severally liable for the partnership's tax debts.
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OPINION/ORDER
The SEC asserted that these interests were
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OPINION/ORDER
These consolidated cases are before the court on interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of injunctive relief. Which was owned 45% by MOAA and 55% by TIAA. TIAA was guaranteed an 8.5% annual return on this account. MOAA did receive income from the Mall venture because it was the manager of the Mall. TIAA was also protected against loss from sale of the Mallif the Mall ever sold for $683 million or less. We will refer to the many entities involved separately. The issue of whether and the extent to which the parties are legally distinct will be resolved later in this opinion. 71 the original MOAC partnership agreement provided that beginning in 2002. This is referred to by the parties as the
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OPINION/ORDER
Berry & Howard were on brief. P.C. were on brief. Arguing that the agreement was unambiguous and imposed no such obligation on it. Arguing that the agreement was ambiguous and that. The agreement was unambiguous in its imposition of such a capital contribution obligation on IBM. We agree that the agreement unambiguously supports Wyman's position and that resort to parol evidence is therefore unnecessary. Received a majority interest of 51% in the partnership and was named the managing partner. If such contributions were
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OPINION/ORDER
Cellular's core allegation is that one of the partners breached the partnership agreement by transferring or assigning its general and limited partnership interests. We agree with the district court that the agreement was not violated. Cellular was an original partner of the Los Angeles Partnership. The Los Angeles Partnership Agreement is based on a form agreement that was developed for structuring cellular telephone partnerships throughout the country (the
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OPINION/ORDER
Trust was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring its two notes from their prior holder. Trust and Atlantic Funding are related entities in that C.F. To
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OPINION/ORDER
844.10 was property of the estate. Was appointed as Trustee. Shearin was at that time. The firm is a registered limited liability partnership with offices located in Norfolk. A partnership agreement that was executed on January 1. Any available distributive net profits are divided into two portions: objective and subjective. Each partner is given an objective and subjective valuation. The subjective evaluation is based on a variety of factors ranging from client development to other beneficial contributions to the law firm. Each partner's given objective and subjective percentage is then applied to the respective objective and subjective portion of the law firm's distributable net profits. The bankruptcy court determined that 85.6% of his receipts was attributable to pre petition work. No exception is taken to this figure. Which was the share of profits of the law firm due to Shearin for his participation in the affairs of the law firm through July 12. To the amount of 3 this sum there is also no exception taken on appeal.
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OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
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OPINION/ORDER
The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
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OPINION/ORDER
Who were tenants in outlet shopping malls. The tenant assigned to AFS exclusive control of all potential legal claims that the tenant might have against the landlord. The district court concluded that the contractual arrangements were
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OPINION/ORDER
Three issues are raised. First is the question whether federal courts have jurisdiction. To entertain the taxpayers' complaints that Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments (FPAAs) were untimely filed and cannot be the basis of assessments substantial against interest them. charged Second. We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the statute of limitations issue and that § 6621(c) interest was improperly charged. The third issue was resolved by a recent decision of this court at odds with the trial courts' decisions. 336 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (district courts have jurisdiction to resolve taxpayers' deficiency interest abatement requests under § 6404(e)). Weiner was a limited partner in Travertine Flame Associates (
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OPINION/ORDER
Three issues are raised. First is the question whether federal courts have jurisdiction. To entertain the taxpayers' complaints that Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments (FPAAs) were untimely filed and cannot be the basis of assessments substantial against interest them. charged Second. We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the statute of limitations issue and that § 6621(c) interest was improperly charged. The third issue was resolved by a recent decision of this court at odds with the trial courts' decisions. 336 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (district courts have jurisdiction to resolve taxpayers' deficiency interest abatement requests under § 6404(e)). Weiner was a limited partner in Travertine Flame Associates (
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OPINION/ORDER
Three issues are raised. First is the question whether federal courts have jurisdiction. To entertain the taxpayers' complaints that Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments (FPAAs) were untimely filed and cannot be the basis of assessments substantial against interest them. charged Second. We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the statute of limitations issue and that § 6621(c) interest was improperly charged. The third issue was resolved by a recent decision of this court at odds with the trial courts' decisions. 336 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (district courts have jurisdiction to resolve taxpayers' deficiency interest abatement requests under § 6404(e)). Weiner was a limited partner in Travertine Flame Associates (
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OPINION/ORDER
Three issues are raised. First is the question whether federal courts have jurisdiction. To entertain the taxpayers' complaints that Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments (FPAAs) were untimely filed and cannot be the basis of assessments substantial against interest them. charged Second. We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the statute of limitations issue and that § 6621(c) interest was improperly charged. The third issue was resolved by a recent decision of this court at odds with the trial courts' decisions. 336 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2003) (district courts have jurisdiction to resolve taxpayers' deficiency interest abatement requests under § 6404(e)). Weiner was a limited partner in Travertine Flame Associates (
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OPINION/ORDER
We conclude that the district court's decision was correct and we affirm. I. Background Because we have the benefit of two thoughtful and thorough opinions by the district court. 3 the background of this matter will be stated summarily. This is a breach of contract case involving a limited partnership agreement. The parties to the limited partnership agreement are Opus and IBM. It is undisputed that Minnesota law applies. A. The Recourse Issue The purpose of the limited partnership was to construct and rent a 50 floor office building known as
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CRNKOVICH LAWRENCE P. V. U.S.
With him on the brief were Loretta C. Final judgment was entered in favor of the Skinners after the United States chose not to contend that the Skinners had impliedly waived the requirement that the government assess them within the statutory period.
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OLSON STEPHEN S V. U.S.
With him on the brief was Teresa J. With him on the brief were Loretta C. Circuit Judge. This is a consolidated appeal from four summary judgments of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Penalties were improperly assessed simply because the Internal Revenue Service (the
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02-3187 -- U.S. V. BAILEY -- 04/25/2003
All the partners were family members and/or close friends of Bailey's. The Partnership consisted of Bailey and eleven partners. The Partnership Agreement was year to year. The Managing Partner shall have no authority to invest in and shall be specifically prohibited from investing Partnership funds in real estate. None of these transactions were authorized by the Partnership Agreement or the other partners. Bailey also apparently used funds transferred from the Partnership accounts to his personal accounts to pay for a new home he built for his family. Bailey was required by the Partnership Agreement to provide quarterly reports to the partners. They also failed to reveal that Bailey was investing in futures. The Partnership capital was something less than $2000. The suit sought termination of the Partnership and to have an accounting. The two suits were certified as class actions and were consolidated. The civil suits resulted in a settlement. Bailey was indicted in a twenty two count indictment.
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OPINION/ORDER
With him on the briefs was Steuart H. With him on the brief were Loretta C. The transactions took advantage of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (and related regulations) designed to yield reasonable results when property is sold on an installment basis and the value of the installment payments cannot be known in advance. Transactions that in substance added up to a wash were transmuted into ones generating tax losses of several hundred million dollars. The offsetting gains were allocated to foreign entities not subject to United States income tax at all. We affirm. * * * The hardest aspect of this case is simply getting a handle on the facts. Gains and losses are generally
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OPINION/ORDER
The United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed proofs of claim against Debtors for unpaid employment taxes assessed against a partnership in which Debtors were general partners. The IRS's claims were properly disallowed because (1) the IRS cannot collect a partnership's tax deficiency directly from the partners without first making individualized assessments against the partners or obtaining judgments against the partners holding them jointly and severally liable for the partnership's tax debts. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Debtors were general partners of Marina Cabrillo Partners (the Partnership). The IRS argues that its timely assessment of taxes against the Partnership allows it to collect taxes directly from the individual partners even though no separate assessment of tax liability was made against them. Only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun (1) within 10 years after the assessment of the tax[.]. So long as the IRS brings an action to collect the taxes within three years after the taxpayer's return was filed.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Benjamin Cotten and Ronald Charnock were longtime friends and business associates. Is due to our relationship.
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OPINION/ORDER
All further citations to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (
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OPINION/ORDER
Which are amply supported by the record. ACM invested $175 million of its cash in private placement Citicorp notes paying just three basis points more than the cash was earning on deposit. Which is evident from the Tax Court's well supported factual findings. Is essential to assessing whether the transaction's tax consequences may be disregarded and lends significant support to the court's ultimate finding that ACM's transactions did not have sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. The consideration consisted of $140 million in cash and LIBOR notes whose present value was $34. Reduced by the transaction costs established by Merrill Lynch. 38 acquire an amount of LIBOR notes that was identical. To the amount of such notes that ACM could have acquired by investing its $35 million in cash directly into such assets. Just as the Gregory Court found that the intervening creation and dissolution of a corporation and transfer of stock thereto and therefrom was a
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OPINION/ORDER
Concluding that the Department's offer was not arbitrary. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Monument Act was passed to protect the ecosystem created by the eruption. It is the sense of the Congress that in the case of mineral and geothermal interests such exchanges should be completed within one year after the date of enactment of this Act. More than twenty years after the Monument Act was enacted. B. The Partnership's Mineral Interests The Partnership is the owner of patented mineral interests on about 604 acres of land located within the boundaries of the Monument. The Norway Sweden Group is located at the head of Spirit Lake. Determined the copper deposits were too small and of too low grade to develop. 16% of this area is under water and most of the remainder is covered with blown down timber. The United Group is located on the east side of a ridge that separates Spirit Lake and the Green River drainage. Natural vegetation has returned to this area after the eruption and guided walks are led on the land.
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97-9029 -- TRUE OIL CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/23/1999
Is the tax matters partner
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OPINION/ORDER
Nearly identical
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BOCA INVESTERINGS PARTNERSHIP V. U.S.
Argued the cause for appellant.
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OPINION/ORDER
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OPINION/ORDER
With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. With him on the brief were William L. AHP was one of several Fortune 500 companies that Merrill approached with this idea. This is the third case before us involving this particular type of scheme. There fore will not belabor the details here. Was virtually identical to the one Merrill proposed to AHP in the case before us now. An installment sale is defined in the code as
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The ousted partner appeals the district court's holding that the remaining partners are entitled to receive contribution from him in relation to a loan that was repaid through the partnership. SIMONS 3 under § 50 42 was in error. Wassenaar and the partners were each credited with a $70. Established an accounting practice whereby the partnership issued checks to the bank under the note and the payments were in turn treated in the partnership's records as distributions to Wassenaar and the partners.1 The business relationship between Wassenaar and the partners ultimately soured. The renewal note finally was extinguished on December 1. The final payment was treated as a reduction of debts owed by the partnership to the partners. Never These transactions were likewise treated as distributions on the partners' individual income tax returns. Holding that while the partnership had issued the checks by which the loan payments were made. Who were thus entitled to contribution.
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AMERITRUST CO. V. WHITE
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Ameritrust Co. v. Senior Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a suit on a promissory note by the owner of the note. CISC subsequently endorsed the note to Ameritrust as security for a loan from Ameritrust to CISC.<p> The district court held that White was not liable on the note after determining. That the note was not a negotiable instrument and. We agree with the district court that the note is not a negotiable instrument. That the option to put was a valid defense. Finding instead (1) that the option to put was an agreement between White and Cardinal and the latter was not a party to the note transaction underlying Ameritrust's cause of action and (2) that even if Cardinal were a party to the note transaction through some inter corporate relationship with CISC. We remand the case for the district court to address in the first instance the propriety of the assignment of the note by Amberwood to CISC to Ameritrust.<p> I. <i>FACTS</i><p> <p> Amberwood was formed as a Georgia limited partnership in August 1985 with the filing of a Certificate of Limited Partnership with the Clerks of the Superior Courts of Bartow County.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-8370.opa.html">AMERITRUST CO. V. WHITE<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Ameritrust Co. v. Senior Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a suit on a promissory note by the owner of the note. CISC subsequently endorsed the note to Ameritrust as security for a loan from Ameritrust to CISC.<p> The district court held that White was not liable on the note after determining. That the note was not a negotiable instrument and. We agree with the district court that the note is not a negotiable instrument. That the option to put was a valid defense. Finding instead (1) that the option to put was an agreement between White and Cardinal and the latter was not a party to the note transaction underlying Ameritrust's cause of action and (2) that even if Cardinal were a party to the note transaction through some inter corporate relationship with CISC. We remand the case for the district court to address in the first instance the propriety of the assignment of the note by Amberwood to CISC to Ameritrust.<p> I. <i>FACTS</i><p> <p> Amberwood was formed as a Georgia limited partnership in August 1985 with the filing of a Certificate of Limited Partnership with the Clerks of the Superior Courts of Bartow County.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/06/972717P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court's accounting is erroneous. T.R.'s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Which was used to make payments on the Christ place contract for deed. The parties have operated the entire 4. When cattle were sold. Grain proceeds were also distributed in this manner until 1973. Morris and T.R.'s share of the proceeds was deposited in the Tarnavsky Brothers bank account. Which is located about 500 miles from the ranch. T.R. was in charge of bookkeeping. Which is about 75 miles from the ranch. After attempts to settle the partners' accounts were unsuccessful. The district court concluded that Morris and T.R. were partners. The existence of a partnership is a mixed question of law and fact. There is no challenge to the district court's factual findings. The ultimate conclusion of whether a partnership existed is a question of law. A partnership is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1997/97a1702p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked to decide whether a highly structured securitization transaction negotiated between Citicorp and an investor in a limited partnership constitutes an
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E81DBF41AAD2A0F188256E5A00707D25/$file/9855056.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Will & Emery. We are called upon to determine whether. Those cleanup costs were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/18FFEF170766D6AC88256AEF005A703E/$file/9855056.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Will & Emery. We are called upon to determine whether. Those cleanup costs were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043848p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are asked who owns the founder's surname. We are also asked whether defendants the founder's grandson and his business have engaged in trademark infringement. Because we conclude that plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. Although the personal aspects of this dispute are not material to our resolution of this appeal. The history of the Doebler family businesses is critical to this matter. A case that is now before us for a second time. 4 A. Other family members were involved in the business as well. All three families were represented on Hybrids' board of directors as well. Jones and Camerer are officers. The Partnership's original functions were ultimately split between Partnership. Doebler III had ties to all three entities: he was partnered with his father in the Partnership and remains an owner of the successor LLC. He is co owner of Farmland. He was but no longer is a shareholder.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/983941P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
AHW was the general partner. Were admitted to the Partnership on November 17. 000 (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/02/98-1010.htm">98-1010 -- FOLEY V. ASPEN SKI LODGE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 02/28/2000<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1BBE99A82D53440288256C2B005015A5/$file/0155038.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LUI were consolidated. As the removed action was essentially a counterclaim to the claims initially brought in federal court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The two attractions contemplated were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021169.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Section 1 the status is changed from
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021169.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jurisdiction in this court is invoked pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. I. Appellant Lewin was a partner in I Tech R&D Limited Partnership [hereinafter
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/feb96/94-2202.html">LYON DEVEL. CO. V. BUSINESS MEN'S ASSURANCE CO.<BR></A><BR>
Plaintiff Lyon & Associates Realty (LAR) appeals the court's refusal to instruct the jury on some of its claims.2 I LDC is a corporation owned and operated by Gary and Jeanne Lyon. They did not have the resources to exercise the option or * The Honorable Ralph G. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. finance the development. Including the following: So long as any of the Guaranteed Obligations is outstanding . . . and unless the Lender shall otherwise consent in writing: . . . Neither Guarantor will take any action that may result in dissolution of the Borrower. The initial loan to the partnership was fifteen million dollars. Construction on the Quail Run project was plagued with delays. 000 loan was nearing exhaustion. Shortly before its response time was to expire. Finding that BMA's exercise of the buy sell provision was valid in all respects. The case was tried before a jury. Modification agreements were not ambiguous. This is in accord with BMA's request. Finding that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict against BMA on its claim of breach of contract for marketing advances.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2003/02-12164.opn.html">MONAHAN V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12164)<BR></A><BR>
The losses and credits claimed by Barrister and its partners were subsequently examined in an IRS audit of Barrister's tax return. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03a0315p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The two cases have been consolidated on appeal. Eastland's complaint was refiled as an adversary proceeding. Essentially arguing that Brown and his two companies converted funds that were to be used to pay property taxes and other reserves on behalf of Eastland. Village Green moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Eastland did not have standing to commence the lawsuit since Eastland's sole managing general partner. Filed against Village Green were dismissed. A jury trial was held in January of 2000. A second jury trial was held in July of 2000. It is from the district court's order denying Village Green's motion that Village Green now appeals in Case No. 01 1015. He was entitled to indemnity for attorneys' fees. It is from this order that Eastland now appeals in Case No. 01 2500. Facts Eastland is a Michigan limited partnership created in 1984. Eastland's sole general partner is JAM. A Michigan co partnership whose two co partners are Brown and Lutz. Eastland's sole limited partner is Eastland Properties.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2003/02-12164.opn.html">MONAHAN V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 02-12164)<BR></A><BR>
The losses and credits claimed by Barrister and its partners were subsequently examined in an IRS audit of Barrister's tax return. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/08/023978P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Russell was in charge of the farming operation in North Dakota. While Melvin was in charge of the oil and gas exploration in the United States and Canada. The brothers withdrew profits from the partnership that were attributable to each of their respective business pursuits and paid the expenses related to each of their respective activities. In years where the oil business was more profitable. Paid some of the oil business's taxesand vice versa for years when the oil business was less profitable. Many of the assets used by BBP were not held in the partnership's name. Were owned by the brothers jointly or individually. For taxable years 1980 through 1994 (which encompasses the records which were before the Tax Court). Which was attributable to grain sales by BBP. The proper 1 Form 1065 is the Partnership Return of Income form. 2 distribution of these 1994 grain sales are at the heart of the dispute in this case. After Melvin was diagnosed with cancer in late 1993. It appears that this was the first that Melvin's family knew of the partnership arrangement to split the tax burden evenly.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/08/011206P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Popkin & Stern was a troubled law firm. The firm has since ceased doing business and sought bankruptcy protection. 2 The question presented in this case is whether. Is liable for a claim made against Popkin & Stern in October of 1991. Old Republic argues that it is not liable for this claim because Popkin & Stern dissolved an event which would have terminated the policy before the claim was made. Popkin & Stern did not dissolve until after the claim was made. We conclude that the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1050.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When the ink is dry. The game is over. Is to ensure that the parties live up to their agreements. This appeal is a continuation of that litigation. The jury instructions were proper and Bowlen was not judicially estopped from arguing that he did not violate the warranty. The jury's verdict that the defendants breached the right of first refusal is contrary to governing Colorado law. Which is all that Elway was offered. The franchise was less successful: Kaiser reported losses of nearly $1 million. As if that were not enough. Agreed to lend Kaiser $10 million in a transaction that was (1) Another entity Kaiser wholly owned. Sports. <hr> Just before the deal was to be finalized. The final version of the Agreement permits Bowlen to transfer the Majority Interest to a subsidiary.(3) Three other clauses in the Agreement are material to this lawsuit. Elsewhere in the contract was a standard investment representation that stated that Bowlen
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1605.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Sidley & Austin (as it then was) demoted 32 of its equity partners to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/347395952971D5AE88256E5A00707B6E/$file/9956917.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2001 is withdrawn. 439 was against the clear weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that it was not. We must also decide whether plaintiffs who have established a defendant's liability under the Fair Housing Act must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the Act in order to be entitled to injunctive relief under the Act. Ltd. (the partnership or Silver Sage) is a partnership organized to purchase and develop lowincome housing at a mobile home park in the City of Desert Hot Springs. Paul Saben and Richard Earlix were the partnership's principals. Which was located in the city.1 The partnership initially sought to finance the project with bonds to be issued by Riverside County. The partnership was able to obtain a commitment for a favorable fifty five year mortgage in the amount of $4. That provision requires local voter approval of any low rent housing projects that are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/99-10679.opn.html">DAVENPORT RECYCLING ASSOCIATES V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/2/2000, NO. 99-10679)<BR></A><BR>
Denying them leave to file a motion to vacate the assessment of tax liability arising from a partnership in which they were limited partners.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FCFDACD987CCC03C88256A5E0057C745/$file/9956917.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2001 is withdrawn. 439 was against the clear weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that it was not. We must also decide whether plaintiffs who have established a defendant's liability under the Fair Housing Act must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the Act in order to be entitled to injunctive relief under the Act. Ltd. (the partnership or Silver Sage) is a partnership organized to purchase and develop lowincome housing at a mobile home park in the City of Desert Hot Springs. Paul Saben and Richard Earlix were the partnership's principals. Which was located in the city.1 The partnership initially sought to finance the project with bonds to be issued by Riverside County. The partnership was able to obtain a commitment for a favorable fifty five year mortgage in the amount of $4. That provision requires local voter approval of any low rent housing projects that are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/99-10679.opn.html">DAVENPORT RECYCLING ASSOCIATES V. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE (8/2/2000, NO. 99-10679)<BR></A><BR>
Denying them leave to file a motion to vacate the assessment of tax liability arising from a partnership in which they were limited partners.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/CA5816AB8007027C88256A53005D2396/$file/9956917.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
439 was against the clear weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that it was not. We must also decide whether plaintiffs who have established a defendant's liability under the Fair Housing Act must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the Act in order to be entitled to injunctive relief under the Act. Ltd. (the partnership or Silver Sage) is a partnership organized to purchase and develop lowincome housing at a mobile home park in the City of Desert Hot Springs. Paul Saben and Richard Earlix were the partnership's principals. Which was located in the city.1 The partnership initially sought to finance the project with bonds to be issued by Riverside County. The partnership was able to obtain a commitment for a favorable fifty five year mortgage in the amount of $4. That provision requires local voter approval of any low rent housing projects that are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/DD2D2E7C46A9545C88256E5A00707B54/$file/9956917.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
439 was against the clear weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that it was not. We must also decide whether plaintiffs who have established a defendant's liability under the Fair Housing Act must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the Act in order to be entitled to injunctive relief under the Act. Ltd. (the partnership or Silver Sage) is a partnership organized to purchase and develop lowincome housing at a mobile home park in the City of Desert Hot Springs. Paul Saben and Richard Earlix were the partnership's principals. Which was located in the city.1 The partnership initially sought to finance the project with bonds to be issued by Riverside County. The partnership was able to obtain a commitment for a favorable fifty five year mortgage in the amount of $4. That provision requires local voter approval of any low rent housing projects that are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4316.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Have been audited by the Internal Revenue Service virtually. Every year since Richard Nixon was President. Kanter was a wellknown and accomplished tax and estate lawyer. Among Kanter's clients was the Pritzker family of Hyatt Corporation fame. Kanter was also an accomplished businessman. Was an expert on the subject of trusts and estate planning. His estate was subsequently substituted as the principal party to this litigation.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/04/963334P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Paramount Technical Products. PG Technology Co. from selling certain partnership interests and corporate stock to an entity which was not a party to licensing and partnership agreements entered into in 1989. Bryan and Patrick McGroarty were the original owners of patents used in the production of moisture barriers. The technology is used to manufacture liners which keep water out of buildings and other structures and is used to construct environmental containment systems which prevent leakage of liquids or gases. The McGroartys also owned two companies that are involved in manufacturing moisture barriers: Paramount. At the time the contracts were executed. Inc. was known as Gundle Environmental Systems. Inc. was known as Gundle Ventures. This contract was called the Joint Licensing and Development Agreement. It stated the parties' understanding that PG Technology was owned
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/98-1360.htm">98-1360 -- LEVY V. LEVITT -- 02/26/2001<BR></A><BR>
Tejon Kiowa was formed to acquire and develop certain real estate the Giddings Building in Colorado Springs. Plaintiffs and Defendant obtained two separate loans for which they were liable individually. These payments were initially classified as capital payments made by Defendant with offsetting loans from Plaintiffs to Defendant. Later they were reclassified as loans from Plaintiffs to Defendant. <p> Despite his nonpayment. Defendant endorsed a Consent and Ratification approving the Giddings Building Deed and was released from liability to the banks on the two notes. Defendant moved for summary judgment as to the date in which the partnership and joint venture were dissolved and his release from liability to Plaintiffs. Summary judgment is appropriate
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/10/951012P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND This bankruptcy proceeding is but one part of the litigation among these parties dating back to 1983 and arising from their participation in a real estate partnership. Limited II (Crossroads). the general partners partnership Plaintiff/appellant Nangle and others were limited partners in a Missouri limited partnership named Crossroads U.S.A. Defendant/appellee Lauer and Joseph Graves were of Crossroads. Bruce Nangle lacks standing to pursue this action and was dismissed from the case by order of the bankruptcy court. The two banks have been represented by one counsel on this appeal. In this opinion for convenience we sometimes refer to Mark Twain Bank generally as including both branch banks and at other points we refer to the separate sister banks where the conduct of one or the other but not both appears to be implicated. 22 1 were two interests in real estate: the Riverheights Retirement Center in Booneville. The Transfer of the partnership interests to Lauer and Graves was completed in November of former limited partners learned at the time of Graves' death that contrary to the representations made by Lauer and Graves in the contracts to buy out the interests of the limited partners general partners Lauer and Graves had previously sold the Riverheights Retirement Center property in return for an interest in an industrial development bond.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D164F3D8A1F5A86788257297004733EA/$file/0535567o.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
AT&T WIRELESS SERVICES 2541 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where the partnership agreement authorizes sale of assets by majority or supermajority vote but is silent on the subject of sale to a related party. The agreements governing the nine partnerships at issue are substantially similar. The key asset in each was the right to own licenses for various frequencies and the customer base and call volume in each market served. The parties are obviously free to discuss the factual record in support of their legal positions when they brief the issue before the Supreme Court of Washington. 1 2542 J&J CELCOM v. She found that they comported with professional appraisal standards and that the values were reasonable and represented the partnerships' fair value at the time of the asset sales. Because some minority partners declined (including all but two of the minority owners who are plaintiffs appellants here). This new partnership was wholly owned by the AT&T Wireless Group. Partnership formalities were followed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/08/97-3074.htm">97-3074 -- LLOYD V. HORN INC. -- 08/21/1998<BR></A><BR>
<p> <p> * This order and judgment is not binding precedent. The case below was bifurcated into issues of construction of the Operating Agreement and damages. It is this ruling which Lloyd appeals. 1291 and affirm the trial court. <p> <center>I. <u>Background</u></center> <p> In June 1989 Lloyd was hired as a manager trainee by the owners of an existing Sonic Drive In in Fort Scott. The partnership was formed for the purpose of owning. The profits from the operation of the Sonic Drive In were distributed among the partners according to their respective interests: Lloyd with 25%. If Lloyd withdrew or was fired as Managing Partner. 7.02]. <p> The Partnership Agreement was amended twice. By which the partnership was converted into a limited liability corporation. L.L.C (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0075p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the United States Tax Court's decision upholding the Commissioner's determination that Mr. Mortensen is liable for a section 6662(a) negligence penalty of $784 for the taxable year 1991. The Hoyt Partnerships have generated litigation across the country. Commissioner Page 2 assessment was erroneous or that Mortensen did what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances. I. The history of these partnerships is complex. Courts have described the partnerships in varying degrees of detail. Hoyt's father was a prominent breeder of Shorthorn cattle and in the late 1960s began promoting cattle breeding partnerships. Hoyt acted as the tax matters partner on each of the partnerships that were subject to the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Hoyt was also the general partner and was responsible for the preparation of the tax returns for each partnership and he typically signed and filed each return. Was prepared and signed by Hoyt. Hoyt was also a licensed enrolled agent.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-5013.html">KEVIN CONWAY V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for defendant <span class=SpellE>appellee</span>.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='mso layout grid align:none. Holding that the Internal Revenue Service s ( IRS s ) deficiency assessment was timely and rejecting the taxpayer s other contentions.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span><u>Conway v. A New York lawyer who had represented the taxpayer and provided investment advice.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Alter told the taxpayer that he and several other members of his law firm were planning to invest in the partnership and recommended that the taxpayer invest as well.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Alter did not provide the taxpayer with the partnership s offering memorandum nor any other document relating to the partnership at the time.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Although a tax opinion about the project was prepared by another New York law firm. Mso bidi language:AR SA'>[1]</span></span><![endif]></span></span></a> a tax partnership is treated as a pass through entity.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Although administrative and judicial proceedings concerning partnership items are conducted at the partnership level.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1886.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. This is an appeal from a Tax Court determination unfavorable to the estate of Ida Abraham (the Estate). That the purchase of the decedent's interests by the children were not bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. That action was taken in order to ensure that Mrs. Which were owned by Mrs. Were transferred to three family limited partnerships (FLPs). Abraham and her children were partners in those FLPs. When the FLPs were set up. Abraham received from her husband were three pieces of commercial real estate located in Tyngsboro and Walpole. The Walpole property was leased to a lumber yard. The other properties were skating rinks leased to third parties. The leases on all of these properties were long term. The feud was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. The litigation was also draining Mrs. There was a separate estate plan. The family also understood that the FLPs were a means to protect Mrs. The protection was there for her as a guarantee that she would live status quo.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1744.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. Insofar as appellants are challenging the judgment entered against them as a matter of law by the district court. Insofar as they are challenging the jury's verdict. Are respectively the managing partners and sole other general partner of two partnerships that developed and now own International Place. Phase 1 of the project was initially financed through a construction loan from Bank of Boston. When construction was complete. The construction loan was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-9000.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
872 imposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-5046.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Juan F. Of counsel was Kevin D. With her on the brief were Richard T. I. BACKGROUND AD Global is a limited liability company formed under the laws of the State of Delaware. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR>
Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/97-4578.man.html">UNITED STATES V. GILBERT (3/16/2001, NO. 97-4578)<BR></A><BR>
The subsequent proceeding would be needless because the order of forfeiture upon which the Government relies is invalid. We affirm the district court's denial of the Government's motion to force the Gilberts to file third party petitions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/97-4578.man.html">UNITED STATES V. GILBERT (3/16/2001, NO. 97-4578)<BR></A><BR>
The subsequent proceeding would be needless because the order of forfeiture upon which the Government relies is invalid. We affirm the district court's denial of the Government's motion to force the Gilberts to file third party petitions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-9010.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was born on June 12. True (David). <hr> Dave was a successful entrepreneur and established a number of companies involved in oil and gas exploration. Companies which generated a substantial amount of revenue often provided the funds to support companies which were not as profitable. Dave developed a business philosophy which was guided by four basic principles. Buy sell agreements were necessary to avoid conflicts among owners and to establish clear (1) Of these business entities. The True Ranches were structured as partnerships under Wyoming law. White Stallion Ranch were structured as Subchapter S corporations. <hr> exit strategies. Each True company was governed by buy sell agreements which embodied these business principles. Disability were each treated as if the holder of the interest had notified the other owners of his or her intent to withdraw from ownership. The other owners were required to purchase the departing owner's interests at a formula price listed in the buy sell agreement. The formula prices in the buy sell agreements were derived from a calculation of the tax book value for the various True companies.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR>
Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1995/94a0966p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are presented with the question whether defendants' acts. We must determine what showing is required for plaintiffs to meet the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov97/95-9448.opa.html">PRODIGY CTRS./ATLANTA NO. 1 V. T-C ASSOC.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Prodigy Ctrs./Atlanta No. 1 v. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES:<p> An unanswered question of Georgia law is dispositive of this appeal. We ask that the Supreme Court of Georgia determine whether a partnership interest in a limited partnership is a chose of action under Georgia law.<p> I. Background<p> <p> The real parties in interest in this action are T C Associates (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov97/95-9448.opa.html">PRODIGY CTRS./ATLANTA NO. 1 V. T-C ASSOC.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Prodigy Ctrs./Atlanta No. 1 v. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES:<p> An unanswered question of Georgia law is dispositive of this appeal. We ask that the Supreme Court of Georgia determine whether a partnership interest in a limited partnership is a chose of action under Georgia law.<p> I. Background<p> <p> The real parties in interest in this action are T C Associates (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-1328a.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Durham argued the cause for appellants/cross appellees.<span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6CE52AF74642714888256E22007187E3/$file/0235599.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Concluding that the federal defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that Bivens relief is unavailable for challenges to IRS partnership tax assessment and collection activities. I1 Hoyt was a well known sheep and cattle breeder in Burns. Each partner was expected to benefit from the partnership in two ways. Which the partners were able to claim as a tax deduction. In later years the partnerships were expected to produce a profit as each partnership liquidated the livestock that it had been assigned. Hoyt was accredited by the IRS as an enrolled agent. Because the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Hoyt was also the tax matters partner (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19959448.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES: An unanswered question of Georgia law is dispositive of this appeal. We ask that the Supreme Court of Georgia determine whether a partnership interest in a limited partnership is a chose of action under Georgia law. I. Background The real parties in interest in this action are T C Associates (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/01/952110P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the en banc decision by the United States Tax Court (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200112/00-1328a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Joel V. With him on the briefs was Edward T. The Tax Court declined to address the govern ment's alternative contention that both partnerships were shams for federal tax purposes. Was a sham for federal tax purposes. Although the trans action is basically a wash. Which is allocated to the foreign partner. The Partnership would have a fiscal year end of March 31st since that would be the year end of the FP. Assuming that the fmv of the contingent note is still $40 million. BC's basis in its Partner ship interest is $122.67 million calculated as follows: BC's initial investment $20.0 million Gain 12.67 Purchase of 50% of FP's interest 90.00 122.67 Step 5: The Partnership distributes the contingent note to BC assuming a fmv of $40 million. The Partner ship would distribute approximately $32.72 million in cash to FP which is the equivalent cash distribution to FP given its percentage ownership. BC's tax basis in the Partner ship is zero and the Partnership still has 127.28 in cash (160 32.72).
