/usr/local/projects/usca/indexes/USCA-ALL.index
Your query workers and compensation returned 3528 results.
Your search has returned a large number of results. You might want to consider using additional terms to narrow it.
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Smith were on brief for appellant.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are asked to predict whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit an employee injured in an on the job automobile accident to recover from both workers' compensation as well as from an uninsured motorist plan that his employer voluntarily purchased. The district court held that workers' compensation was the employee's exclusive remedy. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that state law did not bar an employee's recovery from both workers' compensation and an uninsured motorist plan. Because the Superior Court's reasoning is persuasive. We will reverse. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are asked to predict whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit an employee injured in an on the job automobile accident to recover from both workers' compensation as well as from an uninsured motorist plan that his employer voluntarily purchased. The district court held that workers' compensation was the employee's exclusive remedy. Because the Superior Court's reasoning is persuasive. We will reverse. DiBartolo was injured while occupying an automobile owned by his employer. DiBartolo was acting in the course and scope of his employment. The material facts are not in dispute. 2 Travelers asked the district court to hold that DiBartolo's recovery of workers' compensation benefits after an on the job automobile accident precluded his later recovery on the uninsured motorist plan purchased by his employer. When these statutes are read. They seem to have clearly authorized the collection of both workers' 2. No employee who is otherwise eligible shall be precluded from recovery of uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits from an employer's motor vehicle policy under this chapter . . . . |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was awarded compensatory damages for lost earnings. At least to the extent such earnings were based on pay rates in the United States rather than in the worker's native country. Affordable and Mountain are now joined by third party defendant Silva. 3 In addition. Arguing that the document relied on by these third party plaintiffs to support their indemnification claim is not an enforceable contract. Is not authorized by IRCA under any circumstance. (2) it was the employer rather than the worker who knowingly violated IRCA in arranging for the employment. (3) the jury was instructed to consider the worker's removeability in deciding what. Because we conclude that appellants' and cross appellants' other arguments are also without merit. Madeira's Employment and Injury Plaintiff Jose Raimundo Madeira 1 is a citizen of Brazil who illegally entered the United States in 1998. Madeira was earning approximately $15 per hour in the United States and working as many as 50 hours per week. Such action was apparently unnecessary given his brother's willingness to hire him despite knowing Madeira's undocumented status. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER After he was injured at work. Plaintiff Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. was RMJOB's general liability insurer. Dymowski was part of an RMJOB work crew cleaning a church. When he was restrained by an RMJOB supervisor. This was the suit that Carolina defended and settled. If the worker is an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Inc. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Dyer was on brief for appellant. Were on brief for appellee. CMI claimed that because CMI provides workers' compensation benefits through a welfare benefit plan that is covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The district court concluded that Banks was the statutory employee of Virginia Power and. That Banks' exclusive remedy was for workers' compensation benefits. I. Defendant Virginia Power is a Virginia public service corporation that produces. Was employed by Asplundh as a supervisor of tree trimming crews. His crew was assigned to work in Virginia pursuant to the Asplundh Virginia Power contract. While Banks and his crew were removing tree limbs from a Virginia Power distribution line in Clover. Virginia Power was self insured for workers' compensation benefits and. Virginia Power would have been liable under Virginia law to pay workers' compensation benefits to Banks. Asserting that the power line was either negligently or intentionally re energized by Virginia Power employees. Asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Virginia Power was Banks' statutory employer at the time of his accident and. That Banks' exclusive remedy under Virginia law was for workers' compensation benefits. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 12. Delete |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Background Phillips was diagnosed in 1985 with carpal tunnel syndrome resulting from repetitive work performed in his employment with Ford. corrective surgery in 1986. work for Ford. Benson also opined that the injury was work related. his diagnosis and recommendation in writing to Ford. on medical leave. Ford refused to pay for the treatment on grounds that the injury was not work related. Phillips was released to perform light duty work. period of March 1993 to August 1993. denial of workers' The surgery was partially covered by Phillips' personal medical insurance carrier. Ford refused to pay workers' compensation temporary total disability benefits for the interim Phillips applied to have Ford's 2 compensation benefits reviewed by an administrative law judge of the division of workers' compensation (the Division). Which is within the department of labor and industrial relations of the state of Missouri.2 See Mo. The following documents were filed with the district court: Ford's motion to dismiss. Ford filed |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I Gregory Bullard began working for Alcan in 1995 as a technician whose primary responsibility was operating a forklift. He told a plant safety representative and a supervisor that he |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER J.) entering judgment in favor of defendant appellee on the ground that first party insurance policy proceeds are exempted from reimbursement to the workers' compensation carrier under the plain meaning of Vt. We now vacate the judgment entered by the District Court and remand the case for further findings consistent with that answer. 15 BACKGROUND The facts in this case are not disputed. Defendant appellee John Henry was severely injured in a car accident in December 1999 while driving a truck for his employer. Who was solely responsible for his accident. Suits by an injured employee to enforce the liability of a third party such as Herrick are specifically authorized by the Vermont statute. This policy was worth $400. Henry I Travelers filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment that Travelers was entitled to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We hold that a workers' compensation insurer's right to reimbursement under § 624(e) of proceeds of an underinsured motorist policy is governed by the law in effect at the time that the injured worker recovers those proceeds. Circuit Judge: This case is before us for the second time. Holding that its earlier acceptance was improvidently granted. § 624(e) (2003) of proceeds of an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy is governed by the law in effect at the time that the injured worker recovers those proceeds. BACKGROUND The facts underlying this case are fully set forth in our order of certification. Carpenter was injured in a single car accident. Carpenter's coworker Kimberly Webb was driving the car. Which was settled for $25. Which was settled in April of 2000 for $150. Travelers is the real party in interest to the state negligence suit as well. The negligence lawsuit was still pending. A declaration that it was entitled to the value of Carpenter's settlement under her personal UIM policy. An injured employee may both claim workers' compensation benefits and seek compensation from a party other than the employer who is under some legal liability to pay. |
![]() |
REED V. HEIL CO. (3/14/2000, NO. 98-6982) Was properly before the district court. Summary judgment for the defendant on this claim was appropriate because Reed did not establish one of the elements of a prima facie case under the ADA. Namely that he was a |
![]() |
REED V. HEIL CO. (3/14/2000, NO. 98-6982) Was properly before the district court. Summary judgment for the defendant on this claim was appropriate because Reed did not establish one of the elements of a prima facie case under the ADA. Namely that he was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was on brief. The district court found that such an action is not viable in Maine. While he was an employee of Maine/Sysco. Breton was severely injured at work. Travelers was Maine/Sysco's workers' compensation insurance carrier during that time. Which would have enabled Breton to be reimbursed for medical bills by his personal health insurance carrier. An employer's workers' compensation carrier is immune from suit in tort for actions taken in the administration of a workers' compensation claim. The issue before us is whether. Assuming Breton's allegations of Travelers' wrongdoing are true. His action is nevertheless barred by the immunity and exclusivity provisions and administrative framework of the Act. Employers are granted immunity from common law or statutory actions |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The issue we must address on this appeal is whether Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act. The purpose of Act 44 was to contain the spiraling costs of medical treatment for work related injuries. It is these provisions of Act 44 which create the utilization review process and the corresponding supersedeas that are challenged in this action. Utilization review is a process whereby medical providers assess the reasonableness or necessity of current. Section 531(5) provides the mechanism by which utilization review is invoked. The decision to invoke utilization review is made independently by the employer or insurer. 7 A. Utilization review is invoked when an employee. The Bureau reviews the Initial Request to ensure that it is properly completed i.e. That all information required by the form is provided. If the Initial Request is improperly completed (i.e. If the Initial Request is completed properly. The request is approved and the party requesting review must serve a copy of the Initial Request upon the remaining interested parties. |
![]() |
POGUE V. OGLETHORPE POWER CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
POGUE V. OGLETHORPE POWER CORP. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Inc. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Capo Matos was on brief for appellee. I. Background The relevant facts in this case are few and undisputed. Alleging that American was subject to traditional tort liability because it had failed to fulfill its obligation to secure workers' compensation coverage for Garcia through the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund. An employer who is required to 2 participate. It argued that it was not obligated to provide workers' compensation coverage for Garcia in Puerto Rico because less than 50% of his worktime was spent there. The airline thus was free to insure its employees elsewhere and. Higher benefits than would have been available in Puerto Rico American was immunized from further liability by that act's exclusive remedy provision.1 Second. To the extent statutory immunity was not dispositive. Is insured and compensated pursuant to the workers' accident compensation laws of a state which provides benefits superior to those granted in Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would have 1 The Florida workers' compensation act states that an employer's statutory liability for benefits shall be |
![]() |
99-6199 -- BAFFOE V. W.H. STEWART CO. -- 04/24/2000 Baffoe contends that the district court erred in concluding that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding whether he was denied employment by W. 5. We affirm because we conclude that Baffoe failed to present evidence that he was denied employment by W. H. Stewart is a steel fabricating |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER A firm that was both his employer and the charterer of the barge. A K is immune from tort actions brought by covered employees like Morehead. As the bare boat charterer of the barge on which Morehead was injured. A K is deemed also to be the statutory vessel owner. It was in this capacity that A K was sued. 2 2 The case raises difficult questions of first impression in this circuit as to the liability of a so called dual capacity employer under the LHWCA. Or rather was in its capacity as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are presented with a conflict between the Director. Although we disagree with the Board's conclusion that Congress's intent is clear from the statute. We conclude that the Director's interpretation of the pertinent federal regulations is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations. Federal Black Lung Benefits Program Prior cases have reviewed the legislative history of the Black Lung Benefits Act. We set forth only those portions that are essential to an understanding of this case. Claims for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act are either |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee Secretary of Labor. Therefore were subject to civil monetary penalties pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(e). Who were engaged in the business of providing unskilled workers to factories. Marlene Woods were the temporary workers' |
![]() |
00-5082 -- TURCK V. BAKER PETROLITE CORP. -- 05/31/2001 The jury found that Turck's termination was significantly motivated by and in retaliation for his attempt to consult his workers' compensation attorney during his pending workers' compensation action in violation of Okla. Baker contends that the judgment should be reversed for the following reasons: (1) the district court erred in finding that the cause of action upon which Turck prevailed was properly pled. Although he apparently was not a model employee. Turck's employment history included the following: Turck was given a verbal warning for using the company phone for personal calls in April of 1988. He was suspended without pay for two weeks for insubordination. Id. at 565. Termination was recommended. Was suspended for four days without pay. Id. at 627. Turck was cited for negligence in performing his job duties and warned that further incidents could result in termination. Id. at 570 71. In August 1990. Turck was given another review on April 4. In which he was given scores of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Carter was required to complete and sign a health history questionnaire. Carter then answered in the affirmative the following three questions: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER L.L.P. were on brief for plaintiff. L.L.P. were on brief for defendant. He was a partner with his brother in the firm of Ellis &. The present case arises from Ellis's representation of one person who was employed at two different jobs under two different names: Denis Milan and David Formoso. We will refer to Denis Milan only when discussing his claim for the first accident at the Victory Button Company. Because it appears uncontradicted that David Formoso is the correct name of this individual. We will use that name in all other instances. The first accident occurred on March 25. Claimed to have injured his back during a fall. Doctors examining Formoso determined that this injury was also at the L5 S1 location in his lower back. This claim was referred to St. Ellis represented Formoso in both claims. Although Formoso was claiming a causal relationship between his back injury and the fall at the Westford Regency Hotel. The prior accident at the Victory Button Company with its injury to the same part of the back was never disclosed to St. |
![]() |
99-3369 -- ENFIELD V. A.B. CHANCE CO. -- 10/17/2000 The subrogation interest and future credit are subject to reduction under |
![]() |
03-1343 -- RADIL V. SANBORN WESTERN CAMPS INC. -- 09/22/2004 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Claiming that the action was collaterally estopped. Seeking recovery for the workers' compensation benefits that were paid and payable (i.e. Determined the amount of subrogation damages to which Conwed was entitled: the lesser of (1) the amount of benefits actually paid and payable through workers' compensation. The amount of workers' compensation benefits paid and payable was less than the tort damages attributable to Union Carbide. The tort damages attributable to Union Carbide were less than the benefits paid. The remaining 118 asbestosis claims were stayed pending the appeal. Conwed argues that the court instead should have applied the allocation of fault only to the common law damages determined by the jury. Arguing that the second jury trial was barred by collateral estoppel. Because the issue of whether Union Carbide's warnings regarding its asbestos were adequate already had been conclusively established in the first trial concerning mesothelioma. If the action was not barred. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge We are asked to determine if the delay of the Board of Revision and Review in reviewing a decision of an administrative law judge deprived the Board of jurisdiction under the facts of this appeal. That the Board's delay caused the ALJ's decision to become a final order that we now have jurisdiction to review. We further hold that the ALJ erred in deciding that a maritime employer is entitled to relief from the Special Fund established under S 8(f) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Where the employee's disability was not manifest during the time of his employment. We will reverse the decision of the ALJ. 2 I. Nine years after he retired he was diagnosed with asbestosis resulting from his years of work related asbestos exposure while at Sun Ship. The same month he was diagnosed. Ehrentraut's asbestosis was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court granted the judgment after concluding that the farmworkers presented insufficient evidence that they were |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Candace Wilson was paralyzed as a result of injuries incurred while working as an agricultural laborer for Midway Dairy Farms II (Midway) and sought insurance coverage for her medical bills from a health benefits plan (the Plan) provided by The Prudential Insurance Company (Prudential). related injuries. I. Wilson was employed as a laborer on a dairy farm run by Midway. Midway purchased a group medical insurance policy from Prudential. and Wilson was a participant in the Plan. Wilson was struck by a cow while working at the dairy farm. University She was immediately taken to a hospital in Cape Girardeau. Shortly thereafter in St. she was transferred Missouri. to St. She was transferred to St. Declaring Wilson that under the Plan no benefits are payable for work related injuries. This provision states that there will be no The Honorable George F. United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 1 coverage for: A charge in connection with injury or disease that is eligible under any workers' compensation law. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER PER CURIAM: The issue in this case is whether under Florida law a workers' compensation settlement between an employer and employee containing broad release language absolves the employer of a retaliatory discharge claim. We conclude that the release language at issue here is not sufficiently clear to support a summary judgment for the employer. Borque sought treatment at a workers' compensation clinic for his injury and was ordered by a physician to restrict his lifting activity. A month later he was fired. He also alleged that another employee who was injured on the job but utilized his own health care policy instead of seeking workers' compensation benefits was afforded favorable treatment. While his lawsuit was pending Borque was referred to a different attorney. The 2 mediation was overseen by a judge of compensation claims who had jurisdiction under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law to determine how to construe and whether to give effect to the settlement. The first paragraph of the agreement begins: THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE . . . is intended to be a complete. |
![]() |
ANTENOR V. D & S FARMS This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
ANTENOR V. D & S FARMS This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.A. were on brief. Lanham was on brief. Twombly provided the services she was required to provide under the contract. Participants such as Twombly had full time work assignments averaging 40 hours per week and were paid stipends at an annual rate of $7. 650 in exchange for their service. Twombly was the single parent of a seven year old child and relied on AFOP's promises to provide health insurance and workers' compensation.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court held that this practice is illegal. We will reverse. I. The facts are stated comprehensively in the district court's opinion. Its Local 786 and Caterpillar have been parties to a collective bargaining agreement since 1954. The agreement contained a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Her case was removed to the district court1 on the ground that her claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 4. Were on brief for petitioner. Murphy & Beane were on brief for employer respondent. *Of the District of Massachusetts. Who is the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Concluding: (1) that Locke's negligence claim against her employer was barred by the exclusivity provisions of Florida's workers' compensation laws. She was working as a manager at SunTrust's Recker Highway bank branch in Winter Haven. Because the teller's window glass was bulletproof. 2002 date she was shot. SunTrust was aware that a teller at the same bank had been pistol whipped by a bank robber. Locke was told that SunTrust had hired a security guard and that the security guard would be in place at the bank branch. There was no security guard in place at the branch. The district court concluded that Locke's claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Florida workers' compensation laws because her injuries were causally related to her employment as a bank manager. The parties do not dispute that Locke's Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty days after the entry of the district court's dismissal order on April 10. Locke's Notice of Appeal was due on or before May 10. This is sometimes known as the workers' compensation exclusivity bar. |
![]() |
99-7119 -- SOUTHERLAND V. GRANITE STATE INSURANCE CO. -- 04/19/2001 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Mr. Southerland was injured on the job in 1984. The workers compensation court was not involved in the agreement with the insurance company or the resulting payments. Although this is undoubtedly the law in Oklahoma. To record with the workers compensation court the agreement pursuant to which defendant was making permanent disability payments. See Okla. That would have triggered the workers compensation court's involvement. It follows that the workers compensation court would have then approved the agreement. The memorandum of the agreement would have become a substitute for an original claim. Apple v. The memorandum of the agreement would have been binding on the parties and the basis for an award. See id. at 548. Deciding whether to apply the principle of equitable estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. Oxley v. 946 (Okla. 1997). Equitable estoppel is generally understood to prevent one party from taking a position which is inconsistent with an earlier action that places the other party at a disadvantage.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Determining that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law. Arguing primarily that the court should have certified certain questions to the state supreme court for resolution. Were injured on September 24. Both Chastain and Simpson were employees of Duke Energy 2 Corporation ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Harper's employment was transferred from AutoAlliance to AAI Employee Services Co. The conditions and terms of his employment were governed by the collective bargaining agreement ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Universal Maritime contends that these payments are |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was Carol A. Circuit Judge: This case is one of the last claims likely to be brought by a District of Columbia employee under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The underlying controversy is whether Ms. Is whether the Board erred in asserting jurisdiction to review the supplementary compensation order. We join the other circuits that have addressed this question in holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the order because it was issued pursuant to s 918(a). Snowden's benefit payments were to be calculated. Will assume responsibility for permanent total disabil ity payments after 104 weeks if |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Although we have previously held that the administrative review scheme provided in the Longshore Act supplants district court jurisdiction over claims for benefits. Kreschollek's claim presents a new twist on the question because his challenge to the Longshore Act is a constitutional one and he claims that the review process established by the Act is insufficient to address his injuries. Asserting that Kreschollek was now able to return to work. While the matter was pending before the ALJ. Kreschollek filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and alleging that the review procedure under the Act is unconstitutional because it does not require a predeprivation hearing before employers who voluntarily compensated injured employees may terminate those benefits. Is unconstitutional. Named as defendants were Southern Stevedoring Co. The ALJ's final decision on Kreschollek's administrative claim for benefits and the district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss were handed down within days of each other in March 1995. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Massey was injured while on the job. He claimed that he was discharged on account of his receipt of workers' compensation benefits. Massey's employment with Eastern was governed by the Wage Agreement. Article XXVII states in relevant part that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was injured in October 1993 when the tractor trailer he was driving through Missouri collided with another vehicle driven by an uninsured resident of Missouri. He is apparently not able to return to his chosen occupation of truck driving. He was employed by Adair Transportation (Adair) which had leased the tractor trailer and Brown's services to Chemical Leaman Corporation (Chemical). Brown was the sole driver assigned to the truck which he drove regularly on interstate trips. When he was home in Tennessee he parked the rig at his house or at Chemical's Memphis depot. The trailer was licensed and registered in Tennessee. The tractor was licensed and registered in Texas. Both policies recognize that the covered vehicles are likely to travel through various states. Policy TKF167115 (policy 115) is referred to by the Browns as the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER 1 which found that the Debtor's unpaid workers' compensation premiums were entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E) and. Were nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). I. BACKGROUND The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Farmers directly employing workers in the same capacity as Debtor's employees would not have to carry workers' compensation insurance because the Act excludes. The Bureau brought an adversary proceeding seeking to have the unpaid premiums declared nondischargeable excise taxes pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(8)(E) . The parties stipulated that if the unpaid premiums were nondischargeable. Found that the workers' compensation premiums were entitled to priority as excise taxes under Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(8)(E) and. Were nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(1)(A). STANDARD OF REVIEW The bankruptcy court's decision that the workers' compensation premiums qualify as excise taxes under the Bankruptcy Code is a conclusion of law over which we exercise de novo review. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction The present case was removed from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Are largely undisputed and presented in the light most favorable to Mullins. Mullins was an employee of Little Rock Electrical Contractors (LRE). Waste and fluids from the chickens sometimes fell to the floor in the hallway while the chickens were being transported. Although the floor of the production area was covered with a non slick |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER No. 97 2510 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Eades was electrocuted while testing the electrical system at a Veterans Administration hospital in Fayetteville. He alleges that while he was testing a particular circuit. Eades is a South Carolina resident and performed most of his work for Instel in South Carolina. His employment contract with Instel was entered into in South Carolina. Whose |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hahn LLP were on brief. Were on brief. This is a case of first impression for this circuit on several issues under the Lanham Act. Was chartered in 1990 by the Rhode Island legislature as the workers' compensation insurer of last resort in the state. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Thomas Bordeaux was injured in the course and scope of his employment and his employer began voluntarily paying him temporary disability benefits. Page 2 dispute later developed over whether Bordeaux's disability was permanent. A formal hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Thomas Bordeaux was injured in the course and scope of his employment. A dispute later developed over whether Bordeaux's disability was permanent. A formal hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The policy was set to expire on February 28. It was unable to do so because other insurance companies had no interest in doing business with an ailing telecommunications company whose financial weakness was known throughout the industry. IFCI was incorporated in Arizona. 12342 IN RE: INTERNATIONAL FIBERCOM the following provision: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER O:\Slip\WP\2005\04 7162 Khan9aaaa.odl.wpd |
![]() |
BLACKWELL V. SHELTER MUT. INS. CO. Alleging her termination was in retaliation for exercising her rights under Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act. Blackwell was employed by Shelter Mutual for approximately twenty years. Duke informed her the workload was heavy and she was needed back at the office. Duke did not state her job was in jeopardy if she did not return to work. Blackwell that he did not believe he was treated fairly by Shelter Mutual after he filed a workers' compensation claim. Blackwell determined to be total losses were later owned by Ms. Blackwell may have removed or destroyed pictures in the file related to this claim. As you have mostly failed to respond to my verbal suggestions. You have left me no other option but to outline the problems that have been created by your work over the last few months.... .... Are calling in. Expressing concern that they are having to cover for you way too much. They feel your work over the last few months is causing damage to the service reputation of their agencies. [S]ervice is not being provided as required by your employer. |
![]() |
01-8006 -- STUART V. COLORADO INERSTATE GAS CO. -- 11/27/2001 The district court's jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This appeal is from an order granting a defense motion for summary judgment in a retaliatory discharge action. There are two issues before us: (1) whether this case. In which the plaintiff claims that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for his pursuit of Tennessee workers' compensation benefits. Was properly removed from the Tennessee court where it was originally filed. Removal to federal district court on diversity grounds was proper. At least where Tennessee is the locus of the injury for which the workers' compensation claim was brought. We conclude that the governing law is therefore that of Tennessee. The defendant not having shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of Tennessee law. The judgment entered by the district court will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. (Corinth is said to be about two miles from the state line.). When he was cleared to return to work. Nixon was told that he was no longer needed in Tennessee but could work instead as a truck washer for Waste Management of Mississippi in Tupelo. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was CEO of both companies. RCC was party to collective bargaining agreements with several unions. SSI was not party to any such agreements. Douglas Radtke's son Scott Radtke was vice president and minority owner of SSI. Michael Donohoe was a field operations manager with SSI. Whether to pay an employee with a cash check or through the normal payroll system was decided on a case by case basis after the work had been performed. She was promoted to chief financial officer in 1997. Galston testified at trial that she had believed at the time she worked for SSI that paying workers who were not |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER No. 06 2417 Thomas McCoy was an assembly line employee in Maytag Corporation's ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Federal law limits the amount of Social Security disability insurance benefits that a person may receive when he or she is also receiving state workers' compensation benefits. The Commissioner must |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We must determine whether a non profit organization's obligation to reimburse the New Jersey Department of Labor ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Claimants are the widow and son of a deceased diver and dockbuilder. Which held that the decedent's employer was not required to pay benefits under the Longshore Harbor Workers Compensation Act. The employer has filed a protective cross appeal solely to preserve its right to have this court examine the employment status of the decedent in the event that we reverse the Board on the release and credit issues. We will affirm the order of the Board that the decedent was a harbor worker. We hold that only when these two sections are applied together do they provide a credit to the employer where the apportionment of funds between prior settled claims is unknown. We will affirm the order of the Board. We will affirm its determination that the notice provision of § 933(g)(2) was satisfied by virtue of the employer's participation in the tort settlement. We will reverse the order of the Board that the claimants are not entitled to any benefits under the LHWCA and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We have before us an employee's petition for attorney's fees under § 28 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA). The main question today is whether an award to an employee under § 14(f) for her employer's late payment of compensation is also compensation. If it is. The fee provision is triggered. We hold that an award for late payment under § 14(f) is compensation. Which requires an employer to pay |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.A. were on brief for petitioners. Were on brief for respondent. An exception from total liability is provided to employers under 8(f) of the LHWCA when the employer proves. Which is not specifically elucidated in the statutory language. That the pre existing disability was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Nor that damages were incidental to equitable and declaratory relief or that common questions of law or fact predominated. We are persuaded by none of the plaintiffs' arguments The plaintiffs/appellants are Cornelius Cooper. I. The complex facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are these. Who are The plaintiffs subsequently amended their Complaint in August. Throughout this opinion references to the |
![]() |
