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	OPINION/ORDER This case is an example of how the best laid plans of mice and men can often go awry. I. BACKGROUND The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. He was survived by his wife. Who were minors when he died. Of which he was both grantor and trustee. Three days before he executed his will. The allocation herein to the Marital Trust shall have a value equal to the smallest pecuniary amount which. Only to the extent that those state death taxes are not thereby increased. The Residuary Trust is established pursuant to section 4.2. The remainder of the trust estate not allocated to the Marital Trust or used for the payment of the debts and expenses of Lurie's estate was to be allocated into a Residuary Trust for the benefit of Mrs. Section 4.1 of the Revocable Trust instrument provides that if the residue of the probate estate was insufficient. Then any remaining expenses from the administration of his estate were to be paid from the Revocable Trust. To the extent that the assets of the Grantor's estate . . . are insufficient.
	OPINION/ORDER We will reverse the order of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Overview of Affected Parties The underlying matter in this appeal is an accounting malpractice action. The Trustee's principal allegation is that Price Waterhouse erroneously reported in its audit that accrued interest on Litigation Trust accounts belonged to the debtor rather than to the Litigation Trust. Underlying this claim was a suit between the Litigation Trust and the debtor. Price Waterhouse's erroneous reports were relied on by the bankruptcy court to the Litigation Trust's detriment. Is not a party to the malpractice action. The Trustee alleges the debtor's estate would still be affected by the malpractice suit because the Litigation Trust is effectively a continuation of the bankruptcy estate. Who were former creditors of the debtor's estate. Is not a continuation of the bankruptcy estate for jurisdictional purposes. Price Waterhouse contends the debtor is only tangentially affected by this malpractice action after it assigned away its interests in the litigation claims.
	OPINION/ORDER The U.S. bankruptcy court and the U.S. district court have rendered conflicting judgments that decide the claims of the surviving spouse and that affect the distribution of the net property of the decedent's trust and probate estate. While active probate proceedings were pending in the courts of the State of Texas. In a cross appeal the surviving spouse seeks to reverse the district court's determination that the bankruptcy proceeding was not a core proceeding. Which reduced the sum she was awarded by the bankruptcy court. Incidentally we are required to determine whether the probate exception applies in a bankruptcy case. We have appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Are bound by the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction and that we are required to refrain from deciding state law probate matters. No matter how the issue is framed by the parties. Howard Marshall II were initially named as co trustees of the 1982 trust. They were married on June 27. Last will and testament or conveyance in which Vickie Lynn Marshall is identified as a legatee.
	OPINION/ORDER As Co Trustee of the Marital Trust Created under the will of Willet H. As Co Trustees of the Marital Trust Created Under the Will of Willet H. We must consider whether the IRS was entitled to apply the
	OPINION/ORDER Venue is proper pursuant to 26 U.S.C. We will reverse the Tax Court's decision. Leaving a will which provided that its
	OPINION/ORDER That the inter vivos transfer was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration under 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). At the age of eighty eight.1 She was survived by her son. Who is the executor of The facts we recite are undisputed facts. Was attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney from 1986 until decedent died. Is the attorney of record for this appeal. These gifts were in keeping with decedent's practice of making cash gifts to her children every year around Christmas. After she was released from the hospital. Which was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a first position deed of trust on the Padaro Lane property in favor of the bank. 2 whose stated purpose was to engage in the business of owning and operating residential real property.
	96-1403 -- LINDBERG V. U.S. -- 01/13/1999 The Estate argues that it is entitled to a deduction for payments of $2.27 million made to settle Buell's descendants' tort claims for interference with inheritance. (2) the payments were an administrative expense under I.R.C.
	OPINION/ORDER ESQUIRE McDermott Will & Emery 227 West Monroe Street. This case involves twelve1 consolidated appeals from the District Court's order approving Combustion Engineering's bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.2 We will vacate and remand. The state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits. The difficulties with asbestos litigation have been well documented by RAND and others.3 Efforts to resolve the asbestos problem through global settlement class actions under Fed. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) have so far been unsuccessful. Mounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy. The centerpiece of the Plan is an injunction in favor of Combustion Engineering that channels all of its asbestos claims to a post confirmation trust (the
	OPINION/ORDER The IRS assessed additional gift taxes on the grounds that Armstrong undervalued the stock when the original gift taxes were paid. So
	ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536) The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes.
	ESTATE OF ATKINSON V. COMMISSIONER (10/16/2002, NO. 01-16536) The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. Any applicable estate taxes.
	OPINION/ORDER Trustees of the Stock Trust Under Item Third of the Will of Rodman Wanamaker. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Leaving a will and codicils[fn1] that established trusts for his children and their descendants. At issue in this case is a $120 million trust created in Paragraph Third of his will. The stock was sold for $60 million. After the stock was sold. Holding that Wanamaker had intended to provide spendthrift protection for his great grandchildren and Kellogg's interest in the trust was protected. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Our review of the district court's construction of Pennsylvania law is de novo. Will be reviewed de novo.
	ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="885"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july96/94-5211.opa.html">ESTATE OF SHELFER V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Shelfer v. The court held that Lucille's estate was not liable for a tax deficiency assessed on the value of a trust from which she had received income during her lifetime. Claiming that the trust met the definition of a qualified terminable interest property trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1996/96a1462p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will reverse and remand with the direction that the tax court enter judgment in favor of appellant. I. The facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties. Decedent transferred her remainder interest in her shares to Vaparo in exchange for an annuity which was to pay her $296. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that she made this transfer in contemplation of death or with testamentary motivation. The parties stipulate that this was also the fair market value of the remainder interest. The tax court reasoned that the transfer of the remainder interest in the Vaparo stock was an abusive tax avoidance scheme that should not be permitted: In the instant case. Was excluded therefrom. Decedent's transfer of the remainder interest was of a testamentary nature. Made when she was 80 years old to a family owned corporation in return for an annuity worth more than $1 million less than the stock itself. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482. Both parties agree that our standard of review for this issue of law is plenary. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="880"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1994/94a0890p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will reverse the district court's order. We will remand the case to the district court for the proceedings we outline in this opinion. Which was the post petition portion of the fourth quarter wages it withheld for payment to the City of Farrell. The city contends that Begier held that a trust is created for the benefit of the taxing authority whenever an employer withholds a portion of an employee's wages as income taxes. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="879"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May19/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="879"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May18/03-60348-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tunica casino boat was to be constructed on site. The Biloxi boat named the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="878"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054168p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Laher's TIAA CREF retirement annuity is excluded from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). We hold that it is. Will reverse the decision of the District Court and order that the case be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for entry of an order excluding the annuity from the bankruptcy estate. Pre tax contributions were taken from his paycheck and accumulated into a sum that would be used to purchase a contract that would pay him an annuity over time after retirement.1 Salary </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="875"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb1995/94a0957p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Others whose identities are presently unknown. Robertson is the beneficiary of a testamentary trust that names the Bank as trustee. She asserts that the district court erred in holding that a will provision authorizing the Bank to retain its own stock protected it from liability for failure to diversify trust assets when she failed to show that the Trustee acted either </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="871"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTUxNTEtYWdfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-5151-ag_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that investment advice fees incurred by a trust are not fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code under 26 U.S.C. § 67(e)(1). Instead are deductible only to the extent that they exceed two percent of the trust's adjusted gross income pursuant to § 67(a). Because the remaining members of the Panel are in agreement. Circuit Judge: The question presented on this appeal is whether investment advice fees incurred by a trust are fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="870"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/94AA2EF4319F6F2F88256F93005945E3/$file/0372240.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 7482(a). Davis executed both a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="866"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/99a2278.htm">99A2278- DARDOVITCH V. HALTZMAN<BR></A><BR> The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. <p>Haltzman challenges this reading of the Trust and contingent fee agreement. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="866"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/981421.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The principal appellant is defendant Mark S. In which she was a major shareholder. There were numerous beneficiaries. The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. Haltzman argues that this subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because Dardovitch's claim fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement. Haltzman contends that the amount in controversy is determined by payments presently due. That is ordinarily the case. The central issue is whether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement that is not specific on the point is entitled to additional fees for collecting the proceeds of the settlement or judgment. That he was therefore not entitled to additional fees for the collection actions. The District Court thus held that Haltzman had breached his fiduciary duty to the Trust by accepting legal fees for collecting on the notes that were the Trust's sole assets. Arguing that they were limited to his prosecution of the action to judgment. This award was based on the conclusion that most of this work was necessitated by Haltzman's continued refusal to admit that Dardovitch was a beneficiary of the Trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="862"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-9010.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was born on June 12. True (David). <hr> Dave was a successful entrepreneur and established a number of companies involved in oil and gas exploration. Companies which generated a substantial amount of revenue often provided the funds to support companies which were not as profitable. Dave developed a business philosophy which was guided by four basic principles. Buy sell agreements were necessary to avoid conflicts among owners and to establish clear (1) Of these business entities. The True Ranches were structured as partnerships under Wyoming law. White Stallion Ranch were structured as Subchapter S corporations. <hr> exit strategies. Each True company was governed by buy sell agreements which embodied these business principles. Disability were each treated as if the holder of the interest had notified the other owners of his or her intent to withdraw from ownership. The other owners were required to purchase the departing owner's interests at a formula price listed in the buy sell agreement. The formula prices in the buy sell agreements were derived from a calculation of the tax book value for the various True companies. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="861"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116536.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Tax Court held that no charitable deduction was allowable. Because the law is clear. Atkinson signed a will and created two trusts: the Melvine B. The Tax Court found that no annuity payments were ever actually made to Atkinson from the assets of the annuity trust. The estate continues to claim that checks 2 were sent to Atkinson. That Atkinson saw no need to cash them because her material needs were amply met by non trust assets. This claim is undercut by the fact that the estate produced no copies of these checks or the cover letters that supposedly accompanied the checks to Atkinson. The non charitable beneficiaries next in line to the annuity trust's assets were compelled to make an election. The estate was required to file its federal estate tax return. Found that the estate was not entitled to take any charitable deduction because the annuity trust failed to comply with certain statutory procedures applicable to the deductibility of charitable remainders. Which agreed with the IRS that a charitable deduction was not appropriate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="853"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-4316.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Have been audited by the Internal Revenue Service virtually. Every year since Richard Nixon was President. Kanter was a wellknown and accomplished tax and estate lawyer. Among Kanter's clients was the Pritzker family of Hyatt Corporation fame. Kanter was also an accomplished businessman. Was an expert on the subject of trusts and estate planning. His estate was subsequently substituted as the principal party to this litigation. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="850"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D1C65E15B69260CA88256F9C0001B12B/$file/0335406.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 was an Oregon investment management company that made investments for several hundred individuals. The employee plans are retirement and other employee benefit plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2 Under investment advisory agreements and powers of attorney. In some of the agreements discussed below CCI was the signing or designated party. Some of the ERISA plans were also multiemployer trust funds subject to the Labor Management Relations Act. The receiver also returned about $20 million in cash held in clients' custodial accounts.3 The publicly held securities and cash were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="848"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/00opinions/00-5044.html">WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for defendant appellee.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="844"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept95/94-8287.opa.html">ESTATE OF HUBERT V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Hubert v. We affirm the United States Tax Court holding that the marital and charitable deductions are to be reduced only by the portion of administration expenses allocated to principal and not by amounts allocated to income. <i>Estate of Otis C. This holding brings us in conflict with the two other circuits which have decided the issue. <i>Estate of Street v. Specifically declined to accept the reasoning in <i>Street</i> in a comprehensive opinion.<p> Since the Tax Court wrote a careful analysis of every argument that is made by the Commissioner on this appeal. </i> the Tax Court was confronted with other issues not raised on this appeal so that the portion attached deals only with the issue on this appeal. Is the following footnote on page 2 of the original opinion:<p> We are using the terms </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="844"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept95/94-8287.opa.html">ESTATE OF HUBERT V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Estate of Hubert v. We affirm the United States Tax Court holding that the marital and charitable deductions are to be reduced only by the portion of administration expenses allocated to principal and not by amounts allocated to income. <i>Estate of Otis C. This holding brings us in conflict with the two other circuits which have decided the issue. <i>Estate of Street v. Specifically declined to accept the reasoning in <i>Street</i> in a comprehensive opinion.<p> Since the Tax Court wrote a careful analysis of every argument that is made by the Commissioner on this appeal. </i> the Tax Court was confronted with other issues not raised on this appeal so that the portion attached deals only with the issue on this appeal. Is the following footnote on page 2 of the original opinion:<p> We are using the terms </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="843"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0024p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Whose primary assets are voting and nonvoting stock in Ervin Industries. Who have interests in two of the three trusts. Are the other beneficiaries of the voting stock trust. The essence of her claim was that Bank One's lending relationship with Ervin Industries caused Bank One to have a conflict of interest and abdicate its responsibilities as trustee in the course of three business transactions. We conclude that dismissal was proper. The Trusts and the Parties There are three trusts involved in this litigation. Two of these trusts are testamentary. The first testamentary trust was created by John Ervin. Ervin Industries is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. Is its current president. The primary asset of Ervin's testamentary trust was Ervin Industries' Class A voting stock. His daughter and four grandchildren are the income beneficiaries. Are parties to this suit. This substantial trust was divided into five separate trusts in 1987 so that each beneficiary had his or her own trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="842"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1976.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: On page 10. Cullen & Resnick were on brief for 604 Columbus Avenue. Gottlieb were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Of the Third Circuit. This is a case involving a failed loan transaction that well illustrates Polonius' advice. Among which were the property owned by the Trust itself and properties of the Trust's principal beneficiary. Of which Millicent Young was sole beneficiary. The Young Family Trust was a named plaintiff in the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy and district courts below. The Bank was declared unsound by Massachusetts banking officials. The FDIC was appointed 7 receiver. In February 1991 was substituted as defendant appellant in the district court. That the FDIC was entitled to raise the defenses available to it under the doctrine of estoppel established in D'Oench. The district court vacated that part of the bankruptcy court's judgment that was premised on the secret agreement by one of the Trust's principals to provide kickbacks to a Bank officer. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="840"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3B181A3BD78A945088256E5A00707D47/$file/9835154.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="840"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/51BFE3F68EDF896E88256B0300792F66/$file/9835154.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Appellants' First Amendment claim in light of Phillips. One of the most significant is loyalty to the client. Lawyers have long been required to place their clients' money in bank accounts separate from their own. Lawyers in all fifty states are held to that same high standard of professional conduct. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="834"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972683.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Before the bankruptcy petition was filed. Done all that was necessary to obtain its lien against the debtor's after acquired property. Determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. We affirm. 2 I Dwight Avis was placed in an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding by a petition filed by his creditors on May 10. Under his will. Maureen was given a power of appointment to convey trust assets to the beneficiaries. Her own support and maintenance were administered by trustees. In Maureen's will. She exercised the power of appointment given to her by the Davis Weir trust by bequeathing whatever was left of the trust's assets to the beneficiaries. Because Avis' interest was contingent on (1) how the Davis Weir trust was administered. It was unclear to Avis what. The bankruptcy estate was closed on December 15. He timely moved to have the bankruptcy proceedings reopened in order to bring the inheritance within the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A). 819 of its claim was secured by a lien that it had obtained almost a year before Avis was placed 3 in bankruptcy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200116211.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors. Appellee is entitled to receive an annual amount equal to 7% of the net worth of the trust. The payments are due in monthly installments. Who is unemployed. Appellee is the only beneficiary currently entitled to receive income payments under the trust. Appellee's only rights are to receive the 7% income payments. Her powers are generally limited to directing investment decisions. She does not have the discretion to invade the trust corpus or to alter the amount of payments made to the trust beneficiaries. Appellee is prohibited from assigning or otherwise alienating her interest in the trust by virtue of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2002/01-16211.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/03/99-9031.htm">99-9031 -- MCMORRIS V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/20/2001<BR></A><BR> We reverse and remand with directions to vacate the deficiency assessment at issue here and to recalculate any remaining unrelated deficiencies owing. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="831"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2002/01-16211.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which was created by the debtor prior to insolvency. Was established to provide income to the debtor for her lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. The debtor contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. The debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies as a support trust. Is not exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Is not likewise subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors. </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="828"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/11/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 11/04/2003<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="828"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/07/01-4229.htm">01-4229 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 07/08/2003<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="821"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/06/036010P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nonstock one of which was herbicide for its crops. Several fertilizer liens were also filed in Madison and Pierce Counties. Negotiations were undertaken between DLC and Cooperative for damages. Finding that DLC was indebted to Cooperative on its open account in the sum of $15. The court also found that the affirmative defenses raised by DLC were conclusions of law and that no facts were alleged in support of the conclusions. Which was denied on October 12. This decision was appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. In 1995 the Court of Appeals found there were genuine issues of material fact for trial. This decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Demerath Land Co. v. After its RICO action was dismissed. The request was denied. Found that Cooperative was entitled to a judgment for $27. The appeal was summarily dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court on April 14. No deeds were prepared. Three lawsuits were filed by Fort Calhoun State Bank against DLC. Those suits alleged that the real estate conveyances were fraudulent transfers under the Nebraska Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="820"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-2175.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Those one third interests were devised. Luthy's name.(1) The dispute we encounter is between Mr. Luthy was to have absolute control over the Lease and was to periodically disburse profits to the beneficiaries. His will named Albuquerque National Bank as executor of his estate and as trustee of his testamentary trust. Luthy's estate was his one third interest in the Lease. N.A. is the successor in interest to Albuquerque National Bank and a series of other banks that served as Mr. We will generally refer to a lone entity. Luthy's original one third interest is now held in equal one ninth shares by Mr. The consideration for said lease was furnished and paid by myself and Paul Butt. Buckley being carried for a one third interest for workwhich he was to handle in connection with sale or development of the lease. It was agreed between Paul Butt. Buckley and myself that I was to have complete control and final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease. Said lease was made to me. I was to have complete control and final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease. . . . </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="819"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/03b0006p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case is before us on the bankruptcy Trustee's appeal from a ruling of the bankruptcy court that the Debtors. Were the beneficiaries of trusts with enforceable transfer restrictions such that their beneficial interests in those trusts were excluded from their bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Because we conclude that the Debtors failed to carry their burdens of proof that they were beneficiaries of trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The principal issue in this case is whether the bankruptcy court erred when it concluded that the Debtors' § 403(b) annuity plans constitute trusts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The bankruptcy court's determination that the assets of these pension plans were excluded from the bankruptcy estate by operation of § 541(c)(2) is a conclusion of law which is reviewed de novo. A court's findings of fact are accepted by appellate courts unless they are clearly erroneous. Both of which are qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) as tax sheltered annuity pension plans. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="818"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0010p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In which the precedential effect was limited. Was originally issued and filed on July 19. The court has now designated the opinion as one in which the precedential effect is fully precedential. Michigan. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="818"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0011n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the alleged preferential payments had not been property of the debtor because they were trust funds under Michigan law. The decision will be reversed and the proceeding remanded. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the defendant in a preference action who claims that it was paid with trust funds under the Michigan Building Contract Fund Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="818"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1962.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> LLC</SPAN> were on brief for appellant. P.A.</SPAN> were on brief for cross appellant. It ruled that because the Advest IRA was in Cox's name when Cox petitioned for bankruptcy. Hence was not subject to the later judgment of the divorce court. We reverse the court's decision as to the Advest IRA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </P> <UL> <LI><STRONG>BACKGROUND</STRONG></LI> </UL> <P> Laurie Davis and Thomas Cox were married on August 17. They have two minor children. Davis was a homemaker and. Cox was a successful commercial attorney. The court was required by Maine law to issue. The preliminary injunction was meant to keep intact. Is equitably divided by the court between the divorcing pair irrespective of in whose name it was held. <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="814"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/September2004/032184p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Including undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty as the executor of a will. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Appellant Robert Golden is a citizen of the state of New York and holds general power of attorney for Leah Golden. Appellant Donald Earwood is the personal representative of the estate of Helen Earwood. Golden and Darlene Koposko are both adult citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. King executed a Last Will and Testament (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="810"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2001/00-11663.man.html">O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="810"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011663.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="810"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2001/00-11663.man.html">O'NEAL V. UNITED STATES (7/26/2001, NO. 00-11663)<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="810"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200011663.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="808"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/08/973249P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellants contend that the district court erred in failing to hold that a taxpayer's disclaimer under Arkansas law has the legal effect of voiding interests created under Arkansas law such that federal tax liens are incapable of attachment. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper The Honorable Pasco M. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Facts The relevant facts are undisputed. 000.00 was personalty and $75. 000.00 was realty located in Pulaski County. Drye was survived by her son and sole heir at law. Drye was insolvent and owed the government approximately $325. Drye was appointed the Personal Representative and Administrator of his mother's estate in Pulaski County Probate No. 94 1440. Theresa Drye was appointed Successor Personal Representative and Administratrix of Irma Deliah Drye's estate on February 8. Joined in the election of the disclaimer in order to consent to the disclaiming of any dower or homestead interests that she might have had. 3 3 On March 10. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-8.gif" ALT="802"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/74E1E82C2998A93188256D0A007C7C7F/$file/0117240.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: 4952 IN RE KOLB Slip Opinion page 2940. Cassel argued that the disclaimer was a fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="799"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BD1236CEBC74486388256CDE005ECD0B/$file/0117240.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We conclude that debtor Theodore Kolb's contingent interest is an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Kolb's will granted his entire estate to his wife Hilde Kolb. One half of the estate was given to Hilde outright. The remaining one half was placed in a trust (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="792"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062483p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge This is a battle for William Knapp's estate. It is in federal court because he kept much of his wealth in employee benefit trusts that were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="788"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/April2003/021725p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. * Honorable William C. The Chapter 11 proceedings were converted to Chapter 7 proceedings. Cole Schotz advised the Debtor that all payments for future services would have to be paid from non estate sources. It is only the December 8. 218.57 that is at issue here. . . . if such payment . . . was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition. Newman & Schwartz was paid an additional $125. These payments are not at issue here. The Debtor's contingent interest in this trust was disclosed in the schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court on July 18. The Debtor testified concerning the terms of this trust at a hearing twenty days later that was attended by counsel for the Creditors Committee. The complaint was amended to seek recovery of the fees paid to Newman & Schwartz and to Cole Schotz on May 26. The claims against all other defendants were settled without a determination of whether the trust was part of the Debtor's estate. Which set forth the facts recounted above and averred that they had no knowledge that the Cook Islands trust was the source of the funds used by Stefanie to pay the fees at issue. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="787"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/byDate/May2004/May20/03-10529-CV0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF RUTH A. Ltd (Partnership) was includible in her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036 because the transfer was not a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration. (2) a transfer of assets in return for a pro rata partnership interest is not a transfer for full and adequate consideration. The district court also erred in failing to consider uncontroverted record evidence to support the taxpayer's position that the transfer was a bona fide sale. She was 96 years old. Is the Decedent's son and the executor of her estate. Which was a revocable living trust administered by Mrs. David Kimbell was the sole manager of the LLC. The oil and gas properties were a continuation of an oil and gas business that the Decedent's late husband had founded in the 1920's. Approximately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11%) and royalty (4%) interests. Kimbell's assets were conveyed to the LLC and the Partnership. The primary focus of this appeal is on this transfer from the LLC and the Trust to the Partnership. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="785"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/September2004/033173p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Concluding the transfer of assets was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. We will affirm. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="777"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/05/983648P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The decedent executed a will and a trust agreement. Article I of the will </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="770"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/12/061201P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The transfer was not a bona fide sale for consideration. When Edna was sixty eight and Austin seventy nine years old. The Korbys filed gift tax returns in 1995 claiming a discount of 43.61% on the book value of each gift because the limited partnership interests were minority interests. Their transfer was restricted. In February 1993 when she was diagnosed with severe Alzheimer's dementia. Were intended to pay for the limited partners' income taxes.3 Edna Korby died on July 3. Rejecting the claim that payments from KPLP to the living trust were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="766"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1994/94a0863p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Beekhuis was an officer. The site was sold to Brandywine Chemical. Because the site was contaminated with various chemicals. Witco's claim against Jeanne Beekhuis is in her representative capacity as executrix of the estate of Dr. Its claim against WTC is in its capacity of trustee. The district court entered two orders which are at issue in this appeal. The district court held that the Estate was entitled to statutory indemnification from Witco. The former is whether the three year statute of limitations established by Congress for contribution claims under CERCLA preempts state nonclaim statutes that govern the administration of decedents' estates. The latter issue is whether under CERCLA an estate of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="763"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972765.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The instant case is an appeal by certain creditors of Hatsy Heep ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/03/97-2317.htm">97-2317 -- TAYS V. METLER -- 03/19/1999<BR></A><BR> Plaintiff's motion to certify issues is denied. <p> <center><u>Background</u></center> <p> Helen D. Tays Testamentary Trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="758"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063007p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to determine whether Internal Revenue Code ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="756"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0388p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Against a civil action in which Amedisys is the plaintiff. Amedisys is a Louisiana corporation supplying home nursing services. Because the Louisiana action is an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="754"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/01opinions/01-5015.html">MELLON BANK V. US<BR></A><BR> Font family:Arial'>for plaintiffs appellants.<span style= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="753"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Jan1997/96a1486p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Michael Brown and Guy Michael (hereinafter the firm and its partners are collectively referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="753"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/06/032443P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> MJK was required to identify the collateral on its books. MJK's DTC account balance was negative. Which was a default under the MSL. Trading of GENI stock was halted. Appointing the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="750"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200516260.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The facts are undisputed. The corpus of the trust was the Raborn family horse farm. The Trust Agreement was not recorded in the public records. Was recorded in the Palm Beach County real estate records on 5 February 1991. The Trustee is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="749"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0309p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> His estate was worth approximately $10 million. Roughly $1.9 million in federal estate taxes was due as a result of Karam's death. Who are Karam's wife and children. The plaintiffs argue that Sagemark was untimely in seeking judgment as a matter of law and. Factual background Karam's trust agreement contained what is known as a tax equalization clause. The theoretical advantage of an equalization clause is that. Two smaller distributions on the deaths of each spouse will result in less total estate tax liability than would one large distribution on the death of the survivor. Are relatively uncommon in estate planning. More prevalent is the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="749"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/02/97-2136.htm">97-2136 -- CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. V. HEMPEL -- 02/22/2001<BR></A><BR> Hempel was the plaintiff in the state court proceedings against Mr. Alleging that his father was entitled to coverage for part of the state court judgment on the basis of a professional liability policy issued by that insurance company for the period from 1968 to 1969. <p> The insurers then filed crossclaims against Messrs. The district court ruled as follows: (1) it granted summary judgment to the insurers on their claim that the state court judgment was collusive and that. Westerfield's claim that he was entitled to coverage under the 1968 69 professional liability policy. <p> The losing parties as to all three of those rulings have now appealed. The dispute concerned Ada Mudge's rights under the will of her late husband Daniel Mudge. Mudge's estate was 23. 400 shares of common stock in what later became the Tandy Corporation. <p> Daniel Mudge's will directed his estate to be divided between Ada Mudge and Mr. The will appointed Eugene Graham. Graham as trustee. <p> Under the will. The Annuity Trust was to be funded with one third of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="747"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1602.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for appellee. Promised as part of a reciprocal will agreement with their father that she would devise her estate in equal shares to them and their stepsister. The question posed by this appeal is whether the estate may deduct the settlement amount for purposes of the federal estate tax. The answer depends upon whether the mutual will agreement was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="747"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1537.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.A. were on brief for appellant. Pandolph and Sulloway & Hollis were on brief for appellee Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. P.A. was on brief for appellees Bank of California. Is not a party. Seeks to recoup her losses from the institution ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="742"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001696.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 3 was ultimately valued at over $20 million. Because much of Hunter's estate was tied up in real estate. The trust was considered a complex trust and it took a deduction for this interest payment. The estate and the IRS entered into a settlement agreement in which the estate tax liability of the estate was substantially reduced. Regardless of who was the payee of the check for refunded interest from the IRS. The tax benefit rule is a judicially created doctrine. A completed transaction in one tax year will unexpectedly reopen in a subsequent tax year. Prove not to have been a deductible expense at all. Such a cancelation will occur only when a subsequent event is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="740"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/09/03-3067.htm">03-3067 -- STAFFORD V. CRANE -- 09/03/2004<BR></A><BR> He was judged mentally competent and released to the care of a nursing home. Seeking a declaratory judgment that the trust was void ab initio and seeking the return of all property received by the trust. Which was accepted by the district court. Holding that (1) the trust was void ab initio because the durable power of attorney did not expressly authorize the attorneys in fact to create the trust for Mr. Crane as trustee were misappropriations. Stafford conceded that he himself would have paid the bills for which the disbursements were made. Crane contends that (A) the parties' pre trial stipulation that the trust was null and void as of May 9. Stafford's claim at trial that the trust was void ab initio. Is a long time resident of Keyes. When the parties jointly stipulated that the Trust was null and void. Crane was trustee. Stafford was in the Alzheimer's unit from April until September 2000. Because even though he was competent. He sought a declaration that the Trust was void ab initio. Stafford's counsel advanced the argument that the Trust was null and void ab initio </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="737"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0371p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was transferred from TSR to a trust benefitting Heavrin and his stepsister. Heavrin and Bridges were ordered to pay the TSR Trustee the $250. Heavrin argues that the transfer was not fraudulent because all of the proceeds from the life insurance policy had previously been assigned by TSR to the McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation (MDFC). Therefore the policy was of no value to either TSR or the Trust. Was in settlement of unrelated lender liability claims that Harrod's estate had against MDFC. A Kentucky lawyer who was Harrod's stepson. When the loan agreement was actually executed three months later. TSR was substituted for S&B. TSR were all co signers on the $3.56 million loan from MDFC. For which all three were jointly and severally liable. (Four policies were also obtained on the life of Macatee. Although the details regarding these policies are not reflected in the record.). The Harrod policy from Transamerica was replaced by a $2 million policy issued by Jackson National. Shortly after the Transamerica policy was replaced by the Jackson National policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="735"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/10/01-5133.htm">01-5133 -- U.S. V. BOTEFUHR -- 10/31/2002<BR></A><BR> The Appellants are precluded from litigating the value of the Hondo stock in the present action. 184 F.3d at 1179. <p> Less than two years after the sale and over four years before Davenport and Vestal were to commence paying their promissory notes. Her last will and testament were admitted to probate in Tulsa. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="731"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/08/066009P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bankruptcy Judge This is an appeal and cross appeal from a Judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska issued on February 3. We will deal with these issues seriatim. 2 I. The Events Leading up to the Debtors' Bankruptcy Filing and Foreclosure Schropp and Dahlke were partners in thirteen commercial real estate partnerships with Prime Realty. McCart and Prime Realty are collectively referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="727"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021464.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> TRUST UNDER THE WILL OF JOHN STEWART BRYAN. Circuit Judge: Four federal taxpayers a trust and three of its beneficiaries appeal a district court's decision that they were not entitled to tax deductions for fees paid to investment advisors. The taxpayers maintain that a trust's investment advice fees should be fully deductible under § 67(e) of the Internal Revenue Code because such fees are incurred as a result of the fact that the income producing property is held in trust. We agree with the Government that such investment advice fees are not fully deductible. This appeal involves the Trust Under the Will of John Stewart Bryan (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="727"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2003/021917o.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The relevant facts are undisputed. Hechinger was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="726"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1631.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for appellee. Contending that Appellee Internal Revenue Service ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="723"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-4100a.htm">96-4100A -- TAYLOR V. RUPP -- 01/12/1998<BR></A><BR> For Appellant</a>. <p> A copy of the corrected cover page is attached for your convenience. <p> Very truly yours. Was denied discharge in bankruptcy on the basis that he had willfully and fraudulently omitted material information from his statements and schedules. Claiming that Harold's transfers to Julia of the assets at issue here were void or voidable as fraudulent conveyances or. That Harold had equitable interests in them such that the court should impose a constructive or resulting trust. <p> The bankruptcy judge determined that Harold retained a one half equitable interest in the couple's Park City home even though he had conveyed his share of a joint tenancy title to Julia seven years before when he was solvent. That this equitable interest was part of Harold's bankruptcy estate. The judge also determined that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a money judgment against Julia for $5. The district court summarily affirmed.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="723"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-4100.htm">96-4100 -- TAYLOR V. RUPP -- 01/12/1998<BR></A><BR> Was denied discharge in bankruptcy on the basis that he had willfully and fraudulently omitted material information from his statements and schedules. Claiming that Harold's transfers to Julia of the assets at issue here were void or voidable as fraudulent conveyances or. That Harold had equitable interests in them such that the court should impose a constructive or resulting trust. <p> The bankruptcy judge determined that Harold retained a one half equitable interest in the couple's Park City home even though he had conveyed his share of a joint tenancy title to Julia seven years before when he was solvent. That this equitable interest was part of Harold's bankruptcy estate. The judge also determined that the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a money judgment against Julia for $5. The district court summarily affirmed.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="719"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/07/983598P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> His will created the Grover M. The primary beneficiary of the trust was Mr. Bryan a general power of appointment by will. This transfer is subject to a special enactment known as the Generation Skipping Transfer tax (GST). Unless it is entitled to the benefit of an effective date provision under which transfers under a trust which was irrevocable on September 25. Are not subject to the GST tax. There is no sufficient reason not to apply the plain language of the statute. ¶ A of the will of Grover M. That is. In her will. She thus had a general power of appointment by will. Upon her death the remaining corpus of the trust was included in her estate for purposes of the federal estate tax. Bryan made her will in 1982. The will became effective upon Mrs. It is unnecessary to describe the details of the GST tax. It is sufficient for present purposes to know that the transfer was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="718"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2003/02/01-2212.htm">01-2212 -- WELLS FARGO BANK NEW MEXICO V. U.S. -- 02/11/2003<BR></A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="717"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971182.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland sitting as an appellate court in bankruptcy. Broumas was a banker with Madison National Bank of Virginia and a substantial shareholder in its parent company. James Koch was appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtors' bankruptcy estate. Lawton Rogers (Rogers) and the law firm of which he was a partner. Rogers was Broumas' lawyer. Broumas was Rogers' banker. The two were also friends and participated in several financial investments. The relationship between Rogers and Broumas was so close that Rogers allowed Broumas unlimited access to his accounts at Madison National Bank of Virginia as well as the Law Firm's account by giving Broumas signature authority over the accounts. No charges were brought against Rogers. There was sufficient equity in the residence to support them. Even though the residence was encumbered by a first and a second deed of trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="715"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1040.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief for appellants. Desmery and Craig and Macauley were on brief for appellee. Jun iper's companion claim for cleanup related attorney fees was disallowed as well. The drums were still at the facility when DEQE conduct ed its last site inspection. Juniper contends that the area was sub merged at the time. The Hemingway Bristol chapter 11 reorganization proceeding was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. A chapter 7 trustee was appointed. Were dis covered at the facility. 391 U.S. 471 (1968)).3 2Juniper alleges that an engineering firm was paid $30. An environmental consulting firm was paid $7. A law firm was paid $54. When the trustee's motion for summary judgment on count I was denied the bankruptcy court allowed Juniper to amend count I to assert a claim for contribu tion under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). On the ground that Juniper was the holder of a contingent CERCLA contribution claim based on a debt owed EPA for which Juniper. Bristol were jointly and severally liable. The bankruptcy court ruled that Hemingway and Bristol were responsible parties </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="712"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/12/971221P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> [Debtor] may not have filed income tax returns with either the IRS or the State of Missouri for the years. [Debtor] wishes to have [Snyder] represent him. Does not have the present cash with which to pay [Snyder]. [Snyder] is willing to represent [Debtor] based upon [Debtor's] proposal to give him a Second Deed of Trust in the property. ... *** 17. This Note was for Snyder's </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="712"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1881.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue here is whether an individual involved in a Massachusetts </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="708"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTQwNjEtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-4061-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> AS TRUSTEE OF THE ETHEL BROWNSTONE MARITAL TRUST UNDER ARTICLE SEVENTH OF WILL OF LUCIEN BROWNSTONE. I. Background Lucien Brownstone was a successful man during his life. In his will he created a trust for the benefit of his wife Ethel1. Created under Article Seventh of Lucien's will. Lucien's will also gave Ethel the power to distribute upon her death the remaining principal of the Trust to whomever she appointed in her will (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="708"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/07/99-8020.htm">99-8020 -- IN RE: CHAPTER 12 ESTATE OF HARRIS V. MCPHERSON TRUST -- 07/07/2000<BR></A><BR> Which are subject to a share agreement. Although the facts of this case are somewhat peculiar. Which have considered the seemingly common situation of creditors attempting to assert security interests in animals run. P. 4(a) and affirm. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="703"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972402.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> In an adversary proceeding commenced by those parties to recover from the bankruptcy estate 2 funds they claim were misappropriated by the debtor. Because we agree that summary judgment was proper. Is a former member of the Virginia bar who conducted residential real estate settlements through his company. Four transactions conducted by Dameron are relevant to this appeal. The Virginia State Bar received information indicating that Dameron was misappropriating settlement funds. Including 1 Shelter's closing instructions to Dameron stated as follows: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-7.gif" ALT="700"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/5EF0EE97A0F2EDF9882571D100537B38/$file/0474624.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Janis ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="698"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2001/00-12808.ord.html">SABER V. SALKIN (9/13/2001, NO. 00-12808)<BR></A><BR> The deed was recorded on January 20. At a time when Saber was clearly insolvent.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="698"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2001/00-12808.ord.html">SABER V. SALKIN (9/13/2001, NO. 00-12808)<BR></A><BR> The deed was recorded on January 20. At a time when Saber was clearly insolvent.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="697"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1317OPN.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> LLP</SPAN> were on brief. P.A.</SPAN> was on brief. Payson was that they had never represented Murray Keatinge. Disposed of that contention by holding that the issue of the existence of an attorney client relationship is one of fact. There is no rule in Maine that an attorney in such a position is never in an attorney client relationship with the grantor of the power and no rule that such an attorney is always in an attorney client relationship. <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="697"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1317.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> LLP</SPAN> were on brief. P.A.</SPAN> was on brief. Payson was that they had never represented Murray Keatinge. Disposed of that contention by holding that the issue of the existence of an attorney client relationship is one of fact. There is no rule in Maine that an attorney in such a position is never in an attorney client relationship with the grantor of the power and no rule that such an attorney is always in an attorney client relationship. <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="696"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/02/044029P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which money was never refunded by the proposed sellers when the conveyance was not completed. The agreement was only effective in the event The Honorable Richard H. United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 1 approval was received. 056.14 for the trust land even before Secretarial approval was obtained for the transfer. The Cudmores agreed to return Thorstenson's payments attributed to the trust land in the event that conveyance of the trust land was not ultimately approved by the Secretary. Was not part of this suit) for fraud and breach of contract over the land sale. After the evidence was presented to the jury. Were not recorded. Based upon his We have no information regarding the nearly fifteen year lapse between the originating contracts and the creation of the escrow account. 