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct2000/993925.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The transaction was a constructive fraudulent conveyance. As such it was properly declared void by the bankruptcy judge. It was unnecessary for the bankruptcy judge to rule on the matter of subordination. We will affirm the judgment as to the fraudulent conveyance and vacate the ruling on subordination raised in the cross appeal. This is an adversary proceeding brought by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Limited Partnership IV against D. Santucci and Guelich have since settled their disputes with the Committee and are no longer parties in this dispute. 2 partnership filed a petition under Chapter 11 in June of 1995. All of the assets were scheduled to be sold to Ebony Bull Capital Co. The allegations against Bohn are described in detail in the following excerpt from the state trial judge's opinion overruling preliminary objections:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054034p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Instead awarded him a payment prorated on the basis of the time he was absent. Central to this question is a determination of what the bonus program rewards: employee production or the absence of an occurrence. Then proration for FMLA absences is generally allowed. Then proration is not allowed. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the Vanguard Partnership Plan is a production bonus and that the company had not unlawfully interfered with Sommer's FMLA rights by prorating his bonus. We agree and will affirm.1 I. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 31 No. 103 3 at 4. Congress' stated purposes for the act are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-2381.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Ellis was on brief for Kansallis Finance Ltd. Riedel was on brief for Daniel J. Asserting that they were vicariously liable for fraud committed by their purported law partner. As well as two questions of Massachusetts law on which there is either conflicting or no clearly established precedent. Background This lawsuit stems from a loan and lease financing transaction whose precise details are not relevant to any of the issues on appeal. What is important is that. Which was issued on letterhead captioned
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/sept97/95-9014.wpd.html">LDL RESEARCH & DEV. II V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
Section 174(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0209n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We find that Bagsby's appeal of the district court's refusal to dismiss Gehres' counterclaims is not properly before this Court. The Parties Bagsby and Gehres are both attorneys who were previously married to each other. The Gehres Family is comprised of Gehres's parents (Dennis and Lois Gehres). Magnevu is Gehres's former employer. Schnelz is a Michigan law firm that formerly represented Gehres in this action. Neither party shall be entitled to claim compensation of any kind or reimbursement for expenses from the other relating to legal or other services provided by one party for the other party or any law firm or other entity or person with whom the other was affiliated during the 2 During the spring and summer of 1999. Bagsby asked Gehres to assist him with evaluating the present value of a structured settlement for a case (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/032064.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They notified the property management office in Virginia and an inspection was ordered. Mold was found. Abatement was required. During the mold remediation process Plaintiffs were relocated and their personal belongings were left in the care of the property management firm and the mold treatment firm. Plaintiffs contended that there was not complete diversity because the property was managed by a Virginia subsidiary of the Texas parent. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed as to jurisdiction. The remainder is vacated. This case is remanded with instructions to remand to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Which was granted with leave for Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs amended their complaint and a jury trial was scheduled for May 3. The motion was later expanded to include an additional claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that defendant SWIB was an arm of the State of Wisconsin and. The Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an order or judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0404p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
BACKGROUND Mas One is an Ohio limited partnership that was organized in 1986 with two partners. One was Mas One Generals. The other was Midland Mutual Life Insurance Company. The partnership agreement stipulated that gains and losses were to be generally allocated in proportion to each parties' ownership interest. Were to be allocated first to partners with negative balances. While any such losses were to be allocated first to partners with positive balances. The remainder of the loan was to be repaid in 1994. Two guaranty agreements were signed along with the promissory note. One agreement (the Principal Reduction Guaranty) stipulated that Midland would guarantee the $2.5 million substantial completion principal payment if it was not
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/01/051118P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mark Senda as trustee of his revocable living trust was the general partner with a 10 percent interest. Contributed oral accounts receivable (reported at $200) in exchange for their interests which were unpaid at the time of trial. Mark Senda's revocable trust was the general partner with a 1.0 percent interest. Gave oral accounts receivable (reported at $148) in exchange for their interests which were unpaid at the time of trial. The Sendas' essential claim is that they made gifts of partnership interests. At stake is the value of the gifts. The Code
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/061317np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge This is a contract interpretation case. Maurice Laplace and Saniel Laplace were brothers and partners of L.J.&M. We will affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to Saniel. I. BACKGROUND LJM was founded by brothers Oscar and Louis Laplace in the 1930s. Laplace were also partners of the business. 000 buyout figure was amended each time a partner retired or died. There is no written record of this amendment. When Saniel was hospitalized for heart bypass surgery. A nearly identical amendment was executed for Oscar B. when he had serious health problems. An amendment to the 1959 buyout provision was never executed for him. The buyout amount owed to Maurice's estate is the subject of the instant litigation. 3 His heirs allege that they are entitled to far more than then the $100. Maurice's heirs are citizens of New Jersey and Saniel was a citizen of Iowa. Maurice's heirs assert they are entitled to Maurice's 50 percent stake in LJM. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/98opinions/98-5111.html">GREENBRIAR V. US<BR></A><BR>
On the brief was <U>R. With him on the brief was <U>David . Because the trial court correctly determined that the United States was not in privity of contract with the Owners and therefore could not be held liable for breach of such contracts. Correctly determined that the Owners takings claim is not ripe for review. The petition for class certification is moot.</P> <P ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1670.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Should form the continuation of the paragraph that currently is at page 6. Were on brief for appellant Penobscot Indian Nation and third party defendants appellees. Were on brief for appellee and cross appellant Key Bank of Maine. Were on brief for appellee Michael Marcello. Taintor & Abbott was on brief for defendants appellees and cross appellants. P.A. was on brief for defendant appellee and cross appellant. Hewey with whom Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon was on brief for appellees Consumers Water Company. It is not apparent from the record that the results of the investigation were set out in writing or were made known to the public. It is clear. The complaint alleged that the two Settlement Agreements signed by PIN and the Appellees were void because they did not receive the Secretary of the Interior's approval pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1610.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom <SPAN STYLE=
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) and affirm the Tax Court's decision upholding the negligence penalty. I. The Hansens were partners in a total of six cattle breeding and tax shelter partnerships promoted and run by Walter J. A. Hoyt Partnerships DSBS87 C was one of over one hundred cattle and sheepbreeding partnerships that Hoyt organized. Hoyt was a licensed enrolled agent qualified to represent taxpayers before the IRS.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/may96/95-1162.wpd.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The scheme was masterminded and operated by James Donahue. The corporation and the three limited partnerships are in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code. Harvey Sender is the trustee in bankruptcy for the four bankrupt entities' estates. (2) Colorado partnership law to recover the money she was overpaid. Buchanan after concluding her limited partnership (1) A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/06/02-3221.htm">02-3221 -- LAMPE V. WILLIAMSON -- 06/03/2003<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge.<a href=
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The ownership of which was subject to dispute and in litigation in a pending adversary proceeding. Its partner claimed that the property was owned by the partnership and hence not the estate. Since the sale had been consummated and was not subject to attack. The nonbankrupt partner was entitled to disgorgement of the sale proceeds sufficient to protect the partnership's claimed ownership interest in the property and his potential interest in the partnership. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The debtor is Rodeo Canon Development Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/06/031236P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These are adversary proceedings arising out of the personal bankruptcy of Leroy J. Who was a general partner in Crossroads U.S.A. Alleging it is still a Crossroads limited partner and seeking similar relief. Arguing that the district court erred in dismissing all claims by LIC because it was not a Crossroads limited partner. The applicable state law is the law of Missouri. Crossroads' share was reflected in a $450. The sale contracts recited that Lauer and Graves were acquiring all limited partner interests. The deferred payments to the Nangles were secured by a pledge of the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-5330a.html">RTC V. DC<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/01-5011.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Of counsel was Charles L. With him on the brief were Peter D. The trial court determined that these claims are not ripe for suit because the parties have not obtained a
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With them on the briefs were Joshua B. With them on the briefs were Albert S. With her on the brief were R. With him on the brief were Christopher J. Weber were on the brief of Shipper Intervenors in support of respondent with respect to arguments of SFPP. This case is the latest chapter in a long running dispute over SFPP's tariffs. The shipper petitioners are BP West Coast Products. (3) the Commission erroneously held that certain shippers were not entitled to reparations for rates charged on SFPP's East Line after August 1. SFPP and the Association of Oil Pipe Lines have intervened on behalf of the Commission with respect to these issues. 4 SFPP and the Association of Oil Pipe Lines have also crosspetitioned for review of the three challenged orders. The shippers have intervened on behalf of the Commission regarding these issues. We hold that the Commission's income tax allowance policy was not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law. We also hold that FERC's interpretation of the Energy Policy Act was reasonable.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug99/97-9357.man.html">CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357)<BR></A><BR>
Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site.</P> <P> Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug99/97-9357.man.html">CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357)<BR></A><BR>
Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site.</P> <P> Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992313.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We are called upon to decide whether the United States Tax Court erred in finding the taxpayers liable for deficiencies. We hold that the tax court's finding that the taxpayers are liable for accuracy related penalties under I.R.C. § 6662 is not clearly erroneous. Pridgen 1 Roberts was deceased at the time of the hearing before the tax court. Gaskins were entitled to innocent spouse relief for the taxable years in question under I.R.C. § 6013(e). Roberts was responsible for the day to day operations and management of Beaufort Leaf. Pridgen was assessed a deficiency of $129. Pridgen was assessed a deficiency of $232. Gaskins was assessed a deficiency of $131. Gaskins was assessed a deficiency of $240. 004 was also assessed against Gaskins for the 1991 taxable year. The deficiencies were determined based upon adjustments to each taxpayer's distributive share of Beaufort Leaf's net income for each taxable year. 2 4 PRIDGEN v. INTERNAL REVENUE The marketing of tobacco is regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0702p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
These loans were evidenced by the following seven promissory notes: 1. a $185. This letter is at the heart of this action. The letter was signed by William Carlough. The following are the most significant provisions of the letter: (1) the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/04/00-1316.htm">00-1316 -- U.S. V. WALSH -- 04/02/2001<BR></A><BR>
Jr. was convicted following a jury trial on nine counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0402p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The primary question before us is whether or not the tax code and regulations create a ministerial task obligation on the IRS to notify. A tax matters partner who is under criminal investigation. Hoyt's partnerships were found to be illegal tax shelters. Hoyt is currently serving a federal prison sentence of 235 months for conspiracy 1 No. 03 2304 Mekulsia v. While the scheme was active. Losses were allocated among the limited partners in amounts necessary to zero out their incomes for tax return purposes. There is conflicting evidence and testimony regarding the degree of complicity of the individual investors. Indicating they knew from the beginning that these were not for profit partnerships. The victims in this case were not people that got into this as a matter of personal greed. [They] were truly victimized by a person who is capable of the greatest deceit. Including those closest to him . . . it is my strongest recommendation that those remaining cases that remain open be resolved by denying the tax shelter.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1679.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Morrell</U> were on brief. Four are defendants in this case: Cleofe Rubi Gonzalez (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0443n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Plaintiff appellant the George Khouri Family Limited Partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1767.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. were on brief for appellants. Peabody & Arnold were on brief for appellees. The new venturers were equally unknowledgeable in the nuances of real estate development. McInnis was advised that the Hayeses and McGoldrick wished to limit their investment to a total of $200. McInnis indicated that the prospective limited partners (that is. ' . . . but it was phrased more in the context of performing certain. All attorneys fees were billed to the partnership and paid by partnership funds. 000 was to be in cash. 000 was to be financed by the sellers (secured by a second mortgage on the parcel). $1.5 million was to be financed through a bank loan. The sellers were each to receive a 12.5% limited partnership interest. 5 5 Meanwhile. Stated that the limited partners would have to guaranty the loan personally in the event of a partnership default. There is conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the limited partners knew of the personal guaranty requirement prior to the December 11 meeting. Although all three appear to have signed 6 6 the commitment letter.1 In any event.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0304p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Pressman was a limited partner. Pressman alleges that the Bank is liable for breach of contract. Inman the founder of the Bank and president of the Bank's parent company is liable for procurement of breach of contract and civil conspiracy. I. The Inglehame Farm partnership was formed to accomplish one purpose: to purchase from different sellers several tracts of land in Williamson County.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982631.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The cause of action for violation of the federal securities laws was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by an order entered on March 27. Neither of those decisions is a subject of Cranbrook's appeal. That decision is the only subject of this appeal. The same is true on appeal. We will deal with only the salient issues. CCA was the second property the parties had owned as partners with one another. Cranbrook reserved the right to block any sale of CCA unless the sale proceeds were sufficient to pay off Cranbrook's capital contribution and a special
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011887.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Estate contends that the Tax Court should have applied a minority discount by discounting Godley's interest in the partnerships because he lacked control over them. Whether a minority discount is appropriate in a given situation is part of the larger factual question of valuation. Inasmuch as the Tax Court's valuation of Godley's interest was not clearly erroneous. The remaining fifty percent was owned by Godley's son Frank D. Were formed in 1978 and owned and operated housing projects for elderly tenants. Was formed in 1980 for the purpose of managing the operations of the Housing Partnerships. Housing Assistance payments are made to the Housing Partnerships to cover the difference between the rental rates agreed to under the HAP contracts and the portion of the rent paid by eligible families. Rocky Mount was thirty years and the term for Clinton was twenty years. Jr. was the managing partner for the Housing Partnerships. Jr. was the managing partner. Godley was actively involved in the Housing Partnerships.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1357.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Page 3. Obstfeld were on brief for plaintiff. Goddu and Peabody & Brown were on brief for defendants. Were on brief for intervenors. The Intervenors allege that the settlement is not fair. Procedural and Factual History Atlantic is the general partner in twenty one limited partnerships. Each of which was established to purchase and lease capital equipment such as aircraft. The tender offer was to be financed by an outside lender with a loan secured in part by Atlantic's general partners' personal guarantees and in part by a security interest in all the units tendered. No more than 15% of the units of any one partnership were actually tendered. Notice of the settlement was sent out to all the class members. The Intervenors moved to intervene for the sole purpose of objecting to the settlement on the ground that it contained a release of the partnerships' claims against Atlantic for appropriating a partnership opportunity for itself (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-2115.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dominguez & Totti and Sidley & Austin were on joint briefs for William Lyon and Holders Capital Corporation. Bennazar Zequeira and Gonzalez & Bennazar were on brief for Pacific Employers Insurance Company. Lowe & Adler was on brief for First State Insurance Company. I. Lyon is a principal shareholder and director of Holders. The fire victims sought in phase I to pierce Holders' corporate veil and to prove that the hotel was actually managed and controlled by a de facto partnership of Holders' three shareholders. Lyon was to seek contribution from his various insurers. Subject to their right to seek repayment by Lyon if it was later determined in phase III that their policies did not cover the hotel fire. The insurance policies at issue here were part of an excess coverage plan for the William Lyon Company. First level excess coverage was provided by 3 3 National Union Fire Insurance Company. No entity connected to the Dupont Plaza was expressly listed as an insured. Holders and Lyon both filed claims in the district court to affirm that PEIC and FSIC were responsible to provide coverage for the fire.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0036p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hooper argues that because PPM III was not a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Balancing the four factors to be considered in determining whether PPM III is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). Wolfe is the sole shareholder of Public Properties Management. This agreement was never implemented. Which was made a general partner to PPM III. He would have Dr. After the case was transferred to the Western District of Tennessee. The Joneses were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on March 23. Shortly after the second amended complaint was filed. While the federal litigation was pending. Was also a limited partner of defendant PPM III. Which were to remain in escrow while the litigation proceeded. As many of the issues in the case were mooted by the sale of the property and the only remaining asset of PPM III was the $1.7 million held in the escrow account of Mr. PPM III was a necessary party which could not be joined without destroying diversity.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/01/012785U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The agricultural partnership Larry Reed & Sons (the partnership) and its individual partners were found by a jury to have submitted a false cotton crop insurance claim eight years earlier. The jury found the claim violated the False Claims Act because the 194.1 acres in question were not planted during the 1993 season. The partnership was liable for $281. 059.50 and the partners were each liable for additional nominal amounts. Contending (1) the damages awarded by the jury were based on insufficient evidence. Which was based on computer analysis of satellite images.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/41D3CD7C1C467BA288257084004E8890/$file/0435753.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Gutierrez is substituted for his predecessor. The National Marine Fisheries Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022274.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: David Riese and Gary Plichta have initiated this appeal from an October 1. We will briefly relate the relevant facts underlying this dispute. The Partnership was structured so that SALT owned the Lexington. The other seventy five percent was controlled by the Stroud Group. Pursuant to which Gibraltar was required. The beginning of the Lexington's construction was delayed almost six weeks. Incorporated are defendants. The general construction contractor was Gibraltar Companies of Tennessee. The distinction between the Gibraltar companies is immaterial to this appeal. The Lexington was completed in August 1996. SALT's book value was less than zero at the end of May 1996. Eleven days after the Riese Group was expelled from the Partnership. A jury trial was conducted in the Eastern District of North Carolina in November 1998. That the Riese Group and Gibraltar's UTPA award was against the Stroud Group as well as the SALT Group. They also sought to have the judgment reflect that they (the SALT and Stroud Groups) were jointly and severally liable for their UTPA violations.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/04/98-8102.htm">98-8102 -- U.S. V. WORMAN -- 04/06/2000<BR></A><BR>
<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1506.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Marcaccio and Blish & Cavanagh were on brief for plaintiffs. These cross appeals are from orders of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissing the respective claims of plaintiffs and defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are two entities wholly controlled by Carl Acebes. Defendants are Richard N. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B74A91989E827F4F88256FCF000360F0/$file/0373853.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Interest if the Adjustments were valid. That some of the Adjustments were invalid because the IRS filed them untimely. That insofar as the Adjustments were valid. The partnerships were entitled to certain theft loss deductions on the adjusted The United States Tax Court. Goldberg. 2 The partnerships are River City Ranches #1 Ltd. Holding that the Adjustments were all valid and that the partnerships were entitled to no theft loss deductions. The Tax Court held that the asserted losses were not thefts from the partnerships and. Even if they were. The partnerships argue that the trial of the case was flawed on three procedural points: that the Tax Court improperly denied the partnerships discovery pertinent to the years for which theft loss deductions could be claimed. The partnerships argue that the Tax Court erred in holding that the asserted theft losses were not thefts from the partnerships but were only thefts from the individual partners. The partnerships and the IRS agree that the Tax Court erred in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to make factual findings concerning the validity of impositions of additional interest on back taxes owed by the individual partners.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1998/98a1795p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We agree with the district court that the federal securities claim of one of the investors is barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree with the district court's disposition of the federal securities claim and conclude that the investors have proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether the law firm made a statement containing a material omission upon which the investors relied. Even when the lawyer did not sign or endorse the document and the investor is therefore unaware of the lawyer's role in the fraud.1 We will reverse the judgment of 1. We later set forth the following specific requirements to hold such a lawyer liable: (1) the lawyer knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that 3 the district court insofar as it granted the law firm's motion for summary judgment on the federal securities claim as to three of the four investors. We will reverse the judgment of the district court on the investors' common law fraud claim. Which claim was timely as to all four investors.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2BD9159A5356B7C488256CF60060CC6E/$file/0235054.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
WILL STEEN. About 84 of which are the subject of this lawsuit. Thereby fraudulently reporting tax deductions and other items to which they were not entitled. Hoyt was convicted of mail fraud. Abelein was. It discovered that the partnership records were unreliable to say the least. It was exceedingly difficult to know who was actually a partner at any given point. The Schedule K 1 in making decisions about who was or who was not a partner. Hoyt himself told agents that he moved loyal partners about at will and treated some people who were no longer contributing as if they had never been partners. This was so that his loyalists would not have tax liabilities arising out of the minor difficulty that the cattle or sheep supposedly owned by some of the partnerships were phantoms. The IRS decided that it was not able to accurately ascertain at the partnership level the identities of those who were the real investors in any given partnership at any given time. Having so cracked the dulcarnon with which it was faced.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001517.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Crofton1 entered into a contract with G & H PartThe contract of sale was actually signed by C & H Properties. Of which Harry and Dahlia Ratrie were partners. Ratrie represented: To the best of Seller's knowledge and while the [property] was in Seller's possession. Their byproducts
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/may96/94-1485.wpd.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case arises out of a fraudulent investment scheme with which this court is all too familiar. Eugene Johnson was one of the innocent investors in the scheme.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2197.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Murphy with whom Murphy & O'Connell was on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. This copyright infringement case revolves around a dispute over who owns the copyrights in insurance licensing texts and manuals that were created in 1986. Durkin contends that the district court wrongly concluded that Saenger was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes as to material 2 2 facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. During which time he was an officer and vice president of the corporation. Durkin maintains that the alleged oral agreement contained the following terms: Durkin was to begin immediately to develop. Durkin promptly began to work part time (nights and weekends) on the manuals as he and Saenger had agreed even though he was still employed by Educational Training Systems (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1519.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Kantor and Doremus Associates were on briefs for appellants. P.A. were on brief for appellees. The plaintiffs are entitled to have us assume that the jury saw matters their way. Whether an error was prejudicial). A Netherlands corporation that is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dylex. MMI's common stock was issued to Dylex (42%). Sale of the stock was restricted and directorships were apportioned. The six members of MMI's board of directors at all pertinent times were Axelrod and Gunner (appointed by Ontario). Axelrod and Gunner were elected annually as MMI's president and treasurer. MMI was the only remaining provider in which Sears held an ownership interest. Axelrod and Levy informed Dinco and Weingart that MMI was being offered for sale. Dinco and Weingart were allegedly told that the reason for the sale was that Sears had decided to divest itself of ownership in affiliated factories.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1997/97a1670p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Profession or trade
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/00-4062.htm">00-4062 -- KADONSKY V. U.S. -- 02/09/2001<BR></A><BR>
That money was the proceeds from a sale of real property in Park City. Kadonsky was informed that the government intended to bring forfeiture proceedings against the property as proceeds traceable to drug purchases.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/053706p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Held that it had diversity of citizenship jurisdiction because the sole beneficiary of Emerald Trust was Emerald Investors Ltd. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051189np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because the principals of P.K.S. were sophisticated and knowledgeable. I. Factual Background and Procedural History We are writing here solely for the parties. Stouts Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership was formed to develop commercial real estate in New Jersey. The general partner in Stouts Brunswick was 2 P.K.S. (formed by Herbert Punia and Murray Kushner). 1 and Manao was the sole limited partner. Manao is not a party to this suit. Its agent and advisor Bankers Trust is the defendant. Three provisions in the partnership agreement are relevant here. Kushner are also plaintiffs/appellants in this suit. Neither of whom are discussed in the District Court's opinion or the briefing before us). It is from this side letter that this suit arises. Fred Perlstadt (Bankers Trust's vice president) sent Manao's principal shareholder two letters suggesting that the 1995 put was no longer in place. That suit was settled and dismissed. So we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This means that we
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/595BCCFD0A4500DA88256B4100625E4C/$file/0070850.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Slip op. p. 16380. Strike the sentence that reads:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1BAB33BBE8AE578C88256B17007519E6/$file/0070850.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Phillips contends that a waiver of the three year statute of limitations was invalidly executed by Walter Jay Hoyt III (Hoyt) the Tax Matters Partner of each of 16378 the partnerships. The principal issue on appeal is whether criminal tax investigation of a statutory Tax Matters Partner (the TMP) does. Holding that there is no automatic termination of TMP status by virtue of such an investigation. FACTS The facts were stipulated by the parties in skeletal form sufficient to provide. What was necessary to raise the single issue relied on by Phillips. All three partnerships were organized and marketed by Hoyt. Who was the general partner in each and also the TMP. The Examination Division of the IRS requested that the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS investigate Hoyt for allegedly preparing false tax returns for twelve persons who were limited partners in partnerships formed by Hoyt. Hoyt was aware of the decision by Justice. It was decided not to prosecute Hoyt. Although later Hoyt was investigated.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3830A0C29E10A3C388256E5A00707D72/$file/0070850.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Phillips contends that a waiver of the three year statute of limitations was invalidly executed by Walter Jay Hoyt III (Hoyt) the Tax Matters Partner of each of 16378 the partnerships. The principal issue on appeal is whether criminal tax investigation of a statutory Tax Matters Partner (the TMP) does. Holding that there is no automatic termination of TMP status by virtue of such an investigation. FACTS The facts were stipulated by the parties in skeletal form sufficient to provide. What was necessary to raise the single issue relied on by Phillips. All three partnerships were organized and marketed by Hoyt. Who was the general partner in each and also the TMP. The Examination Division of the IRS requested that the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS investigate Hoyt for allegedly preparing false tax returns for twelve persons who were limited partners in partnerships formed by Hoyt. Hoyt was aware of the decision by Justice. It was decided not to prosecute Hoyt. Although later Hoyt was investigated.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1350.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Brodigan</U> was on brief for plaintiff.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044083p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were not subject to an arbitration provision contained in a separate (but related) agreement. Acorn's general partner was Acorn Technology Partners. Torkelsen. 3 Appellants Chimicles and the Barracks were private limited partners in this venture. Acorn was licensed by the United States Small Business Administration (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/01/011881U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Michael Hollen is a dentist who operates his business through a professional corporation. The transfer was never reduced to writing. Thus it was invalid under California law. Michael Hollen never informed the IRS that the transfer to the partnership was invalid. The Hollens argued that because the transfer to the partnership was invalid. They owned the ranch individually and therefore were liable for tax on the sale to the extent the gain exceeds their original basis in the farm. The tax court held that this argument was barred by the doctrine of the duty of consistency. The taxpayer is placed under a duty of consistency when: (1) the taxpayer has made a representation or reported an item for tax purposes in one year. The Hollens argue that their error in thinking the partnership owned the ranch was one of law. Although the Hollens may have made a legal error in the attempted transfer. The question of who owned the property was. Our affirmance of the tax court's ruling that the Hollens do owe taxes forecloses their argument is that because they owe no tax.