AMER TRAIN DISPATCH V. ICC |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Skolnik were on brief for appellants. Noonberg were on brief for appellees. Plaintiffs are a group of Maine employers who claim that the defendant insurance companies illegally conspired to fix prices and conduct a boycott in a successful effort to coerce the state legislature into permitting higher rates for workers' compensation insurance.1 The district court granted summary judgment for defendants based on the doctrines established in Parker v. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).2 The court concluded that plaintiffs' claimed damage the additional cost of their insurance was attributable to the legislation rather than to the alleged conspiracy. A voluntary association of insurers that is a state licensed rating organization. 2 In briefest summary. Regulation is strict. All employers who do not self insure are required to purchase such insurance. Insurers are |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.A. was on brief for petitioner. Were on brief for respondent Director. Hanson & DeTroy was on brief for respondent Bath Iron Works Corporation. Compensation was denied on the ground that Bath had voluntarily paid in full for Neely's temporary disability and for all outstanding medical expenses. The pertinent facts are undisputed. Neely incurred some medical expenses and was out of work for about two weeks in October 1992. There have been no further periods of disability due to the injury. The compensation regime is one of continuing protection: subject to statute of limitations provisions. Bath also filed a notice that it was controverting Neely's right to compensation under that statute. Because |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER An employee who leaves work to travel with and care for a family member with a serious health condition is not entitled to leave when the family member decides. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment. We state all facts in the light most favorable to the non moving party and assume that all disputed facts are resolved in his favor. He was a union member and was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Ruskin had a policy that required employees to call in if they were going to miss work. He will be dismissed. Gradilla was fired after an unfortunate confluence of events that occurred in October 1999. There is no contention that any of these injuries was either fraudulent or attributable to any negligence on Gradilla's part. 2 GRADILLA v. RUSKIN MANUFACTURING 2189 While he was filling out the necessary paperwork. Gradilla needed her husband to care for her during the trip because her father's death and funeral were stressful. His supervisor told him that he did not qualify for bereavement leave under the collective bargaining agreement because his father in law was not a member of his immediate family. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER USAS was a subcontractor for Appellee Boeing Middle East Limited ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Company for fatal injuries suffered by Bain when a roll of industrial belting was knocked off of a flatbed and killed him. A federal jury sitting in diversity decided the accident was caused by a Philco employee working under the control of IMC at the time of the accident. Jeffrey Bain was employed by a third company at the time as a delivery driver. As part (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case. Philco's trial defense was threefold. It argued (1) Frintz was not negligent in knocking the belting onto Bain. (2) Bain was contributorily negligent. Frintz was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is hereby WITHDRAWN and replaced with the attached opinion. A vote was taken. Are DENIED. Circuit Judge: The Bankruptcy Code provides that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Service or business in [West Virginia] are employers . . . and are . . . required to subscribe to and pay premium taxes into the work C & H COMPANY v. Service or work in which they are engaged |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: 12202 STEVEDORING SERVICES v. We held that the employee's permanent partial disability award was to be measured based on the difference between his pre injury average weekly wages and his post injury wage earning capacity. Another way to understand the inflation adjustment is as follows. Employee B's pre injury average weekly wage is $1000. The inflation rate in the hypothetical is 192% ($48 divided by $25). Employee B's inflation adjusted pre injury average weekly wage is $1920 (192% of $1000). PRICE 12203 reveals that at the time of the second accident employee B continues to have a diminished earning capacity as a result of the first accident. Is consistent with our conclusion here. The court reasoned that the permanent total disability award would be |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We hold that when an increase in an employee's average weekly wage between the time of a prior permanent partial disability and subsequent permanent total disability is not caused by a change in his wage earning capacity. Price was awarded permanent partial disability benefits of $196.01 per week under the LHWCA.1 SAIF Corporation. Is responsible for those benefits. Administrative Law Judge Brissenden determined that Price's residual wageearning capacity after the injury was $333.87 per week.2 1 The 1979 award is not at issue in this case. The amount of his previous award is relevant in determining the appropriate compensation for Price's present claims. 2 The award was calculated by subtracting Price's residual wage earning capacity from his pre injury average weekly wage: $627.88 $333.87. Which is multiplied by two thirds as required by the LHWCA to obtain the award of $196.01. He could no longer work as a fisherman because it was too hard on his back. He was restricted to light jobs as a longshoreman. |
![]() |
99-3229 -- BAUSMAN V. INTERSTATE BRANDS CORP. -- 06/11/2001 IBC contends that it discharged Bausman pursuant to a neutral attendance policy because of absences regarding which Bausman did not provide doctor's notes to confirm that her absence resulted from a work related injury. The action was brought within the district court's diversity jurisdiction. The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Summary judgment is proper if the record shows |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We will vacate the District Court's judgment and remand with directions to enter an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 2 I. Who are already familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case. We will not restate the facts and procedural history except as necessary for our analysis.1 Bass's § 1983 action arises from the denial of a workers' compensation claim that she filed with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The issue on appeal is whether the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
97-7102 -- STATE INSURANCE FUND V. SOUTHERN STAR FOODS, INC. -- 05/21/1998 Appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) decision that its claim for unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums is not entitled to priority status under 11 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Who was hospitalized for injuries sustained in the altercation. Alleging that he was fired in retaliation for the workers' compensation filing. I. Background The following facts are either undisputed or presented in the light most favorable to Hudson. Hudson was not shy about sharing his opinion of Ramirez's work ethic and performance. Hudson informed coworkers that Ramirez was |
![]() |
00-3098 -- SANJUAN V. IBP INC. -- 01/11/2002 Was found to have retaliated against an employee. The central issue presented is whether Kansas law requires a plaintiff seeking to recover on a workers compensation retaliatory discharge claim to demonstrate that he was able to perform his regular duties on the day he was discharged. A Mexican immigrant who has been in this country since he was a teenager. There he performed the strenuous task of a flanker that is. While he was on light duty. Sanjuan was written up ten times for alleged disciplinary violations. Sanjuan's supervisors denied any mistreatment and said that Sanjuan was written up for mistakes he made on the job. On December 23. Sanjuan was driving cattle through a chute. Sanjuan was fired. Sanjuan brought this suit. Claiming he was discharged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Found that Sanjuan was entitled to an award of punitive damages. That the district court should have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law because the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that plaintiff could not return to his regular job on the day he was fired without violating his medical restrictions. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER For reimbursements to Michigan's Unemployment Trust Fund is not entitled to priority status as an excise tax under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E). The bankruptcy court's decision will be affirmed. I. ISSUE ON APPEAL Whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that reimbursement payments owed to Michigan's Unemployment Trust Fund by a nonprofit employer are not excise taxes within the meaning of § 507(a)(8)(E). Neither party has timely elected to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6). An order determining that a claim is not entitled to priority status is a final order. 200 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 2000)(finding that a priorityfixing order is treated as a final order). 685 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005) (finding an order determining that a claim is not entitled to administrative expense priority constitutes a final order). The facts are not in dispute. The only issue before the Panel is the priority status of the Agency's claim. An order determining that a claim is not entitled to priority status is a question of law requiring de novo review on appeal. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Feathers and three members of his crew were fabricating and erecting structural steel pipe supports in Willamette's bleach plant. Directly across from the bleach plant was a pulp mill. Between the bleach plant and pulp mill were three railcars sitting on a railroad track. It was important that the crew get the lift into place on that Saturday so that it would be ready for a larger crew to use on the following Monday. If the lift was In February 2002. The assets and liabilities of Willamette were purchased by Weyerhaeuser Corporation. All parties have agreed. It could have delayed the larger crew's work because the increased weekday rail traffic between the bleach plant and pulp mill could impede the lift from being moved. Feathers claims that he received permission to move the car and that it was common for Benchmark employees to move railcars. He further claims that Willamette personnel were aware that Benchmark employees moved railcars. Because it was Saturday. There were no Willamette crews available. |
![]() |
96-4127 -- LITTLEFIELD V. MOBIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCING -- 12/03/1997 Senior Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lora Sisson are current or former hourly employees of defendantappellant Mohawk Industries. The plaintiffs also alleged that Mohawk was unjustly enriched by the lower wages it paid. Whether plaintiffs state proximately caused injuries to business or property by alleging that the hourly wages they voluntarily accepted were too low. This case is now before the Court on remand from the Supreme Court. I. BACKGROUND 3 Mohawk is the second largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the United States and has over 30. Mohawk employees have traveled to the United States Border. To recruit undocumented aliens that recently have entered the United States in violation of federal law. These employees and other persons have transported undocumented aliens from these border towns to North Georgia so that those aliens may procure employment at Mohawk. Have provided housing to these illegal workers upon their arrival in North Georgia and have helped them find illegal employment with Mohawk. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER It is now before us for the second time after a remand by the Supreme Court. The main question today is this: whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a local carrier's claim that a state utility commission misinterpreted interconnection agreement provisions on reciprocal compensation that are based on federal law. We hold that there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That the action was not filed on a timely basis. The case will be remanded for further proceedings on the incumbent local carrier's contract misinterpretation claim. Telephone service in a local calling area was provided by a single local exchange carrier (local carrier). The duty to interconnect is coupled with other duties set forth in § 251. When the direction is reversed. The terms under which two competing local carriers interconnect their networks and provide for reciprocal compensation are set forth VERIZON MARYLAND v. Inc.) was providing local telephone service in Maryland. (We will refer to MFS Intelenet in the name of its successor. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER No. 97 4970 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Filippi was convicted by a jury of sixty six counts of mail fraud. Filippi was president and treasurer of the company. Joan Upole was the only other shareholder. Upole was involved with Options Counseling Associates. Filippi and Upole met and drafted corporate minutes and resolutions which were backdated to 1994 and 1995. Filippi was paid $164. He was paid $381. Because the multiple count unit increase would have been lower if the offense level for the mail fraud group had been more than four levels less serious than the money laundering/obstruction of justice group. Two levels were added because there were two groups of counts and the offense level for the less serious group (the mail fraud group) was within four levels of the more serious group (the money laundering/obstruction of justice group). Because Filippi was in criminal history category I. The resulting guideline range was 51 63 months. I. Abuse of a Position of Trust Whether a defendant occupied a position of trust is a factual question reviewed for clear error. |
![]() |
FLORES V. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This case presents a novel question: if a seaman whose income consists mainly of tips becomes ill or injured and is unable to work. Can he recover those tips under the remedy for wages that is provided by admiralty law? We hold that the average tip income the seaman was earning prior to his incapacitation is to be included in the measure of wages he is due if he becomes unable to work. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mario Flores is a seaman who signed two consecutive employment contracts to work as a cabin steward on cruise ships owned by Carnival Cruise Lines. Further provided: If you have been contracted as a ... CABIN STEWARD. [T]he tips you may expect go as high as $1000.00 a month. Carnival will take it upon itself to inform passengers of what is customarily tipped for the work that you perform.
[Flores Br. 3. B] The underlined words and figures were typed into blank spaces on the original printed form. Flores claims that he worked on the Ecstasy until April 27. |
![]() |
FLORES V. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This case presents a novel question: if a seaman whose income consists mainly of tips becomes ill or injured and is unable to work. Can he recover those tips under the remedy for wages that is provided by admiralty law? We hold that the average tip income the seaman was earning prior to his incapacitation is to be included in the measure of wages he is due if he becomes unable to work. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mario Flores is a seaman who signed two consecutive employment contracts to work as a cabin steward on cruise ships owned by Carnival Cruise Lines. Further provided: If you have been contracted as a ... CABIN STEWARD. [T]he tips you may expect go as high as $1000.00 a month. Carnival will take it upon itself to inform passengers of what is customarily tipped for the work that you perform.
[Flores Br. 3. B] The underlined words and figures were typed into blank spaces on the original printed form. Flores claims that he worked on the Ecstasy until April 27. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. EMS is not part of the County's fire or police departments but a separate and independent subdivision of the County's Public Safety Division. Six of those substations are housed with the area's fire department. The individual substations are manned at all times by a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 9. He was injured on May 7. Was at one time C & M's workers' compensation insurer. No compensation payments were made. Was adjudicated bankrupt. Armistead resumed his quest for benefits by seeking a Commission determination that Travelers was liable on the award because it had failed to send a prior notice of the cancellation to C & M. The current law is parallel to the former law. While these motions were pending before the Commission. There was a rub. Its very existence was dubious.2 The district judge 2. Is a |
![]() |
02-3378 -- BONES V. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. -- 04/23/2004 Bones was notified that Honeywell deemed her to have voluntarily terminated her employment because she neither reported to work nor notified her supervisor or team of her absences on three consecutive working days. 2) Bones' violation of Honeywell's attendance policy was a legitimate. 4) Honeywell would have dismissed Bones regardless of her request for an FMLA leave because she failed to comply with its notification of absence policy. 5) Bones is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 7) Bones' violation of Honeywell's attendance policy was a legitimate. Such a reason was not pretext for retaliation in violation of the ADA. Noting that it was not work related. In June 1997. That she believed her injury was work related. Testified that Bones never told her that her elbow injuries were work related. His notes indicate that her elbow condition was non occupational. Steelman recommended accommodations for Bones' elbow condition with which McFadden complied. Bones was granted several short term disability leaves for elbow related reasons at various times throughout 1997 and 1998. |
![]() |
01-6377 -- STRONG V. LAUBACH -- 06/16/2004 Laubach was injured in two separate accidents. He filed workers' compensation claims against SBTC that were settled in three stages. Which was to pay Mr. The Strongs have attempted to garnish the workers' compensation benefits awarded to Mr. Laubach's exemption for workers' compensation benefits was limited to $50. Contending that he was entitled to an unlimited exemption. This garnishment summons was served on SBTC's Missouri agent for service of process. Laubach were entirely exempt from garnishment pursuant to Okla. Laubach during the 180 day period the garnishment was in effect. It determined there was only one $50. He contended that the exemption should have been unlimited under Okla. For the proposition that workers' compensation funds paid to the employee are subject to an unlimited exemption. While those paid to others who have an interest in the proceeds are limited to the $50. Laubach and SBTC have appealed from the district court's determination that the exemption is limited to $50. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. TIG maintained that Coffman's claim was covered by a rival policy of insurance issued to Deaton by The Travelers Insurance Company ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The KRS disability retirement benefits plan (hereinafter |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The petition of Artis is denied. The petition of Norfolk and Western Railway is granted. The order of the Board is reversed and the case remanded by published opinion. The state court entered an order that the case was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court's order dismissing the case is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for a hearing on the factual disputes surrounding the terms of the agreement. I. Bobonik is a former employee of Medina General Hospital. That she was constructively discharged in violation of Ohio public policy and that the Hospital retaliated against her in violation of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. Bobonik filed a claim with the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation related to her workplace injury and was receiving workers' compensation benefits. The Foundation is therefore not a party to this appeal. 1 2 2003. These proceedings were not held on the record. The parties appeared to have reached a resolution to their disputes. As evidence of her position that she would not have bargained away her future right to benefits. Bobonik contends that the value of her settlement would have substantially increased if she intended to include the temporary total disability portion of her workers' compensation claim. The parties have not included a copy of the written settlement agreement as part of the Joint Appendix due to the confidentiality of its provisions. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting JAML in favor of defendant because the rubber mixer that injured them was a dangerous chattel instead of a fixture on defendant's real property. The district court erred in holding that Missouri premises liability law applied and that their recovery was limited to workers' compensation benefits. Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. FACTS The facts and procedural history are largely drawn from the order of the district court. Plaintiffs were employees of Topeka Machinery Exchange ( |
![]() |
01-6377O -- STRONG V. LAUBAUCH -- 04/22/2003 Hereby certifies to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the following unsettled question of state law which may determine the outcome in the above captioned actions: Whether workers' compensation proceeds paid to an injured worker are entirely exempt from garnishment. Or whether the exemption is limited to fifty thousand dollars ($50. A summary of the pertinent facts is set out below. See id. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER End page heading. > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 24. The last sentence in the second paragraph |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The sole issue in these proceedings is whether Delaware River Stevedores. To require DiFidelto to report information regarding his earnings when it 2 was not paying him compensation at the time of its requests.1 Section 908(j) provides that an employer may inform a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The issues presented are whether workers' compensation benefits for specific loss of use of a particular body part constitute |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Asserted that the supplemental arbitration award is null and void. Since Defendants were time barred in requesting that the original arbitration award be vacated. Correct or confirm an arbitration award issued in December of 1998 is time barred pursuant to Ohio Rev. The Company is engaged in the production of fine pottery and chinaware at its facility in Wellsville. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On slip opinion page 8451. The district court could have exercised jurisdiction over the City's removed claim. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The court held that GAINSCO did not have a duty to defend Mandrill under its Commercial General Liability Policy ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lora Sisson are current or former hourly employees of Defendant Mohawk Industries. The plaintiffs also alleged that Mohawk was unjustly enriched by the lower wages it paid. I. BACKGROUND Mohawk is the second largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the United States and has over 30. According to the plaintiffs' complaint Mohawk employees have traveled to the United States Border. To recruit undocumented aliens that recently have entered the United States in violation of federal law. These employees and other persons have transported undocumented aliens from these border towns to North Georgia so that those aliens may procure employment at Mohawk. Have provided housing to these illegal workers upon their arrival in North Georgia and have helped them find illegal employment with Mohawk. |
![]() |
96-3326 -- SANJUAN V. IBP INC. -- 11/16/1998 The case was tried before a jury. All of which were denied by the district court. IBP appeals the district court's judgment. Sanjuan did not have any problems with his supervisors. He eventually saw a doctor and Sanjuan was restricted to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are required to interpret and apply various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to a lawsuit arising from a tragic construction accident in the Virgin Islands. The primary issue is the viability of Restatement section 343A. We will affirm. The power lines were clearly visible. There is no dispute that everyone involved with the project knew about the lines and that any contact with them would be dangerous.[fn1] On November 8. A crane was being used to lift steel joists that would connect the columns of the building frame. The first joist was installed with the use of a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court held that Kelly Ryan is not entitled to indemnity from Royal under the Marine Coverage Endorsement ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Sells photographs to tourists on a historic naval ship is entitled to collect benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because we agree that the Commissioner's use of the pre settlement rate in prorating the settlement over a period of 4.3 years is based on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Which was Sanfilippo's life expectancy. The Appeals Council notified Sanfilippo that it was reviewing the ALJ's decision under the error of law provision of 20 C.F.R. § 404.969. Our review of legal issues is plenary. Our role is not to impose upon the SSA our own interpretation of the Social Security legislation. We must defer to her construction as long as it is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious. Discussion The issue before the Court on appeal is whether the Commissioner properly prorated Sanfilippo's lump sum settlement over a period of 4.3 years. The lump sum award should have been prorated over his life expectancy. Is irrational. The Commissioner is required to reduce. When an individual's workers' compensation benefits are paid in a lump sum. The Act requires the Commissioner to prorate the lump sum payment and |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The Bankruptcy Code provides that |
![]() |
SPENCER WILLIAMS, V. U.S. With him on the brief were Janice R. Of counsel on the brief were Richard J. ) are entitled to back pay and future cost of living pay increases under the Ethics Reform
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The Bankruptcy Code provides that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was denied benefits by the Fund for injuries he received at his spouse's restaurant. Is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Meyer was a member of a participating local union that was affiliated with the Fund. His employment as a plumber and pipefitterwhich had nothing to do with the assistance he was providing his spousewas covered by a collective bargaining agreement between a contributing employer and a participating local union. It appears that this should have been covered under the restaurant's workmen's compensation. |
![]() |
97-6107 -- ROWE V. CONOCO INC. -- 06/19/1998 I was feeling very nauseated and having a hard time getting my breath. I was just overcome and lost my breakfast out there. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 19. Robinson & White was on brief. Was on brief. Was convicted of three counts of making false statements on his federal workers' compensation claims. He was acquitted on other charges. Including bankruptcy fraud.1 Edgar was sentenced to one year and one day plus two years of supervised release and was fined $5000. Workers' compensation fraud and insurance fraud was improper. As was the refusal to sever. He also argues that the issue of materiality of the alleged false statements should have been submitted to the jury under the rule established later in United States v. That denying him discovery was error. That the evidence was insufficient to convict in any event. Edgar argues that it was improper and harmful for the government to have 1. Saying the common allegation of fraud is too weak a thread to sew them all together. That the counts should have been severed. He was acquitted on the bankruptcy charge and we find no harm to him from its joinder with the other charges. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Cover sheet. Powers were on brief for appellant. Sharton and Segal & Feinberg were on brief for appellee. Clarke was sexually harassed. Was barred for failure to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies before the Massachu setts Commission Against Discrimination ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Kentucky were exposed over many years to dangerous radioactive substances without their knowledge. Four such workers and members of their families have sued General Electric (GE). Factual background The Paducah Gas Diffusion Plant (PDGP) is a sprawling industrial plant located on a 3. It was built by the federal government in the early 1950s as part of an initial foray into uranium processing. Its three successive operators have all been named as defendants in this suit. They are Union Carbide (formerly known as Carbide and Chemicals Company. 800 individuals have been employed by the PGDP at any one time. The primary purpose of the PGDP is and always has been to enrich uranium. The solid uranium is then converted into a gaseous form and forced through a series of membranes that increase the concentration of uranium 235. This |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was awarded benefits by a workers compensation administrative law judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Bass complained that the Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers Compensation denied her claim without notice that her case was reassigned to. Workers compensation judges ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. This case is made up of three distinct issues with three separate sets of facts. are. The facts themselves are not in serious dispute. The amount distributed to each school district was based on the This approach resulted in school districts number of students in the school district. Whether the State must distribute to them one half or one third of the initial cost in seed money is the first issue that we must address. Loss funding was created by the General Assembly in 1993. The driving force behind the law is the notion that school districts suffering enrollment reductions are never able to reduce staff and cut expenses as quickly as students leave. The crux of the problem here is the manner in which the State computes the amount of loss funding due LRSD and PCSSD. Loss funding is normally computed by (and here we simplify) calculating the loss in Average Daily Membership (ADM) in a district as compared to the average ADM of the three previous years. Varied the standard formula where majority to minority (M to M) transfer students are concerned. 5 M to M students are peculiar to the districts that are parties to the Settlement Agreement. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was on brief. |
![]() |
97-4116 -- HARDMAN V. SPECIALTY SERVICES -- 05/14/1999 The district court granted summary judgment to SKK on the ground that SKK was a special employer under the loaned employee doctrine. Hence was immune from suit under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
HARRISON V. DIGITAL HEALTH PLAN (8/9/1999, NO. 98-8932) The district court found that the claims were time barred or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The only issue meriting discussion is whether the district court erred when it borrowed Georgia's one year statute of limitations applicable to workers' compensation claims rather than the six year limitations period applicable to actions on a simple contract when it considered the timeliness of Harrison's action for wrongful denial of medical benefits under ERISA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The face of American poverty is changing dramatically. Minimum wage workers are unable to support their families' basic needs. At A1 ( |
![]() |
99-1008 -- TRUJILLO V. CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO. RETIREMENT PLAN COMMITTEE -- 02/08/2000 He was discharged from his employment and instructed by Amax to apply for retirement disability benefits under Amax's Henderson Mine Non Contributory Retirement Income Plan (the Plan). Trujillo sought. The Director of the Committee rejected Trujillo's argument that the Plan was responsible for any portion of his attorney fees: You assert that the Plan must assume a portion of the responsibility for attorneys' fees. Which were incurred in obtaining the settlement of [your] workers' compensation benefits. As you have acknowledged. The Plan is governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. ERISA is a comprehensive statute and contains provisions that make it clear that ERISA preempts any state regulation which relates to an employee benefit plan. We believe that the Colorado state case law you rely upon as authority for your position does not govern the operation of the Plan because it is preempted by ERISA. The Plan administrator is required to discharge its duties with regard to the Plan in accordance with the terms of the Plan document. |
![]() |
HARRISON V. DIGITAL HEALTH PLAN (8/9/1999, NO. 98-8932) The district court found that the claims were time barred or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The only issue meriting discussion is whether the district court erred when it borrowed Georgia's one year statute of limitations applicable to workers' compensation claims rather than the six year limitations period applicable to actions on a simple contract when it considered the timeliness of Harrison's action for wrongful denial of medical benefits under ERISA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This case requires us to resolve an issue of first impression in the appellate courts: is a hostile work environment claim cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act? We conclude that it is. Was on disability leave until September 1991. Fox reinjured his back and was forced to take disability leave again. He was able to return to work. It is the period of employment preceding this leave from October 1994 until August 1995 that is at issue in this case.1 When Fox returned to work in Fox returned to work at the Martinsburg GM plant in May 1998 and. They took pictures of the tasks that Fox performed and asserted that those tasks were no different. Who was working at the light duty table. Asked Fox to perform a task that was beyond his physical ability. Fox explained that his abilities were medically limited because of his back. I have back problems and I can't go by your feelings. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are called upon to address the applicability of the ADEA when an employer offers its Medicare eligible retirees health insurance coverage allegedly inferior to the coverage offered to retired employees not eligible for Medicare. Accordingly will reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. Would remain eligible only if they fell into one of four groups: employees unable to continue their employment due to a disability and who otherwise were eligible for a disability retirement pension. The plaintiff class in this action is composed of retirees who are aged 65 or older and thus eligible for Medicare who remain eligible for retiree health coverage under these restrictions. Pressure to reduce costs was enhanced when Highmark announced that it would increase the County's premiums for medical insurance coverage by an average of 48%. The district court described SecurityBlue as follows: SecurityBlue is a coordinated health care plan provided through Keystone Health Plan West. SecurityBlue is available to persons who have Medicare Part B Medical Insurance and who live in the SecurityBlue `service area' [which includes most of western Pennsylvania]. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Bowman II. 20 1 In these appeals we are asked once again to interpret certain provisions of the agreement by which the parties to the Pulaski County. The question presented is whether changes made by the State of Arkansas in the funding of retirement and health insurance for teachers violated that agreement. These funds were separate from another. Separate appropriations for teacher retirement and health insurance were no longer made. Was required to pay its own contributions for teacher retirement. (There were refinements and exceptions to this system. Our general description is sufficient for present purposes.). This new general fund was apportioned among the several districts in accordance with two main criteria: the number of pupils. This change was made in response to a decision of the Chancery Court of Pulaski County. Was that it affected. Are |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Smith was injured while unloading a truck owned by Chemical Leaman Tank Lines. The case was dismissed without prejudice subject to the terms of the settlement. Smith was employed as a utility operator at the Great Lakes facility in Union County. Smith was responsible for hooking a line to the tank trailer and injecting it with nitrogen in order to provide sufficient pressure to drain the pthalic anhydride. Arkansas has a judicial doctrine under which an injured employee and a third party tortfeasor may |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Dunlap was left lying on Nestlé's loading dock for nearly eight hours before help arrived. There was not much anyone could do. He is now severely and permanently disabled. While the record available to us is incomplete. His workers' compensation claim is still pending. 511 (Ill. 1982) ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Custom Ship contends that the payments were |