3 2 understanding that it was dismissed without prejudice. This ruling was never appealed. D. State Court Proceedings Against Virginia Cudmore Grover died in February 1997 and Virginia tentatively received a life estate in the trust property under the terms of Grover's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)approved will. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="692"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/June2004/032801p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was one of ten beneficiaries of a trust created by her uncle. The other beneficiaries sought declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to have the New Jersey adult adoption statute declared invalid and Maria's adoption proceedings declared null and void. I. Plaintiffs/Appellants are surviving beneficiaries of a revocable trust (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="691"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0010p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue in this case are the duties of disinterest and disclosure of an examiner appointed to facilitate a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Which was unable to meet obligations on $1.2 billion in debt and whose Nos. 02 6212/ 6213/6338/6340/ 6341/6344/6347 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro. As did the United States Trustee which is responsible for appointing bankruptcy examiners and trustees. The petition represented the largest bankruptcy case ever filed in Kentucky and at the time was one of the largest bankruptcy cases in the country. Schilling signed a document entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="689"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200612654.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We conclude that some of Becker's individual claims are subject to arbitration and others are not. Because she was not a signatory to the agreements. Were not signatories to the agreements. Davis was president and principal owner of Falcon FM and Falcon FP. Davis was also a registered representative and registered principal of IFG SEC and a registered investment advisor of IFG AS. The complaint alleges that all the defendants were working together to induce Becker and the Trust to adopt a financial strategy that was unsuitable for her personal investment objectives. The complaint also generally alleges that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0254p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is the beneficiary of that plan. Was an employee of the company and a plan participant until his death in 1995. Who were also parties to the action below. He was married to Brenda Fuston Petry Bryant ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-1886.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. This is an appeal from a Tax Court determination unfavorable to the estate of Ida Abraham (the Estate). That the purchase of the decedent's interests by the children were not bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. That action was taken in order to ensure that Mrs. Which were owned by Mrs. Were transferred to three family limited partnerships (FLPs). Abraham and her children were partners in those FLPs. When the FLPs were set up. Abraham received from her husband were three pieces of commercial real estate located in Tyngsboro and Walpole. The Walpole property was leased to a lumber yard. The other properties were skating rinks leased to third parties. The leases on all of these properties were long term. The feud was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. The litigation was also draining Mrs. There was a separate estate plan. The family also understood that the FLPs were a means to protect Mrs. The protection was there for her as a guarantee that she would live status quo.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FE9DB4596784BC4F88256A6F0081F41D/$file/9955851.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6C06D8136F71E47588256F00008266F4/$file/0335041.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The identity of the actual lender is not always clear. This case deals with whether old usury laws have caught up with modern practices in lending. Have the brokers and lenders involved here structured their transactions so clearly that there remain 12372 ZACHER v. We conclude that in certain instances they have. In others they have not. The plaintiffs appellants' (Borrowers) claims are timebarred by the applicable statutes of limitation. We will affirm in part and will reverse in part the orders of the district court. Will remand for further proceedings. Are the two lead cases in a group of putative class actions with similar allegations that were originally filed in King County Superior Court. Borrowers contend that their loans were usurious because Union and AMP were not licensed by the state of Washington to charge interest in excess of 12%. TMS and the Trust Defendants are subject to all claims and defenses that Borrowers may assert against Union and AMP. Union and AMP did not need licenses under the CLA because they were not lending their own money. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/FCD5B0E9FD2E964688256DA2005A70D6/$file/0215618.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an IRS claim for delinquent taxes secured outside of bankruptcy by a lien on a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan is secured in bankruptcy </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="688"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/24131F4B4D48DA4D88256E5A00707BA3/$file/9955851.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2 1 There are four consolidated appeals involving Debtors FTD and JDI. In an unpublished memorandum filed concurrently with this opinion. 2 Defendants' transactions were primarily with FTD. We refer only to FTD unless otherwise noted. 7680 alleging that collateral notes and trust deeds ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="686"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july2000/99-10846.opn.html">TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)<BR></A><BR> The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion. <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="686"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july2000/99-10846.opn.html">TELFAIR V. FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. (7/7/2000, NO. 99-10846)<BR></A><BR> The plan was confirmed on May 3. A responsibility that was not always met. Telfair was not an appropriate class representative and dismissed her claim. Which we will uphold unless it was an abuse of discretion. <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="685"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200311975.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a district court order denying the bondholder plaintiffs' motion to certify a class action and dismissing their complaint without prejudice on the grounds that they. Their case is not yet ripe. Of the dismissal. 2 1 issue was governed by a trust indenture.2 The bondholders were the intended third party beneficiaries of the trust indenture. A master trustee was appointed to oversee the transaction and collect payments as they became due. 1998.3 It is alleged that. It claims that it was unaware that the bondholders' perfected security interest had lapsed. S. Bank The security interest was perfected when the original UCC 1 financing statement was filed on December 22. It was effective for a five year period. Within six months prior to the expiration of the five year period beginning on the date the original financing statement was filed. The UCC 3 was due to be filed anytime from June 22. This was considered an event of default under Section 801 of the bond trust indenture. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="684"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/032263np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue presented by this appeal is whether an individual retirement account ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="682"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958347.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2). Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected debtor's argument and held that the IRA was included in her bankruptcy estate. We hold that debtor's IRA is excluded from the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) because of the restriction on its transferability. I. FACTS The facts are not in dispute. Included in debtor's schedules was an IRA. Which was opened in 1983 and valued Honorable John F. The parties stipulated that debtor's IRA was one defined by § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code [Title 26 of the United States Code].1 II. Standard of Review The sole question at issue in this case is whether 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) excludes from the property of a bankruptcy estate an IRA which is subject to a restriction on transfer by a state statute. Is a matter of law. novo review. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="682"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002232.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The notes were guaranteed jointly and severally by Peterson. 1 and Nancy Peterson.2 The notes were secured by two deeds of trust which encumbered three separate properties: Elm Farm Mobile Home Park. Who were not in bankruptcy. The Petersons removed them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia where the actions were designated Civil Action Nos. 96 264 A and 96 265 A. Peterson in his individual capacity and as trustee of the Peterson Trust unless otherwise indicated. 2 Nancy Peterson is married to Barrie M. Peterson but is not a party to this appeal. 3 The Chapter 11 bankruptcy case was later converted to a Chapter 7 case. 4 Both judgments accrued interest from the date of judgment at an annual rate of 9% </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="681"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1427.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nelson</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/11/996036P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Simmonds ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-1474.html">HOXWORTH V. BLINDER<BR></A><BR> Asking us to decide whether a judgment creditor may assert an equitable lien against assets excluded from a bankruptcy estate pursuant to a settlement agreement when the creditor was also an unsecured creditor of the estate and in privity with the trustee by virtue of the unsecured claim. We conclude the creditor is neither in privity with the trustee nor otherwise barred by the settlement agreement from asserting its secured lien. There are two issues pertinent to our resolution of this matter: first. Whether the Hoxworth Class was in privity with the bankruptcy trustee of the Blinder. Whether the Hoxworth Class' equitable lien was waived or extinguished when the class settled its unsecured claim with the trustee without asserting its lien against the estate. I. Meyer Blinder was the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-2241.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Levinson LLP</SPAN> was on brief. P.C.</SPAN> were on brief. Because the charitable organization was still functioning as such at the time its entitlement to the bequest vested. BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2001/99-2289.man.html">PORTER V. OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH (2/15/2001, NO. 99-2289)<BR></A><BR> Also appealed are an order of a magistrate judge denying the Trustees' motion to compel and an order of the magistrate judge permitting the Trustees to obtain financial worth documents. Boone Porter's ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="680"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2001/99-2289.man.html">PORTER V. OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH (2/15/2001, NO. 99-2289)<BR></A><BR> Also appealed are an order of a magistrate judge denying the Trustees' motion to compel and an order of the magistrate judge permitting the Trustees to obtain financial worth documents. Boone Porter's ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="679"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054479np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will endeavor to recount no more details than necessary because the parties are familiar with the facts.1 W/B Associates is the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. Was sold. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="678"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/93opinions/93-5067.html">PRESEAULT V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="678"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june96/95-8396.opa.html">LEDBETTER V. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Ledbetter v. Ledbetter is the beneficiary of a written. Of which he is also the trustor. First State Bank and Trust Company is the trustee. Is a wholly owned subsidiary of First State Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="678"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june96/95-8396.opa.html">LEDBETTER V. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Ledbetter v. Ledbetter is the beneficiary of a written. Of which he is also the trustor. First State Bank and Trust Company is the trustee. Is a wholly owned subsidiary of First State Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="677"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2309.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Either pays the subsidy to the service provider directly (if the approved schools have not already paid in full) or reimburses the schools for part of the cost (if the projects have been approved and the schools have paid the service provider for the work). Who in turn must pass the funds through to the school.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="675"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/August2004/023754p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will reverse and remand for further proceedings concerning the applicability of the discovery rule to the debtor's claims against its lawyer's law firm and the law firm's individual shareholders. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in Continental Bank's favor. We will also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and the debtor's law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. P.C. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="674"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200312820.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 14).1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 The unlawful activities whose proceeds were concealed or promoted were mail fraud. Also charged with conspiracy in the indictment were John Mamone. That charge was dismissed before trial. Is not relevant to this appeal. 2 1 of Count 14 explained that the purposes and objects of the conspiracy were: (a) to conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds of mail and wire fraud. Silvestri was charged in 30 substantive counts with money laundering. The essential facts in this complex fraud case are these. Buccinna and Weiss were also charged in the same substantive counts. Was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. 3 3 2 opportunities. Tang was left with a small clerical staff. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="674"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AF060E23C7B9A6248825717800774010/$file/0435449.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on the briefs. Was on the briefs. Here we are presented with a will contest involving a member of an Indian tribe in a Department of the Interior probate proceeding where we must decide whether state or federal law of evidence applies. Covington executed a will leaving all her Indian trust allotments to her great grandson. The will listed one of Covington's grandchildren. Though the term </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="669"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1103.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> LLP</SPAN> was on the brief. Ltd.</SPAN> were on the brief. The bankruptcy court ruled that the escrow funds should instead be turned over to the debtor because the debtor's transaction at issue was not a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). We now reverse the district court and direct the bankruptcy court to award judgment to Fleet. </SPAN></P> <P ALIGN= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/08/063280P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Schropp and Dahlke were partners in thirteen commercial real estate partnerships with Prime Realty. Were two of these partnerships. The properties were allegedly encumbered by liens held by Darland Construction Company and Prime Realty. Though there was some dispute as to the validity of these liens. Concerned that Schropp and Dahlke were unwilling to act in the estates' interests. McCart remained convinced that the properties were more valuable than Schropp and Dahlke had acknowledged. Was Phoenix Properties LLC. The purpose of both transactions was apparently to provide financing to Phoenix Properties to allow it to bid at the trust deed foreclosure sale conducted by the First National Bank of Omaha. Both of these transactions and the supporting documents were entered into between parties who are not parties to this bankruptcy proceeding. LLC to bid on and buy the real estate being sold at public auction have nothing to do with this bankruptcy case. Who were also counsel for the debtors. Was property of the bankruptcy estates and had been converted by Schropp and Dahlke. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="668"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200517227.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: The question in this appeal is how the rule of single satisfaction for claims brought by a bankruptcy estate should be applied to 11 fraudulent transfers that were at least partially satisfied in a settlement of a lump sum of $3.9 million involving 377 transfers and several other parties. The debtor was purportedly in the business of leasing office equipment but was allegedly used to perpetrate a Honorable William H. Northern Trust was not a defendant in this first action but 11 of the 377 transfers concerned the funds transferred from the debtor to Northern Trust on the News' behalf. The settlement expressly contemplated as follows that the Trustee could pursue claims for fraudulent transfer against other parties: It is expressly understood between the Parties nothing in [the Settlement Agreement] is intended to in any way prejudice or limit the Trustee's ability to pursue any claims available to her against [other parties]. Northern Trust argued that it was not the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="667"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/10/01-1263.htm">01-1263 -- CONNOLLY V. HARRIS TRUST CO. OF CALIFORNIA -- 10/31/2002<BR></A><BR> Connolly was appointed Chapter 7 trustee. <p> At the time Connolly assumed his duties as trustee. The MiniScribe estate was insolvent. This action was eventually settled on terms highly favorable to the bankruptcy estate and its creditors. He sought additional compensation that would have resulted in a total fee of $3. This was the maximum fee permitted at that time under the percentage fee scheme (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="665"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19958396.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Ledbetter is the beneficiary of a written. Of which he is also the trustor. First State Bank and Trust Company is the trustee. Is a wholly owned subsidiary of First State Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="660"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1EE0CE62ED2CD4DB88256ABE005BB8E4/$file/0070293.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Tax Court. The Commissioner contends that equitable recoupment is not available on the facts of this case. Was named the executor and residuary beneficiary of his estate. The Willits stock was valued at $485 per share and the Savings stock at $181.50 per share. The executor was authorized to sell a certain portion of this stock (500 shares of Willits stock and 2800 shares of Savings stock) in order to pay applicable estate taxes. The declared value of the stock was used as a basis for determining the gain from their sale.1 Consistent with this statutory requirement. 000) was reported as a capital gain on the estate tax return. March was also required to use the stock value declared on the estate tax return for the purpose of determining her capital gain from the sale. The basis of this deficiency was the Commissioner's conclusion that the Willits and Savings stocks were worth substantially more than the estate declared. The Tax Court concluded that the Willits Stock was worth $626 per share and the Savings Stock was worth $276 per share. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="660"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/586083C2CA11725088256E5A00707CA4/$file/0070293.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Tax Court. The Commissioner contends that equitable recoupment is not available on the facts of this case. Was named the executor and residuary beneficiary of his estate. The Willits stock was valued at $485 per share and the Savings stock at $181.50 per share. The executor was authorized to sell a certain portion of this stock (500 shares of Willits stock and 2800 shares of Savings stock) in order to pay applicable estate taxes. The declared value of the stock was used as a basis for determining the gain from their sale.1 Consistent with this statutory requirement. 000) was reported as a capital gain on the estate tax return. March was also required to use the stock value declared on the estate tax return for the purpose of determining her capital gain from the sale. The basis of this deficiency was the Commissioner's conclusion that the Willits and Savings stocks were worth substantially more than the estate declared. The Tax Court concluded that the Willits Stock was worth $626 per share and the Savings Stock was worth $276 per share. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="660"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/3E2FF1B72DB9A9E388256C33005B9183/$file/0035474.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appearing at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) is amended as follows: (1) Slip Opinion 5330 31: Replace paragraph beginning </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="660"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BE55A0B16B61BC068825706D00570AFB/$file/0416443.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> So it is perhaps not surprising that litigation in the paper manufacturing industry would require a prodigious quantity of its product. Which itself was a byproduct of various corporate organizational fabrications and deconstructions. Fort James was eventually acquired by the Georgia Pacific Corporation. A large portion of this transaction was accomplished through various means. We shall refer to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="658"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/11/033059P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This opinion is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir. Anderson is the legal nephew of Mary Jo Hixon. Anderson was faced with multiple liens and levies against his real estate assets. To the extent that Anderson's claims are also directed at the bankruptcy court's denial of Anderson's post hearing motion for new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. 595 (8th Cir. 1988). 23 2 Anderson while Anderson was incarcerated. A revocable living trust into which certain of Anderson's assets were transferred. Among the assets conveyed to the Anderson Trust were two properties in Springfield. Both properties were conveyed to the Anderson Trust on September 12. The goals of the Anderson Trust were to pay Anderson's child support obligations and to give Hixon </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="658"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/12/036093P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeals the bankruptcy court1 order and judgment which determined that the conveyance of Mark Anderson's residence to the Mary Jo Hixon Trust was not a valid conveyance and that the residence never became an asset of the bankruptcy estate of Mary Jo Hixon. Issue The issue is whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Mary Jo Hixon forged the signature of Mark Anderson on a deed conveying Mark Anderson's residence to the Mary Jo Hixon Trust and whether Mark Anderson knew of the transfer. A finding of fact will not be reversed as clearly erroneous unless. The reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2 1 Background Mark Anderson is the debtor's nephew. Anderson was convicted of a drug offense. While Anderson was incarcerated. Both she and Anderson are trustees of the Anderson Trust. Anderson was released from prison at some point in time. Although there is some evidence in the record that he was incarcerated at the time of the real estate transfer described below. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="657"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011753.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Trust was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring its two notes from their prior holder. Trust and Atlantic Funding are related entities in that C.F. To </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="656"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-3078.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> To change the terms of her will and revocable trust. Approximately six weeks after she was moved to Indianapolis. Evelyn executed a new will and a new trust agreement. Evelyn once again executed a new will and an amendment to the trust. Causing her to execute a new will and a new trust naming Robert the sole beneficiary of her estate. As this was essentially a probate matter. Finding that Brion's lawsuit </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="656"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/02/03-3065.htm">03-3065 -- NOVAK V. FLANNAGAN -- 02/19/2004<BR></A><BR> These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> The court has consolidated these appeals on its own motion.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="656"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept1997/97a1705p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Whether the obligors on unmatured promissory notes can obtain declaratory relief against the obligees of those notes and have the notes declared void and unenforceable. Whether transactions involving investment securities are covered under section 9.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 2 Practices and Consumer Protection Law ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="652"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/D2106220DBD7F65088256B96005AFE40/$file/0035474.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case turning on lien priorities. Fleet was a corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding was converted to Chapter 7. There has been no finding and no contention that Fleet was a sham or alter ego or that the corporate veil ought to be pierced for any reason. Fleet is a separate person from the Stantons. This appeal is a dispute between the trustee in the 1 Beeler v. 578 (9th Cir. 1998). 5326 Stantons' bankruptcy and the factor over which is entitled to the proceeds from that sale. The trustee's theory was that it was entitled to avoid International Factors' mortgage lien on the house. Because it was created when the Stantons mortgaged their house. Not when the advances were made. Because the advances were to Fleet. Applied and prohibited the factor's advances to Fleet.4 Violation of the automatic stay is a serious business. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="651"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/01/011025P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND Jefferson Company is a Minnesota business trust formed by a declaration of trust filed with the Minnesota Secretary of State. The bankruptcy court essentially concluded that the conveyance from the Paulsons to Jefferson Company was fraudulent. The court reasoned that the property was always held by the Paulsons. The transfer was created for the specific purpose of shielding the property from legitimate claims by creditors. Appellant asserts that the record before the bankruptcy court was insufficient for the court to conclude on summary judgment that a fraudulent conveyance occurred. Appellant also claims that an allegation of fraud was never pleaded and thus was not an issue properly before the court. The trustee's motion to dismiss this appeal due to mootness is also pending. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted where the record reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="651"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/99/03/986071P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) and (c). Yanke was appointed as successor guardian for the person and the estate of Michelle Laganiere. Laganiere was a minor. By the time Yanke's status as guardian was terminated in February. Judgment was entered in that amount against Yanke and Minnesota Trust. Was unsuccessful in that appeal. Minnesota Trust commenced a lawsuit against Yanke and a co guarantor on the bond.2 That lawsuit was pending in the Minnesota State District Court when Yanke filed his petition for bankruptcy relief on December 9. Effectively seeking two adjudications: (1) that Yanke is indebted to it in the amount of $191. (2) that the debt was excepted from Yanke's Chapter 7 discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). Entered judgment in 2 No issues relating to the co guarantor have been raised or discussed in this appeal. 3 favor of Minnesota Trust. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="651"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/02/052145P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The facts are undisputed and were fully recited by the district court in this case. His will created a residuary trust for the benefit of his wife and children. The Government acknowledged the residuary trust should have been taxed with the G.A. It was not because of the estate's QTIP election. The Government conceded the sons were entitled to a refund plus interest. Argued the amount of the refund should be offset by a proportionate amount of the tax that should have been paid on the trust by G.A. The district court* analyzed the elements of equitable recoupment and concluded they were satisfied. Limited the amount recouped to the tax burden that would have been borne by the plaintiffs if the improper QTIP election had not been made and the tax had been imposed in a timely manner. Agreed with the parties that the tax code's general rule is that interest is paid on tax unpaid on or before the due date. That none of the Code provisions directly address whether interest is due in the equitable recoupment context. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="651"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/feb96/94-1434.html">HILL V. UNITED STATES<BR></A><BR> Attached is a published version. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. This case was brought on behalf of Tasha Hill. Tasha was seriously injured as a result of the government's negligence at an Army medical facility in Colorado. 500 to Tasha's parents for services rendered to her over the past few years when they were unable to afford professional medical care. The award was based on the estimated cost of providing twenty four hour nursing care. The government claims that the parents were merely providing largely unskilled parental care and should not be compensated for a level of care that they did not provide. The district court found that the Hills' care was equivalent both in kind and quality to the care that would have been rendered by a Licensed Practical Nurse. The government has not demonstrated that this finding was clearly erroneous. The government has also urged that the district court erred in failing to place the award to pay for Tasha's future damages in a reversionary trust.2 Tasha's award is based on a projected life expectancy of a normal healthy girl of her age. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="650"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/datefile/datefile.htm">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> End page heading. > <div align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/08/04-4122.htm">04-4122 -- FUNK V. LFLM DEFENDANTS -- 08/23/2004<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="648"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2202.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With whom Ian Crawford and Todd & Weld were on brief. Who was a real estate agent and knowledgeable in real estate matters. The increased risk involved in the speculative type of investment in which he was getting involved. He </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="646"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/06/00-6083.htm">00-6083 -- U.S. V. LOVE -- 06/20/2001<BR></A><BR> The parties are familiar with the facts. Love asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove the alleged offenses were committed or that Love conspired to commit the offenses. That counts 3 and 4 were barred by the statute of limitations. That the evidence was insufficient to support convictions on counts 5 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="646"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-5215.opa.html">ROBINSON V. GIARMARCO & BILL, P.C.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Robinson v. The district court's refusal to change venue will only be disturbed for a clear abuse of discretion. <i>Howell v. The standard by which to decide the issue of personal jurisdiction is clear:<p> [T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict. To the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. The defendants have alleged facts that either harmonize with or are not directly addressed in the complaint. The defendants reside and are licensed to practice only in Michigan. The Decedent resided in Michigan until 1980 when he and his wife moved to Florida.<p> Tootalian began providing accounting services to the Decedent in 1957 but it was not until 1980. Who is not a party to this litigation. The Decedent discharged his tax attorney and Tootalian contacted Hertzberg to assume representation of the Decedent in his estate planning matters.<p> In 1987 the Decedent requested that Hertzberg prepare a will and amend an existing trust agreement. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="646"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb96/94-5215.opa.html">ROBINSON V. GIARMARCO & BILL, P.C.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Robinson v. The district court's refusal to change venue will only be disturbed for a clear abuse of discretion. <i>Howell v. The standard by which to decide the issue of personal jurisdiction is clear:<p> [T]he plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict. To the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. The defendants have alleged facts that either harmonize with or are not directly addressed in the complaint. The defendants reside and are licensed to practice only in Michigan. The Decedent resided in Michigan until 1980 when he and his wife moved to Florida.<p> Tootalian began providing accounting services to the Decedent in 1957 but it was not until 1980. Who is not a party to this litigation. The Decedent discharged his tax attorney and Tootalian contacted Hertzberg to assume representation of the Decedent in his estate planning matters.<p> In 1987 the Decedent requested that Hertzberg prepare a will and amend an existing trust agreement. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="644"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/07/033096P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> There were a number of unresolved questions regarding liability for DLC's purchase and application of herbicide and other crop inputs from Central Farmer's Cooperative. There was also a question of liability regarding damage to DLC's crops from Cooperative's inputs. There was a dispute over the damages due from an insurer. There was a question as to whether DLC fraudulently transferred assets to DLC Family Trust. These claims were purportedly worth a collective face value of $240. DLC argued that trial was unnecessary because all of the unsecured creditors settled their claims and could not benefit from avoidance of the transfer. The bankruptcy court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve all administrative claims and address the issue of fraudulent transfers. Koley Jessen submitted an affidavit to the bankruptcy The bankruptcy filing also listed a debt owed to an insider that was subsequently waived. 3 3 court to explain Mostek's history with McGill and to explain Koley Jessen's belief that DLC would waive any claim resulting from a potential conflict of interest. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="644"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/994142.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Colton's primary argument on appeal is that because the government offered no evidence that he made any affirmative misrepresentations or breached any fiduciary. He cannot be held to have violated the federal bank fraud statute. So that the district court can vacate two of the bank fraud convictions because they were multiplicious. 000 and so his sentence should have been enhanced. Which was originally titled the Dennis A. He removed Ellis Koch as a trustee because Koch was known to be closely associated with him. For payment because Riggs believed that the property value was insufficient to cover the loan in light of certain environmental and financial problems jeopardizing the Wal Mart contract. Who was now practicing law in Annapolis. Laskin testified that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="642"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/002771.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Discovered after oral argument that he was disqualified. Particularly the strength of the rule that such exemptions are construed narrowly against the party seeking them. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="639"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/03/042185P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we conclude upon de novo review that the plaintiffs have standing. Were registered members of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. Included among these lands were Allotments 3016 (a.k.a. It is undisputed that. It is also undisputed that the mortgages gave the FSA the right. Ernest was to receive Allotment 1366 consisting of five acres. Harry was to receive Mollie's interest in Allotment 176A consisting of 133.42 acres. Virginia was to receive Allotments 371 and 1357 collectively consisting of 80 acres. Were to receive the rest and residue of Virginia's estate. His estate was probated in 1997. It was determined that Ernest was Harry's sole heir. Land that Harry did receive or should have received from Mollie's estate passed or should have passed to Ernest. Probate proceedings regarding Ernest's estate were not commenced until 2003. Although the parties agree that probate is still open on Ernest's estate. The plaintiffs allege that Ernest's heirs are Virgil. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="636"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTIyMzYtYmtfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-2236-bk_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The priority scheme is so vital to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code that we remand this case to the bankruptcy court for further Page 1 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 review of the settlement and consideration of that aspect of the settlement that may deviate from the rule of priorities. Circuit Judge: There is little doubt that settlements of disputed claims facilitate the efficient functioning of the judicial system. Whether a pre plan settlement's distribution plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme Page 2 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 will be the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. It will be dispositive. Iridium Operating LLC ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="631"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/981196.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Line 2 the crossreference is corrected to read </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="630"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A294DE38BC83F75B88257051005488B8/$file/0415044.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Kamehameha Schools have operated as the charitable legacy of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop. The Kamehameha Schools give preference to students who are of native Hawaiian ancestry. Attendance at the Kamehameha Schools is effectively limited to those descended from the Hawaiian race. The issue considered here is a significant one in our statutory civil rights law: May a private. Purposefully exclude a student qualified for admission solely because he is not of pure or part aboriginal blood? The parties agree that this is a case of first impression in our circuit. He argues that he was denied entry to the Kamehameha Schools because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. I The facts are not in dispute. Nonsectarian schools which are dispersed among the Hawaiian Islands. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS 8927 The school system was founded in 1887 under a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="629"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/03/046067P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> To have Fiegen file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on its behalf. Those funds were deposited in Fiegen's trust account. Wesley Huisinga was appointed Chapter 7 trustee and filed an application to operate the business. 452.50 remaining in Fiegen's trust account on the date of filing was property of the estate. The Court further held that the reasonable value of the prepetition services performed by Fiegen was $2. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.2 We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo.3 Reversal is appropriate if the bankruptcy court misunderstood or misapplied the law.4 DISCUSSION There are four distinct issues before us. The first is whether the unapplied portion of the retainer ($8. The second is whether Fiegen has a lien on the retainer to secure prepetition work for which he had not been paid at the time the petition was filed. The third is whether 1 The $2. The fourth is the reasonable value of the services provided. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="629"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7DFE0CEAE02C4E5988256CEE00808B5A/$file/0136076.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to Trust One Mortgage Corporation (Trust One) in a class action involving residential mortgages. The class is composed of all mortgagors whose Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage loans were funded by Trust One and whose mortgage brokers were paid compensation in excess of 1% of the aggregate loan amount (the Bjustrom class). Bjustrom is the representative class member. Such claim was not contained in Trust One's motion for summary judgment. I. There are no disputed facts. Trust One is an Irvine. Mortgage brokers are paid for this work. The amount of compensation they receive is regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The charge not to exceed: (i) $20 dollars or one percent of the original principal amount of the mortgage . . . whichever is the greater. 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i). TRUST ONE MORTGAGE CORP. 3957 At issue are the lender paid broker fees denominated as yield spread premiums (YSP)2 and service release premiums (SRP).3 Both are disclosed to a borrower on a HUD 1 Settlement Statement. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="629"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0745n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Harris and Schwentker were romantically involved. Owners who were loyal to him. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="629"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-1752_015.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The fundamental question in this consolidated appeal is when title to funds held in trust passes to a beneficiary. That question is broad. An imprecise resolution might have far reaching implications for. How to resolve this fundamental question in this particular situation is not easy. That terminal was to belong to United Air Lines. The issues on appeal are whether the district court correctly affirmed (1) the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to United with respect to its prepetition reimbursement for work completed prepetition. A. The Bond Agreements The 1997 and 2001 bond agreements share the same basic structure and are governed by California law. The money in these funds is pledged for the repayment of principal and interest on the bonds and is held in trust for the bondholders. United is obligated to make these payments. Were designed to reimburse United for construction costs it incurred on the LAX project. Although the structure of the funds is similar. Unless United is in default in its payment obligations. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-7129a.html">BURKA PAUL S. V. AETNA LIFE INS CO<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/01/951251P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the auction proceeds were held by Debtor as an agent for its principal. Therefore the funds were not property of Debtor's estate. We have simultaneously filed an opinion in an appeal from another adversary proceeding arising out of Debtor's bankruptcy filing. Background The underlying facts are summarized as follows. Debtor was a corporation in the business of auctioning personal property for its customers. Debtor deposited the proceeds from the sale in an account at the First National Bank of Omaha (hereinafter the First National account) which Debtor had specifically created for the purpose of holding auction proceeds. 2 The net proceeds from the Natkin auction sale were not remitted to Natkin within ten days after the sale. Since the date on which the proceeds from the Natkin sale were deposited in the First National account. Was $32. The balance in the First National account on the date of Debtor's bankruptcy filing was $45. The bankruptcy court stated that the relationship between an auctioneer and its customer is that of an agent and principal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="627"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc4OTdfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7897_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who are the beneficial owners of Brickellbush. N.V. and other persons who may be interested in this action and who are presently unknown to plaintiffs. Thus we conclude that their substantive RICO claims were properly dismissed. Because Plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claims are entirely dependent on their substantive RICO claims. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects.1 BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts giving rise to this appeal is assumed. As those facts are set forth in the District Court's comprehensive published opinions. We relate below only those facts and proceedings that are relevant to the present appeals. Sohrab was to pay FCAM $4.5 million in return for an interest in a new Delaware corporation called First Capital Corp. The action was commenced in December 1993. Found that Sohrab himself was not personally liable.1 NACI and NAP were shell companies. That dismissal was reversed as against Sohrab by the Appellate Division.3 In June 2001. Judgment was entered in Oost Lievense's favor. 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 See First Capital v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="626"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-2586.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Redlener</SPAN> were on brief. Kazarian</SPAN> were on brief. They now claim that the Membership Interests placed in escrow are part of the bankruptcy estate and not the property of the appellee. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court ruled that the escrowed assets were not part of the bankruptcy estate and were properly distributed from escrow to the appellee. While there is a long and complicated history between the parties. NTA) are holding companies. The Membership Interests were NTA's primary assets and entitled NTA to exercise total control over Concourse. (2) Holding Company would have the option to purchase NTA's Membership Interests in Concourse. Concourse commenced a civil action in Illinois state court seeking a determination that it was not in default under the terms of its loan agreement with Holding Company. The Standstill Agreement and the Escrow Agreement.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="626"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/06/002171P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Rodney was unmarried and had no children. 283 worth of stock to each of their own children.2 The transfers were made to irrevocable trusts for each set of children (Larry's. 000 gift tax exclusions and electing to have each gift treated as made one half by each spouse. Those transfers are not at issue here. Rodney was not assessed any additional tax as the transfers to his nieces. Brothers were all bona fide transfers. The IRS reasoned that the gifts to each of the donors' own children were valid gifts. That the gifts to each niece and nephew were constructive gifts to the donors' own children. Appellate Jurisdiction We have jurisdiction over appeals from tax court cases pursuant to Section 7482 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 The IRS argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear The IRS assessed the taxes for 1992 against the trusts rather than the individuals because the statute of limitations had run against the donors. Which expires three years after the return is filed. 6901(c)(1). 3 This appeal was originally filed in the Seventh Circuit because the tax court was located within that circuit. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="625"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/03/046059P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court allowing a claim by The Estate of Victor Litzinger in the amount of $130. We remand with instructions to the bankruptcy court to address a jurisdictional issue which was never raised or briefed before the bankruptcy court or this Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Was Guy's wife. Victor was an elderly man when. Victor executed a Last and Will and Testament which named Guy as Personal Representative of Victor's estate. The will left all assets which Victor owned at the time of his death to Guy and Warren equally. Guy did sign a Substitute W 9 which indicated that the account was opened as a joint account and the evidence showed that the brokerage company considered the account a joint account with right of survivorship. No draws were made on the Victor/Guy account between the time it was opened and Victor's death. 2 On January 7. Were transferred to the Guy/Louise account. The only evidence of Louise's complicity in this transfer was the testimony of both Guy and Louise that. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="625"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0006p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Many employers are required to withhold various taxes from the wages of their employees. Which the employers hold in trust until the taxes are paid over to the federal government. 902.24 that was paid to satisfy an assessment made against the late Willard R. It is not disputed that Bell was the largest stockholder (51.5% of shares) and chief operating No. 02 3295 Bell v. Nor is it disclaimed that Bell essentially ran the company on a day to day basis. Dyac was responsible for withholding federal wage. Dyac was struggling financially at and following its acquisition by Bell. The issue of who controlled Dyac's funds is paramount. As the same are set forth on the Budget. The timing of Bank One's cessation of trust fund loan advances is in dispute. 000 in FICA trust fund taxes that were in arrears for most of January. Denied the request because Bank One had already lent Dyac money for payroll taxes in January and this additional request represented an overadvance that was not covered by the Forbearance Agreement. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="623"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/06/012898P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Into executing a last will and testament. Sianis's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata based upon an earlier Nebraska probate court order admitting Mrs. Sianis's will to informal probate. Erred in concluding that his claims are barred by res judicata. Sianis's allegations concerning his mother's will and that the district court improperly exercised jurisdiction over that claim. Sianis's claim related to the Trust is not precluded by the probate of Mrs. Sianis's will. Sianis simultaneously executed a will and a trust instrument. The trustee was to distribute 25% of the value of the Trust property to Mr. It further provided that the remaining trust property was to be distributed to Mrs. She succumbed to cancer approximately a month after she executed her will and the trust instrument. Sianis's will was informally probated in a Nebraska probate court. The estate was closed and liquidated in May 1997. Sianis's will. At roughly the same time that the estate was closed. Representing the full amount he was entitled to under the terms of the Trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="620"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1983.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Read</U> was on brief for appellant Wendy B. Biggs</U> were on brief for appellant Susan Otis.</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="619"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052312p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue is whether plaintiff established diversity of citizenship based on a change of domicile. We will vacate and remand. 3 I. Which was later acquired by the Bank of New York. Was to develop the property acquired by the trust into a commercial and transportation center. McCann died in February 2002 while this and related state court actions were pending. Contending diversity of citizenship was lacking because all parties were domiciled in New Jersey.1 B. The material facts regarding McCann's domicile are undisputed. They contended they lacked the authority to grant the relief the estate requested because they were no longer trustees of the Newman Trust. His federal income tax returns filed during his life represented he was a New Jersey resident. Represented he was a New Hampshire resident. Virginia's application for continued health insurance coverage after McCann's death represented he was a New Jersey resident. McCann's funeral was held in New Jersey. He was buried in New Hampshire. In concluding McCann was not a domiciliary of New Hampshire. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="619"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200410012.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1229. We reverse because we conclude that the transfer at issue in this case was necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Berkshire Mortgage Finance Corporation was the only lender willing to advance the debtors $23.5 million before August 31. Kissimmee's hotel was not subject to the RCAP mortgage. It was under no obligation to refinance its hotel at the time. In pertinent part: 3 Berkshire's willingness to make the loan to [the debtors] is contingent upon Kissimmee Lodge's agreement to refinance its hotel through Berkshire. Berkshire will not provide any financing to [the debtors] unless Kissimmee Lodge refinances through Berkshire. The Kissimmee Lodge refinancing therefore is incident to an a condition precedent to the reorganization of [the debtors] and that refinancing therefore is exempt from Florida documentary stamp taxes. The FDOR argued that the plan failed to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)1 because the § 1146(c) exemption the proposed plan conferred on the Kissimmee transaction was not available as a matter of law to non debtor entities. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="617"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1666.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Klickstein & Levy were on brief. Procter & Hoar LLP were on brief. The district court dismissed the suit after reviewing the trust agreement and concluding that the trustee was not subject to ERISA liability as a fiduciary or co fiduciary in respect to the harms alleged. The Bank wrote to Hawthorne stating that: Our appraiser is prepared to begin his review on Monday. If he is not permitted to begin his review by Friday. We believe that we have no recourse but to seek the advice of the Department of Labor as to our concerns about Hawthorne's instructing us to continue to report the real estate at values supplied by Hawthorne as investment manager. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="617"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/05/006117P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="615"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2001/00-10201.opn.html">UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)<BR></A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="615"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2001/00-10201.opn.html">UNITED STATES V. DE LA MATA (9/27/2001, NO. 00-10201)<BR></A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="615"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/05/97-3073.htm">97-3073 -- WETHERILL V. BANK IV KANSAS -- 05/28/1998<BR></A><BR> Brown ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="615"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1994/94a0750p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which the Salvation Army was holding. Were part of the estate in bankruptcy. We will reverse the order directing turnover to the Bank. We will therefore remand this issue to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings in this regard. Which was incorporated by reference into the bonds.[fn1] In March 1989. Modular also executed a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement which was filed on April 20. Modular commenced work on the Salvation Army project but was unable to complete all of its obligations under the contract. A Trustee was appointed. First Indemnity contends that the unpaid contract proceeds and retainage held by the Salvation Army were not properly characterized as accounts receivable owing to Modular so that the Bank's superpriority lien would apply to them. The Salvation Army was not obligated to make final payment to Modular until: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="615"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200010201.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the indictment and jury instructions were fatally defective. That there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and that the discovery of new evidence mandated the grant of a new trial. Castilla (hereinafter the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="613"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2002/00-14481.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="613"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2002/00-14481.opn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge:</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-6.gif" ALT="613"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan97/95-8347.opa.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>In re Meehan United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge: Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A.
	OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > In re Meehan United States Court of Appeals. Circuit Judge: Appellant Virginia Ann Meehan is a Chapter 7 debtor. The contested property is debtor's individual retirement account (IRA). Which debtor claims is excluded from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A.
	OPINION/ORDER We reject Lamie's argument that § 330(a) included a
	OPINION/ORDER MD 21201 Amicus Law Professors in support of Appellant *** Joining Professor Lipson on the brief are Professors Ralph Brubaker. Introduction This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court. The question on appeal is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. While the question in Hartford Underwriters was one of a nontrustee's right unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme. Our conclusion is consistent with the received wisdom that
	OPINION/ORDER He was denied entry. The Kamehameha Schools were created through a charitable testamentary trust. Plaintiff argues that he was denied admission because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Factual Background Historical Context2 The islands of Hawaii are geographically isolated in the South Pacific Ocean and were originally settled sometime between 1 and 750 A.D. The immediate result of that first encounter was that Native Hawaiians were introduced to Western goods and Western diseases. The first treaty was signed in 1826. Additional treaties were signed in 1849. Was commercially desirable. Western economic domination of the Hawaiian Islands was followed by an interest in establishing political control. Was overthrown by a small group of nonHawaiians. Who were assisted in their efforts by the United States Minister. Laws were then enacted suppressing the Hawaiian culture and language and allowing for the displacement of Native Hawaiians from their lands. The Hawaiian language was banned as a medium of instruction in schools.
	ESTATE OF HOOVER V. COMMISSIONER In determining the fair market value it is appropriate to take into account a discount factor for the minority interest holder's lack of control and marketability. Included among the assets in the decedent's estate was a 26% interest in the T 4 Cattle Company. 000) is qualified real property. The estate and the Commissioner stipulated that this methodology would be appropriate to arrive at the fair market value of the decedent's 26% interest in the qualified real property if 2032A were not elected. The fair market value was thus $1. The estate and the Commissioner further stipulated that the 2032A special use value of the ranch was $2. The decedent's 26% pro rata share of the of the special use value of the qualified real property was therefore $533. The estate reported that the value of the decedent's 26% interest in the limited partnership's qualified real property for estate tax purposes was $1. The total value of the decedent's interest in the limited partnership for estate tax purposes was $2.
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue in this appeal is whether a New Jersey statute. A trustee was appointed. The debtor listed the IRA as an asset but claimed that it was not part of the bankruptcy estate because of N.J.S.A. § 25:2 1(b). The trustee filed a cross motion seeking to have the IRA declared an asset of the estate. Subsection (c)(2) provides: A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The question before us is whether N.J.S.A. § 25:2 1(b) constitutes a
	OPINION/ORDER The ownership of which was subject to dispute and in litigation in a pending adversary proceeding. Its partner claimed that the property was owned by the partnership and hence not the estate. Since the sale had been consummated and was not subject to attack. The nonbankrupt partner was entitled to disgorgement of the sale proceeds sufficient to protect the partnership's claimed ownership interest in the property and his potential interest in the partnership. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The debtor is Rodeo Canon Development Corporation (
	00-4055 -- BAILEY V. BIG SKY MOTORS, LIMITED -- 12/30/2002 An escrow agency was the initial transferee of the disputed funds rather than a mere financial conduit of those funds. We hold that the transaction in question was a preferential transfer under
	OPINION/ORDER White were on brief for appellant.
	99-1581 -- VOIROL V. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- 07/26/2002 On behalf of the other American Federation members who have not seceded from International Co Masonry. The parties' various claims were tried to the district court without a jury during the week of April 14. All requests for attorney's fees were denied. Plaintiffs appealed. Haydn was a Freemason. As was Mozart. Benjamin Franklin was an enthusiastic Freemason.
	OPINION/ORDER The brothers were the only members of the partnership. The issue is whether the fair market value of the artwork upon which the estate tax was calculated also constitutes the cost basis of the property for income tax purposes when it was later sold. The taxpayers do not challenge the accuracy of the method used to calculate the fair market value of the works of art upon which the estate tax was calculated. The Ninth Circuit held that the value of the artwork owned by Sidney Janis at his death was a question of fact and that (1) the valuation of $14.5 million placed upon it by the Tax Court was not clearly erroneous and (2) the Janises were obligated by
	OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal. ISSUES The first issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the Debtor's purchase of certain annuities constituted a fraudulent transfer to Anderson pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that the purchase of the annuities was an avoidable fraudulent transfer. A second issue on appeal is whether the merits of Anderson's request for the imposition of a constructive trust should have been addressed by the bankruptcy court and should be included in this appeal because Anderson did not properly raise the issue as an affirmative defense. BACKGROUND Mark Anderson is the Debtor's nephew. Anderson was convicted of drug offenses and sentenced to prison. He owed past due child support which his ex wife was attempting to collect. A sheriff's sale was pending with respect to certain real estate owned by Anderson. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. 2 1 handle Anderson's business affairs while Anderson was incarcerated.
	OPINION/ORDER Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act.
	OPINION/ORDER We hold that there is diversity of citizenship here. That the defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted. The notes were endorsed by Barrie Peterson. Who is now the sole shareholder of DEP. Both notes were secured by first lien deeds of trust on three pieces of real property located in Prince William County. The bank was repeatedly forced to pay long overdue sewer and water bills.
	02-1173 -- WALKER V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES -- 07/21/2003 The transfer of employees between covered Union positions and non covered management positions. Ellsworth Walker and Virgil Salazar were employees of the Regional Transportation District and participants in the pension plan. The definition of
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is an interlocutory appeal in a bankruptcy case. BACKGROUND The Whiting Turner Contracting Company (
	OPINION/ORDER Dyer and Jeanie owned a house together when they were married (
	OPINION/ORDER We are presented with two decisions of the district court dated May 18. We are asked to decide whether the district court erred in determining that the bankruptcy court was not authorized to compel the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate tax payments first to trust fund taxes. We will affirm the decisions of the district court. I. We feel compelled to set forth the facts in detail because these bankruptcy cases are so heavily fact intensive. KBS is a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the sole purpose of acquiring and operating a modular home manufacturing business. Were its sole owners. That payment was not accompanied by a quarterly return. 468 were
	OPINION/ORDER Which was recorded first. Was not released even though the outstanding balance on the promissory note secured 1 FNB has since merged with Fifth Third Bank. Which is named as defendant in this action. N.A. by FNB's deed of trust was paid in full at the time Redick entered into a subsequent deed of trust with Chase. Failed to follow up when confronted by information that should have raised concerns. Because our holding is grounded on the language of the deeds of trust and their accompanying promissory notes rather than upon the circumstances surrounding their negotiation. A lengthy factual recitation is unnecessary. It was recorded in Williamson County two days later. This statement is underscored in the following paragraph: 2 No. 06 5012 JPMorgan Chase. Whichever is greater. 000 that was a
	OPINION/ORDER I. The relevant facts underlying this litigation are undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on April 30. Christiansen was contractually obligated to the owner of the project to deliver the project free of mechanics liens. We agree with the parties that no material fact disputes exist and that we are called upon to review only legal issues. 2 under which a defendant may assert a counterclaim against a plaintiff
	OPINION/ORDER 761.48 made by Debtor to David Huddle and the Bank was an avoidable preferential transfer. The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the money paid by Debtor to Huddle and the Bank was held by the Debtor as an agent for its principal. It was therefore not property of the estate which the Trustee could recover under § 547. Background The underlying facts are summarized as follows. Debtor was a corporation in the business of auctioning personal property for its customers. Huddle's business assets were the security for a loan which had been made by the Bank to Huddle. Which was deposited in Debtor's general bank account. Seeking to set aside the payment made by Debtor to the Bank and Huddle on grounds that the payment was an avoidable preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).2 The Trustee maintained that Huddle was a creditor and the money in dispute was property of the bankruptcy estate which should be distributed in the normal course of the bankruptcy proceedings. Debtor and Huddle were in an agent principal relationship.
	OPINION/ORDER The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined the stock transfers were reciprocal cross gifts and assessed a deficiency of $215. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George. He and George had discussed with their insurance agent their desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The IRS denied annual exclusions for gifts made by Robert in 1994 and 1995 to members of George's family on the basis that
	OPINION/ORDER Ronald Lurie (Ronald) was a general and managing partner of Popkin & Stern at that time. This deficiency judgment was based on the difference between the value of the property of Popkin & Stern's estate and the amount needed to pay all of the allowed claims against Popkin & Stern.2 On June 17. He was incarcerated. The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee to make a claim against a general partner of a bankrupt partnership if
	OPINION/ORDER They claim that they were deceived by a fraudulent marketing scheme which induced them to purchase residential lots and homes at inflated prices. This case and its related proceedings have a long and convoluted history. The present appeal is the third time this Court has considered this case. They also sought to represent a putative class consisting of all persons who purchased houses or homesites from GDC or GDV over the period from 1957 to 1990 and who are members of the North Port Out of State Lot Owners Association (
	ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, ET AL. V. GALE A. NORTON With him on the briefs were
	OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Lois J. With him on the brief were Dennis Gingold. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment delineating appellants' trust obligations to IIM trust benefi ciaries and injunctive relief to ensure that such trust obli gations are carried out. The district court concluded that the federal government and its officers have been derelict in their duties. Notwithstanding the fact that appel lants have taken significant steps towards the discharge of the federal government's fiduciary obligations. Appellants clearly have yet to fulfill their trust duties. The relief ordered was well within the district court's equitable powers. This is undeniable. Such duties are grounded in the very nature of the government Indian relationship. It is equally clear that the federal government has failed time and again to discharge its fiduciary duties. There is no dispute that appellants. Have failed to discharge fully their fiduciary obligations. The issue we confront is whether the district court properly delineated the contours of the obligations owed by the Interior Secretary.
	OPINION/ORDER Most of Scott's efforts were aimed at exposing the fact that Mechem's officers and directors were engaged in fraudulent activity. The bankruptcy court's award was appealed by three other creditors of the estate. Holding that some of Scott's expenses were incurred either before the chapter 11 petition was filed or after the case was converted to chapter 7. The district court further held that Scott could not recover the expenses he incurred while the chapter 11 proceedings were pending because he was acting solely for his own benefit. The court held that the bankruptcy court's award was inequitable because Scott was an insider in the corporation that was committing the fraud. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. Mechem was founded in 1986 to manage pre need funeral trust funds for individuals and to provide these individuals with funeral goods and services to be paid for with the funds in trust. The funds were advanced from the participating individuals to Mechem through funeral directors.
	OPINION/ORDER Held that it had diversity of citizenship jurisdiction because the sole beneficiary of Emerald Trust was Emerald Investors Ltd. (
	OPINION/ORDER Because the relief sought against Siade's employer sponsored health care plan was not available The Honorable Audrey G. The plan was governed by ERISA. Siade was diagnosed with non Hodgkin's lymphoma and sought GHP's pre approval for an allogeneic stem cell transplant. GHP denied coverage on the basis the procedure was
	OPINION/ORDER We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne (
	OPINION/ORDER We must determine in this appeal whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior consent judgment and whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to actual or constructive fraud against creditors. Plaintiff Appellant Donald Dionne (
	OPINION/ORDER With whom Wolfe Associates was on brief. LLP was on brief. The parties have stipulated that Borden. Borden contends that the plaintiffs are only due reinstatement in the Plan. Reimbursement for expenses incurred that would have been covered by the Plan. Plaintiffs assert that this remedy is inadequate and that they are entitled to additional equitable relief. Even though the estate was no longer legally obliged to pay those costs. We deny the plaintiffs' appeal and rule for Borden on the cross appeal.
	OPINION/ORDER Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court1 holding that Digital River. Inc. (
	OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief were David P. With her on the brief were Thomas L. Of counsel were E. On its holding that plaintiff Colleen Renville DuMarce's (
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Before us is a criminal appeal from two defendants. Who were convicted of credit card fraud. The district judge should have decreased her sentence because she only played a minimal role in the criminal endeavor and the entire loss was not reasonably foreseeable to her. Defendant Akinkoye claims that the enhancement for abuse of trust was not warranted because he was not in a position of trust. That a two level increase for obstruction of justice was not warranted because the statements he made had no effect on the prosecution of his case. The district court's decisions are in order and we therefore affirm. I. Akinkoye was a real estate agent employed by Re/Max real estate agency and worked in its Burtonsville. To the extent that the clients' mail was delivered into secured places such as inside the home or in a locked mailbox Akinkoye would access the mail by using the keys to the home provided by the clients. 000.1 None of the clients was aware that their names. Information and property were being used fraudulently.
	ESTATE OF KOSOW V. COMMISSIONER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >Estate of Kosow v. District Judge:<p> <p> The Estate of Joseph Kosow has appealed the Tax Court's decision to disallow a deduction for a claim that was made against and paid by the estate. The Tax Court held that the estate had failed to prove that the agreement by the deceased that gave rise to the claim was an agreement supported by full and adequate consideration. Who were born in 1940 and 1945. Joseph had largely disassociated himself from the manufacturing businesses and was primarily engaged in financing activities through the Industrial Finance Corporation. A corporation of which he and his brother were equal shareholders.<p> Joseph's business ventures permitted him and his family to enjoy a very comfortable standard of living. One of which was a Cadillac that was regularly replaced. Joseph paid all the major bills as they came due and Barbara was not aware of any reliance on credit to sustain their standard of living. Joseph was very secretive about his business ventures. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012319.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 1 under which Bedford was responsible for transporting the modular units manufactured by RBS to the Aspen Knolls building site. Then erecting and completing the structures.2 The subcontract provided that its terms were to be interpreted in accordance with New York law. 2 Bedford also performed work for RBS outside the subcontract. The work was separately invoiced to RBS as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="583"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb95/93-4307.opa.html">ESTATE OF KOSOW V. COMMISSIONER<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Estate of Kosow v. District Judge:<p> <p> The Estate of Joseph Kosow has appealed the Tax Court's decision to disallow a deduction for a claim that was made against and paid by the estate. The Tax Court held that the estate had failed to prove that the agreement by the deceased that gave rise to the claim was an agreement supported by full and adequate consideration. Who were born in 1940 and 1945. Joseph had largely disassociated himself from the manufacturing businesses and was primarily engaged in financing activities through the Industrial Finance Corporation. A corporation of which he and his brother were equal shareholders.<p> Joseph's business ventures permitted him and his family to enjoy a very comfortable standard of living. One of which was a Cadillac that was regularly replaced. Joseph paid all the major bills as they came due and Barbara was not aware of any reliance on credit to sustain their standard of living. Joseph was very secretive about his business ventures. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="582"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/07/98-9005a.htm">98-9005A -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999<BR></A><BR> A copy of the corrected cover page is attached. <p> Sincerely. She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="582"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2097.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on brief for appellant.</SPAN> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="580"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/022AF3550BC8603288256E5A00707CA7/$file/9956131.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2106. Is a professional musician. Cusano was the lead guitarist for KISS from 1982 until 1984. During which time Cusano co authored and performed 1 Cusano's claims were: (1) open book account songwriter/publisher royalties. Defendants Simmons and Stanley were listed as creditors possessing contingent and disputed claims in an unknown amount. The plan was confirmed in 1990 and Cusano was released from bankruptcy in 1993. The coffee table book entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="580"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/247AD8E3195E2C4A88256ABF004D0A31/$file/9956131.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2106. Is a professional musician. Cusano was the lead guitarist for KISS from 1982 until 1984. During which time Cusano co authored and performed 1 Cusano's claims were: (1) open book account songwriter/publisher royalties. Defendants Simmons and Stanley were listed as creditors possessing contingent and disputed claims in an unknown amount. The plan was confirmed in 1990 and Cusano was released from bankruptcy in 1993. The coffee table book entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="580"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=04-1901_041.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Facts The facts of this case are. F&G was a direct mail marketing company engaged in the marketing of gifts. A leveraged purchase of a large number of F&G shares by the ESOP was proposed. F&G had been enjoying record profitability for several years and was forecasted to continue this trend into the future. F&G's largest subsidiary was Michigan Bulb Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200515900.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BTI seeks to recover certain standby letter of credit proceeds that were drawn down and retained by The CIT Group/Business Credit. Which was the assignee of BTI's lessor. Whose two general partners are David C. The standby letter of credit was created to secure BTI's obligations to Two Trees under a lease agreement that was part of a sale leaseback transaction. Factual Background Most of the facts in this case are undisputed. We largely adopt the bankruptcy court's statement of the facts in its 30 September 2002 order: BTI was in the trucking business. The bonds were paid. BTI was entitled to purchase the property for $1. BTI's primary lender was CIT. Which was thereafter amended from time to time. Dinstein was an officer and director of BTI's parent company. Was apparently the architect of the sale and leaseback plan involving Two Trees. That is. David Walentas was a general partner in Two Trees and Chairman of the Board of BTI Parent. That it is in the best interest of [BTI] to obtain a letter of credit in the amount of up to $1.6 million in favor of Two Trees . . . securing [BTI's] lease obligations to Two Trees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="579"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/07/98-9005.htm">98-9005 -- DAVENPORT (ESTATE OF) V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 07/13/1999<BR></A><BR> She did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the stock to do so. That is. Included in the sisters' assets were 3. Was consistent with their joint ownership agreement. Even though Birnie may not have held legal title to the Hondo stock. Her ownership of the stock was presumed in her will. Several of Birnie's and Elizabeth's federal income tax returns were audited. Botefuhr were appointed as coexecutors of Elizabeth's estate.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="578"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/08/98-7057.htm">98-7057 -- U.S. V. ROBERTS -- 08/03/1999<BR></A><BR> Hollis Earl Roberts was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="578"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR> Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="578"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//june2001/99-14962.man.html">MAIZ V. VIRANI (6/8/2001, NO. 99-14962)<BR></A><BR> Who are Mexican citizens. Defendants do not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the liability verdict as a whole. Plaintiffs are 53 residents of Monterrey. Most of them are members of fourteen family groups. Also plaintiffs in this case (although not participants in this appeal) are six corporations to which the individual Plaintiffs eventually transferred their interests.<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="577"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/08/98-7057a.htm">98-7057A -- U.S. V. ROBERTS -- 08/03/1999<BR></A><BR> 13 of the original version. <p> A corrected copy of the opinion is attached for your convenience with the proper citations. <p> Very truly yours. Hollis Earl Roberts was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="577"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021535.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Individually and for the benefit of the David Partington Rabbi Trust of which he is beneficiary. Rabbi trusts are arrangements </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="576"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1398.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Robbins and Gadsby & Hannah LLP were on brief. P.C. were on brief. We are confronted in this case with difficult issues involving the interpretation of the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act of 1930. Which is owned by Edward Koplovsky ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="575"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/11/964137P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. This matter is before us for the fourth time. 3 McCullough responded in writing that the fee agreement was acceptable and that he was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="575"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-2352A.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Phillips</U> was on brief for appellant. <P> <U>Christopher S. Were on brief for appellees.</P> <BR WP= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="575"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/10/953535P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case is on appeal and cross appeal from an order entered in the United States District Court1 for the Eastern District of *The Honorable James M. 1994) (hereinafter bankruptcy court order). argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that (1) PLPOA does not have equitable ownership of certain real property within Pagosa under either a promissory estoppel theory or a trust theory and (2) the disputed land is subject to a valid mortgage lien held by the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB) notwithstanding a restrictive covenant of use and enjoyment of the land for the benefit of Pagosa property owners. If PLPOA does have an ownership interest in the disputed property. Then that interest is avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 544. Pagosa is a 26. The Pagosa Lakes Property Owners' Association was originally named the Pagosa Property Owners' Association. 23 2 a wholly owned subsidiary of FCI. FPI was the indirect successor in interest to the original developer of Pagosa. FCI filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. was reorganization plan. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043399p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Even though there were multiple sellers and suppliers of the produce. As a matter of convenience we hereinafter will refer to one of the plaintiffs. We will affirm the district court's order. Which now is defunct. Formerly was engaged in the business of buying produce from various sellers and suppliers for ultimate resale. Pacific claimed that it was the beneficiary of a statutory trust under PACA. From which it was entitled to recover payment for the produce. 138 (3d Cir. 2000) ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2002/01-10433.opn.html">BLANCHARD V. DELOACHE-POWERS (3/28/2002, NO. 01-10433)<BR></A><BR> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200014481.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Stephen Lawrence appeals the bankruptcy court's order adjudging him in contempt and ordering his imprisonment until the contempt is purged. An arbitration judgment was issued against him in the amount of $20.4 million dollars. Several amendments were made to the Trust. A spendthrift provision was added. The Trust was amended so that settlor's powers could not be executed under duress or coercion and his life interest would terminate in the event of his bankruptcy. An amendment was added declaring Lawrence Honorable Henry A. The Trustees issued a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2002/01-10433.opn.html">BLANCHARD V. DELOACHE-POWERS (3/28/2002, NO. 01-10433)<BR></A><BR> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="574"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/01/97-9556.htm">97-9556 -- HRI, INC. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY -- 01/06/2000<BR></A><BR> The effect of state adjudications against a tribe on EPA's authority to assess whether lands are Indian country. Dismissing in part and remanding in part. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="573"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2517.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Outboard Marine Corporation is in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Among its holdings are the assets. In what is known as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1997/97a1681p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court concluded that Integrated lacked standing to pursue the state law claims because its purchase of the claims from a trustee in bankruptcy was void ab initio under New Jersey law. We disagree and will affirm. 2 I. The debt was secured by separate security agreements in assets such as accounts. Certain individual defendants who were former Machine Technology employees entered Machine Technology's offices and took or copied various documents. Were unlawfully competing with Integrated. The district court denied Integrated's request for an injunction on the ground that Integrated was not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062162p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It is common practice in bankruptcy cases for parties in interest to attack the validity and priority of the claims of creditors higher in the pecking order than they. It is not uncommon for debtors to use the Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is because Chapter 11 provides more flexibility and control in determining how to go about selling off the various aspects of the debtor's business and distributing the proceeds. A typical mechanism for effecting a Chapter 11 liquidation is the creation of a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/12/00-1381.htm">00-1381 -- HILL V. KINZLER -- 12/26/2001<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="572"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/01/026041P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Finding that the 1994 judgment against Lurie was for a sum certain. Was not subject to modification or adjustment. Was not ambiguous. Was subject to collection and execution. Lurie was the managing partner of the firm at the time Debtor's creditors commenced an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case against the Debtor in March 1992. Appellee Robert Blackwell ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4DE616BC2382EFD088256CD1005CCFA5/$file/0270007.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The question presented is whether the twolife annuity retained by the Schotts in their grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs) is an interest qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 2702 and so to be subtracted from the value of the gift. The trust provided that 11.54% of the initial net fair market value was to be paid to the grantor commencing on May 31. Ending on the date that was fifteen years after the commencement date or. The annuity was to be paid to the spouse for the balance of the term. The terms of the annuity payments in the trust in material respects were identical with those of the trust established by his wife. The Tax Court held that an annuity measured by two lives was unqualified because the annuity could extend beyond the life of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU0ODgtY3YgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/04-5488-cv%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the district court erred by concluding (1) that a warranty that individual loans were eighty percent secured by real property had </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU0ODgtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5488-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> That the district court erred by concluding (1) that a warranty that individual loans were eighty percent secured by real property had </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/AFB6B788433F135C88256E5A00707B50/$file/9956366.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A title insurance company that satisfied its obligations to its insured following embezzlement by a mortgage broker is entitled to payment from the State of California Department of Real Estate Recovery Account to recover a portion of an unsatisfied judgment against the embezzling brokers. We hold that it is not. Is a title insurance company that insures the condition of real estate title for lenders. The new loans were to be secured by a first lien position. Mortgage Link was required to pay off existing liens on the refinancer's properties so that the refinanced loans would be secured by first trust deeds. Stewart Title was obligated to protect its insured against loss of priority to the full extent of loss up to the face amount of the policies. When the senior liens were not paid off by Mort gage Link. Each of Stewart Title's insurance policies also provided that Stewart Title was entitled to be subrogated to all rights of its insured. DISCUSSION The California Real Estate Recovery Account Fund exists to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/98-7022a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief was James W. The goal was to arrange a $122 million </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/CF9A8A5817373AFD88256A50005D50CD/$file/9956366.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A title insurance company that satisfied its obligations to its insured following embezzlement by a mortgage broker is entitled to payment from the State of California Department of Real Estate Recovery Account to recover a portion of an unsatisfied judgment against the embezzling brokers. We hold that it is not. Is a title insurance company that insures the condition of real estate title for lenders. The new loans were to be secured by a first lien position. Mortgage Link was required to pay off existing liens on the refinancer's properties so that the refinanced loans would be secured by first trust deeds. Stewart Title was obligated to protect its insured against loss of priority to the full extent of loss up to the face amount of the policies. When the senior liens were not paid off by Mort gage Link. Each of Stewart Title's insurance policies also provided that Stewart Title was entitled to be subrogated to all rights of its insured. DISCUSSION The California Real Estate Recovery Account Fund exists to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/03/952426P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on two claims and judgment as a matter of law (JAML) on the remaining claims following opening statements. Was the income beneficiary of The Brown the first trust. Were the remaindermen. the residual trust. on his own as long as children were also the beneficiaries of the second trust. Referred to as Maurice and United Missouri Bank (UMB) were cotrustees during Maurice's life. Although Maurice could conduct any business he was competent. One of the trust assets was the Maurice L. Brown Company was renamed Petroleum Production Management. Secured by junior mortgages on properties owned by Petroleum Production. notes were allocated to the residual trust. Maurice was diagnosed with brain cancer. Which was paid to Virginia. Finding that claims against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty are equitable and therefore not triable to a jury. That Count IV against Thomas was dependent on the equitable claims against UMB. Finding that both counts were dependent upon Maurice's competency at the time he signed the release and that the Brown children had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on the issue. between one of the Brown children and UMB employees. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="570"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0140n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was struck by a vehicle owned by Amoco. She is unable to walk. There were separate claims for the estate of Linda Coles (Count I). The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in June 1974. Nicholas Smith (who had previously been one Coles' attorneys) and Security Bank & Trust were appointed co guardians of the estate of Linda Coles by the Wayne County Probate Court. The original Complaint was amended to list the plaintiffs as Nicholas Smith and Security Bank and Trust Company. A Motion and Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment was filed in the district court on July 8. The settlement terms were reduced to three separate consent judgments. 333.33 were paid from the recoveries of Rudolph and Gladys Coles only. Which was attended by all interested parties. The magistrate judge sought to ascertain whether the settlement was in the best interest of the child. Do you understand that if the child's claim is settled here today no further money can be asked of either Amoco or Mr. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="569"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-1553.html">UNITED STATES V. KOEHN<BR></A><BR> The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court was warranted in applying the abuse of a position of trust enhancement. Appellant was the president of Executive Mortgage. These funds were intended to be held in escrow and disbursed to pay off existing mortgages. When the existing mortgages were satisfied. New notes and related papers were forwarded to the buyer. The purpose of wiring the funds was to pay off the existing mortgages on the thirteen loans U.S. Sokol that the loans were not due until later that month but that they would be sent in the near future. Mortgage was driven out of business. After Appellant's fraud was discovered. He was charged with and pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1343. It is clear that the predicate wire fraud act occurred when </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="568"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972286.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Sugarloaf's sole asset is Sugarloaf Centre. Throughout the period when the Debtor was a debtor in possession. The property was encumbered by an $11.75 million first priority deed of trust and a second priority judgment lien in favor of Charles Vaughn ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/50A03335A6C29F6188256E5A00707B46/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991939.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Are as follows. Al Abood is an Iraqi national who resides in Monaco. The El Shamaris are also originally from Iraq but have become naturalized United States citizens. Al Abood's late husband was a wealthy man named Shaker. No real estate investments were ever made. The money was taken by the El Shamaris for their own use. The El Shamaris falsely represented to Al Abood that profits from the real estate ventures were being deposited in a bank account for the benefit of Al Abood's minor son. Concerned a charitable trust created by Shaker to benefit Iraqi students.1 Nimat persuaded Al Abood that Nimat had found a student worthy of 1 The trust to benefit Iraqi students was one of three funds within a larger trust at a foreign bank operating on the island of Jersey. The second fund was a family maintenance fund. The third fund was a capital fund which was to derive income and would largely be used to benefit the Al Aboods' son later in his life. Hanaa Zainal who is actually employed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and is a distant relative of Al Abood. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="567"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B1A43334A16E06FB88256A4C0057B941/$file/0070013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS Simplot is headquartered in Boise. Simplot stock is divided into Class A and Class B common stock. Both classes have a right to dividends. If any are declared. No common stock dividends have ever been declared. 6173 Class B stock has a slight advantage in its treatment on liquidation. Class A stock is subject to a transfer restriction of 360 days during which the company or another Class A shareholder may purchase the stock. At the time of evaluation the stock was owned as follows: Class A Percent of Number ofTotal Class A StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot)18.00023.55% Don Simplot (Richard's brother) 18.00023.55 Gay Simplot Otter (Richard's sister) 18.00023.55 Scott Simplot (Richard's brother) 22.445 29.35 % Total 76.445100.00% Class B Percent of Number ofTotal Class B StockholderSharesShares Decedent (Richard Simplot) 3. Was $830 million. So that the return to stockholders in 1993 was slightly over 4%. Was the chairman of the board and the dominant person in setting company policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/001021.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Young Sergio was thrown from a 1985 Dodge Caravan through the open liftgate and killed. Was driving the vehicle on an errand with her 8 year old daughter Maria riding in the front seat and young Sergio in the back seat. She drove through a red light and was struck in the left rear by an oncoming car traveling at 30 m.p.h. Who was not wearing a seatbelt. Was thrown through the rear liftgate that had opened during the accident. Both of whom were wearing seatbelts. Were not seriously injured. Negligent design under South Carolina law were allowed to go to the jury. The Estate asserted that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/03/96-9016.htm">96-9016 -- KORNFELD V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE -- 03/03/1998<BR></A><BR> Kornfeld (taxpayer) was not entitled to a federal income tax deduction for amortization of a life interest in bonds that he purportedly jointly purchased with his daughters and secretary. The question for determination is whether what was done. Was the thing which the statute intended. <p> <u>Gregory v. 469 (1935).