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The affidavit states that these claims may have resulted from
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1435.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/95opinions/95-1307a.html">LOS ANGELES SMSA V. FCC<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/99-2317.htm">99-2317 -- BOWMAN V. SP PHARMACEUTICALS -- 12/05/2000<BR></A><BR>
(2) since any opportunity enjoyed by Appellant was contingent on obtaining financing. (2) triable issues of fact exist regarding the individual defendants' motives and state of mind when they represented to Appellant that he was a partner. U
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981939.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We will refer to Charles A. A certified public accountant who was retained to provide accounting advice. By the early 1980s Greene was earning a substantial six figure salary. Although Corman was not retained as an investment advisor. Satisfied that Corman was qualified to analyze investments.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/00opinions/00-7021a.html">WESTERN ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. MARKET SQUARE ASSOCIATES<BR></A><BR>
With </p> <p>him on the briefs was Richard J. With him </p> <p>on the brief were Paul Martin Wolff. </p> <p>accordingly we affirm.</p> <p>I.</p> <p>Market Square is a mixed use property in downtown Wash </p> <p>ington. At the </p> <p>heart of the alleged fraud are alleged misrepresentations of </p> <p>expected costs and profits that Market made in budget </p> <p>projections for the Market Square project. After Western was deceived into approving a </p> <p>fraudulent budget in 1989. </p> <p>caused the partnership to repay loans for cost overruns that </p> <p>Market alone was responsible for repaying. Was </p> <p>unlikely to succeed on the merits.</p> <p>Subsequently. </p> <p>which are defined in 18 U.S.C. s 1962.</p> <p> . (4) </p> <p>the Going Concern Scheme.</p> <p>The four alleged schemes are briefly summarized as fol </p> <p>lows. (1) The Revised Budget Approval Scheme was a plot </p> <p>to conceal cost overruns. </p> <p>knowing that the cost projections in this budget were also </p> <p>inaccurate.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1427.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
SMG claimed CPI breached the contract by failing to make the final (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. As well as (3) the district court's threshold ruling that CPI's proffered expert testimony was inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702. Background Factual Background SMG is a marketing company that maintains lists of names and addresses of children. CPI is an education and career preparation company that provides products and services to college bound high school students. The significance of this provision will be discussed in greater detail below. <hr> Rental Ag. IV. In the event any payment is more than ten (10) days late. Suspend Lessee's ability to utilize the High School Records until such time as all amounts owed to SMG are paid in full. It is agreed that a monthly payment not paid by its due date will be subject to a late charge of ten percent (10%). If collection efforts are required. The quantity term
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B634B2B858D351AB88256D0A007C8EFF/$file/0130414.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: 1. The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. Appellants argue that the Government's conduct before and during the trial was vexatious. Provided the Department of Agriculture Office of the Inspector General (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb99/96-4570.man.html">W. GROUP NURSERIES V. ERGAS (2/12/1999, NO. 96-4570)<BR></A><BR>
We hold that the contract language at issue is ambiguous when viewed in the proper context and therefore reverse and remand for its interpretation in light of extrinsic evidence.</P> <P><CENTER><EM>Facts</EM></CENTER> </P> <P> This case arises out of a complex series of transactions in which nursery owners sold their properties to a tax shelter syndicator. $3 million dollars was to be paid in cash at closing. $17 million was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note from Syndicator. $2.1 million was contingent on the sale of certain nursery stock.</P> <P> In a separate transaction contemplated by the Sellers/Syndicator agreement. Partnership's note (referred to as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-2175.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Stewart</U> were on brief. Gray</U> were on brief. <U>Chief Judge</U>.</STRONG></FONT><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb99/96-4570.man.html">W. GROUP NURSERIES V. ERGAS (2/12/1999, NO. 96-4570)<BR></A><BR>
We hold that the contract language at issue is ambiguous when viewed in the proper context and therefore reverse and remand for its interpretation in light of extrinsic evidence.</P> <P><CENTER><EM>Facts</EM></CENTER> </P> <P> This case arises out of a complex series of transactions in which nursery owners sold their properties to a tax shelter syndicator. $3 million dollars was to be paid in cash at closing. $17 million was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note from Syndicator. $2.1 million was contingent on the sale of certain nursery stock.</P> <P> In a separate transaction contemplated by the Sellers/Syndicator agreement. Partnership's note (referred to as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200101/00-7021a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Richard J. With him on the brief were Paul Martin Wolff. I. Market Square is a mixed use property in downtown Wash ington. At the heart of the alleged fraud are alleged misrepresentations of expected costs and profits that Market made in budget projections for the Market Square project. After Western was deceived into approving a fraudulent budget in 1989. Caused the partnership to repay loans for cost overruns that Market alone was responsible for repaying. Was unlikely to succeed on the merits.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1921.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Nachman with whom Joan Schlump Peters was on brief for Merit Builders. Palou & Miranda were on brief for Taber Partners I. Gonzalez & Rodriguez were on brief for appellees. A New York general partnership whose sole partners are two New York corporations. S.E. (hereinafter referred to collectively as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/12/97-9003.htm">97-9003 -- TWENTY MILE JOINT VENTURE, PND, LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE - - 12/27/1999<BR></A><BR>
The primary individuals in the group of investors were Mr. Which is one of the Appellants in these matters. Is the Appellant in No. 97 9003. As was the case with Parker Properties. These details are unimportant to the issues presented in these appeals. We have ignored these intermediate entities and have referred to the investors as if they individually were partners of Parker Properties and Twenty Mile. <p> The parent company of Empire. Commercial was also influenced by the fact that the real estate market was on the decline. Commercial's goal was to receive as much cash as possible and to be indemnified from all continuing liabilities associated with the joint venture partnerships. It was willing to accept less than the outstanding balance of the loans in order to liquidate its interests and to avoid future liabilities associated with the projects. <p> In early 1988. 910.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/09/963561P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is an appeal from the order of the district court2 granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee E. That there is no evidence to support the district court's conclusion that his rights under a separate Employment Agreement were waived by his independent act of voting to convert Blanch Company from a partnership to a corporation. The district court's summary judgment on the age discrimination claim is affirmed. Is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Bloomington. Is a Canadian citizen In with substantial experience and expertise in the reinsurance business. in Montreal. Enan & Co. was acquired in a merger transaction based reinsurance brokerage firm. A MinneapolisBlanch Partnership's acquisition of Enan & Co. was for Mr. Enan was contemporaneously presented a copy of the existing Blanch Partnership Agreement3 and executed a separate Employment Agreement with Enan & Co.4 The Employment Agreement provides that Mr. Shall have no further obligation or liability to the Employee ... if... (iii) the Employee voluntarily terminates his employment hereunder.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2251.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom Mary Jo Mendez and Rosalinda Pesquera were on brief. Odell & Calabria were on brief. We conclude that while Title VII's employment related shelter might in certain circumstances extend to a person who is a partner in a law firm. Is not entitled to such shelter here. The appellant was mitted a non proprietary
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1994/94a0831p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Lawrence Seidman (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQ3OTgtYWdfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-4798-ag_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Reigler was deprived of due process. The Tax Court was under no duty to appoint a TMP. Hence Reigler was not deprived of due process. We therefore conclude that the Tax Court was without jurisdiction to vacate its September 1. I. Reigler was a limited partner in Cinema `84. A Connecticut limited partnership that was formed to purchase and exploit the rights to a number of films. Cinema `84 filed
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept98/97-5178.man.html">NAT'L PARTNERSHIP INV. CORP. V. NAT'L HOUS. DEV. CORP. (9/10/1998, NO. 97-5178)<BR></A><BR>
The appeal raises two narrow questions of law: (1) whether the appointment of a receiver by a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is governed by state or federal law. BACKGROUND</CENTER> </P> <P> NHDC is the operating general partner of Mangonia Residence I. The Partnership is a Florida limited partnership that was organized in 1994 to build and lease a 252 unit apartment complex for low income elderly persons in West Palm Beach. (NAPICO) is the managing general partner of National Corporate Tax Credit Fund V (NCTCV). NCTCV is a limited partner in the Partnership with a 98.9% ownership interest. I(NTC) is a special limited partner in the Partnership with a 0.1% interest. ANALYSIS</CENTER> </P> <P> NHDC contends that the appointment of a receiver in a diversity case is governed by state substantive law in accordance with <EM>Erie Railroad Co. v. NHDC favors application of Florida law in the present case because the standards governing the appointment of a receiver under Florida law are arguably more stringent than under federal law. <EM>Compare McAllister Hotel.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002087.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 2 the references to Judge
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/02/986003P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The cases were commenced on September 12. The Court will render a decision upon this matter.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-4091.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
David Cardon and Noel Vallejo entered into a (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Their partnership was governed by the United Education Centers Partnership Agreement (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/07/973552P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Liberty Industrial Park (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/08/973892P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dirk Wray and Al Yip were members. Larken was awarded $2. Arguing that Larken's pursuit of its priority capital distribution is barred by res judicata because of previous litigation in Minnesota. Wray was to receive a 30 percent interest in any equity position that Larken would obtain for which Wray was the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2233.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C. were on brief for appellant. Richardson and Gelinas were on brief for appellee.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1538.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C.</U> were on brief for Appellants.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept98/97-5178.man.html">NAT'L PARTNERSHIP INV. CORP. V. NAT'L HOUS. DEV. CORP. (9/10/1998, NO. 97-5178)<BR></A><BR>
The appeal raises two narrow questions of law: (1) whether the appointment of a receiver by a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is governed by state or federal law. BACKGROUND</CENTER> </P> <P> NHDC is the operating general partner of Mangonia Residence I. The Partnership is a Florida limited partnership that was organized in 1994 to build and lease a 252 unit apartment complex for low income elderly persons in West Palm Beach. (NAPICO) is the managing general partner of National Corporate Tax Credit Fund V (NCTCV). NCTCV is a limited partner in the Partnership with a 98.9% ownership interest. I(NTC) is a special limited partner in the Partnership with a 0.1% interest. ANALYSIS</CENTER> </P> <P> NHDC contends that the appointment of a receiver in a diversity case is governed by state substantive law in accordance with <EM>Erie Railroad Co. v. NHDC favors application of Florida law in the present case because the standards governing the appointment of a receiver under Florida law are arguably more stringent than under federal law. <EM>Compare McAllister Hotel.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/40CA000898F3DD7688256CAA005F65CE/$file/0130414.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellants argue that the Government's conduct before and during the trial was vexatious. Provided the Department of Agriculture Office of the Inspector General (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1355.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Handler were on brief for appellant. Rosenberg was on brief for appellees. The issue before us is whether IBM's veto is absolute. The issue is close. We conclude that the refinancing provision is inapplicable because the proposal that has been presented so far lacks refinancing content. Are named as parties in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. We refer to the appellees simply as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-3274.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
HISTORY Ottawa Medical Center (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/00-3097.htm">00-3097 -- SHORE LIMITED OPERATION PARTNERSHIP V. VENEMAN -- 02/22/2001<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Plaintiffs Randall and Starla Shore. We have jurisdiction under 7 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1995/94a0934p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We are presented with disputes over coverage under two contracts. The primary issue is whether the indemnification agreement sufficiently waived the immunity granted employers under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. Holding the contractor was entitled to conditional indemnification but its general partner was not. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Which as Chen's employer was immune from suit under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.[fn2] After Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern tendered their defense to CNA Insurance. Alleging it was obligated to defend and indemnify them. The district court had jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).[fn3] We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Our review is plenary. Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Injuries or death or other claims or suits are caused by the sole negligence of a party indemnified hereunder unless otherwise provided in the Prime Contract.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/11/99-2081.htm">99-2081 -- AG SERVICES OF AMERICA INC. V. NIELSEN -- 11/06/2000<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1169.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Spalding</U> were on brief for petitioner.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2002/01-10478.opn.html">COGGIN AUTOMOTIVE CORP. V. COMMISSIONER (6/6/2002, NO. 01-10478)<BR></A><BR>
Received two notices of deficiency from the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner) alleging additional tax due.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FFF28E68F4D95C8C882572F300826DA5/$file/0655054.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We address whether this generic advertising is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/01/01-5022.htm">01-5022 -- CITGO PETROLEUM CORP. V. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP. -- 01/24/2002<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/12/061201P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The transfer was not a bona fide sale for consideration. When Edna was sixty eight and Austin seventy nine years old. The Korbys filed gift tax returns in 1995 claiming a discount of 43.61% on the book value of each gift because the limited partnership interests were minority interests. Their transfer was restricted. In February 1993 when she was diagnosed with severe Alzheimer's dementia. Were intended to pay for the limited partners' income taxes.3 Edna Korby died on July 3. Rejecting the claim that payments from KPLP to the living trust were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/f56fd721e1cfc33188256c2200051345/$FILE/0015143.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The appeal was initiated by the objectors. The general partner of the partnership and the management of the Company were the same. There was never any litigation over the 1996 Plan. It enjoined implementation of the 1997 Plan in the event it was approved. The 1997 Plan was approved by approximately 70% of the limited partnership interests with only 13.53% of the interests voting against it. Notice was then sent to the class members (comprised of all limited partners) explaining the terms of the settlement and the scheme by which Plaintiffs' counsel would seek fees and costs (in lieu of pursuing the 25% fee agreements they had executed with a significant number of the limited partners). The Partnership would have received only $13 per share. Plaintiffs' counsel further claimed the 1997 Plan could not have been implemented because it was unlawful and even if it could have been implemented. It would not have yielded a control premium. They claimed the settlement plan would maximize the value to investors and that 18% was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1999/982036.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before this court on an appeal from an order for summary judgment in this diversity of citizenship commercial litigation dispute. The owner/developer of the project was American Power Recyclers. The general partners were American Power Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/CA9F2ACFB322616E88256D710080892B/$file/0216480.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This is not the first time Myers has asked us to strike down the Ordinance. Myers refused to comply because the Ordinance was contrary to the company's
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F56FD721E1CFC33188256C2200051345/$file/0015143.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The appeal was initiated by the objectors. The general partner of the partnership and the management of the Company were the same. There was never any litigation over the 1996 Plan. It enjoined implementation of the 1997 Plan in the event it was approved. The 1997 Plan was approved by approximately 70% of the limited partnership interests with only 13.53% of the interests voting against it. Notice was then sent to the class members (comprised of all limited partners) explaining the terms of the settlement and the scheme by which Plaintiffs' counsel would seek fees and costs (in lieu of pursuing the 25% fee agreements they had executed with a significant number of the limited partners). The Partnership would have received only $13 per share. Plaintiffs' counsel further claimed the 1997 Plan could not have been implemented because it was unlawful and even if it could have been implemented. It would not have yielded a control premium. They claimed the settlement plan would maximize the value to investors and that 18% was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/04-4122.htm">04-4122 -- FUNK V. LFLM DEFENDANTS -- 08/23/2004<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2002/01-10478.opn.html">COGGIN AUTOMOTIVE CORP. V. COMMISSIONER (6/6/2002, NO. 01-10478)<BR></A><BR>
Received two notices of deficiency from the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner) alleging additional tax due.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0179p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Alleging that TCI's opposition to SPG's tender offer was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the TCI Board. No. 03 1609 not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Had an interest in the litigation that would be impeded or impaired by a disposition in its absence but could not be joined as a defendant because two general partners were citizens of the same state as plaintiff Glancy. The question is whether that absentee partnership is an indispensable party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) such that the action must be dismissed rather than proceed in the partnership's absence. We note that the following rendition of facts is based upon our reading of the documents compiled by the parties at an early stage of the litigation. The enterprises of the Taubman family is complex and laden with acronyms. TCI is a publicly traded corporation that was incorporated in Michigan in 1973 and that has its principal place of business in Michigan. TCI is organized as a corporate Real Estate Investment Trust (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1444.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The parties have been litigating issues related to the confirmation and enforcement of the amended arbitration award. Which was affirmed by this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and vacate and remand to the district court for further remand to the arbitration panel for clarification of the arbitration award. (1) The Honorable Ted Stewart. As follows: Plaintiff USECC is a joint venture comprised of two uranium mining companies. [Cycle Resource Investment Corp. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ABE87F9EF2594E9288256AAE0058E1A6/$file/0070081.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the cost basis of the rights was therefore zero. I The Gladdens are 50% partners in the Saddle Mountain Ranch partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1502.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief. Were on brief. Insofar as is relevant. Appellants contend that the district court erred in reaching the following four conclusions: (1) appellants' appeal of the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee was untimely. Fine.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D1A78F80C08DB68188256E5A00707C66/$file/0070081.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the cost basis of the rights was therefore zero. I The Gladdens are 50% partners in the Saddle Mountain Ranch partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0488n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Kmart's bankruptcy announcement was followed by a predictable drop in its stock price. As the plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/05/002226P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The case was brought by a number of companies. Who are citizens of Minnesota. I. Appellants M.J. and Nancy Emerson and Richard and Susan Triplett are residents of Iowa who became limited partners by investing in some Operating Limited The Honorable Donovan W. United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 2 1 Partnerships (Operating Partnerships).2 Forty Operating Partnerships were formed between 1991 and 1996 under California law to own and operate low income housing projects through general partners Nationwide Housing Group. Each partnership adopted an agreement which provided that the limited partners would have voting rights in proportion to their investment. L.P. (the Institutional Fund) was a limited partner in twelve of the Operating Partnerships. The Institutional Fund was comprised of appellees General Mills. NHG informed the Institutional Fund that the Operating Partnerships and NHG were experiencing financial difficulties. The corporate parties were concerned about their investments.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/08/976102P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Sauer is a former general contractor who built and operated strip malls. Sauer and J.A.S. were experiencing financial difficulties. She was eventually diagnosed with depression and began taking anti depressants. Pruss' prognosis was further complicated by the discovery of a lump in her breast on April 15. While Pruss was exploring her treatment options and contacting care providers. Although Sauer knew he was to commence payments. Sauer's residence was sold to Household Bank at a foreclosure sale. Which was denied on December 21. The appeals were dismissed as interlocutory. Although the hearing on the fee applications was originally scheduled for October 2. It was continued indefinitely on the request of the trustee. 354.21 of which is attributable to contributions by the debtors. The amounts which Pruss sought in her final fee application do not comport with the amounts which were actually allowed by the bankruptcy court. 6 9 In its application. The abuse ofdiscretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable. . . .
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/05/951235P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The note was on the sale of five A deed of trust In turn. Because on its face the note was payable only to Franke. Record title to the apartments was transferred from SLA to five limited partnerships. 2 was the sole limited partner. a predecessor in interest The partnerships obtained a new loan from to the Department of Housing and Urban Franke signed Development (HUD). The underlying debt was paid off. deeds of release stating the apartment complexes no longer secured the note's repayment. Deeds of trust on the apartment complexes were given to HUD's predecessor to secure the new loan. Was awarded a twenty year contract to manage the apartment complexes. Franke proposed a reorganization plan that was eventually accepted and confirmed by the bankruptcy court in As a result. A Missouri limited partnership in which Franke is the sole general partner. Was given title to the apartments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1994) (providing federal jurisdiction over actions affecting property on which the United McNeill seeks a declaratory judgment that the McNeill also seeks judicial The appellees' claims to the property are subordinate to her rights.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043663p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Before us is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying Appellants' motion to lift a stay of litigation which was entered pursuant to a receivership order. Appellants Leonard and Lynne Barrack (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1617.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C.</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1489.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Associates</U> were on brief. Gray</U> were on brief. Buhlman</U> and <U>Bingham Dana LLP</U> were on brief. In which multiple frauds are alleged against a partner to a biotechnology venture. We now affirm the judgment.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept99/97-2090.opn.html">EAGLEVIEW TECHNOLOGIES V. MDS ASSOCIATES (9/23/1999, NO. 97-2090)<BR></A><BR>
Eagleview asserts that district court based the decision upon its erroneous conclusion that MDS was not a common carrier within the meaning of the Act's provisions. Anderson was realigned as a plaintiff in the case. Two of which are the subject of this appeal by Eagleview. </P> <P> <STRONG>I.</STRONG> <STRONG>Communications Act Claim</STRONG></P> <P> A brief review of the facts is sufficient to understand the basis for our decision on this appeal. The license was subject to the condition that the licensee
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972150.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Walker first argues that the district court was wrong to deny his motion to amend his answer because EHM did not show it was prejudiced by his delay in seeking to amend. I. Walker was a general partner in several limited partnerships. Under the management agreement that each partnership and EHM entered into (all of the agreements were identical). EHM was obliged to collect rent from the project's residents and deposit it into the project's general operating account. One such cost was EHM's compensation. EHM was not required to pay for project operating costs from its own funds. Which is a North Carolina corporation. EHM claimed that Walker was liable for the full amount of these debts because he was a general partner in each partnership. The proposed counterclaim arose out of the same transactions as EHM's claim and was therefore compulsory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). The thrust of the proposed counterclaim was that EHM was not entitled to the fees it sought because it had mismanaged the projects.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1698.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Kilbridge and Lane Altman & Owens LLP were on brief. Cesari & McKenna were on brief. Are general partners in a number of real estate partnerships. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that 2 2 the value of his Individual Partnership Account (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may98/96-2222.opn.html">BIVENS GARDENS OFFICE BLDG., INC. V. BARNETT BANKS OF FLORIDA, INC. (5/4/1998, NO. 96-2222)<BR></A><BR>
We hold that although the district court was correct to grant judgment in favor of the defendants on several of the claims. That Konstand and Karns have stated shareholder derivative claims for which they have RICO standing. The development was to include a shopping center. Konstand was originally the majority shareholder of BCI. James Karns was the largest minority shareholder. While the other half was owned by approximately twenty limited partners. From the time that it was built until it was sold in 1981. Was never constructed.</P> <P> Konstand funded these ventures both through the sales of BCI shares and BGH limited partnerships. Was a principal lender. 000 from defendant University City Bank (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may98/96-2222.opn.html">BIVENS GARDENS OFFICE BLDG., INC. V. BARNETT BANKS OF FLORIDA, INC. (5/4/1998, NO. 96-2222)<BR></A><BR>
We hold that although the district court was correct to grant judgment in favor of the defendants on several of the claims. That Konstand and Karns have stated shareholder derivative claims for which they have RICO standing. The development was to include a shopping center. Konstand was originally the majority shareholder of BCI. James Karns was the largest minority shareholder. While the other half was owned by approximately twenty limited partners. From the time that it was built until it was sold in 1981. Was never constructed.</P> <P> Konstand funded these ventures both through the sales of BCI shares and BGH limited partnerships. Was a principal lender. 000 from defendant University City Bank (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept99/97-2090.opn.html">EAGLEVIEW TECHNOLOGIES V. MDS ASSOCIATES (9/23/1999, NO. 97-2090)<BR></A><BR>
Eagleview asserts that district court based the decision upon its erroneous conclusion that MDS was not a common carrier within the meaning of the Act's provisions. Anderson was realigned as a plaintiff in the case. Two of which are the subject of this appeal by Eagleview. </P> <P> <STRONG>I.</STRONG> <STRONG>Communications Act Claim</STRONG></P> <P> A brief review of the facts is sufficient to understand the basis for our decision on this appeal. The license was subject to the condition that the licensee
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/12/01-5077a.htm">01-5077A -- TRAINOR V. APOLLO METAL SPECIALTIES INC. -- 12/13/2002<BR></A><BR>
It is ordered that the petition for rehearing is denied. The motion for clarification is granted. <p> The court has determined that the opinion filed December 13. The <p> opinion is otherwise unchanged. A copy of the amended opinion is attached to this order. <p> Entered for the Court <p> PATRICK FISHER. Ruling that Apollo was not an employer covered by the ADA because it did not have fifteen or more employees in each of twenty calendar weeks during the relevant period as required by 42 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/12/01-5077.htm">01-5077 -- TRAINOR V. APOLLO METAL SPECIALTIES INC. -- 12/13/2002<BR></A><BR>
Ruling that Apollo was not an employer covered by the ADA because it did not have fifteen or more employees in each of twenty calendar weeks during the relevant period as required by 42 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/004751.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Watson's only role
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-1865.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
\ pursuant to which the partnership\'s income was to be allocated as\ follows: (1) A guaranteed payment of 10 percent of the gross\ profits from the tax return preparation business would be paid to\ the originating partner. (2) 100 percent of the gross profits from\ legal services attributable to each originating partner was\ allocated to that partner. (3) the remaining net profits were\ allocated equally to each partner. Burke prepared and filed the partnership\ returns for 1996 and 1997 in accordance with the partnership\ agreement.</p>\ </span>' var WPFootnote3 = '<span class=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/01-5011c.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Of counsel was Charles L. With him on the brief were Peter D.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992410.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Determining that Alper was not covered under the general and professional liability policy issued by Scottsdale (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-2858.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-9020.htm">97-9020 -- DAVIS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/30/1998<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner Judith W. Have jurisdiction over the appeal. The parties have addressed (1) whether this court has jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed more than ninety days after entry of the Tax Court's decision. (2) whether this court has jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed while a motion for reconsideration was pending. There is no problem with tacking of tolling motions. <u>See</u> <u>Okon v. Memorandum findings of fact and opinion was merely an interlocutory ruling sustaining the Commissioner's determinations and deciding Ms. 1092 93 (10th Cir. 1995) (order determining liability but leaving damages to be calculated is not final). Decision was the . Davis' motion to reconsider the interlocutory opinion was not a tolling motion. <u>Cf.</u> <u>Wagoner v. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. <u>See</u> 26 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/05/98-1021.htm">98-1021 -- FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION V. NOEL -- 05/14/1999<BR></A><BR>
The FDIC's claims for deceit and other tort causes of action were tried to a jury. WGSC was a subsidiary of Western Gulf Savings and Loan Association (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/06/023051P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
When one payee indorses a check that is payable jointly to two payees. Article 3 of the Arkansas Uniform Commercial Code provides that the bank is liable for conversion to the nonconsenting payee.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1791.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The appellant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-1541.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Denise C. With him on the brief was Scott B. Have made. They sought a declaration that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. The court held that the '782 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Arguing that the case was exceptional. The district court decided that the case was indeed exceptional and awarded Church & Dwight nearly all of the requested attorney fees. Evident and Peroxydent timely appealed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). It contends that Evident was a While both Evident and Peroxydent appear to be appellants. It is only Peroxydent's liability for attorney fees that seems to be at issue in this appeal. 03 1541. 1213 3 1 mere licensee lacking all substantial rights in the patent and therefore did not have standing to sue under the patent. Peroxydent also claims that it was simply a passive third party counterclaim defendant without an interest in the litigation. It asserts that its presence in the lawsuit as a third party defendant was not sufficient to cure the defect in standing.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2001/008070.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs were investors in Cinema Plus. We will affirm the district court's order denying class certification. Was formed in Delaware in 1987 to produce and distribute feature length motion pictures. Inc. were general partners of Cinema Plus and. Inc. was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/05/98-1021a.htm">98-1021A -- FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION V. NOEL -- 05/14/1999<BR></A><BR>
Please disregard the gray shading around footnote number 5. <p> <p> A copy of the corrected page 14 is attached. <p> Sincerely. The FDIC's claims for deceit and other tort causes of action were tried to a jury. WGSC was a subsidiary of Western Gulf Savings and Loan Association (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011753A.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
What standards would have to be met before Virginia would permit such a claim. FIRST FLIGHT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 3 2) If the answer to (1) is yes. The Supreme Court of Virginia explained:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb96/94-2858.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0392p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was managed by Fleckenstein Capital as its General Partner. Fleckenstein Capital is based in the state of Washington. Included with the solicitation letter was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972286.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Sugarloaf's sole asset is Sugarloaf Centre. Throughout the period when the Debtor was a debtor in possession. The property was encumbered by an $11.75 million first priority deed of trust and a second priority judgment lien in favor of Charles Vaughn (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1714.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The mandate of limited federal jurisdiction must be honored by all and the parties to 2 No. 02 1714 the instant litigation have failed to do so despite this court's numerous warnings. Indeed our warnings have focused on the exact issue that is at the root of the jurisdictional problem in this case. The misidentification in diversity cases of the citizenship of parties which are neither individuals nor corporations. We remind the bench and bar of this circuit that it is their nondelegable duty to police the limits of federal jurisdiction with meticulous care and to be particularly alert for jurisdictional problems in diversity cases in which one or more of the parties is neither an individual nor a corporation. 941 F.2d 588. We are nonetheless faced once again with a diversity case where the status of a partnership. Which is neither an individual nor a corporation. Was left unresolved until after oral arguments before this court. Now that the status is finally resolved. It turns out there is no complete diversity of citizenship between the parties.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/07/01-4232.htm">01-4232 -- WESTON V. HARMATZ -- 07/21/2003<BR></A><BR>
Presenting a view of the record with as much resemblance to reality as an ancient prospector's memories of what might have been. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/10/00-4045.htm">00-4045 -- BAD ASS COFFEE CO. OF HAWAII V. BAD ASS COFFEE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 10/30/2001<BR></A><BR>
BACH sought and was granted preliminary injunctions enjoining BACLP from using the Trademark in Hawaii and Nevada. The three cases were consolidated in this appeal. This court <strong>affirms</strong>. <strong></strong> <ol> <li><strong>FACTUAL BACKGROUND </strong></li> </ol> <p> The parties are well acquainted with the copious record in this case. This court includes only the background material necessary to fully understand our holding. <p> Jones was formerly employed by Royal Aloha Coffee. BACLP is a Nevada limited partnership in which Jones is the principal. Nevada. <p> Almost before the ink was dry on the agreements. BACH sent BACLP written notice that it was terminating both the MDAN and the TDAN based on BACLP's default under the Promissory Note and the APSA. Concluding that BACH was entitled to terminate the MDAH. BACLP's motion to vacate the arbitration award was denied. This motion was granted on April 13. The appeals were consolidated and all are properly before this court. <ol> <li>DISCUSSION </strong></li> </ol> <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/10/982620P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LP (we refer to the latter two parties collectively as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/03/042019P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Grassmueck is the bankruptcy trustee1 for the estate of W.J. The district court2 ruled that the Trustee's claims were barred by the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto and by the statute of limitations. I. This lawsuit arises out of a complex scheme of investments that are alleged to have been administered in a fraudulent manner. Hoyt III (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3757_016.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Concluding that Pioneer Ranch was responsible for the trucking company's liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C28BC543D12A12F288256A25005ABA1F/$file/9955395.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Often contentious accounting process and was preparing his report recommending the ultimate allocation of millions of dollars in assets between the brothers. The district court was confronted with the tricky task of determining what actually happened and whether Frederick had attempted to defraud the court. The procedural protections the accused party is entitled to before sanctions may be imposed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Frederick Hanshaw is the sole shareholder of F. Gordon Hanshaw is the president of Emerald River Development. Was also a named party. Her interests are coextensive with Gordon's and treated the same. 4400 court ordered the dissolution of the partnership and appointed a receiver to oversee allocation of partnership assets. The district court finding that Enterprises was Frederick's alter ego and that he was its agent. Frederick and Enterprises argue that the district court's sanction and surcharge were tantamount to a finding of criminal contempt and. Frederick should have been afforded various procedural protections applicable to criminal trials.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/10/98-5053a.htm">98-5053A -- HUFFMAN V. SAUL HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 10/05/1999<BR></A><BR>
The sentence that reads: <p> Plaintiffs assert that Saul's notice of removal was untimely. Whether the thirty day time period is measured from service of the initial pleading. Under the second paragraph. <p> <p> The reference to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/feb96/92-5242.html">OLCOTT V. DELAWARE FLOOD CO.<BR></A><BR>
We are called upon to resolve a fourteen year old federal securities dispute raising choice of law and sanctions issues. Bernard Olcott brought this Rule 10b 5 securities action alleging he was defrauded regarding his 1976 1979 investments in four limited partnerships. I. The interminable saga we have before us began when Mr. Alleging the limited partnerships were operated fraudulently. Delaware Flood Company was the general partner of all four limited partnerships. Layton Oil Company and William Douglas Layton were the general partners of Delaware Flood Company which was itself a limited partnership. Michael Galesi was intertwined with the affairs of the other parties in several ways. He was a promoter of the four limited partnerships and a limited partner in some of them. Galesi also originally was a limited partner of Delaware Flood Company and currently is its general partner. While this case was pending. Claim must be filed no more than three years after the underlying events and within one year after the fraud is discovered.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/0484C727D43CCD9788256E5A00707AD9/$file/9955395.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Often contentious accounting process and was preparing his report recommending the ultimate allocation of millions of dollars in assets between the brothers. The district court was confronted with the tricky task of determining what actually happened and whether Frederick had attempted to defraud the court. The procedural protections the accused party is entitled to before sanctions may be imposed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Frederick Hanshaw is the sole shareholder of F. Gordon Hanshaw is the president of Emerald River Development. Was also a named party. Her interests are coextensive with Gordon's and treated the same. 4400 court ordered the dissolution of the partnership and appointed a receiver to oversee allocation of partnership assets. The district court finding that Enterprises was Frederick's alter ego and that he was its agent. Frederick and Enterprises argue that the district court's sanction and surcharge were tantamount to a finding of criminal contempt and. Frederick should have been afforded various procedural protections applicable to criminal trials.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2595.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C.</SPAN> were on brief for appellant.</P> <P> <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/993856.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which have been consolidated before the district court for pretrial purposes. Which is in the business of purchasing such delinquent claims from municipalities in several states. Appendix references are to the appendix filed in Nos. 99 3858 and 99 3859. 4 September 1996. The City and the School District entered into a Purchase Agreement whereby existing claims and liens for unpaid taxes and sewer charges were assigned to NTF.2 App. at 517. Ltd. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-5037.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With her on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel were Gerald M. Are the owners and managers of properties that have provided low income rental housing under several programs sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Once 20 years had passed since the mortgage was issued. HUD was required to ensure that the properties would continue to operate as low income housing and that the property owners satisfied certain other requirements. One of the requirements was that property owners had to be in compliance with all applicable HUD regulations governing the condition of the properties. 24 C.F.R. § 248.145(a)(12). The loans that HUD guaranteed were known as section 241(f) equity loans because the guarantees were authorized under section 241(f) of the National Housing Act. HUD refused to process the necessary paperwork on the ground that Carabetta was not in compliance with certain HUD regulations. Schedule D listed 25 properties the parties agree were to be insured under this provision. Another property was inadvertently omitted from 06 5037.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1435.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Glovsky and Glovsky & Associates were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. 3) the court does not have discretion to determine which conviction to vacate for sentencing purposes. We find that the Guidelines should not have been used at all. Cloutier was a carpenter in the Lowell. The drug partnership was formed between Cloutier and Lionel Laliberte. This marijuana was transported by other people. A pick up truck was 4 used to carry seven hundred pounds of marijuana from Florida to Lowell. A single automobile was used. After the marijuana was delivered to Lowell. Brady testified that the next cocaine purchase was made by Cloutier and himself a year or more later. This partnership terminated when Auch was arrested in January 1987. 1. Richards was indicted on the conspiracy count. Was sentenced by the court. It is undisputed that Cloutier stopped dealing cocaine in mid 1987. McCann remained active in the money laundering partnership with Cloutier until 1987 when they started to divide up their commonly held assets. 1988 1989 Michael Brady/William Cloutier Brady testified that he and Cloutier were involved between 1988 and 1989 in small scale marijuana sales.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200315917.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Comcast alleged that it is a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/973484P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which prohibits prepayment penalties and charges on a loan used in part for the purchase of agricultural land.2 Appellant seeks to have this Court find that § 535.9 also prohibits contractual language that forbids the prepayment of a loan. The full facts and history of the case are outlined in detail in the well reasoned opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 3 and this Court will not restate that history here. The necessary facts are as follows. The note was then assigned to Prudential Insurance Company of America (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/10/96-1532.htm">96-1532 -- U.S. ENERGY CORP. V. NUKEM INC. -- 10/22/1998<BR></A><BR>
Defendants argue that the second amended judgment (1) contains an award which was not granted by the arbitration panel and is. We affirm. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/E9B2567FD81D455588256B0E00043F7C/$file/0035545.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court held that Clackamas was not an
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4AB147978B29627288256E5A00707D59/$file/0035545.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court held that Clackamas was not an
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/02-1191.htm">02-1191 -- SENDER V. BRONZE GROUP -- 08/26/2004<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1349.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The details of the complaint are not relevant to this appeal because Roizman agreed to pay Grabler approximately $96. These three individuals are the sole shareholders in Benchmark Properties Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-2180.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On page 5. Were on brief for appellant. Devalerio & Pease were on brief for appellee. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50. Exclusive of 3 that declaratory relief was inappropriate. The parties named in the complaint are as follows: ARTHUR J. Park Towne is named as a nominal defendant. Defendant Hoffman asserted diversity jurisdiction because Halleran is a resident of Massachusetts. Hoffman's assertion stood unchallenged until after briefs were filed in this court. Argued that diversity was lacking under the rule of Carden v. A limited partnership is a citizen of every state of which its general or limited partners are citizens. Plaintiff says that diversity is interest and costs. Is between (1) citizens of different states. Removal of such an action is permitted by 28 U.S.C. 1441. 4 lacking here for two reasons. Several Park Towne limited partners are citizens of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff's counsel represents that several WFA limited partners are residents of Pennsylvania.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1962.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
LLC</SPAN> were on brief for appellant. P.A.</SPAN> were on brief for cross appellant. It ruled that because the Advest IRA was in Cox's name when Cox petitioned for bankruptcy. Hence was not subject to the later judgment of the divorce court. We reverse the court's decision as to the Advest IRA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </P> <UL> <LI><STRONG>BACKGROUND</STRONG></LI> </UL> <P> Laurie Davis and Thomas Cox were married on August 17. They have two minor children. Davis was a homemaker and. Cox was a successful commercial attorney. The court was required by Maine law to issue. The preliminary injunction was meant to keep intact. Is equitably divided by the court between the divorcing pair irrespective of in whose name it was held. <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/004348.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a judgment of civil forfeiture for funds from a bank account owned by Kim's Wholesale Distributors. The complaint claimed that the funds were subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. Proof supporting the forfeiture was obtained from business records seized from Kim's pursuant to a warrant issued by a United States Magistrate Judge in connection with a wide scale investigation of illegal trafficking in food stamps. Final judgment was entered against Kim's in the amount of $92. Chinese take out restaurants were buying food stamps from low income food stamp recipients for seventy cents on the dollar. It was alleged that the restaurants were then reselling the food stamps to a partnership (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/10/98-5053.htm">98-5053 -- HUFFMAN V. SAUL HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 10/05/1999<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/05/97-1478.htm">97-1478 -- C-470 JOINT VENTURE V. TRIZEC COLORADO INC. -- 05/10/1999<BR></A><BR>
All land was located near the proposed Colorado Highway 470 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may95/93-4436.opa.html">LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may95/93-4436.opa.html">LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Because we also conclude that none of the defenses asserted in the foreclosure action are covered by either of the two policies. Would furnish a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/12/96-1202.htm">96-1202 -- JAMES BARLOW FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. DAVID M. MUNSON INC. -- 12/15/1997<BR></A><BR>
</strong>Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept99/97-5380.man.html">LEVAN V. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC (9/29/1999, NO. 97-5380)<BR></A><BR>
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute. Which were completed in 1989 and 1991. Were of a type referred to in the industry as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/01/01-4033.htm">01-4033 -- U.S. V. BONNEVILLE DISTRIBUTING INC. -- 01/24/2002<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/75DFFB00DEA2A1DE88256BD00080697C/$file/0056653.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ORDER The request to publish the unpublished Memorandum disposition is GRANTED. Is redesignated as an authored Opinion by Judge T.G. I. Appellants are forty three independent dealers who operate Shell or Texaco gasoline stations in southern California. Holding that Shell and Texaco's contribution of the gas stations to Equilon was not a sale. Appellants appeal that decision.3 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 7 after which the California statute is patterned.8 Therefore. Common sense meaning.10 If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. There is no need to resort to other indicia of legislative intent.11 Only if the meaning is not clear will we turn to legislative history to help resolve the ambiguity. [1] California Business & Professions Code § 20999.25 indisputably governs the parties' relationship. The question here is whether Shell and Texaco's contribution of assets to Equilon falls under Section 20999.25(a). We must determine whether: (1) Equilon is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1257.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Gandara with whom Bauza & Davila was on brief for appellees. Was returning from a Motor Plan company Christmas party. Motor Plan was a car rental agency. Soto was driving a car owned and provided to her by Motor Plan as a fringe benefit. Lopez's left arm and hand were badly injured. Lopez sued Soto and Motor Plan in federal district court claiming that Soto had been negligent when operating the car and that Motor Plan was also responsible.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1994/94a0694p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will therefore affirm in part and reverse in part. We will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. It is important to emphasize at the outset that. Because we are reviewing the partial grant of a motion for summary judgment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-5129.html">TRAUMA SERVICE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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Circuit Judge: Eric Noel and Sandra and Brian Hall are no strangers to the inside of a courtroom. This lawsuit is the fifth between Noel and Sandra Hall. On the ground that they should have been asserted as compulsory counterclaims in earlier statecourt litigation. Sell Red Hot Prospect a horse that was no such thing. Sandra Hall's last name was Johnson. A. State Court Litigation The unhappy collaboration between Sandra Hall and Noel resulted in four suits litigated in Washington State courts (a fifth suit was filed but never litigated): two actions concerning the mobile home in the small claims department of the Clark County District Court (eventually consolidated on appeal). Small Claims Suits Concerning the Mobile Home Two separate actions related to the mobile home were litigated in the small claims department of the district court in Clark County. Skamania County Superior Court Suit Concerning the Investment in Red While the mobile home suits were pending against him. (The Clark County suit is discussed below.).