![]() |
HICE LARRY V. OWCP With him on the brief was Carol A. petitioner first filed his appeal in the Ninth Circuit and now seeks to have his case heard here. Arguing that we have jurisdiction because the administrative law judge who adjudi cated his claim has his office in Washington. (2) provided for judicial review |
![]() |
CHARLES V. BURTON (3/12/1999, NO. 96-9212) Which holds that the Burtons were joint employers and therefore statutorily required to carry insurance or a liability bond. In this case involving the Agricultural Workers Protection Act. The district court found that the appellees were not joint employers of the farm workers under the AWPA and did not award the farm workers actual damages for a violation of the AWPA's registration provision. Both were to share in the profits. The workers were entitled only to statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1). Refused to award actual damages because the workers' injuries were |
![]() |
CHARLES V. BURTON (3/12/1999, NO. 96-9212) Which holds that the Burtons were joint employers and therefore statutorily required to carry insurance or a liability bond. In this case involving the Agricultural Workers Protection Act. The district court found that the appellees were not joint employers of the farm workers under the AWPA and did not award the farm workers actual damages for a violation of the AWPA's registration provision. Both were to share in the profits. The workers were entitled only to statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1). Refused to award actual damages because the workers' injuries were |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was Carol A. Petitioner first filed his appeal in the Ninth Circuit and now seeks to have his case heard here. Arguing that we have jurisdiction because the administrative law judge who adjudi cated his claim has his office in Washington. (2) provided for judicial review |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) the matter is not ripe for judicial review. (3) plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Basing its holding on the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were not ripe and. The court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Contending that the district court erred in holding that their claims were not ripe. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. We affirm on the ground that the dispute is not justiciable because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts. An impairment rating evaluation is performed by a licensed physician chosen by the parties or appointed by the Department of Labor and Industry (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was hurt while working when a railroad crossing gate arm broke and struck him on the head. The Board argued that the City was not a proper party to recover expenses that it incurred as a result of Vasquez' disability retirement. Her claim is derivative of his personal injury claim. (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) does not divest the district court of jurisdiction because the City's claim against the Board was first properly filed in federal court and no other party objected to removal. Was dispatched to a railroad crossing in downtown San Diego because the crossinggate arms at the railroad tracks were stuck in the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court2 ruled that Dush's characterization of herself as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Eddy will not support recovery on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Virgin Islands Workers' Compensation Act. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and will direct that judgment be entered in favor of WAPA. Factual Background 1 Gabrielle Eddy was employed by WAPA as a first class lineman trained to do |
![]() |
N:\DOCS\E-DOS\9-9\04-3530+-CAHALAN V. ROHAN.WPD BACKGROUND Rohan and Cahalan were both employed by the New Jersey law firm McCarter and English. The firm was helping to administer a nationwide class action settlement. Cahalan and Rohan were sent to Minnesota to instruct and supervise telephone operators answering settlement related questions. They were scheduled to remain in Fairbault. Rohan and Cahalan were driving back to their hotel in the evening in Rohan's rented vehicle. Rohan attempted to make a left turn when his view of oncoming traffic was partially obscured by a semi tractor The Honorable Paul A. Alleging that UPS and the driver of the van were directly and vicariously liable for his injuries. That Rohan was negligent or grossly negligent in turning without observing approaching traffic. Holding that Cahalan failed as a matter of law to show that the van driver was negligent. Finding that it was barred by the NJWCA. Contending that the dismissal should have been with prejudice. If an injury is compensable under workers' compensation in New Jersey. |
![]() |
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING V. JOHN H. DALTON |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. Background It is undisputed that Marion Leonard is entitled to disability benefits for injuries suffered while working for Southwestern Bell. Leonard was placed on leave in 1995 because of her injuries. The employee benefit plans in which she participated were the Southwestern Bell Corporation Disability Income Plan ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER NALC argues that OWCP's factual determinations were binding on the arbitrator pursuant to 5 U.S.C. When Colatat reported to her supervisor that her knee was in pain and that she could not walk. She was taken in an ambulance to a hospital emergency room for treatment. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Finding that Budd qualified as a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was injured on August 7. At issue in this appeal is whether Marino. Who was working with riggers on a task associated with the construction project at the time of his injury. Because our jurisdiction is based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties. As Marino is a citizen of New York. ICR is a New Jersey corporation with its principal offices in Mahwah. The amount in our task is to predict how the courts of New Jersey would resolve this issue if presented with these facts. As the courts of New Jersey have spoken on this general issue several times. We have recently addressed this issue applying New Jersey law. Marino was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER To whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 1 I. Hired Melvin in 1996 as an at will employee to work in its DeWitt. Patchin said |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER (2) Defendants NAS and SMS Demag were immune under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. The electrode arm was designed to retract and raise out of a melting structure in the event of a power loss. The complaint generally alleged that the Defendants were negligent in failing to monitor and inspect the accident area and to take adequate 2 No. 04 5340 Smith v. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence submitted shows |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Lyman Stilley's disability and (in part) his death were caused by mesothelioma. His widow was awarded benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) against Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (Newport News) because of Stilley's exposure to injurious doses of asbestos as a company employee. Under this rule the last employer covered by the LHWCA who causes or contributes to an occupational injury is fully liable for compensation benefits. Because the present rule is consistent with the Act and passes constitutional muster. Stilley was exposed to airborne asbestos dust and fibers in sufficient quantity and duration to cause asbestos related lung disease. Where he was exposed to asbestos for sustained periods. In 1994 Stilley was diagnosed with mesothelioma. In the LHWCA proceedings Newport News stipulated that while Stilley worked for the company he was exposed to asbestos in sufficient quantity and duration to cause mesothelioma. Newport News argued that it should not be liable for the benefits because Stilley was exposed to asbestos at his later employment with NASA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Seeking a declaration that it was not required to defend or indemnify J & L in a personal injury action in state court relating to a logging accident that occurred on November 13. Was preparing to haul a load of timber from a J & L logging site. 2004ction was whether Shields was an employee of J & L at the time of his injury and. Facts J & L is a small. Is a fifty eight year old man who has worked in or around the logging industry most of his adult life. Which were garaged at his house and were maintained primarily by him. J & L hired Shields's trucks and drivers when it needed loads hauled and did not have any available trucks or drivers of its own. Although there was no formal contract between them. The payment arrangement between Shields and J & L was somewhat complicated. Shields was paid by the load for his work hauling for J & L. Shields was listed as an employee on the J & L payroll registers. He received a weekly payroll check of $250 from which taxes and health insurance premiums were withheld. He also received a check from the general account from which no withholdings were taken. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The ALJ then merged the claims against the two employers and found that SSA was liable under the |
![]() |
01-3372 -- DOEBELE V. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY -- 08/28/2003 (2) weighing the evidence against her in concluding as a matter of law that she was not a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER An employee who suffers an on the job injury that leaves him with a permanent partial bodily impairment is eligible for certain benefits. The statutory scheme provides that these benefits are determined by reference to an impairment rating schedule: the higher the employee's impairment rating. See id.1 Each of the appellants in these consolidated appeals was injured on the job and suffered a permanent. Appellant Earl Cramer was dissatisfied with the level of benefits commensurate to the impairment rating assigned him 9% permanent. He asked the Division to grant him benefits |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Line 8 |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND The Local is the exclusive bargaining agent for the hourly production and maintenance workers employed at ABB's Jefferson City. The pertinent portion of the CBA is Article IX. The employees will be subject to the laws set forth and any State legislation that is modified. Amended and enacted will be applied as required by laws in effect or as they become effective. Employees were not required to use paidleave benefits. Which included an |
![]() |
NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION V. DEPT OF MINING Solomons argued the cause for appellants. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Solomons argued the cause for appellants. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because the suit was |
![]() |
00-5168 -- COOPER V. CENTERAL & SOUTHWET SERVICES -- 11/28/2001 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
99-3184 -- PRICE V. WESTERN RESOURCES INC. -- 11/14/2000 Holding that Price was Western's statutory employee pursuant to Kan. This action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Kan. Would have created triable issues of fact. Affirm.
|
![]() |
98-6312 -- CLARK V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. -- 07/23/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiffs William Neal Clark and Billie Clark. Inc. (collectively National) were not guilty of bad faith breach of contract in regard to the payment of medical expenses incurred by William Neal Clark following an on the job injury. The parties are familiar with the facts and we will relate them only as necessary to our disposition. Was driving a Wal Mart van when he struck a semi truck head on. He was seriously injured and . (4) expert testimony that the insurance adjuster was inadequately trained. He also argues that the court erred in giving a jury instruction which placed the burden on him to prove he was covered by workers' compensation without allowing him to introduce workers' compensation records or. Instructing the jury that he was covered by workers' compensation insurance. He also argues the district court should have given his requested jury instructions. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Gust v. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. For which National paid Manufacturers a single premium. that he should be paid as follows: $500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. The Circuit Court issued a final order directing that Manufacturers fulfill the obligation under the assignment to the Bank and pay all future annuity payments until the judgment held by the Bank against Sloma was paid. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was on brief for appellant.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This appeal involves a question of Nevada state law upon which there was no clear precedent. Which was an essential determinant of this appeal. Background The background of the case is set forth in the order of certification (222 F.3d 750). Appellant Anna Marie Rubin was injured in an automobile accident while picking up supplies for her business. Informed Rubin that she was required to reimburse SIIS if she recovered any damages from the other parties involved in the accident. Rubin states that she subse7731 quently reimbursed SIIS for 80% of the medical expenses it paid and that she is in negotiation with SIIS regarding the other 20% (presumably for litigation expenses). The provision specifies that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Laura Metcoff Klaus. With her on the brief were Roscoe C. With him on the brief were Grant Crandall and Judith Rivlin. The case will be remanded to the District Court with instructions to re mand the case to the Department of Labor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background The BLBA is a federally administered law providing bene fits to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoco niosis. Coal mine operators are responsible for paying benefits to miners whose death or total disability due to black lung disease arose out of employment in the mines. 30 U.S.C. s 932. It is caused by the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Laura Metcoff Klaus. With her on the brief were Roscoe C. With him on the brief were Grant Crandall and Judith Rivlin. The case will be remanded to the District Court with instructions to re mand the case to the Department of Labor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background The BLBA is a federally administered law providing bene fits to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoco niosis. Coal mine operators are responsible for paying benefits to miners whose death or total disability due to black lung disease arose out of employment in the mines. 30 U.S.C. s 932. It is caused by the |
![]() |
DEBORAH KATZ PUESCHEL V. U.S. Argued for defendant appellee. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is whether plaintiffs can use 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) to enforce their rights to overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA expressly recognizes and encourages such settlements: The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation 3 owing to any employee or employees under . . . this title. The agreement of any employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he may have . . . to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime wages and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(c) (1998). The EMS workers signed a release containing the following language: Your acceptance of back wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act means that you have given up any right you may have to bring suit for such back wages under Section 16(b) of the Act. Do not sign this report unless you have actually received payment of the back wages due. Because |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER When he was involved in an automobile accident while on duty. He was placed on leave from August 26. The number of workers' compensation claims Epps filed in concluding that Epps was unable to perform his duties. Hardy again recommended termination after noting that there were no light duty assignments available. That the department's officers were required as part of their full duties to bend. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The issue presented by this appeal is a jurisdictional one pending as well in three other courts of appeals[fn1] whether the administrative bodies that adjudicate black lung claims or the district courts have jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding interest assessed against coal mine operators on reimbursements to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Under the FTCA the federal government is liable to the same extent that a private individual would be under the law of the state where the negligent act occurred in this case. The Navy is not Luna's employer. The question in this case is whether the Navy is a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The bankruptcy court held the accounts receivable were not the equivalent of wages or salary and therefore were not exempt under the Nebraska statute. Pruss is an attorney engaged in the practice of law as a sole practitioner. The scheduled value of these receivables was $41. Her claim of exemption was. The Chapter 7 Trustee of two other bankruptcy estates which are creditors of Ms. The |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. Sloma agreed that he should be paid as follows:$500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. The Bank continued to receive monthly payments from Manufacturers pursuant to the assignment until Sloma's business venture failed and. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > United States Court of Appeals. He was employed by Gulf Coast Catering Company which provided catering services to offshore oil rigs. Damages for the injuries were governed by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Negotiated a settlement with Sloma to fulfill his rights under the Act pursuant to which Sloma was to be paid $180. Sloma's employer and its carrier were discharged of any further obligation or liabilities to Sloma. The settlement was approved as an Award by the United States Department of Labor. Sloma agreed that he should be paid as follows:$500.00 per month for 20 years certain until 240 payments have been made. The loan was structured to be repaid in accordance with the annuity payments that were assigned to the Bank. The Bank continued to receive monthly payments from Manufacturers pursuant to the assignment until Sloma's business venture failed and. Judgment was entered against Sloma for the amount due under the note. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation (Norshipco) petitions for review of an order of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (the Board) reversing an administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of longshore and harbor workers' compensation to Carl Hord.1 Because we conclude that the Board correctly determined that Norshipco did not satisfy its burden of establishing that suitable alternative employment was available to Hord. I. Hord's left arm and hand were injured in the course of his employment at Norshipco on October 25. Norshipco voluntarily paid various periods of temporary disability compensation and permanent compensation for the 20 percent impairment of Hord's arm and hand. 1 The Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs is also a Respondent in this case. We refer to Respondents collectively as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This is a bankruptcy case. The issue is whether the claim of the California Uninsured Employers Fund ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Alleging that she was an employee of Giant Foods and that she sustained a work related knee injury on September 9. Which was held on September 14. Which was provided |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court determined that Krouse was judicially estopped from claiming to be a |
![]() |
99-3067 -- NEWELL V. K-MART CORP. -- 07/12/2000 1291 and REVERSE.
Newell was employed at K Mart's Lawrence. Where she was typically responsible for loading and unloading tractor trailers of merchandise. Newell was terminated for allegedly violating K Mart's absenteeism policy. As an employee with fifteen years' seniority. Newell was entitled to twenty days of paid vacation each year. 80 hours of which were paid and 40 of which were unpaid. An employee was to be terminated if he or she exceeded the allotted days of vacation and paid and unpaid personal leave. Newell took off June 7. Was informed upon returning to work the next day that she had been terminated. She exceeded her available leave and was terminated. Newell sued K Mart. Contending that Newell was terminated because of her excessive absenteeism. That caused her to have an inadequate number of vacation days remaining to cover her absence on July . P. 59(a). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Bloom was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. Her physician said the symptoms were work related. Bloom reported to Metro that she was experiencing pain. The doctor then reported to Metro that |
![]() |
98-8040 -- GIBSON V. WAL-MART STORES INC. -- 06/25/1999 Gale Gibson and Becky Brooks were moving stock in the back room of a Wal Mart store located in Wyoming. Gibson was injured when a box being placed on top of a shelf by Brooks fell on her. Miller also told her that her health insurance (secured through Wal Mart) would not cover her medical expenses because her injury was work related. Gibson |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER CLC is an insurance brokerage that assisted Hatcher in the application process. It indicated Prestige/Paramount was a sole proprietorship. The Plan's procedures provide that an employer with an outstanding obligation for workers compensation insurance is not entitled to Plan insurance. In relevant part: This application is being returned to you for the reason(s) listed below. If a deposit premium was submitted with the application. Is postmarked within fifteen (15) calendar days following the date of this letter and the risk is otherwise deemed eligible for coverage. The original binding date will be void unless all items requested below are provided. One of Hatcher's employees was injured on the job and sometime thereafter. 1992 and asserts Hatcher's employee's workers compensation claim that arose in the interim was not insured by the Plan. The complaint asserted NCCI was directly liable to Hatcher and secondarily liable to CLC as Hatcher's equitable subrogee. CLC was not entitled to equitable subrogation. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Magna Bank is the successor in interest to the rights. United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 23 2 1 Debtor's efforts to reorganize were unsuccessful and. The Debtor's Chapter 11 case was converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. Authorized the Debtor's use of cash collateral that was subject to Magna's security interest to pay expenses set forth in an attached budget. The financing order required that the Debtor |
![]() |
01-5032 -- GARRISON V. BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC. -- 04/19/2002 Arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. We look at those in terms of where we are placing people for possible future injuries.... ... Well. The positions that we were looking at you for are those positions that would put you in a position to likely be injured again and we don't do that. Mr. Garrison sued Centrilift in federal district court alleging he was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will reverse the decision of the District Court in part and affirm it in part. I. Inasmuch as we are writing solely for the parties. We will recite only those facts necessary in the consideration of this appeal. There are two insurance policies at issue: one covers liability. Kline was resetting a back room when a Staples employee allegedly swung open a door that caused two tables to fall on Kline's back. Brenner was insured by Wausau under a policy (Wausau Policy) that contained the following |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We reverse and remand because we conclude that (1) the Administrative Law Judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was a |
![]() |
UNIFORCE TEMP. PERSONNEL V. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMP. INS. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was a |
![]() |
UNIFORCE TEMP. PERSONNEL V. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMP. INS. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
KLINEDINST V. SWIFT INVESTMENTS (8/6/2001, NO. 00-13092) Klinedinst was employed as an automobile painter for Swift. Swift stipulated that Klinedinst was not paid overtime.
|
![]() |
KLINEDINST V. SWIFT INVESTMENTS (8/6/2001, NO. 00-13092) Klinedinst was employed as an automobile painter for Swift. Swift stipulated that Klinedinst was not paid overtime.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Clinchfield Coal Company and Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation ( |
![]() |
98-6368 -- STATE INSURANCE FUND V. ACE TRANSPORTATION INC. -- 10/20/1999 We have jurisdiction. Remand for further proceedings. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Holding that the officers were required to exhaust the binding grievance and arbitration procedures in their collective bargaining agreements. We hold that arbitration was not required. Whom we conclude are not covered by the FLSA. 119 (1st Cir. 2003). Appellants are current and retired police officers who are. Or were at relevant times. Employed by the Town of Agawam. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hendricks performed maintenance duties and traveled to businesses where Compass Group's vending machines were located to fill. Was unable to resume her duties as a driver so she went on light duty. She asserted that while on light duty she was entitled to receive the pay rate 1 It is unclear from the record whether Hendricks ever took FMLA leave. Concluding that FMLA leave is unpaid leave and that the CBA did not entitle Hendricks to payment of the wage rate differential. All reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in the light most favorable to the non moving party. May not do so if the employee is receiving pay through workers' compensation. A health care provider may certify that an employee is able to return to |
![]() |
BLEDSOE V. PALM BEACH COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. (1/22/1998, NO. 96-5375) We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Bledsoe was employed as a Resource Technician for the District from January 1988 until his termination in October of 1992. Against the District and Palm Beach County alleging that both of those entities were his |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Coverage was barred as a matter of law. Sustained burns over sixty five percent of his body after his clothes ignited while he was cleaning paint equipment with flammable thinner on Corn Island's premises. Fremont was responsible for both Williams's medical expenses and the 1 A |
![]() |
02-6126 -- HAMMOCK V. U.S. -- 10/15/2003 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff John A. Was therefore barred by the associated exclusive remedy rule in Okla. Hammock's direct employer was an independent contractor of an agency of the United States which. Hammock's employer was not an independent contractor of the United States but a mere vendor and that the state workers' compensation scheme does not impose statutory compensation obligations on vendees like the United States |
![]() |
BLEDSOE V. PALM BEACH COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. (1/22/1998, NO. 96-5375) We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Bledsoe was employed as a Resource Technician for the District from January 1988 until his termination in October of 1992. Against the District and Palm Beach County alleging that both of those entities were his |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court concluded that because Carroll Deal and Karen Lamb Kirkham were not |
![]() |
00-3389 -- MINNER V. DAYTON HUDSON CORP. -- 04/22/2002 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. I. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Target on the basis that plaintiff was Target's statutory employee and therefore his exclusive remedy is under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Minner's delivery efforts were in accordance with a contract between Anderson News and Target. Plaintiff was responsible for driving a truck. Is shipped to individual stores from Target's warehouse and is delivered. This immunity is extended to a principal |
![]() |
02-7081 -- SOUTHERLAND V. GRANITE STATE INSURANCE CO. -- 06/11/2003 These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. The parties appeal several decisions the district court made in this diversity action governed by Oklahoma law. While he was working for Greenleaf Nursery. After discovering there was no court ordered compensation award. Defendants will be entitled to summary judgment only if |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Local Lodge 964 ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER She filed a workers' compensation claim and was determined to be permanently totally disabled pursuant to § 39 71702. The State Fund recognized that her ACE was $759.99 and that her disability rate should have been $506.66. What brought this case to the fore is what happened when Siaperas sought Social Security Disability Insurance benefits ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He appeals a district court order that dismissed this action on the ground that Miller's claim is preempted by the FECA. Miller was employed by the United States Postal Service from approximately 1981 to 1992. Miller filed a workers' compensation claim that alleged that he was suffering from depression as a result of the way his postmaster treated him.1 The OWCP denied Miller's claim on the ground that Miller failed to submit sufficient medical evidence to prove that his condition was caused by his employment. Miller claimed that he first became aware that his depression was related to his employment on February 12. That claim sought damages equal to the amount that Miller claimed was due him in workers' compensation benefits. For summary judgment.3 It argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Miller's FTCA suit was simply an attempt to redress the OWCP's denial of Miller's workers' compensation claim and judicial review of the OWCP's decision was prohibited by 5 U.S.C. 8128(b).4 Relying on McDaniel v. |
![]() |
CRAMER V. STATE OF FLORIDA This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether Iowa law imposes tort liability on a workers' compensation insurer for bad faith failure to monitor and direct the medical treatment being furnished by the employer insured to an injured employee. 1 we conclude that the insurer's duty in this situation is limited to paying the workers' compensation benefits to which the employee is The Honorable LINDA R. Who concluded that her hip pain was most likely related to a childhood condition known as Perthes. That decision is not an issue on appeal. 2 2 against T.I. Contending that the jury should have been instructed that Lumbermens had a duty to |
![]() |
BIANCO V. GEORGIA PAC. CORP. (9/3/2002, NO. 01-14656) 33 U.S.C. § 901 |
![]() |
BIANCO V. GEORGIA PAC. CORP. (9/3/2002, NO. 01-14656) 33 U.S.C. § 901 |
![]() |
CRAMER V. STATE OF FLORIDA This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
96-2279 -- ALMEGARD V. SAN JU AN PILOT TRAINING INC. -- 01/07/1998 Circuit Judges.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The issue presented by this appeal is whether Department of Labor ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Doffing and washing was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Cross appeals by certain plaintiffs from so much of the district court's order as * The present caption in these consolidated appeals lists as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER They contend that the district court erred in concluding that: (1) paidlunchtime compensation did not constitute remuneration regularly received for employment and is therefore excludable from the regular rate of pay used to calculate overtime compensation. (2) time spent by employees changing into and out of plant uniforms at the work site was not |
![]() |
CRAMER V. FLORIDA This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > employee's impairment rating. This basic scheme remains in place today. Each of the appellants in these consolidated appeals was injured on the job and suffered a permanent. Appellant Earl Cramer was dissatisfied with the level of benefits commensurate to the impairment rating assigned him 9% permanent. Equal to the same as those that were being provided to other disabled workers |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was employed as a package car driver. Jones's position as a package car driver required that he perform |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The appellants were members of the Union while employed by the Times. Most counts were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the appellants' failure to exhaust administrative remedies or to their lateness infiling charges. The male appellants' sex discrimination claims were dismissed for lack of standing to sue under Title VII and NJLAD. We conclude that the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed in its entirety. We will reverse. We do so based on our determination that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Facts and Procedural History Johnston Atoll is a United States possession. Located about 700 miles west southwest of Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean.1 It is only two miles long and one half mile wide. Gambling and fighting are prohibited. The hip injury is the subject of the instant claim. Which is one of several authorized social clubs on Johnston Atoll. OWCP 463 There are conflicting accounts of precisely what transpired at the AMVETS. It is undisputed that Ilaszczat fell and injured his hip there. None of the soldiers was interested. He described his second encounter with the soldiers as follows: [T]here was a couple of the military guys sitting at the bar and somehow the subject got around to martial arts. . . . [Burum] said he was really good at it and I said. [H]e was pretty insistent upon showing me how he could lift my [sic] leg over my head without touching me. . . . I went to the back of the room where the pool table and that picnic table [were] and I put my drink down on the picnic table and when he went to kick me. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Alleging that Defendants were liable under the Tennessee workers' compensation scheme. (4) Defendants were liable under the Tennessee workers' compensation scheme. (2) Defendants were required to pay for side rails for Plaintiff's bed. Defendants were required to pay for wound care for Plaintiff. (4) Defendants were required to pay for the conversion of a van into a handicapped van. The Tennessee Department of Labor was in the best position to assess these claims.1 On March 13. A panel of this Court affirmed the order of the district court and its finding that Plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. The district court found that Plaintiff was entitled to future medical services under the Tennessee workers' compensation scheme. The Tennessee Department of Labor was the appropriate body to determine whether future medical services were reasonably necessary as required under Tennessee law. The district court ordered Plaintiff to provide Defendants with detailed proof as to which medical bills were outstanding. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for the Director. Were on brief for Bath Iron Works. |