<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0273n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Rosemary Butcher's Rule 60(b) motion for relief below was patently without merit. Her appeal from the district court's denial was equally baseless. The sanctions ordered by the district court were clearly proper and are affirmed. Appellees' motion for sanctions on appeal under Rule 38 and § 1297 is granted. A Michigan limited partnership in which Alexander was a partner. Both the June 30 and July 6 deeds were recorded on July 12. This deed was recorded on July 14. Executed a master deed creating The history set forth in this Opinion is largely taken from the Court's previous opinion in this matter. Nine of those condominiums were sold to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest. He was the majority stockholder. Three of these condominiums were sold to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest. He also stated under oath on several occasions that LTDC was the owner of the Phase II property and that HCDC was the owner of the Phase III property. The plaintiffs did not sue Rosemary because she was under the protection of the bankruptcy court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1364.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nickless</SPAN> with whom </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov2000/995479.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the second. Successive malpractice action is also pr operty of 2 the estate. It is personal property and does not belong to the bankruptcy estate. Because O'Dowd's second malpractice action is based on alleged pleading errors committed in the first malpractice action. It is the bankruptcy estate that was har med by the alleged malpractice that is the subject of the second action. We will affirm the order of the District Court. We will refer to the entire group of defendants collectively as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="566"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1371.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Snyder LLP</SPAN> were on brief for appellants. </SPAN> <BR WP= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="564"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept2000/995592.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We consider whether certain fraudulent transfer claims arising from transfers made by Cybergenics Corporation were included in a sale of all assets of Cybergenics so as to foreclose its creditors from thereafter pursuing those claims on behalf of its bankruptcy estate. We conclude that the sale of all of Cybergenics' assets did not encompass these claims and we therefore will reverse the District Court's dismissal of the creditors' complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Was a successful marketer of body building and weight loss products under the Cybergenics name. L&S was sold in a leveraged buyout. The newly formed Cybergenics Corporation became burdened with more than $60 million of debt that was secured by substantially all of Cybergenics' assets.1 In August 1996. The original purchase price was over $110 million. The purchase price was later reduced to approximately $60 million. 3 1996. Another party who bid $2.65 million was the successful purchaser of all Cybergenics' assets. The sale order was not appealed and the sale was consummated. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="564"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7550D29232E1B7508825714E0001C46A/$file/0356405.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are faced with the question of whether a creditor of a bankruptcy estate has standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Basil and Thelma Spirtos were married in 1954. She is a creditor of Basil's bankruptcy estate. David Ray is the bankruptcy trustee. The substance of plaintiff's claims is that the defendants </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="564"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2290.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Conley and Sulloway & Hollis were on brief for defendant. P.A. were on brief for plaintiff. That some of the monies in these joint accounts were intended for Hardy's personal use. All of Marcucci's expenses were defrayed by Hardy with his social security income and with funds disbursed from the joint accounts. Helped care for Marcucci while Hardy was away from New Hampshire for approximately eigh teen months during Operation Desert Storm and while performing her other military duties. Prior to the final probate of Angela's will. Marcucci learned that the joint account balances were substantially less than $364. Constance told Marcucci that Hardy was claiming the right to withdraw funds from the joint accounts. Although Marcucci commented at the time that he would be without substantial assets unless he contested Angela's will. The will became final in August 1990.1 1Marcucci admits he knew the homestead had been left to Hardy by Angela. 000 loan is presumed uncollectible. No trust distributions were either promised or made to Marcucci. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8A98DADBE23347A388256F0E00819979/$file/0210287.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> As the error went to the heart of Boulware's defense and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Boulware is entitled to a new trial on the nine tax counts. Boulware was indicted on four counts of filing false tax returns for the 1989 1992 tax years. The company was renamed Hawaiian Isles Enterprises ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAyLTk0NTEgdyAybmQgRXJyYXRhLnBkZg==/02-9451%20w%202nd%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The primary issue is whether the work for hire doctrine applies to works created by the principal employee of a corporation that was. The Court's principal ruling was that copyrights in most of the 70 dances in dispute belong to Defendants Appellees Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance. Who is Graham's sole beneficiary under her will. We agree with the District Court that the work for hire doctrine was properly applied to dances created after 1966. On certain other aspects of the Court's judgment we conclude that a partial reversal or remand is required. That title is appropriate for the task this litigation presented to the District Court and now presents to this Court. The earliest account of this classic Greek myth is from Pherecydes. Many of the pertinent facts are obscured by inadequate record keeping. Graham was very successful. Initially known as the The Center was incorporated Graham Foundation for Martha Contemporary Dance. The corporation was renamed the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAyLTk0NTEgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/02-9451%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The primary issue is whether the work for hire doctrine applies to works created by the principal employee of a corporation that was. The Court's principal ruling was that copyrights in most of the 70 dances in dispute belong to DefendantsAppellees Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance. Who is Graham's sole beneficiary under her will. We agree with the District Court that the work for hire doctrine was properly applied to dances created after 1966. On certain other aspects of the Court's judgment we conclude that a partial reversal or remand is required. That title is appropriate for the task this litigation presented to the District Court and now presents to this Court. The earliest account of this classic Greek myth is from Pherecydes. Many of the pertinent facts are obscured by inadequate record keeping. Graham was very successful. The Center was incorporated in Initially known as the Martha Graham Foundation for Contemporary Dance. The corporation was renamed the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="563"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/033552p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Since Knapper's attempt to void the default judgments is foreclosed by the Rooker Feldman 2 doctrine. We will vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A mortgage lien was placed on both parcels of real estate as a result of one or more loan agreements Knapper entered into with Amresco Residential Securities Corporation. It was served on September 7. Giacomelli's affidavit of service recited that the complaint was served on an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="562"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5036.html">THE SHOSHONE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE WIND RIVER V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for plaintiff cross appellant The Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Lynn E. Calkins</u> and <u>Maria Whitehorn Votsch</u>.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Also on the brief was <u>Richard M. Who argued for plaintiff cross appellant The Arapaho Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Brian W. Argued for United States.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="562"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0510n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Alph's principal place of business is Detroit. The surviving member could elect to purchase the deceased member's shares in the company as long as the option was exercised in writing within one year of the deceased member's death. The parties disagree as to the date on which Alph's value is to be determined. Is to use. The Surrogate's Court of the State of New York exercised its jurisdiction over Philip Uzielli's will. This matter is still pending in the Surrogate's Court. A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that is purely probate. Even when the traditional requirements of diversity jurisdiction have been met. The starting point in any probate exception analysis is Markham.1 In Markham. The Supreme Lower courts have struggled to apply this Markham test. 713 (7th Cir. 1982) </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200512320.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The first of which is an issue of first impression in this Circuit: (1) whether the doctrine of in pari delicto bars a trustee's claims on behalf of a bankrupt debtor for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Laddin is the trusteein bankruptcy for ETS. The operation of the sale leaseback program was a Ponzi scheme that defrauded thousands of investors of over $300 million. IRA Custodians) are large holders of individual retirement accounts. Laddin did not have 4 standing to assert claims on behalf of the creditors. The court reasoned that the Creditors' Committee did not have the authority to assign the claims belonging to ETS creditors and the Trust Agreement did not authorize Laddin to bring claims on behalf of creditors. The wrongdoing of Edwards as a sole shareholder was imputed to ETS. Because the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//feb2002/01-12250.opn.html">SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)<BR></A><BR> The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTUxMDYtY3YgdyBFcnJhdGEucGRm/05-5106-cv%20w%20Errata.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed individual plaintiffs' claims for negligence and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the banks in which those plaintiffs' funds were deposited and insofar as it dismissed plaintiff Regal Trade's claim for fraud against defendant Sterling Bank. Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs are investors who were defrauded by lawyer David Schick in the early 1990s as part of his multimillion dollar Ponzi scheme. Many of Schick's victims have tried 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 with varying degrees of success to recover some of their lost investments from Schick's estate in bankruptcy. This is the second time we have considered these investors' claims against these defendants. 540 U.S. 1012 (2003). concluded that there was an adequate basis for diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over non diverse 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 parties. A plaintiff must make a different showing of proximate cause one that is often more difficult to make when bringing suit under the RICO statute than when bringing a common law cause of action. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTUxMDYtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-5106-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed individual plaintiffs' claims for negligence and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the banks in which those plaintiffs' funds were deposited and insofar as it dismissed plaintiff Regal Trade's claim for fraud against defendant Sterling Bank. Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs are investors who were defrauded by lawyer David Schick in the early 1990s as part of his multi 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 million dollar Ponzi scheme. Many of Schick's victims have tried with varying degrees of success to recover some of their lost investments from Schick's estate in bankruptcy. This is the second time we have considered these investors' claims against these defendants. 540 U.S. 1012 (2003). concluded that there was an adequate basis for diversity 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over non diverse parties. A plaintiff must make a different showing of proximate cause one that is often more difficult to make when bringing suit under the RICO statute than when bringing a common law cause of action. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/12/022467P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeals the district court's ruling that Pictet's counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion were moot in light of the earlier entry of judgment in Pictet's favor under Arkansas statutes furnishing appraisal rights to dissenting corporate shareholders. The acquisition company was itself owned by a trust administered by the Appellee. The total consideration was subject to certain adjustments and a 5% holdback escrowed to pay claims and expenses incidental to the merger. Any remaining holdback was scheduled for distribution to non dissenting former FLT 1 First Union is now Wachovia Bank. 2 shareholders in two payments after the merger. The Jones Trust would have received approximately $3.7 million for its 6. Was held in escrow by Sun Trust Bank in Atlanta. 2.5% of the holdback in Sun Trust Bank was distributed to non dissenting shareholders. While the claims were pending. The remaining holdback monies held in Sun Trust Bank were distributed to non dissenting shareholders. First Union also agreed not to disburse any additional funds from the Golden Gate Bank account while litigation with Pictet was pending. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200112250.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and comment only on two issues discussed by our esteemed dissenting colleague: (1) whether the gift was properly characterized as one of interests in land instead of shares of the family partnership. (2) whether a 33.5 percent discount is inapplicable when valuing the land gifted in this case. I. GIFT OF LAND We agree with the Tax Court that the gift in this case was an indirect gift of We review decisions of the Tax Court </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200110433.opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Last Will and Testament of Waldo DeLoache. As Custodian of the Interests of John Michel Whitehead DeLoachePowers and Russell Whitehead DeLoache Powers under the Last Will and Testament of Waldo DeLoache. Individually as legatee under the Will of Olivia Dubberly Hughes. As Executor of and individually as legatee under the Will of Mary S. The Will of Bruce Dubberly. As beneficiary of the trust under the Will of Marjorie Whitney A. The Will of Joseph Alexander Perkins. The Last Will and Testament of Waldo DeLoache. As Custodian of the Interests of John Michel Whitehead DeLoachePowers and Russell Whitehead DeLoache Powers under the Last Will and Testament of Waldo DeLoache. Individually as legatee under the Will of Olivia Dubberly Hughes. As Executor of and individually as legatee under the Will of Mary S. The Will of Bruce Dubberly. As beneficiary of the trust under the Will of Marjorie Whitney A. The Will of Joseph Alexander Perkins. Circuit Judge: This consolidated appeal arises out of the probate of the will of Waldo DeLoache ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="560"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb2002/01-12250.opn.html">SHEPHERD V. COMMISSIONER(2/28/2002, NO. 01-12250)<BR></A><BR> The United States Tax Court held that the transfer was an indirect gift of undivided fractional shares of land and that the value of the gift to each son was $160. We build on its observations and </SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="558"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/03/03-20013.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. We also creditor seeking to impose the constructive trust is the lease's previous holder. The development of this formation was to be known as the East Sour Lake Field Redevelopment Project ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="557"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/016072P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Nelson was awarded an interest in his former spouse's ERISA qualified retirement plan in the amount of approximately $71. Nelson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and asserted that the interest was either not property of his bankruptcy estate. That it was exempt under either 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) or 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). The bankruptcy court ruled that the interest was property of the bankruptcy estate and was not exempt except in the amount of $4. Which was the remaining sum available under the wildcard exemption set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Nelson appeals only from the bankruptcy court's ruling that his interest in the ERISA qualified retirement plan was property of the bankruptcy estate. Nelson was divorced from Denise Nelson in September of 2000. Which was the entire marital value of this asset.1 There is no dispute that this retirement plan is a qualified plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/94opinions/94-5285a.html">NATL TAXPAYERS UNION V. USA<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1745550937F817BB88256ABF007BE07E/$file/9917040.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug97/95-2078.man.html">HUNT V. HAWTHORNE ASSOC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Hunt v. Hunt is a retired Eastern Air Lines ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug97/95-2078.man.html">HUNT V. HAWTHORNE ASSOC.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Hunt v. Hunt is a retired Eastern Air Lines ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0284p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brought this action to assert his interest in real property that was mortgaged by the Cooks. Does not have a perfected security interest in the property that is superior to Rogan's interest as a judicial lien creditor. An </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="556"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2CE960676BCF075588256E5A00707CAE/$file/9917040.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the district court's final judgment. Was an employee owned garbage company. 12634 Plaintiffs are former employee shareholders (or their heirs and assigns) of Norcal. There is no dispute that the ESOP is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. Forty four of the Plaintiffs also were Norcal employees and participants in the benefit plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="555"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/July2002/012542.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Board of Trustees of the pension fund ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="555"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1170.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> L.L.P. were on brief. We agree that Salem's actions are entitled to protection under the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. Credit only those assertions that are supported by materials of evidentiary quality. Conscious that they are approximations. Salem was appointed trustee and he embarked upon the administration of the estate. Even this reduced amount was not free and clear. For the real estate was encumbered by a prior first mortgage that secured $100. LeBlanc maintained that the real estate was worth much more (say. Subject to the following proviso: If the gas station is sold within two years from [Oct. 19. The court will then either confirm or revoke its approval. The substance of the transaction is in dispute. The record on appeal is devoid of any satisfactory evidence of its terms. Salem asserts that the balance represented business assets of the Corporation and was paid out accordingly. LeBlanc contends that this allocation was a sham and that Lizotte fraudulently diverted $360. 000 that should have been available to his creditors (including Mailman and. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="552"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/99-4230.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="552"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/99-4230.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appellee/Cross Appellant Kaiser Aerospace and Electronics Corp. is currently suing Teledyne in Florida state court because Teledyne allegedly violated an agreement between the parties that. Would have given it certain shares in the new entity. Teledyne brought this case as an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin Kaiser's state court action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. Teledyne asserts that Kaiser should have. The bankruptcy court and subsequently the district court found that Kaiser's constructive trust claim was barred by res judicata. That Kaiser's damages claim was not barred.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/8F1B938CF3AE976F882573170053F20F/$file/0417494.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> FACTUAL BACKGROUND Defendant Saxton1 is a real estate development company incorporated and domiciled in Nevada. Saxton's stock was listed and publicly traded on the NASDAQ exchange2 and Saxton was engaged in several real estate development projects that it financed. The twelve loan transactions alleged in plaintiffs' second amended complaint (SAC) are as follows: 1. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note secured by the lien of a deed of trust on the property. Whose president was defendant James Saxton. All references to </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1381.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Carter and McKool Smith were on brief for appellants David C. Madoff and Cohn & Kelakos LLP were on brief for appellee. Senior Circuit Judge. appeal is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by approving a settlement between the chapter 7 trustee for Healthco International. Three months later an interim trustee was appointed and the reorganization was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. By the time the chapter 7 trustee ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1389.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge. is left for distribution in the consolidated chapter 7 estate of Bristol Terminals. An applica tion for an order authorizing joint administration of the Bristol and Hemingway chapter 11 estates was immediately granted by the bankruptcy court. The Hemingway Bristol chapter 11 proceedings were voluntarily converted to negligence on its part or on the part of its agents. The mortgage unmistakably provides that the sale and mortgage of the Property were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="549"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/974230.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Defendants Blanding's and Derrick's convictions (as well as Taylor's and Gordon's) were eventually overturned by this court on appeal on the grounds that the intervening Supreme Court decisions in McCormick v. Rendered defective the jury instructions that were given at their trials. All three cases were remanded to the district court for retrial. Are now deceased. Neither of these individuals is a party to this appeal. Was concluded in October of 1994. All of these materials were to be surrendered by December 1. That the government take every scrap of paper that they have. The district court concluded that the government's argument that the drugrelated audiotapes produced in March of 1995 were not relevant or discoverable under Brady was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="547"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200612296.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This fund was created following the settlement of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit filed on behalf of inmates in the Glynn County Detention Center ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="546"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/08/992511P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Complications from an automobile accident have prevented Judge Gibson from reviewing this opinion prior to its being filed. The opinion is consistent with Judge Gibson's vote at conference. 1 BOWMAN. Before us is another matter arising from the bankruptcy of Popkin & Stern (P&S). A Missouri law firm in which Ronald Lurie was a general partner. That an interest in certain real property was fraudulently transferred to them by their father and thus could be reached by the bankruptcy trustee and sold for the benefit of P&S's creditors. That they are entitled to compensation for their loss of it. Concluding that at least one of the disclaimers executed by Ronald is facially valid and enforceable. I. At issue is a piece of real property. Edna's last will and testament named Ronald as the executor and. As a co trustee of all trusts created under her will. Edna's will provided that upon her death. Her sons Ronald and Robert were the intended beneficiaries of her estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="546"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar2001/97-4578.man.html">UNITED STATES V. GILBERT (3/16/2001, NO. 97-4578)<BR></A><BR> The subsequent proceeding would be needless because the order of forfeiture upon which the Government relies is invalid. We affirm the district court's denial of the Government's motion to force the Gilberts to file third party petitions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(</SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="546"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar2001/97-4578.man.html">UNITED STATES V. GILBERT (3/16/2001, NO. 97-4578)<BR></A><BR> The subsequent proceeding would be needless because the order of forfeiture upon which the Government relies is invalid. We affirm the district court's denial of the Government's motion to force the Gilberts to file third party petitions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(</SPAN><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="544"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/957FBD7CF1F5989B88256CDB000B2C44/$file/0016660.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The current action is a challenge to provisions of the Agency's 1987 Regional Plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="543"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/lognameprint.php">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Jerome Wayne Johnson</td> <td align=left valign=top>03 13595 / 03 00036 CR J 25 TEM</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>07 12 2004</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Bowman</td> <td align=left valign=top>02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E</td> <td align=left valign=top><font color=red>08 13 2003</font></td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr bgcolor=cccccc> <td colspan=3> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align=left valign=top>In re: Will C. Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="543"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//2nd-idx.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Eleventh Circuit
	OPINION/ORDER Whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Bowman	02 13050 / 01 01345 CV BU E	08 13 2003


In re: Will C. Cohen	03 13162 / 02 23079 CV KMM	07 08 2004


In re: Will C.
	OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant Robert Cohen. Was on brief for appellant James K. Were on brief for appellee. Ambrose Devaney were convicted of defrauding two federal credit unions and other related offenses. Were co founders of BCCU. Robert Cohen was general counsel to both credit unions. A coconspirator who was BCCU's manager. Devaney was a real estate developer. The only defendant who was an outsider to the credit unions. The loans were used in part to finance the purchase of commercial real estate on Cape Cod. Devaney formed more than a dozen nominee trusts to create 3 3 the impression that the loans were going to many different borrowers. There was evidence that in some cases Cohen directly submitted false certificates to BCCU. The excess loan proceeds were usually deposited in Cohen's client account. The sham
	OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit
	OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit
	BAY VIEW, INC V. U.S. Argued for defendant appellee.
	OPINION/ORDER Eleventh Circuit
	OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The issue in this case is whether the approved plan of reorganization of the A. The district court held that prejudgment interest is not authorized by the plan. The goal of the CRF was to pay claims 2 as quickly and efficiently as possible. Those who are dissatisfied with these amounts or who have suffered more severe injuries may choose arbitration or litigation against the Trust. The district court ruled that prejudgment interest is not permitted by the Plan.
	DEL-RIO DRILLING V. U.S.
	OPINION/ORDER COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The taxpayers maintain that the Tax Court erred in concluding that certain travel related expenses paid by WVI were primarily for their personal benefit and constituted constructive dividends paid to Dr. Each of these contentions is without merit. I. WVI was incorporated in July 1983 to develop a time share resort near Williamsburg. The initial shareholders were Dr. Gow as the trustee.1 The Voting Trust was to continue for ten years until September 30. It was amended on October 24. Gow served as both A voting trust is a device whereby two or more persons. On which the time share resort was to be built. Regardless of which figures are correct. That is. The taxpayers were guests in lavish hotels and resorts costing up to $900 per night. WVI's corporate tax returns were audited in July 1991. The Gows' jointly filed tax returns were thereafter included in the audit. Was $1. In the event that the fraud penalties were found inapplicable.
	OPINION/ORDER Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the district court's jurisdiction. Extends to vessels that have not been arrested within the court's jurisdiction. Millennium Seacarriers was formed to hold the capital stock of various vesselowning subsidiaries (collectively
	OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was Chrys D. With him on the brief were Myles V. 000 in possible future estate tax liability that her estate would incur pursuant to 26 U.S.C. s 2035(a) if she were to die within three years after the transfer. Contributions to it would therefore have been subject to gift taxes. Was less than the $170. 901 that Stevenson would have had to pay had the trust been set up correctly. (Steven son would have been liable for gift taxes on $161. The district court found that the estate tax claim was unripe. Stevenson would have paid less in gift taxes than she eventually did. Stevenson fails to point to anything in the record suggesting that she would have altered her gift giving practices had the trust been properly established. Stevenson's own estate tax expert states in his affidavit:
	OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction was premised on both diversity of citizenship. Hence we will affirm. The plaintiffs are beneficiaries of trusts administered by Corestates which are subject to these fees. Because these amounts are far less than the $50. Plaintiffs assert that the jurisdictional amount is achieved either (1) via their claim for punitive damages. Which they allege the trustees have been mismanaging. Although plaintiffs have also brought this action
	OPINION/ORDER Woodworth & Evarts was on Edward S. Woodworth & Evarts was on brief. Was dismissed as time barred. The breach of contract claim in count II was dismissed on the grounds that Hancock had assumed no contractual obligation with respect to the foreclosure sale and that the trustees under the Nevada deeds of trust were not Hancock's agents. I I BACKGROUND BACKGROUND As these claims were dismissed pursuant to Fed. The Hancock loans were secured by first 2 deeds of trust on two Nevada ranch properties owned by the partnership. Freeport McMoran Gold Company had
	OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 22. Harder and Sherin and Lodgen were on brief for appellee. were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge. whether either the chapter 7 debtor or an unsecured creditor possesses standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order authorizing the chapter 7 trustee to settle an adversary proceeding to which the appellants were neither original nor intervening parties. The proceedings were converted to chapter 7. Was sold by the chapter 7 trustee for approximately $1 million. Whereby The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief The judgments Malkemus obtained in the probate court following relief from the automatic stay were captioned judgments of
	97-9556A -- HRI, INC. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY -- 01/06/2000 Circuit Judges.
	OPINION/ORDER PC were on consolidated brief for defendants Liliane Unanue and Kalif Trading. Garcia Sola and McConnell Valdes were on consolidated brief for plaintiff.
	OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 4. Jr. were on brief. Goodwin Procter & Hoar were on brief. Clients' funds which lawyers held for a short term or in nominal amounts were deposited into non interest bearing pooled trust accounts. Banking laws and the ethical obligation of lawyers to maintain clients' funds so that they were immediately available for reimbursement prevented such pooled trust accounts from accruing interest. The Massachusetts IOLTA program was established by amendment to Canon 9. The deposits were nominal in amount or to be held for only a short period of time. The designated charities were Massachusetts Legal Assistance. The parties have not briefed or argued any issues in the context of the 1993 amendment to the IOLTA Rule.3 Although the amendment of the IOLTA Rule affects the process of funds disbursement. The changes are not material to this decision. Was significant. The funds are still disbursed primarily to Massachusetts Legal Assistance with the remainder to
	OPINION/ORDER Pratt was on brief for appellant.
	OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court's order will be affirmed. Does Castle have standing to object to the Final Report and the Application for Fees? 3. The order on appeal is final and may be appealed as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). None of the parties have timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(c)(1).
	OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from an Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota issued on October 19. Flora Klesalek executed her last will and testament naming Darrell Suchy. Who were her niece and nephews. Who was helping care for Flora at the time. Was named as personal representative under the will. Connie was also named as Flora's attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney. She was admitted to the Prairie View Nursing Home in Underwood. Flora also named William as her personal representative under the will. William was in charge of all of Flora's income and expenses and was a signatory on Flora's accounts. He was also named as a beneficiary on that account. For the 33 months he was her attorney in fact. As beneficiaries under Flora's will. Filed an action in the probate court seeking to have William removed as the personal 3 representative under the will. The Plaintiffs conceded that Flora was mentally competent through all of the transactions. The bankruptcy court also found that William was overpaid for his services in acting as Flora's attorney in fact in the 1 Robert.
	OPINION/ORDER District Judge: Before the Court are an appeal and cross appeal from a final judgment in an ERISA2 action in which three employee benefit trust funds (collectively the
	OPINION/ORDER Brown was on brief. Were on brief and Kirby A. Was on supplemental brief. It held that there was no plain error warranting reversal. See United States v. Kenrick.
	OPINION/ORDER District Judge: Before the Court are an appeal and cross appeal from a final judgment in an ERISA2 action in which three employee benefit trust funds (collectively the
	OPINION/ORDER Were on brief. Were on brief. Defendant appellant Michael Carucci was a real estate broker and a business associate of Stephen Flemmi. Carucci and Flemmi were indicted on charges relating to money laundering. Only Carucci's case was tried. Carucci was found guilty of two counts of engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. On appeal. Carucci contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal liability under the statute. The seller asked Carucci where Flemmi's money was coming from. Carucci told them it was from lottery winnings. Told others that the money was from a family trust. That I didn't think he'd have a problem.
	94-1579 -- SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. AMOCO PRODUCTION CO. -- 07/20/1998 ) for lands located within the exterior boundaries of the ) Southern Ute Indian Reservation and which class ) members have not obtained tribal consent to and ) federal approval of said interests of rights. Which entities ) have not obtained tribal consent to and federal ) approval of said exploration. 2) a declaratory judgment that Tribal consent is required for CBM extraction. Sought injunctive relief to prevent the federal defendants from issuing permits to explore for and extract CBM under oil and gas leases or from otherwise acquiescing in the derogation of the Tribe's alleged ownership interest in CBM. Two issues were identified as fundamental to the resolution of all claims against the Amoco defendants: 1) the determination of CBM ownership. Amoco was designated as representative of the class and. The Tribe brought a cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of CBM ownership. The district court held that CBM ownership was vested unambiguously in the Amoco defendants. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
	OPINION/ORDER Because the principals of P.K.S. were sophisticated and knowledgeable. I. Factual Background and Procedural History We are writing here solely for the parties. Stouts Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership was formed to develop commercial real estate in New Jersey. The general partner in Stouts Brunswick was 2 P.K.S. (formed by Herbert Punia and Murray Kushner). 1 and Manao was the sole limited partner. Manao is not a party to this suit. Its agent and advisor Bankers Trust is the defendant. Three provisions in the partnership agreement are relevant here. Kushner are also plaintiffs/appellants in this suit. Neither of whom are discussed in the District Court's opinion or the briefing before us). It is from this side letter that this suit arises. Fred Perlstadt (Bankers Trust's vice president) sent Manao's principal shareholder two letters suggesting that the 1995 put was no longer in place. That suit was settled and dismissed. So we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This means that we
	OPINION/ORDER Federal courts have reviewed an ERISA health plan's denial of benefits for arbitrariness and capriciousness. Now we are called upon to decide whether a fiduciary's decision to delegate part of its Firestone authority to an independent claims administrator triggers de novo review. He was placed in intensive care. Andrew was taken the five hours from Grand Junction to Salt Lake City by ground ambulance. Was admitted to the neuroscience ward. Pain control a regimen she stated was medically necessary and typical for patients in Andrew's condition. The United Staffing Plan (the
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a cautionary tale for ERISA administrators. We are met with three claimants to an ERISA governed life insurance policy held by the decedent. The two most basic components of any ERISA plan are the plan administrator and the plan documents. The plan administrator is a fiduciary charged with the duty to administer the benefit plan
	OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court also sustained in part Mungo's objection to Taylor's proof of claim by reducing the amount of the claim to a figure that Mungo argued was permissible. Mungo later sought to have the claim judgment reconsidered. Arguing that she had not actually agreed to that figure but rather that it was the only permissible amount that could be awarded. The district court's decision is appended below. The bankruptcy court's order as amended is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Taylor was a disputed creditor by virtue of her representation of Mungo in state court divorce proceedings. That motion was denied. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to award Mungo costs where she was the prevailing party at trial. These issues are as follows: 1. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor failed to give thorough advice concerning the divorce settlement was clearly erroneous. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor and her former spouse were undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown in August 1997 was clearly erroneous.
	OPINION/ORDER That the amount now due and payable was $937. The trustee responded that she was talking to several potential purchasers of the lease. She also stated that the lease was the only asset of value in the estate. No extension was necessary. The trustee stated that AgriProcessors was interested in purchasing the lease from the bankruptcy estate. In so doing the court noted that the lease was Tama's most significant asset. The Bankruptcy Estate agrees that if the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 8(d) above. AgriProcessors objected to the trustee's motion to amend the motion to assume and assign on the grounds that the negotiating procedures were not clearly spelled out in her motion. The court further noted that outside of bankruptcy AgriProcessors would not have been entitled to be paid its cost of making its offer if it lost the bidding. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.3 The decision to award administrative expense priority is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.4 We review such a decision for abuse No one questioned Iowa Beef's participation at the hearing of July 9.