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/07/002413P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 72 1 calculation error that the hospital corrected after the civil action was filed. The attorney's fee award was based on the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/12/99-6086.htm">99-6086 -- SMITH BARNEY INC. V. HARRIDGE -- 12/14/1999<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Defendant Thomas J. Harridge's claims were barred as untimely because the claims arose more than six years prior to the filing of his NASD arbitration request. Harridge claims that he was completely inexperienced with respect to investment decisions and relied on Gale's expertise in electing the lump sum distribution and in investing his savings. Harridge learned these limited partnerships investments were nearly worthless in October 1995. Asserting that Harridge's claims arose more than six years after the date the limited partnership interests were purchased and. The claims were not eligible for submission to arbitration under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-2059.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Even though the only possible basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship. They have done so. The supplemental briefs reveal that Hoagland is a citizen of Illinois. It is his citizenship rather than Midwest's that is germane to diversity. Because there is no suggestion that he was appointed receiver in order to create diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1359. That while the Sandberg firm is a professional corporation incorporated and having its principal place of business in Missouri. Three of the twenty two members of the firm (the shareholders in the professional corporation) are citizens of Illinois. If the citizenship of the members is what counts for purposes of determining diversity. As would be the case if the law firm were a partnership. A number of subsequent cases are in accord. There are no contrary decisions. Made clear that Coté stands for a rule that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991043.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Who was a stockholder. Claiming that their preemptive decision was justified by
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/C9A9E65EA9F661C588256BD000808C09/$file/0056653.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ORDER The request to publish the unpublished Memorandum disposition is GRANTED. Is redesignated as an authored Opinion by Judge T.G. I. Appellants are forty three independent dealers who operate Shell or Texaco gasoline stations in southern California. Holding that Shell and Texaco's contribution of the gas stations to Equilon was not a sale. Appellants appeal that decision.3 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 7 after which the California statute is patterned.8 Therefore. Common sense meaning.10 If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. There is no need to resort to other indicia of legislative intent.11 Only if the meaning is not clear will we turn to legislative history to help resolve the ambiguity. [1] California Business & Professions Code § 20999.25 indisputably governs the parties' relationship. The question here is whether Shell and Texaco's contribution of assets to Equilon falls under Section 20999.25(a). We must determine whether: (1) Equilon is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2001/00-10323.man.html">MCMAHAN V. TOTO (7/10/2001, NO. 00-10323)<BR></A><BR>
Several of the limited partners in that suit were dismissed. Because their claims were precluded by release and assignment provisions contained in agreements between them and McMahan. The state court granted summary judgment in favor of the limited partners.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0429n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Blessing and 58 other named plaintiffs in this action are former employees of defendant Kelsey Hayes Company and members of defendant United Steel. They allege the decision is a breach of the collective bargaining agreement or. Is barred by promissory estoppel. The district court concluded that Kelsey Hayes was within its rights under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to unilaterally close the plant and that. USW's decision not to challenge the closing was not irrational and was not in breach of its duty of fair representation. Plaintiffs insist that they have stated facially valid claims. That dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is premature. Believing that Kelsey Hayes' unilateral decision was in contravention of the unique. When the grievances were denied. The union concluded that KelseyHayes was entitled. 58 fellow employees were not satisfied. Removal was based on federal question jurisdiction. Four of which are relevant to this appeal. All four are premised on a Memorandum of Agreement (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/nov95/94-9018.html">ESTATE OF HOOVER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR>
In determining the fair market value it is appropriate to take into account a discount factor for the minority interest holder's lack of control and marketability. Included among the assets in the decedent's estate was a 26% interest in the T 4 Cattle Company. 000) is qualified real property. The estate and the Commissioner stipulated that this methodology would be appropriate to arrive at the fair market value of the decedent's 26% interest in the qualified real property if 2032A were not elected. The fair market value was thus $1. The estate and the Commissioner further stipulated that the 2032A special use value of the ranch was $2. The decedent's 26% pro rata share of the of the special use value of the qualified real property was therefore $533. The estate reported that the value of the decedent's 26% interest in the limited partnership's qualified real property for estate tax purposes was $1. The total value of the decedent's interest in the limited partnership for estate tax purposes was $2.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2001/00-10323.man.html">MCMAHAN V. TOTO (7/10/2001, NO. 00-10323)<BR></A><BR>
Several of the limited partners in that suit were dismissed. Because their claims were precluded by release and assignment provisions contained in agreements between them and McMahan. The state court granted summary judgment in favor of the limited partners.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/sept95/94-1170.html">SHERIDAN SQUARE PARTNERSHIP V. UNITED STATES<BR></A><BR>
The owners contended that HUD was constrained to calculate yearly adjustments using the applicable Automatic Annual Adjustment Factor (AAAF). Equaled (in most cases) only thirty percent of the rent adjustments to which the owners would have been entitled under the AAAF system in effect. We must
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1360.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Daniel Prentiss and Associates was on brief for Newharbor Partners. Elmer and Licht & Semonoff were on brief for F.D. This is an appeal of a judgment based on a directed verdict1 in a diversity case. This case arises from failed negotiations to form a joint real estate venture.2 The primary issue is whether or not a letter of intent executed by the parties gave rise to a duty to negotiate further in good faith despite express language 1 At the close of the evidence. The trial court granted a judgment non obstante veredicto because the jury had already returned its verdict when the appellees' motion was acted upon. The two types of business entities are. Since it is not apparent from the face of the record. Whether the putative
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011659.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. That Roanoke was entitled to damages in the amount of $840. The district court granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that Roanoke had offered insufficient evidence to show that it was the owner of the damaged property. Agreed under the contract with Dewberry to reimburse DewThese facts are taken from our opinion in Roanoke Prop. DEWBERRY & DAVIS berry for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred while defending claims arising under the contract for which Dewberry was the prevailing party. Holding that Dewberry could not collect attorneys' fees or costs under the contract because Dewberry had been found by the jury to have breached the contract.2 On May 14. Insofar as the district court's ruling was premised on a question of substantive contract law as opposed to an exercise of its discretion. (J.A. at 925.) 3 There is some dispute as to whether this claim is governed by Virginia or North Carolina law. That Virginia law is applicable. 2 ROANOKE PROPERTIES v.
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This disposition is not citable as precedent. It is a public record. Because we conclude that serious questions have been raised concerning prudential standing and the enforceability of the '187 patent. Which was one in a series of continuations based on a divisional application of the '410 patent. The '870 application stated both that the application disclosed and claimed the same subject matter as in the prior application and that the inventors were the same. The claimed invention was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2003/02-13435.opn.html">JOHN B. GOODMAN LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. THF CONSTR., INC. (2/14/2003, NO. 02-13435)<BR></A><BR>
Appellees argued that since the contracts were performed in part by an unlicensed contractor. Must determine in the first instance whether the contracts at issue are enforceable.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-6294.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
On plaintiffs' claims that their loss of business income was covered by their Zurich policy. The losses were sustained because customers canceled their visits to hotels plaintiffs operated when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all airplane (1) The Honorable John L. Who will be referred to collectively as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-4162.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Ridge first attempted to persuade a Texas trial court that venue was proper in Utah. Which concluded that venue was proper in Texas. Holding that the venue ruling was a mixed question of fact and law and the parties' arbitration agreement permitted judicial review of pure legal questions only. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Background The Ridge is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of business in Summit County. Which was formed to develop real property in Summit County. Was the other limited partner and also owned 49% of the partnership. Was the general partner and a 2% owner of Mountain Red Hawk. Schneider and S&K do not contest that they are bound by the original partnership agreement and its amendments. The parties shall have. The right to seek vacation or modification of any award that is based in whole or in part on an incorrect or erroneous ruling of law by appeal to an appropriate court having jurisdiction. . . . The agreement provided that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/71A061C7705237C3882571FC004939A4/$file/0436066.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on the briefs. Was on the brief. Was on the brief. Appellants are residents who presently live in this housing property. We affirm the district court's denial of appellants' motion to intervene in the quiet title lawsuit because their interests are sufficiently protected by their APA lawsuit. Kimberly merely held that certain defenses were not available to the government in a quiet title action brought by Section 515 borrowers to enforce their contractual right to prepay their loans. Ours is an APA case brought by residents challenging the agency's noncompliance with the Emergency Low Income Housing Protection Act. Kimberly did not hold that ELIHPA was invalid or that the Department of Agriculture was free to violate it. I. Background The facts are not disputed. Section 515 of the National Housing Act of 1949 was enacted by Congress to encourage private investment in housing for elderly and low income individuals in rural areas. Which was later subsumed into RHS. UNITED STATES the housing owners agreed to rent to qualified low income tenants at affordable rates for as long as the loans were outstanding.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041617np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will affirm. The Partnership counterclaimed that it was entitled to rescission because Utilities had materially breached the Agreement by. Further found that Appellees were entitled to rescission because Utilities had materially breached the Agreement. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2003/02-13435.opn.html">JOHN B. GOODMAN LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. THF CONSTR., INC. (2/14/2003, NO. 02-13435)<BR></A><BR>
Appellees argued that since the contracts were performed in part by an unlicensed contractor. Must determine in the first instance whether the contracts at issue are enforceable.
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This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Bilzerian United States Court of Appeals. Bilzerian (
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. The essential facts are undisputed. Karen Rader is employed as a teacher at Elk Valley Christian School in Elkview. Elk Valley Christian School is a member of AACS. The Plan is administered by Gallagher Bassett Services. Incorporated.2 1 The proceedings in this action were conducted by a magistrate judge pursuant to the consent of the parties. The parties agree that when the partnership was formed. It was not required to furnish contributions to the workers' compensation fund of West Virginia (the Fund) on behalf of the partners. That the partnership was not required to notify the Fund of a decision not to participate. James was injured during the course of his employment with T&J Painting. [a]ny accidental bodily injury which arises out of or in the course of any employment with any Employer and/or for which the individual is entitled to benefits under any workers' compensation law or ... receives any settlement from a workers' compensation carrier.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). *Judge Ervin heard oral argument in this case but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 3 OPINION PER CURIAM: Roanoke Properties Limited Partnership (RPLP) appeals an order of the district court granting judgment as a matter of law. As tenants in common. 1 Several other entities that were initially parties in this suit are no longer involved in the action. 2 RPLP also appealed. RPLP appealed an alternative ruling by the district court that Dewberry was entitled to a new trial on damages even if it was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because the findings of the district court are not clearly erroneous. McMillan discovered that Hoekenga was the general partner of Columbia Properties Fund II Limited Partnership (
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OPINION/ORDER
The district court barred Autotech's expert and denied Autotech relief finding that there was no 2 No. 05 4544 evidence to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because fiduciary duties were not created and therefore not breached. I. Background Autotech and ADC are two companies involved in the touch screen industry. While ADC is a direct marketer that sells automation control products through e commerce and catalogs. There were no lawyers involved. The parties were to
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UNITED STATES V. MESSNER
The first was filed as a joint personal petition with Ruth Ann Messner. The second was a corporate petition in the name of Commercial Builders of Kansas. Messner was an officer and stockholder. The corporate reorganization was converted to a liquidating bankruptcy under Chapter 7. That case was still pending upon the date of the filing of the indictment. Messner was convicted on counts one. Although neither the real estate interest nor the bonds were disclosed in either of the bankruptcy cases. Messner concedes they should have been set forth in the statement of financial affairs of his personal petition.(1) Following the verdict. Messner asserts the district court should have dismissed counts six and seven because he had no duty to disclose his receipt of assets in 1992. Revesting all estate property even that which was undisclosed back to him. He was not a debtor in possession in 1992. He therefore insists he was under no duty to disclose his receipt of $20. Admitting the government could have charged him with not reporting the existence of his interest in the real estate contract and bonds in 1990.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Have been altered in the process). When the bankruptcy petition was filed. (Capitol) and Cadle were the primary creditors. The remaining interest due Cadle was added to the balance of its loan. 2 Prior to the confirmation hearing. We have recognized that short of constitutional mootness.
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NIPPON CREDIT BANK, LTD V. MATTHEWS (5/15/2002, NO. 98-8639)
BACKGROUND
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NIPPON CREDIT BANK, LTD V. MATTHEWS (5/15/2002, NO. 98-8639)
BACKGROUND
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JAMES BARLOW FAMILY LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. MUNSON
Over whether the Barlows are entitled to royalty payments from the federal leases. I. The leases at issue in this case cover federal lands in western Colorado on which unpatented oil shale claims were located. Oil shale claimants and the Department of the Interior were involved in disputes over the claimants' rights to mineral patents on these and other lands where oil shale claims were located. The government contended that many oil shale claims were void for lack of valid discovery and for failure of the claimants to perform required annual assessment work. Since the mineral claims were staked prior to 1920. The government issued federal oil and gas leases on some of the lands which were involved in oil shale disputes. The Barlows (or their predecessors in interest) acquired in the early 1970s federal leases which were subject to outstanding oil shale claims. Since much of the area of interest was covered by disputed oil shale claims. Munson was uncertain how to lease oil and gas rights. Both of which were successors in interest to oil shale claimants.
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98-5053 -- HUFFMAN V. SAUL HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 06/16/1999
We hold that the notice of removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C.
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OPINION/ORDER
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Bilzerian United States Court of Appeals. Bilzerian (
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98-1110 -- K N GAS SUPPLY SERVICES INC. V. AMERICAN PRODUCTION PARTNERSHIP-V -- 12/01/1999
KNGSS and American are parties to a gas supply contract which obligates KNGSS to purchase an annual minimum quantity of gas at a fixed price from American. Either determination would have allowed KNGSS to pass the regulation related costs back to American. After an extensive review of the history of the regulation of the natural gas industry. Porfilio Senior Circuit Judge
FOOTNOTES Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.
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OPINION/ORDER
A reorganization plan was proposed by appellees William E. The Franke Gannon reorganization plan was approved over the objection of the Debtors. Finding that the estate indeed was insolvent and thus the Debtors' equity interests in the estate were without value and were properly extinguished. Arguing that the estate's assets actually exceeded its liabilities at the time of the reorganization and that they are entitled to the excess value of the estate because the creditors have otherwise been paid in full. Our standard of review is the same as that of the district court. A reorganization plan may be confirmed over the objection of equity holders whose interests are being eliminated as long as the
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OPINION/ORDER
As deficiencies were assessed against her because she filed a joint tax return with her husband. References to
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NATCO LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. MORAN TOWING OF FLORIDA (9/28/2001, NO. 00-13886)
BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER
Williams (the Commissioner) is the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Delaware. Asserting they were vicariously liable for the established criminal behavior of co defendant Sholam Weiss.2 The Global Defendants opposed the motion. This appeal followed.3 Weiss was convicted of racketeering and other charges in connection with this scheme. Was sentenced to a total of 845 years in prison. Factual Background NHL is a Delaware company with its principal place of business in Orlando. Which was responsible for regulating NHL. Informed NHL's chief financial officer he was negotiating the acquisition of up to $200 million in reinsurance for the company's annuity portfolio. Neither the company nor the escrow funds were used to fund a reinsurance transaction. They were used at least in part to purchase non performing mortgages. The Global Defendants were involved in purchasing these non performing mortgages. (Global Equities II) was formed by Messrs. Global Equities was dissolved for failure to pay taxes on June 26.
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OPINION/ORDER
Have brought this RICO class action on behalf of all individuals who played NHL professional hockey during the time in which defendant R. Count II of the complaint alleges that Eagleson and certain companies with which he was affiliated conspired to pilfer NHLPA funds over the course of many years. The principal issue on this appeal is whether the district court correctly granted Eagleson and the NHL defendants summary judgment on Count I on statute of limitations grounds. Thus is not at issue on appeal. We nevertheless have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Alan Eagleson was executive director of the NHLPA. Which would otherwise have been prohibited by the players' contracts. The participation of the best NHL players was essential to the success of the tournaments. Hockey Canada was to be paid the first $600. All other net revenues were to be split equally between the NHL clubs and the NHLPA. The NHL players earned little additional pay for playing in the tournaments and were induced to participate on the understanding that they would be benefitting their pension fund.
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OPINION/ORDER
Before us are just some of the bitter fruits of a legal partnership gone awry. Because Lundy is without standing to pursue these state law claims in an Article III court. We will vacate the orders of the District Court and remand with instructions to dismiss these claims.1 I. Are unrelated to the unauthorized practice of law claim and are disposed of in a separate decision filed this same date. 2 1 Lundy. Lundy claims to have learned that Hochberg had previously pled guilty to a federal count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Was therefore practicing law in Pennsylvania without a license. Diamond who was previously associated with Lundy. Left to practice with Haymond and Hochberg when H&L was dissolved The record belies Lundy's present assertions of ignorance regarding Hochberg's criminal conviction and licensure status. That Lundy was informed of Hochberg's indictment when Lundy. Hochberg were negotiating to form H&L in April 1997. Knew or should have known about the subsequent plea. Hochberg and Haymond had continued as partners and were allied against Lundy.
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00-5226 -- YALE 41 ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. FIVE SHOPPING CENTER COMPANY -- 08/10/2001
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiffs appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on their complaint alleging breach of settlement agreement and seeking enforcement of a liquidated damages' provision therein. 1175 (10th Cir. 1999). The parties are familiar with the facts and we only very briefly summarize those necessary to resolve this appeal. Dill was not released. A contractual provision in which damages for breach are determined in anticipation of that breach is void unless. The provision will be deemed void even if the damage resulting from a breach would be difficult to ascertain. Sun Ridge Investors.
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99-5239 -- HUFFMAN V. SAUL HOLDINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP -- 08/22/2001
Circuit Judge.
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OPINION/ORDER
One half payable during the production process and the remainder
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OPINION/ORDER
1998 4:24:29 PM
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OPINION/ORDER
He was sentenced to 293 months in prison for the continuing financial crimes enterprise violation. Lefkowitz argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any crime. Lefkowitz was President of Citi Equity Group. Or acquire buildings in which a prescribed percentage of the apartment units are occupied by low income tenants. Money raised from limited partners was the project's equity. Remaining debts to the builder were paid. While CEG obtained permanent financing to replace the construction loan once a building was completed. 000 were unbuilt. Funds from limited partners and FSM investors were first deposited in an operating account for each particular investment. 000 was used to pay Lefkowitz's personal expenses. The black hole was $3. IRS agents traced new partnership deposits that cleared negative balances in the central CEG account and then were used to meet Lefkowitz's personal needs and to fund older projects. This practice was not disclosed to CEG investors. Lefkowitz denies that this was fraudulent.
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NATCO LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. MORAN TOWING OF FLORIDA (9/28/2001, NO. 00-13886)
BACKGROUND
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Next door was the Alpine Forrest Mobile Home Park. There was a flurry of regulatory interest in the old and often shoddy underground storage tanks used by gasoline stations. The leak was promptly reported to state authorities. A faulty pipe was found and quickly repaired. Lou Frasco was Urban Assets' founder and prime mover.
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98-1122 -- FLANNERY PROPERTIES V. BYRNE -- 05/30/2000
Byrne told him the eastern property line
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OPINION/ORDER
That is. Because the court found that the plans did not establish that future liquidation or further reorganization was unlikely. The debtors have continued to operate Le Marquis since that time as debtors in possession. The court must determine that the plan is
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OPINION/ORDER
This is a breach of BOWNES. This time around he was awarded $20. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The following facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. All reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor. The plaintiffs appellants in this case are the conjugal partnership comprising Joseph Jones and his wife Vernetta. The defendants appellees are the conjugal partnership comprising Arthur Pineda and his wife Toni. The position was offered for a one year term. Judge Acosta was the presiding judge in the San Juan Dupont Hotel Fire Litigation. Who was not a court reporter but aided her husband in producing the transcripts. Which was reluctantly given. Judge Acosta was not impressed with his reporting skills. Pineda never informed Jones that Judge Acosta's authorization was a condition precedent to the oral contract. The Dupont trial was scheduled to proceed in discrete
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REICH V. STANGL
Stangl was a party in interest who had engaged in prohibited transactions. Stangl was general partner of the Bowling Property Limited Partnership. Davidson were partners in the S & D Limited Partnership (
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OPINION/ORDER
That the motion is well taken. It is hereby ORDERED. After considering Segal's peti tion we find that his request is for the most part very reasonable and that he is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $99. The Corporation for National and Community Service (
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97-1375 -- SOUTHERN COLORADO MRI V. MED-ALLIANCE INC. -- 01/28/1999
Reverse its decision to limit damages to only 60% of the difference between sale price and market price.Background SCMRI is a partnership comprised of doctors and subsidiaries of Parkview and St. SCMRI was most interested in MedAlliance. MedAlliance was concerned about potential competition from the Pueblo hospitals. The parties agreed in January 1993 to avoid this problem by structuring the deal to have MedAlliance purchase the facility jointly with the Pueblo hospitals. While the letter stated explicitly that it was not an offer. The letter stated: ImageAmerica is prepared to value SCMRI at $3. This revised proposal is contingent upon a response from . . . We will respectfully withdraw our offer as we cannot continue to
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BURKA PAUL S. V. AETNA LIFE INS CO
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OPINION/ORDER
Because this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss. Was founded in the early 1990s. There are two operative complaints from which we draw the facts. Who was not a party to the Agreement. 2. Texcan Cables International did not receive any Anicom stock in the transaction. 3 4 No. 05 4322 the use of fictitious sales orders or
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OPINION/ORDER
With whom Cullen & Butters was on brief for appellants. P.C. were on brief for appellees. On the grounds that Appellants' claims are time barred under ERISA's six year statute of limitations. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The following facts are summarized in the light most favorable to Appellants. Was formed as a pension and profit sharing plan for the employees of the J. It is subject to ERISA. The Plan's accounts were handled by Hegenbart. If the recommendation was not accepted. At no time was Hegenbart given power of attorney or discretionary authority over the accounts. The Plan was charged commissions of about 3.5% for the sale of the CATS purchased in 1985. The first was purchased in June of 1985. (ii) there was not expected to be a public market for their investment. (iii) there were risks involved. Appellants were sent prospectuses which similarly disclosed risks involved when they purchased $40. The record shows that the portfolio review dated October 1988 lists as the market value what was actually the face amount of the interests in the limited partnerships.
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OPINION/ORDER
L.L.P. were on brief. Snyder LLP were on brief. Leach were on brief. The district court determined that appellants' RICO claim was barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations. we affirm.
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OPINION/ORDER
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Because the parties are familiar with the facts as set forth in the Tax Court's memorandum and opinion. Walford's deduction for losses in 1981 arising from the Sav Fuel investment was properly disallowed because the partnership did not have the requisite profit motive under 26 U.S.C. 183.(2) The court further found that Mr. Walford was liable for an addition to tax and increased interest. Walford does not argue that these penalties were erroneously assessed. We will consider only his arguments challenging the Tax Court's conclusion that the Sav Fuel partnership was not engaged in a profit making activity. We affirm.(3) Whether Sav Fuel was intended as a profit making venture is a question of fact that this court will not disturb unless clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when. We are definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We conclude that the Tax Court's finding that Sav Fuel lacked an actual profit objective is not clearly erroneous.
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OPINION/ORDER
He filed two appeals. 2 No. 02 2427 Meyerson's appeal in the defamation suit was decided last July. Which would spoil diversity because Showboat concedes that it too is a citizen of that state. The district court found that Meyerson is a citizen of Michigan but did not determine Showboat's citizenships. It relied on Showboat's assertion that none of its partners is a citizen of Michigan. No. 02 2427 3 In this court the parties have repeated their sorry performance of the first appeal. Is disappointing. The performance of Showboat's legal team was worse. They contended that sanctions beyond the public rebuke they had received in our opinion
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OPINION/ORDER
Were on brief for the United States. Clary William Wester was formerly president. Wester was convicted by a jury of several different crimes. We begin by describing what the evidence would have permitted the jury to find. The three others were Robert Fredo. The loan was secured by land and future improvements and a personal guaranty of the debt from each of the partners. NEFR was concerned that Wester's and Fredo's participation in the partnership might create conflicts of interest. That the bank
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STATE TREASURER OF THE STATE OF MICH. V. BARRY (2/19/1999, NO. 97-9177)
Circuit Judge: Because the partial summary judgment order involved here was not a final decision. There was no subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on. This would have allowed the parties to appeal the May 27 partial summary judgment order.
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STATE TREASURER OF THE STATE OF MICH. V. BARRY (2/19/1999, NO. 97-9177)
Circuit Judge: Because the partial summary judgment order involved here was not a final decision. There was no subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on. This would have allowed the parties to appeal the May 27 partial summary judgment order.
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OPINION/ORDER
Vincent Lane was charged with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and eight counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining three counts. Which were then dismissed. Lane was sentenced to 30 months in prison. I. Background Vincent Lane is a real estate developer who participated in several ventures during the 1980s and 1990s in both Illinois and in Texas. From 1988 through 1995 he was also the chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Lane's conviction is based on fraudulent statements concerning his financial stability made to bank officials at American National Bank (
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OPINION/ORDER
I. BACKGROUND MFIP is a family limited partnership formed under Florida law in May 1990 for the purpose of owning property. Were named as general partners. MBI is a corporation formed under Florida law in October 1991 to act as the general partner of MFIP. PFH is a corporation formed under Florida law in 1993 for the purpose of holding title to real property. Two thirds of the PFH stock is owned by International Markets. One third of the PFH stock is owned by MFIP. When she realized that her initial loans were to 4 entities controlled by Matthews. Freezing the assets of Matthews' alleged alter egos and restraining the defendants from making payments to Mathews or to his alleged alter egos.3 The Corporate Defendants were directed to deposit all of their liquid assets into the registry of the court. The remaining defendants were Farm Depot. The records in these cases are filed as follows: in 98 8639 and 98 8687. The record consists of 1 volume and 8 boxes of exhibits (which are also filed as the record and exhibits in 98 8639 and 98 8687).
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OPINION/ORDER
I. BACKGROUND PDQ is a manufacturer of car washes. Wash was PDQ's exclusive distributor for the St. Wash and Wallis were discussing a deal in which they would form a partnership to hold the exclusive distributorship. PDQ terminated Wash's agreement eight months before it was to expire. Wash and Wallis is explained more fully below. Louis region was a company known as Nu Look. Wallis was considering the replacement of numerous car washes it had purchased from Ryko. Wallis executives became convinced that PDQ's equipment and organization were far superior to Ryko. No cause was required for a party to elect not to renew the agreement. Brooks informed PDQ via letter that Wallis was committed to buying PDQ equipment from Wash for those locations. The two G 5s were plagued with the problems often associated with the roll out of new products. While the G 5s were not functioning as promised. That Wallis was
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OPINION/ORDER
1 challenges the District Court's holding that loading dividends used to fund insurance premiums for corporate owned life insurance (
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OPINION/ORDER
Whether the obligors on unmatured promissory notes can obtain declaratory relief against the obligees of those notes and have the notes declared void and unenforceable. Whether transactions involving investment securities are covered under section 9.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 2 Practices and Consumer Protection Law (
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OPINION/ORDER
With her on the brief were Matthew S. Of counsel on the brief were William R. On the brief were Eileen J. (TCLA) are the dissolved partnerships of interest in the instant dispute. IBC Financial Services (f/k/a Bancor Development Company of Laredo) (Bancor)1 is a notice partner of TCLA. These parties and TransCapital Leasing Associates are hereinafter collectively referred to as Petitioners. 26 U.S.C. § 6226(b)(1) provides that:
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OPINION/ORDER
Is nondischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). (2) Cochrane is collaterally estopped from relitigating factual findings upon which the underlying state court judgment was based. Background The judgment debt that is the subject of this litigation arose out of a Minnesota state court action (hereinafter referred to as
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WAYMARK CORPORATION AND CARAVELLO FAMILY LP V. PORTA SYSTEMS
Argued for defendant appellee. With him on the brief was Kevin E. Mso bidi font family:
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OPINION/ORDER
That Viking's purchase of all the unsecured creditors' claims and subsequent attempt to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding was an abuse of the bankruptcy process. The estate's only significant asset was Jeraldine Olson's 38.8 per cent. interest in a partnership whose major asset is the Viking Plaza Shopping Center.1 The Olsons' four adult children and two unrelated individuals also own shares in the partnership. Which is owned by the Olson children. This case is about Viking's and the Olson children's attempts to acquire the estate's interest in the partnership. An amount which will. The Bankruptcy Court issued the order that is the subject of this case. It held that Viking had abused the bankruptcy Viking points out that Twin City Federal had also filed an unsecured claim against the estate for $1.8 million as Viking was acquiring the claims of the unsecured creditors. Viking argues that it
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ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE V. MILLS ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE V. WE REVERSE. FACTS BEACH TELEVISION PARTNERS (BTP) WAS A FLORIDA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP THAT OWNED AND OPERATED TWO INDEPENDENT TELEVISION STATIONS. RULING THAT ORIX DID NOT HAVE A VALID SECURITY INTEREST IN THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE FCC BROADCAST LICENSES. THE FCC MUST DETERMINE THAT THE TRANSFER WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST. COURTS HAVE TRADITIONALLY HELD THAT LICENSEES HAVE NO TRUE OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THEIR BROADCAST LICENSES. SEE FCC V. COURTS TYPICALLY HAVE HELD THAT SECURITY INTERESTS IN BROADCAST LICENSES ARE INVALID. RECENT FCC AND COURT DECISIONS HAVE INTIMATED THAT THE COURTS' PREVIOUS BLANKET INVALIDATION OF ALL SECURITY INTERESTS IN BROADCAST LICENSES MAY BE UNWARRANTED. SEE IN RE CHESKEY. 918 19 (7TH CIR.1993) (RECOGNIZING THAT FCC POLICY MAY CHANGE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT "WHETHER TO PERMIT SUCH INTERESTS IS ... A MATTER FOR THE FCC RATHER THAN THE COURTS TO DECIDE").">
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OPINION/ORDER
HUD was assigned mortgage liens against the property. McNeill alleged the district court had
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97-1421 -- UNITED INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC. V. WHARF (HOLDINGS) LIMITED -- 04/28/2000
NYNEX devoted its resources to this early phase of the project with the tacit understanding that if Wharf received the award and both Wharf and NYNEX were comfortable with the relationship and the project. NYNEX would have an opportunity to invest in the communications company or possibly garner an operations and maintenance contract for its efforts. Mark Schneider. UIH is based in Denver. UIH representatives made it clear they were not interested in serving as a consultant on the project for a fee. Would commit their resources in exchange for a right to invest in CNCL if Wharf was awarded the license. In response to UIH overtures that it was interested in obtaining a greater ownership interest. A foreign company is not permitted to own more than 10% in the cable operator.
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DOYON, LIMITED V. U.S.