![]() |
00-3243 -- FOSTER V. ALLIEDSIGNAL INC. -- 06/18/2002 Foster was informed by AlliedSignal that she had been fired. Which the district court granted upon concluding that Foster |
![]() |
CRAWFORD & CO. V. APFEL (12/14/2000, NO. 99-2201) 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.932 and 416.1432. |
![]() |
CRAWFORD & CO. V. APFEL (12/14/2000, NO. 99-2201) 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.932 and 416.1432. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With them on the briefs were Sally M. With them on the brief was Christopher L. To those claimants who have thus far not settled with the unions. Although we are reluctant to prolong this unduly protracted litigation any longer. I. Background The background of this case is set out in full in our prior opinion. Although referrals were available to non union |
![]() |
97-7039 -- ARTHURS V. FMC CORP. -- 04/10/1998 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellant Grede Pryor Foundry. We have jurisdiction over the apportionment proceeds in this diversity action. 1367(a)). The facts are not in dispute. Perry Arthurs was working for Grede Pryor Foundry. Inc. when his arm was caught in the gears of a crane. As well as two entities who had serviced the crane. The total settlement proceeds were $170. Arthurs for workers' compensation benefits to be paid in the future. There is no dispute that Oklahoma state law controls. The court shall apportion the proceeds |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. Summary judgment should be entered if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Porter was employed by Alumoweld as a BD machine operator from August 6. Porter was then placed on a personal leave of absence from November 8 18. Alumoweld's February 14 letter included the following statement: |
![]() |
NEW V. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The District Court concluded that Buskirk could not recover under his |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The first is whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury on the threshold dollar amount for a felony conviction under § 1920. The second is whether the District Court erred in finding that the total amount of benefits Tupone received as a result of false applications for workers' compensation benefits constituted the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court held that such failure was not a thus. To an injured employee was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Walker claims that he did not insure his workers because he did not consider himself the general contractor for the construction project and because he believed that Hope and his coworkers were responsible for securing their own insurance. Reasoning that Walker's failure to obtain insurance was not the direct cause of Hope's injuries and citing the policy of strictly construing exceptions to discharge. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled O.C.G.A. § 34 9 8. Refusal or willful neglect to obtain workers' compensation insurance where required is a misdemeanor. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party has |
![]() |
96-3320 -- RAMIREZ V. IBP, INC. -- 12/10/1997 Anticipating that he was about to file a claim under Kansas workers' compensation law for work related injuries. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from a district court's judgment predicated on its opinion holding that an employer violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from a district court's judgment predicated on its opinion holding that an employer violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. This appeal followed. 2 A district court's decision regarding the applicability of a particular statute of limitations is reviewed de novo. Is compliance with the FTCA's statute of limitations. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The question presented is whether settlements he made with others of his employers should be credited against the amount owed by the last responsible employer. Holding that denial of the credit is compelled by 33 U.S.C. § 903(e) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the LHWCA). He was exposed to asbestos from pine lagging on the ships and to metal fumes from cutters and welders in both ships and shops. He was diagnosed with bronchiestasis. He was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis. Among his employers were Southwest Marine. The ALJ ruled that Triple A was not entitled to a credit for Alexander's settlements with the three other employers. Or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law . . . shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The question presented in this appeal is whether Beatty is entitled to benefits if he is able to prove a total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mining employment in combination with other nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary impairments. Although this is a close question. One on which we have received little guidance from Congress. We conclude that the Director's position is reasonable. We will affirm the orders of the Benefits Review Board. His last job was as a beltman. His lungs were continuously exposed to coal dust. His attendance record at work was good. A formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The question presented is whether settlements he made with others of his employers should be credited against the amount owed by the last responsible employer. Holding that denial of the credit is compelled by 33 U.S.C. § 903(e) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the LHWCA). He was exposed to asbestos from pine lagging on the ships and to metal fumes from cutters and welders in both ships and shops. He was diagnosed with bronchiestasis. He was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis. Among his employers were Southwest Marine. The ALJ ruled that Triple A was not entitled to a credit for Alexander's settlements with the three other employers. Or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law . . . shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter. |
![]() |
ITT BASE SERVICES V. HICKSON (9/18/1998, NO. 96-9329) Senior District Judge: This is a petition for review of a final order of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction and therefore do not reach the substantive issues on appeal. Instead. We transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Petitioner ITT Base Services (ITT) is a contractor for the United States Navy. Claimant was involved in a boat accident during the course of his employment. The accident occurred about three miles off Midway Island when the tugboat he was on sank after colliding with a nuclear submarine. Shark infested water before he was rescued. The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the United States Department of Labor and a hearing was held on March 23. The ALJ found that Claimant's psychological injury occurred as a result of the 1986 boat accident. |
![]() |
ITT BASE SERVICES V. HICKSON (9/18/1998, NO. 96-9329) Senior District Judge: This is a petition for review of a final order of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction and therefore do not reach the substantive issues on appeal. Instead. We transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Petitioner ITT Base Services (ITT) is a contractor for the United States Navy. Claimant was involved in a boat accident during the course of his employment. The accident occurred about three miles off Midway Island when the tugboat he was on sank after colliding with a nuclear submarine. Shark infested water before he was rescued. The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the United States Department of Labor and a hearing was held on March 23. The ALJ found that Claimant's psychological injury occurred as a result of the 1986 boat accident. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was employed by the U.S. The machine is operated by a crew of employees who rotated among the three different tasks. The claim was denied. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With her on the brief were Linda Sher. With her on the brief were Jonathan P. When the Board learned that one of these employees was an undocumented alien. It denied him reinstatement and terminated his backpay as of the date the employer discovered he was unauthorized to work. Because the Supreme Court has held that undocumented workers are protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Because the limited reme dy awarded here is within the Board's discretion and furthers the purposes of both labor and immigration law. |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. RHODES (6/4/1999, NO. 97-6853) Rhodes then filed a compensation claim that stated both that she was in the truck when it was hit and that she suffered injuries from the accident. Her claim was mailed to the Department of Labor in Jacksonville. For processing. A subsequent post office investigation revealed that Rhodes was not in the truck at the time of the accident and that her compensation claim therefore was fraudulent. Rhodes was charged in a two count indictment with making a false compensation claim. With the terms to run concurrently. Rhodes appeals her conviction and sentence on three grounds: (1) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror who was the cousin of a Government witness. (2) the Government failed to prove that she committed mail fraud because the evidence was insufficient to establish that she knew (or reasonably should have foreseen) that her fraudulent claim would be placed in the mail. (3) the district court improperly sentenced her to a term of supervised release that exceeded the statutory maximum for her violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1920.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would conclude that a driver who slips on grease from a nearby kitchen when he steps on the ground while alighting from a car is not engaged in use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. We will therefore reverse the decision of the district court. We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hilpl was employed as a bid manager for Perloff Brothers. Woods Management was a prospective customer of Perloff Brothers. The Common Pleas action was settled for $800. This controversy is easily located within the landscape of Pennsylvania law. Hilpl and his injury are clearly subject to the provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. The answer to this question is obviously controlled by state law. None of the terms in the phrase |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. RHODES (6/4/1999, NO. 97-6853) Rhodes then filed a compensation claim that stated both that she was in the truck when it was hit and that she suffered injuries from the accident. Her claim was mailed to the Department of Labor in Jacksonville. For processing. A subsequent post office investigation revealed that Rhodes was not in the truck at the time of the accident and that her compensation claim therefore was fraudulent. Rhodes was charged in a two count indictment with making a false compensation claim. With the terms to run concurrently. Rhodes appeals her conviction and sentence on three grounds: (1) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror who was the cousin of a Government witness. (2) the Government failed to prove that she committed mail fraud because the evidence was insufficient to establish that she knew (or reasonably should have foreseen) that her fraudulent claim would be placed in the mail. (3) the district court improperly sentenced her to a term of supervised release that exceeded the statutory maximum for her violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1920.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. DeShazo was a passenger. An employee of a BHOO subsidiary was driving. The district court dismissed that suit after determining that DeShazo was not a Jones Act seaman. Claiming that BHOO was liable for the negligence of its driver.2 The district court granted BHOO's motion for summary judgment. The DeShazos contend that Egyptian law should apply to their claims. 2 Claims against two other defendants were dismissed. 2 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. The district court first concluded that DeShazo's claims were governed by Louisiana law. Section 184 states: Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted in any state if the defendant is declared immune from such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a state under which the defendant is required to provide insurance against the particular risk and under which (a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury. |
![]() |
TILLMAN V. MILLER (1/26/1998, NO. 96-9191) Georgia has failed to show that what it seeks to compel plaintiff to do is justified and not too burdensome. Plaintiff advertises on television. He is not in the telecommunications business. The advertisements in this case are not deceptive or misleading. Is not tied to an inherent quality of the thing he is trying to sell his legal services. Georgia is not justified in placing. Which was scheduled to become effective in July 1995. Which shall be in boldface Roman font 36 point type and appear in a dark background and remain on the screen for a minimum of five seconds as follows: Willfully making a false or misleading statement or representation to obtain or deny workers' compensation benefits is a crime carrying a penalty of imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10. O.C.G.A. § 34 9 31. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Social Security Act places a ceiling on an individual's combined social security benefits and state workers' compensation benefits if the workers' compensation benefits are periodic. 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1996). Will reduce. The Social Security Act provides that an individual's workers' compensation benefits are saved from offset by the SSA if the state is executing a |
![]() |
97-8125 -- COLETTI V. CUDD PRESSURE CONTROL -- 01/05/1999 She alleges the trial court improperly denied her the opportunity to introduce deposition testimony as substantive evidence because the deponents were present at trial and available to testify. Coletti contends the trial court should have imposed sanctions for Cudd's alleged failure to timely and adequately comply with the court's discovery orders. Ms. Coletti was formerly an at will employee working as an administrator for Cudd. Cudd supervisors visited the Rock Springs office in an attempt to cure certain problems the company was having with operations there. Coletti she was placing her on a |
![]() |
TILLMAN V. MILLER (1/26/1998, NO. 96-9191) Georgia has failed to show that what it seeks to compel plaintiff to do is justified and not too burdensome. Plaintiff advertises on television. He is not in the telecommunications business. The advertisements in this case are not deceptive or misleading. Is not tied to an inherent quality of the thing he is trying to sell his legal services. Georgia is not justified in placing. Which was scheduled to become effective in July 1995. Which shall be in boldface Roman font 36 point type and appear in a dark background and remain on the screen for a minimum of five seconds as follows: Willfully making a false or misleading statement or representation to obtain or deny workers' compensation benefits is a crime carrying a penalty of imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10. O.C.G.A. § 34 9 31. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This case concerns whether time workers spent traveling on employerprovided transportation to a secure construction site or time spent going through security screening is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Bryan Robertson was using a Black & Decker heavy duty power sander/grinder on a concrete bridge in Mountain View. The jury found that the accident was proximately caused by defendants' conduct in manufacturing and selling the grinding wheel in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. The issues are (1) whether the district court erred in admitting expert testimony that defendants' product warnings were inadequate. Robertson had worked on bridges for over five years and was familiar with the Black & Decker grinder. Norton grinding wheels were purchased separately from the grinder and bore a warning label stating: |
![]() |
MOYER V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROG. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. We will affirm the Board's decision affirming the Director's attorney fee award unless it is arbitrary and capricious. He claims that he was deprived of this interest without due process. Nor did she allow him to submit additional materials before any reduction was made. Moyer did not have a property interest in his $225.00 per hour fee. The Director's regulations explicitly provide that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court held that the trustee should not have received compensation based 2 on a $7. The trustee argues that the district court's interpretation of S 326(a) was improper and that the determination of a fee award is not limited to the factors enumerated in S 330(a). Cain was subsequently appointed as Chapter 11 trustee. The debtor's principal asset was a parcel of property consisting of two office complexes in Marlton. Which was subject to a mortgage in favor of First Fidelity Bank. It was later appraised at a fair market value of $9. The trustee was awarded interim compensation of $28. The Chapter 11 proceeding was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding and Mr. Cain was reappointed as Chapter 7 trustee. Although the trustee alleged that he was prepared simply to abandon the property and allow First Fidelity to foreclose on it. Once the administrative expenses were paid. That at a sale |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER While Deanna Beard was employed at a Flying J restaurant in Davenport. Each party then filed post trial motions that were denied by the district court. Beard was employed as an assistant manager of Flying J's restaurant in Davenport. Krout was hired as the general manager of the restaurant. There is no question that Mr. Krout was Ms. Beard says were erect because she had been in the freezer at the restaurant. Krout that his behavior was unwelcome and complained about it to several other Flying J employees. Although none of these employees was listed in Flying J's employee handbook as a person to contact in case of sexual harassment. Snider said that he was unable to determine whom to believe. Krout was reinstated after a brief suspension. Krout from his position and that there was no evidence that he had engaged in any misconduct. Krout was to be reinstated. Flying J contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Beard was required to produce evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she was a member of a protected group. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal by Dr. A |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Funds appeal the court's decision that the owner operators driving for Berger Transfer are independent contractors. Asserting that they were Berger Transfer filed this action for declaratory judgment. To apply the Minnesota statute of limitations in the event the owner operators were found to be The Honorable Richard H. I. The Funds argue that issue preclusion prevents the district court from deciding whether the Berger Transfer owner operators were employees or independent contractors. Which held that a Berger Transfer owneroperator was an employee. The court noted that the Funds acknowledged that not all owner operators were classified the Thus. They did not prevent Berger Transfer from the court held that the owner operators Following a bench were independent The Funds contractors. Were employees or independent contractors. 1330 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing the parameters We reverse the district court's decision not to apply offensive nonmutual issue preclusion only for an Before [issue preclusion] will bar relitigation of a factual issue in a subsequent proceeding. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Line 10 the word |
![]() |
03-1182 -- ROBERSON V. PINNACOL ASSURANCE -- 05/12/2004 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff/Appellant Jeanne Roberson. Standard of Review Our review is de novo. See Sutton v. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal will be upheld only if. |
![]() |
97-6091 -- INGRAM V. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 2021 -- 08/04/1998 Circuit Judges.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The suit is a public enforcement action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. * This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of class certification. I. BACKGROUND Eller & Sons is a small business in Franklin. Employees 2 are recruited from Guatemala. Peakload or intermittent basis when qualified U.S. workers are not available. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). Employers of H 2B guestworkers are required to pay them an hourly prevailing wage rate. Which is determined by the State Workforce Agency (SWA) having jurisdiction over the proposed area of intended employment. The workers allege the average wage rate at which Eller & Sons was certified to pay the H 2B workers was $8.32/hour. The appellee migrant workers were employed by Eller & Sons at various times from June 1999 through June 2005. Opt in notices for the FLSA collective action were sent to approximately 1. Who were employed in [Eller & Sons'] forestry operations from June 1999 until the present. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Board also said that the award was not nominal. Nevertheless held that Newport News was not entitled to § 8(f) relief because the award was so small in fact. While Stallings was on the job welding. He was promptly diagnosed with metal fume fever. He was unable to return to work until September 28. Stallings was assigned to work inside in close proximity to several other welders. The doctor again warned Stallings to avoid inside welding and confirmed that Stallings's medical restriction to outside work was permanent. On those days he was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Tupper's dentist's office was closed. Which states any person who discharges an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits is liable in a civil action for the employee's damages. Tupper appeals asserting he was protected by § 176.82. We conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact and Boise is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We are satisfied that the district court properly analyzed Minnesota law. This is not fully consistent with Minnesota law. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that two types of conduct were prohibited by the statute: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. The essential facts are undisputed. Karen Rader is employed as a teacher at Elk Valley Christian School in Elkview. Elk Valley Christian School is a member of AACS. The Plan is administered by Gallagher Bassett Services. Incorporated.2 1 The proceedings in this action were conducted by a magistrate judge pursuant to the consent of the parties. The parties agree that when the partnership was formed. It was not required to furnish contributions to the workers' compensation fund of West Virginia (the Fund) on behalf of the partners. That the partnership was not required to notify the Fund of a decision not to participate. James was injured during the course of his employment with T&J Painting. [a]ny accidental bodily injury which arises out of or in the course of any employment with any Employer and/or for which the individual is entitled to benefits under any workers' compensation law or ... receives any settlement from a workers' compensation carrier. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With her on the brief were Marvin Krislov. O'Brien also sued the owner of the building in which she was injured and received a payment in settlement of that litigation. Because there is no evidence that a waiver occurred. We conclude the employer is entitled to the credit. It is entitled to such relief. Governs workers' compensation claims made by private sector employ ees who were injured in the District of Columbia prior to 1982. Compensation awards for such claims are made by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ( |
![]() |
HOPE V. WALKER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Hope sued Walker for compensation for his injuries. Reasoning that Walker's failure to obtain insurance was not the direct cause of Hope's injuries and citing the policy of strictly construing exceptions to discharge. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
![]() |
97-1276 -- UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1992 BENEFIT PLAN V. RUSHTON -- 07/09/1998 Are |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. Boggs & Blow were on brief for appellee. Inc. ( |
![]() |
HOPE V. WALKER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > Hope sued Walker for compensation for his injuries. Reasoning that Walker's failure to obtain insurance was not the direct cause of Hope's injuries and citing the policy of strictly construing exceptions to discharge. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The public policy claim was sent to the jury. Defendants then renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the public policy claim and the District Court granted the renewed motion finding that Plaintiff had failed to establish at trial that he was an at will employee. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Gary Kusens was employed by Defendant Pascal Company. When his position was eliminated. Plaintiff was 54 years old. His base salary increased and his commissions were determined as a fixed percentage of nationwide Pascal sales. Two of the people responsible for the elimination of Plaintiff's position were Defendant Benjamin Paschall. Pascal's Vice President of Sales and Marketing who was also Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Plaintiff was the oldest of the four Regional Sales Managers at Pascal. Who was terminated the same day as Plaintiff. Was the second oldest. The youngest two Sales Managers were retained. Plaintiff filed suit contending that he was fired because of his age and not because of Pascal's financial strategy. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Miller argued that the proper measure of loss for sentencing purposes was the difference between the amount he actually received from Medicare and Medicaid and the amount to which he was legitimately entitled for the services he rendered. The offense level based on the estimated loss should therefore have been increased by four levels. The Government conceded that some of Miller's objections to the PSR were reasonable and that the defense expert's loss estimate was based on better data than the PSR. The Government argued that the proper formula for calculating loss was the difference between the amount Miller billed (rather than the amount he actually received) and the amount to which he was legitimately entitled. Most generous estimate of the amount of money to which he was entitled. The court held that the total loss amount was between $73. The Guidelines limit intended loss to the amount of loss that was likely. The loss calculated by the district court was not likely. The district court held that the amount of loss was the total amount claimed on the false vouchers. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The ALJ held that Sea Land was liable for a twenty percent penalty on an overdue compensation award under § 14(f) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. We will deny the petition for review and affirm the decision of the Board. Romano who was then presiding over the matter. The ALJ approved the terms of this settlement in an Order Approving Settlement which was filed in the office of the district director on Tuesday. On that same date the order was sent to the parties by certified mail. A copy of the ALJ's Order Approving Settlement was received in the office of Crawford & Company. The check was probably mailed to Barry the same day.[fn1] Barry subsequently asserted that Sea Land's payment had been untimely and petitioned the district director to assess a twenty percent penalty against Sea Land under 33 U.S.C. § 914(f) ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We will affirm. I. Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts of this case. Our summary of the facts will be brief. Johnson was employed in the coal mining industry from October 1978 to June 1992. Johnson stopped working for BethEnergy and was unilaterally placed on Pennsylvania workers' compensation benefits by BethEnergy effective June 22. Were more credible than those of Dr. Judge Kenny held that Johnson was entitled to compensation |
![]() |
SUDER V. BLUE CIRCLE, INC. Blue Circle argues that attorney fees should not be awarded under 1447(c) when there is a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The named plaintiffs in this case (whom we will call |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Heisler & Piampiano was on brief for petitioners Bath Iron Works Corporation and Birmingham Fire Insurance Company. Hanson & DeTroy was on brief for insurer respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Lupton & Weiss was on brief for claimant respondent Alvin D. We hold that the federal award was barred by collateral estoppel. The events and procedural history are complicated. A condensed version will set the scene. In 1984 he was transferred to a desk job. Was awarded 25 percent partial disability benefits. Bath's company physician told Acord that he was being let go. The record is murky but it was apparently Acord's own opinion that the coming winter would aggravate his knee. It was the doctor's view that there would be no suitable work available if Acord's physical restrictions increased. Began to pay Acord total disability benefits when he was dismissed in November 1988. This decision was affirmed by the commission's appellate division in September 1990. It is not uncommon for employees connected to maritime affairs to be covered by both federal and state compensation statutes. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER OTHER AS YET UNDETERMINED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE LOUISIANA INSURANCE RATING COMMISSION Defendants Appellees Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana Before DUHÉ. 2004 insurance set by the LIRC over a period of several years were confiscatory. constitute an Liberty Mutual argues that without these rates thus in impermissible taking compensation violation of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth. 1 The district court dismissed Liberty Mutual's claims sua sponte based on its determinations that Liberty Mutual's claims were not ripe and were precluded from ever ripening. The rates for workers' compensation insurance are set by the LIRC. The latter of which is comprised of consumers who cannot obtain insurance in the voluntary market. Insurers were required to serve the involuntary market as well as the voluntary market. They were confiscatory and thus constituted a taking by the state. Louisiana The panel stated that |
![]() |
WYOMING FUEL CO. V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP. PROGRAMS Was denied benefits because he failed to demonstrate any of the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to benefits. The ALJ also concluded that Brandolino was entitled to benefits from Wyoming Fuel because he had demonstrated that he had pneumoconiosis ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Webner began his association with Titan in 1991 while he was employed by Titan's predecessor. Neiman's was a family owned business specializing in brake and actuator assemblies that were mounted onto trailers. Neiman's primary customer was Titan. Webner's first job at Neiman's was as a truck driver charged with delivering axles. Webner had surgery and was off work recovering for six months. Webner was able to return to work full time at Titan in January 1997 a year and a half after his second injury. Webner was also restricted from twisting and bending no more than 12 times per hour. 2 During his first month back to work. Webner was having to bend and twist frequently when retrieving parts used on the assembly line. He had back spasms and was in constant pain. Webner was required to obtain a medical release from the company's orthopaedic surgeon. Webner's back discomfort decreased and his daily productivity as measured by the number of pieces he assembled was at an acceptable rate.1 While Webner was recovering from his second surgery. |
![]() |
01-9505 -- SVETICH V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 01/24/2002 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner Mike Svetich seeks review of the decision of the Benefits Review Board ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER New conceded that fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court and. A writ of mandamus is the proper means by which a party may challenge a remand order. In determining that Counts I and II arose under the Alabama workers' compensation laws and thus were more appropriately heard in state court. New asserts that Thermtron is therefore not applicable to these facts. We cannot adjudicate those issues and do not address them. 4 DISCUSSION The only issue resolved in this opinion is whether this court is empowered with jurisdiction over this proceeding. We are convinced that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes us from reviewing this remand order and. A district court |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He claims that he was wrongfully discharged from his position as a police officer for the Township. The injury was diagnosed as a herniated disc. Which was approved later that month. That he was suspended from active duty. Asserting that Young was no longer disabled as a result of a work related injury. He was subpoenaed on several occasions to provide court testimony about matters that he had witnessed before his injury. The last such subpoena in the record is dated in February of 1994. Young was maintained as an employee on the Township records. The Township's police officers are required to report such incidents. The magistrate judge determined that Young |
![]() |
FLORIDA HOSP. TRUST FUND V. COMMISSIONER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The salient facts are not in dispute. Appellants are three trust funds |
![]() |
03-9575 -- ENERGY WEST MINING CO. V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 07/09/2004 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Odessa Jones. Jones' employment as a coal miner was a substantially contributing cause of his death. See 20 C.F.R. |
![]() |
FLORIDA HOSP. TRUST FUND V. COMMISSIONER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The salient facts are not in dispute. Appellants are three trust funds |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Many layers of complex procedural issues have beclouded this initial claim. We will affirm the District Court's decision regarding the as2 applied challenge. This rather prolix explanation of the procedural twists and turns of this case is necessary to understand our decision. The case was decided in two phases. The first phase ended in October 1994 when WCJ Mickey found Bass was serving in the course and scope of her employment when she fell. To determine whether Bass was actually injured by the fall. Was whether Bass's back pain was from a preexisting injury. WCJ Michael Rosen was hired to fill Mickey's position. Her cases were turned over to him. Bass was not notified of this change. Which was then reviewed and signed by Perry and issued more than five years after Bass filed her claim. Finding that her testimony was not credible as to what 1. The Judges assumed the handling of this case after the record was closed and they had no opportunity to observe the claimant. Were otherwise incapable of properly evaluating her credibility. |
![]() |
98-8080 -- MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE LLC V. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. -- 03/16/2001 Remand.