	CIENEGA GARDENS V. U.S. Argued for plaintiffs appellants. With him on the brief were Everett C. Argued for defendant appellee. With him on the brief was David M. Director. Of counsel on the brief were Carole W. Rental rates were held below market rates. On exiting the programs. The trial court granted summary judgment solely on the basis of that decision. This appeal is. We conclude a property right vested in the Owners that was temporarily taken. We also conclude that there is no reason this taking is not. Compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We further hold with respect to at least the subset of Owners for whom there is a well developed record before us. That they are entitled to ". Mso bidi language:AR SA'>[3] This appeal is one in a series of proceedings.
	OPINION/ORDER When both Congress and the terms of the ESOP provide that the primary purpose of the plan is to invest in the employer's securities. We will vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plan fiduciaries and will remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. In this opinion we will refer to the plaintiff appellant Charles Moench. Statewide's Demise Statewide Bancorp was a bank holding company with its principal office in Toms River. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) informed the Statewide Board that
	OPINION/ORDER As well as to other creditors who are not parties to these appeals. Tecumseh is trying to collect unpaid sewer and water bills. We must determine whether the bankruptcy court was correct in determining the relative priorities of the claims of these parties. Is the former owner of a chicken processing plant in Tecumseh. The first loan (the
	OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction Jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (transferring jurisdiction of cases arising in or related to Title 11 from district court to bankruptcy court). Jurisdiction in district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (enabling district court to consider interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts). Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (authorizing appeals from final district court judgments reviewing The Honorable Rodney S. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. The balance of the note was to be paid on September 30. Nerland Oil was responsible for forwarding from Conoco to Superpumper the credit card receivables generated by the Dakota Fuel Stop. Superpumper and Nerland Oil did not have a contract governing this relationship. It is a well known industry practice which is generally not recognized in writing. The existence of these contracts is puzzling. As WFTS was not a Conoco jobber authorized to sell the Conoco fuel products required.
	OPINION/ORDER We hold that the tax was paid upon a transfer of property by a general power of appointment under a trust that became irrevocable in 1976. Was therefore a generation skipping transfer exempted by§ 1433(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The judgment of the district court is accordingly reversed. Sections I and II of his will established a trust in favor of his wife E. The remainder on her death to be distributed
	OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
	OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
	OPINION/ORDER A promissory note was executed in that amount to be due in one year. Payment was never made on the note. The money received from the remaining proceedings was used to purchase a certificate of deposit at the Ozark Mountain Bank. While the suit was pending. In California they purchased a business which was later sold. The accounts were operated in the names of the Jeters and in the name of the Jeter's son. The Jeters were involved in the business of buying and selling realty. Accounts for the corporations were kept in Farrell Jeter's name. Shubert's lawsuit on the promissory note was tried in Taney County. The bankruptcy court opinion is reported at In re Jeter. The district court opinion is reported at In re Jeter. The garnishment was largely unsuccessful. The Jeters were successful in keeping their funds from Shubert. The execution was unsuccessful because only a modest sum of money was in the account titled in the names of Wendell and Betty Jeter. The schedules filed by the debtors were inaccurate. It was determined that the sale of a house built by Tri Lakes Builders.
	OPINION/ORDER Was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The jury also rendered a special verdict that several properties were used to facilitate his crimes or were proceeds of them and should be forfeited to the government pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. We must decide whether forfeiture was proper where Victor has never held title to the two forfeited properties. Operates in rem against the property itself on the theory that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing. 1414 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996) (
	OPINION/ORDER Hacking & Neumeier was on brief for appellant Stephen A. Michel & McInnes were on brief for appellant Jonah Jacob. Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellee Mt. Senior Circuit Judge. sought a declaratory judgment that it does not have a duty to defend the named defendants in an underlying malpractice action against them. Hamelburg (the Law Firm).2 The factual allegations of Jacob's complaint as summarized by the district court are as follows. South Copley was created to acquire. Jacob was a passive investor who entrusted Greenbaum. That we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court made no findings justifying its exercise of its discretionary declaratory judgment authority. An insurance company's claim that it has no duty to defend in another action is the archetypal case for which a declaratory judgment is appropriate. 2 Other defendants are named in the malpractice action. Are not parties to this appeal. 3 Trust. Northeast Realty Investment Group was incorporated to manage the partnership's real estate holdings.
	97-8004 -- HUNTER RANCH INC. V. HUNTER -- 07/02/1998 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
	OPINION/ORDER The creditors' committee all agreed the settlement was in the 2 No. 05 3502 best interest of the estate. The bankruptcy court held the settlement was in the best interest of the estate and approved it. I. Background Desnick was the owner and sole shareholder of Doctors Hospital and a number of other entities. Because the loan was. It was secured by the Hospital's equipment and (like the Daiwa loan) by the Hospital's accounts receivable. The proceeds some $48.5 million after administrative fees were deposited into an No. 05 3502 3 account bearing the name of Desnick and his wife. Twelve of the other defendants were Desnick controlled entities2 and four were former corporate officers or directors3 of the Hospital whom Desnick had effectively agreed to indemnify for their losses.4 The gist of the complaint was that Desnick and the other officers and directors caused the Hospital's bankruptcy through mismanagement and a series of fraudulent transactions to the tune of about $34 million which benefitted Desnick.
	OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The Estate of Dorothy Mingus appeals the bankruptcy court's order disallowing its claim for the Debtor's alleged legal malpractice arising out of the execution of the will of his client. Mingus did not have standing to sue the Debtor because she was not in privity with the testator. Its decision will be AFFIRMED. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court properly construed Ohio law in its determination that the claim of the Estate of Dorothy Mingus for negligent legal malpractice should be disallowed. Issues related to allowance of claims against the estate are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Findings of fact by the bankruptcy court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
	OPINION/ORDER Barron & Stadfeld were on brief for appellee. The Gens Note was secured by a third mortgage on real property in Barnstable. Although the Barnstable Property was subject to two prior mortgages. Home Owners was declared insolvent and the Resolution Trust Corporation (
	MAY V. ILLINOIS NAT'L INS. CO. (9/29/1999, NO. 98-2580) Senior Circuit Judge: The plaintiff administrator ad litem of a probate estate brought this suit to recover against the automobile liability insurer of the decedent for bad faith refusal to settle a damage claim for death and injuries resulting from an automobile accident in which the decedent was at fault. A judgment was obtained by a third party against the estate for personal injury/wrongful death damages in excess of the insurance coverage. Is barred unless the estate itself is liable in the probate proceeding to the third party claimant for the excess damages. The amount the insured is obligated to pay constitutes the extent of damages. See Swamy v. If a deceased insured's estate is not obligated to pay the excess judgment. Turns on a point of Florida probate law as to whether the estate itself is obligated to pay the judgment in excess of $1 million. That liability turns on an interpretation of the statutory law of Florida concerning the requirement for filing a claim in the state probate proceeding. The district court held on a motion for summary judgment filed by the insurance company that liability on the judgment was barred because the judgment creditor failed to file a statement of claim in the probate proceeding within the time required by Florida law. The plaintiff administrator ad litem.
	OPINION/ORDER The result of which was that less property was available to creditors in his bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court1 held that the tuition savings plans are assets of his estate. That they could not be claimed as exempt at the time the case was filed. The business was performing poorly and was unable to pay its debts. These payments were voluntary. Was approximately $22. Said they were not property of the estate. Asserted that the § 529 accounts were property of the estate and not subject to any exemptions. Legal conclusions de novo.3 The question of whether a § 529 tuition account is property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate is subject to de novo review.4 With regard to the homestead and IRA issues.
	OPINION/ORDER The question presented in this case is whether various state law claims against a bankruptcy trustee in his individual capacity can be either a
	OPINION/ORDER Because we conclude that the settlement agreement was valid. That enforcement of the agreement was proper. Although the district court erred in ruling that the appeal of the judgment enforcing the settlement was untimely. Rains is an attorney and a debtor in bankruptcy. Flinn is the bankruptcy trustee. A settlement conference was held on September 23. The agreement was reduced to writing and the parties (including Rains) and their attorneys signed it. Among the exemptions claimed by Rains was his interest in a retirement plan sponsored by the American Bar Association (retirement plan). The agreement alternatively provided that: [i]n the event that payment is not timely made by the defendants. 000 unless before the due date for payment the debtors have posted an irrevocable standby letter of credit . . . (or other instrument or collateral acceptable to the trustee and to [the creditor]) to support the $250. Rains drove himself to a hospital emergency room where he was admitted and diagnosed with a ruptured cerebral aneurysm.
	MAY V. ILLINOIS NAT'L INS. CO. (9/29/1999, NO. 98-2580) Senior Circuit Judge: The plaintiff administrator ad litem of a probate estate brought this suit to recover against the automobile liability insurer of the decedent for bad faith refusal to settle a damage claim for death and injuries resulting from an automobile accident in which the decedent was at fault. A judgment was obtained by a third party against the estate for personal injury/wrongful death damages in excess of the insurance coverage. Is barred unless the estate itself is liable in the probate proceeding to the third party claimant for the excess damages. The amount the insured is obligated to pay constitutes the extent of damages. See Swamy v. If a deceased insured's estate is not obligated to pay the excess judgment. Turns on a point of Florida probate law as to whether the estate itself is obligated to pay the judgment in excess of $1 million. That liability turns on an interpretation of the statutory law of Florida concerning the requirement for filing a claim in the state probate proceeding. The district court held on a motion for summary judgment filed by the insurance company that liability on the judgment was barred because the judgment creditor failed to file a statement of claim in the probate proceeding within the time required by Florida law. The plaintiff administrator ad litem.
	OPINION/ORDER Senior Circuit Judge: The plaintiff administrator ad litem of a probate estate brought this suit to recover against the automobile liability insurer of the decedent for bad faith refusal to settle a damage claim for death and injuries resulting from an automobile accident in which the decedent was at fault. A judgment was obtained by a third party against the estate for personal injury/wrongful death damages in excess of the insurance coverage. Is barred unless the estate itself is liable in the probate proceeding to the third party claimant for the excess damages. The amount the insured is obligated to pay constitutes the extent of damages. If a deceased insured's estate is not obligated to pay the excess judgment. Turns on a point of Florida probate law as to whether the estate itself is obligated to pay the judgment in excess of $1 million. The district court held on a motion for summary judgment filed by the insurance company that liability on the judgment was barred because the judgment creditor failed to file a statement of claim in the probate proceeding within the time required by Florida law.
	OPINION/ORDER The instant case is a civil action for conversion and civil theft brought by the United States against F. The facts of that case that are relevant here are recounted in our opinion in United States v. Among these assets were $2 million that had been placed in trust by the McCorkles in the Cayman Islands for the payment of their lawyers' fees and transferred by trust to F. Found that Bailey was a transferee of the laundered proceeds that belonged to the United States. Bailey had to file a petition with the district court and prove that he had received the money as a bona fide purchaser for value without cause to believe that the money was subject to forfeiture (
	OPINION/ORDER Ocwen Federal Bank claims that a deed of trust is valid against subsequent purchasers of the property. The bankruptcy and district courts each held that a deed of trust omitting this information was invalid under Tennessee law. Believing that the acknowledgment was defective and that her status as a bona fide purchaser gave her a superior interest in the debtors' home under Tennessee law. The acknowledgment was
	OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
	OPINION/ORDER Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust Page 2 The district court found that Spectrum's lien on the proceeds of a malpractice settlement was valid and enforceable. Therefore is invalid. Spectrum argues that the issue of the validity of the lien is precluded by two prior state court judgments approving the malpractice settlement. We conclude that the issue is not precluded by either of the state court judgments. That the lien on the settlement is prohibited by federal and state Medicaid law. I. BACKGROUND The material facts in this case are undisputed. Bowling has little or no control of her limbs and is unable to speak. Spectrum is the parent company of a group of providers of sub acute rehabilitation and nursing services. Bowling was admitted to GVHC in December 1998. The total customary cost of Spectrum's services provided to Bowling during the time she resided at GVHC was $639. The 1 It is unclear from the record how Bowling's co payments factor into the shortfall. Spectrum states that its total customary cost was $639.
	99-6156 -- PLOTNER V. AT&T CORP. -- 09/01/2000 Concluding the appeal is timely. We further conclude that the necessary elements of res judicata are present. 158(d) and affirm.
	OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court invalidated the Bank's mortgage on real estate owned by a partnership of which the debtors and Sanchez were the partners. The issues presented for review are (i) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear this adversary proceeding. Whether the district court was correct in treating it as a core proceeding rather than as a non core proceeding requiring de novo. That this was a non core matter necessitating plenary review by the district court. I. FACTS In 1988. The purpose of the partnership was to hold. No formal partnership agreement was ever entered into. Orlando Toledo continued to act as managing partner and Carmen Sanchez was uninvolved in Partnership affairs. In April of 1989. This was done without Sanchez' consent or knowledge. If the mortgage was valid. Sanchez was not served with the notice of foreclosure and therefore was not a party to these Florida state court proceedings. At some $1.8 million) was still unsatisfied thereafter.
	OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Concluding that the chapter 7 trustee did not have standing to pursue the state law fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty actions against SunTrust Banks. We conclude that the debtor OBM did have an interest in the funds transferred and therefore the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the debtor did not have an interest in the funds transferred and as a result the trustee of its estate lacked standing to prosecute the state law fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Is final if it
	OPINION/ORDER KPERS filed the basic underlying suit in which recusal is sought in Kansas state court in 1991. These parties were Boatmen's First National Bank of Kansas City. Were probating his mother's estate. Of which Judge Bartlett was a primary beneficiary. Judge Bartlett explained that the estate planning work for him was substantially complete5 and that he was seeking no further legal advice from the firm. Judge Bartlett recused himself from deciding Boatmen's application because he owned stock in Boatmen's parent His disqualification from deciding Shook's and Blackwell's Boatmen's motion to intervene was See Boatmen's First applications stemmed from a concern that his rulings on these applications would affect Boatmen's application. eventually stayed. All that remained was a transfer of some insurance to a new trust. The court informed the parties that his daughter had accepted the offer from Shook and also that his son was probably a member of KPERS because he was the assistant city manager of the City of Hays.
	OPINION/ORDER The defendants argue that the instruments that they offered to investors were not
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Appellants Anthony Gricco and Michael McCardell were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Anthony Gricco was the regional manager for private companies that contracted with the Philadelphia Parking Authority to operate the parking 2 facilities at the Philadelphia International Airport. Gricco was responsible for the general operation of the facilities. Was Gricco's chief assistant. A customer who had parked in the lot for a long period of time would have a real ticket reflecting a high parking fee. Flannery also disabled the fare displays on the ticket reading machines so that customers could not see that the parking fees that they were paying were higher than the fees recorded by the machines. More corrupt cashiers were enlisted. The rest was divided into four equal shares for Gricco. The cashiers waived their right to a jury trial and were convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Million were acquitted. The government submitted a sentencing memorandum asserting that the total amount stolen between 1990 and 1994 was $3.4 million and that the tax loss was $952.
	OPINION/ORDER O:\Slip\WP\2006\05 7140 Stewart7a.odl.wpd
	02-5084 -- BRUNER V. BRUNER -- 08/08/2003 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Diana Bruner. Seeking a declaration that the Estate is the equitable owner of certain tracts of land to which Leda and Bim hold legal title. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiff on the grounds that her claims were barred by the clean hands and estoppel doctrines. Were contrary to federal laws governing the sale and encumbrance of restricted Indian lands. Restricted Indian land is
	OPINION/ORDER Harrington & Richardson was on brief. The fraud is alleged to have been committed by the purchaser and the debtor's former counsel in the acquisition of a mortgage against the asset. Were in prison. I. Bruce and Andrew Jeremiah are the partners of the debtor. Its business essentially was to lease space in this complex to retail. Hershel Smith to represent them in a dispute they were having with the Center's prior mortgagee. While Smith was representing the Center in the bankruptcy proceedings. It developed that he also was representing some of its creditors. RSS's principals are William Ricci and the Smith Family Trust. Of which attorney Smith's children are the beneficiaries. Also is a convicted felon. Seeking to have the Center placed in receivership. Were in jail for allegedly dealing drugs out of the Center. The Trustee sought to have the mortgage declared null and void. The Center was subject to (1) liens for $850. The Center is in deteriorating condition. Contend that the Center's financial picture is not quite so grim.
	NEWLAND V. NEWLAND That Appellant's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Because we agree that Appellant's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The Bank was removed as administrator of the estate on May 12. 1992 and at that time Fairbanks was permitted to withdraw as attorney of record for the Bank. Appellees concluded that Charles was presumed dead under a specific provision of the Kansas probate code. Appellees thus prepared a petition for final settlement stating that Lester's siblings were the only surviving heirs who were known or could be ascertained with reasonable diligence. The reports of Charles' death were greatly exaggerated. The court ruled that the presumption of death statute was not self executing. The state district court granted Charles' petition and a hearing was scheduled for October 4. The state district court later held that Charles was the sole heir of the estate. 1991 and ordered the district court to conduct a hearing to restore Charles to the position he would have been in absent the erroneous order of final settlement.
	98-2169 -- U.S. V. BROWN -- 08/04/1999 Circuit Judges.
	OPINION/ORDER For Appellee.
	99-6059 -- PATTERSON V. SPEARS -- 01/31/2000 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This appeal arises out of an adversary proceeding commenced by Appellee Kenneth Spears. Who is Denton's mother. The matter was tried to the bankruptcy court along with another adversary proceeding commenced by one of Denton's creditors. So the alleged oral revocation of the trust was of no effect. Who was the trustee of the spendthrift trust. Claims that she had contributed virtually all of the corpus of the trust and that the trust was revoked. Both parties agree that all the issues raised on appeal are governed by Oklahoma law. We note that our review of this appeal was hindered by Patterson's failure to comply with 10th . Which requires her to refer to the specific places in the record where each issue was raised and ruled on. That the trust was revoked by oral consent of all the interested parties in the early 1990s. Because Oklahoma's Trust Act requires the
	OPINION/ORDER 1998 4:24:29 PM
	OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Realty Company (
	OPINION/ORDER Frisoli was on brief. Ragosa contends that the bankruptcy court should have abstained from hearing this case. That the court should never have included the disputed parcel in the bankruptcy estate. Was deeded to Michael and Mary Colarusso in 1992. Both the Canzanos and Ragosa were neighbors of the Debtors. Stating:
	OPINION/ORDER The cash price for the truck was $27. The rate of interest specified in the contract was 18% per annum. Which were considered as part of the claim. Coors is a liquor distributor which does business as R.C. Distributing and is referred to as such in some of the relevant agreements and the parties' pleadings. Coors and Ross Perry have the same principals and owners and many of the same shareholders. The agreement was later assigned to Coors. Ross Perry is crossed out as the seller and R.C. Distributing is hand written in. Indicating that perhaps this transaction was a direct sale. The assignments which took place in August 1996 and May 1997 are. They look more like intercompany transactions. 2 2 1 Debtors acknowledged that Coors was an oversecured creditor. Because Coors was not the seller nor a licensed sales finance company. Debtors maintained that Coors could not legally charge 18% interest and was thus barred from collecting any interest at all. Debtors sought to have Coors' claim reduced to the principal balance due on the debt at the date of filing.
	OPINION/ORDER Which provided general management services to the restaurants in exchange for five percent of RMR's gross sales. and RMI were organized under Missouri law. Have three primary benefits: (1) Bicknell had significant experience in restaurant management. The central component of the agreement between Gray and Bicknell was a stock purchase agreement (SPA). RMR was required to cancel its management contracts Gray and Bicknell also entered into two ancillary agreements on First. Day to day operations of the restaurants were the responsibility of the onsite managers. This real estate is referred to as the Battlefield restaurant property. 3 1 continued to take five percent of RMR's revenues as a management fee despite the SPA's provision that this practice would cease once Bicknell became a fifty percent owner. After Bicknell realized that RMR was still paying RMI a management fee. He did not attend because he believed that Gray's intention was to pressure him into increasing his investment in RMR and forgiving Gray's breach of the SPA.
	OPINION/ORDER Sine's role in the scheme was to reassure individuals that they were lending money to a legitimate real estate investor and that millions of dollars in legitimate collateral protected them in case of default. Once the scheme started to unravel and it became clear that the collateral was worthless. Claiming that it was as much of a surprise to him as to anybody else that the collateral was illusory. Such use of the judge's statements was highly improper. He convinced victims that they were lending money to fund various real estate projects conducted by Alpha Funding Group. Of which Panthaky was president. Sine was the trustee of Alpha Trust. The
	OPINION/ORDER They were unsuccessful. This motion was opposed by the debtors. Who would otherwise be entitled to prompt distribution of the remaining cash if the case were conducted under Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 11. 221 22 (2d Cir. 2000) (primary purpose of Chapter 7 trustee is
	OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellant. Richardson and Gelinas were on brief for appellee.
	OPINION/ORDER ORDER The government's Motion to Change Wording of Opinion is GRANTED. 2007 is hereby amended as follows: 1) On slip op. 4792. The final two sentences of the paragraph beginning
	OPINION/ORDER The state and local taxing authorities who had received and refused or failed to refund the recordation and transfer tax proceeds were located in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Each of the taxing authorities was served with notice of the motion and each responded by filing motions for abstention. NVR was exempt from transfer and recordation taxes on any real property transfers completed between April 6. The date that its reorganization plan was fully implemented and the bankruptcy period ended. Specifically holding that
	OPINION/ORDER Before the court are several appeals from judgments concerning lands once recognized to be part of the Yankton Sioux Reservation. That case was remanded for further proceedings.1 In the district court the case was then consolidated with an Individually. The district court concluded that the reservation has not been disestablished and still includes all land within the original exterior reservation boundaries that was not ceded to the United States. The individual named state and county officials appeal.2 We affirm the conclusion that the reservation was never clearly disestablished. We reverse the conclusion that the original exterior boundaries of the reservation continue to have effect and that all nonceded lands remain part of the reservation. I. The original boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation were defined in a treaty between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe on April 19. 000 acres in what is now Charles The named defendants in the declaratory judgment action were Matt Gaffey. South Dakota.3 The Supreme Court held in Yankton that the reservation was diminished by land ceded to the United States under an 1892 agreement.
	OPINION/ORDER Appellants2 are growers of fresh fruits and vegetables. Certified was in the business of purchasing fresh agricultural produce from growers for resale. Sundance Natural Foods. 3 Certified is not a party to this appeal and this case was proceeding in district court against Certified and Messing when the notice of appeal was filed. 6876 the growers sued not only Certified but also Transfac. They allege that Certified was to have held the accounts receivable in trust for the growers until the growers were paid for their produce. Unless Transfac can prove that it was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the breach. Because Transfac bought the accounts for at least what they were worth. Transfac cannot be found to have acquired the accounts in breach of the trust. Were not resolved by the summary judgment motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It is designed to protect commodity producers against secured lenders. Here is how it works: Farmer sells oranges on credit to Broker. Broker is required to hold the receivable in trust for Farmer until Farmer was paid in full.
	OPINION/ORDER Appellants2 are growers of fresh fruits and vegetables. Certified was in the business of purchasing fresh agricultural produce from growers for resale. Sundance Natural Foods. 3 Certified is not a party to this appeal and this case was proceeding in district court against Certified and Messing when the notice of appeal was filed. 6876 the growers sued not only Certified but also Transfac. They allege that Certified was to have held the accounts receivable in trust for the growers until the growers were paid for their produce. Unless Transfac can prove that it was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the breach. Because Transfac bought the accounts for at least what they were worth. Transfac cannot be found to have acquired the accounts in breach of the trust. Were not resolved by the summary judgment motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It is designed to protect commodity producers against secured lenders. Here is how it works: Farmer sells oranges on credit to Broker. Broker is required to hold the receivable in trust for Farmer until Farmer was paid in full.
	03-5153 -- MALLOY V. WALLACE -- 05/28/2004 Background Wallace is trustee of the Stephen Paul Wallace Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Whose sole asset is a minority interest in a family partnership (the Partnership) and the right to distributions therefrom. Filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and Appellee Plaintiff Patrick Malloy III was appointed trustee for Wallace's estate in bankruptcy. Alleging Wallace had not honored the terms of the trust and seeking a determination that therefore the trust was illusory and its assets were properly the property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court announced that it was dismissing the third party complaint and granting the motion to strike the Answer because it had been filed by a non party. These rulings were formalized in a written order dated December 10. Malloy wrote to Wallace noting that the period for filing a responsive pleading had expired and advising Wallace
	03-5153A -- MALLOY V. WALLACE -- 05/28/2004 Background Wallace is trustee of the Stephen Paul Wallace Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Whose sole asset is a minority interest in a family partnership (the Partnership) and the right to distributions therefrom. Filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and Appellee Plaintiff Patrick Malloy III was appointed trustee for Wallace's estate in bankruptcy. Alleging Wallace had not honored the terms of the trust and seeking a determination that therefore the trust was illusory and its assets were properly the property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court announced that it was dismissing the third party complaint and granting the motion to strike the Answer because it had been filed by a non party. These rulings were formalized in a written order dated December 10. Malloy wrote to Wallace noting that the period for filing a responsive pleading had expired and advising Wallace
	OPINION/ORDER Inc. (
	OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
	OPINION/ORDER The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. Was nondischargeable because Hines had been awarded a separate property interest in the Debtor's retirement account. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether a share of the Debtor's retirement plan awarded to his former wife in the parties' divorce decree is a dischargeable debt. (3) whether the bankruptcy court erred by denying confirmation of the Debtor's chapter 13 plan when the objector did not specify the Bankruptcy Code provision upon which the objection was based as required by the local rules of the bankruptcy court. An order is final if it
	OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
	OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
	OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: Slip Op. at 9033. That is. Hence that Walker and In re Collins are 11440 no longer good law. The definition of
	OPINION/ORDER PA 19103 Counsel for Appellee Sun Ship Inc. This case was argued before the panel of Judges Fuentes. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 USC § 46(d) *Judge Roth assumed senior status on May 31. 2 alleging both false claims and
	OPINION/ORDER Because we determine that 2 the bankruptcy court was without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the federal income tax liability for the 1990 through 1994 taxable years. The opinion below will be vacated. This Chapter 11 bankruptcy case was filed by the debtor on August 24. The taxes were based upon the additional $500. The debtor objected to the proof of claim on the basis that the funds were not income. An evidentiary hearing was held on the objection after which the bankruptcy court found. The IRS proof of claim was allowed in its entirety. That the debtor may have made restitution in subsequent tax years. No years were specified and the opinion does not indicate what tax years the Court believed would be in issue.1 Payments in the nature of restitution are deductible with respect to the tax years in which they are made. 26 U.S.C. § 165. He was entitled to claim a deductions of the amounts paid on his 1040 return for the 1991 taxable year. It appears that the delay was occasioned by settlement negotiations between the parties. 4 2 response objecting to the motion.
	OPINION/ORDER P.C. was on brief for appellant.
	OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because there was no error in the ulti 4 U.S. We repeat only the facts that are relevant to the appeal. LLC and Nielsen Enterprises LLC will be referred to collectively as
	OPINION/ORDER The parties do not dispute that the net loan proceeds ultimately disbursed to the Chandlers were $57.
	OPINION/ORDER Jr. was convicted on one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 2 Frost contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for mail fraud. I. Frost was a certified public accountant who worked exclusively for Harvey Jones. He was paid for his work. Bernice Jones was also paid for her work on behalf of the Trust from the Jones Investment Company. That if they ever were. All royalty payments from those wells were paid to Frost. Some of these funds were applied to Frost's personal stock and bond investments. Frost contends that under Arkansas law he was permitted to withdraw reasonable compensation from the Trust without Bernice Jones's consent and that consequently the evidence does not support the fraud conviction and related money laundering charges arising from the $1. Uphold the conviction if a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (3) knew it was reasonably foreseeable that the mails would be used.
	OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: In this diversity case we must interpret the provisions of a will creating a testamentary trust. The district court declared that the will required the trustee to allocate all capital gains as income payable to the life beneficiary. Because the will grants the trustee authority to allocate capital gains as income or principal. I. Julia Tull Walker died in 1965 leaving a will that created multiple trusts. The income of each trust was granted to a series of life beneficiaries. The final life beneficiary in each trust was Julia Tull Walker's daughter in law. The will named John Walker. The parties have referred to the separate trusts created by Julia Tull Walker's will collectively as the
	OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case. The issue is whether the claim of the California Uninsured Employers Fund (
	OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
	OPINION/ORDER The district court found that the Committee's claims were time barred. We agree that the Committee's claims are barred and affirm. I. The facts are undisputed. The Plan is an employer sponsored. Which is governed by ERISA and contains a reimbursement provision.3 The Plan is administered by the Committee in Rogers. Separate named defendant Evelyn Soles was never served with a summons or complaint in this matter. Patrick Hollander was a Wal Mart employee in Myrtle Beach. He was covered by the Plan. Hollander was struck by a car driven by J.W. Hollander died to comply with this request will entitle the Plan to withhold benefits due you under the Plan Document. You or your covered dependents may not do anything to hinder reimbursement of overpayment to the Plan after you have accepted benefits. .... These rights apply regardless of whether such payments are designated as payment for. Subrogation is when Wal Mart pays your medical charges relating to your accident while waiting for the responsible party to settle.
	OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction. According to the Joint Plan: [T]here will be a voluntary transfer of Investors' alleged interests in notes and trust deeds. In exchange 11936 for a right to payment from a Liquidating Corporation [PLC] which will be formed for the purpose of (1) taking title to all of the assets of the Debtors and the alleged Investor interests. PLC was further charged with investigating and pursuing all appropriate and cost effective actions on behalf of the Debtor's estate. Investors were entitled to pro rata distributions from the liquidation of the Debtor's assets remaining after the costs of implementing the Joint Plan. The first distribution was to be within 60 days of the Joint Plan's effective date. Thereafter distributions were to be made as soon as the amount of unrestricted cash available for distribution exceeded $1 million. It was empowered to resolve objections to claims. The Debtor's assets were valued at about $80 million. Who were also able to report tax deductible losses of $100 million in 1992.
	OPINION/ORDER Werner and as trustee of trusts created under the last will and testament of Anne L. Trusts created under the last will and testament of Leo L. Was the largest manufacturer and marketer of ladders and other climbing products in the United States. The plaintiffs are the Anne Werner Estate. Were minority shareholders of the Company. The ten individual defendants (
	OPINION/ORDER I Fran Lebowitz may have rightly observed that a person has the same chance of winning the lottery whether one plays or not. 1 the probability of tax imposition on the prize is almost 100%. Nor were his heirs. Future payments were to be made to a deceased winner's estate according to the annuity terms. The payment of federal estate tax is not similarly structured. Which is themed
	OPINION/ORDER I Fran Lebowitz may have rightly observed that a person has the same chance of winning the lottery whether one plays or not. 1 the probability of tax imposition on the prize is almost 100%. Nor were his heirs. Future payments were to be made to a deceased winner's estate according to the annuity terms. The payment of federal estate tax is not similarly structured. Which is themed
	OPINION/ORDER P.C. was on brief. LLP was on brief. LLP were on brief. That is only a step along the road to meaningful relief. This is a case in point.
	OPINION/ORDER The Petitions asserted that disqualification was also wa r r a n te d u nder 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) as a result of ex parte communications among Judge Wolin and his advisors. Our decision was
	OPINION/ORDER We are called upon to construe a series of contracts. We conclude that Royal has raised a triable issue as to whether all of the losses claimed by the beneficiaries were covered under its policies. I. Student Finance Corporation (
	OPINION/ORDER We are called upon to construe a series of contracts. We conclude that Royal has raised a triable issue as to whether all of the losses claimed by the beneficiaries were covered under its policies. I. Student Finance Corporation (
	OPINION/ORDER MURPHY Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Frances executed a will. Who is now deceased. Was the mother of Clifford and Adrienne. 2 Although Frances was exhibiting symptoms of dementia at the time she executed the documents. The parties do not contend that she lacked the mental capacity to execute these documents. 3 Frances' will left her entire estate equally to Clifford and Adrienne. 1 PAOLILLO v. Adrienne called Clifford and told him to expect a call from Frances who was claiming that Adrienne had robbed her. This is the first time he was made aware of the existence of the Trust. He was not made aware. Once it was explained to Frances that Adrienne. Which was done in December 1995.4 According to Clifford. He began to suspect that all of Frances' money was not being deposited in the Trust. When Clifford and Frances were stopped in Pennsylvania. An arrest warrant was issued for Clifford for kidnapping. The Trust was converted from a revocable trust to an irrevocable trust. 5 The arrest warrant was issued pursuant to an Application for Statement of Charges submitted by Frederick County Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Olander. 4 4 PAOLILLO v.