With him on the brief were Christopher M. With him on the brief were Loretta C. Limited (
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Happy contractual relationships are all alike. Every unhappy contractual relationship is unhappy in its own way.1 In this case. Gemplus and Humetrix were poised on the threshold of a promising business opportunity. Garnett trans. 1933). 2 A Smart Card is a credit card sized microprocessor that stores data files. Guistini was a 45% shareholder in Inovaction S.A.R.L. (
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OPINION/ORDER
This is a diversity contract case under Kentucky law. I. The Parkside companies are affiliated entities in the business of developing low income housing. Since the Project was for lowincome housing. Parkside was eligible to receive low income housing tax credits as a federal subsidy from the Kentucky Housing Corporation (
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ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE V. MILLS ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE V. WE REVERSE. FACTS BEACH TELEVISION PARTNERS (BTP) WAS A FLORIDA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP THAT OWNED AND OPERATED TWO INDEPENDENT TELEVISION STATIONS. RULING THAT ORIX DID NOT HAVE A VALID SECURITY INTEREST IN THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE FCC BROADCAST LICENSES. THE FCC MUST DETERMINE THAT THE TRANSFER WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST. COURTS HAVE TRADITIONALLY HELD THAT LICENSEES HAVE NO TRUE OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THEIR BROADCAST LICENSES. SEE FCC V. COURTS TYPICALLY HAVE HELD THAT SECURITY INTERESTS IN BROADCAST LICENSES ARE INVALID. RECENT FCC AND COURT DECISIONS HAVE INTIMATED THAT THE COURTS' PREVIOUS BLANKET INVALIDATION OF ALL SECURITY INTERESTS IN BROADCAST LICENSES MAY BE UNWARRANTED. SEE IN RE CHESKEY. 918 19 (7TH CIR.1993) (RECOGNIZING THAT FCC POLICY MAY CHANGE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT "WHETHER TO PERMIT SUCH INTERESTS IS ... A MATTER FOR THE FCC RATHER THAN THE COURTS TO DECIDE").">
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OPINION/ORDER
This statute provides that the Board shall authorize the construction and operation of a proposed new line
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OPINION/ORDER
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. Because we conclude that the district court should have granted ABC and Willson judgment as a matter of law. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute.
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: Happy contractual relationships are all alike. Every unhappy contractual relationship is unhappy in its own way.1 In this case. Gemplus and Humetrix were poised on the threshold of a promising business opportunity. Garnett trans. 1933). 2 A Smart Card is a credit card sized microprocessor that stores data files. Guistini was a 45% shareholder in Inovaction S.A.R.L. (
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OPINION/ORDER
We are presented with a case of first impression regarding the validity of the Treasury Department's so called
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OPINION/ORDER
Concluding that Castaways and Gonzalez were not
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OPINION/ORDER
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: This is the second round in a decade long struggle by Strotek Corporation. These allegations were first made in a federal action brought under the Sherman Act. At the time Strotek I was filed (December 1996). The district court lacked diversity jurisdiction: the defendant Airline Transport Association of America (ATA) was then an unincorporated trade association deemed a citizen of any state where it had members which included Nevada. Which was filed December 6. Service was effected January 28. Inc. is a citizen of the District of Columbia and is therefore diverse from Strotek. Assets and liabilities were transferred to ATA. Inc. was a citizen of Washington. D.C. when the complaint in Strotek II was filed and the action was removed. Because
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OPINION/ORDER
The primary questions before us are (1) whether the District Court erred in holding that a Michigan state court action. By the Williams group against Kid Rock is preempted by the Copyright Act under the developing doctrine of
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OPINION/ORDER
At issue is the district court's order forcing Napster to disable its file transferring service until certain conditions are met to achieve full compliance with the modified preliminary injunction. We 4801 have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The name(s) of one or more files that have been available on the Napster file index containing the protected copyrighted work. Both parties are required to adopt reasonable measures to identify variations of the file name. Napster was able to prevent sharing of much of plaintiffs' noticed copyrighted works. Plaintiffs nonetheless were able to present evidence that infringement of noticed works still occurred in violation of the modified preliminary injunction. The district court determined that Napster was not in satisfactory compliance with the modified preliminary injunction. The district court ordered Napster to disable its file transferring service until certain conditions were met and steps were taken to ensure maximum compliance. It will not be reversed simply because [we] would have arrived at a different result if [we] had applied the law to the facts of the case.
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OPINION/ORDER
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Pavilion Properties Limited Partnership was formed for the purpose of developing four. This total claim was comprised of various subclaims. The award was not itemized to indicate how much was attributable to each kind of damage claimed by Pavilion. The court reasoned that Pavilion's claim
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OPINION/ORDER
Walker were associated through four business entities that they primarily used to develop real estate in South Carolina. Williams are equal general partners in Columbia Hotel Associates. Carolina Development was formed to apply for and develop low income housing limited partnerships. They planned to use government financing to construct a mixed residential and commercial property in which 20% of the units were designated as low income housing. The parties do not dispute that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina at Sandman's instance in August. We may set aside findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Code § 36 3 601(3)(a) (1976) is the controlling statute because the parties undertook primary liability for the letter of credit through the agreement. That statute frees all parties from liability when one of the makers of an instrument pays the instrument and takes an assignment thereof. 1 Williams accord 1 The statute provides: (3) The liability of all parties is discharged when any party who has himself no right of action or recourse on the instrument 4 ingly argues that Sandman could not foreclose on his partnership interest because that collateral was freed of the letter of credit.
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OPINION/ORDER
P.C. and related entities1 neither were
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99-1465 -- ALLISON V. BANK ONE - DENVER -- 05/15/2002
The district court dismissed the RICO and COCCA claims prior to trial and they are not the subject of these appeals. Before us are the parties' appeals and cross appeals arising from the district court's rulings. Including its post judgment decisions regarding costs.
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OPINION/ORDER
The defendants were charged with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) conspiracy and a RICO substantive count. Thefts of goods in interstate commerce were among the thirty six racketeering acts and thirty six counts charged. All of the seven defendants were convicted of at least some of the charged offenses. Alleging anything to do with murder or violent crimes in aid of racketeering and many of the numerous extortion racketeering acts and counts were found by the jury to be wanting and resulted in findings of
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OPINION/ORDER
At issue here is whether an individual involved in a Massachusetts
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OPINION/ORDER
That ABC and Willson therefore were liable for injuries that appellees suffered as a result of the story. We conclude that ABC and Willson are entitled BFC's name has changed several times since its inception. Because we conclude that the district court should have granted ABC and Willson judgment as a matter of law. Was insufficient to establish one of the elements of appellees' claim: that ABC and Willson broadcast the story with actual malice. Were engaged in the business of organizing and managing commercial real estate limited partnerships. The idea behind these partnerships was that small investors. It was anticipated that the partnerships would hold onto the properties for a period of time ranging from between four to nine years and then sell the properties and distribute the proceeds among the investors. There was a severe nationwide decline in the value of real estate. The properties held by Levan's limited partnerships were no exception. Levan and BFC offered their limited partners the two exchanges that are at the center of this dispute.
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98-6273 -- U.S. V. GADDIS -- 10/15/1999
Circuit Judges.
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OPINION/ORDER
The issue in this appeal is the district court's denial of Z Mega's counterclaim for $212. There were two sham transactions in which Z Mega paid a total $212. The facts of this case are complex and we limit our description to those relevant to this appeal. The Coop was a rural farmers' cooperative association conducting business as a grain elevator. Who was not on the Z Mega asserts that the Coop is liable based on three legal theories: conversion. Pete Werner was the majority Under the financing arrangement. The Coop soon began to have difficulty getting its money back. than the purchase of PIK certificates. scheme. Werner also used Coop funds to finance the operations of other enterprises with which he was associated. Z Mega was a limited partnership formed for the Its general partner was Z & W Ag Enterprises (Z & W Through his ownership of Z & W Ag. There was a shortfall of approximately $327. The Coop was reimbursed for all of the funds it had advanced to the PMS PIK Certificate Trust Account.5 through PMS.
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OPINION/ORDER
LLP were on brief. LLP were on brief. Promised that Massmanian would have an ownership interest in such a venture. Massmanian testified that Badzin told him on numerous occasions that a partnership agreement would be forthcoming and that Massmanian would have a ten percent share. We will not disturb the jury verdict unless
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether the bankruptcy court was correct to give preclusive effect to an issue raised in a prior state court action. The state court entered judgment against Har 1 There is some dispute as to whether the agreement was for Lucas Ostrich to sell the Kimnod Ostriches' eggs and progeny or rather to sell interests in some of the birds themselves. The dispute is not relevant to our resolution of this case. 5968 mon. Seeking to have the state judgment debt adjudged nondischargeable under the fraud exception. Kobrin based his motion for summary judgment on the argument that the state court default judgment was preclusive of the issue of whether Harmon had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied the substantive law. No questions of fact are at issue in this appeal. Our review is entirely de novo. The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued.
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OPINION/ORDER
Because we conclude that Appellees have sufficient contacts with New Jersey. We will reverse. Miller Yacht was required to present a prima facie case that jurisdiction existed. Miller Yacht is a New Jersey corporation with its principal offices in South Toms River. Are not New Jersey residents or corporations. Miller Yacht and Appellees began negotiating a deal that was intended to allow the Appellees to become exclusive marketing representatives and dealers for some of Miller Yacht's boats. Appellees stress their argument that they were each acting in their individual corporate or personal capacities and that their contacts with New Jersey should be analyzed separately. While they are correct that. Miller Yacht alleges that Steven Smith and Ivan Bogachoff were acting as partners while they negotiated with Miller Yacht.
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OPINION/ORDER
United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 2 James and Shirley Kirwan and their son William were general partners of the Kirwan Ranch partnership.3 In 1991. Only David's name was to appear on the deed. The Vanderwerfs filed claims and amended The background facts related to the underlying transactions between the parties are taken from the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in the state fraud action. 586 N.W.2d 858 (S.D. 1998). 3 3 proofs of claim with the bankruptcy court in March and April which were based on their experiences with the Kirwan partnership. A hearing on their objections was scheduled for May 15. A hearing on these motions was set for June 26. The debtors argue on appeal that the bankruptcy court did not have discretion to lift the stay after having issued orders denying the Vanderwerfs' amended proofs of claim. The grant or denial of relief under Rule 60 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Whether claimants have a meritorious claim. The decision to lift the automatic stay was not inappropriate.
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OPINION/ORDER
Two issues are raised on appeal: first. Whether a general contractor may rely on the non occurrence of a valid
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OPINION/ORDER
Brown & Dugan were on brief for appellants. P.A. were on brief for appellees George E. P.A. were on brief for appellees Michael S. Nor is any one of them licensed to practice law there. Review by this Court is de novo (nondeferential). Was killed when the aircraft he was flying. Was struck over the New Hampshire Vermont border by an aircraft from Florida. Which is not a party to this litigation. The affidavit is identical to an unsigned and undated draft affidavit of Mr. Sawtelle except that the draft states that plaintiffs were referred to the California firm by the New Hampshire attorney. They submitted an affidavit of an advertising assistant at AOPA who confirms that there were no advertisements for the law firm in the AOPA magazine for the years 1988 through 1991. The case was assigned to defendant. Farrell is not licensed to practice law in New Hampshire. Among the topics addressed in those communications was Farrell's recommendation that Florida was the most advantageous forum for the wrongful death claim.
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OPINION/ORDER
Jr. were on brief for the appellant Ellen D. Were on brief for the appellees. FitzGerald was on brief. The section further provides that
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BACA V. KING
His ranch is made up of private fee land. The permit by its own terms was subject to
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OPINION/ORDER
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's 1 Mary B. Ballard is a participant in this dispute solely as a result of having filed joint tax returns with her spouse Claude M. All references will be to Claude M. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income. Both Ballard and Lisle worked in Prudential's real estate department which was divided into two divisions: equity operations and mortgage operations. Prudential was one of the largest owners of commercial real estate in the United States. Their offices were located next to one another. Arrangements were made to buy Ballard's and Lisle's influence.2 For 2 Referred to as
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OPINION/ORDER
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether the bankruptcy court was correct to give preclusive effect to an issue raised in a prior state court action. The state court entered judgment against Har 1 There is some dispute as to whether the agreement was for Lucas Ostrich to sell the Kimnod Ostriches' eggs and progeny or rather to sell interests in some of the birds themselves. The dispute is not relevant to our resolution of this case. 5968 mon. Seeking to have the state judgment debt adjudged nondischargeable under the fraud exception. Kobrin based his motion for summary judgment on the argument that the state court default judgment was preclusive of the issue of whether Harmon had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied the substantive law. No questions of fact are at issue in this appeal. Our review is entirely de novo. The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued.
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RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. UNITED TRUST FUND
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Resolution Trust Corp. v. The case presents the following questions: whether a conservator as well as a subsequently appointed receiver of a failed financial institution each have an independent right to repudiate a lease under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7190CBD2515404EF88256E91007C814A/$file/0210651.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: (1) On slip opinion page 4660. Lines 21 23 are amended to read:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1997/97a1714p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A defendant and a nonparty deponent were held in contempt of court. The issue we confront on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in holding the defendant and the nonparty deponent in contempt and in fashioning sanctions with respect to its contempt order. We will hold that the district court abused its discretion in holding the defendant in contempt for failure to appear because the plaintiff failed to set a time and place for his deposition. We will remand to the district court so it may reconsider appropriate sanctions consistent with this opinion. Was defendant Eastern Consolidated Utilities. Final judgment was entered on August 30. The case was dismissed as to them. Daddona was given notice of the deposition. He also testified that Five Star was owned in three equal shares by Gubitosi. The Dadd Partnership was owned in equal parts by Daddona and his two brothers. Hair's testimony was limited to the events surrounding the incorporation of these entities. Was not a defendant in the underlying action and 4 became involved only after judgment was entered.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-5039.html">WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Bernard Nash</u>. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Thomas L. Specifically
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/12/976041P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Forbes (
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Shipsey was originally indicted on December 31. Counts 21 and 22 were dismissed by the district court at the end of the government's case inchief. The district court declared a mistrial on the deadlocked counts and Shipsey was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment. For failure to state an offense.1 It denied the motion as to the remain1 Counts 17 19 were dismissed because. Rejecting Shipsey's argument that the superseding counts were barred by the statute of limitations. He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment on each count. Shipsey is a land developer and building contractor. He was one of three general partners in Michael Shipsey and Associates (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1043.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Barlow</SPAN> were on brief for appellees.</SPAN></P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1340.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. Invest Almaz also contends that the jury was not properly instructed on a claim that. Was formed for the purpose of investing the pensions and savings of the parent company's employees. Invest Almaz's intent was to build housing for the parent company's retired employees and also to sell OSB for needed hard currency in the export market. Invest Almaz came to the conclusion that it would be more cost effective to purchase the equipment from an existing plant in North America and have it transported back to Russia. </FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1393.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jos Luis Gonz lez Casta er was on brief for appellant. Bobonis & Rodr guez Poventud was on brief for appellee. Six of the seven causes of action were brought on behalf of Rodr guez and the conjugal partnership. Since her claims were based on his wrongful termination. The only issue remaining was the extent of damages and the corresponding compensation.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992443.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 31 the spelling of Justice Frankfurter's name is corrected. Line 3 the citation to Coeur d'Alene Tribe is corrected to read
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200214131.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue is whether Siemens's refusal to sell or license patented or copyrighted goods to the appellants is an illegal use of monopoly power in a secondary market.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/2645ac671d1020e088256a47005a6f8c/$FILE/0015130.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether the bankruptcy court was correct to give preclusive effect to an issue raised in a prior state court action. The state court entered judgment against Har 1 There is some dispute as to whether the agreement was for Lucas Ostrich to sell the Kimnod Ostriches' eggs and progeny or rather to sell interests in some of the birds themselves. The dispute is not relevant to our resolution of this case. 5968 mon. Seeking to have the state judgment debt adjudged nondischargeable under the fraud exception. Kobrin based his motion for summary judgment on the argument that the state court default judgment was preclusive of the issue of whether Harmon had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied the substantive law. No questions of fact are at issue in this appeal. Our review is entirely de novo. The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1218.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: On page 8. Wheatley and Gordon & Wise were on briefs for defendants. Hall & Stewart were on briefs for appellees. At issue in this case are two different appeals. Which we have consolidated. Whose source is a lawsuit over unpaid bank loans. The background facts are largely undisputed. The borrowers were licensees or had other ownership interests in radio stations in various cities. Fleet concluded that the borrowers were in default and brought suit in two different federal district courts to collect upon different notes made or guaranteed by the borrowers. The borrowers were required by that date either to have made a down payment of $6.4 million or to have in force purchase agreements with third parties obligating the latter to buy stations from the borrowers for that amount or more. The precise terms of the settlement agreement and other pertinent facts are set forth below. Giddens had an extensive background in appraising and selling radio stations and was a partner in a brokerage firm.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/00-3135.htm">00-3135 -- ORR V. BHR INC. -- 02/16/2001<BR></A><BR>
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Plaintiff appellant Steven M. We affirm. <p> <em><center></em>I<em>.</em></center> <p> Plaintiff was employed by St. Was a minority shareholder in SJEP. He complained that the rates charged to SJEP for billing services provided by defendant BHR were higher than competitive prices. Who were the controlling shareholders in both SJEP and BHR. Plaintiff further claimed that his at will employment with SJEP was terminated because he opposed the billing situation between SJEP and BHR. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. <u>See</u> <u>Celotex Corp. v. Plaintiff asserts that the district court committed reversible error on the following grounds: (1) summary judgment on the antitrust claims was error because plaintiff was a target of defendants' anti competitive scheme and his cooperation was integral to the success of the illegal scheme. (2) the claim of tortious interference with a contract or business relationship was not subject to summary judgment because defendants had an improper purpose and their conduct in discharging plaintiff violated state and federal law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199801/91-1248a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Smith were on the briefs. Carroll was on the briefs. Were on the brief. Were on the brief. Nemeroff were on the brief for intervenor Northeast Cellular Telephone Company. Carroll were on the brief for intervenor Saco River Cellular. L. Andrew Tollin and Michael Duele Sullivan were on the brief for intervenor Portland Cellular Partnership. A general partnership the original partners of which were Seacoast. (The current partners are Seacoast. Objected that PortCell was ineligible for a license because it had failed to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1854.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Dana & Gould were on brief for appellees Biopure Corporation. Allen & Snyder were on brief for appellants. Jr. and Ropes & Gray were on brief for appellee. The district court entered two separate summary judgment orders for intervenor CFI.1 The first judgment was against Trainor and awarded CFI a constructive trust over Trai nor's
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-2210.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Chief Judge. and four partnerships of which he is the general partner. Four limited liability companies of which he is the managing member. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the Brademas entities' suit was barred by the statute of limitations. I. Background Thomas Brademas is the general partner of the Madison Partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2645AC671D1020E088256A47005A6F8C/$file/0015130.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether the bankruptcy court was correct to give preclusive effect to an issue raised in a prior state court action. The state court entered judgment against Har 1 There is some dispute as to whether the agreement was for Lucas Ostrich to sell the Kimnod Ostriches' eggs and progeny or rather to sell interests in some of the birds themselves. The dispute is not relevant to our resolution of this case. 5968 mon. Seeking to have the state judgment debt adjudged nondischargeable under the fraud exception. Kobrin based his motion for summary judgment on the argument that the state court default judgment was preclusive of the issue of whether Harmon had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d). Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the bankruptcy court correctly applied the substantive law. No questions of fact are at issue in this appeal. Our review is entirely de novo. The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul09/03-20577-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Bryan failed to present evidence either establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or establishing that McKinsey's legitimate explanation for terminating Bryan's employment was a pretext for racial discrimination. I Bryan is a black male. Bryan was promoted multiple times by McKinsey to positions involving higher levels of responsibility and pay. Bryan was promoted to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971833.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. Which apparently were to be attached to the three documents under negotiation in the event of an agreement between the parties. Chesapeake's three general partners each signed an affidavit (Partnership Affidavit) stating that the Purchase and Sale Agreement had been
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july95/91-5898.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. UNITED TRUST FUND<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Resolution Trust Corp. v. The case presents the following questions: whether a conservator as well as a subsequently appointed receiver of a failed financial institution each have an independent right to repudiate a lease under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/03/976066P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. BACKGROUND The Hatchers are Iowa farmers. They owned farmland which was partly encumbered by a mortgage on which they fell delinquent. A sheriff's sale was set for January 6. Which consisted of 46 acres of land on which their residence and another building were situated. The Hatchers were able to locate yet another buyer.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/September2004/023304p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because we conclude that Appellees have sufficient contacts with New Jersey. We will reverse. Miller Yacht was required to present a prima facie case that jurisdiction existed. Miller Yacht is a New Jersey corporation with its principal offices in South Toms River. Are not New Jersey residents or corporations. Miller Yacht and Appellees began negotiating a deal that was intended to allow the Appellees to become exclusive marketing representatives and dealers for some of Miller Yacht's boats. Appellees stress their argument that they were each acting in their individual corporate or personal capacities and that their contacts with New Jersey should be analyzed separately. While they are correct that. Miller Yacht alleges that Steven Smith and Ivan Bogachoff were acting as partners while they negotiated with Miller Yacht.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972118.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Although the case was brought mainly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City was required to reimburse Pulaski for certain expenses in operating the incinerator. The WDSA's original term was fifteen years. For the first eleven years the WDSA was in effect. Community opposition was mounting against the operation of any incinerator whether retrofitted or new at the 3 Pulaski site. If it was certified by the Director of Public Works. Replacement or expansion is necessary to serve the public interest in the efficient. Seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Moratorium was preempted by state law and (2) damages for the City's alleged breach of the WDSA. The Director certified to the City Council that a replacement incinerator at the Pulaski site was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/961355U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because the agreement was relevant and its probative value was not outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the jury. Was to buy and sell cattle. To ensure that the cattle were purchased in the name of the Partnership. No paperwork was ever produced. reimbursed First National Bank for the $59. Roller was charged in a six count indictment. Roller was also charged with two counts of bankruptcy fraud and three counts of money laundering. never received any money from the sale of the cattle. Contending both that the Agreement was not relevant and that it would confuse the jury as to issues of civil liability versus criminal liability. He was sentenced to twenty one months in prison and three years of supervised release. He was ordered to pay restitution of $37. The only argument raised on appeal is that the district court erred in admitting the Agreement because admission of the Agreement confused the jury concerning civil versus criminal liability. of evidence under a deferential standard. The district court's ruling will be affirmed.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BE4F0A06563FEDED882572F2007B0C02/$file/0475716.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The sentencing court's finding should have precluded relitigation of the fraud issue before the tax court. Even if relitigation is not precluded. We hold that he is entitled to deduct certain bona fide business expenses. The first provided for a base offense level of ten
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2003/01-17249.opn.html">BALLARD V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 01-17249<BR></A><BR>
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's findings. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/june97/96-1300.wpd.html">HILLMAN V. WEBLEY<BR></A><BR>
Because it is necessary for an understanding of the instant appeal. (AHI) is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in Colorado. AHI was engaged in the business of providing remote electronic monitoring of business and residential security systems throughout the United States. Barnard is a former director and president of AHI. One proposed opportunity was for investors to purchase interests in various limited partnerships which were established to purchase alarm monitoring accounts from small. Among the many investors who took part in the offerings were a group of entities. Was appointed as a member of AHI's board. Was appointed as Senior Vice President of AHI. B. The securities lawsuits A series of lawsuits were subsequently filed in California. Who were involved in the management of AHI and/or AHI related entities. Also named in several of the suits were Coopers & Lybrand. AHI's statements and promises to investors were simply a cover up for an
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-2322.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Lopez Adames</span> was on brief. This is an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment brought by two defendants to a political discrimination lawsuit. One of the appellants is Aní. Is a substitute defendant to an official capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief initially lodged against his predecessor. The other appellant is Milton Segarra. </span>The motion for summary judgment was based. Holding that the claims against the Governor were permissible under <span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200514255.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Holding that there was a lack of complete diversity between Ambrosia (and its subsidiaries) and Appellees. There were no viable federal claims that would allow the court to exercise federal question jurisdiction over the matter. There are two main issues before this Court. The aforementioned Green Isle entities are collectively referred to as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-2153.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was on brief for co appellees Wackenhut Corrections Corporation and Gerardo Acevedo.</SPAN></P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2003/01-17249.opn.html">BALLARD V. COMMISSIONER (2/13/2003, NO. 01-17249<BR></A><BR>
Petitioners Appellants have been assessed tax deficiencies (including penalties against Ballard) totaling $1. (2) that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support the Tax Court's findings. We find that the application of Rule 183 did not violate Petitioners Appellants' due process rights and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding that Ballard received and fraudulently failed to report income.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0143n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was not directly liable for its debts. Is personally liable under the relevant agreements for signing them as the president of a dissolved corporation. Among their corporations and their assumed business names are T & P Enterprises. See JA 77 (admitting that Delstar Resources (Kentucky) was administratively dissolved on November 3. That Bluegrass Drilling Corporation was dissolved on November 1. Others have never existed at all as independent entities. See JA 78 (admitting that The Viking Group
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1356.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This matter is before the court on defendants appellees' petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. The panel will clarify the rationale in its opinion by issuing an amended opinion. A copy of the amended opinion is attached to this order. The suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all the judges of the court in regular active service in accordance with Rule 35 (b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The suggestion for rehearing en banc is DENIED. It should have vacated its previous substantive rulings and remanded the case to state court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1447(c).(1) The State Court Complaint In June 1999. Whose successor in interest was BHP. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> of their employment with HIOC. The assignments provided that plaintiffs would share in the NPIs once payout was reached. Although the plan was adopted in 1981. Cunningham and Mantor alleged that the payments they received were not calculated properly.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july98/95-9448.man.html">PRODIGY CENTERS/ATLANTA NO. 1 V. T-C ASSOCIATES, LTD. (7/29/1998, NO. 95-9448)<BR></A><BR>
Because PCDC's partnership interest was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/06-1218.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Stephen P. With her on the brief were Gerald F. Of counsel on the brief were Stuart L. With him on the brief were Michael Eisenberg. Of counsel was John D. Ltd.'s (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1601ERR.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2000 is amended as follows:</FONT></P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031860.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Both originated in state court and were removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. They were later consolidated. The basic claim was that GTA and the individuals violated Exro's right to litigation proceeds that GTA recovered in a patent infringement suit. I GTA is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia.1 Exro is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Columbia. The DRA is a product GTA developed that. Two of these managers were Exro directors. The other two were GTA directors. The Operating Agreement says that these initial capital contributions were to be contributed as of the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1662.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Guez Mateo was among some fifteen to eighteen Puerto Rico corrections department employees investigated for alleged involvement in the misappropriation of automobile parts from the repair shop at Rio Piedras State Penitentiary. Thirteen criminal cases eventually were prosecuted. Leading to nine convictions based on guilty pleas.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/04/01-5119.htm">01-5119 -- OLCOTT V. DEAWARE FLOOD CO. -- 04/24/2003<BR></A><BR>
Defendants assert the district court was without jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19959448.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because PCDC's partnership interest was a
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Because PCDC's partnership interest was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july95/93-9263.opa.html">LOYOLA FED. SAVINGS BANK V. FICKLING<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Loyola Fed. Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes.<p> The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims.<p> <i>Jurisdiction</i><p> <p> In our <i>de novo</i> review of the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Loyola's argument that as a federally chartered corporation it is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec99/92-2929.ma2.html">UNITED STATES V. NEDER (12/10/1999, NO. 92-2929)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P><CENTER>ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES</CENTER> </P> <P> This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. Was harmless error.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july98/95-9448.man.html">PRODIGY CENTERS/ATLANTA NO. 1 V. T-C ASSOCIATES, LTD. (7/29/1998, NO. 95-9448)<BR></A><BR>
Because PCDC's partnership interest was a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/EA6E4091B444CE1088257111004FAB92/$file/0435592.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That it correctly held that Johnson's claim for payment for the crane services is time barred. I. Background Johnson is a citizen of Alaska. Columbia is a limited partnership organized in Ohio. Are limited liability companies (LLCs). The two LLCs are owned by a Kentucky corporation. By a trust whose sole trustee is a bank incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Minnesota.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-5126.html">CIENEGA GARDENS V. US<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981199.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. The Woodlands Skilled Nursing Center is located in Rutherfordton. Was built by RNH in the late 1970s. The original operator of the facility was a company named ISO. Which later were acquired by Rutherford. Are scheduled to expire in April 2000 and cover the facility's real and personal property. A copy of the bankruptcy court's order and Notice to Interested Parties was mailed to Rutherford along with forty other potential buyers. The Rutherford Nursing Center was identified as a 150 bed facility
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/03-20076-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982548.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
First full paragraph the paragraph is rewritten to read as follows: Section 523(a)(2)(A) covers debts incurred through the direct provision of
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982566.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The following facts are relevant in this adversary proceeding. 1996.2 1 The argument that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction is without merit. 2 This inquiry occurred after the Trustee had hand delivered to Shearin's attorney a request for
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991554.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which allegedly was committed when the landlord introduced a competing grocery store into the shopping center. Was constructed in 1987. The
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/09/97-2001.htm">97-2001 -- RATNER V. PARK & SHUTTLE INC. -- 09/03/1998<BR></A><BR>
The document was lost or destroyed through no fault of plaintiffs. Located near the Albuquerque Airport (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/09/97-8055.htm">97-8055 -- FRU-CON CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. KFX INC. -- 09/01/1998<BR></A><BR>
EA K was created to develop coal processing facilities in North America. Which were to transform low grade coal into a better fuel called K Fuel. Fru Con shall not be required to perform any further services and B+B shall have no further obligation to make a capital contribution to [EA K] Energy. Paragraph (f) stated
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2363.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Israel Santiago Lugo (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2254.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom Nora Vargas Acosta and Vargas & Ram rez Law Office were on brief for appellant. Durand were on brief for appellees. No resolution of the motion for reconsideration was issued. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Was a practicing licensed securities broker and licensed supervisor of other securities brokers. OCFI's investigation eventually included the plaintiff himself. 1 The facts recited herein are either not in dispute or are alleged by the plaintiff. 2 On January 27. That the plaintiff was to cease all supervisory and administrative functions at FCC for one year. The plaintiff was afforded an administrative hearing on the issue of the revocation of his license. There is no evidence that the plaintiff raised any search and seizure claims. This step was a procedural prerequisite to seeking judicial review. This is so because all or some of the charges made to the Defendant are of a penal character that entail fines.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/01-21114-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/02-20312-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDA0LTU2ODctY3Zfc28ucGRm/04-5687-cv_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/02-21002-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/11/98-5181.htm">98-5181 -- EAST TEXAS SEISMIC DATA V. SEITAL DATA INC. -- 11/26/1999<BR></A><BR>
Because the contract is unambiguous and explicitly grants each venturer the right to sell its interest in seismic data after two years. We affirm. <p> Capmac is the successor to McKenzie Management. Santa Fe is the successor to Adobe Resources. IMC is the successor to FMP Operating Company (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2611.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Ndez</SPAN> with whom <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FF43FB23AFC4323A88256E3E0061BBB6/$file/0016922.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. BACKGROUND This is another in a long line of cases involving the Central Valley Project (the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1110p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Finding that CalFed's interest in the property was not being adequately protected during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. Was less than the bankruptcy court had determined and was adequately protected. The district court also found that the debtor retained equity in the property and that relief from the automatic stay would therefore be unavailable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as well.[fn2] We will reverse the order of the district court and remand with instructions to return this matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Was formed to acquire a 176 unit garden apartment complex located in Florida. It is the debtor's primary asset. A third mortgage was held by FEC Mortgage Company (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july95/93-9263.opa.html">LOYOLA FED. SAVINGS BANK V. FICKLING<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Loyola Fed. Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes.<p> The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims.<p> <i>Jurisdiction</i><p> <p> In our <i>de novo</i> review of the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Loyola's argument that as a federally chartered corporation it is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jun2001/995551.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
He argues that the court should have granted the writ because trial counsel had a conflict of inter est and was otherwise ineffective. Clarence Moody (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/03-20092-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/06/032443P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
MJK was required to identify the collateral on its books. MJK's DTC account balance was negative. Which was a default under the MSL. Trading of GENI stock was halted. Appointing the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2002/011755.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Shareholders contend that they were deceived into relinquishing their ownership rights and that they could 1. The consortium of investors is referred to as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2003/021339u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is the owner of 7.5 acres of land. Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court's Memorandum Opinion.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/07/053622P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was added as a plaintiff three weeks after the suit was filed.1 After the insurers learned that O'Quinn and Couch had worked at the time in question for Dover & Dixon. Was sued in Arkansas state court by the estate of Margaretha Sauer which claimed that Advocat's negligent and reckless care had caused her death. Caronia notified the defendants that Ohio Casualty was one of Advocat's excess insurance carriers and requested that O'Quinn contact Ohio Casualty's Vice President & Counsel. Which was marked
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/088ADB1589395F3F8825716500567FE7/$file/0556040.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appeal the district court's orders1 which (a) abstained as to their claim that three sections of the California law relating to marriage are unconstitutional. 2 and (b) ruled adversely to them on their claims that two sections of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)3 are likewise unconstitutional. BACKGROUND It is agreed: Smelt and Hammer are both males who wish to obtain a California marriage license and to marry each other in that state. They were denied a license both times