|
![]() |
03-9508 -- MCNALLY PITTSBURG MANUFACTURING CO. V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 02/10/2004 |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This case is before us for the second time.1 Appellant. That are governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are presented with disputes over coverage under two contracts. The primary issue is whether the indemnification agreement sufficiently waived the immunity granted employers under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. Holding the contractor was entitled to conditional indemnification but its general partner was not. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. Which as Chen's employer was immune from suit under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.[fn2] After Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern tendered their defense to CNA Insurance. Alleging it was obligated to defend and indemnify them. The district court had jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).[fn3] We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Our review is plenary. Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Injuries or death or other claims or suits are caused by the sole negligence of a party indemnified hereunder unless otherwise provided in the Prime Contract. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER It asserts that it was denied due process of law because of the delay in the litigation. That the ALJ's decision is with 2 No. 01 4226 out substantial evidence. That the statutory presumption for date of onset violates the Administrative Procedure Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Should have heeded Henry David Thoreau's warning to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER 1992 as a term of an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is a black lung benefits case that began nearly twenty five years ago with the death of a coal mining employee named Harold Milliken. The ALJ concluded that Evelyn Milliken was entitled to survivor's benefits. We conclude that the Board's affirmance was not legally erroneous and that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. I. BACKGROUND 3 The only new evidence of any import introduced at a modification hearing was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER White was a borrowed servant of appellee Bethlehem Steel. The district court found that he was a borrowed servant. Because the LHWCA mandates that an employee's sole remedy with regard to his employer is through the LHWCA. Because White was under the authoritative direction and control of Bethlehem Steel at the time of his injury. About 100 were assigned to Bethlehem Steel. White was assigned to the New Ore Pier within the Bethlehem Steel yard. Langenfelder would have no choice but to terminate that individual. White was working on the M/V JUNIPER. Which was berthed at the New Ore Pier. White maintains that his injury was caused by a lack of light in the hold. Alleging that the company was negligent for allowing him to remain in the hold after dark without any light source. It does not allow an employee to maintain a tort action if the employee is a borrowed servant. The district court then concluded that White was a borrowed servant of Bethlehem Steel due to the control that Bethlehem Steel supervisors exercised over him. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The sole issue on appeal is whether we should construe or extend the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. He was actually employed by Tidewater Temps but worked on behalf of Mid Atlantic Coastings (MidAtlantic). Which was used to load sand for sandblasting. The crane operator's negligence and Norfolk's use of an inadequate communication signaling system were the reasons for her son's death. The Court noted that at common law there was no civil action for an injury that resulted in death and that English maritime law also had no cause of action for wrongful death on the high seas. The Court concluded that because it is now established that in the courts of the United States no action at law can be maintained for [wrongful death] in the absence of a statute giving the right. We are forced to the conclusion that no such action will lie in the courts of the United States under the general maritime law. Which originally was an obscure and rarely used cause of action for which many state wrongful death statutes did not account. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The materiality of his false statements is an element of the offense that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The occurrence of any one of these events could have affected his eligibility status. so. It was not informed that he received workers' compensation benefits or the medical payments. Baumgardner maintained that his work with vacuums was merely a hobby. He stated that there were no months from January 1979 until April 1992 in which he had made more than $75 or worked more than fifteen hours. The government charged Baumgardner with making a false statement to a government agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for reporting that there were no months in which he earned more than $75.00 or worked more than fifteen hours. He was also charged with concealing the receipt of workers' compensation benefits with the fraudulent intent to secure payment in a greater amount than was due him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(4). convicted of both offenses. He was He was also ordered to He was sentenced to twenty three months imprisonment and three years supervised release. pay over $200. |
![]() |
98-9531 -- HENNINGSON V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 09/16/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner Maxine Allred Henningson seeks review of the final decision by the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (Board) denying her request for waiver of recovery of overpaid black lung benefits. We have jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Benefits Review Board (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. It also dismissed plaintiff's ADEA claim because plaintiff failed to present evidence that he was replaced by a younger worker. The district court ruled that plaintiff presented no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff's separation from employment was causally connected to the fact that North Care provided him with FMLA rights. That is. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings. Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff alleged he was replaced by a younger worker. 1111 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that one required element of prima facie ADEA discrimination claim is replacement by a younger worker). That Hamm was simply hired as an additional maintenance worker and months later plaintiff resigned. Before plaintiff failed to finish his repair tasks or was hospitalized. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs are former employees of UPS who claimed to have been injured during the course of their employment with UPS. Each Plaintiff applied for and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. Filed a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Are at the heart of this case. We will discuss the facts of each separately in the interest of clarity. Which were neither MBEs nor WBEs. One or more members of a minority group must have ownership of 51% of the company. One or more members of a minority group must have dayto day management and control. There was an additional limitation. An established business was one which. This restriction indicates that Chicago was not interested in subsidizing entrenched. Even if the businesses were owned by women or minorities. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellant. Rizzotti and Craig and Macauley were on brief for appellee. Because we conclude that the motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted with respect to some of Lattimore's claims and because it appears that the jury's verdict may have rested on those claims. Was hired by Polaroid in 1977 as a machine operator. His supervisor was Bill Mitchell. The restriction was renewed each year until 1989 and. Lattimore was assigned to light duty work. There is the door. He was seen by Dr. Hillier provided Lattimore with the first in a series of reports stating that Lattimore was disabled from returning to work. An employee is eligible for STD benefits if medical reports submitted by the employee's treating physician support the conclusion that the employee is totally disabled. 3 the results of which will be deemed conclusive with respect to the employee's ability to work. Approximately twelve weeks after Lattimore was accorded STD status. Hillier indicated that Lattimore was improving and should be able to return to work on July 24 if an examination scheduled for July 21 showed the progress that Dr. |
![]() |
PHILLIPS V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO. INS. On their claim State Farm was obligated to pay a portion of the attorney fees and costs they incurred to obtain a settlement from a third party tort feasor. Wendell Phillips and Robert Gregson were driving southward on Interstate 19 in Pima County. Gregson was insured until sometime after they filed their complaint. Gregson was an uninsured or underinsured motorist. |
![]() |
96-3159 -- RODRIGUEZ V. IBP INC. -- 07/20/1998 The case is ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Pascual R. Contending he was terminated in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits. We reverse and remand because there are disputed issues of material fact. Rodriguez began working at IBP's Garden City. His work was satisfactory. He was hit in the elbow by a bucket of meat. A week later he was examined by a doctor. Rodriguez was not able to return to his regular job. He was allowed to work in a variety of generally light work jobs. While during this period IBP assigned him jobs that he felt he was physically unable to do. Informed IBP he was claiming entitlement to workers' compensation as a result of the April 1990 accident. (The record does not contain further information indicating whether this hearing was held. Or whether Rodriguez was successful in seeking benefits.) On Friday. They were apparently not jobs Rodriguez had requested. Bolton told him that if he was unable to do these jobs. Rodriguez was to call in every day before his shift began if he was not working that day. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Pollard also claims that she was wrongfully discharged under Maryland law. Because Pollard's impairment during her recovery from back surgery was a temporary one not covered by the ADA. I. Plaintiff Mary Pollard was an Area Supervisor for defendant High's of Baltimore. Pollard began working for High's in 1985 as a store clerk and was eventually promoted to the Area Supervisor position. Area Supervisors are responsible for monitoring ten to fifteen stores. This requires spending considerable time driving from store to store within an assigned area and occasionally filling in for clerks when clerks and/or managers are unable to work. Pollard was informed by her personal physician. She was not cleared to return to work until April 1998. Brager determined that Pollard could work with the following restrictions: Pollard was limited to working eight hour days. Was prohibited from doing any repetitive bending or any lifting POLLARD v. Was prohibited from driving for extended periods of time. High's told Pollard that it did not have |
![]() |
97-9559 -- BROYLES V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 05/07/1998 After her claim was administratively denied. We agree and accordingly transfer this case to the Seventh Circuit. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was walking alongside the tracks late one night inspecting his train's brakes with a lantern when he stepped into a hole and injured his leg. The district court should have so instructed the jury. The remaining claims of instructional error are without merit. Instructing the jury to deliberate on damages regardless of 1 (...continued) between any of the several States . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce. No. 04 1960 3 its findings on liability was not error. A cautionary instruction to deter juror speculation about medical and workers' compensation benefits was not required. I. Background This appeal is about jury instructions. So only brief reference to the evidence adduced at trial is necessary. Schmitz testified that the hole into which he fell was surrounded by |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. * injury was covered by the LHWCA. Holding that We the platform was not a covered situs under 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). have jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). Which was used to transport employees from Venice. Is accessible only by vessel. above. Thibodeaux injured himself after observing that a discharge line located five feet below the deck of the platform was leaking oil. Upon determining that he could better inspect the line from There are docking areas for the two water craft noted a small wooden platform below the deck and adjacent to the line. An ALJ held Thibodeaux was covered by the LHWCA as he was a maritime employee and his injury occurred on a pier. Reasoning that the oil production platform was not a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The case is also before us on a cross appeal that USX filed from the portion of the district court's order of June 27. We will reverse the order of June 27. To the extent that they are 1 Although this action implicates multiple policies. Inasmuch as the issue before us is the same under all the policies we refer to the action as though it involves a single policy. In this regard we note that the magistrate judge in her Report and Recommendation that became the district court's opinion sometimes referred to all the policies singularly. 3 in favor of USX and will affirm the order and judgment to the extent that they are in favor of Liberty Mutual. We will remand the case to the district court to enter a final summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual on the portions of the summary judgment that we are reversing. The Parties and the Relevant Insurance Contract USX is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Liberty Mutual is a mutual insurance company founded by an act of the Massachusetts Legislature with its principal place of business in that state.2 In 1912. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because the worker's disability was due in part to pre existing conditions. An administrative law judge found that the employer merited § 908(f) relief because the worker's disability was materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the asbestosis alone. Because there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's award. The Claim under the LHWCA Callis Carmines ( |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. SUBA (1/9/1998, NO. 95-9408) Managed Risk were convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United States. Kelly was convicted of four additional counts of mail fraud (Counts 112 115). 30 32). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Including: it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law (JAML) on Karcher's failureto promote and retaliation claims. 3) that it is entitled to a new trial because of erroneous evidentiary rulings and erroneous jury instructions. Karcher was an employee of Alco Controls (Alco). Who are represented by District No. 9. At least one third of the union employees are female. There were only three basic types of equipment in the machine shop. Set up workers and The set up workers manually calibrated the machines to manufacture a particular refrigerator part and were then responsible for maintaining the machine so that it would produce consistently accurate parts. After the machine was set up. Where the adjustments in the machines were set up by computer. tooling had previously been made by hand. They agree that the new jobs were classified as |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. SUBA (1/9/1998, NO. 95-9408) Managed Risk were convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United States. Kelly was convicted of four additional counts of mail fraud (Counts 112 115). 30 32). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on the brief. The matter in dis pute is covered by the arbitration clause in the CBA. The Board should have deferred to arbitration. Approximately 20 Burns employees at Yankee Rowe were represented by a union affiliated with United Government Security Officers of America ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER At ultimate issue is the defendant employers' failure to hire the employees engaged at the site from the plaintiff union's hiring hall. The parties have been ceaselessly embroiled in this matter for over eight years. During this time they have appeared before the district court thrice and an arbitrator once. They are now before this Court for the third time. Given what appears to us to be the relatively modest stakes and the fact that the primary point of contention in the case will probably never recur. [fn2] it is unfortunate that their litigation strategies have prevented them from settling. We can only hope that the opinion that follows will edge them toward a swift resolution of their remaining disputes instead of propelling them back to the arbitrator for another round of pugnacious battle. One we will answer in the affirmative. Is whether the district court erred in not applying retrospectively the National Labor Relation Board's decision in John Deklewa & Sons. A host of other questions is also before us. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judges. *Judge Russell heard oral argument in this case but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). Circuit Judge: We are presented with the jurisdictional question of whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Petition for review of the determination of the Benefits Review Board (BRB) that claimant Robert Castro is entitled to total disability compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. General Construction also claims that the method the administrative law judge (ALJ) used to calculate Castro's average weekly wage was incorrect and that the OWCP violated Gen 2402 GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. The ALJ's wage calculation was correct under Ninth Circuit law. The BRB must accept the ALJ's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). We |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Rojo's action was barred by a prior settlement (1) This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Her attorney was clothed with apparent authority to settle all claims against IBP arising from her accidental injury. Rojo contends the court erred because her intent to settle the wrongful discharge claim was a material disputed fact. The district court should not have granted summary judgement. Because the parties are fully versed in the facts underlying Ms. These facts were deemed by the court to be |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs are seven master firefighters employed by the City. It is not 1 Under the Commonwealth of Virginia's emergency medical services regulations. Basic Life Support is defined as that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER ERRATA SHEET The concurring opinion of Judge Stahl should be attached to the opinion in case number 93 1422 which was issued March 24. The panel's decision heightens the tension between the two competing purposes of the vaccine compensation program: holding down vaccine prices by cutting litigation costs while ensuring that the injured are adequately compensated. The defendant argues that the increase in litigation costs associated with compensating a relatively small group of victims' family members through state tort systems will place at risk a much larger group of unvaccinated individuals due to price sensitivity in the vaccine market. I respectfully suggest that this is an issue which Congress may wish to revisit. Fordham & Starrett were on brief for appellant. Provides a special procedure to compensate those who are injured by certain vaccines. The question before us in this appeal (under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)) is whether the Act also bars the family of such a person from bringing a tort suit to obtain compensation for their own. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The question presented is whether settlements he made with others of his employers should be credited against the amount owed by the last responsible employer. Holding that denial of the credit is compelled by the purposes of the credit doctrine and 33 U.S.C. § 903(e) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the LHWCA). He was exposed to asbestos from pine lagging on the ships and to metal fumes from cutters and welders in both ALEXANDER v. He was diagnosed with bronchiestasis. He was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis. Among his employers were Southwest Marine. The ALJ ruled that Triple A was not entitled to a credit for Alexander's settlements with the three other employers. Or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law . . . shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter. Does not clearly state whether credit is due for settlement awards with other employers with whom settlement was reached while there was uncertainty as to who the last covered employer would be. |
![]() |
01-5077A -- TRAINOR V. APOLLO METAL SPECIALTIES INC. -- 12/13/2002 It is ordered that the petition for rehearing is denied. The motion for clarification is granted. The court has determined that the opinion filed December 13. The opinion is otherwise unchanged. A copy of the amended opinion is attached to this order. Entered for the Court PATRICK FISHER. Ruling that Apollo was not an employer covered by the ADA because it did not have fifteen or more employees in each of twenty calendar weeks during the relevant period as required by 42 U.S.C. |
![]() |
01-5077 -- TRAINOR V. APOLLO METAL SPECIALTIES INC. -- 12/13/2002 Ruling that Apollo was not an employer covered by the ADA because it did not have fifteen or more employees in each of twenty calendar weeks during the relevant period as required by 42 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER There is an exemption for workers in retail stores or other service establishments (including the automobile repair service that is the defendant in this case) who (1) are paid a wage that exceeds one and a half times the minimum wage and (2) receive more than half their compensation 2 No. 06 2645 in the form of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was J. Of counsel on the brief were Jules Bernstein and Linda Lipsett. With him on the brief were Peter D. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Ivy Hill removed the action to federal court on the ground that the meal period claims were |
![]() |
96-1191 -- STANLEY V. U.S. -- 04/09/1998 31 30 608 |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER McCallum were on brief. PA were on brief. Knight is entitled to workers' compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Even when he was not directly working with asbestos. He labored in close proximity to other employees who were. The matter was eventually referred to an ALJ for adjudication. A hearing was held in November 2000. BIW argued that Gertrude's claim was untimely since it was filed over three years after William's death. She had complied with the statute of limitations. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The issues were |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER It refused to award fees under section 928(b) for his knee injury claim because the amount tendered by his employer was greater than the compensation awarded. We have jurisdiction over this timely petition pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). Contending that Richardson was fabricating his back injury. Richardson's back and knee claims were consolidated for hearing. The Board concluded that Richardson was entitled to RICHARDSON v. Richardson was not entitled to additional money on his back claim. We do not defer to the Board's interpretation of the Act because it is not a policymaking agency. Richardson argues that he is entitled to fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a). Which states: If the employer . . . declines to pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim for compensation . . . on the ground that there is no liability . . . and the person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim. Fees under subsection (a) are available even though the Company voluntarily paid compensation before receiving notice of the claim. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because the administrative law judge's rulings were supported by substantial evidence. She developed problems with her left hand and was treated by Dr. She was given temporary light duty work restrictions and subsequently returned to her duties aboard ships. She was assigned to work in a building doing |
![]() |
98-9545 -- U.S. STEEL MINING CO. INC. V. DIRECTOR OFFICE WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 12/03/1999 Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. Holybee is entitled to survivor's benefits if pneumoconiosis was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Rez Zayas was on brief for appellants.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Holding Rocco Morganti ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER (Uticon) was awarded a bid from the Kentucky Department of Transportation (KYDOT) to build a bridge and related structures on Kentucky Highway 101 in Edmonson County. Was then fastened to the support angles to form a solid decking upon which concrete would be poured to make the bridge surface. Lock was employed by Javier Steel as a welder who was welding support angles. Javier Steel was responsible for providing workers' compensation benefits for all of its employees. Deck was concerned that the angles could possibly break under the heavy weight of the concrete poured on the decking to form the roadway. Javier Steel was made a third party defendant. Was an intervening plaintiff. Lock opposed the motion claiming that Javier Steel was not working under its contract with Uticon. Lock claims he fell and was injured because Uticon did not provide a fall safety system for which it was contractually obligated under its contract with KYDOT. Lock alleged that Uticon was not protected from liability by the workers' compensation provisions. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With whom |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was unable to return to work until July 18. Was forced to cease his duties after experiencing considerable pain and swelling in his knee. Zebott was paid temporary total disability benefits and a ten percent permanent partial disability of the left lower extremity. Both Fransen and Zebott were granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Standard of Review Our review of the Board's decisions is limited. The Board must affirm the ALJ's findings unless they are contrary to law or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. This principle applies even if the Board might have reached a factual conclusion different from that reached by the ALJ. Because our sole purpose on appeal is to assure that the Board 3 followed this standard of review. Substantial evidence is |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs are or were members of the Defendant Transportation Workers Union of America ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The total judgment was for $614. While these assurances were inconsistent with the terms of the plan. As the terms were in the plan and also were described in the summary plan description which the appellants provided to Haberern. The appellants argue that recovery on this claim is barred because damages for a breach of fiduciary duty cannot be awarded to a plan beneficiary under section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. We find that the reduction in Haberern's salary was a management decision for which they cannot be liable under ERISA. We determine that the district court's conclusion that a letter Haberern's attorney sent to the appellants' attorney was a request for information within the meaning of section 105(a). Is erroneous as a matter of law. We will reverse the district court's judgment awarding damages on all these grounds. We have noted a comment in the appellants' brief that the district court barely distinguished among the appellants in reaching its conclusions. We recognize that the district court may have entered judgment on certain claims against particular appellants not liable on those claims. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER He was in Cubic's employ for three months prior to becoming associated with Sprint PCS. Gagnon was directly supervised by Kathleen Wilder. Gagnon was promoted in October 1997 to CBT Manager. Wilder was out of the office on maternity leave and Jim Keenan. Vice President Jim Mendenhall was instrumental in promoting Gagnon to the manager position. We also note that there are two pending motions taken with the case. Appellant's Motion for Judicial Reassignment is denied. Appellant's Motion for Waiver of Costs is granted pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h). 2 1 Because Gagnon's position was new at Sprint PCS. It did not have a dollar figure assigned for compensation. The MRP is not a guaranteed salary point. When a salary increase greater than ten percent is sought. A Compensation Exception Request form stating the amount of the raise requested is completed. Mendenhall's rejection of the initial compensation request is an important part of Gagnon's claim of discrimination. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is hereby amended as follows: 1. Replace the second sentence with: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Although the goal of California's apprenticeship programs is to promote economic opportunity. Its regulations have caused considerable concern to the employers affiliated with the Associated Builders and Contractors of Southern California. Are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. Was on brief for appellee. The retrofitted HUDDELL was towed to Simplex's facility at Newington. At which point three options were available for getting from the tank onto the 'tween deck floor: (1) holding onto a |
![]() |
97-7116A -- WILES V. MICHELIN NORTH AMERICA INC. -- 04/21/1999 Please note the word |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We affirm all the substantive decisions of the district court on issues of federal law.1 We hold that under 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A) tip income is included within the definition of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We affirm all the substantive decisions of the district court on issues of federal law.1 We hold that under 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A) tip income is included within the definition of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Albert Borda was awarded black lung benefits on two merged claims. Of the 1978 claim until after the 1988 claim was filed and never informed Consolidation Coal that the 1978 claim was still pending on reconsideration. Consolidation Coal contends that it was denied due process by the OWCP's delay and failure to notify it of Borda's claim and urges us to dismiss it as the responsible operator and to direct the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to pay Borda's benefits. Which was also sent in with my original claim. *** Sir. This is ALL of my work record that had been mailed you. This was my record for all of my employable years. I have nothing more to send you. It is about 30 yrs. give or take a bit. Some medical evidence was sent also. Stating that I do have Black Lung. Have marked them with 3 red *** asterisks. Will be easily picked up. You should have received more evidence from Fairmont Clinic. His claim was being reconsidered. Suspecting that the government may have lost his file. The file that the OWCP sent him was nearly empty and did not contain his multiple submissions of documents evidencing his coal mine employment and pneumoconiosis. |
![]() |
97-7116 -- WILES V. MICHELIN NORTH AMERICA INC. -- 04/21/1999 1291 and affirm. |
![]() |
99-9526 -- WYOMING FUEL CO. V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 07/18/2000 The ALJ concluded that Arnoldi had established he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of his coal mine employment. The Board concluded that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not contrary to law.
We review the Board's decision |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on brief for appellees. We note Plaintiffs' statement that |
![]() |
00-1205 -- BARZANJI V. SEALY MATTRESS MANUFACTURING CO. -- 03/20/2001 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Jamal Baranji appeals the district court's summary judgment dismissing his discrimination complaint on the ground that he failed to file an administrative charge within three hundred days of the alleged acts of discrimination. We affirm. Plaintiff was employed by the Sealy Mattress Company from September 25. During this time he suffered a back injury for which he was treated conservatively and was advised to restrict his lifting and hours. Sealy contested plaintiff's workers' compensation and disability claims on the ground that the injury was not work related. Sealy informed plaintiff that it did not have any work available to fit his medical restrictions. That he should notify them when he was released for unrestricted work. He was informed on June 10. He was told he did not speak English well. He was paid less than employees who were hired later and his coworkers made fun of him. He was not placed on light duty after his doctor released him on May 19. |
![]() |
98-5194 -- TAYLOR V. PESPI-COLA CO. -- 11/12/1999 The district court concluded as a matter of law that Plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired under the ADA. Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not claim the letter and it was returned to Roth. It was returned to Roth. On July 2. Plaintiff was unable to return to work in any employment position with Defendants and did not know when he would be physically able to return. 1996 were those which required qualifications Plaintiff had stated he was unable and would continue to be unable to perform. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER After Moler explained that Sosby was released by her own physician. Sosby was able to return to work on January 3. Was unable to reach her until March 10. Miller was suspicious of Sosby's alleged injuries. While Sosby was allegedly on medical leave. 2000 injury because Sur Tech reported that Sosby was not at 2 No. 05 4629 Sosby v. Sosby contends that she was either at home or at the hospital the entire time. Randolph's examination were inconsistent with Sosby's description of her accidents. Sosby was still on medical leave at that time. Gula determined that she was |
![]() |
96-9522 -- BERTHOLF V. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 10/03/1997 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner Dorothy Maynard Bertholf. Petitioner failed to establish that the decedent's death was |
![]() |
03-1209 -- ELLIOT V. TURNER CONSTRUCTION CO. -- 08/24/2004 1291 and affirm in part and reverse in part.