	OPINION/ORDER Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank (
	ELECTRO-WIRE PRODS. V. SIROTE & PERMUTT, P.C. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Electro Wire Prods. v. Sirote was paid a total of $7. 056.40 of which was paid to Sirote in October of 1989. Which was dismissed in April of 1989 after the Princes reconciled. 000 in property was conveyed from Mr. The property deeds executed by Prince in this property transfer remained in Sirote's files and were not recorded until October 17. Cooper then asked Todd to prepare a memorandum outlining the estate planning work she had done for the Princes and the effect it might have on Prince's bankruptcy proceedings. P.C. have no connection with the Debtor. P.C. have not formerly represented the Debtor and do not presently represent any party in interest in the case and to best of the undersigned's knowledge is otherwise qualified to serve in the capacity as attorney for the Debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="504"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec94/93-7073.opa.html">ELECTRO-WIRE PRODS. V. SIROTE & PERMUTT, P.C.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Electro Wire Prods. v. Sirote was paid a total of $7. 056.40 of which was paid to Sirote in October of 1989. Which was dismissed in April of 1989 after the Princes reconciled. 000 in property was conveyed from Mr. The property deeds executed by Prince in this property transfer remained in Sirote's files and were not recorded until October 17. Cooper then asked Todd to prepare a memorandum outlining the estate planning work she had done for the Princes and the effect it might have on Prince's bankruptcy proceedings. P.C. have no connection with the Debtor. P.C. have not formerly represented the Debtor and do not presently represent any party in interest in the case and to best of the undersigned's knowledge is otherwise qualified to serve in the capacity as attorney for the Debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="503"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct95/93-4855.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. MULLENS<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Mullens was the president and sole shareholder. Mullens told investors the limited partnerships were formed to purchase and sell small. Omni was a ponzi scheme.<p> Mullens. All but approximately $7.4 million of the funds invested were traced through reconstruction of Omni's books and bank records.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="503"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct95/93-4855.opa.html">UNITED STATES V. MULLENS<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>United States v. Mullens was the president and sole shareholder. Mullens told investors the limited partnerships were formed to purchase and sell small. Omni was a ponzi scheme.<p> Mullens. All but approximately $7.4 million of the funds invested were traced through reconstruction of Omni's books and bank records.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="503"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/002204.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was at $14 per share on the second day of trading. Stating that in his opinion that stock was undervalued and would appreciate. Kestel told Stopper that it was his duty to hold the stock until it rose to its true value. Which was at least $3.00 per share. The Stealey stock in Stopper's Trust was sold by the successor trustee for $0.86 per share in late October 1999. That he was grossly negligent in consciously and deliberately disregarding the risks of the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="503"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/04/996083P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> An escrow account was established with First Trust National Association ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-5.gif" ALT="501"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1996/96a1437p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> At issue is the ownership of certain real property in Camden. The district court held that Plaintiff Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="499"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F5E3B20BC4D1587188256A10006132BE/$file/9971013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that the Tax Court disregarded what should have been dispositive. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS The asset of the Estate to be valued is 46. Seminole's sole 3304 asset is the stock of Kazoo. Kazoo is the largest seller of professional uniforms in a highly competitive business. Was held as follows: Shareholders Decedent's Estate A. Trustees under will of Julia Kaufman Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer Branch Diane K. 800 100.00 Class B shares owned by a Seminole employee were subject to redemption by the company on termination of the employee's employment. Voting for directors was noncumulative. The state in which Seminole was incorporated. The stock was not publicly traded. The Merrill Lynch final report was delivered to him on July 5. 1994 Merrill Lynch wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a minority interest was $29.77 per share. Each seller subsequently testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been under no compulsion. The Tax Court rejected the evidence of the two sales on the ground that they were not at arm's length and that they were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="499"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/37103027FB39452688256E5A00707A98/$file/9971013.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that the Tax Court disregarded what should have been dispositive. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS The asset of the Estate to be valued is 46. Seminole's sole 3304 asset is the stock of Kazoo. Kazoo is the largest seller of professional uniforms in a highly competitive business. Was held as follows: Shareholders Decedent's Estate A. Trustees under will of Julia Kaufman Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer Branch Diane K. 800 100.00 Class B shares owned by a Seminole employee were subject to redemption by the company on termination of the employee's employment. Voting for directors was noncumulative. The state in which Seminole was incorporated. The stock was not publicly traded. The Merrill Lynch final report was delivered to him on July 5. 1994 Merrill Lynch wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a minority interest was $29.77 per share. Each seller subsequently testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been under no compulsion. The Tax Court rejected the evidence of the two sales on the ground that they were not at arm's length and that they were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="499"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/03/954263P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This case involves the tax status of land within an Indian reservation which was once alienated from Indian ownership and subsequently reacquired by the tribe in fee simple. Minnesota levied an ad valorem tax on such fee land owned by the Leech Lake Band of The Band paid the taxes under protest and sought a declaratory judgment that the land is immune from state taxation. I. The Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe. Whose reservation is located in northern Minnesota. The reservation was created by a series of treaties with the United States government. The Band's original reservation was impacted by changes in federal Indian policy. See The purpose of the policy was to open land to non Indians and to assimilate the Indian The overall effect Id. at was drastically to reduce the amount of land under Indian control. The legislative centerpiece of the allotment policy was the General Allotment Act (GAA). Parcels of land to be granted to individual Indians were initially held in trust by the United States. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="498"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU4MjQtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5824-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Three appeals have been consolidated in this case. A trial against defendant Robert Rosenstock and an inquest to fix damages against Briggs were scheduled to begin in August 1997. Briggs was a publicly held auto leasing company incorporated in New York. Robert Genser ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="498"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1971992101DD308D88256BC0007CE2BC/$file/0110438.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on the briefs. Were indicted. Subsequently convicted after a bench trial.1 Weaver was a licensed real estate agent. Buschman was a licensed broker. Weaver and Buschman contacted homeowners in the Sacramento area who were in or near default on their mortgages. Claimed to have the ability to delay or to prevent foreclosure. Concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 7562 ority over the security interest in his home and prevent the secured party from foreclosing.2 Each homeowner was told that. The payments to the trusts were distributed among the defendants according to various fee splitting agreements. They were neither used to make payments on the homeowners' mortgages. None of the defendants is an attorney). In violation of 12 U.S.C. 2 Each of the documents purporting to claim a common law lien stated: Common Law Liens are superior to and supersede mortgages and equity liens. Otherwise they shall have been deemed to have waived any and all rights to such challenge. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="498"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-5051.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief was Patrick Burkett. On the brief were Peter D. Plaintiff Appellant Laura Wilson is the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband. Wilson's estate services that were paid for by Medicare. brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital and two doctors. She contended that the government's claim against her husband's estate was improper and therefore constituted an illegal exaction. Wilson's claim1 arose under the Medicare statutes and because jurisdiction over such a claim is vested exclusively in federal district court. Some background will help the reader to understand the issue in this case. Medicare is a system of federally funded heath insurance for the aged. It is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. All statutory references are to the 2000 version of the United States Code. 3 For convenience. Medicare paid for medical services without regard to whether they were also covered by an employer group health plan. Which were designed to make Medicare a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/01/99-1547.htm">99-1547 -- WEINMAN V. FIDELITY CAPITAL APPRECIATION FUND -- 01/14/2004<BR></A><BR> P. 23(b)(1)(A) class was improper. (4) the settlement was not fairly negotiated. Is unfair. (6) the bankruptcy court erred in denying a dispositive motion seeking to dismiss this action on any of four separate grounds set forth in the motion (more specifically described below). <p> These issues are substantially identical to the ones raised in <u>Integra I</u>. The appellants here further assert that they and the <u>Integra I</u> appellants have </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043609p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that evidence of pre petition conduct in this case by a law firm is relevant to a review of a debtor's application to retain the firm as special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted as counsel for the debtor pre petition in negotiating settlement arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by attorneys who were co counsel with the firm in insurance matters for those same claimants. Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess carriers.1 The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi. We take judicial notice of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of certain facts such as that a document was filed. Garnering support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success of a plan. A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021605.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> MALTAS Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Concluding that there was no evidence to support a finding of a confidential relationship or the exercise of undue influence. Because we find that there is a material issue of fact in dispute. Were married in 1942. Virginia was responsible for conducting the family's financial affairs and managing their assets until her death in 1991. Was substituted as plaintiff in this action. 1 MALTAS v. While Ben was in Alaska. Legal fees were satisfied. Michael and Mary Ellen were looking to purchase a home but could not afford to do so on their own. Ben was aware that his money was being used in this manner. Mannion was asked to draft a quit claim deed (the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/06/98-4125.htm">98-4125 -- MORGANROTH & MORGANROTH V. DELOREAN -- 06/05/2000<BR></A><BR> The only one which is relevant to this appeal is the theory that the transfer of the property should be set aside under Utah Code Ann. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/03/022045P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> While the retirement plan was determining whether the DRO qualified as a QDRO. Ronald claimed in the bankruptcy proceeding that his pending distribution from the retirement plan should be excluded from his bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)1 because it was subject to ERISA's anti alienation provision. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/F822E1DE5540855A8825708B0081F154/$file/0389037o.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Dissent by Judge Winmill ORDER A misconduct complaint was filed against a district judge of this circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (now 28 U.S.C. § 351(a)) in February 2003. The claim asserted in the complaint is that the judge </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-2408.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief for appellees. Background Background The Nelsons were married on February 2. Mark was obligated to pay Paula $200 weekly as child support for the benefit of their eight year old daughter. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1070p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Board of Directors of City Trusts [Board] appeals the district court's order finding that the Board and Girard College [College] were included in a certified class involving a nationwide class action suit against Uniroyal and numerous other defendants in regard to the presence of asbestos in public and private schools. Because the district court found the appellants were members of the class. The Board was enjoined from pursuing its own state asbestos lawsuit against Uniroyal. Was bound by the Uniroyal settlement. It was necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction to enjoin the appellant's state court action. I. The Board was created by a Pennsylvania statute in June 1869 to act as a trustee in administering a number of estates and trusts for the benefit of the City of Philadelphia.[fn1] The estate involved here is the Estate of Stephen Girard. The Girard Estate is the largest estate and trust owned and administered by the Board. Girard College was established as an institution for orphan children in Philadelphia. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/jan96/94-7099.html">FREEMAN V. ALEX BROWN & SONS, INC.<BR></A><BR> Concluding that the tolling provisions of 96 must be construed to suspend the applicable statutes of limitation and that Stone is the holder of the causes of action. Brown allegedly encouraged this investment with full knowledge that the fund was subject to wide fluctuations in performance and was not an appropriate investment vehicle for estate assets. Brown allegedly failed to inform Richards of this risk and of the fact that the trust was not intended to be a complete investment program with all assets committed to the single fund. Realizing that her ward's estate was losing money. Brown was civilly liable under Section 408 of the Oklahoma Securities Act. That Brown was also liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. Arguing that the Oklahoma Securities Act claim was barred by the three year statute of limitation specified in Okla. 1 and that the fiduciary duty claim was barred by a five year statute of limitation under Okla. Permitting the claims to be raised at any time until one year after his ward's legal disability is removed. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="497"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2000/995082.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Contending that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Custom's claim for refund and offset because Custom did not </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="495"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1759.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: On the cover sheet: after Hon. Were on brief for appellant. Ltd. were on brief for appellee. * Of the District of Puerto Rico. The tax issues have become snarled in confusion wrought by a cryptic notice from the Internal Revenue Service. Provided that the estate's total tax liability was $345. 266.24was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july98/98-3577.opn.html">JOHN CHRISTO, JR., JOHN CHRISTO, , JAMES PHILLIP CHRISTO, IRENE LAURETTE CHRISTO V. KENNETH EARL PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577)<BR></A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug2000/98-3577.man.html">CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577)<BR></A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug2000/98-3577.man.html">CHRISTO V. PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577)<BR></A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19983577.OPN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19983577.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. Carried with this appeal was Padgett's motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction due to the Christos' lack of standing to assert any claims that became property of the estate. This argument is merely I. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="494"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july98/98-3577.opn.html">JOHN CHRISTO, JR., JOHN CHRISTO, , JAMES PHILLIP CHRISTO, IRENE LAURETTE CHRISTO V. KENNETH EARL PADGETT (8/25/2000, NO. 98-3577)<BR></A><BR> We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to remand to the state court. All of the outstanding stock of Bay Bank was owned by Florida Bay Banks ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="493"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/95opinions/95-5428a.html">STDNT LOAN MKT ASSN V. RILEY RICHARD<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="493"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/02/006074P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over this appeal 1 The Honorable James G. ISSUE The issues on appeal are whether: (1) the bankruptcy court improperly asserted jurisdiction to order disgorgement of the fees paid to the Attorney for services allegedly performed for the debtor. (3) the conclusion that the disgorged fees should be returned to the estate was appropriate as a matter of law. The deed transferring the Illinois property to the third party was recorded in Illinois. The bill stated that it was for past. The Debtor's schedules show that his only major asset was the $102. The Attorney testified that because the first two checks were for attorneys' fees. He represented that the reason he did not disburse his attorneys' fees directly to himself from his attorney trust account was to make sure he left a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="493"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/031473.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. National Home Loan Corporation (National) was in the business of providing individuals with loans secured by second mortgages on real property. The principal amount of the loan was $26. The disclosed Annual Percentage Rate of the loan was 15.952%. The current holder of Faircloth's note is Financial Asset Securities Corporation Mego Mortgage Home Owner Loan Trust. The non holder trusts are the entities that Faircloth alleged are the holders of the notes of the other members of the putative class as a result of National's sale of those loans. Faircloth alleged that each of the 29 defendants is liable under North Carolina law for National's conduct in selling the original loans. Were liable for the acts of National as holders of the notes securing the class members' respective mortgages. None of which are North Carolina residents. Faircloth filed an amended complaint that was substantially similar to the original complaint. If Faircloth were to prevail on her individual claims in the original complaint. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="493"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-7060.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The question in this case is whether the Earned Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) makes an employer a fiduciary to its employees if it agrees to make regular employer contributions to an ERISA covered employee benefit <hr> plan. The Plaintiff Appellants (Trustees) are trustees of various employee benefit funds (Funds) who sued the Defendant Appellees (the Lunas) to recover promised but unpaid monthly employer contributions to the Funds. The payments were owed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which the Lunas' company was a party. Finding that the Lunas were not ERISA fiduciaries. We AFFIRM the district court's ruling that the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Inc. was an Oklahoma construction company that employed workers represented by Local 584 of the International Association of Bridge. Employer contributions under the CBA were </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="493"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sep1999/981703.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> One of Holmes' clients was involved in a protracted business dispute. Holmes asked his client to deposit money in an escrow account under Holmes' name while the matter was being resolved. To distract the client's requests for the additional funds he was to receive under the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="491"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug2001/003698.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The District Court found that neither plan was governed by ERISA and therefore dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As both plans were covered by ERISA. The Profit Sharing Trust was funded through a rollover of William's assets from profit sharing and pension plans from two prior jobs. The Profit Sharing Plan provided that distributions from the plan were to be made as a joint and survivor annuity. Distributions from the Pension Trust were to be made as joint and survivor annuities. The assets from these IRAs were distributed to the Insurance Trust. As well as an order compelling the trustees of the Insurance Trust to obtain a refund of inheritance taxes paid on the assets that were transferred to William's IRAs. The District Court held that neither the Profit Sharing Plan nor the Pension Plan was governed by ERISA and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by order entered August 15. Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend this order was denied on October 3. Was substituted for Evelyn as a plaintiff. 2. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2001/00-12624.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We affirm.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/942200A.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Lines 1 2 the sentence is changed to begin </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1996/96a1367p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Lindsey Coal Mine Company Liquidating Trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971580.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: Herbert Collins was once a bail bondsman in Virginia. He and his wife filed for bankruptcy in 1990 and were released from all of their legally dischargeable debts. The Collinses moved to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination that the bail bond debt was dischargeable. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was discharged. We hold (1) that the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated because there was no suit against the Commonwealth and (2) that Mr. Collins's obligation as surety on the forfeited bail bonds is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Collins was a (licensed) professional bail bondsman in Norfolk. His premium or fee was based on a percentage of the face amount of the bond. Collins failed to pay off the bonds of some defendants for whom he was surety after they skipped their court appearances. Listed on their schedule of unsecured liabilities was a debt of $37. (This was a noasset bankruptcy.). In August 1996 the Collinses filed a motion to reopen their bankruptcy case for a determination of whether the judgment debt from the bail bonds was dischargeable. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//may95/93-4436.opa.html">LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Because we also conclude that none of the defenses asserted in the foreclosure action are covered by either of the two policies. Would furnish a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034625p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> PA 18235 Counsel for Appellee Judge Chertoff heard oral argument in this case but resigned prior to the time the opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C.§46(d). Because we conclude that the rents were not the property of the bankruptcy estate. The court of common 1 The mortgages specified that Lender shall have the right. Although the Appellee disputes whether the notice letters sent by the bank were correctly addressed or in fact received by all tenants. The mortgaged properties were sold to the bank for cost by the county sheriff. Schwab was appointed as bankruptcy trustee ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/may95/93-4436.opa.html">LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP. V. JDC (AMERICA) CORP.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Because we also conclude that none of the defenses asserted in the foreclosure action are covered by either of the two policies. Would furnish a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/feb96/94-4241.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d). I. The facts of this case are undisputed. A foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 16. The Trustee filed two concurrent motions in the bankruptcy court that are the subject of this appeal. Or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Trustee and State Bank stipulated at the hearing that the amount of State Bank's claim was $148. That the sum of secured and unsecured claims was $207. There was substantial equity in the property in excess of State Bank's $148. Once the automatic stay was again in place. State Bank asserted that because the value of the property was $170. There was not sufficient equity in it to merit enjoining the foreclosure sale to allow the Trustee to liquidate the property. State Bank contended that the bankruptcy court's finding in the order lifting the stay that the Debtors acted in bad faith was res judicata in the current proceeding. The question of determining value is difficult because it seems to me that there are some questions of credibility on both appraisals. . . . . </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTU0MDItY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-5402-cv_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (2) imposing a remedy disgorgement that defendants appellants allege is beyond the power of the federal courts. Defendants contend that the District Court's action was erroneous on several grounds. We consider two of the defendants' arguments in greater detail: (1) that the District Court should have allowed defendants to benefit from an exemption to the federal securities registration For reasons substantially similar to those articulated in this opinion. Franklin arose from the same district court proceedings and was argued befo re this Court in tandem with the instant cases. 1 2 requirements2 and (2) that the District Court exceeded its authority in granting equitable disgorgement of defendants' ill gotten profits. The facts below are drawn from the complaint of the SEC and the Cavanagh III opinion of the District Court. A Massachusetts corporation that was developing a fingerprint verification system. Prohibits the sale or delivery after sale of any security by means of interstate comm erce </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2001/00-12624.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We affirm.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/99a0425p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judges. 1 2 In re Fordu COUNSEL No. 97 3936 No. 97 3936 In re Fordu 31 will not disturb a lower court's findings with respect to sanctions unless a clear abuse of discretion is found. There was no abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court. There is no evidence. Sanctions under this provision appropriately may be awarded when an attorney advances an argument that is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0002p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Decedent was over eighty years old and became interested in planning his estate so that Spendthrift would continue after his death. Retained exclusive control over the private placement: All sales are subject to the discretion of the Sellers including the right to accept each unit as purchased or none until the entire offering is purchased. INSURING CLAUSE If during the policy period any claim or claims are made against the Insured (as herinafter defined) or any of them for a Wrongful Act (as hereinafter defined) while acting in their individual or collective capacities as Directors or Officers. The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Insureds or any of them. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="490"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-1384.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> was on brief for appellant.</SPAN> <BR WP= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="485"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/7DA4A1591B8DDC4288256BDC0080816E/$file/0115452.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 2002 is amended as follows: P. 7330. Holding that the appropriate remedy is a proportionate share of the profits the bank made with the misappropriated trust funds. FACTS Security Pacific National Bank (SP) was the trustee for 2. 500 or more trusts (the parties are not more precise). BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST 8773 which its compensation was set by contract and could only be increased by consent or by order of the probate court. Was unable to correct that practice until 1994. The question before the court was whether. Which claimed the interest should have been compounded. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST observed that all of the plaintiffs' claims were based on the California Probate Code. The trustee is chargeable with any of the following that is appropriate under the circumstances: (1) Any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust. With interest. (3) Any profit that would have accrued to the trust estate if the loss of profit is the result of the breach of trust. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="485"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=03-3305_032.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Asserting that the case was complex and document intensive. He alleged that he was suffering from partial blindness in one eye that impaired his ability to read for comprehension. Which was unopposed. Attached to the motion was an affidavit from Vincent's optometrist estimating that he likely would have had difficulty reading for comprehension until September 20. Only because they were in an unreadable format. It promised to provide Vincent a copy of the data once it was converted to a usable format. For reasons that are not clear from the record. It found that Vincent had not shown that the government knew that the evidence was false. That the evidence was not material to the charged offenses. During cross examination he agreed that the bank statement sent to Osinga was a forgery. Those counts were not presented to the jury and are not at issue on appeal. 1 6 No. 03 3305 argues that the denial so hampered his ability to represent himself effectively that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 6) the likelihood a continuance would have satisfied the movant's needs. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="485"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/65833DC94B3B8B2B88256BBC0052640E/$file/0115452.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that the appropriate remedy is a proportionate share of the profits the bank made with the misappropriated trust funds. FACTS Security Pacific National Bank (SP) was the trustee for 2. 500 or more trusts (the parties are not more precise). For which its compensation was set by contract and could only be increased by consent or by order of the probate court. Was unable to correct that practice until 1994. The question before the court was whether. Which claimed the interest should have been compounded. It observed that all of the plaintiffs' claims were based on the California Probate Code. The trustee is chargeable with any of the following that is appropriate under the circumstances: (1) Any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust. With interest. (3) Any profit that would have accrued to the trust estate if the loss of profit is the result of the breach of trust. The court held that determination of the profits </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/08/98-4086.htm">98-4086 -- MCGAVIN V. SEGAL -- 08/25/1999<BR></A><BR> We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/04/976090P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Claiming that Van Der Heide's plan did not satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)'s </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/05-5141.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief were Stuart E. Of counsel were Scott Austin and Elizabeth M. The breach was the elimination of the regulatory capital by the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform. Is foreclosed by our recent decision in American Capital Corp. v. I. BACKGROUND CHTE is an irrevocable trust. Donald Crisp ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/02/061794P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The District Court1 held that Mary Beth Kamrath is entitled to the proceeds because she is the named beneficiary on the policy. Although Williams knew the assignment form could not have been sent in response to his March 31 letter on account of the short passage of time. Bradley also executed a last will and testament that named his sister. Aon would not have accepted it as an effective change of beneficiary. Bradley told her that he was going to change the beneficiary of his life insurance policy to his children. Bradley told Mary Beth that neither spouse could change a beneficiary until after the divorce was complete. 3 Bradley committed suicide on September 27. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/08/99-1344.htm">99-1344 -- WEINMAN V. FIDELITY CAPITAL APPRECIATION FUND -- 08/21/2001<BR></A><BR> Any and all additional parties who either have joined or will join the said Committee. Circuit Judge. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=91-1625.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: Page 50. Was on brief for Ankers White. Was on brief for appellants defendants. appellants defendants. Procter & Hoar were on brief for plaintiff appellee. Hoar were on brief for plaintiff appellee. 3 3 CYR. The inmate was given no hearing prior to the AFP placement. AFP status was reviewed every five days by the prison official who recommended the particular placement. Domegan sought to establish that the AFP was viola tive of the Eighth Amendment. (iii) turned off his water supply. 3The ten defendants named in the final amended complaint were Joseph J. Three other defendants were named in earlier complaints but were 5 5 Domegan was granted summary judgment on the procedural due process claim. Judgment was entered in the amount of $1.00 against Ponte. Although the district court determined that Domegan was a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062155np.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. The property was also mortgaged in favor of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/011909.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: A month before they were married. Two years after Odom and Newton were married. I Toni Odom and Charles Newton met in 1983 while both were working as linemen and line splicers for BellSouth Corporation. Each was a participant in BellSouth's Employee Stock Ownership Plan ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=99-1865.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appraiser also pointed out that the real estate was encumbered by a prior first mortgage that secured nearly $100. LeBlanc asserted that the real estate was worth much more than the estimate but offered no concrete evidentiary support for a different valuation. Subject to the following condition:</FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="484"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar1998/98a1820p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm the appointment of the trustee and reverse the order denying Gibbons's motion for an order authorizing employment of the Firm as his counsel. Two groups loomed large in the bankruptcy proceedings: one was an Official Bondholders' Committee and an indenture trustee. Under which the holding companies would have infused $100 million into Marvel in return for priority recognition of the Lenders' debt claims. The Icahn interests contended that the Perelman controlled Marvel debtors were favoring their </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="482"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/97/05/976025P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Bankruptcy Judge This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court. Appellants have also filed an Application which seeks summary judgment in their favor and a trial by jury. Neither of which are appropriately made on appeal. The Application is denied. This action is but one in a variety of cases and proceedings involving these Debtors over the past eight years. 1989 which case was dismissed by the court. The case was subsequently converted to a case under Chapter 74 and PlaintiffAppellee was appointed trustee. Which mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. They have not claimed the stock as exempt. Charlene Kay Kingsley herself contacted the transfer agents for the stock and arranged to have record title transferred to Promise Land Express Trust. Were named co trustees of Promise Land Express Trust. not authorized these transfers. Even though he is not a party in this adversary proceeding. 4 5 remaining counts of the Complaint. DISCUSSION Summary judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="482"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/10/01-2252.htm">01-2252 -- HACEESA V. U.S. -- 10/24/2002<BR></A><BR> Haceesa was sent home that night. He was dead. <p> Only after his death was Haceesa's disease diagnosed correctly: he died of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome. Haceesa was a Navajo Indian. The hospital where he was first seen on April 25 </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="482"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=90-2193.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> David Kelston with whom Penny Kozol and Friedman & Atherton were David Kelston with whom Penny Kozol and Friedman & Atherton were on brief for appellant. on brief for appellant. Was on brief for with whom Wayne A. Was on brief for appellee. appellee. Claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument. Controlled five corporations [hereinafter </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="480"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5096.html">UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for plaintiff appellant.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief was <u>Howard N. Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With him on the brief were <u>Peter D. Director.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>Of counsel on the brief was <u>Marc E. 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.) ( EPACT ).<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>EPACT imposes special monetary assessments on domestic utility companies that have purchased government enriched uranium for the purpose of commercial electricity generation. 535 U.S. 1095 (2002).<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This case presents the question whether the assessments constitute unconstitutionally unapportioned direct taxes.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>This issue was raised in passing in <u>Maine Yankee</u>. On the merits we hold that the EPACT special assessments are not direct taxes and do not therefore require apportionment in accordance with the Direct Tax Clauses of the Constitution. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="478"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/B2F27EFF2D8F1A2988256EB5004E2AED/$file/0215762.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The face of American poverty is changing dramatically. Minimum wage workers are unable to support their families' basic needs. At A1 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="478"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=01-1622.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Ganem</U> were on brief. Barlow</U> were on brief. <U>Senior Circuit Judge</U>.</STRONG></FONT><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="478"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan98/95-9408.man.html">UNITED STATES V. SUBA (1/9/1998, NO. 95-9408)<BR></A><BR> Managed Risk were convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United States. Kelly was convicted of four additional counts of mail fraud (Counts 112 115). 30 32).<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="478"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan98/95-9408.man.html">UNITED STATES V. SUBA (1/9/1998, NO. 95-9408)<BR></A><BR> Managed Risk were convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United States. Kelly was convicted of four additional counts of mail fraud (Counts 112 115). 30 32).<A HREF= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="478"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Feb2004/013774p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sought and were denied M edicaid benefits because their assets exceed a level qualifying them for Medicaid eligibility. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to Medicaid benefits depends on how we view certain private trusts they established for the community spouse's benefit. Are designed to provide a stream of annuity payments to the community spouse for the duration of his or her life. New Jersey did not consider the corpus of these CSATs as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="476"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1061.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Carl Emmett Baylis was on brief for appellants. Were on brief for appellee. The sole question presented on this appeal is whether. Johnson were officers. Employers are required to hold these withheld funds </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/96/10/951012P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND This bankruptcy proceeding is but one part of the litigation among these parties dating back to 1983 and arising from their participation in a real estate partnership. Limited II (Crossroads). the general partners partnership Plaintiff/appellant Nangle and others were limited partners in a Missouri limited partnership named Crossroads U.S.A. Defendant/appellee Lauer and Joseph Graves were of Crossroads. Bruce Nangle lacks standing to pursue this action and was dismissed from the case by order of the bankruptcy court. The two banks have been represented by one counsel on this appeal. In this opinion for convenience we sometimes refer to Mark Twain Bank generally as including both branch banks and at other points we refer to the separate sister banks where the conduct of one or the other but not both appears to be implicated. 22 1 were two interests in real estate: the Riverheights Retirement Center in Booneville. The Transfer of the partnership interests to Lauer and Graves was completed in November of former limited partners learned at the time of Graves' death that contrary to the representations made by Lauer and Graves in the contracts to buy out the interests of the limited partners general partners Lauer and Graves had previously sold the Riverheights Retirement Center property in return for an interest in an industrial development bond. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-5087.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the brief were Melvin C. Of counsel on the brief was Thomas R. With him on the brief were Stuart E. The plaintiffs argue that the 1993 legislation breached the contract because it changed the tax laws to abrogate tax benefits to which they were entitled at the time the contract was executed and because the legislation specifically targeted the benefits they enjoyed under the contract. Holding that under the pre 1993 tax laws they were entitled to the tax benefits in question and that * Paul R. The plaintiffs have cross appealed from the court's denial of their request for additional damages. Fixed rate mortgages created when interest rates were low. The acquisition was effected through a contract between FSLIC. FSLIC bound itself to make assistance payments to Texas Trust in an amount equal to the difference between the book basis of the covered assets and the value of those assets when they were sold or written down. The Consolidated Group expected to be able to take deductions for the built in losses on the covered assets as those assets were liquidated or written down. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Oct1995/95a1188p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This breach of contract and fraud action is brought by real estate owners against the Resolution Trust Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="473"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0786n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Dismissal of the suit was premised upon the Estate's execution of a document entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19968019.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Senior Circuit Judge: We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. ORDER This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/july97/94-1579.wpd.html">SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. AMOCO PROD. CO.<BR></A><BR> Which entities have not obtained ) tribal consent to and federal approval of said explora ) tion. ) for lands located within the exterior boundaries of the ) Southern Ute Indian Reservation and which class ) members have not obtained tribal consent to and ) federal approval of said interests of rights. 2) (1) Our reversal will require the district court to address the defenses asserted by defendants to preclude recovery by the Tribe. 2) a declaratory judgment that Tribal consent is required for CBM extraction. Two issues were identified as fundamental to the resolution of all claims against the Amoco defendants: 1) the determination of CBM ownership. Amoco was designated as representative of the class and. The district court held that CBM ownership was vested unambiguously in the Amoco defendants. Or reach the federal defendants' claims that the Tribe's action was barred by the statute of limitations. It is from these rulings that the Tribe appeals.(2) II. The single issue which is determinative of this appeal is whether the Tribe. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0007n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. That the sale order was void. While we conclude that Mueller waived the jurisdictional argument and the sale order is not subject to collateral attack. We agree that the order of sale was not properly a basis for a finding of contempt and that Mueller's conduct was not contemptuous. The bankruptcy court's order of contempt and sanctions award will be reversed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding Mueller in contempt of the order approving the sale of the legal malpractice claim and imposing sanctions on him for violating that order. Is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//july97/96-8019.opa.html">BAGGETT V. FIRST NAT'L BANK<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Baggett v. Senior Circuit Judge:<p> <p> We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. Defendant.<p> <p> CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:95 CV 684 FMH.<p> <p> <i>ORDER</i><p> <p> This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1307.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Verrill & Dana were on brief for appellant. Hanson & DeTroy were on brief for appellee DN Associates. DN Associates was represented by James D. DN Associates' proposal would have retained the interests of the limited partners through a recapitalization proposal. The rationale behind Casco's opposition was its understanding that the debtor's continued opposition to Casco's perfectly reasonable plan and the repeated proposing of alternative plans by debtor's counsel to save the interest of the limited partners was adverse to the estate. Debtor's counsel insisted that his efforts were beneficial to the estate and expected to be compensated for his efforts by the bankruptcy court. That such rendered services were not necessary and did not benefit the estate as required by statute. Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions Section 323 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a trustee is the fiduciary of a bankrupt estate. Bankruptcy courts are given the discretionary authority to compensate professionals employed under 11 U.S.C. 327 by an estate trustee or debtor in possession for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/05/026077P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court denying Debtor's motion to assume a real property lease. L.L.C ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/98/08/976102P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sauer is a former general contractor who built and operated strip malls. Sauer and J.A.S. were experiencing financial difficulties. She was eventually diagnosed with depression and began taking anti depressants. Pruss' prognosis was further complicated by the discovery of a lump in her breast on April 15. While Pruss was exploring her treatment options and contacting care providers. Although Sauer knew he was to commence payments. Sauer's residence was sold to Household Bank at a foreclosure sale. Which was denied on December 21. The appeals were dismissed as interlocutory. Although the hearing on the fee applications was originally scheduled for October 2. It was continued indefinitely on the request of the trustee. 354.21 of which is attributable to contributions by the debtors. The amounts which Pruss sought in her final fee application do not comport with the amounts which were actually allowed by the bankruptcy court. 6 9 In its application. The abuse ofdiscretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable. . . . </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200313605.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court found that Andrx's allegations regarding a licensing agreement entered into by Elan and another competitor to settle a separate infringement suit were insufficient to support an antitrust action under the Sherman Anti Trust Act. The district court's order is AFFIRMED in part. We will begin by briefly summarizing the relevant statutory provisions. After which we will recount the relevant facts specific to the parties. Different FDA approval standards apply depending on the drug the applicant is attempting to market. The facts are derived from the allegations in Andrx's complaint. Are presented in the light most favorable to Andrx. Our inquiry is limited to the allegations in the first amended complaint. 3 1 requirements outlined in § 355(b). Or would only violate a patent on a § 355(b) approved drug which is invalid. Which is then given forty five days to initiate patent infringement proceedings against the ANDA applicant. § 355 grants the first manufacturer to file an ANDA application for a generic drug using the type of certification outlined in § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) an exclusive 180 day period to market the generic drug before another ANDA application is approved for a similar generic drug. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/04/992590P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Klaessons and the trust resisted on the ground that the property was a homestead and therefore exempt from execution. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/july97/96-8019.opa.html">BAGGETT V. FIRST NAT'L BANK<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Baggett v. Senior Circuit Judge:<p> <p> We have reviewed plaintiffs/appellants' complaint filed in district court. Defendant.