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/981677P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Of which Kerr is the president and sole shareholder. Worked on Vatterott & Co. projects as well as Legacy Homes projects and thus were eligible to participate in Vatterott & Co.'s 401(k) pension plan. Vatterott & Co. is the plan administrator and Commerce Bank is the trustee of the Vatterott & Co. 401(k) plan. The plan entitles a plan participant who is terminated prior to retirement to receive the net credit balance in his individual plan account. Kerr was fully vested in the 401(k) plan at the time of his termination from Legacy Homes. 1991 (the valuation date based on Kerr's October request) was $16. The 4 district court also declined Kerr's request for attorney's fees and costs because Kerr was unsuccessful on his ERISA claims. Arguing that lost interest is an appropriate equitable remedy under section 1132(a)(3) and proof of receipt is not an element of his claim under section 1132(c). Kerr does not dispute that he has received the funds in his account to which he is entitled under the plan. Argues instead that his recovery was inadequate because he had to wait three and a half years for his money and had to file suit before Vatterott & Co. finally paid the account over.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jul2004/Jul20/02-21311-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For the reasons we will explain. I 4 The facts and procedural history of this nine year old dispute are long and. The underlying claims were each dismissed on summary judgment. The non movant.1 GUS's contract claim comes to us in a slightly different posture HAL was awarded judgment as a matter of law after GUS prevailed in a jury trial and we present the facts related to the contract issue in the light most favorable to GUS.2 A In 1979. The CHAMPION PACKER program was a tracking system designed GUS any for use in the freight forwarding and shipping industry. licensed the software to Lopez. Lopez was to contribute LOPEZ COBOL for use in developing the new system. Parkin was to provide the system design and programming expertise. Herrin was to supply industry expertise. Was detained in a Mexican jail for seven months during the initial stages of the software development project. He was ousted from the company without recompense in March 1993. Lopez claimed that MEPAW was an unauthorized copy of LOPEZ COBOL and that Parkin and Herrin had breached their obligation to compensate him for providing the LOPEZ COBOL system.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/10/03-2068.htm">03-2068 -- SCHWARTZ AND HAYS V. HAFEN -- 10/05/2004<BR></A><BR>
The Park consists of 205 acres of land and is located on the northside of Las Cruces at the southeast corner of I 25 and U.S. 70. Which were approved by the Las Cruces City Council. <p> At issue in this case are Parcels 11 through 14 of the Park. An ordinance was passed by the City changing the zoning of these parcels from R 3 to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-5013.html">TOTAL MANAGEMENT V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1377.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Named as defendants in the second and third amended complaints are (1) Continental Supplies Corp. Appellees are mistaken. The general rule is that interlocutory orders. Are subject to appeal once the district court enters a final judgment. At 47 54 (2d ed. 1994) (interlocutory orders that leave the cause of action pending are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19939263.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Its theory was that Loyola was a federally chartered corporation and not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. The district court accepted the argument that it did not have diversity jurisdiction. Fickling's state law counterclaims were submitted to a jury. Since he recovered all that he was entitled to under the affirmed claims. Contrary to Loyola's it is not argument a that of as a federally state for chartered diversity corporation citizen any purposes. The facts here make applicable the rule's exception allowing a corporation to be considered a citizen of one state for diversity purposes if the corporation's activities are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001134.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Our review of the record and the district court's opinions discloses that this appeal is without merit. Because leakage from underground storage is explicitly exempt from the Act. Because Teck's theory in opposition is not based on any record evidence. Its sole act was to lease the land to a third party. Given our finding that summary judgment was properly granted to Crown Stations. Is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Teck's claims in opposition are without merit. Fees and costs therefore are appropriate under the Act. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec99/92-2929.ma2.html">UNITED STATES V. NEDER (12/10/1999, NO. 92-2929)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P><CENTER>ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES</CENTER> </P> <P> This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. Was harmless error.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Oct2003/001969u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We addressed some of the bitter fruits of a legal partnership gone awry. 1 Before us are the remains of the day: a challenge by Marvin Lundy contesting the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss his RICO 2 claims and his state law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Haymond and Hochberg asserted that Lundy's appeal was from an unappealable order because of the pendency of two remaining causes of action. Although Lundy's appeal from the District Court's order was premature. That appeal ripened with the District Court's final entry of judgment and Haymond and Hochberg have not suffered any prejudice. RICO is an acronym for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 1964. 3 2 1 FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Because a final order was entered. Are intimately familiar with every twist and turn in this litigation. Our review of a grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary. Our review is for an abuse of discretion because it concerns the relief obtainable in a receivership proceeding.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/07/973581P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jepson was traveling in a 1985 Plymouth when the car collided with a 1976 International truck driven by Curtis Wendel. Wendel was employed by Triple F Ranch. South Dakota Lessees: It is mutually agreed that Lessees shall maintain and repair equipment and keep it in good running condition. It is also mutually agreed to pay the payments as in the following schedule May 1. Although the name on a vehicle's title is not dispositive on the issue of ownership under South Dakota law. Fox testified to his belief that he was the owner of the truck until the partnership made its final payment under their agreement. John Fox was originally listed as a defendant. The claim against him was dismissed on summary judgment. 4 3 the truck for four years prior to the accident. Fox also stated that having his name on the truck's title was an error. Were precisely the same as if the payments were made on the purchase price of the equipment amortized at 8% for the term of the lease. The lease was actually an installment sale contract.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/95-6369.op.html">MCMILLIAN V. JOHNSON<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>McMillian v. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND</b><a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/11/98-9016.htm">98-9016 -- TUCEK V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 11/02/1999<BR></A><BR>
Depending on whether the mixed question is primarily factual or legal. <u>See</u> <u>Anderson v. All partners have a right for a limited period of time to participate in settlements offered to other partners. <u>See</u> 26 U.S.C. <p>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/01/964018P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The notes were secured by a deed of trust on property known as the Tech Buildings owned by Executive Hills. The SLAC loan extension was provided. The appellants were required to assume notes. Which were modified versions of the two promissory notes executed in 1986 by Executive Hills and which had by then become financially insecure. The A&M Agreement provided that interest was to accrue until December 31. As such terms are hereinafter defined) shall be fully liable (1) for the payment. The A&M Agreement acknowledges the possibility that tenant improvement loans might be made when it defines that term to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/12/043893P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court1 ruled that Kroeplin Farms General Partnership is entitled to the proceeds of a Multi Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) policy. The policy is a standard form. Including MPCI policies
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1308.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
An Order and Judgment was filed in this matter. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Heizer was to walk through the residence in the presence of counsel
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0052p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Because the exercise of personal jurisdiction was integral to the order on appeal. This case is remanded to the district court for entry of an order to dismiss. Facts The facts underlying this controversy are complex. The properties involved in this case are three industrial facilities located in Bowling Green. Balkhouse Properties became the fee simple owner of the properties and Kroger was the lessee. The three lease agreements were essentially identical. Each lease was for a twenty year term. Malease and Balkhouse Associates then entered into three separate
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-1275.html">BAUERHIN TECHNOLOGIES V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-50549.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Two paragraphs of these agreements are at the center of the parties' dispute: IX. Other documents prepared by the Architect for this project are the instruments of the Architect's service for use solely with respect to this project and the Architect shall be deemed the author of these documents and shall retain all common law. Copy or cause to have copied. Except that the stated base architectural fee for one of the projects was $250. After all five projects were completed. In WHA sued several related Trammell Crow entities. refer to all the entities collectively as TCR. 3 1 We will designing The North Bend. Construction Documents for Trammell Crow Residential utilizing plans which are copyrighted property of Womack+Hampton Architects. An agreement was reached between Womack+Hampton Architects. Trammell Crow Residential and Chiles Architects allowing him to utilize our designs on that development for a Use Fee which is common in this industry.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2CCD0B28E4AFFCA988256E8C005A9113/$file/0156007.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
ROLLER DERBY SKATES were secured by D Beam. A California limited partnership of which Evans is the general partner and majority owner. Roller Derby twice loaned Evans money pursuant to promissory notes that were repayable out of his share of DBeam's royalty payments. The motion to remand was denied. While DBeam was represented by counsel. All the claims relating to Roller Derby's conduct under the licensing agreement were disposed of on summary judgment. We have jurisdiction over Evans's usury claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A limited liability partnership of which he is the majority shareholder. We lack jurisdiction over D Beam's claims and they are dismissed. [1] It is a longstanding rule that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/May2003/022096u.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Zoning Board's decision was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas on December 1. Is the appointed receiver for the Hankin Family Partnership. 1 Hankin then petitioned for the appointment of a Board of View with the Court of Common Pleas. While these state actions were pending. Appellants allege that the District Court erred in determining that the federal and state court actions are parallel proceedings warranting abstention and that the court abused its discretion in abstaining from judicial On June 4. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's March 22. As the order is final and appealable. Abstention based stay orders of this [Colorado River] ilk are `conclusive' because they are the practical equivalent of an order dismissing the case.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr98/95-8960.ma2.html">CAMP CREEK HOSPITALITY INNS, INC. V. SHERATON FRANCHISE CORP. (4/30/1998, NO. 95-8960)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P> Defendant appellee's petition for rehearing is denied. Plaintiff Appellant's petition for rehearing is granted. 1997 and published at 130 F.3d 1009 is vacated. The following opinion is entered in lieu thereof:<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/98-5265a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief were Wilma A. Horan were on the briefs for appellee/cross appellant. Was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Held that the SBA's actions were arbi trary and capricious. Who had intervened in the litigation and was deemed the party at fault. Were left in place. Was arbitrary and capricious. We agree with the district court that the SBA's action was not arbitrary and capricious and that dissolution of the preliminary injunction properly followed. Decline to opine as to the effect this finding may have in some speculative action on the contract brought in the Court of Federal Claims. 1997 self certification as small was erroneous. A determination that AMTEC was a large business entity. DSE maintained that the SBA's First Size Determination was arbitrary and capricious for failing to count the personnel of various alleged affiliates in assessing the total number of AMTEC employees. When the Area Office became apprised that AMTEC may have had additional and undisclosed affiliates.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/54B7C2420215507A8825734F0059BA58/$file/0555739.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The parties were left with an arbitration award and two district court orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I Improv West is the founder of the Improv Comedy Club and the creator and owner of the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-1327.html">STATE STREET BANK V. SIGNATURE<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1328.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellants.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1682.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. The common drive for financial returns now brings us a dispute over rights to the income stream of the fastest growing ophthalmic drug in history. <P> The entire range of claims articulated by plaintiff appellant was dismissed by the district court on summary judgment. We will begin our analysis.</P> <P><CENTER><STRONG>I. <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/044721p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We agree with the Commissioner of the IRS that the lump sum consideration paid for the right to lottery payments is ordinary income. They did not then have the option to take the prize in a single lump sum payment. So they were entitled to 26 annual installments of $369. The Commissioner determined that this sale price was ordinary income. In December 2002 the Latteras were sent a notice of deficiency of $660. Because its decision was final. We have appellate jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). So venue is proper under I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A). We do not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Discussion The lottery payments the Latteras had a right to receive were gambling winnings. The parties agree that the annual payments were ordinary income. Whether the sale of a right to lottery payments by a lottery winner can be treated as a capital gain under the Internal Revenue Code is one of first impression in our Circuit. It is not a new question. Both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that such sales deserve ordinaryincome treatment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/06/03-4086.htm">03-4086 -- LIFEWISE MASTER FUNDING V. TELEBANK -- 06/29/2004<BR></A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/93opinions/93-5067.html">PRESEAULT V. U.S.<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar98/96-6333.ma2.html">TURQUITT V. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA (3/25/1998, NO. 96-6333)<BR></A><BR>
While he was a pre trial detainee in the county jail of Jefferson County. Philip Turquitt (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1306.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hacking & Neumeier was on brief for appellant Stephen A. Michel & McInnes were on brief for appellant Jonah Jacob. Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellee Mt. Senior Circuit Judge. sought a declaratory judgment that it does not have a duty to defend the named defendants in an underlying malpractice action against them. Hamelburg (the Law Firm).2 The factual allegations of Jacob's complaint as summarized by the district court are as follows. South Copley was created to acquire. Jacob was a passive investor who entrusted Greenbaum. That we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court made no findings justifying its exercise of its discretionary declaratory judgment authority. An insurance company's claim that it has no duty to defend in another action is the archetypal case for which a declaratory judgment is appropriate. 2 Other defendants are named in the malpractice action. Are not parties to this appeal. 3 Trust. Northeast Realty Investment Group was incorporated to manage the partnership's real estate holdings.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar98/96-6333.ma2.html">TURQUITT V. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA (3/25/1998, NO. 96-6333)<BR></A><BR>
While he was a pre trial detainee in the county jail of Jefferson County. Philip Turquitt (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1131.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Barlow</U> were on brief for appellee. </FONT></P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961981.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For Appellees. 3 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Keith's claims were dismissed or decided favorably to the appellees on summary judgment. Keith was permitted to proceed to trial on his claim that the appellees retaliated against him for conduct protected by the First Amendment. The principal issue raised in the instant appeal is whether the district court erroneously determined. That the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that the appellees' adverse actions were caused by Keith's first amendment activities. The appellees have cross appealed. His constitutional claims are barred by the statute of limitations. A claimant must demonstrate that conduct protected by the First Amendment
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/09/02-4037.htm">02-4037 -- SHELTER MORTGAGE CORP. V. CASTLE MORTGAGE CO. -- 09/15/2004<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judges. <p> <strong><hr align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july97/96-3075.opa.html">AGUILAR V. SOUTHEAST BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Aguilar v. The specific issue is whether the compulsory counterclaim rule applies when the putative counter claimant in an <i>in rem</i> foreclosure action is not a party to the mortgage agreement which is the subject of the foreclosure. Because the ramifications of the decision in this case could have far reaching effects on property law in Florida. Who are all doctors (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1293.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. LLP</U> were on brief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § . Anthony Aldrich (against whom the Commission did not file a complaint) were the sole shareholders of a consulting firm incorporated in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Aldrich was also a member of the board of directors for Purolator Products Co.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-31134.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge:1 In this appeal we are asked to review a district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Quantum Varde Asset Fund. The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. The loans were. The Louisiana bank failed and was placed into receivership. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992432.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 2 counsel's name is corrected to read
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr98/95-8960.ma2.html">CAMP CREEK HOSPITALITY INNS, INC. V. SHERATON FRANCHISE CORP. (4/30/1998, NO. 95-8960)<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge:</P> <P> Defendant appellee's petition for rehearing is denied. Plaintiff Appellant's petition for rehearing is granted. 1997 and published at 130 F.3d 1009 is vacated. The following opinion is entered in lieu thereof:<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2312.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Rodriguez Suris & Godreau were on consolidated briefs. Lance Belsome was on brief. With whom Will Kemp and Monita F. Were on brief. Should expenses indigenous to a court's handling of mass disaster litigation be reallocated once the winners and losers have been judicially determined? Finding that the court's abrupt slamming of these doors was improvident. Among the many 2 successful innovations that brought the litigation to a celeritous conclusion were (1) the creation of a Joint Document Depository (JDD). Each of whom was responsible for dispersing filings among his or her constituents. The court periodically requisitioned fresh monies as funds on hand were depleted. The orders were silent as to (i) whether or not the court planned to readjust defendants' contributions in light of future developments. 1Because the mechanics of the allocation process are not critical for present purposes. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) and the defendant San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Corporation were assessed a total of $100.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-5103.html">BROWN PARK V. US<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992380.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Appellant Brunswick County was the beneficiary of a letter of credit issued by appellee The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi. BCH was obligated to reimburse the County for part of the costs associated with the construction of a solid waste collection facility. BCH defaulted on this obligation and was later forced into bankruptcy. The County was required to produce either BCH's co signature or a written arbitration award. See also id. at 115 (stating that under New York law
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/93opinions/93-5268a.html">MURPHY BRUCE G. V. FDIC<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcU1VNXDAzLTc1MThfc28ucGRm/03-7518_so.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981967.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: The question before this Court is whether a claimant who never received written notice of his right of conversion as guaranteed by an insurance policy governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Is entitled to benefits. Canada Life first filed this action in district court seeking a declaration that at the time of his death Lebowitz was not covered by the Policy. Although Canada Life may not have been required by ERISA to provide Lebowitz with written notice of his right of conversion. The life insurance policy was a Policyholder Administered Group Life Benefit policy. WTP was designated the Policyholder/Plan Sponsor. Canada Life was designated the Claims Administrator. The Summary Plan Description document (SPD) of the Policy was distributed to all partners. Lebowitz was still considered a full time senior partner by WTP. III (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/01/01-1292.htm">01-1292 -- BROWN V. EVANS -- 01/06/2004<BR></A><BR>
1291 because the order and judgment from which the plaintiff appellant appeals is a final decision disposing of all claims which the plaintiff appellant has against the defendant appellee. <p> This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. Who is African American. Alleged that he was discharged because of racial discrimination. Brown was nominally employed by the Secretary of Commerce. The subagency involved was the Census Bureau. Brown was appointed as a probationary Community Partnership Specialist at the GG 11 grade level with the Census Bureau. His appointment was subject to the completion of a one year probationary period. Was temporary. Brown was fired on January 5. Brown applied and was deemed qualified for two postings for temporary employment at three levels (GG 9. Brown was appointed as a probationary Community Partnership Specialist at the GG 11 grade level with the Census Bureau. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1567.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mogul & Singal were on brief for appellant. Frawley with whom Brann & Isaacson was on brief for appellee. *Of the District of North Dakota. Holding that 1) appellee has neither made out the elements of an estoppel claim nor established that his estoppel claim is actionable under ERISA. Appellee Donald Law was employed by the accounting firm of Arthur Young & Co.3 (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-7020a.html">NASHVILLE LDG CO V. RESOL TRST CORP<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july96/95-6369.op.html">MCMILLIAN V. JOHNSON<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>McMillian v. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND</b><a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jun2004/Jun22/03-50859.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Two paragraphs of these agreements are at the center of the parties' dispute: IX. Other documents prepared by the Architect for this project are the instruments of the Architect's service for use solely with respect to this project and the Architect shall be deemed the author of these documents and shall retain all common law. Copy or cause to have copied. Except that the stated base architectural fee for one of the projects was $250. After all five projects were completed. In WHA sued several related Trammell Crow entities. refer to all the entities collectively as TCR. 3 1 We will designing The North Bend. Construction Documents for Trammell Crow Residential utilizing plans which are copyrighted property of Womack+Hampton Architects. An agreement was reached between Womack+Hampton Architects. Trammell Crow Residential and Chiles Architects allowing him to utilize our designs on that development for a Use Fee which is common in this industry.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-3183.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Background Nancy Bear is an enrolled member of the Kickapoo Tribe and lives on the Tribe's reservation in Kansas. Count I requested a decree dissolving a partnership of which Bear was a member and an accounting that would divide the partnership assets. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <hr> [ ] 60 254(b) final judgment should be entered on Count II of plaintiffs' Petition (For Partition).
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july97/96-3075.opa.html">AGUILAR V. SOUTHEAST BANK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Aguilar v. The specific issue is whether the compulsory counterclaim rule applies when the putative counter claimant in an <i>in rem</i> foreclosure action is not a party to the mortgage agreement which is the subject of the foreclosure. Because the ramifications of the decision in this case could have far reaching effects on property law in Florida. Who are all doctors (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012440.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Suburban began looking for another conduit partner in order to expand into commercial lending and because it was dissatisfied with PaineWebber. An initial meeting was arranged for early May 1994 in San Francisco. To ensure A conduit relationship is one in which a lender originates and sells loans to a secondary purchaser. MERRILL LYNCH MORTGAGE 3 that Merrill Lynch was comfortable working with them. Was formerly associated with DRG Financial. Inc.3 Merrill Lynch contends that none of these names were mentioned at the meeting. Suburban contends Merrill Lynch was eager to receive as much business as possible from Suburban. That because Merrill Lynch had just entered the conduit business Suburban's experience and expertise were assets. That Merrill Lynch was enthusiastic about working with Suburban. Which it claims was at Merrill Lynch's request. DRG Funding was accused of improprieties by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 3 4 SUBURBAN MORTGAGE v.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-7105.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Only when (1) the plaintiffs have given proper notice of the alleged violation to the defendants. The state in which the alleged CWA violations have occurred. (2) the EPA is not
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/Jun2004/Jun22/03-50549.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Two paragraphs of these agreements are at the center of the parties' dispute: IX. Other documents prepared by the Architect for this project are the instruments of the Architect's service for use solely with respect to this project and the Architect shall be deemed the author of these documents and shall retain all common law. Copy or cause to have copied. Except that the stated base architectural fee for one of the projects was $250. After all five projects were completed. In WHA sued several related Trammell Crow entities. refer to all the entities collectively as TCR. 3 1 We will designing The North Bend. Construction Documents for Trammell Crow Residential utilizing plans which are copyrighted property of Womack+Hampton Architects. An agreement was reached between Womack+Hampton Architects. Trammell Crow Residential and Chiles Architects allowing him to utilize our designs on that development for a Use Fee which is common in this industry.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012194.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 5 the word
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Applying the same test that the District Court should have applied. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2002/01-11864.opn.html">UNIVERSITY COMMONS-URBANA, LTD. V. UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTORS INC. (9/13/2002, NO. 01-11864)<BR></A><BR>
One of the grounds of appellants' challenge is that a member of the arbitration panel was not impartial. We conclude that appellants' allegations of partiality are sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Sitting by designation.</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1344.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Hrycay & Sears were on brief. Rousseau and Friedman & Babcock were on brief. The guaranty was free of ambiguity and the plaintiff was entitled to summary enforcement. Both the 1985 Note and the mortgage deed were signed on Bandon's behalf by the four appellants as Bandon's sole general partners. Cases in which the FDIC is a party are ordinarily deemed to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/08/98-5187.htm">98-5187 -- THOMPSON V. U.S. -- 08/29/2000<BR></A><BR>
6621 were inapplicable to the disallowed deductions of taxpayers Clarence and Anna Thompson. Thompson is a surgeon who practiced medicine during the 1980s through Surgical Associates. A venture that was attempting to manufacture machines to recycle plastic scrap into usable plastic pellets (recyclers). The Thompsons' overall tax liability was reduced by $93. 094 for that year. <p> Davenport's sole general partner and tax matters partner was Samuel Winer. A permanent injunction was entered against Mr. Was not entered into for profit. Was thus a sham. The Thompsons were informed that the deductions and credits claimed on their 1982 return were disallowed. The Thompsons were assessed $277. 6659<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/987515.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The facts of this case are tragic. While the boy was anesthetized. This appeal is from a declaratory judgment action in which Watkins' insurance company. 2 sought a ruling that Watkins and his partnership were not covered by the Medical Protective policies. The significant policy language was a clause that excluded coverage for
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQyNDEtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-4241-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The demand for arbitration was filed by Josephine LeBeau. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). LeBeau and the new executive board were sworn in for a new term of office. She was the Executive Director until May 7. DC 1707 alleged that LeBeau's employment relationship was governed by a union constitution and thus came under the Labor Management Relations Act. A determination that she was not entitled to severance benefits. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The district court denied the motion to stay arbitration. Was renewed from year to year. DISCUSSION I We review the district court's determination as to whether parties have agreed to arbitrate de novo. 254 (2d Cir. 1999). 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II The only question presented in this appeal is whether LeBeau's employment contract and its arbitration clause were still in force when she lost the election in May 2002. they were still in force. It is common ground that the present issue would be properly referred to arbitration.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/12/02-1220.htm">02-1220 -- RUTTER & WILBANKS CORP. V. SHELL OIL COMPANY -- 12/24/2002<BR></A><BR>
Appellants are eleven objectors (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/08/003210P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
K tel common stock was publicly traded on the NASDAQ National Market System (NMS). Thereby representing K tel was $226. The remaining documents filed with both courts reflect the name is spelled Kieves. This court will reference him as Kieves. 3 3 On October 19. K tel was not actually delisted as a result of the October 19. Almost 2.7 million shares of K tel common stock were sold by four individual defendants between May 8. There were only two other transactions by the individual defendants: on November 13. 000 shares which are at the end of or outside the class period) for approximately $532. The scheme was characterized by two circumstances. The Class asserts K tel knew in March 1998 of a $1.498 million loss due to the poor performance of a subsidiary and K tel was required by GAAP to write off the assets of the subsidiary in its March 10 Q filing. The Class alleged such overstating of assets in the March 10 Q and the later June 10 K is a violation of GAAP and is evidence of fraud and scienter because K tel's inclusion of the overstated assets concealed its inability to comply with the minimum necessary tangible net asset requirement for continued listing on the NMS.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTQyNDEtY3YgQW1lbmRlZC5wZGY=/05-4241-cv%20Amended.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The demand for arbitration was filed by Josephine LeBeau. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). LeBeau and the new executive board were sworn in for a new term of office. She was the Executive Director until May 7. DC 1707 alleged that LeBeau's employment relationship was governed by a union constitution and thus came under the Labor Management Relations Act. A determination that she was not entitled to severance benefits. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The district court denied the motion to stay arbitration. Was renewed from year to year. DISCUSSION I We review the district court's determination as to whether parties have agreed to arbitrate de novo. 254 (2d Cir. 1999). 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II The only question presented in this appeal is whether the arbitration clause in LeBeau's employment contract was still in force when she lost the election in May 2002. If it was still in force. It is common ground that the present issue would be properly referred to arbitration.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971333.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jul2001/002566.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Appellants in this case are a number of self professed conservative. The District Court granted summary judgment to Kidder and Miller and held that the Appellants' claims were barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations. The Appellants contend that the court erred in three major respects: It incorrectly concluded that the Appellants were injured at the time they purchased the securities. It erred in holding that the Appellants were on inquiry notice of their injuries no later than early 1990. We will affirm. The plan was to acquire commercial real estate properties in the Sunbelt. The bulk of the return for investors was to come from appreciation in the properties. 3 Kidder prepared and distributed to its brokers a prospectus. The crux of the Appellants' claims is that Kidder fraudulently suggested that the funds were low risk. There are numerous corporate defendants in this case. We will refer to all the Defendants/Appellees collectively as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2002/01-11864.opn.html">UNIVERSITY COMMONS-URBANA, LTD. V. UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTORS INC. (9/13/2002, NO. 01-11864)<BR></A><BR>
One of the grounds of appellants' challenge is that a member of the arbitration panel was not impartial. We conclude that appellants' allegations of partiality are sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Sitting by designation.</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-50859.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Two paragraphs of these agreements are at the center of the parties' dispute: IX. Other documents prepared by the Architect for this project are the instruments of the Architect's service for use solely with respect to this project and the Architect shall be deemed the author of these documents and shall retain all common law. Copy or cause to have copied. Except that the stated base architectural fee for one of the projects was $250. After all five projects were completed. In WHA sued several related Trammell Crow entities. refer to all the entities collectively as TCR. 3 1 We will designing The North Bend. Construction Documents for Trammell Crow Residential utilizing plans which are copyrighted property of Womack+Hampton Architects. An agreement was reached between Womack+Hampton Architects. Trammell Crow Residential and Chiles Architects allowing him to utilize our designs on that development for a Use Fee which is common in this industry.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-2278.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.A. was on briefs for appellant. Sawyer & Nelson were on brief for appellees. On the ground that they were barred by res judicata. We affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal but are compelled to do so on a ground that leaves open to Lundborg the opportunity to pursue a central aspect of her claims by an independent action in Maine state court. For reasons that will become apparent. Such a suit is not a promising venture. I. The facts of the case are complicated and its procedural history involved. The underlying
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1998/98a1951p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case is before us on application of the Board for enforcement of its order against Sheet Metal Workers International Association. Unfair labor practice charges were filed against the Union by Delcard Associates. Coercing and threatening employees seeking access to their jobsites and by picketing at jobsite gates reserved for use by neutral employers.2 The complaints were consolidated for trial before an Administrative Law Judge. The A.L.J. found that the Union engaged in a joint venture with four other unions picketing at the Stong job site and was jointly responsible for unfair labor practices committed by those unions. We have appellate jurisdiction over the Board's petition seeking enforcement and the Union's petition for review pursuant to SS 10(e) and 10(f) of the NLRA. Omni and Stong. 3 adopted the A.L.J.'s conclusions including the determination that the Union
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200606/04-1434a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Cameron Cohick and Gregory E. With him on the brief were Giovanni P. Circuit Judge: This is a petition for review of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulation of
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/june96/94-4242.wpd.html">AMOCO PROD. CO. V. NEWTON SHEEP CO.<BR></A><BR>
The defendants in that action were originally the United States and its lessees. There was a related dispute between the Newtons and Bass Enterprises Production Co. The issues relating to the ownership of the oil and gas were resolved in two decisions by this court in 1988. Most of these accounting issues were settled. Windfall profit taxes from unpaid oil proceeds during the years 1980 1987 was not resolved. After the title dispute was settled and the first payment to the Newtons from Amoco's oil purchases was authorized. That they were consequently unable to obtain a refund. The proceeds of Amoco's oil and gas purchases that would have been paid to the Newtons. Were suspended and held by Amoco in an escrow account from the beginning of production in 1976 until January 1982. Were to be deposited with the clerk of the district court and invested in U.S. Where they were to remain until further order of the court. This was the first occasion on which the Newtons received any of the proceeds from Amoco's purchases.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4C4840FD0B589A9488256BA000504E8B/$file/0017378.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is substituted for her predecessor in office under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). 5943 5944 MCBRIDE COTTON AND CATTLE CORP. v. Or beneficiary who is a delinquent debtor on an agricultural loan administered by the USDA. None of the plaintiffs is a delinquent debtor. We hold that the exhaustion requirement of 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) is not jurisdictional. We further hold that exhaustion is excused because the plaintiffs' complaint alleges collateral. I Because it is relevant to our discussion of the jurisdictional issue. These contracts are seven year contracts. Plaintiff Running Water Land & Cattle Inc. is a corporation whose president is John Mitchell. Shareholders are members of the Mitchell family. Before Running Water was incorporated. Asserting that it was not timely. Plaintiff Thompson Farm is a Texas general partnership that was formed in 1975. Roger Thompson is a partner. As are two other family members. Are outstanding. There is no record that an administrative appeal was requested. Plaintiff Brandstatt Family Trust (the Trust) was created in January 1995 by J.M.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1192.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
000 at the time the note was due. Ndez
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4683047AD316D50E88256A020060817F/$file/9955584.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
OPINION PER CURIAM: Crow Winthrop Development Limited Partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1649.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.A.was on brief. With whom David Riv‚ Power and O'Neill & Borges were on brief. I. BACKGROUND The Fajardo Shopping Center (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/july96/94-1514.wpd.html">TRIERWEILER V. CROXTON AND TRENCH HOLDING CORP.<BR></A><BR>
C&T offered to have Dublin Osaka Group. When these opinions were provided. Following is a description of each appellee's alleged role. Watt owned equity in the firm and was to receive a share of its profits. That Watt was participating in and overseeing C&T. Or tell Trierweiler that it was necessary to confirm ownership. Brasher wrote that Dublin did in fact have the authority to fulfill its duties under the Unconditional Guaranty and Security Agreement. Other defendants (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1491.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Carlos Del Valle Cruz and Lespier & Munoz Noya were on brief for appellees. Shortly after Pedro Rossell¢ of the opposition New Progressive Party (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec97/95-8960.man.html">CAMP CREEK HOSPITALITY INNS, INC. V. SHERATON FRANCHISE CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Camp Creek Hospitality Inns. We affirm in part and reverse in part.<p> Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to
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Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in a personal injury action. Kuntz was severely injured when a metal rod he was removing from a billboard came in contact with an electric transmission line operated by defendant Kootenai Electric Cooperative. Because some of its members are citizens of Washington. As is Kuntz. The Cooperative claims that complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects. Kuntz was an independent contractor in the business of removing and replacing advertising placards on billboards. This billboard had a vinyl sign that was secured by 14 metal rods. The Cooperative is a cooperative marketing association organized to generate and distribute electric power to its members. The Cooperative is incorporated in the State of Idaho and has its principal place of business there. After the reconstruction project was completed. The conductor nearest to the billboard was eight feet from the billboard.1 The Cooperative did not warn Lamar or Kuntz that a conductor was closer to the billboard than before the reconAnother.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1EE2602A384FB58188256D7C0077B4E1/$file/0015474.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Facts and Procedural History Appellee EBI is in the business of repairing and maintaining sewer pipes and other structures that convey sewage. EBI then learned that Riley and Kunimitsu were the sole partners of Kamaaina Pumping and terminated their employment. It concluded that the appropriate remedy for the employees' breach of the duty of loyalty was disgorgement of profits Riley and Kunimitsu made while competing with EBI. Breach of the Duty of Loyalty The primary issue on appeal is whether EBI may bring a claim under Hawaii law against its employees for directly competing against it. We conclude that Hawaii law would recognize EBI's claim against Riley and Kunimitsu for their breach of the duty of loyalty. [1] It is clear under Hawaii law that employees owe their employer a duty of loyalty. Hawaii courts have recognized the authoritative nature of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. We thus believe that the Hawaii Supreme Court would follow the Restatement in finding that such a cause of action exists. [2] The Restatement recognizes that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1810.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Wishart and Jackman & Roth were on brief for appellant. With whom Dwyer & Collora was on brief for appellees. As summary judgment was proper. Defendant John 1All evidence in genuine dispute is related in a light favorable to Byrd. Advised her that there was no set track to partnership but that Byrd likely would be considered for partnership within two to three years provided she met the performance standards. She was its highest paid associate. During her two year tenure she was responsible for generating almost $100. Her areas of practice with H & M were concentrated principally in commercial loan workouts and federal banking regulation. By the fall of 1989 her responsibilities included all H & M bankruptcy cases as well.2 A major client during this period was Boston Five Cents Savings Bank. Told Ronayne that she and others in her department were dissatisfied with Byrd's work and doubted that she had the bankruptcy law knowledge she claimed. Monahan informed Ronayne that Boston Five did not have confidence in Byrd's advice or work product.