Turner Construction was hired as the general contractor for construction of Invesco Field at Mile High Stadium in Denver. The company was required to place a temporary pedestrian bridge across the Platte River to accommodate pedestrian traffic. Elliot testified that his job responsibilities included: go[ing] to a job site . . .and show[ing] the contractor basically how the bridge was put together. How a launch . . . was enacted. What equipment is suggested as far as what you would use to push or launch the bridge with. Making sure that the bridge is put together correctly. Mak[ing] sure that all the bolts are tight and sort of an inspector. Elliot's function was in part as a consultant and in part as an inspector. He testified that as the panels were hooked together. All the bolts were tightened. All the pieces were in the right place facing the right way. He stated that |
![]() |
97-9555 -- WARD V. DIRECTOR OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS -- 06/04/1998 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. This application is petitioner's third duplicate claim under the Act. It affirmed. We review the Board's order to determine whether it correctly concluded that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence and was not contrary to law. See Northern Coal Co. v. |
![]() |
96-3018 -- SMITH V. MIDLAND BRAKE INC. -- 03/13/1998 Plaintiff Robert Smith was employed by the defendant. Plaintiff was on a leave of absence and was receiving workers' compensation benefits. He contends that there were numerous job openings at Midland Brake that should have been made available to him and asserts that defendant either could have obtained or did obtain releases from his physician for him to work in those positions. Contends that it made efforts to return plaintiff to work in different positions at the company but was unable to obtain a written release from plaintiff's physician allowing him to return to work. On September 7. Plaintiff asserted that he was discharged in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He was discharged in retaliation for pursuing his workers' compensation claim. Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.. |
![]() |
98-4034 -- CERKA V. SALT LAKE COUNTY -- 03/03/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Cindy Cerka appeals the district court's order dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff appeals. We review de novo whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). |
![]() |
02-6126O -- HAMMOCK V. U.S. -- 03/28/2003 If the vendor here qualifies as the defendant retailer's independent contractor (or if that is not a threshold predicate for assessment of the latter's status as a principal employer under |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Roth is permanently and totally disabled as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome that developed while Roth was working for the Homestake Mining Company. settle his claim. 000 to Homestake had initially refused to pay the workers' compensation benefits to which Roth was entitled. 000 settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim without also allowing Roth to show that a third of that amount was paid to Roth's attorney. jury. Roth was employed by Homestake from 1972 to 1990. syndrome. Roth was unable Roth also argues that the District Court erred when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the to work after 1990 as a result of the recurring effects of carpal tunnel Roth was classified as permanently and totally disabled. One Before Homestake settled third of which was paid to Roth's attorney. action in the District Court. from Homestake. Roth had filed this bad faith Roth sought both actual and punitive damages Roth claimed that part of his actual damages was the attorney fees that he had incurred in order to recover the workers' compensation benefits Homestake wrongly refused to pay. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Roth is permanently and totally disabled as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome that developed while Roth was working for the Homestake Mining Company. Homestake had initially refused to pay the workers' compensation benefits to which Roth was entitled. 000 settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim without also allowing Roth to show that a third of that amount was paid to Roth's attorney. Roth was employed by Homestake from 1972 to 1990. Roth was unable to work after 1990 as a result of the recurring effects of carpal tunnel syndrome. Roth was classified as permanently and totally disabled. One third of which was paid to Roth's attorney. Roth claimed that part of his actual damages was the attorney fees that he had incurred in order to recover the workers' compensation benefits Homestake wrongly refused to pay. Homestake argued that if any attorney fees were to be awarded in Roth's present action. Roth claims that evidence of the attorney fees should have been admitted at the trial because the District Court allowed the jury to see an exhibit that showed that Roth had received $326. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is that Ledbetter may prevail only if she can prove that unlawful discrimination tainted an annual review of her salary made within 180 days of her filling a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Is how Title VII's timely filing requirement applies in this specie of disparate pay cases that is. Because we need not do so to determine whether Goodyear is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. All we need to do is examine the last salary decision Goodyear made that affected Ledbetter's pay during the limitations period. We have done that and conclude that no reasonable jury could find that the decision was discrimanitorily motivated. Goodyear's Gadsden plant was divided into several discrete units. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Charles P. May was on the brief. With him on the brief was Carol A. Is considered affirmed as of that date for purposes of obtain ing appellate review. The final decision we have before us is the ALJ's decision. We have no final decision and hence no jurisdiction a Board decision to remand is not a final order within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. s 921(c). The 1928 Act incorporated by reference the provisions of what was then entitled the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The 1928 Act is kept alive by the General Savings Statute. We have confronted this situation. The subsequent 1984 amendments were without effect on the law of the District. |
![]() |
98-6112 -- HUGGARD V. GOLDEN CORRAL CORP. -- 02/09/1999 The cause was based on diversity jurisdiction and asserted only state law causes of action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Deborah J. With him on the briefs were Bennett L. With him on the brief were Thomas O. With him on the brief were Richard M. Edward Shakin were on the brief of ILEC Intervenors in support of respondent. Although this relay is imperceptible to the caller. How the call is paid for matters a great deal to the participating telecommunications carriers. The `originating' carrier A is ordinarily required to compensate the `terminating' carrier B for the use of carrier B's facilities. |
![]() |
97-8116 -- U.S. V. HENRY -- 01/11/1999 Henry appeals on several grounds: (1) the government failed to prove a statutory element by not showing what effect the unreported income would have had on his benefits if reported. Henry was employed as a construction maintenance foreman for the Department of Justice. Was awarded disability benefits until he became employed again in August 1980. He had several different jobs and was on and off disability. From April 1992 until his benefits were terminated upon his conviction. Even if your activities were part time or intermittent. Report as your |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We conclude that judgment as a matter of law was inappropriate as to the hostile work environment claim because 1) the plaintiff appellant alleged harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and a sufficient basis for imputing the offending conduct to her employer. 2) the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on an affirmative defense as to which they bore the burden of proof. We conclude that judgment as a matter of law was appropriate as to the plaintiff appellant's retaliation Decided: June 14. Greta Fairbrother presented significant evidence of sexual harassment that was sharply disputed by her employer. The following facts are either undisputed. Whiting is divided into six units. Forensic Treatment Specialists are assigned to work on specific units during one of three specific shifts. Fairbrother was the only female working the second shift on Unit One. Unit One was permeated with hostility toward her. Much of it was of a sexual nature. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Petitioner was clearly entitled to a de minimis awar d. We will reverse the Board and remand for determination of that award. 1. Our jurisdiction over these matters is pursuant to 33 U.S.C. Because we conclude that ALJ Bar nett's award of attorney's fees was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. That the Boar d was therefore without authority to disturb that award. We will reverse the Board and reinstate ALJ Barnett's award of attorney's fees. I. The basic facts are not in dispute. Because he was unable to continue his previous employment due to his disability. Is a workers' compensation statute that fixes disability benefits for maritime workers who are injured on the job. 3 disability. Award any compensation for lost wage ear ning capacity because Petitioner was then employed in another position for wages comparable to his pre injury ear nings. Despite her finding that Petitioner's |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.A. was on brief. PA was on brief. This case is properly before us pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 921(c). He was exposed to asbestos. Commercial Union Insurance Companies was Bath Iron Works' workers' compensation insurance carrier. Jones was employed with Bath Iron Works in a position which did not expose him to airway irritants and was able to work following the appropriate treatment for his disease. The new work area was poorly ventilated. As he was totally disabled. Bath Iron Works maintains that Jones' brief for this hearing was the first time that he argued that he had suffered a new injury and that his award should be based upon his average weekly wage at the time when he stopped working in February 1991. There was no reason to adjust the date of the award. 1991 and that he was. The Benefits Review Board held that there was evidence that could result in a finding of new injury in 1991. The ALJ stated he felt such a ruling was necessary |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Whether he is entitled to unscheduled compensation under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21) on the ground that his shoulder injury prevented him from accepting a more lucrative foreman's position. If neither form of compensation is granted. Petitioner is entitled to a de minimis award under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). We hold that petitioner is entitled to neither scheduled nor unscheduled recovery. That he is entitled to a de minimis award to preserve the possibility of a modified award should his earnings fall below pre injury levels. Until he was able to secure a mostly clerical position with Eagle. Keenan's employment history and earnings since the injury are presently in dispute. The only fact that remains in dispute is the probability of future changes in Keenan's economic position. Keenan argues that he is entitled to receive scheduled benefits from Eagle for permanent partial disability to his arm under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(1). That he is entitled to unscheduled benefits for permanent partial disability as defined by his economic losses under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Judge Hilton dismissed Pueschel's FTCA suit on the bases that it (1) should have been brought under Title VII. (2) was barred. By the doctrine of res judicata because in a prior Title VII action brought by Pueschel the FAA was found not to have discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and work disability or to have retaliated against her for filing prior complaints. (3) failed to state a claim in light of the fact that Virginia employers do not have a common law duty to ensure that their employees are not subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation. Specifically his conclusion that Pueschel was precluded from bringing a Title VII action asserting discrimination and retaliation claims arising out of her FAA employment. Pueschel further contends that she was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the FAA's motion to dismiss her FTCA suit because the district court did not hold a hearing prior to ruling on the FAA's motion. Pueschel argues that Judge Wexler erred by concluding that her Title VII suit was barred by Judge Hilton's dismissal of her FTCA suit. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER An administrative Declaratory Order interpreting the Act are preempted by ERISA. We find the Act and its regulations are not preempted because they confer broad authority that may be implemented in a manner consistent with ERISA. Therefore we will affirm the judgment of the district court striking the Declaratory Order. The Prevailing Wage Act The purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The factual discussion that follows is drawn from the ALJ's findings. The Union was recognized in 1967 as the exclusive representative of: All production and maintenance employees. Successive collective bargaining agreements were in place from the time the Union was organized in 1967 until 1994 when the present dispute arose. The Union and Pirelli entered into negotiations for a new contract to replace the agreement that was due to expire at midnight on May 1. The President explained that its paper cable product was no longer viable and that Pirelli's overall profitability had been reduced. The Union was not inclined to accept the proposed reductions in pay and benefits and stated that it was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Nugent were on brief. Were on brief. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for petitioner. Section 8(f) of the LHWCA provides that an employer obliged to pay disability benefits to an employee may be relieved from full liability if the employee's compensable disability was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court found that Plaintiffs were not engaged in |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Who was employed by ITO as a longshore worker.1 The question presented for our review concerns the proper measure of benefits under Section 8(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The combined weekly benefit awarded by the BRB to Green in compensation for his independently disabling ankle and shoulder injuries exceeded the amount to which he would have been entitled had he been totally disabled. We agree with ITO that such a result is illogical. Green was entitled to additional compensation for the lasting attenuation of his physical abilities. Green would have been foreclosed from engaging in his former work: The Employer argues that the . . . injury to Claimant's shoulder does not cause Claimant to be disabled when considered alone. The compensation for the particular disability is expressed in terms of payment for a fixed number of weeks at a rate of two thirds the claimant's average weekly wage at the time of the injury. Where the loss is incomplete. The duration of the award is proportionately reduced. § 908(c)(19). |
![]() |
NOBLE V. UNITED STATES (6/29/2000, NO. 99-14328) We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because there was a substantial question as to whether the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. ( |
![]() |
NOBLE V. UNITED STATES (6/29/2000, NO. 99-14328) We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because there was a substantial question as to whether the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because there was a substantial question as to whether the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER While his employer voluntarily paid him benefits under the other plan after that judgment was entered. Providing that where |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs have frequently sought damages from affiliated corporations. Plaintiffs with claims arising from non WARN Act sources of law against debt laden or bankrupt corporations have occasionally attempted to sue the corporations' major secured lenders. On the theory that the lenders have exercised such control over the corporations that veil piercing is appr opriate. The question before us is whether the for mer employees of Component Technology (CompTech). Have set forth sufficient evidence to cr eate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether . Requires us to consider not only the prerequisites for parent/subsidiary liability in the WARN Act context (as will be shown. That 2 jurisprudence is apposite here). Courts have been extr emely reluctant to hold lenders liable for their borrowers' actions. Some version of the |
![]() |
SEATTLE OPERA V. NLRB Lemly was on brief. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Jonathan A. Bullard were on the brief for amici curiae Consumer Federal of America and Fund Democracy. Speyer was on the brief for amicus curiae Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association in support of petitioner. 2 Rex A. Staples was on the brief for amicus curiae North American Securities Administrators Association. With her on the brief were Brian G. Circuit Judge: Brokers and dealers are not subject to the requirements of the Investment Advisers Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lemly was on brief. Were on brief. The Board held that the Opera's refusal to bargain with the American Guild of Musical Artists (Union) after the Union was certified as the collective bargaining representa tive of an allegedly appropriate unit of the Opera's employ ees constituted an unfair labor practice (ULP) under section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). It contests the Board's conclusion that the Opera's auxiliary choristers are |
![]() |
96-3413 -- ALDRICH V. BOEING CO. -- 07/01/1998 The district court held that Aldrich was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim under the ADA and. That he had failed to establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability. |
![]() |
96-6270 -- BINGHAM V. DYNAIR FUELING INC. -- 04/29/1997 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Michael C. Claiming he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Okla. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Of counsel on the brief were Richard Tinsman. Also of counsel on the brief was Dawn Finlayson. With her on the brief were Peter D. Of counsel was Christian J. Of counsel on the brief were Robert H. Of counsel on the brief were Gregory O'Duden. I A primary responsibility of the Customs and Border Protection Service ( |
![]() |
NEW VALLEY CORP. V. GILLIAM, DORETHA Dobbs argued the cause and was on the brief for petitioner New Valley Corporation.  . Woodall argued the cause and was on the brief for respondent Doretha Gilliam. The LHWCA was made applicable to the District of Columbia by the 1928 District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act. holding that legal marriage alone is insufficient to confer eligibility for survivor benefits. Courts must examine the facts of the relationship to determine if there |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Wickstrom was on brief for appellant.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court held that the state law claims were barred by the state Workmen's Compensation Act. The following facts are either undisputed or were properly found by the district court. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Dobbs argued the cause and was on the brief for petitioner New Valley Corporation. Woodall argued the cause and was on the brief for respondent Doretha Gilliam. The LHWCA was made applicable to the District of Columbia by the 1928 District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act. Holding that legal marriage alone is insufficient to confer eligibility for survivor benefits. Courts must examine the facts of the relationship to determine if there |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We conclude that the BRB erred in terminating Plesh's benefits and we will therefore reverse. 1979.[fn2] This application was governed by the guidelines set forth in 20 C.F.R. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hybrids can be grown only if the plant's tassel is removed so that it may be fertilized by a different variety. Though machines have been developed for this task Remington prefers hand detasseling when that is feasible. Removing unwanted plants (rogueing) to improve the average quality of a plot also is best done by hand. Their main target is Remington. Concluded that Zarate was the workers' only employer. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Remington and its two senior managers. The agreement between Remington and Zarate is a standard form for creating an independent contractor relation. The workers' principal contention is that it just doesn't matter whether Zarate was an independent contractor. Is that. There is no reason to read it in that fashion. Whether Remington is bound by Zarate's promises is wholly a matter of state law (whether of Indiana or Texas is a subject the parties do not discuss). This is so even if Zarate was Remington's agent. The AWPA likewise is silent about guarantees of work. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Article 35(1) of the agreement provides: Bargaining unit members will receive the same cost of living increases paid to other MFR employees pursuant to the directive of MFR's funding source. The parties understand that the timing and amount of any such increase is entirely dictated by the funding source. Bargaining unit members will be reviewed and will be considered for a merit increase. . . . MFR will guarantee at least that for each bargaining unit employee the sum of any [cost of living increase] paid during the year and the merit increase will be as follows: 2002 4%. If the [cost of living] increase for 2004 is 2.5%. 2004 bargaining unit members will receive at least an additional 1.0%. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Holding that the Workers' claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER UFCW argues that the District Court1 should have dismissed Daggitt's sexual harassment claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Asserting that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the union because it was not an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This case presents the question of whether construction workers' |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Donald Scott Lagatree was refused employment as a legal secretary by Luce. Both cases are closely on point.' |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Tidyman's argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying Tidyman's' motion for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient. That the size of the jury verdict was excessive. Tidyman's argues that the Washington state law is intended to cover only accrued wages that are not paid. Arguing that we should not apply the Title VII damages cap to these awards because it is unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the district court's determination that the plaintiffs were not entitled to punitive damages. We conclude that Title VII's cap on punitive damages is constitutional. Was promoted to officer manager. Hemmings was promoted to controller in 1987. Hemmings was concerned about the lack of women in management positions at Tidyman's and what she perceived as roadblocks to their promotions. Was promoted to Chief Operating Officer and the CFO position opened. Trial witnesses testified that Hemmings was wellqualified for the CFO position. Hemmings was interviewed for the position along with another woman and one man. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Defendant had denied her request based on a provision of the FMLA which excludes from FMLA eligibility any employee who is employed at a particular |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Where Chiao was injured solely by the negligence of a co employee. Despite the policy's limitation of compensatory damages to those that are |
![]() |
99-5139 -- GREEN V. HARSCO CORP. -- 05/25/2000 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff appellant Melvin Green appeals the district court's May 4. Green was absent from work at Harsco for over one year. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The principal issue on appeal is whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania waived its sovereign immunity by accepting certain federal funds for the Department of Corrections. We will reverse in part and affirm in part. George Koslow was hired by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a water treatment plant supervisor for the State Correctional Institute in Graterford. He was dismissed for being unable to perform |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Labor Ready is a temporary employment agency with over 200 offices nationwide. Applications are kept on file. Workers who have submitted applications ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 1 defeat summary judgment when an ADA claimant has represented to the Social Security Administration that she is |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. In 1993 Sanhueza was employed in Dillard's Distribution Center in Charlotte. Sanhueza's doctor diagnosed her with carpal tunnel syndrome and ordered her to cease working until she could have corrective surgery. All of these 2 positions were unavailable. Her doctor's restrictions were still in effect and her preferred jobs remained unavailable. We agree with the district court that Sanhueza cannot show she was fired because she filed a workers' compensation claim. Because there was little to do at the Distribution Center where Sanhueza was originally employed. Dillard asked her what other jobs she might like to have. Quality control person it is undisputed that each one was unavailable. Were under a hiring freeze at the time. The quality control positions were entirely full. There is ample evidence that Dillard does not fire people simply because they file workers' compensation claims. All were employed by Dillard at the time the district court granted summary judgment. |
![]() |
LEFEVRE V. SEC DEPT OF VA |
![]() |
NEW V. SPORTS & RECREATION, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court concluded that LWCC is liable for half of the workers' compensation payments made by United States Fire on behalf of employer Seacor Marine ( |
![]() |
SCI LIQUIDATING CORP. V. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO. (7/20/1999, NO. 98-9069) SCI Liquidating Corporation ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER (2) are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. (3) are unconstitutionally vague in the use of the term |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The sole question presented for review by the Court en banc is the threshold question of whether Hartford has statutory standing to surcharge Magna's collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1994). It was indebted to Magna in the amount of approximately $4.1 million. The Bankruptcy Court approved the loan agreement in its final financing order and authorized the Debtor to use the proceeds of the postpetition loan and the cash collateral that was subject to Magna's security interest to pay expenses set forth in an appended budget. Upon Magna is the successor in interest to Landmark Bank of Illinois. 1998 Magna was absorbed by merger into Union Planters National Bank. 22 approval of the loan agreement. When the Chapter 11 reorganization failed and the Debtor's case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. That non trustees have standing under § 506(c) to surcharge a secured creditor's collateral. That Boatmen's was controlling and that Hartford 3 therefore had standing to seek recovery under § 506(c). Is established by the Bankruptcy Code. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Shivers' claim was found barred by the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court concluded that LWCC is liable for half of the workers' compensation payments made by United States Fire on behalf of employer Seacor Marine ( |
![]() |
NEW V. SPORTS & RECREATION, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The issue on appeal is whether S 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act1 voids a general release of claims given as part of a negotiated settlement. John McKee and John Kaltenbrunner are all former employees of defendant Consolidated Railroad Corporation who were injured during the course of their 1. While the releases were not identical. Testified he would not have executed a release with a broader scope. Wicker claims he was also exposed to trichlorethylene and trichloroethane while employed at Conrail. May have been exposed to other toxic chemicals without his knowledge. He does not believe any of his injuries are related to asbestos exposure. Samuel Weaver was employed by Conrail from 1974 until 1991. Said he would not have signed it otherwise. Weaver testified that he was exposed to chemicals during the course of his employment. Many are recent 3 developments which were not discovered until after he had signed the release. Thomas Kleiner was exposed to asbestos while employed by Conrail. Testified that neither he nor Kleiner were aware at the time the release was executed that Kleiner had been injured by exposure to chemicals other than asbestos. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court concluded that LWCC is liable for half of the workers' compensation payments made by United States Fire on behalf of employer Seacor Marine ( |
![]() |
SCI LIQUIDATING CORP. V. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO. (7/20/1999, NO. 98-9069) SCI Liquidating Corporation ( |
![]() |
96-2133 -- BAKER V. FLINT ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO. -- 03/06/1998 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
SEACO V. RICHARDSON (3/11/1998, NO. 96-9288) The ALJ granted Richardson's request for temporary total disability compensation during the disputed time periods and denied the petitioners' request for a credit for the container royalty and holiday/vacation payments made to Richardson during the period of his disability. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs are employees of the City of Altus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Approximately 29 City employees are Hispanic. All Plaintiffs are Hispanic and bilingual. Received a complaint that because Street Department employees were speaking Spanish. Other employees could not understand what was being said on the City radio. Sanchez was particularly concerned that his subordinates. The letter informed Nettles that employees had not been given proper notice if this was a new administrative policy and questioned whether Willis and the City had followed proper procedures in implementing the new policy. Sanchez reported that Willis had told him that the reason Hispanics speak Spanish |
![]() |
01-1397 -- FREEMAN V. UNITED AIRLINES -- 11/26/2002 This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument is not necessary to the disposition of this appeal. See Fed. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. In this diversity action. Freeman was required to prove that he had been actually or constructively discharged and that no such discharge had occurred: United had merely placed Mr. Freeman was actually or constructively discharged or that United placed Mr. Freeman alleged that his supervisor did not respond to these complaints and that he was subject to harassment and ridicule by coworkers because he had raised these concerns. In August 1998. Freeman was able to perform his regular duties. In spite of this recommendation. Freeman's coworkers continued to have concerns about Mr. Freeman apparently stated that he |
![]() |
SEACO V. RICHARDSON (3/11/1998, NO. 96-9288) The ALJ granted Richardson's request for temporary total disability compensation during the disputed time periods and denied the petitioners' request for a credit for the container royalty and holiday/vacation payments made to Richardson during the period of his disability. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. I. Plaintiffs are all hourly employees over the age of 40 who work for Tyson. Each is a recipient of a pension from the former owner of the Tyson facility. The Tapered Bearing Division of SKF was experiencing financial difficulties. Most SKF tapered bearing employees were represented by the United Steelworkers of America. Tyson understood that SKF was losing money and that the Tapered Bearing Division was expecting reduced sales volumes on an on going basis. That issue is not before the Court. 1 2 covered by the Union contract. The concept of second tier employees was memorialized in a Memorandum of Agreement. In pertinent part: It is contemplated . . . that certain members of the bargaining unit. Will retire under the SKF Pension Plan. Pursuant to the 30 Year Retirement without actuarial reduction option (including these employees who are eligible to age into such option pursuant to the 1999 amendments to the labor contract) described in a Memorandum of Understanding between SKF and the Union or pursuant to an Early Retirement option with actuarial reduction. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court denied Countrywide's petition on the grounds that Countrywide's arbitration agreement is unenforceable based on the doctrine of unconscionability and that Ferguson cannot be compelled to arbitrate her Title VII employment discrimination claims. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). Affirm on the ground that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. When Ferguson was hired she was required to sign Countrywide's Conditions of Employment. The arbitration agreement then outlines which claims are covered by the agreement1 and which claims are not covered.2 1 Agreement to Arbitrate. Are not limited to. Claims for discrimination or harassment on bases which include but are not limited to race. Claims resulting from the default of any obligation of the Company or the Employee under a mortgage loan which was granted and/or serviced by the Company. Or (2) is underwritten by a commercial insurer which decides claims. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The underlying dispute concerns a union election that was held in 1993 to determine whether certain Cavert employees should be represented by the Union. Cavert challenges the Board's ruling that an employee who had been out of work for five months due to an injury was eligible to vote. That the standard was improperly applied in this case. Election and Aftermath Cavert Acquisition Company[fn1] is a manufacturer of steel wire. The Union challenged the ballots of two employees on the ground that they were supervisors and therefore excluded from the bargaining unit. The three contested ballots were therefore potentially determinative of the election's outcome. A hearing was held before a hearing officer concerning the challenged ballots. The revised tally was 17 in favor of the Union and 16 opposed. Claiming that the certification was invalid because of the inclusion of Morris's vote. The challenges as to the supervisors are no longer in dispute. Morris was examined by a doctor who gave him a handwritten note stating that he would be |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: We dispense with a full recitation of the facts since we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case. Christina Arnold was attacked and seriously injured by her employer's dog while working in her employer's home. Who was insured under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by Appellee. We will affirm. Appellant admits in her brief that if Nauss |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lines 1 2 the language is corrected to read: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The manufacturers were their |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER A federal employee's recovery against the United States for injuries that he sustains on the job is limited to the fixed benefits to which he is entitled under the statutory compensation scheme. Bar contribution claims against the United States by third parties who are sued by such a federal employee. The District Court held that these contribution claims against the United States were barred because the substantive right to contribution in the maritime law is unavailable where the party against whom contribution is sought enjoys statutory immunity from liability to the injured plaintiff. We agree with the District Court and will therefore affirm.1 McAllister also appeals the District Court's dismissal of its contract based claims for indemnification. The USNS MOHAWK was assigned to do most of the towing. The relevant portion of the statute provides: The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER That she was injured and would need to go home. The statute provides that whenever a firefighter of a city or town |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER That the parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the Longshore Act. Gilchrist was in the employ of Employer. Which is self insured. That written notice of the injury was given within thirty (30) days. That Gilchrist was temporarily and totally disabled from May 7. That Gilchrist was previously awarded compensation for a 10% permanent disability for loss of use of his right hand and 10% permanent disability for loss of use of his left hand. Petitioner is a 38 year old former employee of Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock. He sustained a work related injury to both hands in February 1984 and was treated by Dr. Gilchrist was unable to continue working as a shipfitter. Gilchrist was out of work from October 7. There was no longer any work available to him within his restrictions at the Shipyard and Gilchrist began to work with a vocational rehabilitation counselor from the Shipyard. He was employed at Lowe's. A formal hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Malamphy in Newport News Virginia. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With whom Law Offices of Gabriel Dumont was on brief. Stewart were on brief. Circuit Judge. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because Christensen's appeal of his underlying compensation award was still pending. While Christensen's appeals were pending. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants because it found that the underlying compensation award was not final given Christensen's appeal of it to the Benefits Review Board. DISCUSSION We must decide whether a compensation award is |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Scheuring claims that he is a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.A. was on brief. PA was on brief. Hanson & DeTroy was on brief. Were on brief. A facility the Benefits Review Board (BRB) determined was not covered by the Act. His present interest in this case is in continuing health coverage for his disability. Has informed us that it will reimburse Liberty Mutual if the order awarding benefits is upheld. This petition for review by BIW and Commercial Union concerns whether Brown should have received benefits under the Act. The original claim for compensation was filed on July 22. The basic attack mounted by Commercial Union and BIW is that the second ALJ found. That Brown failed to produce credible evidence of any hearing loss during the covered period at the shipyard and that the BRB was not free to disturb that ruling. Commercial Union agrees that there was such exposure and says that while there was substantial evidence to support a finding of hearing loss during the covered period. No such finding was in fact made and that therefore the second ALJ's finding was the controlling one. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER While that appeal was pending. Who have since been entitled to hold or sell as they please. The bankruptcy judge's injunction lapsed it was not formally vacated. The Trustee concedes that the underlying dispute was resolved in July 2003 by the shares' distribution to individual investors. The dispute is live because the investors deserve compensation for the loss they suffered between the time of the bankruptcy court's order (when United's stock traded for $1.06 per share) and the dissolution of the ESOP (when the market price had fallen to 76¢ per share). Although the price has since risen (it was $2.02 the day before this appeal was argued). That gain is inde No. 04 4128 3 pendent of the litigation: anyone who thought United a good investment could have purchased its stock in the open market. The injury was suffered by those who thought it a bad investment and sold as quickly as they could in June 2003. They lost 30¢ per share (plus the return on investments available between December 2002 and July 2003) compared with the financial position they would have enjoyed had the bankruptcy judge allowed them to sell earlier. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hall with whom McConnell Valdes Kelley Sifre Griggs & Ruiz Suria was on brief for plaintiff. Ruiz Suria was on brief for plaintiff. Diana Lopez Feleciano with whom Diana Lopez Feleciano Law Offices Diana Lopez Feleciano with whom Diana Lopez Feleciano Law Offices was on brief for defendants. Appellees. was on brief for defendants. Principally on the ground that the provisions of Puerto Rico law on which the award was based are preempted by federal labor law. The meal hour issue was submitted to arbitration. The parties' submissions authorized the Arbitrator to determine |
![]() |
GEORGIA ELEC. MEMBERSHIP CORP. V. HI-RANGER, INC. (11/16/2001, NO. 01-11439) Sitting by designation. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Elliott was convicted of seven counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. Who is black. Was appointed a part time special assistant attorney general to represent the Second Injury Fund (the Fund) and the State of Missouri in workers' compensation cases where either the Fund or the state was being sued. related injury. the In limited circumstances. The Fund provides additional The goal of the Fund is to encourage employers to hire the compensation to previously compensated employees who suffer a second jobpartially disabled by limiting the employer's liability in the event that employee |
![]() |