<p> <p> CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:95 CV 684 FMH.<p> <p> <i>ORDER</i><p> <p> This case is before the Court on the Defendant First National Bank of Gainesville's Motion to Dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [3 1]. Frances Otwell Bagby ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="472"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/9153A3D4FC4FE6A888256EA7006A9844/$file/0216594.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a judgment creditor is entitled to intervene as of right under Fed. We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the denial of the motion to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States against Alisal on nine separate causes of action encompassing hundreds of individual violations of the The requests for judicial notice filed by Silverwood and Alisal on the eve of oral argument are granted. R. Evid. 201. 2 This judgment was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. An abstract of the judgment was issued and recorded in Monterey County in 1996. Silverwood contends that it is still owed a significant sum. 1 UNITED STATES v. Silverwood maintains that its interest in collecting its judgment against Alisal will be substantially impaired if it is not allowed to intervene. The question of whether the motion was timely filed is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ALISAL WATER CORP. or transaction which is the subject of the action and [that] the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="470"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1642.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Davis and McGovern & Associates were on brief for appellant. Crisafulli were on brief for appellees Fleet National Bank and Fleet Credit Corp. With whom McGair & McGair was on brief for appellees C & J Jewelry Co. The facts are related in the light most favorable to appellant Peters. At 6 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="470"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1004EC107EC8531788256C44007C163E/$file/0017055.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an action alleging breach of a fiduciary responsibility insurance policy arising out of an insurance company's refusal to defend its insured against a third party claim. At issue is whether the Winncrest action involves an alleged breach of fiduciary duty that triggers Federal's obligation to defend under California law. Procedural History PTF is an employee benefit trust that has a fiduciary responsibility insurance policy with Federal. (2) whether Federal was prejudiced by any late tender of the claim. Summary judgment was ultimately granted to Federal because the court found that the Winncrest action did not proximately result from a breach of fiduciary duty. It is necessary to understand the complex factual scenario alleged by Winncrest. Federal does not have standing to maintain its cross appeal. The district court found that Federal did not have a duty to defend PTF in the Winncrest action. Federal was not the aggrieved party in this judgment. A party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="470"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/05/063028P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND Fazio is a licensed real estate broker with his own RE/MAX franchise in Des Moines. Homecomings Financial was one of the companies that hired Fazio to perform such third party work. Homecomings would either enlist Fazio to sell the third party property </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="470"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972776.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Allstate issued five life insurance policies to Mary Gaye Fister.1 The total face value of these policies was $1. 000. 1 The five insurance policies are as follows: Policy No. Winslow Estate of Mary Gaye Fister* Appellants' complaint states that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="470"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/29D56C277CF48D238825734F0059E271/$file/0617288.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that when a debtor applies for a 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) preliminary injunction to stay a proceeding in which the debtor is not a party. I. BACKGROUND Hoffman is the founder and a major shareholder of both Indivos and Excel. One of the main purposes of these agreements was to separate Hoffman from the management of Indivos. Which was controlled by Hoffman and separately owned Indivos shares. Was not a party to the Settlement Agreement or the Pledge Agreement. Excel was a party to the Voting Trust and Standstill Agreement. Including whether their positions on patent ownership were taken in good faith. Ruling that all of the patents Excel accused Indivos of infringing were actually owned by Indivos. The parties were attempting to schedule additional hearing dates to finish the proceeding. Hoffman's bankruptcy petition was dismissed in September 2004. Hoffman argued to the arbitrator that the stay established by Excel's bankruptcy petition applied to Indivos' claims against him because those claims were intertwined with Indivos' claims against Excel. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="467"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//apr95/93-3303.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST V. FRAGETTI<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Resolution Trust v. If she or he are married. If she or he are married. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a consolidated appeal from district court orders remanding these six cases back to state court. The issue in each case is whether the district courts' decisions that the removal in each case had been untimely are erroneous in light of a 1991 amendment to the removal provision of the Financial Institutions Reform. We hold that these decisions are erroneous. Carteret Federal Savings Bank ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="467"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Oct2001/001157.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which were allegedly operated as a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="467"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/apr95/93-3303.opa.html">RESOLUTION TRUST V. FRAGETTI<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ><title>Resolution Trust v. If she or he are married. If she or he are married. Circuit Judge:<p> <p> This is a consolidated appeal from district court orders remanding these six cases back to state court. The issue in each case is whether the district courts' decisions that the removal in each case had been untimely are erroneous in light of a 1991 amendment to the removal provision of the Financial Institutions Reform. We hold that these decisions are erroneous. Carteret Federal Savings Bank ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="466"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=04-5112.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs are descendants of Osage Indians listed on the tribal rolls at the time of the Osage Allotment Act of 1906. Their complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) a claim that the defendants (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. 640 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1981). <hr> The court first concluded that the Tribal Council was a necessary party under Fed. Reasoning that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="466"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0538n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> On which were. The majority explained: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="466"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07b0003n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. The bankruptcy court held that certain insurance proceeds were not property of a chapter 7 estate converted from chapter 11. The dismissal of the involuntary was reversed on appeal and an order for relief was entered. Held that recovery on all grounds was precluded by the previous order releasing the funds. The court concluded that recovery was not available under any of these provisions as a matter of law because the transfers occurred post petition. Is recovery of the excessive legal fees under 11 U.S.C. § 329 precluded because the payments to the attorney took place post petition or because of equitable concerns? 3. Is recovery of the funds under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544. The bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the adversary proceeding is a final. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Was the beneficiary under. The existence of the First Policy was not disclosed in TEI's bankruptcy schedules or in its plan of reorganization confirmed on September 1. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="466"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/06/98-1342.htm">98-1342 -- COUNTRY WORLD CASINOS V. TOMMYKNOCKER CASINO CORPORATION -- 06/23/1999<BR></A><BR> The property was acquired by New Allied Development Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="466"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2173.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: p.9. P.C. were on brief for Monarch Life Insurance Company. P.C. were on brief for Ropes & Gray. We now affirm the district court on the ground that Monarch Life is collaterally estopped from asserting a state court challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enter the permanent injunction incorporated in the confirmed reorganization plan. This Order constitutes an injunction against all persons (other than the FDIC as Receiver) from taking any of the following actions (other than an 2Ropes & Gray was scheduled as a creditor in the chapter 11 proceeding. None are material to this appeal. 5Section 105(a) provides in relevant part: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/07/97-1276.htm">97-1276 -- UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1992 BENEFIT PLAN V. RUSHTON -- 07/09/1998<BR></A><BR> Are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4F7778C44FE40B548825706D0056C41A/$file/0316791.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction and affirm. Who were officers and/or directors of Boston Chicken. Inc. are the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19943423.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It is now before us for the second time. appeal are: The issues presented on (1) whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee can assert a bad faith claim against an insurer when the underlying cause of action accrued after the named insured was discharged in bankruptcy. (2) if such a claim is found to be cognizable. What is the measure of recovery. (3) whether the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to prejudgment interest. The measure of recovery is the Honorable William C. The trustee is not entitled to prejudgment interest. I. BACKGROUND The general factual background for this case is described in detail in Camp v. Is the insurer of Dr. On several occasions both before and after Kimbell's petition was filed. Paul could not be liable for bad faith refusal to settle because its insured Kimbell was bankrupt and could not be held personally liable for the excess judgment. Such that the named insured was never personally liable for any amount of the judgment. A second question certified to the Florida Supreme Court involved the construction of particular policy language and is not repeated here. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/10/016014P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> While the jury was deliberating. Was affirmed by the state appellate court. The judgment was recorded in California pursuant to California law on September 28. The case was later converted to chapter 11 and ultimately dismissed. That the majority of the trustee's information regarding the debtor's assets was obtained after a criminal investigation conducted by the FBI. 3 2 1 Ultimately. She was convicted of a bankruptcy crime relating to the filing of these false documents.3 In April 2000. To amend her petition and to dismiss and stay based upon improper venue were denied. A subsequent appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Citizens Bank of Tulsa and Prudential Securities interpleaded the assets sought into the registry of the court and were dismissed. Her conviction and sentence were upheld in a per curium decision. Citizens Bank of Tulsa was assigned adversary proceeding number 99 4200 and is appeal number 01 6014. Inc. was assigned adversary proceeding number 99 4203 and is appeal number 01 6015. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/06/08/053791P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was the holder of a Citibank Visa credit card when he died on August 29. His account balance was $889.58. Which were never mailed to George or Michael Hess. Citibank claimed that it was entitled to interest that had accrued during the two years between the date in February 1999. Whether the amount of interest was calculated according to the terms of the cardmember agreement attached by Hess to his complaint or under Missouri's statutory interest rate. The court calculated the amount of interest that would have accrued on the account through December 2000 employing three different potential methodologies. The court calculated the total interest that would have accrued under both variable and fixed rates. The balance on George Hess's account in December 2000 would have been greater than $974.96. The court observed that the cardmember agreement submitted by Hess states that finances charges continue to accrue until payment in full is credited to the account. Concluded that once Citibank was notified of George Hess's death. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/995113.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The sole question presented by this appeal is whether restaurants are </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="463"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200511/05-5068a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs were Peter D. With him on the brief were Dennis M. The means by which they were to fulfill this duty. The defendants argue that reissuance of the injunction was an abuse of discretion. In trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="461"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012161.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were gifts or compensation for services. The district court concluded that they were gifts and dismissed the complaint. It also held that the counterclaim was time barred under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(b) because the government failed to prove that Lane made intentional or knowing misrepresentations in connection with the amended income tax returns he filed. Because the payments in question were gifts. Because Lane's grossly negligent misrepresentations were sufficient to trigger the extended limitations period of § 6532(b). I. What follows is a story of sentiment which appellant would convert LANE v. Hampton Powell was formerly CEO of the Lane Company. Jane Young was his secretary there from 1958 until he retired in 1984. Powell was a very generous man. Giving was his primary pleasure in life. His practice at Christmas was to give shares of stock in equal amounts to Young. Which was converted to Interco stock when Interco acquired Lane Co. in the mid 1980s. He was very grateful to her. She visited him whenever he was in the hospital. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA0LTIxMTJfb3BuLnBkZg==/04-2112_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This appeal is taken from a March 18. Appellants challenge the reallocation to other creditors of stock warrants that were initially allocated to appellants under Metromedia's Plan. Without contesting that cash and stock allocated to appellants were properly reallocated to those creditors under the terms of a prior subordination agreement. Appellants argue that they are allowed to keep the warrants by virtue of an exception in that subordination agreement. Also argue that this appeal should be deemed equitably moot because numerous transactions have occurred since the Plan's September 8. Appellants' objections to the Plan were rejected on the merits by the bankruptcy court and the district court. the same time. The district court ruled that relief (if At 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 justified by the merits) would not have been barred by the doctrine of equitable mootness because effective relief could have been afforded without </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan97/95-8347.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/93opinions/93-5395a.html">FREEMAN CLYDE V. FDIC<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/09/98-4077.htm">98-4077 -- U.S. V. BURRIDGE -- 09/14/1999<BR></A><BR> A district court is required. We conclude that it is not. Which is a question of fact for the sentencing court. The ultimate objective of like kind accomodation transactions is to enable taxpayers. It is undisputed. Hall was unable to contact Burridge and never received any of his money back. <p> Burridge pleaded guilty to ten counts of wire fraud. Nor was there any explicit discussion of an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust under U.S.S.G. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/012016.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Jurisdiction in this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The embezzlement was uncovered in June. I. Virginia law allows an insurer to rescind a policy if it is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="460"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan97/95-8347.opa_fn.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 ></head><body><a name= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="458"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/sept2000/98-3747.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> R's services were conducted on behalf of its clients and not for the particular benefit of the estate. Several proposed plans for reorganization were put forward by the debtors in an attempt to achieve a consensual plan. R represented several individual property damage claimants.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="458"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//sept2000/98-3747.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> R's services were conducted on behalf of its clients and not for the particular benefit of the estate. Several proposed plans for reorganization were put forward by the debtors in an attempt to achieve a consensual plan. R represented several individual property damage claimants.</SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/724BFEB242C4B660882571A80075D37A/$file/0435339.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over appeals from </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1971.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> George & Klein was on brief for appellant. With whom Riemer & Braunstein was on brief for appellee. The CHM chapter 11 proceedings were converted to chapter 7 and Braunstein was appointed the CHM chapter 7 trustee. The applications were opposed by CHM creditors. Was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="457"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Sept2000/005042.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Several affiliates.1 Bruno's is based in Alabama and operates a chain of supermarkets in the southeastern United States. Huff was the holder of $290 million in Bruno's subordinated notes. HSBC was the indenture trustee for the subordinated notes (we refer to them together as Huff). They argue that the District Court should not have confirmed the plan for a host of reasons. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and are thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. Three separate interests have appeared to defend the plan: the debtors and debtors in possession (referred to throughout as the Debtors). Representing the group of banks (the Banks) that were the senior lenders to Bruno's before the reorganization. Together they contend that the plan does not violate the absolute priority rule because the releases were not granted </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="456"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19952665.OPA.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Because we find that judgment was properly awarded to the government. Facts1 The facts in this case are not in dispute. At all times Honorable Harlington Wood. Our statement of the facts is taken in large measure (verbatim in considerable part) from the district court's excellent opinion. 1 relevant to this controversy. The The bankruptcy court entered an order granting that application. order stated that the commission would be paid </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="456"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982191.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> 844.10 was property of the estate. Was appointed as Trustee. Shearin was at that time. The firm is a registered limited liability partnership with offices located in Norfolk. A partnership agreement that was executed on January 1. Any available distributive net profits are divided into two portions: objective and subjective. Each partner is given an objective and subjective valuation. The subjective evaluation is based on a variety of factors ranging from client development to other beneficial contributions to the law firm. Each partner's given objective and subjective percentage is then applied to the respective objective and subjective portion of the law firm's distributable net profits. The bankruptcy court determined that 85.6% of his receipts was attributable to pre petition work. No exception is taken to this figure. Which was the share of profits of the law firm due to Shearin for his participation in the affairs of the law firm through July 12. To the amount of 3 this sum there is also no exception taken on appeal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="456"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-6186.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It had neither paid the taxes it was disputing nor sought administrative relief before the Internal Revenue Service. Arguing that the judgment is void because the jurisdictional defect that existed when the suit began was incurable. Whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Were the only children of S. One of their businesses was Primco Management Company. An Oklahoma corporation whose stock was held equally by the brothers' revocable living trusts. Primco was the nerve center for the Goldmans' other businesses: it performed administrative services such as bookkeeping. The complaint and stipulation were amended as follows: 1. Goldman for the tax (1) The district court said that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="453"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc3OTIgdyBFcnJhdGFfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7792%20w%20Errata_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (4) correctly held that plaintiffs' statelaw claims were ripe for adjudication. We hold that the District Court's award of punitive damages was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause and with Illinois law. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal brought by individual and corporate defendants who. Defendants contend Plaintiffs have brought a motion to dismiss this appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. W e have d enied this mo tion. 1 2 that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over this case and the parties to it on multiple grounds. Assuming the case was not arbitrable. They claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial while an appeal was pending in this Court from the District Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. That the District Court abused its discretion by deciding unsettled questions of Illinois law after all the federal claims were dismissed. That the Illinois claims brought by plaintiffs were not ripe for adjudication. Arguing that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to reinstate RICO claims that were previously dismissed at the behest of this Court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="453"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/01/96-3308.htm">96-3308 -- KAHN V. SCHIGUR -- 01/20/1998<BR></A><BR> We conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct. <p> <center><strong>BACKGROUND</strong></center> <p> The basic facts are not in dispute. Seitter was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee.<a href= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="453"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-2100.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on brief. With whom Sheketoff & Homan were on brief. LLP were on brief. Friedman was convicted of defrauding several federally insured banks and ordered at sentencing to pay restitution to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Because Unisource was not the victim of defendant's offenses. If they were actually raised by the facts of this case. Affirming the district court's order does not present the dangers the government fears because we do not agree that the district court's order releasing funds to Unisource was an order of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="453"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022389.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> ORDER Intervenors Appellants have filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The appellants' petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was submitted to this Court. 2 As the panel considered the petition for rehearing and is of the opinion that it should be denied. IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is denied. It is ORDERED that footnote 3 on page 25 of the printed slip opinion is amended to read as follows: The intervenors have urged us to refer to the Maryland Court of Appeals the questions of Maryland law involved in this case. The arguments of each to the district court were the opposite. The intervenors appeal from the district court's decision adopting what is called the pro rata rule of Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Holding that the intervenors' claims are subject to an aggregate limit by reason of the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="453"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc3OTJfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7792_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> (4) correctly held that plaintiffs' statelaw claims were ripe for adjudication. We hold that the District Court's award of punitive damages was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause and with Illinois law. Circuit Judge: This is an appeal brought by individual and corporate defendants who. Defendants contend Plaintiffs have brought a motion to dismiss this appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Assuming the case was not arbitrable. They claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial while an appeal was pending in this Court from the District Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. That the District Court abused its discretion by deciding unsettled questions of Illinois law after all the federal claims were dismissed. That the Illinois claims brought by plaintiffs were not ripe for adjudication. Arguing that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to reinstate RICO claims that were previously dismissed at the behest of this Court. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/aug99/97-9357.man.html">CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357)<BR></A><BR> Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site.</P> <P> Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021846.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This is a dispute between two insurance companies over payment for the costs of defense in a suit involving a trip and fall accident in which a visitor to a residential duplex building was injured. Fallen contends that the stairway was damaged as a result of an earthquake. When State Street Bank was served with Fallen's suit papers. Contending that Travelers was its principal insurer and owed it a defense of the Fallen action and that Liberty Mutual also owed Ryland a defense as an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA1LTY5MzUtYmtfb3BuLnBkZg==/05-6935-bk_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue before this Court is relatively straightforward: When marital assets have been awarded to the wife in a state court matrimonial proceeding. Are those assets nevertheless part of the husband's bankruptcy estate if a Chapter 7 petition is filed after the state court's decision but before the state court judgment is entered? Finding that the entry of the state court judgment is </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=05-6379.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Defendant was sentenced to ninety six months' imprisonment some eighteen months above the Sentencing Guideline recommendation and ordered to pay $80. Defendant's first payment obligation to Bridgeview was due January 1998. These dividends were Defendant's sole source of income. Bainbridge informed Defendant that the loan reversal was not possible. A title was issued on January 12. Those loan officers both stated that because the amount of the loan was within Defendant's lending authority. To put Defendant's initials on the paperwork to signify that Defendant was in fact the loan officer of record. This distribution was recorded on several official bank forms as well as a nonstandard memorandum created by Mr. Machala for the express purpose of detailing the loan proceed distribution </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/June1995/95a1067p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/05/99-6387.htm">99-6387 -- U.S. V. SPARKS -- 05/02/2001<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/04/066074P.pdf">C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\BAP TIGUE V. SOSNE.WPD<BR></A><BR> The property was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company in Sanchez's name only. Although the debtor contends that this was a clerical error. Chase was listed as the mortgagee on the policy. The debtor and Sanchez had difficulty obtaining insurance proceeds to repair the property because the debtor was not a named insured. Believing that the total payments were still insufficient. The trustee filed a complaint seeking damages against State Farm for failure to pay insured losses and a declaratory judgment against the debtor and Chase that the estate was the proper recipient of any insurance proceeds. It was entitled to the $21. The debtor is now. The trustee and Chase have moved to dismiss this appeal. Arguing it is now moot. Standard of Review Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only hear actual cases or controversies as defined under Article III of the Constitution. The case is moot and the federal court no longer has jurisdiction to hear it. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTEzNjdfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-1367_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Erroneous denial of acceptance of responsibility points. agree only that the appellant's CHC was erroneous. We agree only with appellant's argument that his original CHC was wrongly calculated and remand for resentencing on that issue.2 We do not direct the remand to a different district 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 judge. His conviction for bankruptcy fraud. a) The SEC Action Appellant was the chairman. The bankruptcy court held that the $75 million judgment in favor of the SEC was 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 nondischargeable. 2000). This trust was funded by approximately $4 million in bearer bonds that appellant delivered to its trustee just before filing for bankruptcy. When its existence was discovered. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and the trust's situs was moved twice to evade detection. 181. Appellant was indicted and convicted in New Jersey of Id. at bankruptcy fraud for concealing the bearer bonds and casino chips and for money laundering of the bonds and their proceeds. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991979.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Asset freezing injunction on the United States' allegations that the defendant oncology service providers defrauded the Medicare and CHAMPUS1 programs and thereafter were engaging in complex reorganizations and transfers of assets to insulate themselves from liability. Concluding that because both money damages and equitable relief are sought in this case. The controlling authority is not Grupo Mexicano but Deckert v. Doctors Colkitt and Derdel are physicians specializing in radiation oncology. The United States alleges that the defendants claimed reimbursement on bills for radiation oncology services that were not provided or ordered by the physician and on bills for unnecessary radiation oncology services. Count V 8 alleges that payments were made to defendants under a mistake of fact. Count VI alleges that all actions of the defendants were actions of Colkitt under an alter ego theory. Profits </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca10.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=06-5128.wpd">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-2801.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Weizeoricks were charged a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="452"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//aug99/97-9357.man.html">CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. V. NATIONSBANK (8/11/1999, NO. 97-9357)<BR></A><BR> Claiming they were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW. His will named the Bank as co executor of his estate. It was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne. It was not until the 1990s that the EPA required Canadyne to clean up the Site.</P> <P> Canadyne sued. Concluding the Bank was not a </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1154.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Spinella & Angelone were on brief for appellants. Bomster and Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated were on brief for appellee. Who was also an officer and director of the bankrupt lender. Defendants argue that no fiduciary duty was transgressed. Counter that the Trustee committed waste and failed to mitigate damages to the bankrupt estate by allowing foreclosure on the properties which allegedly were conveyed in order to satisfy the debt. Defendants contend that they are entitled to a significant reduction of any outstanding debt because of the equity in. We now affirm the district court's partial summary judgment and hold affirm that final judgment certification was justified. Miscalculation of debt are unavailing as a matter of law. The nature of the business of Columbus Mortgage was to serve as a mortgage lending firm specializing in residential real estate loans secured by first and second mortgages on real estate. It is undisputed that Mr. Were in the business of selling and developing real estate: Defendants Appellants Muratore Agency. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//nov96/94-3423.opa.html">VENN V. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Venn v. It is now before us for the second time. The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee can assert a bad faith claim against an insurer when the underlying cause of action accrued after the named insured was discharged in bankruptcy. (2) if such a claim is found to be cognizable. What is the measure of recovery. (3) whether the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to prejudgment interest. The measure of recovery is the amount of the judgment in excess of policy limits. The trustee is not entitled to prejudgment interest. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The general factual background for this case is described in detail in <i>Camp v. Is the insurer of Dr. On several occasions both before and after Kimbell's petition was filed. Was bankrupt and could not be held personally liable for the excess judgment. Such that the named insured was never personally liable for any amount of the judgment. The case was set for trial. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=05-3601_012.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="448"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/nov96/94-3423.opa.html">VENN V. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INS. CO.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>Venn v. It is now before us for the second time. The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee can assert a bad faith claim against an insurer when the underlying cause of action accrued after the named insured was discharged in bankruptcy. (2) if such a claim is found to be cognizable. What is the measure of recovery. (3) whether the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to prejudgment interest. The measure of recovery is the amount of the judgment in excess of policy limits. The trustee is not entitled to prejudgment interest. BACKGROUND<p> <p> The general factual background for this case is described in detail in <i>Camp v. Is the insurer of Dr. On several occasions both before and after Kimbell's petition was filed. Was bankrupt and could not be held personally liable for the excess judgment. Such that the named insured was never personally liable for any amount of the judgment. The case was set for trial. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="446"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=93-1542.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF GROSVENOR PARK REALTY TRUST. Is amended as follows: Amend the cover sheet to show that Judge Jack E. Tanner is from the Western District of Washington and was sitting on the District Court of Massachusetts by special designation. AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF GROSVENOR PARK REALTY TRUST. With whom Beatrice & Beatrice was on brief for appellant. With whom Williams & Grainger was on brief for appellee FDIC. Argues that summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. Contends that Gleicher's conclusory remarks are insufficient to overcome the circumstantial evidence of fraud. FACTUAL BACKGROUND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed. The Note was secured by a mortgage on the Lynn property. 000 to a limited partnership (of which Gleicher was a general partner). 000 loan was in the form of an unsecured line of credit due to expire on December 30. 000 line of credit was fully drawn and had expired. It would have to be secured with. Stein reminded Gleicher that the Note was a demand note and would shortly expire. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="446"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1365.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Simard and Riemer &Braunstein were on brief. Were on brief for the United States. The question in this bankruptcyappeal is whether. Thejudgment lien was recorded on August 4. Weinstein would have beenentitled to the Massachusetts homestead exemption. 522(c)provides that such exempt property is not liable for any pre petition debt except the specific types enumerated in 522(c)(1) (3). Liens that are not void. Section 522(f) provides: Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions . . . the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section if such lien is (A) a judicial lien . . . .11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1) (emphasis added). The debtor must have </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="446"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200315932.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The district court approved the bankruptcy court's decision that held an alter ego claim is property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate under Georgia law. Because it is unclear under Georgia law whether a corporate entity can bring an alter ego action against its former principal. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are undisputed. Icarus is a national manufacturer and 1 Formerly known as Piedmont Hardwood Flooring. Baillie Lumber sold lumber to Icarus and was never paid. At the time of this suit Thompson was no longer involved in the management of Icarus. Icarus filed a complaint against Thompson in bankruptcy court claiming that the irregularities were fraudulent transfers and were held in constructive trust for Icarus. Baillie Lumber filed suit against Thompson in a Georgia state court alleging Thomson is the alter ego of Icarus and thus personally liable for the debts owed to Baillie Lumber. Baillie argues that the state alter ego claim is not the property of Icarus's estate. That it is not trying to recover money owed to the estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="445"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/034509p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We will affirm. Bankruptcy Proceedings The essential facts are not in dispute. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on April 22. A trustee was appointed. Each parcel of property was encumbered as follows. 509 (3d Cir. 1997). 3 2 property was more than sufficient to satisfy Newcourt's claim on its business loan and thus there was no need to look to the residential property except in the event of a deficiency after liquidation of the business assets. The trustee requested that the automatic stay remain in effect until it was determined whether the administration of the estate might result in equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee concluded that there was no equity for the benefit of unsecured creditors and therefore consented to the entry of an order granting Newcourt's motion for relief from the automatic stay. Zinchiak argued that there was no need to grant relief with respect to the residential property until it became evident from liquidation of the business assets that a deficiency remained on Newcourt's claim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0279n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The convictions are affirmed. Madison's sentence is affirmed. Madison's sentence is reversed and remanded. Was selfemployed as a minister. Madison's principal employment from 1996 1999 was as the executive director for Cherokee Children and Family Services. Was run under the umbrella of Cherokee Children and Family Services. The organizations collectively are referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/00/00-3910.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brenda Combes was the insured person. Was surprised to discover that Brenda had changed the beneficiaries on these policies (or had tried to do so) from himself and the couple's daughter Ashley to Brenda's sister. The third policy was part of a benefit plan established under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. Since their interests are aligned for present purposes). Seeking a declaration that she was the sole beneficiary of that policy as well and demanding payment of the proceeds. The Pennsylvania and North Carolina actions were later transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. The three cases were consolidated. All contested proceeds were deposited with the court. While we do not doubt that David and Ashley were sympathetic figures. We conclude that the oral agreement is not sufficient under the law of Illinois to override a written designation of a beneficiary on an insurance policy. We also conclude that the flaws David identifies in the ERISA change of beneficiary form were not enough to defeat its effectiveness. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2033.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Marzelli</SPAN> were on brief. P.C.</SPAN> were on brief. We are asked to determine whether two Massachusetts homestead exemptions can be </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/oct2001/01-12200.opn.html">SUNTRUST BANK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO. (10/10/2001, NO. 01-12200)<BR></A><BR> BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-2329.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: Page 16. PC was on brief for appellants. Friedman with whom Karen Frink Wolf and Friedman & Babcock was on brief for appellees. Because there is no need to distinguish Gregory W. That the property's cash flow was less robust than advertised. Made several lower offers that were rejected by Wainwright. Who is not a lawyer. Were to be completed 3 3 after Khanna closed the purchase of the apartments. 000 was to be paid to the contractors that completed the improvements. Thus the cost of the planned improvements was in no sense part of the bank's proceeds from the sale. Had Boulos add this term to the contract: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/03/016061P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Eastern States brought an adversary proceeding against the defendants asserting that it was entitled to a portion of the annuity payments which the defendants were receiving pursuant to a personal injury settlement obtained by the debtor prepetition.1 The complaint alleged that the debtor had assigned a portion of those payments to Eastern States and that Eastern States held a properly perfected security interest in those payments. A trial was held. The court therefore concluded that Eastern States' interest was subordinate to the trustee's interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544. To the extent that the judgment ruled that Eastern States' interest is subordinate to the debtor's. BACKGROUND The debtor brought a personal injury lawsuit against several defendants which was settled pursuant to a Release and Settlement Agreement on May 25. The trustee was entitled to 25 percent of the payments and the remainder was exempt and going to the debtor. 1 Although the judgment did not mention the summary judgment motion. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="444"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//oct2001/01-12200.opn.html">SUNTRUST BANK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO. (10/10/2001, NO. 01-12200)<BR></A><BR> BACKGROUND</STRONG></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="442"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/06/061925P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Holding that Lewallen's claims were core bankruptcy proceedings. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on her trailer home. This arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce. Lewallen's loan was in default at the time of the transfer. Lewallen attempted to refinance the loan with a new lender but her application was denied. Her home was the primary asset in the bankruptcy estate. That Green Tree's attorney's costs and fees were not a proper claim because they were attributable to Green Tree's own billing mistakes and failure to respond to Lewallen's inquiries. Although a hearing on Lewallen's objection was scheduled in the bankruptcy court for September 2004. The matter was continued several times. Counsel for Green Tree stated that an adversary proceeding was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="442"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/02/991428P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The subject of the lease is a 2.29 acre tract of land in Storm Lake. We do not have much to add. A brief statement of the relevant facts and a discussion of the main contention urged by plaintiff on the appeal will suffice. Moore Trust Estate was created by the will of C.H. Including the tract that is the subject of this case. The lease was to last for twenty five years. A new lease between the Center and the Trustees was then executed. The Center of course knew what was The Hon. It knew what was in the lease that it executed anew with the Trustees. One of whom was the Center. The claim is based upon the Center's expectation (really only a hope) that it would be allowed to buy the land. The fact that it was not practical to remove the building from the land. The basic relationship here is between landlord and tenant. Was an arms' length transaction. On the land was freely agreed to. Is. Moore's will. The will provided as follows: 3 And my desire is that they will be kind and fair with all their tenants. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="442"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/04/046033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota This is an appeal of the bankruptcy court's June 10. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Kaler was appointed the chapter 7 trustee ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="442"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-2161.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Daley & White were on brief. Grasso and Mortensen were on brief. We hold that the FDIC has no such shield and is liable. The units in the Hotel were marketed and sold by the University Bank and Trust Company and the other defendants as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/jan2001/97-6342.man.html">UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342)<BR></A><BR> BACKGROUND</CENTER> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1501.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Brown & Dugan were on brief for appellants. P.A. were on brief for appellees George E. P.A. were on brief for appellees Michael S. Nor is any one of them licensed to practice law there. Review by this Court is de novo (nondeferential). Was killed when the aircraft he was flying. Was struck over the New Hampshire Vermont border by an aircraft from Florida. Which is not a party to this litigation. The affidavit is identical to an unsigned and undated draft affidavit of Mr. Sawtelle except that the draft states that plaintiffs were referred to the California firm by the New Hampshire attorney. They submitted an affidavit of an advertising assistant at AOPA who confirms that there were no advertisements for the law firm in the AOPA magazine for the years 1988 through 1991. The case was assigned to defendant. Farrell is not licensed to practice law in New Hampshire. Among the topics addressed in those communications was Farrell's recommendation that Florida was the most advantageous forum for the wrongful death claim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/12/026033P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> A Notice of the Right of Redemption was served on Ms. The plan provided that the trustee was to make payments to Advanta Mortgage to cure an arrearage in mortgage payments of $9. The trustee was directed by the plan to accumulate sufficient funds to pay Tax 58's claim in one lump sum prior to distributions of other claims except for the trustee's administrative expenses. Since the focus of this appeal is the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation and application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Our review is de novo. 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for the lower court's application of facts to the legal interpretation of a statute is de novo). The holder of the certificate of purchase may serve the property owner with notice stating that the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/06/076001P.pdf">C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CHARRISO\LOCAL SETTINGS\TEMP\NOTES6030C8\VELDE V. STENERSON-REVISED DRAFT OPINION.WPD<BR></A><BR> I. We are able to glean the following factual allegations underlying Trustee's motion to compromise from our review of the record on appeal. Y Knot Construction ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Nov1999/995116.TXT">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> They are entitled to an abatement of the penalties assessed under those provisions. Concluded that reasonable cause was not established by the Taxpayers because financial distress was the only fact and circumstance supporting their failure to pay and deposit employment taxes timely. Because we believe the Brewery bright line test is inconsistent with both Congress' creation of a reasonable cause exception and Treas. We believe the better reasoned approach is the one set forth in Fran Corp. v. We have concluded that reasonable cause existed for the Taxpayers' failure to pay and deposit their employment taxes timely. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for the Taxpayers. I. The following facts are undisputed and have been largely stipulated to by the parties. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/BEC13ED496074BF888256E5A00707B0D/$file/0015728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The award was in favor of N.D. Galam asserts that the award was improperly granted pursuant to fee statutes of the State of Arizona regarding sanctions and contract claims. Was the major shareholder of the Debtor. The original lease was dated March 3. Was amended September 23. The lessor was the Abner E. The September lease was for a term of five years with a five year renewal option. It provided that the lot was exclusively for the use of the bar. The September parking lease was included as an asset on the schedules filed in the bank ruptcy action. The Trust was listed as a creditor. While the bankruptcy was still pending. A new lease of the parking lot was negotiated. The monthly payments were reduced and the duration was changed from five years with a five year renewable option to a one year lease with nine one year renewable options. Provided that the lessee was given 60 days written notice within 30 days of the purchase. The bankruptcy court noted that his interest had increased to 60 percent at the time that this litigation was going forward. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/dbe9ba53d6ef03ec88256a3a005b2562/$FILE/0015728.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The award was in favor of N.D. Galam asserts that the award was improperly granted pursuant to fee statutes of the State of Arizona regarding sanctions and contract claims. Was the major shareholder of the Debtor. The original lease was dated March 3. Was amended September 23. The lessor was the Abner E. The September lease was for a term of five years with a five year renewal option. It provided that the lot was exclusively for the use of the bar. The September parking lease was included as an asset on the schedules filed in the bank ruptcy action. The Trust was listed as a creditor. While the bankruptcy was still pending. A new lease of the parking lot was negotiated. The monthly payments were reduced and the duration was changed from five years with a five year renewable option to a one year lease with nine one year renewable options. Provided that the lessee was given 60 days written notice within 30 days of the purchase. The bankruptcy court noted that his interest had increased to 60 percent at the time that this litigation was going forward. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199903/97-7211a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With him on the briefs was Mark L. With him on the brief was Laurie B. Because of its importance to local commerce and because there is no decision by the highest court in the District of Columbia precisely on point. We have decided to certify it to that court. We agree that such dismissal was improper and rein state these two claims contingent on a positive response by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to the question certified here. DeBerry that this grant was improper and accordingly reinstate the claim. DeBerry is a citizen of the District of Columbia. First Government is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland. Code s 28 3904 is entitled </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/ea50059bc5df2783882569520074e699/bec13ed496074bf888256e5a00707b0d/$FILE/0015728.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The award was in favor of N.D. Galam asserts that the award was improperly granted pursuant to fee statutes of the State of Arizona regarding sanctions and contract claims. Was the major shareholder of the Debtor. The original lease was dated March 3. Was amended September 23. The lessor was the Abner E. The September lease was for a term of five years with a five year renewal option. It provided that the lot was exclusively for the use of the bar. The September parking lease was included as an asset on the schedules filed in the bank ruptcy action. The Trust was listed as a creditor. While the bankruptcy was still pending. A new lease of the parking lot was negotiated. The monthly payments were reduced and the duration was changed from five years with a five year renewable option to a one year lease with nine one year renewable options. Provided that the lessee was given 60 days written notice within 30 days of the purchase. The bankruptcy court noted that his interest had increased to 60 percent at the time that this litigation was going forward. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan2001/97-6342.man.html">UNITED STATES V. DENNIS (1/8/2001, NO. 97-6342)<BR></A><BR> BACKGROUND</CENTER> </SPAN></P> <P><SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/961431.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> No rent was paid on the premises postpetition. Was one of several automobile dealerships in Northern Virginia controlled by John W. The lease was thus rejected by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). The debtor's case was converted to Chapter 7. Trustee Hall was appointed to administer the estate. Was pursuing its own§ 506(c) action against Ford Credit. Reynolds was also permitted to surcharge Ford Credit to satisfy its claim. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=92-1447.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Is amended as follows: Page 50. Delete the sentence that starts with </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/DBE9BA53D6EF03EC88256A3A005B2562/$file/0015728.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The award was in favor of N.D. Galam asserts that the award was improperly granted pursuant to fee statutes of the State of Arizona regarding sanctions and contract claims. Was the major shareholder of the Debtor. The original lease was dated March 3. Was amended September 23. The lessor was the Abner E. The September lease was for a term of five years with a five year renewal option. It provided that the lot was exclusively for the use of the bar. The September parking lease was included as an asset on the schedules filed in the bank ruptcy action. The Trust was listed as a creditor. While the bankruptcy was still pending. A new lease of the parking lot was negotiated. The monthly payments were reduced and the duration was changed from five years with a five year renewable option to a one year lease with nine one year renewable options. Provided that the lessee was given 60 days written notice within 30 days of the purchase. The bankruptcy court noted that his interest had increased to 60 percent at the time that this litigation was going forward. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/55FD1970A5A6FB7A88256E68007CB036/$file/0216847.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> To which were annexed certain supplemental state law claims. The plaintiffs appellants are Stephen Turner. An entity that employed the Turners.1 The defendants appellees are Ah Beng Yeo. A law firm in which Cook is a partner. The plaintiffs appellants' federal claims are that actions taken by Yeo and Martini. WPS was owned by the Golden Gate Trust. A family trust of which the Turner children were beneficiaries. Provided medical services to WPS and Susana Turner was WPS' general manager. Perkiss & Lew to assist in collection of the judgment assistance which appears to have continued until March. Subsequently an amended complaint was filed. WPS was not a plaintiff on the FDCPA claim or on the state law claims other than the Unfair Competition Act claim. The Turners asserted that because WPS was not owned. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-2072.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.A.</U> were on brief for appellant.</FONT> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/00/04/006002P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> It is from that order that Schroeder appeals. The debtors' case was converted to a case under Chapter 11. Rouse was appointed the Chapter 7 trustee. The debtors agreed to have the automatic stay modified to allow Frank and Dorothy Dell to resume foreclosure on the debtors' apartment building. If counsel's total fee in a case is $1. The disclosure of fee in initial filings is sufficient and it is unnecessary to file any itemized application. That parties have 20 days to object. If no objections are filed the Court may enter an order. If objections are filed the Court may set a hearing. 3 Schroeder's representation of the debtors continued. The trustee's motion alleged that the payments made to Schroeder were cash payments from funds wrongfully diverted out of the bankruptcy estate (and then back to the debtors) by a transfer of more than $20. That the payments made to him were not from assets of the bankruptcy estate and asserted that the fees and expenses were reasonable and not excessive. Because he was not requesting compensation from the estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/oct96/95-6281.wpd.html">UNITED STATES V. PRETTY<BR></A><BR> I. The alleged crimes began after Claudette Henry was elected Oklahoma State Treasurer and named Whitehead as Deputy State Treasurer. She sold securities and insurance and Kuhse was her supervisor. When Pretty was marketing PBEA materials and Kuhse was selling insurance. Whitehead was the Treasurer's </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/962862.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Deceased and as Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Ralph Brown Sayre. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Friend and Imogene Williams brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that defendantappellant Attorneys Liability Protection Society ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="441"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1014.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Rosenthal P.C. were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Participating hospitals which retain ownership of the capital assets used to provide services to their Medicare recipients are entitled to periodic reimbursement for estimated actual depreciation on those assets. A hospital which has closed would be eligible for further depreciation reimburse ments from HHS on a Medicare related capital asset which was sold within one year after its closure for less than its depreciated basis. HHS regulations allowed hospitals forty five days after their withdrawal from the Medicare program to submit a The HHS depreciation methodology is similar to that utilized for federal tax purposes. Since HHS already would have reimbursed the hospital $40. Were the asset to sell for only $500. The HHS regulations likewise allow hospitals a three year period within which to reopen and amend a final cost report which was timely filed. The Trustee obtained two extensions of the forty five day filing deadline from the bankruptcy court and the Hospital's final cost report was submitted to HHS within the extended deadline. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0200p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Her underlying contention is that she is the owner of certain real property. That Defendants have acted illegally in interfering with her ownership. The agreement secured the indebtedness by promising to pay Plaintiff for all sums provided if and when the Henry Ruff Property was sold. Plaintiff was the sole title holder of the Huff Road Property. The circuit court found that the Henry Ruff Property was marital property to be divided2between Mary and Edward. The circuit court failed to even address whether the 1976 reconciliation agreement was valid. The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the 1976 reconciliation agreement and any of the subsequent transfers were valid. As there was a question of whether the transfers were part of a conspiracy to deprive Edward of his rightful marital property. Should have the opportunity to testify at trial. The circuit court later determined that the conveyances by Frances and Nancy were fraudulent. The circuit court found that the 1976 conveyance from Edward to Mary was void because it lacked consideration and because it was against public policy. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/06/97-1284.htm">97-1284 -- U.S. V. ABBEY -- 06/05/1998<BR></A><BR> 1291 and affirm. <p> <center>I.</center> <p> Abbey is a resident of Longmont. Abbey was persuaded by employees of the Veterans Administration (VA). Which was entirely separate from his position with Boulder County. Involved overseeing the financial affairs of veterans who for various reasons were unable to manage their own financial affairs. The primary responsibility of the named fiduciaries was to sign blank checks for Abbey. Abbey was to insure that the veterans had housing. Summarizing how each veteran's funds were spent. <p> In return for his work as a fiduciary. Abbey was entitled to an administrative fee under Colorado law equal to five percent of each veteran's income. It is unclear whether any of these charges were submitted for approval in state court. <p> Beginning in approximately October 1989 (roughly coinciding with Lancelot's absence from work because of cancer and his subsequent retirement). Abbey told her he was counseling many of the veterans without compensation and it would be a conflict of interest for him to personally submit bills to the veterans for counseling. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1996/96a1298p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). We will affirm the conviction. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//mar98/97-6175.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/85662C74F6A2E74088256B4F00616368/$file/0070998.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> He financed $1.4 million of the purchase price with a loan from Wells Fargo Bank that was secured by a lien on Catalano's residence. Catalano opposed the motion on the ground that the value of the property was substantially greater than that of the outstanding debt. The property was sold to Wells Fargo for $1. The outstanding principal balance of the Wells Fargo loan was $1. Which was the amount of interest that. Catalano's residence was property of the bankruptcy estate at the time of the foreclosure. That therefore all tax consequences of the sale should have fallen upon the bankruptcy estate. Catalano could not be considered to have paid any interest in 1995 because the fair market value of his residence. Which the Commissioner maintained was accurately reflected in the amount Wells Fargo bid at the foreclosure sale. Was less than the outstanding principal on the loan. Because the proceeds from the sale were insufficient to pay off the entire 1153 amount of outstanding principal. There were no proceeds remaining with which interest could have been paid. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/mar98/97-6175.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/11/96-6410a.htm">96-6410A -- GAINES-TABB V. ICI EXPLOSIVES, USA, INC. -- 11/09/1998<BR></A><BR> That defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of their injuries. They cannot state a claim for negligence <u>per se</u> under one of the state statutes at issue because ammonium nitrate is not an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200512/04-5257a.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With her on the briefs were Gregory G. With him on the brief was Rhonda M. Peter Buscemi was on the brief for amici curiae State and Local Bar Associations in support of appellees. Babb were on the brief for amicus curiae The Conference of Chief Justices in support of appellee American Bar Association. The Bar Associations sought a declaratory judgment that the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in the practice of law are covered by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/971339.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Norton Baskin (Baskin) is the personal representative of the estate of his late wife. (Seajay) physical possession of certain documents which appellants assert are assets of the Rawlings estate. Did not render a decision on the counterclaim.2 1 It is important to note the distinction between the physical ownership of documents. The physical document and the copyright are subject to separate transfer. That decision is now before this Court on appeal. She was the noted author of books such as Sojourner. In her will. Bigham was the daughter of publisher Charles Scribner. 1961.3 Rawlings' will left immediate custody of </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="436"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/11/96-6410.htm">96-6410 -- GAINES-TABB V. ICI EXPLOSIVES -- 11/09/1998<BR></A><BR> That defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of their injuries. They cannot state a claim for negligence <u>per se</u> under one of the state statutes at issue because ammonium nitrate is not an </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/012775.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Trustee argues that payments of fees by Pillowtex to Jones Day within the 90 days before bankruptcy may have constituted an avoidable preference and that the receipt of such a preference by Jones Day would constitute a conflict of interest with Pillowtex's 2 creditors and its bankruptcy estate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/07/026002P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order and judgment of the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court can require the Taxing Authorities. The holders of tax claims against the debtor which are secured by liens on certain real property presently owned by the debtor's non debtor spouse. During the period that the Homestead was jointly owned by Fred and JoAnna Bame. An involuntary Chapter 7 petition was filed against Fred Bame ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/July1996/96a1368p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1988). We will affirm the conviction. The plans were marketed to small business employers. NIBA members were fully insured by NIBA's group insurance contract with World Life and Health Insurance Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/02/10/026031P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> BACKGROUND The material facts are not in dispute. The debtors' primary business is the manufacturing of cutting and welding equipment. The Estates shall reimburse the Indemnified Parties for any legal or other expenses reasonably incurred by them in respect thereof at the time such expenses are incurred. Damage or liability which is finally judicially determined to have resulted from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of any Indemnified Party. 3 To resolve numerous objections4 from the U.S. Contribution or reimbursement therefore are approved by the Court. (b) The Debtors shall have no obligation to indemnify Houlihan Lokey. For any claim or expense that is either (i) judicially determined (the determination having become final) to have arisen solely from Houlihan Lokey's gross negligence. Stating it was excessive. Stated that the portion of the indemnification provision that releases Houlihan for any liability arising from its engagement other than that judicially determined to be willful misconduct or gross negligence is inappropriate. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/972244.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who was Tom's widow. Betty's claim was based on a property settlement agreement that she entered into with Tom in connection with their divorce. The district court held that Betty's claim was preempted because it was based upon state law that related to an employee benefit plan. Her constructive trust claim is not preempted. Which was incorporated but not merged into their divorce decree. A separate QDRO that was entered by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. The transferred policies are not at issue in this appeal. Betty never received or requested such proof. 3 was maintained through his employer. Which was administered by MetLife. This life insurance policy was subject to the provisions of ERISA. It was not specifically mentioned in the property settlement agreement. The beneficiary designations on the policies were changed frequently. Betty was not named as the beneficiary of either the MetLife policy or any other policy that would fulfill the property settlement agreement's $200. The threshold question in this case is whether ERISA preempts the enforcement of a property settlement agreement against life insurance benefits paid through an ERISA governed plan. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2004/03/02-1554.htm">02-1554 -- WEIS BUILDERS INC. V. KAY S. BROWN LIVING TRUST -- 03/17/2004<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> <center>I.</center> <p> Defendants appellants Kay Brown Living Trust and Ryan S. Seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no contract between the parties. Arguing that the district court's order is interlocutory and. An interlocutory order granting an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to the Act is considered 'final' at least for the purposes of appeal. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/02/02-1070.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Diamond was convicted of mail fraud. Was promised a fifty to one return in less than a year. That was the pitch. It was. It was a scam. Hood was actually a retired electrician who had come up with the idea for a Prime Bank Notes scam through his association with other scam artists. The whole thing was completely fabricated. The status of Omega was always the same. Pay out was just around the bend. One such marketeer was Michael Kodosky. In 1998 she met with Hood and asked him about the ongoing investigation into Omega and told Hood that she knew it was an illegal scam. She had two additional meetings with Hood which made it even clearer that she was aware that the Omega Trust and Trading transactions were fraudulent. Diamond was sending out her own Private Party Loan Agreements. She was involved in the Omega scam up to her eyebrows. Various investors were told that they could receive their Omega updates from Diamond and that she was coordinating Omega activities for California. One such individual was Reverend Jody Boyd. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="434"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/07/04/053867P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Who was governor. The trustee's first complaint was dismissed as to Morris and the Morris. Not to Senior Cottages itself because there was no allegation that Senior Cottages had a value in excess of creditors' claims against it. The complaint </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec97/96-3556.man.html">UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556)<BR></A><BR> The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance.</P> <P> Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings.</P> <P> We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error.</P> <P> We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering.</P> <P><CENTER>I</CENTER> </P> <P><CENTER>SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE</CENTER> </P> <P><CENTER>A. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/10circuit/aug96/95-4120.wpd.html">RUPP V. MARKGRAF<BR></A><BR> The cashier's check was purchased using Cowboy funds and it stated on its face that it was purchased by Cowboy Enterprises. This address was not Cowboy's business address. Davis was living at the time. The cashier's check was delivered to the Markgrafs. Which was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee brought this adversary proceeding in 1993 alleging that the transfer was fraudulent and seeking its avoidance and recovery against the Markgrafs under 11 U.S.C. 544(b) & 550. Was the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Sept2002/013805.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to determine whether a creditor's committee may assert fraudulent transfer claims under S 544 of the Bankruptcy Code ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec97/96-3556.man.html">UNITED STATES V. ROSS (12/19/1997, NO. 96-3556)<BR></A><BR> The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams and their co conspirators created shell corporations and contrived deceptive paper transactions that had no economic substance.</P> <P> Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. Under separate headings.</P> <P> We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error.</P> <P> We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering.</P> <P><CENTER>I</CENTER> </P> <P><CENTER>SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE</CENTER> </P> <P><CENTER>A. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19963556.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Government persuaded the jury that Ross and Adams conspired to obtain money for their personal use and benefit from two financially troubled insurance companies by falsely representing that the loans were to be used solely for business purposes. Ross and Adams contend that the evidence presented to the jury is insufficient to sustain a conviction. They assert that the district court miscalculated their sentence and applied a sentencing guideline that is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of conviction because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of the guilt of the accused of each crime. We hold that the court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence and its decision to reject defense instructions were free from error. We vacate the sentence imposed on each defendant and remand for resentencing because the district court failed to make an independent finding that it was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross and Adams conspired to commit the offense of money laundering. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/04/01/036034P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court authorizing the Rule 2004 examination. We would have affirmed the bankruptcy court on the record before it. Which include a stipulation of a material fact which was not available to the bankruptcy court. ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the court properly authorized the Trustee of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of Etty R. In light of the parties' stipulation on appeal that the Debtor's employment was terminated post petition and post conversion of her case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Any claim for wrongful termination is property of the Debtor and not property of the bankruptcy estate. The Debtor was employed by the Appellant. STANDARD OF REVIEW Decisions authorizing examinations under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The Trustee is required to collect and reduce to money property of the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1). </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=95-1712.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Richmond & Rothstein were on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. Holding that Progressive's mortgage was not entitled to priority over the federal tax liens under the Massachusetts common law doctrines of equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The mortgage at issue is secured by real property located in Marshfield. 000.00 mortgage note which was properly recorded in favor of the Miles Standish Federal Credit Union ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDAzLTc3NDBfb3BuLnBkZg==/03-7740_opn.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Corning's motion is denied. The order appealed from is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Will & Emery (Richard B. Circuit Judge: INTRODUCTION Underlying this appeal are massive asbestos liability claims against appellee Corning. The immediate issues are whether a state or federal forum will determine certain insurers' claims that their policies do not cover asbestos claims against Corning and whether we have jurisdiction to review the determination of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denise L. Judge) that the claims belong in federal court because they are core to PCC's Pennsylvania bankruptcy proceeding. The appellants in this procedurally complicated appeal are insurers that issued liability coverage to appellee Corning. The London 3 Market Insurers as the affiliate insurers.1 The affiliate insurers wish to have their liability to Corning assessed in New York State Supreme Court while Corning prefers a federal forum. Corning removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania where PCC's bankruptcy proceeding was pending. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/01/99-3176.htm">99-3176 -- OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION V. OVERLAND PARK FINANCIAL CORP. -- 01/05/2001<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judge. <p> <strong><hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/04a0179p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Alleging that TCI's opposition to SPG's tender offer was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the TCI Board. No. 03 1609 not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Had an interest in the litigation that would be impeded or impaired by a disposition in its absence but could not be joined as a defendant because two general partners were citizens of the same state as plaintiff Glancy. The question is whether that absentee partnership is an indispensable party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) such that the action must be dismissed rather than proceed in the partnership's absence. We note that the following rendition of facts is based upon our reading of the documents compiled by the parties at an early stage of the litigation. The enterprises of the Taubman family is complex and laden with acronyms. TCI is a publicly traded corporation that was incorporated in Michigan in 1973 and that has its principal place of business in Michigan. TCI is organized as a corporate Real Estate Investment Trust ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="432"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/4F03E8F0747EF3A888256F850079E16D/$file/0315958.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We conclude that even though a bankruptcy court's post confirmation </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="430"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/05/99-1253.htm">99-1253 -- STEFFENS V. STEFFENS -- 05/26/2000<BR></A><BR> Circuit Judges. <p> <hr align= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="430"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1340.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. Were on brief. Invest Almaz also contends that the jury was not properly instructed on a claim that. Was formed for the purpose of investing the pensions and savings of the parent company's employees. Invest Almaz's intent was to build housing for the parent company's retired employees and also to sell OSB for needed hard currency in the export market. Invest Almaz came to the conclusion that it would be more cost effective to purchase the equipment from an existing plant in North America and have it transported back to Russia. </FONT></P> <P><FONT FACE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1976.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Gutkoski were on brief for appellants. Johnston were on brief for appellees. This is an appeal from a jury verdict of no liability in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff appellant is Richard K. Defendants appellees are Benjamin Mahlab. We address only one of the three issues raised by appellant because it is dispositive. Excerpts from the letters were allowed in evidence. Were the parents of two children: Brian. Klonoski was born and raised in Connecticut. Klonoski was employed by Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital as a cardiologist. She was sent home in the afternoon. Klonoski's death she was delivered of a healthy baby girl. Klonoski was in San Diego at a medical meeting of cardiologists on Saturday. He was notified late Saturday of his wife's admission to the hospital. His wife was comatose and did not recognize him. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY As is usual in a well prepared medical malpractice case. As is also usual. The address to which her letters (the evidence in dispute) were sent. To the extent defendants can more persuasively support their assertion that such a list (or the names of particular people which would otherwise appear on such a list) is protected by the work product doctrine (i.e. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/07a0140n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> I. Kena is a limited liability company owned by plaintiffs Leslie and James Foster. Each letter contained the following statement: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2001/07/00-8081.htm">00-8081 -- HAWORTH V. ROYAL -- 07/03/2001<BR></A><BR> The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. <p> Debtor Marjorie Louise Haworth. We affirm. <p> The operative facts are known to the parties. The trustee claimed that the purported transfer of the property was void because </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/991990.P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Line 2 the text is corrected to read </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1999/01/96-2161.htm">96-2161 -- RIENHARDT V. KELLY -- 01/07/1999<BR></A><BR> 000 and was awarded costs against them in the amount of $9. Were not liable. (2) that the district court should have abstained from hearing the tort claim. Because the jury's verdict is not severable into the issues over which the court did have jurisdiction and those over which it did not. The challenge to the exclusion of character evidence is mooted by the resolution of the first issue </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/05/05/042009P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Imperato argues that the district court erred when it found that his claim was time barred. The amount given to Samples was $75. Wallace and Samples have lived at the house on the Property under the terms of the lease between McMinn and Samples. McMinn moved to dismiss Imperato's complaint on the basis that it was time barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable for causes of action under the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfers Act. Imperato amended his complaint to make clear that his cause of action was not based upon the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfers Act. Imperato alleged that Wallace was the true and equitable owner of the Property despite McMinn being the record title holder. The District Court ruled that Imperato's complaint was time barred under the statute of limitations of the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfers Act. McMinn formed a resulting trust.1 A </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/199801/97-5016a.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Was on the briefs. Amy Loeserman Klein and John McJunkin were on the brief. We hold that the contract language affords Beal a credit only when collateral property was sold between specified dates. Although the court recognizes that the contract was initially drafted and executed by its predecessor in interest. A warning that this information was liable to be inaccurate. Many of the loans involved were in default. This began a six month due diligence period during which Beal could determine if there were any breaches of the representations or warranties made with respect to the prop erty it acquired. That there were no undisclosed delin quent real property taxes on included properties. Beal closed the transactions but noted that it reserved the right to pursue (through the instant litigation) certain credits and back taxes it thought it was due under the contract. The FDIC has consistently asserted that Beal's only reme dy for allegedly defective mortgage loans is via recourse to the contract provisions for breach of warranty. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1613.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C.</SPAN> were on brief for appellants.</P> <P> <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-2239.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Which we have consolidated for decision. Aurora Christian Schools Ocean Atlantic is a real estate development company that is incorporated in Virginia and maintains its principal place of business in Alexandria. Will Counties three of the suburban </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-2292.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.A. were on brief for Elizabeth Ann DiGeronimo. P.C. was on brief for Beckley Capital Limited Partnership. Rood & Branch were on brief for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Before us are two appeals arising out of two different district court cases. No such release was ever delivered. A balance remained due on the note (apparently the balance was then about $195. Beckley argued that it was entitled to the much longer six year statute of limitations available to the FDIC under the Financial Institutions Reform. Concluded on cross motions for summary judgment that Beckley was governed by the one year statute and dismissed the case. Beckley was not only appealing from that dismissal but also seeking in state court to obtain an equitable extension of the one year deadline for suing the estate. The district court dismissed the claim against the FDIC on the ground that it was barred by a different provision of FIRREA. The court also dismissed the estate's claim against Beckley on the ground that it was effectively a compulsory counterclaim that the estate should have asserted in the earlier lawsuit by Beckley to recover on the guaranty. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Apr1997/97a1569p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The purpose of this rule is to give top corporate managers an incentive to use available corporate funds for the payment of wages and benefits rather than for some other purpose. The issue raised by this case is what happens when their company files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the employees seek to recover from the corporate managers for unpaid vacation and retirement benefits that were allegedly earned in the pre petition period. Is whether. The company's managers have no discretion to order payment of the amounts owed to the employees. I. The Shenango Corporation ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/051374p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We review the District Court's determinations that: (1) a debtor's right to a surplus generated by a pension plan is a property interest. (2) an amendment to that pension plan that irrevocably decreases the surplus is a transfer of the property interest. (3) the value surrendered and the value gained as a result of the transfer need not be precisely calculated in this instance in order to conclude that they are not reasonably equivalent. In 1995 Fruehauf entered into contracts with several of its top executives that would pay them significant benefits if the Company or its assets were sold. As the benefits would not accrue to the beneficiaries unless they were still employed by Fruehauf at that time. B. The Emergency Board Meeting Fruehauf continued to have financial difficulties. Although the parties dispute what was considered at this meeting. They discussed an amendment (known as the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/982061.U.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Gloria Robinson and Michael Welch are trustees/administrators of the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05a0177p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Contech was billed by and paid these carriers directly. Computrex's business was to provide these services to shippers using multiple carriers. Computrex was then to issue carrier checks Monday night and to mail the checks to the carriers on Tuesday morning. That is. By the time the involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Computrex. It was Computrex's practice. 414.04 were made to Contech's carriers within ninety days of the filing of the involuntary petition in this case. Contech's carriers were only owed approximately $300.00 while other clients' carriers were owed over twenty four million dollars at the time five creditors of Computrex filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against it on December 20. Page 3 (2) (3) (4) (5) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. 1 made while the debtor was insolvent. If such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider. That enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="ftp://opinions.ca5.uscourts.gov/unpub/02/02-20941.0.wpd.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. The opportunity at issue was the right to obtain stock in Zentech. SSI is the owner of StruCAD. The district court's judgment was affirmed in part. Is still pending or has just been concluded in the district court. Guntur and Irannezhaad were at this time also given Zentech common stock. The 3 1 bankruptcy court found that the stock received by Guntur and Irannezhaad was not in return for their employment by Zentech. Rather was Agreement. in return for SSI's execution of the Maintenance As such. The bankruptcy court concluded that the Zentech stock was a corporate opportunity of SSI that had been misappropriated by Guntur and Irannezhaad and that the Zentech stock properly belonged to the SSI Estate. 666.4 shares of Zentech held by Guntur at the time judgment was entered and 40. 000 shares of Zentech held by Irannezhaad at the time judgment was entered. The bankruptcy court also held that the SSI Estate was entitled to recover $696. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//dec98/97-6823.man.html">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The issue is one of characterization. The IRS contends that the plan impermissibly reclassifies the status of tax obligations and that the plan is. The appellees claim that the plan permissibly allocates priority of payments and is also feasible and in good faith. Haas was. He is an attorney who is a sole practitioner. His wife is employed full time in her husband's law office providing secretarial and clerical assistance. We will hereafter refer to them as the debtors. Virtually all of which was secured by notices of federal tax lien. 000 was for income taxes and $68. 000 was for employment taxes. Employment taxes (also referred to as trust fund taxes) refer to taxes the debtors were supposed to withhold for income taxes and social security. During the pendency of the bankruptcy the debtors were required to pay $1. 600 in pre petition accounts receivable were collected and held in a separate account. 600 is available to satisfy claims. 000 in bankruptcy estate assets.</P> <P> There are. Provides that claims secured by liens on property of the bankruptcy estate are secured claims only to the extent of the value of the collateral. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=94-1479.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Dickson and Law Offices of George Dickson were on brief for appellants. Bass & Green were on brief for appellee. Circuit Judge impression presented in this case is whether section 501(a)(1) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Is preempted by section 501(a)(1). Is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dime Savings Bank of New York. Was assigned to Dime Savings the day it was made. The interest rate was fixed at 7.75% for the first six months. The interest rate was capped. Including that (1) the SIS is preempted by 804(c) of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982. Is pre empted by section 501(a)(1).3 B. 'the question of whether federal law pre empts a state statute is one of congressional intent.' </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/94A3A232EF028C75882572920002E846/$file/0416911.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Placed the corporation into bankruptcy without considering other alternatives that may have yielded greater value for the corporation and its shareholders. Who were minority shareholders. The equity of the minority shareholders was wiped out and the assets of the corporation were sold to one of defendant Yageo Corp.'s subsidiaries. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to sue as assignees of the corporate claim and that their breach of fiduciary duty claims are preempted by federal bankruptcy law and barred by res judicata. The district court held that plaintiffs have standing and that their claims are neither preempted nor barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs cross appeal the district court's damages calculations and its determination that they did not have standing to assert the claims of minority shareholders. Was formed in 1996 by George Chen and George </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200510143.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Thompkins ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/07/022255P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The Moore Plan canceled this coverage when it determined that Geissal was not entitled to continuation coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=02-2578.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> McGinn</SPAN> and <SPAN STYLE= </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2002/11/00-1457.htm">00-1457 -- NICOLAS V. PERKINS -- 11/05/2002<BR></A><BR> Brought thirteen federal and state law claims against various defendants while the probate of her mother's estate was pending in state court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="427"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op/01/01-1261.PDF">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Of which she was the executive director. Arising out of activities No. 01 1261 3 that she was alleged to have committed as Discovery's director. Process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the [Bankruptcy Code]. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="423"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/05b0015n-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The precedential effect of this decision is limited to the case and parties pursuant to 6th Cir. These appeals were consolidated by order entered March 18. Related appeal is taken from the bankruptcy court's order denying Appellant's motion to compel service of process. The bankruptcy court's decisions are AFFIRMED. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it approved the settlement and disbursement of funds in the Deere Credit adversary proceeding. An order is final if it </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="423"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/03/10/031325P.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Finding that a 1994 judgment against Lurie is subject to collection and execution. We affirm the BAP's decision and determine that the administrative costs were properly added to what Lurie owes to the Liquidating Trust. The facts of this case are not in dispute and have been reported at length below. Lurie was a general partner of Popkin & Stern and agreed to contribute $361. This judgment also provided that </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042615p.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The appellants or the decedents they represent (hereinafter collectively referred to as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1354.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Garcia Rodon was on brief. If that power is upheld. Fernandez is essentially uninsured on the malpractice claim and it may be that the malpractice plaintiffs will recover nothing regardless of the merits of their claim. PCFA had been dissolved by an act of the legislature and was no longer liable on Dr. Dr. 2 2 Fernandez was covered by PCFA under an occurrence policy.1 However. PCFA was abolished before Mercado Boneta filed his claim against Dr. Which provides coverage for occurrences within the policy period regardless of when the claim is made. Is distinguished from a claims made policy. Which only covers the insured for claims that are actually made during the policy period. 2. Veronica was born on January 1. Was treated by Dr. Was taken several times to Dr. Fernandez was negligent in failing to properly diagnose Veronica's condition and in failing to hospitalize her. Submits that Veronica's hearing impairment was the likely result of head trauma Veronica suffered when she fell from a slide in January of 1986. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1133.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> P.C. were on brief for appellant. Denied they were personally liable for these corporate debts. Background Defendant Appellee Green & Freedman Baking Company ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/03-1395.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> With her on the brief was Nels J. Of counsel on the brief was Daniel J. Of counsel were John B. With her on the brief was Kathryn E. The landowners appeal those aspects of the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho as were decided adversely to their </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.villanova.edu/locator/3d/Jan2003/011351.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Staiano was the U.S. Her current replacement is Acting U.S. After concluding that it is not moot in either sense. We affirm the District Court's ruling that the indemnification provision is permissible. These affiliates are United Artists Theatre Circuit. Revoking the automatic reference means in practical terms that bankruptcy cases are assigned to the District Court unless. They are referred to the Bankruptcy Court. Which was filed while the reference revocation was in effect. 3 Houlihan Lokey's reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. The letter also contained an exception for </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Aug1996/96a1406p.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Circuit Judge We are called upon to determine the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by a broker dealer of securities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Inc. ( </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/95opinions/95-5118.html">FISHER V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/03opinions/03-5054.html">OKERLUND, ET AL. V. U.S.<BR></A><BR> Argued for defendant appellee.<span style='mso spacerun:yes'> </span>With her on the brief were <u>Eileen J. Mso bidi font family: </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1665.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Were on brief. Made out a will and left Kathleen Gass the house. The court concluded that Kathleen Gass was not entitled to assert the </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="420"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/00a0195p-06.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The notices stated that Taxpayers were not entitled to a loss in the amount of $5. Determining that COD income of an insolvent S corporation cannot be used to increase the shareholders' basis. evidence shows that the bankruptcy trustee was actively administering New Manchester's estate well into 1995. Some of New Manchester's creditors were. There is no need to address the pass through issue at this time. Friedman's death would not affect the continuation of this matter. 1 demonstrate that the debts were. There was no such event. Further evidence that a discharge had not occurred in 1992 is the fraudulent conveyance claim filed in December. This offer was refused by the bankruptcy court. The claim was eventually settled on or about April 11. These facts demonstrate that not only was the fraudulent conveyance claim still pending after 1992. The value of the claim was in dispute well into 1995. Because the value of the claim was uncertain in 1992. The actual amount New Manchester's estate would realize from the claim was not ascertainable in that year. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Mar2000/982164.txt">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> We are asked to decide whether the affirmative defenses of setoff. This appeal raises a question as to whether the creditor whose affirmative defenses were extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale received constitutionally adequate notice such that failure to object would result in a waiver of its affirmative defenses and its deemed consent to the transformation of the debtors' contract claims into unimpeachable accounts receivable. Were not extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale. Was constitutionally inadequate. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Folger acquired substantially all of the assets of three bankrupt companies through a bankruptcy auction </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/19976175.MAN.pdf">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> The bankruptcy court concluded that the automobile was </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=96-1355.01A">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Handler were on brief for appellant. Rosenberg was on brief for appellees. The issue before us is whether IBM's veto is absolute. The issue is close. We conclude that the refinancing provision is inapplicable because the proposal that has been presented so far lacks refinancing content. Are named as parties in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. We refer to the appellees simply as </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit/feb96/94-4908.opa.html">RPM INVESTMENTS V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP.<BR></A><BR> This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > <title>RPM Investments v. Is not available under 12 U.S.C. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/757EDEC843604EBA882571D900811E23/$file/0416149.pdf?openelement">OPINION/ORDER</A><BR> Elaine Zieroth are substituted as parties to this appeal for their predecessors Ann M. Is reasonable. The Fitzgeralds maintain a residence on the property and have used and continue to use the ranch as a base camp for their cattle grazing operations in the adjacent Sitgreaves National Forest.1 The property contains a house. When the property was surveyed in 1916. The Sitgreaves and Apache Forests were administratively combined and are sometimes referred to jointly as the Apache Sitgreaves National Forests. 1 10466 THE FITZGERALD LIVING TRUST v. The property was surrounded by the Sitgreaves National Forest or by lands owned by third parties. The property was completely surrounded by the Sitgreaves National Forest. There were several access routes to the property through the national forest. To continue using the road.2 The request was made pursuant to the Forest Service's determination that FDR 56B was no longer needed for public use and pursuant to its program of having all uses under permit. The case was dismissed as moot when the proposed easement expired.3 In January. </TD> </TR> <TR CLASS="swhit"> <TD CLASS="swrank"><IMG SRC="/usca/images/score-4.gif" ALT="419"></TD> <TD CLASS="swtitle"><A HREF="http://www.law.emory.edu/11circuit//jan95/91-3924.html">RESOLUTION TRUST V. DUNMAR CORP.<BR></A><BR> This