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Garcia with whom Garcia & Fernandez was on brief for appellants. Gelpi & Gotay were on brief for appellee. The district court's analysis of that issue is plainly correct. Monterrey was not incorporated at the relevant time. Lack of consideration is unavailing for other reasons set out by appellee. The conjugal partnership was liable for the debts and obligations of either of its members. That that particular debt was beyond the joint and several liability of the partnership. Evidence showing this is lacking. Nor is there reason to treat the Mi Tacita stock. No reason is suggested that the stock should be deemed to belong to Mr. We have considered appellants' other arguments and are satisfied that the judgment below was correctly rendered.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/05/03-5153a.htm">03-5153A -- MALLOY V. WALLACE -- 05/28/2004<BR></A><BR>
Background <p> Wallace is trustee of the Stephen Paul Wallace Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Whose sole asset is a minority interest in a family partnership (the Partnership) and the right to distributions therefrom. Filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and Appellee Plaintiff Patrick Malloy III was appointed trustee for Wallace's estate in bankruptcy. Alleging Wallace had not honored the terms of the trust and seeking a determination that therefore the trust was illusory and its assets were properly the property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court announced that it was dismissing the third party complaint and granting the motion to strike the Answer because it had been filed by a non party. These rulings were formalized in a written order dated December 10. Malloy wrote to Wallace noting that the period for filing a responsive pleading had expired and advising Wallace
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/05/03-5153.htm">03-5153 -- MALLOY V. WALLACE -- 05/28/2004<BR></A><BR>
Background <p> Wallace is trustee of the Stephen Paul Wallace Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Whose sole asset is a minority interest in a family partnership (the Partnership) and the right to distributions therefrom. Filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and Appellee Plaintiff Patrick Malloy III was appointed trustee for Wallace's estate in bankruptcy. Alleging Wallace had not honored the terms of the trust and seeking a determination that therefore the trust was illusory and its assets were properly the property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court announced that it was dismissing the third party complaint and granting the motion to strike the Answer because it had been filed by a non party. These rulings were formalized in a written order dated December 10. Malloy wrote to Wallace noting that the period for filing a responsive pleading had expired and advising Wallace
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200315321.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Thus is strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers. The jury trial focused on whether the plaintiff consented or was sexually battered by the crew member. The district court sua sponte raised an entirely new issue regarding which of the four defendants actually employed the errant crew member and whether that employer was a common carrier. Concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove any single defendant was both a common carrier and the employer of the crew member Honorable Richard Mills. Sitting by designation. 2 * and therefore that no defendant was liable for the crew member's assault. A cruise line is strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers during the cruise. Inc. is the operator of the M/V ZENITH. Zenith Shipping Corporation is the owner of the vessel. Contending that they are not liable for Aydin's intentional misconduct. Defendants argued that they are liable (1) only for their own breach of reasonable care under the circumstances and (2) only for their employees' intentional conduct while acting within the scope of their employment and in furtherance of the defendants' business purposes.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1447.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: Page 50. Delete the sentence that starts with
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1847.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Poppick and Fink Weinberger P.C. were on brief for appellants. Clarke and Sullivan & Worcester were on brief for appellees. Partnerships were agreeable to $120. 000 if there were an added
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2001/00-13293.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
In which Hoffend sought to have a claim arising from alleged securities law violations deemed nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to discharge. We hold that liability under § 20(a) is insufficient to impute culpability to a debtor so as to render the liability nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The dismissal is affirmed.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/07/962763P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Magill was an active judge at the time that this case was submitted and assumed senior status on April 1. Before the opinion was filed. It would have granted summary judgment in favor of Met Life and awarded damages accordingly. The loans were secured. Yet the REIT was unwilling to purchase them unless Hoyt and Met Life entered into a settlement agreement because the Group III Properties were the subject of an ongoing insolvency proceeding. Only the second is relevant here. Met Life was to deliver to Hoyt certain documents that would allow Hoyt to convey the Group III Properties to the REIT unencumbered. The contract defined purchase price as $15.5 million
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/05/964108P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Starr is to investigate and prosecute matters
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2060.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Covell</SPAN> and <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/97opinions/97-1097.html">FANNING V. WEST<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1587.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. Which is but one action amongst an array of administrative proceedings and litigation in both Commonwealth and federal courts. Is irrelevant to the single issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity before us.</P> <P> On October 30. Concluded that the Authority was not entitled to immunity as an arm of the state.</P> <P> The Authority sought reconsideration of the district court's opinion in a Motion to Amend Judgment filed on November . Which was denied by the district court on February 25. 22 (1st Cir. 2001).</P> <P> After the district court opinion was issued. The state has both dignitary and fiscal interests in identifying which state entities are <SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1562.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Federal jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship (the McCullochs are citizens of New York and the defendants are citizens of Puerto Rico) and the existence of a controversy in the requisite amount. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (ii) whether true diversity existed in view of the defendants' assertion that Mandorico (a corporation organized under the laws of Puerto Rico) was an indispensable party and/or the real party in interest on the plaintiffs' side of the case.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/953039P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which tax was paid. a refund. So that the tax on this sale was subject to The Bankruptcy Court held that the plaintiffs in this case. D & P decided that a self directed liquidation of its assets was its best alternative. Were entitled to the proceeds of that refund. The three offers were not identical. which offer they wished to accept. A problem was discovered. administrative expenses. The sales taxes on The balance in D & P's operating account was not sufficient to pay operating expenses. Would receive title to the assets free and clear of any 22 the sale if all of the proceeds were paid over to the creditors. offer. The Nath Group was asked to increase its Instead. The sale was closed on October 31. The Nath Group purchased two more restaurants from D & P The required sales taxes were paid over to the state of Minnesota for both sales. The sales tax statute was amended to exclude the sale of substantially all of the assets of a business from the list of taxable events. This amendment was retroactive to June 30.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/07/952240P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Willis was tried for bank fraud. Willis now appeals from that He was also We affirmed his United States v. I. Willis is a well educated man. He holds degrees in law (J.D.) and The scheme that business (M.B.A.) and is a certified public accountant. led to Willis's conviction began with his formation of a partnership called Rec Co. Willis's and Hopp's share of the purchase price was financed by First Federal Savings Bank (First Federal). The nominee borrowers were assured that the true beneficiaries of the loans. False information was 2 as promised. The bank was alerted to the scheme. Which on its face stated that it was the full agreement between the parties. however. Holding that the government had no duty to turn over documents that counsel could have discovered by investigating the district court file. counsel. Willis must show that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient and that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by that deficient performance. We first address Willis's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross examine Ettles.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/11/00-5168.htm">00-5168 -- COOPER V. CENTERAL & SOUTHWET SERVICES -- 11/28/2001<BR></A><BR>
Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align=
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Was also named as a defendant in this action and appears as a party in the caption of this appeal. That decision is not challenged by Optimum on appeal. Is therefore deemed waived. 1320 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1517.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Among the firm's accounts receivable was a contingency fee agreement. 000 was deposited into an escrow account. 000 from the Groton settlement was deposited into Schlichtmann's escrow account. A former co defendant who was dismissed from this case). The court concluded that because Schlichtmann's post bankruptcy work on the Groton matter was not performed on behalf of the dissolved partnership. He was entitled to a portion of the Groton fee to compensate for the work he performed in his individual capacity. Whether the two thirds portion of the Groton fee retained by Schlichtmann was a proper division between Schlichtmann and his former partners was to be resolved at trial.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTIwOTUtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-2095-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Plaintiffs were not party to the software agreement. The CD ROM product was never marketed by McGraw. Was not restricted in any way. Plaintiffs are each entitled to 10% of the gross receipts from the transfer.2 The software agreement provided that Augusta would
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/07/053859P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Edwardine Reis Rogers is named as a plaintiff in three of the six counts in the underlying state court suit at issue here. Because the conduct that led to that cause of action was directed toward Dr. We will refer only to him in our discussion. 1
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/07/00-7133.htm">00-7133 -- U.S. V. HOLDER -- 07/10/2001<BR></A><BR>
Fred Lloyd Holder was charged in the Eastern District of Oklahoma with murder in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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Was severely injured by steam and scalding water from a boiler. The boiler was in northern Minnesota at a pool jointly operated by the City of Crookston (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2001/00-13293.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
In which Hoffend sought to have a claim arising from alleged securities law violations deemed nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to discharge. We hold that liability under § 20(a) is insufficient to impute culpability to a debtor so as to render the liability nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The dismissal is affirmed.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1996/96a1412p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. INTRODUCTION Hyatt Corporation is the manager of a resort hotel on St. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (action between citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (action between citizens of different states in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties). We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the grant of partial summary judgment and abuse of discretion review over the court's transition order. Great Cruz was looking for a company to maximize the economic potential of the resort. Hyatt was reticent to commit the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/986484.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
2) its decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. I. Factual Background The parties have stipulated to the following facts. Are licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to provide wireless cellular telephone service to the Borough of Ho Ho Kus. Is licensed to provide wireless mobile radio services. Bell Atlantic and Nextel are referred to collectively throughout this opinion as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/983519.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Township claims that the District Court erred in concluding that its zoning ordinance was impermissibly exclusionary under the Pennsylvania Constitution. We conclude that the Township's ordinance is not invalid under state law or the TCA and will reverse. PCS systems are arranged around service
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May2001/002185.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were subject to the class settlement. Appellants have presented this Court with thr ee issues on appeal. While Appellants are subject to the class settlement. Therefore are enjoined from pursuing any claims that fall within that settlement. They are not enjoined from pursuing. Are collectively referr ed to as the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA2LTE0NDUtY3Jfb3BuLnBkZg==/06-1445-cr_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
That the trial evidence in this case was sufficient to establish such a nexus. J.) is AFFIRMED. Reich raises five issues on appeal: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to establish that his conduct would have the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/02/023043P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Twins and Midwest Sports Channel (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/021025P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Trout was 66 years old. A 67 year old bus driver was reassigned to drive Trout's former route. Gretlein was the only non board member present during the Board's closed door meeting to deny renewal to Trout. He was also responsible for informing employees of the Board's decision and indeed informed Trout that the Board had decided not to renew his contract. Trout alleges he asked Gretlein why he was not going to be employed the following school year and Gretlein said
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1998/98a1794p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1998) *Judge Sloviter was Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at the time this appeal was submitted. Ruling that (1) the Committee's Schedule 13D statement was complete. (2) IBSF was equitably estopped from rejecting the Committee's board nominee. We will reverse the district court's first two determinations. Will affirm the district court's determination that IBSF's reduction of the number of board seats was improper. I. Dramatis personae Identification of the numerous individuals and entities that make up the IBSF Committee to Maximize Shareholder Value is important to an understanding of the issues in this case. We will borrow (and modestly enlarge. With bracketed inserts) the district court's concise description of the principal players: [Plaintiff appellant] IBS Financial Corp. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Dec1996/96a1479p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Appellant John Cocivera and six corporations that he established were convicted by a jury of various crimes arising out of a scheme to defraud Medicare. I. Cocivera was the chief executive officer and fifty percent owner of six Pennsylvania corporations that were created in August 1989 to provide medical equipment to Medicare beneficiaries through a national telemarketing operation. Cocivera and the corporations were indicted in September 1994 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on one hundred forty four (144) counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Were found guilty of all 205 counts by a jury in May 1995. Each of the other corporations was convicted. Cocivera was sentenced to a 78 month prison term. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1998/98a1941p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Before us is an expedited appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1996/96a1406p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge We are called upon to determine the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by a broker dealer of securities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Inc. (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/release.pl?B1=Search+Month&month=06&date=01&year=98">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200103/94-1035a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Peter Keisler. Joffe and Henk Brands were on the briefs for petitioner Time Warner Entertainment Co. Leanza and Harold Feld were on the briefs for petitioner Consumers Union. With him on the brief were Christopher J. Frederick Beckner III were on the brief for intervenor Time Warner Entertainment Co. The first type is horizontal. Addressing operators' scale:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/07/98-9005a.htm">98-9005A -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999<BR></A><BR>
A copy of the corrected cover page is attached. <p> Sincerely. She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/07/98-9005.htm">98-9005 -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999<BR></A><BR>
She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199906/98-1194a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Alex A. With her on the brief were Joel I. With him on the briefs was Kevin Hawley. A purchaser such as Rio Grande is only permitted to include the seller's depreciated original cost in its cost of service calculations. Rio Grande pointed out that this transaction was different. Be cause the pipeline was purchased for a new use and the purchase price was less than the cost of constructing a comparable facility. Claiming that FERC's decision is flatly at odds with the benefits rule and that the agency's judgment defies reason. We must first resolve three threshold issues: (1) whether Longhorn Partners Pipeline (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199808/96-0001b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
It appearing to the court for the reasons set forth more fully in the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith that the motion is well taken. It is hereby ORDERED. After considering Sagawa's petition we find that her request is for the most part very reasonable and that she is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $7. Background The facts of the investigation conducted by IC von Kann are set forth in detail in In re Segal (Segal Fee Application). We briefly note that the Corporation for National and Community Service (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/01/97-9024.htm">97-9024 -- GILMORE & WILSON CONSTRUCTION CO. AND SUBSIDIARY V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 01/13/1999<BR></A><BR>
These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> These three appeals challenge the Tax Court's affirmance of the Commissioner's imposition of penalties and interest due to the taxpayers appellants' negligent underpayment of taxes owed for various tax years from 1979 to 1983. <em>See</em> <em>Estate of Hogard v. 1997 WL 160769 (1997).<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1977.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is a federal statute for the protection of franchised dealers and distributors of gasoline and other petroleum projects. The ostensible theory of such statutes (ostensible because it is unclear why the intended beneficiaries could not obtain similar protection by contractual negotiation) is that a franchised dealer in effect invests in the franchisor's trademarks and as a result creates goodwill for the franchisor which the latter might on occasion be tempted to appropriate by terminating the franchisee. Of which the one pertinent to this case is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992255.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Line 7 the references to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971026.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
No. 97 1026 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was apparently not profitable. Glude was determined to be solely responsible for AEI's debt. Was thereafter required under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988) to pay the debt himself. Is a Washington. Sterenbuch was to be president and Glude vice president of the corpo2 ration. Sterenbuch and Glude were to sit as directors of AEI. They entered into a written partnership agreement which was updated in September 1988. SGPF was to own all of the stock of AEI. Glude was to operate as a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=03-1111_062.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The seven defendants were convicted after a three month jury trial of a variety of federal offenses. Was convicted only of a tax offense.). Many of them are too insubstantial to require discussion. Because the sentences were based in part on factfindings made by the judge. The government concedes that the defendants are entitled to the limited remand authorized by United States v. The force of the concession is obscure. That is for later. Cicero is self insured for its employees' health benefits. Was the instrument of the fraud. Other defendants were Town officials. Millions of dollars that the Town paid to SRC were siphoned to a partnership. Which was a tool of the conspirators and provided them with money and other things of value. Which continued until it was unmasked in 1996.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1997/08/96-1202.htm">96-1202 -- JAMES BARLOW FAMILY V. MUNSON -- 08/26/1997<BR></A><BR>
The revised opinion is attached. Rehearing is otherwise denied. Appellees' motion to file a reply to the response to the petition for rehearing is granted. <p> In accordance with Rule 35(b). The suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service. The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied. <p> Entered for the Court <p> PATRICK FISHER. Over whether the Barlows are entitled to royalty payments from the federal leases. We reverse and grant summary judgment in favor of Munson. <p align=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0488n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Kroger Co. lease is ambiguous. Kroger obtained removal of the suit to federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction and counterclaimed for overpayment of CAM charges in 2003.1 Before the matter was brought before the magistrate judge for summary judgment. The parties by joint stipulation agreed that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962025.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The permit would have authorized B&B to fill 1.5 acres of wetland in Prince George's County. Whose § 404 Permit Applications Were Distinguished and/or Relied Upon as Bases for Denying Appellants' § 404 Permit. Whether the Army Corps of Engineers' Denial of Appellants' Permit Was Arbitrary and Capricious. A rubble landfill or rubblefill is a disposal site for nonpolluting construction debris. It was estimated that the ravine. B&B was asked to minimize the traffic impact on the neighboring community by accessing its site from the west. B&B attempted to show that the rubblefill was in the public interest. Another was disturbed by the damage that the project would do to the bald eagle nesting site on the property. The letters showed that citizens were troubled by noise. The Corps forwarded copies of the comments to B&B and indicated that it was inclined to deny the permit. Who was charged with making the final decision. He concluded that the detrimental environmental impacts of the project outweighed its benefits and that the project was contrary to the public interest.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5026.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This disposition is not citable as precedent. It is a public record. The deficiency was due in part to the IRS's unfavorable treatment of certain partnership income and losses reflected in the Riggles' form 1040. Because the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is limited to actions for the recovery of money damages or unlawful exactions. The Riggles argue that they were not required to pay the tax due before contesting the deficiency. Because prepayment was not required by the notice of deficiency. That argument is also incorrect. Which does have jurisdiction to consider tax disputes before the amount in dispute is remitted and a request for a refund is made. 26 U.S.C. § 6213. The Court of Federal Claims was also correct in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Riggles' due process violation claims. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a money mandating provision. They are left without legal recourse to contest the deficiency. Proceed in the Court of Federal Claims if the IRS denies that request. 05 5026 4 In their reply brief in this court the Riggles make additional arguments that were not made in their opening brief or in the Court of Federal Claims.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec97/95-8960.man.html">CAMP CREEK HOSPITALITY INNS, INC. V. SHERATON FRANCHISE CORP.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Camp Creek Hospitality Inns. We affirm in part and reverse in part.<p> Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/014878.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Caplinger was tried and convicted in the Western District of North Carolina on six counts of wire fraud and two counts of international money laundering. Caplinger's convictions and sentence arise out of his successful efforts to attract investment in a bogus scheme to market worldwide a drug that was supposed to be effective in treating HIV/AIDS and cancer. I. Caplinger was indicted and tried on six counts of wire fraud. The essence of the government's case was that Caplinger engaged in a scheme to defraud investors who put money into Caplinger's purported effort to market ImmuStim. The scheme was crooked. At a time when the Diamond Group partnership was desperate to find ways to avoid a collapse. Kampetis was introduced to Caplinger. Who Kampetis believed was a physician operating a clinic in Santo Domingo. Caplinger told Kampetis that worldwide sales of ImmuStim
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012386.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Essentially contending that the global settlement agreement failed to recognize DVI's security interests in assets that were disposed of by the agreement. Colkitt and Derdel were physicians specializing in radiation oncology. Was involuntarily placed into bankruptcy by its creditors. A trustee was appointed. Seeking to recover for the EquiMed estate losses that were allegedly caused by fraud. Those proceedings were consolidated with the EquiMed bankruptcy. COLKITT 15 were removed to federal court and transferred to the District of Maryland for consideration in the bankruptcy of EquiMed. Arguing that its security interest in various of EquiMed's assets were not recognized by the agreement. All of which were surrendered as part of the settlement agreement.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001360.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We will refer to Defendants collectively as DMAS. 1 HCMF CORPORATION v. Reasoning that the claim HCMF sought to add to its complaint was indistinct from its original claim. Thus the amendment was futile. We nevertheless agree with the district court that the amendment was futile. The construction of the nursing homes was financed by bonds authorized by Industrial Development Authorities (IDA). The FHA mortgages have a slightly higher interest rate than the IDA bonds. Medicaid is a joint federal state program under which federal funds are made available to states that provide medical services to eligible recipients. The federal Medicaid requirement relevant here was contained in the Boren Amendment: Each state was required to assure the federal government that under its Medicaid program the state reimbursed nursing facilities at rates that were
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-1035a.html">TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT CO. V. FCC<BR></A><BR>
With him on the briefs were Peter Keisler. Joffe and Henk Brands were on the briefs for </P> <P>petitioner Time Warner Entertainment Co. Leanza and Harold </P> <P>Feld were on the briefs for petitioner Consumers Union.</P> <BR WP=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-4057.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Arise from one action and have been consolidated. We have combined it with the consolidated appeals for dispositional purposes only. We have jurisdiction over all four appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. In support of his claim that he was holder of fee title to the land. He did so despite the fact that whether or not MTGLQ was
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1351.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Three cases are consolidated for purposes of this appeal. King now appeals the district court's: (1) determination that the noncompete provisions were enforceable. I PA is a professional consulting firm with offices in 20 countries and over 3400 employees. Although it is a New Jersey corporation with a human resources office in that state. PA is headquartered in Washington. King was a Senior Vice President (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2338.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. The primary purpose of which was to consolidate expenses thereby increasing the profitability of their parking lots. The agreement (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Testimony at trial made clear PCA's function was to manage the day to day activities of the lot while the Joint Venture managers provided high level management. PCA representatives were not allowed on the property until February 11. Golden and Lorentzen continued to give commands to PCA employees resulting in great confusion among the employees as to who was in charge. After PCA informed Golden he was being removed as operations manager in December of 2001. The contract was never discussed with anyone at PCA as required by its policy. Several days after he was fired from PCA in January of 2001. We will reverse only if the district court's findings are without factual support in the record or if. We are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-5156.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
This case is before us for the fourth time after a long and tortured history.(1) Bernard Olcott (Olcott). Who was previously awarded sanctions against the defendants in the amount of $1. I. Background The facts germane to this appeal are these. He named Delaware Flood (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. Olcott I was an unpublished order in which we remanded to correct statute of limitations problems. The gist of Olcott's complaint was that Delaware Flood had diverted his investment to purposes other than those stated in the limited partnership agreements. Olcott complained it was insufficient and moved for sanctions. The court agreed the accounting was insufficient. 1986 regarding the accounting issues until all accounting issues are resolved . . . . 5. Was insufficient. The judge . . . may make such orders with regard thereto as are just.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-40238.1.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court's order is but one action taken in its capacity as an administrator of the settlement fund. It is accordingly not a final appealable order. The litigation was consolidated in January 1998 by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation and assigned to the Southern District of Texas for further proceedings. Non settling plaintiffs and non settling defendants are regarded as being outside the settlement class and are neither bound by the terms of the agreement nor entitled to file claims under it. CE was designated a non settling defendant. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Anson are formerly classaction plaintiffs who asserted a right to damages for barrels of oil they sold at artificially deflated prices in the preceding decade. Having previously determined that CELP could not assert claims on its own behalf because it is a non settling defendant. Anson are affiliates of a non settling defendant.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-40099.1.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court's order is but one action taken in its capacity as an administrator of the settlement fund. It is accordingly not a final appealable order. The litigation was consolidated in January 1998 by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation and assigned to the Southern District of Texas for further proceedings. Non settling plaintiffs and non settling defendants are regarded as being outside the settlement class and are neither bound by the terms of the agreement nor entitled to file claims under it. CE was designated a non settling defendant. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Anson are formerly classaction plaintiffs who asserted a right to damages for barrels of oil they sold at artificially deflated prices in the preceding decade. Having previously determined that CELP could not assert claims on its own behalf because it is a non settling defendant. Anson are affiliates of a non settling defendant.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/1ee2602a384fb58188256d7c0077b4e1/$FILE/0015474.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
I. Facts and Procedural History Appellee EBI is in the business of repairing and maintaining sewer pipes and other structures that convey sewage. EBI then learned that Riley and Kunimitsu were the sole partners of Kamaaina Pumping and terminated their employment. It concluded that the appropriate remedy for the employees' breach of the duty of loyalty was disgorgement of profits Riley and Kunimitsu made while competing with EBI. Breach of the Duty of Loyalty The primary issue on appeal is whether EBI may bring a claim under Hawaii law against its employees for directly competing against it. We conclude that Hawaii law would recognize EBI's claim against Riley and Kunimitsu for their breach of the duty of loyalty. [1] It is clear under Hawaii law that employees owe their employer a duty of loyalty. Hawaii courts have recognized the authoritative nature of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. We thus believe that the Hawaii Supreme Court would follow the Restatement in finding that such a cause of action exists. [2] The Restatement recognizes that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-41704.1.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court's order is but one action taken in its capacity as an administrator of the settlement fund. It is accordingly not a final appealable order. The litigation was consolidated in January 1998 by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation and assigned to the Southern District of Texas for further proceedings. Non settling plaintiffs and non settling defendants are regarded as being outside the settlement class and are neither bound by the terms of the agreement nor entitled to file claims under it. CE was designated a non settling defendant. The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. Anson are formerly classaction plaintiffs who asserted a right to damages for barrels of oil they sold at artificially deflated prices in the preceding decade. Having previously determined that CELP could not assert claims on its own behalf because it is a non settling defendant. Anson are affiliates of a non settling defendant.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F80CB202D6EB5AFA8825703D007A31EB/$file/0217525.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude that the novation theory providing one basis for Fanucchi's breach of contract claim should have survived summary judgment. Linda Limi were general partners in Fanucchi & Limi Farms. The 1994 Loan was memorialized in several documents. The Commercial Guarantees are individual loan guarantees by Larry Fanucchi. Both the Agricultural Loan Agreement and Agricultural Security Agreement have an integration clause that reads: Amendments.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/055542np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Will affirm. David argues his damages award is entitled to exception from discharge as arising from embezzlement or larceny under subsection (a)(4) or from willful and malicious injury by the debtor under subsection (a)(6). §§523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) provide. These and other subsection (a) exceptions to discharge are construed strictly against the objecting creditor. He argues his father was collaterally estopped from denying the damages award arose from embezzlement. He argues the Bankruptcy Court should have rejected his father's testimony because the Common Pleas Court adopted a proposed conclusion that his father was not credible. 4 issue preclusion applies where 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the later action. 2) there was a final judgment on the merits. 3) the party against whom it is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. 4) the party against whom it is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior action.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6AF6D2F5E65025CA88256E5A00707A71/$file/9955584.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
OPINION PER CURIAM: Crow Winthrop Development Limited Partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/08/99-5102.htm">99-5102 -- ELLSWORTH MOTOR FREIGHT LINES INC. V. NORTH AMERICAN RESOURCES INC. -- 08/22/2000<BR></A><BR>
Ellsworth was awarded $640. Punitive damages were assessed against NAR in the amount of $35. Ellsworth was then providing<strong> </strong>between $150. Ellsworth alleged all the defendants were liable based on numerous legal theories. The district court concluded the general verdict against only NAR on the contract claim was not inconsistent with the jury's answer to the agency interrogatory on the verdict form for the fraud claims. Aiding and abetting claims were reconcilable with its findings of liability and the evidence presented at trial. The district court had previously rejected Ellsworth's proposed instruction which would have enabled the jury to find against the other defendants on the contract claim based on an agency theory. To rectify the finding that only NAR is liable on the contract claim. Is whether the district court erred in refusing to submit Ellsworth's proposed instruction which would have allowed the jury to consider agency liability on the contract claim.<a href=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1361.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom David Efr n and Law Offices David Efr n were on brief for appellant. With whom Rodr guez & Casellas was on brief for appellees. Was injured by defendant appellee. 000 but the trial court found that the verdict was most likely the result of bias or compromise and set it aside. The plaintiff contends that she should have been granted a third trial because the $50. 000 damage award was insufficient and the trial judge improperly excluded evidence. They are entitled to attorney's fees incurred after the offer. (3) the trial court should not have awarded the plaintiff costs incurred after an offer of judgment. Inc. is also a defendant to the action. The parties have not distinguished between them on appeal. She was seated in the front row as part of a group that had received complementary tickets to the game. Because in his experience people often were reluctant at first but later changed their minds. The plaintiff's purse strap had fallen over the back of her seat and was providing additional resistance to Lockard's efforts.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1E84BB06CA720555882572A600811EB3/$file/0571894.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
District Judge: This is an appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court upholding a tax deficiency determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/95-5086.html">ANIXTER V. HOME-STAKE PROD. CO.<BR></A><BR>
1996 by Judge Lucero Please be advised that the attached dissent was omitted from the decision as filed January 29. We are told. Investments made in later year Programs were paid to earlier year investors as
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/03/023562P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Their primary allegation is that the appellees have. Arguing that the district court should have found certain claims barred by res judicata. Is located within the city of Shorewood. The field is diagonally bisected by a drainage ditch running from the northeast corner to the southwest corner. The field was designated as a wetland on the National Wetland Inventory Map issued by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.5 After the Johnsons purchased the property. The district court concluded that it was not necessary to vacate the prior orders. 5 4 The Johnsons contest the validity of this designation. 5 southern boundary of the Johnson property. The state court held that the Johnsons were collaterally estopped from re litigating the scope of the taking6 and In the first action. Although the record does not precisely disclose what was argued at the first trial. Were already adjudicated [in the first state proceeding]. . . upon a motion for summary judgment. 000 award was appropriate because the value of the Johnsons' property would have been diminished absent clean up of debris caused by the flooding.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/013800.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue is whether the plaintiffs in a state suit for defamation confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court by raising a first amendment issue in response to an anticipatory defense. The defendants successfully petitioned to have both cases removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Holding that the plaintiffs
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4F7778C44FE40B548825706D0056C41A/$file/0316791.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction and affirm. Who were officers and/or directors of Boston Chicken. Inc. are the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov98/95-5137.man.html">BMC INDUS., INC. V. BARTH INDUS., INC. (11/18/1998, NO. 95-5137)<BR></A><BR>
Therefore was liable under the theory of promissory estoppel for Barth's nonperformance.</P> <P> A jury resolved the breach of contract and promissory estoppel issues in favor of BMC. We conclude that the court should have granted Nesco judgment as a matter of law. Manufactures semi finished polymer opthalmic lenses that are used in the production of eyeglasses. These lenses are created by an assembly line process. The assembly is inspected and then heated and cured until the monomer solidifies into a plastic lens. The lens is removed from the mold assembly through a process called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1223.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Mahoney & Miller was onbrief. L.L.P. were on brief. Before the Court is defendant appellant Kmart Corporation's (
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He was the one hundred percent owner of Near North National Group. Was the sole owner of Near North Insurance Brokerage. Including a wide ranging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/05A003BD077B852488256CC5005B10A1/$file/9770123.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
A number of business transactions whose tax consequences are at issue here. When the NFL injunction was lifted in 1982. The Raiders were to repay the loan from 12 percent of the net receipts from the operation of luxury suites to be constructed by the Raiders at the LA Coliseum. The repayment was to begin in the third year of suite rentals. The loan was secured by the tobe constructed suites. The LAMCC Agreement was the result of arm's length bargaining between the Raiders and the LAMCC. Plans to construct the suites prior to the 1984 Summer Olympics were abandoned after the Los Angeles Olympic Committee voiced concerns over the timing of the construction. Was halted on February 18 of that year. The Raiders responded that they were willing and able to provide the required bonds. Construction never resumed and the suites were never completed. The lawsuit was settled on September 11. The Commissioner disallowed the Raiders' rent deductions because the rent was not currently payable and was part of the loan from the LAMCC.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may99/98-2088.man.html">LADY J. LINGERIE V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE (5/27/1999, NO. 98-2088)<BR></A><BR>
The plaintiffs/appellants are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/99-8058.htm">99-8058 -- BARLOW & HAUN INC. V. MCPEEK -- 06/06/2000<BR></A><BR>
H is a geological consulting firm that has its principal place of business in Casper. McPeek is a geologist working and residing in Colorado. Co. is a Colorado partnership that was formed by McPeek and his wife. <p> Ray Thomasson formed and is president of TPA. Ltd. is a Colorado limited partnership formed for the purpose of enabling the professionals brought together by TPA to share in the royalties in each other's projects. <p> George E. Co. is a petroleum engineer and an associate of TPA. H was solidified by a September 1. You are not an employee of B&. You will spend all of your professional geological time working for B&. H will pay you a consulting fee of $1. You will work on the B&. H Coors Denver Basin gas project approximately one half time and you will develop oil and gas exploration ideas and prospects during the other half of your time. <p> 4.). H will reimburse you for out of pocket expenses you may incur on behalf of any client but you will be responsible for any other office or prospect development costs. . . . <p> 5.).