GEORGIA ELEC. MEMBERSHIP CORP. V. HI-RANGER, INC. (11/16/2001, NO. 01-11439) Sitting by designation. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner is a pro se litigant who filed for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. For which he was awarded workers' compensation benefits in December 1990. The claim was closed in 1992. Various administrative law judges who were involved in Petitioner's underlying workers' compensation proceeding. The magistrate judge explained that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Concluding that Castaways and Gonzalez were not |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With whom Gleeson & Corcoran was on brief. Urging that Lydon's state law claims were preempted by federal labor laws. Finding that the state law claims were indeed preempted. They are not preempted here because of Boston Sand's prior litigating position. When he settled his claim and received a lump sum payment that was projected to cover four years of weekly payments based on Lydon's expected period of disability. During those four years Lydon was presumed as a matter of Massachusetts law (Mass. After a physician determined that he was physically able to do so. Boston Sand considered Lydon to have quit his job and forfeited his seniority rights. In December 1995 union attorney Paul Kelly ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Applicable to all workers who were not already subject to paying license fees at either the county or the state level. Whenever the word |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We do have jurisdiction over the first petition. As we will explain more fully. Stanley filed this second claim more than one year after his first claim was denied. We defer to a reasonable administrative interpretation of the governing statute to the effect that such a second claim is a timely modification request. We conclude that the administrative proceedings through which Stanley was awarded benefits did not deprive Betty B of due 2 process of law. Who was disabled. I. The procedural history of this case is both lengthy and complex. We will describe this history in some detail because it. Is the focus of the coal company's arguments. It also informed him that he could seek |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Arlene Marie Frokjer was found guilty of twelve counts of making false statements to obtain federal employees' compensation. Frokjer was referred to the Medical Advanced Pain Specialists clinic in late 2001. Frokjer was ordered to pay $97. Each count of conviction was premised on a finding that Frokjer knowingly made a false statement to obtain compensation for purported work injuries that prevented her from working. Frokjer contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that her statements were false and that she knew of their falsity. Moving bulky objects into the back of a truck does not demonstrate the falsity of her statements that she was unable to work. The instances in which she was observed in physical activity do not necessarily contradict her statements that she was unable to work fulltime. Because there was no direct testimony that she did so. She also argues that she believed in the truth of her statements that she was unable to work. Because she had been told many times by various doctors that she was injured. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: Page 50. Was on brief for Ankers White. Was on brief for appellants defendants. appellants defendants. Procter & Hoar were on brief for plaintiff appellee. Hoar were on brief for plaintiff appellee. 3 3 CYR. The inmate was given no hearing prior to the AFP placement. AFP status was reviewed every five days by the prison official who recommended the particular placement. Domegan sought to establish that the AFP was viola tive of the Eighth Amendment. (iii) turned off his water supply. 3The ten defendants named in the final amended complaint were Joseph J. Three other defendants were named in earlier complaints but were 5 5 Domegan was granted summary judgment on the procedural due process claim. Judgment was entered in the amount of $1.00 against Ponte. Although the district court determined that Domegan was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This case is an appeal from an October 22. Appellants are the Trustees ( |
![]() |
JEFFERSON CTY. V. ACKER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER When Lessard's medical benefits were terminated following the sale of ARM's assets to PRM and Lessard was subsequently denied benefits under the new plan established by PRM/MMI. Lessard was entitled to participate in the medical portion of the Plan. ARM was required to continue funding the Plan through February 28. When its Plan was finally terminated. Pursuant to conditions that are the subject of this lawsuit. ARM employees were automatically transferred to active employment with PRM/MMI coincident with the execution of the sale. ARM employees transferred to employment with the new company were covered under its welfare benefits plan without an interruption in coverage since they were covered under the new plan upon the termination of the ARM plan. The Agreement excepted from the condition employees who were on vacation or who had taken a personal day and thus were not |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER When he was 39 years old. Were liquidated in bankruptcy proceedings in 2004 and that Zeigler's surety. |
![]() |
98-3075 -- CHERMOK V. WAL-MART STORES INC. -- 04/02/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff. Holding that because plaintiff was a statutory employee of defendant under Kan. He was limited to workers compensation and was precluded as a matter of law from claiming third party negligence against defendant. We affirm. Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver by Gainey Transportation. Plaintiff was struck on the head. Summary judgment is appropriate if |
![]() |
FRY V. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOC. Sitting by designation. (1) Defendants ALPA and ALPA Master Executive Council for United Airlines ( |
![]() |
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA V. THOMAS (7/31/2000, NO. 99-13824) Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
![]() |
02-1056 -- JACKSON V. DILLARD'S DEPT. STORES INC. -- 10/17/2003 Jackson was employed by Dillard's in its Park Meadows Mall store in Littleton. She claims to have been sexually harassed on repeated occasions. This transfer was intended to both meet the work restrictions recommended by her doctor and assuage Ms. Jackson did not return to work after six months and was terminated under the leave policy on February 2. She was not employed elsewhere. The evaluation was conducted May 3. Was medically unable to do so. She was able to return to work so long as it involved only light duties. Reasoning that because she was not |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Crissy Simpson's right hand was severely injured in an accident at work while she was operating a power press machine. Concluding that he was fraudulently joined and therefore the court had diversity jurisdiction over the action. I. The Procedural Setting Simpson's complaint alleged that the power press machine could be operated in two control modes: with palm buttons that ensure the operator's hands are outside the die spaces when the press is operating. Or with a foot pedal that allows the press to operate when the operator's hands are in danger. Simpson alleged that supervisor Thomure |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 1 Review Board ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Jr. was on brief for appellant. |
![]() |
JEFFERSON CTY. V. ACKER This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The appellant is American Airlines. American argues that the Bankruptcy Court and District Court were incorrect in their conclusion that American had assumed any liability to pay Robinson pursuant to the APA. We will affirm the order of the District Court.1 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to review Robinson's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2) and 1334. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158 and 1291. We have plenary review of the District Court's determination. Robinson is a former flight attendant of TWA who sustained a work related injury during a flight between Paris and New York on January 31. She was permanently disabled. Article 20(D)(2) of the CBA provided that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER No. 97 2670 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Daniels argues that his defamation claims should not have been dismissed as time barred. Eldo Daniels is a Georgia Pacific employee working at GeorgiaPacific's Big Island. Georgia Pacific held a second meeting after a two day investigation and advised Daniels that his acts and statements did not constitute sexual harassment and the charges were dismissed. Daniels does not allege that the graffiti was authored or authorized by Georgia Pacific. Daniels immediately complained to Georgia Pacific officials about the new graffiti and it was removed the next day. The length of time that the August 1992 graffiti remained on Georgia Pacific property is uncertain. Daniels alleged that the graffiti was removed one year after he complained of it. Which was removed immediately. Daniels averred that the August 1992 graffiti was not removed until October 1994. This later date was not alleged in the district court records. Georgia Pacific denied Daniels' grievance and noted that it thought the proper remedy was a workers' compensation claim. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is a complex insurance coverage case. The award of attorney fees to SRT is vacated. SRT's cross appeal from the order denying its request for paralegal fees is dismissed as moot. While he was installing a satellite television dish. SRT is headquartered in Minot. The work in Sioux Falls was being performed by SRT on behalf of Hughes Network Systems pursuant to a contract between SRT and Hughes that the parties signed on August 9 and August 14. The Bureau dismissed the claim because Schettler's death occurred at an identifiable out of state job site and thus was not incidental and referable to Schettler's principal employment in North Dakota. SRT could have covered its employees working in South Dakota through the Bureau at no additional cost by obtaining a certificate of extraterritorial coverage. North Dakota and South Dakota have reciprocal agreements. Never notified the Bureau that it would have employees working in South Dakota. While SRT was appealing the Bureau's decision. SRT filed a counterclaim alleging that the loss was covered or that NFU was negligent in not providing the 3 appropriate coverage. |
![]() |
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA V. THOMAS (7/31/2000, NO. 99-13824) Finding that section 632 was inapplicable because the Federal Reserve's cause of action was statutory and therefore was not a suit |
![]() |
WILLIAM O. SCHISM V. U.S. Argued for plaintiffs appellants. |
![]() |
DOSS V. FOOD LION, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > The issue in this case is whether Doss' claim is actionable as an independent tort under Georgia law. An order for immediate review of this issue as one involving |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Commissioner of Social Security determined that Olson was eligible for social security disability benefits but reduced those benefits under the federal statute that offsets social security and worker's compensation disability benefits. Concluding that North Dakota worker's compensation impairment awards are not subject to the § 424a offset because they are payments for loss of bodily function. Worker's compensation benefits subject to this offset are |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER MDI's parent is a non profit corporation that employs disabled and other disadvantaged workers. MDI was formed in early 1994 to build a plant in Grand Rapids funded by a grant from a large local employer. MDI was left to find assembly. The Grand Rapids plant was in precarious financial condition. It was held on December 16. Union supporters Keith Hawkinson and Ricky Thayer were permanently laid off. Ten were active union supporters. By telling employees a raise was not feasible because of the Union's campaign. The ALJ found that these employment actions violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3)1 because they were motivated by a desire to retaliate against union supporters and to discourage further attempts to secure union representation. MDI argues these portions of the Board's order should not be enforced because they are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. It is an unfair labor practice |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hammonds and Hartford entered into a settlement agreement in July 1993 (the 1993 Agreement) which was approved by the South Dakota Department of Labor later that month. Again titled |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Contending she was permanently and totally. (2) the pre existing disability was manifest to the employer when it hired the employee and (3) the pre existing disability contributed to the permanent total disability caused by the work2 related injury. The employer is only responsible for 104 weeks of compensation. Newport News claimed that at the time Elliot was hired. Newport News changed the grounds for its § 8(f) application: the company submitted a letter from a physician opining that Elliot's pre existing disability was a chronic back condition sustained during a car accident prior to Elliot's employment with Newport News. Newport News had to demonstrate that it |
![]() |
DOSS V. FOOD LION, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > The issue in this case is whether Doss' claim is actionable as an independent tort under Georgia law. An order for immediate review of this issue as one involving |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. The BRB affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's determination that: (1) Jerome Puller was permanently totally disabled as a result of a work related accident. Was not entitled to relief under Section 8(f) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Becker approved this opinion but died before it was released. 2 John M. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the Plan was an unfunded |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES: This case comes to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on appeal from the district court's denial of Food Lion's motion for summary judgment in this diversity action brought by Eric Doss. was Food Lion had employed Doss as a stock clerk. The issue in this case is whether Doss' claim is actionable as an independent tort under Georgia law. An order for immediate review of this issue as one involving |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because we conclude that the BRB's decision is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ initially assigned to the case concluded that Smith was entitled to benefits. The BRB vacated the ALJ's conclusion that Smith was totally disabled and remanded the case to permit the ALJ to reweigh the medical evidence. The matter was assigned to a second ALJ. The second ALJ concluded that Smith was not disabled. The second ALJ again concluded that Smith was not disabled. The case was assigned to a third ALJ. This ALJ concluded that Smith was not disabled. It was assigned to an ALJ. In considering whether the evidence supported a finding that Smith was totally disabled. He determined that this evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate total disability. Nor was there any evidence that Smith suffered from cor pulmonale with right sided congestive heart failure. Waugh conducted a cardiac catherization on Smith and determined that his recurrent chest pain was not of cardiac origin. |
![]() |
PLEASANT-EL V. OIL RECOVERY CO., INC. (8/6/1998, NO. 97-6500) Full payment of the compensation order was hand delivered to Pleasant's lawyer. Or the employer will be assessed a 20% penalty. 33 U.S.C. § 914(f). The Defendants sought to have the default judgment vacated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. ISSUES The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether the ten days allowed under 33 U.S.C. § 914(f) for payment of a compensation order are ten business days or ten calendar days. That the manner in which the judgment was enforced violates their due process rights. STANDARD OF REVIEW Review of the judgment entered by the district court on Pleasant's petition for enforcement of the supplementary compensation order is the same as in civil suits for damages at common law. See 33 U.S.C. § 918(a). Thus the court's review is de novo. 3 F.3d 390 (11th Cir.1993)(challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review). |
![]() |
02-7077 -- LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT WORKER UNION OF AMERICA V. KEATING -- 02/13/2004 1A of the Oklahoma Constitution were preempted by federal law and that any remaining non preempted provision was not severable from the preempted provisions. 1A that were preempted by federal labor law were |
![]() |
PLEASANT-EL V. OIL RECOVERY CO., INC. (8/6/1998, NO. 97-6500) Full payment of the compensation order was hand delivered to Pleasant's lawyer. Or the employer will be assessed a 20% penalty. 33 U.S.C. § 914(f). The Defendants sought to have the default judgment vacated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. ISSUES The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether the ten days allowed under 33 U.S.C. § 914(f) for payment of a compensation order are ten business days or ten calendar days. That the manner in which the judgment was enforced violates their due process rights. STANDARD OF REVIEW Review of the judgment entered by the district court on Pleasant's petition for enforcement of the supplementary compensation order is the same as in civil suits for damages at common law. See 33 U.S.C. § 918(a). Thus the court's review is de novo. 3 F.3d 390 (11th Cir.1993)(challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review). |
![]() |
STANDARD V. A.B.E.L. SERVICES, INC. (12/3/1998, NO. 97-9226) Five of whom were dismissed by the district court. Contending that Standard was not considered for a promotion and was later terminated for legitimate. Nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Inc. is a business engaged in the production and sale of decorative architectural pieces. These pieces are produced by casting them from molds. The manufacturing process is performed by two different departments: the tooling department and the production department. The tooling department is responsible for crafting the molds that the production department uses to make the finished product. The production of these molds requires a far greater level of skill than is required to cast the finished pieces. Some of the molds are made from scratch. Others are made by altering or combining pre existing molds in a process known as mold setup. Plaster Concepts leases most of its employees from A.B.E.L. Standard was such a leased employee. Leased employees are interviewed and selected by Plaster Concepts. While A.B.E.L. is responsible for handling payroll. |
![]() |
STANDARD V. A.B.E.L. SERVICES, INC. (12/3/1998, NO. 97-9226) Five of whom were dismissed by the district court. Contending that Standard was not considered for a promotion and was later terminated for legitimate. Nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Inc. is a business engaged in the production and sale of decorative architectural pieces. These pieces are produced by casting them from molds. The manufacturing process is performed by two different departments: the tooling department and the production department. The tooling department is responsible for crafting the molds that the production department uses to make the finished product. The production of these molds requires a far greater level of skill than is required to cast the finished pieces. Some of the molds are made from scratch. Others are made by altering or combining pre existing molds in a process known as mold setup. Plaster Concepts leases most of its employees from A.B.E.L. Standard was such a leased employee. Leased employees are interviewed and selected by Plaster Concepts. While A.B.E.L. is responsible for handling payroll. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The doctor informed the Postal Service that it would be |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was hired as an executive vice president in 1992. Which is on a site adjacent to tidal marshes and Purvis Creek. Each cellroom was about the size of a football field and contained fifty mercury |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. HANSEN (8/24/2001, NO. 99-11638) Was hired as an executive vice president in 1992. Which is on a site adjacent to tidal marshes and Purvis Creek. Each cellroom was about the size of a football field and contained fifty mercury |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Have been locked in a dispute over a 1994 application for subdivision and site plan approval for purposes of extending appellants' sand and gravel removal operations. We have jurisdiction over the appeal and cross appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will reverse in part and affirm in part and remand for further proceedings. Neither the parties nor the District Court questioned whether the SDP or EPC claims were ripe. We asked the parties to address this issue at oral argument because |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The appeal was consolidated with a National Labor Relations Board ( |
![]() |
UNITED STATES V. HANSEN (8/24/2001, NO. 99-11638) Was hired as an executive vice president in 1992. Which is on a site adjacent to tidal marshes and Purvis Creek. Each cellroom was about the size of a football field and contained fifty mercury |
![]() |
BROOKER V. DUROCHER DOCK AND DREDGE (1/26/1998, NO. 96-9297) Durocher was constructing a new seawall. The ALJ reasoned that the electric company |
![]() |
BROOKER V. DUROCHER DOCK AND DREDGE (1/26/1998, NO. 96-9297) Durocher was constructing a new seawall. The ALJ reasoned that the electric company |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Smith is appealing that order as well as orders denying motions that the court disqualify itself from hearing Smith's case. Was completely preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Where the plaintiff was subject to a collective bargaining agreement which contained a management rights clause giving the employer/defendant the right to |
![]() |
00-3256 -- CALDWELL V. LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA -- 04/30/2002 Caldwell is entitled to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Avil‚s & Col¢n Morales LLP were on brief. Col¢n & Mart¡nez was on brief. We affirm on the alternative ground that the appellee was immune from suit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Mary Helen is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest because of the general rule that interest follows principal. The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to calculate the amount of prejudgment interest owed to Mary Helen. The agreements are collectively referred to as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements (NBCWAs). Mary Helen was a signatory to at least two of these agreements: the 1946 Welfare and Retirement Fund and the 1950 NBCWA. The agreements were revised in 1974 and 1978. Though by this time Mary Helen was no longer actively mining coal and thus was not a party to either agreement. 4 MARY HELEN COAL v. The Supreme Court held that the Coal Act was unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises. Concluded that the Coal Act premiums were not amenable to a Takings analysis. The Coal Act violated the Due Process Clause because it bore no legitimate relation to the government's asserted interests and the degree of retroactive effect was severe. Once that decision was announced. |
![]() |
97-2394 -- UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION LOCAL 1745 V. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE -- 05/28/1999 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Wild asserts that he was terminated because of his disability. The Minnesota Human Rights Act Summary judgment was entered at the direction of the Honorable Michael J. Determining that Wild's assertion of disability under the ADA or the MHRA was not supported by the undisputed facts in the record. A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADA must establish that he or she (1) is disabled within the meaning of the Act. (2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job. (3) was terminated because of the disability. Which he insists falls within the definition of a disability under the ADA.3 An individual is substantially limited in his work under the ADA if the injury |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the brief was Michael R. With him on the brief was Mark A. Which is typically based on data about the insured's payroll and the classifications of its employees for risk purposes. Which is subject to later correction. The initial rate per $100 of payroll for |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Fletcher was diagnosed with diabetes. Fletcher claimed that she did not have a staph infection at the time PCF terminated her employment. Fletcher's doctor wrote to Sawyer informing her that Fletcher was indeed infected with the staph virus. Although the regulations promulgated by the Department have the force of law. The regulations are not formally published. 3 2 In portions of Sawyer's deposition read at trial. Claiming that she needed to know whether Fletcher was infected with staph in order to determine whether Fletcher could return to work in the PCF deli. PCF timely cross appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the invasion of privacy claim. 4 DISCUSSION A party who moves for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury may later |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. He was employed by Sewell. Was ultimately accepted. A hearing was eventually conducted and. We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Respondents are O'Dell. Such claims are paid by private employers or by a fund to which the employers contribute. Are treated differently. Are governed by |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER LeVelle alleged Penske violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ( |
![]() |
98-3100 -- MCDOWELL V. FARMLAND INDUSTRIES INC. -- 05/18/1999 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Kevin McDowell appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendant on his claim that defendant's decision to terminate his employment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a transfer pumper. He claimed the injury had occurred while he was at work. Even though the injury was not reported until April 6. Sent him a notice stating he was very concerned about the number of accidents in which plaintiff had been involved. Plaintiff met with Harm who plaintiff alleges told him he was thinking of moving him to another department because of his knees. Plaintiff was not transferred. Continued working as a transfer pumper until his employment was terminated. In 1982. Plaintiff and others were laid off as part of a reduction in force. Many of those laid off were rehired. The criteria for retaining employees were seniority. Plaintiff initially was . Two employees with less seniority were moved ahead of him because they possessed skills plaintiff did not. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because we find that Lubrizol's claim is not covered by the policy. Central to this case are two contracts: an equipment purchase contract between Lubrizol and Valvoline. Or loss of or damage to property is the result of the joint negligence or misconduct of Valvoline and Lubrizol. It was Lubrizol's belief that its National Union umbrella insurance policy would cover any payment to Valvoline pursuant to this indemnity agreement. Two are relevant here. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.C. was on brief for Self Help. All of whom were JHA Commissioners. Was voluntarily dismissed by Andrade on the first day of trial. 3 3 recommendation. Which is funded by the Department of Labor through the National Council of Senior Citizens ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The District Court granted the May Department Stores' summary judgment motion.1 We will affirm. Our review of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is plenary. We |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Bankruptcy Judge The Trustees of the Trism Liquidating Trust ( |
![]() |
96-1549 -- LENON V. ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE CO. -- 02/18/1998 Plaintiffs' claims are based on a judgment in their favor in a separate action they brought against Wilkinson (the Wilkinson action or case) seeking fringe benefit contributions and other damages under collective bargaining agreements applicable to Wilkinson's work at the Denver International Airport. We conclude it is appropriate to resolve this appeal now rather than wait for proceedings to conclude in the Wilkinson action. On the merits. Agree that the type of damages plaintiffs seek are not covered under the surety bond. Was required to use union labor on work it performed under subcontract at the Denver International Airport in Colorado. Plaintiffs are the same in both this case and the Wilkinson action. Plaintiff trustees are the named fiduciaries of four multiemployer welfare and pension benefit plans as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Appellants contend the district court erred in finding that MMI is immune from tort liability arising from the death of Clarence Matthew Copley by way of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. MMI maintained its offices in the same premises as Appalachian and was in the business of leasing and providing maintenance services for various kinds of equipment used by Appalachian in its mining operations. Appalachian and MMI were parties to an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Decedent Mark Pauley was married to plaintiff Renee Pauley. An RTO is the size of a small room and serves to eliminate pollution from fumes emitted during production processes. Which was many feet thick. Manner and method of removal were the responsibility of Ace. GeoEnergy's primary employee on the RTO project was field supervisor Donald Vandersypen. Who was responsible for coordinating between Ball Metal and Ace. Vandersypen's job was to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER OPINION PER CURIAM: We examine whether a false imprisonment that caused the victim to lose employment and employment opportunities is an injury to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are Defendant's employees or former employees. They are or were bus drivers. The Board moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims and argued that its practices were in compliance with the FLSA. (2) whether the district court erred in granting the Board's motion for summary judgment in connection with the claims of those Plaintiffs who assert that they have worked unpaid overtime hours. STANDARD OF REVIEW The grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review and the circuit court applies the same standard used by the district court. The two have distinct facts and legal issues that are treated separately here. A. Different Rates for Different Routes The first issue we address is whether the district court erred in granting the Board's motion for summary judgment in connection with the claims of the bus drivers and bus monitors. The rate of pay is based largely on the employee's years of service to the school. The rate of pay is set a $6 per hour rate for field trips and a $7 per hour extended day rate that applies to everything other than the regular route and field trips. |
![]() |
AMER ASSN UNIV PROF V. BD TRST UNIV DC |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER While the district court identified the correct standard for reviewing the Plan's decision a deferential |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER IT IS ORDERED that the motion to publish is granted. Section 1 |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. BACKGROUND Frank Bros. is a construction company with its principal place of business in Janesville. Which were funded by capital from both federal and state agencies through the provisions of the Federal Aid Highway Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lockwood was engaged in various lines of business. Lockwood's case was converted. Norwest was not a prepetition creditor of Lockwood.2 Rather. Which was approved by the bankruptcy court by its February 4. Norwest was granted a superpriority administrative expense claim in the event that its claim exceeded recovery from its collateral. The Obligations of the Borrower to the Bank shall at all times constitute allowed administrative expense claims in the Case having priority over all administrative expenses of the kind specified in Sections 2 Lockwood's prepetition lender was Washington Square Capital. The Professional Fees shall have a Pari Passu priority with the Super Priority Claim granted to Bank hereunder and under the Final Order (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. Undisputed Facts The relevant facts are as follows. Claimant is a former accountant for the U.S. Earning wages that were |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER These consolidated interlocutory cross appeals before us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1993) present an interesting and important question of maritime law: whether state wrongful death and survival statutes are displaced by a federal maritime rule of decision concerning the remedies available for the death of a recreational boater occurring within state territorial waters. [fn1] which are explicitly excluded from the reach of the Death on the High Seas Act. The remedies at issue are loss of society. Was killed in a boating accident in the waters off Puerto Rico. Fashioned a federal common law rule applicable to cases involving the death of a non seaman in territorial waters under which future earnings and punitive damages are not recoverable but damages for loss of society or support are. Each party sought certification to appeal the portion of the court's ruling that was unfavorable. Our analysis of the Supreme Court's maritime wrongful death jurisprudence reveals that there is no federal substantive policy with which state wrongful death or survival statutes conflict here. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This case presents the question of whether an employee who alleges that he was subjected to severe. Even if that employee also alleges that the motivation for that discrimination was his sexual orientation. We would hold that an employee's sexual orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII. That the harasser is. Motivated by hostility based on sexual orientation is similarly irrelevant. It is enough that the harasser have engaged in severe or pervasive unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature. The relevant facts are not in dispute. High profile and famous guests for whom that floor was reserved. Were also male. Rene gave deposition testimony that he was caressed and hugged and that his coworkers would |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Although other less significant issues are raised. The primary issues before us on this second appeal are whether the Court erred in concluding 1 Nos. 03 6611/6612 Pollard v. DuPont de Nemours Page 2 that DuPont was liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law and whether the Court erred in its punitive damages award on this claim. We have previously set out in great detail the unusual facts concerning the persecution and discrimination plaintiff suffered over a period of a year and a half at the hands of DuPont employees and managers before she was discharged. Plus additional facts which have occurred since that earlier opinion. Are included here. In 1978 she was promoted to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Section 908(f) is commonly called § 8(f). 1994 while Dillard's claim for benefits was pending before the district director. The pre existing disability was manifest to the employer when it hired the employee. If the employer's § 8(f) claim is success2 ful. Then the employer is only responsible for 104 weeks of compensation. The remainder of a claimant's workers' compensation benefits are paid from a special fund established under the Act. The matter was referred to an ALJ. A formal hearing was held before the ALJ to resolve the issues of Dillard's entitlement to permanent disability benefits and Newport News' right to § 8(f) relief. That entitlement to § 8(f) relief was also based on Dillard's preexisting back condition in addition to his hearing loss and foot injury. The Director filed a post hearing brief in which it raised what is called the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER That insurance is comprehensively regulated by means of the statutory Arkansas Workers' Compensation Insurance Plan administered by the Insurance Commissioner. Assigned risk employers are insured by participating insurers at rates established by the Administrator. United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 2 1 The district court concluded Calico's claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine. A doctrine that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Arguing the agreement with Cox was void because S.D. Berube alternatively argued that he was entitled to rescind the agreement. No claim for compensation under this title is assignable. All compensation and claims therefor are exempt from all claims of creditors except those for child and spousal support obligations. 2 of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Injunctive relief and a declaration that they were entitled to a retroac tive reimbursement. The District Court denied all relief and dismissed the workers' complaint. 1 We conclude that the workers are entitled to an order: (1) declaring that Pennsylvania's waiver policy violated the Trade Act. Circuit Judge: The individual plaintiffs in this case are industrial workers who reside and worked in western Pennsylvania. Allowances and other benefits to workers who have lost their jobs as a result of competition from imports. Michele Aikens and John Whitcomb ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Found that Billy Livermore's death was caused. Because the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence. BACKGROUND Billy Livermore was an underground coal miner for over forty years. The doctor who issued the certificate of death concluded the immediate cause of death was hemorrhagic shock (blood loss) due to esophageal and stomach bleeding. Contributing causes were respiratory failure. Concluded that there were signs of mild anthracosis1 in Livermore's lungs. Concluding there was no evidence of pneumoconiosis. Opined that there was not enough significant pathology to indicate Billy Livermore suffered from pneumoconiosis. Which was sufficient to establish that he had clinical pneumoconiosis. 269 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is permissible for an ALJ to credit the opinions of physicians who perform an autopsy over those who merely view the results). Which were caused or exacerbated by the coal dust exposure. The ALJ found Maxine Livermore had established that Billy Livermore's death was attributable to pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R. § 718.205 and awarded benefits. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We conclude that the dismissal was in error. Historical Background The underlying case is result of an order by the Judicial Panel on MultiDistrict Litigation. Sitting by designation. 2 * details of the underlying claims are not of significance to the disposition of the appeal before us. It is enough to observe that. Or fear that they will contract. Union Carbide Chemical & Plastics Co. 3 After the modifications were publicized to class members. After the settlement was restructured to take account of Dow Corning's bankruptcy filing. The participating implant manufacturers are referred to collectively as |
![]() |
97-1178 -- GOLD V. LOCAL 7 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERICIAL WORKERS UNION -- 11/03/1998 Later that same month she was terminated by the union. Rule 15(b) provides that |
![]() |
NORTHERN COAL CO. V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP. PROGRAMS Pickup met her burden of proving that pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or factor in her husband Charles Pickup's death. Pickup was regularly employed by Northern in or around a coal mine for a period of one year. Northern was the last company for which he worked. Was hospitalized. Was absent from work from April 19 through May 7. Was again hospitalized. Was absent from work through June 11. Pickup was again hospitalized with heart and other health problems. He was released to return to work on August 16. Was laid off and never worked for Northern again. He was hospitalized because of respiratory failure and persistent cardiac arrhythmia. Pickup's survivor claim were consolidated and referred to an ALJ for a hearing which was held on February 15. The ALJ issued an interlocutory order determining that Northern was the responsible operator liable for any benefits to be awarded. Pickup is entitled to survivor benefits and that Northern is the responsible operator. Pickup was entitled to disability benefits. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is a whistleblower action brought by Adrienne Anderson (Anderson) against Metro Wastewater Reclamation District (Metro) pursuant to various environmental statutes which prohibit discrimination against |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The ALJ found that Metropolitan was the employer liable for compensation benefits to claimant William Price ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Prince & Tye were on brief. Lueck and Barnes & Thornburg were on brief. Dykes was still four years away from possible qualification under DePuy's |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs was Ned A. With him on the brief were Leonard R. Rosenfeld was on the brief for intervenor Interna tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Country Ford challenges primarily the Board's deter mination that a collective bargaining unit consisting of service technicians and lube workers at one of its facilities was appropriate under section 9 of the NLRA. Because there are no grounds upon which petitioner could rightfully refuse to provide the union with the requested information. Inc. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the evidence presented at trial. Was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of Cooper and against the Lee County. Was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to render a verdict in his favor. Each Commissioner of Revenue is an independent constitutional officer. See id.1 The salaries of constitutional officers and their staff are paid by each county. Each county is reimbursed for these expenditures by the Compensation Board of the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Compensation Board). It is within the constitutional officer's discretion to determine how this money is used. Each county is required to provide group life. Was hired to work full time as a deputy commissioner by the Lee County Commissioner of Revenue. Cooper's position was funded by lump sum money allocated by the Compensation Board to pay temporary employees. At the time he was hired. |
![]() |
FALKEN V. GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA (12/15/1999, NO. 99-8160) The sixteen Appellees are certified as emergency medical services (EMS) responders and often are assigned to EMS units. The employees are certified firefighters and can be assigned to shifts on the fire trucks. The County argued the nature of this employment position in the fire department entitled it to apply the partial overtime exemption under § 207(k) of the FLSA for employees engaged in |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Claiming that he was entitled to additional compensation for the year 1996 and that Weinstock had failed to make * The Honorable Berle M. Both of the plans are defined contribution plans that are subject to ERISA. The amount of additional compensation to which Tomasko was entitled. Whether Weinstock was obliged to make a contribution to Tomasko's pension accounts. 1997 constituted the full amount to which he was entitled for work performed in 1996. Was arbitrary and capricious. 4 We agree. We reverse factual conclusions of the district court only if they are clearly erroneous. A plan administrator's decision will be overturned |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER In failing to find that Forest and Zurich were solely responsible for Mr. This Court concludes the district court was correct in finding that LOAIA did not apply such that the waiver of subrogation by Ace was valid. BACKGROUND Terry Hudson was formally employed by Coastal Production Services. Inc. ( |
![]() |
FALKEN V. GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA (12/15/1999, NO. 99-8160) The sixteen Appellees are certified as emergency medical services (EMS) responders and often are assigned to EMS units. The employees are certified firefighters and can be assigned to shifts on the fire trucks. The County argued the nature of this employment position in the fire department entitled it to apply the partial overtime exemption under § 207(k) of the FLSA for employees engaged in |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is an appeal from the district court's award of summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff Appellant's intentional tort claim against his employer. The primary focus of the parties' appellate briefs was the soundness of the district court's ruling on the intentional tort claim. Is subject matter jurisdiction. Which is lacking. Since the district court and this Court are without authority to consider the merits of the case. This matter remanded to the Michigan state court from which it was removed. Was severely injured while performing electrical maintenance.2 Valinski had been assigned to help with an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Who was her fiance and We affirm. Where she told her mother what had happened and then called Pilch and told him what had Pilch called Mason that evening and told him that Edmiston had Pilch testified that Mason's response was |
![]() |
ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC V. U.S. Of counsel was Jason A. With her on the brief were Loretta C. We affirm.