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/96opinions/96-1325.html">BONNEVILLE ASSOC. V. BARRAM DAVID J<BR></A><BR>
On the brief were Frank W. Of counsel on the brief was Kevin S. We affirm.<p> I<p> <p> The facts are undisputed. Was one of Bonneville's general partners. Stating that it
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991721.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The jury award for fraud constituted a double recovery and thus was stricken under the doctrine of election of remedies. The appellants and the appellees were parties to a venture to purchase. Was to provide the expertise in marketing the aircraft. Duncan also was to distribute the proceeds from the sale of the aircraft. The Duncans were Florida residents. The appellants filed an adversary proceeding in the Florida bankruptcy court seeking a determination that some or all of Duncan's debt was non dischargeable. 000 debt to the appellants was non dischargeable because it represented amounts Duncan converted illegally. Final judgment to that effect was entered in January 1994. The first was a claim for fraudulent conveyance. The Duncan Limited Family Partnership were the recipients of a series of fraudulent transfers from Joseph Duncan. The second was a claim for common law fraud. Both parties consented to have a Magistrate Judge preside. The appellants still would not have received the jury award for fraud as the court held that the corresponding $165.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2174.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. Generation of Settlement Agreement</STRONG></P> <P> The history of the parties' litigation is complicated by several corporate transmutations. When the Settlement Agreement was signed. Freedom sent a letter to GTE claiming that GTE was infringing the '067 patent. GTE Wireless's operations were assigned to Cellco (a Bell Atlantic subsidiary) at the closing of the GTE/Bell Atlantic merger. GTE Mobilnet was dissolved on June 21. All its assets were distributed to its sole shareholder. The GTE/Bell Atlantic merger was completed July 10. The patent action was transferred to Massachusetts federal court. Stating that Cellco was a successor to GTE Mobilnet and seeking to preliminarily enjoin Freedom from pursuing its patent case against Cellco. GTE Wireless claimed that defendants were in breach of the Settlement Agreement by continuing to pursue Freedom's patent suit against Cellco. That the definition of GTE in the Settlement Agreement only included affiliates that were in existence at the time the agreement was executed.</P> <P> The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/11/991241P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction in the court of appeals is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Melvin was a self employed farmer and crop duster. Aerial was to provide such crop dusting services for profit. Melvin's plane crashed moments later and Melvin was seriously injured. The stated purpose of the Plan is to provide
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1821.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief for appellee United States of America.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D840671383736FD388256BD700817DFF/$file/0017355.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We hold that an unincorporated Indian tribe such as appellee is not a
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-2437.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With whom Mann & Mitchell was on brief. Forrester and Sidley & Austin were on brief. This case presents a question of first impression in this circuit: Are a trial court's published findings of attorney misconduct. Notwithstanding that the monetary sanctions imposed by the court for that conduct have been nullified? Our sister circuits are divided on this important question. Are not appealable. The settlement proposal was coincident with the resolution of Tax Court proceedings involving the Arbitrage Management Partnerships (the partnerships). Because the parties were trying to settle the adversary action. ANALYSIS The threshold question in this matter is whether the bankruptcy judge's published findings of fact. Are appealable. There are no longer any monetary sanctions extant in this case. Both because they received insufficient process and because their conduct was not sanctionable. Having satisfied herself that they were supported by the record. Imposing sanctions against counsel is a serious matter.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/lognameprint.php">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Jerome Wayne Johnson</td> <td align=left valign=top>03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>07 12 2004</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Bowman</td> <td align=left valign=top>02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>08 13 2003</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/release.pl?B1=Search+Month&month=06&date=01&year=04">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971915.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
(Plantation) have infringed Resorts' service marks. It concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the defenses of laches and acquiescence. Is valid and that National and Plantation have infringed the mark. The area was called Tuftstown until 1895 when Tufts changed the name to Pinehurst. 928 (4th Cir. 1995). 5 A mark shall be canceled if its registration was fraudulently obtained. An applicant is required to state under oath that
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr97/96-2636.opa.html">JACOB MAXWELL, INC. V. VEECK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Jacob Maxwell. The Miracle Is Here
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031020.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Which Weitz alleged was the fourth suit in which CMC asserted the same or similar claims. The bankruptcy court dismissed most of CMC's claims on the ground that they were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and imposed sanctions against Tirana in the amount of $33. The bankruptcy court rejected Weitz' alternative ground for sanctions based on the argument that the claims were barred by the Colorado River doctrine. The bankruptcy court concluded: Defendant's reliance upon the Colorado River doctrine in support of this motion is inappropriate. The doctrine is a type of abstention that is discretionary. This court will not consider the application of the Colorado River doctrine as a basis for the imposition of sanctions. Concluding that CMC's claims were not clearly barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Weitz does not challenge the district court's ruling that CMC's claims were not clearly barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2439.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Were on brief. Were on brief. The motions were predicated in part on a state official's qualified immunity from suit. § 4 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.</P> <P> Both plaintiffs worked at the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of Justice.<A HREF=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Dec2001/011484.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is a shareholder of Motient corporation. The issue on this appeal requires us to determine whether beneficial ownership of a subject issuer's equity securities is a necessary element of group membership 2 within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We conclude that it is. We have carefully considered the other issues presented by the Appellant and conclude that no extended discussion is necessary. We will affirm the Order of the District Court dismissing Rosenberg's Complaint. 1 The specific question before us is whether beneficial ownership of the equity securities of a corporate issuer by each group member is a necessary element for entrance in a section 13(d) group. May an individual without beneficial ownership of the equity securities of an issuer become a member of a group consisting of individuals who are beneficial owners of the issuer's equity securities for the purpose of determining whether the group members are statutory insiders subject to section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934?
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19982088.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs/appellants are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-5053.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The parties are familiar with the facts and extensive procedural history and we need not restate that material here. Suffice it to say that what we have before us is the latest chapter in a legal battle that began many years ago concerning the ownership of paintings by American Impressionist artist Theodore Robinson. Was procured by fraud on the court. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. R. 32.1. (1) Plaintiffs' docketing statement for appeal number 06 5053 suggests that they are also challenging the district court's sealed order dated January 24. Were procured by fraud on both courts. Was procured by fraud on the court. Granting (2) Plaintiffs' docketing statement for appeal number 06 5055 suggests that they are also challenging the district court's sealed order dated January 24. Were the result of defendants' fraud on the court. We likewise review for abuse of discretion both a district court's determination that a late filing was caused by excusable neglect.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/lognameprint2.php">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman</td> <td align=left valign=top>02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>08 13 2003</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align left valign=top>In re: Will C. Cohen</td> <td align=left valign=top>03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>07 08 2004</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align left valign=top>In re: Will C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/35D299D5B4EF32D788256E5A00707C80/$file/0015259.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1031.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is amended as follows: The caption on the coversheet should read:
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/01/01-1401.htm">01-1401 -- U.S. WEST CONMMUNICATIONS INC. V. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. -- 01/04/2002<BR></A><BR>
Local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. Have made competition among multiple providers of local service seem possible. Incumbent LECs are subject to a host of duties intended to facilitate market entry. Foremost among these duties is the LEC's obligation under 47 U.S.C.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/05/962572P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The judgment was overturned because of erroneous jury See Bening v. The evidence presented at trial is recited here in the light most favorable to the verdict. 637 (8th Cir. 1997). 1988 and 1989. Alfred Harre and Bening are Illinois farmers who invested in Concepts Communications and a related limited partnership in James Grice. Who was Concepts' president. Who was Concepts' attorney throughout most of this period. Muegler represented that the companies were involved in the telecommunications business and that money invested in them would be used to purchase telephone equipment and run the businesses. There was no such contract. The limited partnership never operated as a business. funds invested by Harre and Bening were not used to purchase telephone equipment. There was evidence that the $120. 000 supposedly invested in the partnership was used instead to purchase a The Honorable Charles A. An amount almost equal to that loan amount was spent by Concepts to open a gay bar In December 1989. Who as a convicted felon was prohibited from selling securities.2 There was evidence that Muegler knew Grice was a convicted felon.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr97/96-2636.opa.html">JACOB MAXWELL, INC. V. VEECK<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Jacob Maxwell. The Miracle Is Here
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/995855.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board that seven workers were not supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act. We conclude that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Accordingly. We will grant the Petition for Review and deny the Board's Cross Application to Enforce. Surplus electricity is sold to Jersey Central Power & Light Company. The plant was built for the specific purpose of supplying Marcal with its energy needs. Any disruption in the steam or electricity supply will cause mill operations to halt abruptly. Shut downs are extremely costly because of lost production time and possible equipment damage. Plant personnel are organized into the following positions: Plant Manager. Those with the title of
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-1167.html">FIELDTURF, INC., ET AL. V. SOUTHWEST RECREATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC.<BR></A><BR>
Argued for plaintiffs appellants.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Christopher T. New York.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief were <u>Arthur S. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Diane M. Carlton</u>.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel were <u>Gwendolyn R. We vacate and remand that portion of the district court s judgment pertaining to non infring
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8981CDC2903311A888256D8A007E23DC/$file/0256339.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Is there a private right of action to recover damages for violating regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pursuant to § 276 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that require interexchange carriers to compensate payphone service providers for
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/992E627FF5D1D98088256D330072DBEF/$file/0117358.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a corporate officer who is personally liable for corporate fraud may discharge such debt in bankruptcy. The judgment order did not specify the causes of action upon which entry of default judgment was based. Cantrell claimed that he was never personally served with the summons and complaint. Cantrell did admit that in November 1997 he was notified by the Alameda County Clerk Recorder that a $1. 118.75 state court judgment lien had been recorded against him and that Cal Micro was listed as a primary lien holder. Cal Mirco thus argued that the motion to set aside was time barred because Cantrell. Its denial of Cantrell's motion to set aside was subsequently upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cal Micro also filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the bankruptcy court was required to give preclusive effect to the default judgment. Cantrell contended that as a matter of law he was not a fiduciary within the meaning of § 523(a)(4).
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may99/98-2088.man.html">LADY J. LINGERIE V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE (5/27/1999, NO. 98-2088)<BR></A><BR>
The plaintiffs/appellants are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2B51AFD9071888AA88256AB6005EEA41/$file/0015259.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: This is a case in which an ousted business partner has attempted to force an involuntary bankruptcy in order to gain 11666 a business advantage. It calls for this Court to determine the test to be used in determining whether a dispute is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021946.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Will. Because the Army Corps is entitled to approve an applicant's project proposal under a less stringent Nationwide Permit regime even if the applicant initially requested a type of individual permit that would have required more rigorous review. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the Army Corps' decision to approve the project. I. Hanover County is located in a rapidly growing area north of Richmond. Because it appears that Henrico County is unwilling to satisfy Hanover County's wastewater treatment needs beyond this contractual limit. They oppose the project and have filed numerous court challenges against it. There are two different methods of obtaining Army Corps clearance for a project. The general permits at issue in this case are all Nationwide Permits (NWPs). Activities falling within the scope of an NWP are automatically authorized without any individualized inquiry. Although preconstruction notification of the Corps is required in some cases. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e) (2003). In cases where preconstruction notification is required.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021819.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeals from the district court's order reversing the bankruptcy court's order that held that debt arising out of a divorce settlement agreement was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(15) (West Supp. 2003). Because we find that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in determining that the debt was not dischargeable. I. Ferraro was legally separated from Ballard in 1995. Property issues in a written stipulation agreement and were subsequently divorced. If it was sold within three years IN RE BALLARD 3 of the stipulation agreement. Or 25% of the appraised value of the Chesapeake property if it was not sold within three years.1 Despite Ferraro's requests. The Chesapeake property was not sold within three years of the stipulation agreement and. Was obligated to pay support obligations in excess of $100. Ballard is also one of ten beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust with approximately $85. The property's appraised value was approximately $450.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/12/98-3264.htm">98-3264 -- SOUTHWESTERN BELL WIRELESS INC. V. JOHNSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS -- 12/27/1999<BR></A><BR>
Also contends that the court's order is overbroad. We agree with the district court and hold that (1) the BOCC's RFI regulation is impliedly preempted by federal law. (3) the district court's order is not overbroad. Wireless communications are transmitted by radio at a frequency assigned by the FCC. SW Bell is obligated to provide wireless telecommunications services to its customers. <u>remedy the problem or show to the satisfaction of the Zoning Administrator</u> that the tower or other site equipment is not the cause of the interference or disruption. If the interference . . . causing the functional interruption is not remedied within the 24 hours. Set a hearing to show cause why the applicable Permit shall not be terminated and the site . . . shall not cease operation</u> until the problem is remedied. The BOCC was aware of FCC authority and regulations in the RFI area. SW Bell and other wireless communications providers participated in public hearings and provided written comments about the Interference Regulation and
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19962636.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The Miracle Is Here
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1999/987159.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
For underpayment of tax attributable to a valuation overstatement pursuant to IRC S 6659.1 The Commissioner's decision was based upon the taxpayers' attempt to claim tax credits and losses purportedly resulting from their 1981 investment in Northeast Resource Recovery Associates (
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With her on the brief were <u>Ethan Horwitz</u> and <u>Karin Segall</u>.</p> <u> <p ALIGN=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0875a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
1994 is amended as follows: 1. The words
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P.A.</SPAN> was on brief for appellants.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19982088.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The plaintiffs/appellants are
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1028.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Valls</SPAN> was on brief for appellants.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/992344.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Though MMG was successful in securing orders. JP nonetheless ran into financial difficulties and was unable to purchase materials or pay vendors. Edelman is the president and sole shareholder of Kimber. Inc. does not recognize nor does it have any obligation to you under the . . . MMG cross appeals the judge's calculation of prejudgment interest and the judge's refusal to grant MMG commissions on a sale that is currently the subject of litigation in Tennessee. A summary judgment motion should be granted only if there is no genuine dispute as to an issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The only remaining parties are MMG. 000 pistols purchased by Nationwide and Nationwide's repeat orders which were covered by section 6.8 of the Representative Agreement. 4 the evidence in the light most favorable to the non moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in the non movant's favor. Issues of contractual interpretation are reviewed de novo .
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19942782.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Larue was a seaman employed as deckhand on a tug owned and operated by Moran Towing. When the tug's duties were completed she commenced retrieving from the deck of the Joann M. the 200 pound tow line that she had provided to the vessel. This required crewmen of the Joann M. to lift the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/23F2B067DAC26E288825713E004DC7A2/$file/0316340.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Circuit Judge: Christopher Weber was appointed by a Texas state court as a receiver for the marital estate of Tracy O'Reilly Kohlrautz and Franz Wilhelm Kohlrautz. I. Background The Kohlrautzes were married in Luxembourg in 1981. Kohlrautz were domiciled in Texas for purposes of divorce proceedings in that state. Her complaint alleges that two pieces of Nevada property owned by Oilmen are assets of the marital estate. Oilmen's central contention against Weber was that he engaged in tortious abuse of process in assisting Ms. The district court concluded that Weber was protected by absolute immunity for acts within the scope of his authority as receiver. The court held that there were triable questions of fact as to whether he committed acts outside his authority. We have asked for and received supplemental briefing on the issue of what law is applicable to this case. Interlocutory Review and Standard of Review [1] We do not ordinarily have jurisdiction to review a denial of a motion for summary judgment because such a denial is not a final judgment.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200314366.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The eleven other plaintiffs are Cell Cal T9 (a partnership). 1964. 3 2 The district court determined the facts as follows: Palmer Wireless is a Delaware corporation that acquired a majority interest in Cellular Systems (also a Delaware corporation) by transfer from a parent company in 1995. PCC and Price (who was CEO and treasurer of PCC) decided to acquire Palmer Wireless. Price Wireless was a wholly owned subsidiary of Price Holdings. Which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Price Cellular. Which was a wholly owned subsidiary of PCC. Stating that Cellular Systems' shareholders were not entitled to any consideration under the terms of that acquisition and telling them how to get more information on it from the Securities Exchange Commission. ANALYSIS 6
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19955137.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Therefore was liable under the theory of promissory estoppel for Barth's nonperformance. Was formed and received all of the assets and liabilities of Barth Industries. Which was the sole shareholder of Barth Industries. The remaining one percent interest was acquired by BIC Corporation. The final judgment in this case was entered against Barth Industries. We conclude that the court should have granted Nesco judgment as a matter of law. Manufactures semi finished polymer opthalmic lenses that are used in the production of eyeglasses. These lenses are created by an assemblyline process. The assembly is inspected and then heated and cured until the monomer solidifies into a plastic lens. The lens is removed from the mold assembly through a process called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981290.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The jury concluded that Exel was not liable for breach of contract. Because this first issue is dispositive. Exel was especially interested in Suburban's lending program because of the Merrill Lynch connection. Exel believed that if the loan refinancing the Shoppes was backed by Merrill Lynch. Suburban was entitled to a commitment fee of 2% of the loan proceeds. Was ultimately under no obligation to fund the loan. Suburban was not required under the terms of the loan application to provide the full $4.8 million requested by Exel.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/sept97/95-1524.wpd.html">SCHWARTZ V. CELESTIAL SEASONINGS, INC.<BR></A><BR>
This court reverses and remands. (1) Judge Henry was not present during oral argument. He was vouched in. The IPO Prospectus revealed that Celestial was introducing new ready to drink (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2304.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
His fingerprints are all over the state's history for the last half of the 20th century. Where were you born and raised?
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1995/95a1115p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The issue presented is whether the monies expended by the tenant before bankruptcy can be recouped or otherwise credited against rental payments due thereafter. Landlord Flagstaff Realty Associates was obligated to maintain the parking area and exterior of the building in good repair. The specific bases for rejection were that the rent provided in the lease was below market value and that tenant had asserted a claim for $477. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(d) and 1291 (West 1993). There are no disputes as to the material facts. Our first inquiry is what rent is reserved under the lease. Pa. 1989)(
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-1410.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Stinson alleged that she\ is a resident of Maine. She sued SimplexGrinnell as a\ limited partnership but failed to allege that none of the members\ of the partnership are citizens of Maine. 000 and that Stinson is a citizen of\ Maine. The parties have given no indication of the existence\ of a limited partner with Maine citizenship. Loranger</span> was on brief for appellant.</span></span></p> <p><span style=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=06-3665_018.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Is so rundown that it is a public nuisance. New West is trying to litigate the tenants' rights rather than its own. The district court held that this defensive use is the exclusive remedy. That would be so if defendants were private actors. §1983 allows a suit against state actors when the objective is to obtain a declaration that a rule of federal law supersedes the rules that the state actors are implementing. Dismissing this claim was especially inappropriate. As the suit in which preemption would be offered as a defense is itself in federal court. The condemnation action was removed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and is pending in the Northern District of Illinois as No. 05 C 6746 before the same judge who resolved New West's suit. The condemnation action had been on the judge's docket for more than nine months before New West's suit was dismissed. That the condemnation action is pending in federal court suggests that it is imprudent to resolve the current suit until the condemnation proceeding has been finally resolved.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/03/03-2575.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
In exchange for a partnership interest: Adco was entitled to 20% of any returns exceeding $1.1 million. On the theory that he should have seen a huge verdict coming and ensured that Adco got a slice. (Federal bankruptcy law is the source of subject matter jurisdiction. A further complication is that Rovell failed to give timely notice of the malpractice claim to his insurance carrier. Its problem is not standing but substance: Adco transferred to HJV any interest in both the intellectual property and the ensuing claim against Mobil and Taylor. Adco's injury thus is deriv No. 03 2575 3 ative rather than direct HJV did not recover enough to call for a payout to Adco. No rule of Oklahoma law of which we are aware permits a partner such as Adco to litigate independently on account of an injury done to a partnership. Adco therefore is not entitled to recover against Rovell. Adco's demand for an independent recovery is a thinly disguised effort to undo the assignment to which it consented during the Oklahoma litigation.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5EF0EE97A0F2EDF9882571D100537B38/$file/0474624.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Janis (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/014052.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Which is principally owned by Thomas O. The substantive claims asserted by the parties are actually relatively simple: the Coffeys claim that Kool Mann owes them the balance remaining of the $5 million purchase price from the sale of LCSDI. While Kool Mann contends that it is entitled to a number of set offs against that balance because of alleged misrepresentations by the Coffeys as well as certain other deductions. It is the tortured procedural history of this matter which makes this appeal exceedingly and unnecessarily complex. We have detailed only those facts that bear on our current disposition.1 In light of the protracted nature of this litigation and the length of time and judicial resources it has consumed. We have taken it upon ourselves to determine the value of the Coffeys' proof 1. The facts of this case have been well documented in a number of previously published opinions. We have done so even though under normal circumstances we might have been inclined to remand to the District Court for a remand to the Bankruptcy Court to recalculate the damage figures.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A19E2EB47F95923E88257168007C9290/$file/0455647.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
We conclude that they have failed to make a prima facie showing 5260 COLBERN v. We hold in the alternative that appellees had a legitimate non discriminatory reason for the actions they took and that such reason was nonpretextual. Appellants are virtually all Caucasian3 former MLB players who played in the Major Leagues for less than four years between 1947 and 1979 and were accordingly denied MLB pension and medical benefits.4 Until 1947. African Americans were not allowed to Colbern played for the Chicago White Sox in 1978 and 1979. MLB commissioner Allan
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-5152.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Title to the Tulsa Property is held by a limited partnership. Whose general partner is 61 MM Corp. The partnership and the corporation are both parties to this dispute and will be referred to collectively as the 61 MM Defendants. The remaining defendant who is a party to this appeal is FPM S.A. d/b/a Finastate Projects Management S.A. A Swiss corporation whose principal place of business is Fribourg. Both of which are Panamanian corporations. Have not been served. (FSM is the successor in interest to Finastate SA. The latter will be referred to as FSM in this opinion.). Who were not parties to the Fiduciary Agreement and who forfeited any objection to venue by not timely raising it. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for further proceedings regarding the meaning under Swiss law of the forum selection clause and whether dismissal is appropriate under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Yavuz was to have a 20% ownership share in the Tulsa Property. Was the value of the gold and silver that Mr.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-3105a.html">USA V. DURENBERGER DAVID F<BR></A><BR>
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan96/94-2782.opa.html">LARUE V. JOANN M.<BR></A><BR>
This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Larue v. Larue was a seaman employed as deckhand on a tug owned and operated by Moran Towing. When the tug's duties were completed she commenced retrieving from the deck of the Joann M. the 200 pound tow line that she had provided to the vessel. This required crewmen of the Joann M. to lift the
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19943563.OP.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants were convicted of conspiracy and bank fraud. Two appellants were also convicted of money laundering. Larrison were partners in a joint venture to develop a real estate project in Pinellas County. Twitty wrote Freedom stating: Thirty nine (39) out of 42 units are presently contracted for. Chief among the conditions 2 was the pre sale of twenty one of the proposed forty two condominiums in binding. The evidence at trial was that Roome and Feldman were not bona fide purchasers. Each was induced to sign purchase agreements for condominiums. Was told that they would never have to close on the contracts. They were told that the joint venture would arrange. They were each rewarded with a discount toward the purchase of a $120. Twitty assured Freedom that Roome actually was planning to close on her twenty condominiums and that she had the financial ability to do so. 3 Without Roome's twenty contracts. The joint venture did not have enough pre sales to satisfy the conditions set by Freedom for the financing.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200002/98-1245a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs were John P. Wilcox argued the cause and was on the briefs for petitioner Washington Water Power Company. With him on the brief were Jay L. With him on the brief were Joseph H. Was the main shipper on the line. This so called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021138.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The action was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Piney Creek Limited Partnership (
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19943563.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants were convicted of conspiracy and bank fraud. appellants were also convicted of money laundering. following sentence. Larrison were partners in a joint venture to develop a real estate project in Pinellas County. Twitty wrote Freedom stating: Thirty nine (39) out of 42 units are presently contracted for. Only if Twitty Chief and among the the others promised was to the meet certain of conditions. conditions pre sale twenty one of the proposed forty two condominiums in binding. The evidence at trial was that Roome and Feldman were not bona fide purchasers. Each was induced to sign purchase agreements for condominiums. Was told that they would never have to close on the contracts. They were told that the joint venture would arrange. They were each rewarded with a discount toward the purchase of a $120. Twitty assured Freedom Roome actually was planning to close on her twenty condominiums and that she had the financial ability to do so. The joint venture did not have enough pre sales to satisfy the conditions set by Freedom for the financing.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov98/95-5137.man.html">BMC INDUS., INC. V. BARTH INDUS., INC. (11/18/1998, NO. 95-5137)<BR></A><BR>
Therefore was liable under the theory of promissory estoppel for Barth's nonperformance.</P> <P> A jury resolved the breach of contract and promissory estoppel issues in favor of BMC. We conclude that the court should have granted Nesco judgment as a matter of law. Manufactures semi finished polymer opthalmic lenses that are used in the production of eyeglasses. These lenses are created by an assembly line process. The assembly is inspected and then heated and cured until the monomer solidifies into a plastic lens. The lens is removed from the mold assembly through a process called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3865_029.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Thomas' claim should have been dismissed because it did not satisfy the requirements of the Illinois Whistleblower Act. Thomas' brief incorrectly affirmed that Guardsmark's jurisdictional statement was complete and correct. We hope to make it clear once and for all (if such a wish for finality were possible) that an appellant's naked declaration that there is diversity of citizenship is never sufficient.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/98opinions/98-7209b.html">DISTRICT INTOWN PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. D.C.<BR></A><BR>
Christensen argued the cause for appellants. </p> <p>With him on the briefs was Stacey L. With him on the </p> <p>brief were Jo Anne Robinson. Nelson were on the brief for amicus </p> <p>curiae The National Trust for Historic Preservation and D.C. </p> <p>Preservation League.</p> <p>Before: Edwards. All nine lots were declared </p> <p>historic landmarks. </p> <p>finding that the construction was incompatible with the prop </p> <p>erty's landmark status. The District Court found that there was no categori </p> <p> . The property as it was </p> <p>originally purchased in 1961 and as it was held for 27 years </p> <p>prior to the 1988 subdivision. When the proper </p> <p>ty is viewed as a single parcel. There is no doubt that it has </p> <p>not been rendered valueless. Even if each subdivided </p> <p>parcel is considered separately. The record </p> <p>here does not show that District Intown's investment backed </p> <p>expectations were disappointed. This is not surprising. Be </p> <p>cause District Intown could not have had any reasonable </p> <p>investment backed expectations of development given the </p> <p>background regulatory structure at the time of subdivision. </p> <p>Accordingly.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199912/98-7209b.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Stacey L. With him on the brief were Jo Anne Robinson. Nelson were on the brief for amicus curiae The National Trust for Historic Preservation and D.C. All nine lots were declared historic landmarks. Finding that the construction was incompatible with the prop erty's landmark status. The District Court found that there was no categori cal taking under Lucas. The property as it was originally purchased in 1961 and as it was held for 27 years prior to the 1988 subdivision. When the proper ty is viewed as a single parcel. There is no doubt that it has not been rendered valueless. Even if each subdivided parcel is considered separately. The record here does not show that District Intown's investment backed expectations were disappointed. This is not surprising. Be cause District Intown could not have had any reasonable investment backed expectations of development given the background regulatory structure at the time of subdivision. The property was known as Cathedral Mansions South and consisted of an apartment building and adjacent landscaped lawns.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199912/98-7209a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the briefs was Stacey L. With him on the brief were Jo Anne Robinson. Nelson were on the brief for amicus curiae The National Trust for Historic Preservation and D.C. All nine lots were declared historic landmarks. Finding that the construction was incompatible with the prop erty's landmark status. The District Court found that there was no categori cal taking under Lucas. The property as it was originally purchased in 1961 and as it was held for 27 years prior to the 1988 subdivision. When the proper ty is viewed as a single parcel. There is no doubt that it has not been rendered valueless. Even if each subdivided parcel is considered separately. The record here does not show that District Intown's investment backed expectations were disappointed. This is not surprising. Be cause District Intown could not have had any reasonable investment backed expectations of development given the background regulatory structure at the time of subdivision. The property was known as Cathedral Mansions South and consisted of an apartment building and adjacent landscaped lawns.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1654.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
P.C.</SPAN> was on brief. LLP</SPAN> was on brief. LLP</SPAN> were on brief. That is only a step along the road to meaningful relief. This is a case in point.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE=
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/187277432C25C8998825703B0082E980/$file/0356349.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Two provisions of these assumption agreements are at issue here: The parties selected New York law as governing their obligations and Peters and Osley waived the benefit of any statute of limitations defense. OSLEY because the suits were filed after the statute of limitations expired. Ruled the New York choice of law clause of the assumption agreements was enforceable and that New York law barred the waiver of the statute of limitations. Concluding ABF's claims were timebarred under the New York statute of limitations. The order granting dismissal was entered on April 10. Timeliness of Appeal [1] If an order is appealable. When judgment is entered for purposes of appeal depends upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. When a judgment is not set forth on a separate document. Then it is deemed entered for purposes of appeal 150 days from entry ABF CAPITAL CORP. v. Osley and Peters argue ABF's notices of appeal were untimely because the 180 day timetable was shortened after ABF prematurely moved to alter or amend judgment under Civil Rule 59(e) on April 24.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19955137.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Was formed and received all of the assets and liabilities of Barth Industries. Which was the sole shareholder of Barth Industries. The remaining one percent interest was acquired by BIC 2 1 of the contract. Therefore was liable under the theory of promissory estoppel for Barth's nonperformance. We conclude that the court should have granted Nesco judgment as a matter of law. Manufactures semi finished polymer opthalmic lenses that are used in the production of eyeglasses. These lenses are created by an assembly line process. The assembly is inspected and then heated and cured until the Corporation. The final judgment in this case was entered against Barth Industries. The lens is removed from the mold assembly through a process called
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/May1998/98a1861p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
The district court ruled that this suit under ERISA was barred under New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine because Fornarotto's previously filed tort action was sufficiently related to the instant action to trigger application of that doctrine. For the reasons that follow we will reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Fornarotto was employed by the New Jersey American Water Company (a subsidiary of American Waterworks Company. Fornarotto was eligible to participate in the company's pension plan which provided different levels of benefits to eligible employees. The employee becomes disabled and is
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0363p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
Defendants argue that (1) the actions of a magistrate judge were invalid and void because of a delayed formal order of referral by the district court. (2) the documents of a corporation that are generated after its administrative dissolution become personal documents. Was incorporated under Kentucky state law on June 26. Boyd was designated president. Was served on Boyd. Boyd argued that the records were personal records. He concluded that B & D was estopped from asserting that it no longer existed as a corporation. B & D was serving an intended business function and was engaged in business. The magistrate judge determined that B & D was required to produce its corporate records and that Boyd. Concluding that they were personal rather than corporate and thus outside the scope of the IRS summons. After de novo review of the portions of the magistrate judge's final R & R as to which objections were filed. It rejected Boyd's argument that B & D's dissolved corporate status meant that the records of the corporation created post dissolution were personal records qualifying for a Fifth Amendment privilege.
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1568.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
With him on the brief was Keith H. Of counsel was Catherine L. Jackson may not collaterally challenge the district court's previous judgment that he is entitled to only $2.65 million rather than $12 million in damages for the manufacture. Which was affirmed in a previous appeal. Jackson is not entitled to a second trial as a matter of right simply because the district court stayed his counterclaims of indirect infringement. Jackson argued that the jury's damages award was reasonable based on the evidence that he adduced at trial showing the benefits Glenayre's customers enjoyed by infringing the '900 patent. Or conveying
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/10/03-6104.htm">03-6104 -- CLUB V. SEABOARD FARMS INC. -- 10/28/2004<BR></A><BR>
CERCLA's statutory definition of this term is somewhat turbid. Is unambiguous. We are led to the contrary conclusion because another part of the statute's text provides a catch all provision that encompasses Seaboard's entire production site. Each building is separated by 40 to 100 feet. <p> At issue are the emissions from Dorman Farm's waste management system. Land application area is a separate facility. Seaboard is obligated to report under
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<TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/02/041349P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR>
They argue that the district court1 erred in finding that the IRS had a legitimate purpose for its investigation and that the information sought was relevant to such a purpose. IRS Agent Cheryl Kiger concluded that the partnership was an abusive tax shelter. She sought approval from the IRS Lead Development Center for an investigation into whether Kaiser and Mueller were promoting or distributing abusive tax shelters. 2002 and the case was assigned to Agent Kiger. That information regarding their dealings with other clients was material and necessary to determine whether they had acted unlawfully and whether injunctive relief should be pursued. That the IRS did not already have the informat |