|
![]() |
LIGHTNING V. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The principal issue we discuss in this appeal is whether the appellee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Is preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. We affirm the district court's ruling that the claim is not preempted. I. His job performance was marginal. Which is nothing. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Revised and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 11326 (requiring the ICC to impose conditions on any railroad merger to ensure that the employees are guaranteed certain benefits for at least four years after the merger). The Master Agreement incorporated what have come to be known as the New York Dock conditions by which railroads may |
![]() |
99-1236 -- BRONK V. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH INC. -- 06/27/2000 The district court held that plaintiffs were properly excluded from defendants' employee welfare plans. Would be entitled to participate in defendants' pension plans if they could demonstrate they were common law employees of defendants. Concluding plaintiffs were not entitled to participate in either the welfare plans or the pension plans. 1291 and affirm.
Plaintiffs are twenty nine individuals who. Plaintiffs were not hired directly by Mountain States or US West. Instead were hired by various leasing companies who. Entered into leasing contracts with US West and Mountain States. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and the proceedings at trial. We will address the contentions in summary form. Appellant argues (1) that his repeated false statements were not material and as a result of their immateriality the evidence to sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1341 was insufficient. (3) that he could not be guilty of the mail fraud counts because the evidence of mailing was insufficiently dependant upon a hearsay document. I. All CA 7 forms contain a section that advises the signer that there are penalties for fraud or false statement. McDonald completed a series of CA 7 forms containing the following question regarding outside employment: |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER While she was employed by the City of Waukegan (the City). Leslie McPherson alleges that she was sexually harassed. Her claims that the City was liable for Copenharve's torts under a respondeat superior theory and her demand that the City indemnify any judgment against Copenharve. She was promoted to Clerical Technician II sometime around September 1999. McPherson was one of two clerical technicians and reported directly to Edna Nieves. Michelle Weland was the office manager. It was Nieves who conducted McPherson's performance reviews. When he asked her what color bra she was wearing. What color is your bra today. (Appellant's Br. 1 It is undisputed that Copenharve was McPherson's |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The panel reasoned that Pallas no longer controlled because it was inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court authority governing retroactivity principles. Because we conclude that Pallas is not |
![]() |
00-8083 -- MOFFETT V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES INC. -- 05/29/2002 We affirm.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The SCIF's EAP refused to produce records or to testify about the substance of communications with other employees on the ground that the communications were privileged under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee v. Employee Assistance Programs are worksite based programs designed to assist employees in identifying and resolving personal issues. EAPs began in the 1970s as alcohol and drug treatment programs but have substantially broadened their scope and have become increasingly prevalent at all different types of workplaces. 45 percent of all full time workers have access to EAPs. 000 employers have adopted EAPs. EAPs have been shown to reduce absenteeism. The SCIF's EAP is staffed by a coordinator and three consultants. Although no one on the staff is a licensed psychia trist. All of the consultants 3455 have backgrounds in psychology or social work. Confidentiality is a key component of the EAP. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Arps allege that AON acted in bad faith when it refused to pay reasonable medical expenses and when it failed to concede that James Arp is permanently and totally disabled. I. BACKGROUND James was employed as a salesman by Combined. Which is owned by AON.1 On January 9. James was driving from Rapid City. He was ejected from his vehicle and fractured his skull on the concrete road. It is undisputed that James's head injury rendered him permanently disabled.2 He requires 24 hour supportive care. AON is self insured for workers' compensation up to $500. 000.00 are paid by Continental. The administration of AON's workers' compensation program was managed by GAB. AON's contract with GAB was cancelled and James's claim was transferred to Cambridge. This is not a subtle case as Mr. Arp's disability is clearly permanent and it has been obvious since the beginning of my treatment of Mr. It is obvious that he is unemployable. The claim was accepted by AON and James began receiving temporary total disability benefits.3 His medical bills were also paid. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The question in this case is which of two workers' compensation carriers should pay for it. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that a first injury in 1997 was aggravated by a second injury in 2001. The carrier insists that there was no second injury in 2001 and that Baumler's worsened condition was just the natural progression of his 1997 injury. We need to decide whether the ALJ's contrary finding is worthy of deference. The sheets of metal he works with are heavy. As Baumler was carrying one of these sheets with a coworker. Although no serious injury was immediately apparent. By mid1999 Baumler was cleared to return to the plate shop with restrictions on the amount he could lift. He was still in some pain. As he was stepping onto a 5 inch ledge to measure the curvature of a piece of metal. For 3 to 5 minutes he was unable to straighten his leg. He was then able to resume working. Which convinced him that the displacement of Baumler's lowerback disc had become more severe and that surgery was now in order. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Total Myanmar was appointed Operator of the Gas Production Joint Venture and the Gas Transportation Company. Total Myanmar was responsible. For |
![]() |
LIGHTNING V. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
The principal issue we discuss in this appeal is whether the appellee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Is preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. We affirm the district court's ruling that the claim is not preempted. I. His job performance was marginal. Which is nothing. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. Situated adjacent to Players Island Casino at the same street address is Harrah's Riverfront Casino. Which is operated by Harrah's. Maintain the common grounds on which both casinos are located. While he was still employed by Harrah's. Donovan was injured when he drove his vehicle into an excavation or depression in the roadway operated by Riverside Joint Venture. The proceedings were conducted by a magistrate judge. Arguing that it was Donovan's coemployer by virtue of its joint venture relationship with Players and that Donovan's sole remedy was under Missouri workers' compensation law. Is under the Worker's Compensation Act exclusively inasmuch as plaintiff may not sue in tort a joint venturer as a negligent third party for negligence resulting in an on the job accident and injury. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: In March 2004 plaintiff appellant David Dent accepted overtime compensation that was owed to him by his former employer. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The SCIF's EAP refused to produce records or to testify about the substance of communications with other employees on the ground that the communications were privileged under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee v. Employee Assistance Programs are worksite based programs designed to assist employees in identifying and resolving personal issues. EAPs began in the 1970s as alcohol and drug treatment programs but have substantially broadened their scope and have become increasingly prevalent at all different types of workplaces. 45 percent of all full time workers have access to EAPs. 000 employers have adopted EAPs. EAPs have been shown to reduce absenteeism. The SCIF's EAP is staffed by a coordinator and three consultants. Although no one on the staff is a licensed psychia trist. All of the consultants 3455 have backgrounds in psychology or social work. Confidentiality is a key component of the EAP. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We will. Granting Venicassa's claim for benefits and ordering the Trust Fund to pay them.1 We have appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The decision of the Benefits Review Board is a final order under Section 21(c) of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. We are also asked to decide whether the ALJ's determination at a second hearing. Was supported by substantial evidence. Venicassa submits that the denial of benefits by the ALJ on remand was irrational because the ALJ relied on the same medical evidence that he had relied on to make the initial award of benefits. We have confronted a disturbing record of delay in processing claims for black lung benefits in prior cases. 893 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1990) (Benefits awarded 17 years after the initial claim was filed). Benefits are awardable to persons who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Venicassa indicated clearly on his claim form that his most recent employer was Consolidation Coal Company. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Charged along with more than a dozen other individuals in a 26 count indictment that was eventually redacted at trial to seven counts. To be followed by a three year term of supervised release. consolidated for sentencing before Judge Laken's offenses were Pauley. (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on (a) the RICO conspiracy count. Laken and Black were indicted and tried on charges that they. Those coconspirators were to use part of the illegally gained moneys to fund their bribery payments to the union officials. The Pension Fund Fraud/Kickbacks Trial Laken and Black were tried in a 15 week trial in 2001 2002. Prior to its conclusion he entered into a plea agreement with the government. principal government witness was Jeffrey Pokross. Until he was arrested in 1996 and agreed to cooperate with the government. Pokross was a principal in DMN Capital Investments. The affairs of DMN Capital were overseen by Robert Lino. With Pokross's cooperation many conversations were recorded. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is withdrawn and the attached opinion is ORDERED filed. The full court was advised of the petitions for rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing and the petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED. The action was brought in 1998 by a class of approximately 15. P. 23(a) ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. All appeals to the Board relating to claims under the Act were deemed to have been affirmed if the case had been pending before the Board for one year by September 12. Which Petitioners have paid since October 13. Rehabilitative attempts were unsuccessful. Which was not performed by a physician. The ALJ 3 also found that the labor market study was based on the unsupported premise that Baum could perform sedentary work on a full time basis. The ALJ concluded that Baum was prevented from returning to his former employment and from obtaining any other employment. Byrd came to this conclusion after reviewing a February 1994 videotape of Baum engaging in various physical activities.4 Because the May 1992 report was in Petitioners' possession at the time of the hearing. The ALJ found that the Petitioners were not entitled to any relief. The findings of fact in the decision under review by the Board shall 4 A man whom Petitioners have identified as Baum was videotaped leaving his home. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER KAHN CLERK PER CURIAM: Tim Franks was injured on the job in 1994 while operating a truck mounted boom mechanism.1 Georgia Electric Membership Corporation (GEMC) paid workers' compensation benefits to Franks for his disabling injuries. Franks was employed by Cobb Electric Membership Corporation (Cobb). Cobb was an affiliate of Georgia Electric Membership Corporation (GEMC). 2 1 O.C.G.A. Section 34 9 11.1 states in pertinent part: (a) When the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter is caused under the circumstances creating a legal liability against some person other than the employer. Then the employer . . . shall have a subrogation lien. If such action is not brought by the employee within one year after the date of injury. Then the employer or such employer's insurer may but is not required to assert the employee's cause of action in tort. Have been dismissed. GEMC argues that this is an issue of first impression as no Georgia Supreme Court cases specifically address this issue. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Which we will develop more fully in our analysis. WARN is a remedial statute that generally provides protections to workers. To enter skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully compete in the job market. 20 C.F.R. 639.1(a).(3) WARN directs that an employer can be liable for up to sixty days' back pay and benefits to certain employees who lose their jobs as part of a plant closing or mass layoff(4) without receiving sixty days' advanced notice. See 29 U.S.C. 2104(a)(1).(5) An employer may be excused from the sixty day notice requirement where a mass layoff was the result of an unforseen business circumstance. An employer |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. I. UHP is a company that cleans tanks and holds for ocean vessels with ultra high pressure water jets. Was moored at Cargill South Terminal in Chesapeake. The pump and hoses used to operate the ballast tank were owned by UHP. Chisholm was aboard the ULTRAMAX as a first assistant engineer. As UHP employees were preparing to begin cleaning one of the ballast tanks. The loose hose veered and struck Chisholm who was standing approximately 10 to 15 feet away from the ballast tank. This amount was $200. This exact amount was then tendered by UHP to Sealift as indemnity on or about December 11. The district court concluded that Chisholm did not have a right to a jury trial but impaneled a jury anyway to function as an advisory body.1 See id. at 929 30. The admiralty claim pro 1 The fact that the district court ruled that Chisholm did not have a right to a jury because he presented no viable negligence claim rebuts the dissent's assertion that UHP's liability was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Died prior to the time the opinion was issued. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 7 Affirmed in part. Senior Circuit Judge: The primary question before us in this appeal is whether a debtor in bankruptcy operating under the aegis of Chapter 11 may. Continue to reap the benefits of its bargain without concern that the non debtor party will be made whole for the debtor's unfulfilled prepetition obligations. All of which are affiliates or subsidiaries of Adventure Resources. The Adventure companies are involved. Among the myriad of Adventure's creditors were six trusts established to provide pension. The 1993 Benefit Plan) were created as the result of NBCWAs collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the UMWA with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.1 The remaining two trusts (the Combined Benefit Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan) exist by operation of law. They were established as a result of the enactment of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. I. Respondent Maurice Wilson is a former employee at the Lambert's Point Yard operated by petitioner Norfolk Southern Railway Company.1 The Lambert's Point Yard receives. Stores railroad cars filled with coal that is then loaded onto ships. Or under the Norfolk & Western Railway Company merged into its parent company during the pendency of this appeal and is now known as Norfolk Southern Railway Company. 1 NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY v. 42 (1989) (where an employee is covered by the LHWCA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The action was brought in 1998 by a class of approximately 15. P. 23(a) ( |
![]() |
LARO MAINT CORP V. NLRB |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was hired as a program administrator by the IDNR in 1991. She was paid the second highest salary among the four program administrators. Were male. Her direct supervisor was Richard Little. He was constrained by the IDNR's Merit Compensation Guidelines. Was Mr. Hildebrandt's salary was less than all three of the other program administrators. Although all three raises were within the IDNR's Merit Compensation Guidelines for the |
![]() |
BROWN ANTHONY ET AL V. PRO FTBL INC |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Mondzelewski argues that the District Court erred in holding that he is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Which was handed down after the District Court ruled in this case. Mondzelewski contends that the District Court 2 erred in rejecting his retaliation claim on the ground that he is not disabled. The relevant facts are as follows. He injured his back lifting boxes of meat and was treated by Dr. Mondzelewski was again released to work with the same lifting restrictions. Workers were generally given schedules that allowed them free time in either the mornings or the afternoons. Workers generally were not required to work in the evening on weekends on a regular basis. These shifts were considered |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hizinski was employed by Meehan. Was to carry 110 pound grain sacks Review of Order of Benefits Review Board * * The Honorable Gary A. Sitting by designation. 1 across the uneven surface of other sacks as a vessel was being loaded. was giving him pain. Hizinski sought benefits for his injured right knee under the LHWCA pursuant to his amended claim which was filed on May 9. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). American was not liable for the complaint of right knee injury. The ALJ further found that Hizinski was entitled to the 33 The ALJ further found The U.S.C. § 920(a) presumption with regard to the causal nexus between his right knee problems and his employment with Meehan. that rebuttal had not been established with regard to this condition. ALJ concluded that claimant was permanently totally disabled. STANDARD OF REVIEW In LHWCA proceedings the BRB must accept the ALJ's findings unless they are contrary to the law or unsupported by substantial Meehan appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor 2 evidence. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Charged along with more than a dozen other individuals in a 26 count indictment that was eventually redacted at trial to seven counts. To be followed by a three year term of supervised release. consolidated for sentencing before Judge Laken's offenses were Pauley. (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on (a) the RICO conspiracy count. Laken and Black were indicted and tried on charges that they. Those coconspirators were to use part of the illegally gained moneys to fund their bribery payments to the union officials. The Pension Fund Fraud/Kickbacks Trial Laken and Black were tried in a 15 week trial in 2001 2002. Prior to its conclusion he entered into a plea agreement with the government. principal government witness was Jeffrey Pokross. Until he was arrested in 1996 and agreed to cooperate with the government. Pokross was a principal in DMN Capital Investments. The affairs of DMN Capital were overseen by Robert Lino. With Pokross's cooperation many conversations were recorded. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER P.C. were on briefs for appellant. P.C. were on brief for United Food and Commercial Workers Local Union 791 and National Employment Lawyers Association. LLP were on brief for appellee. Coleman gave Shaw's a list of physical restrictions and indicated that Martin could return to work if these restrictions were respected. Shaw's sent Martin a letter in September 1995 informing her that she was 2 2 terminated. Agreeing that Martin's claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The sole issue on appeal is whether section 301 preempts Martin's state law claims.1 Section 301 modestly provides only that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court rejected Long's argument that the release was invalid because it failed to meet specific and detailed requirements of the OWBPA. Was ratified when Long accepted and retained severance benefits paid to him following execution of the release. Because we are convinced that the ratification doctrine should not apply to a waiver of age discrimination claims which is invalid under the OWBPA and that Long should not be required to tender back severance benefits before proceeding with his age discrimination claims. We find that the grant of summary judgment with respect to these claims was inappropriate. We will. We will remand the non ADEA claims for further consideration. Are undisputed. Who was born in 1936. From the early 1980s Long was employed in Sears' Home Improvement Products and Services Division (HIPS). Although his primary responsibility was to sell roofing. Long's job performance was excellent and his earnings. Were in the neighborhood of $100. Sears analyzed the HIPS division's economic performance and concluded that reorganization was warranted. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. This litigation is almost twenty two years old. While that petition was pending. Although he determined that the settlement was reasonable and that Ramey's interests were well represented by counsel. The question whether the BLBA recognizes settlement agreements such as the one entered into by Ramey and Triple R is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. Is finished. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The District Court having determined that CareFirst is not a member of the class and therefore lacks standing and authority to object to the settlement agreement on its own behalf or to opt out of the Settlement Agreement. All portions of the brief of Linda Cahn except those related to her own claim for attorneys fees were stricken. Only those arguments put forward by the remaining Movants Appellants are considered in this Opinion as to the other issues. 4 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 amended Settlement Agreement. Assuming either of the preceding questions is answered in the affirmative. Serious questions have been raised as to whether four of the class action representative plaintiffs plan participants and beneficiaries who apparently suffered neither economic nor 1 2 3 4 5 6 Insured plans pay set premiums to an insurance company in exchange for full payment of their members' prescription drugs. Retain for themselves the obligation of paying for the prescription drugs provided to their beneficiaries and participants. 5 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 medical injuries resulting from the PBM's alleged wrongdoings have Article III standing to assert. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Tract 4 203 was owned in fee simple by the Enggrens.1 In 1972. Which was unimproved at the time. Which was appurtenant to Tract 4 203. Was also owned by the Enggrens. The initial parties to the lease were the predecessors ininterest to the parties before us. 4 2 1 take ownership of the tower. Construction of the 307 foot observation tower was completed in 1974. Tract 4 204 was owned in fee simple by Overview.3 On this land. These improvements were operated in conjunction with the tower as a tourist attraction. Was filed by the Government on May 17. A bench trial was set for Overview also owned the two right of way easements over Tract 4 108 and Tract 4 109. These easements were appurtenant to Tract 4 204 and provided access to the tower. The improvements on the Condemned Properties were demolished on July 3. Which is not in dispute on appeal. Experts may reasonably disagree over which will yield the most accurate estimate in any particular case. The second meaning of `methodology' pertains to the legal procedure by which an award of just compensation for the United States' taking is determined. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The issue on appeal is the continuing vitality of our opinion in International Bhd. of Elec. Monitors |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Line 3 the judge's name is corrected to read |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is the second time we have been asked to r esolve issues stemming from divorce and custody proceedings involving Peter and Pamela Hughes. 308 n. 1 (3d Cir . 1974) ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER To the extent that he cannot earn what he would have been able to earn absent his injury. It held that his |
![]() |
98-2328 -- EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOTUNITY COMMISSION V. HORIZON/CMS HEALTHCARE CORP. -- 07/31/2000 The summary judgment was premised on the Commission's twofold failure to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination: (1) the Charging Parties' lack of qualification for modified duty because they were not injured on the job. (2) the absence of evidence the Charging Parties were treated less favorably than non pregnant but otherwise similarly situated employees. The matter is before this court only on the Commission's appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the disparate treatment claim. Facts The following facts are undisputed or. Because the Commission is the party opposing summary judgment. The Charging Parties are former employees of Defendant. The Charging Parties were placed under work restrictions by their respective physicians. The work restrictions included various limitations on the amount each Charging Party was allowed to lift. Each Charging Party could have performed all of her job duties with the exception of the heavy lifting. Defendant had instituted and maintained a policy pursuant to which it allowed employees to work modified duty positions consistent with any work restrictions imposed by the employee's physician (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Local 431 (Union) appeals the district court's1 order vacating a labor arbitration award in which the arbitrator concluded that Excel Corporation (Excel) violated terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by terminating employees who were injured on the job after their twelve month medical leave expired. Were set out in the arbitrator's award. An employee's seniority was terminated if that employee had been absent from work continuously for more than two years due to sickness or accident. The Union's proposal excluded from the scope of the seniority provision employees who were injured on the job and/or who were receiving workers' compensation. The circumstances surrounding these terminations are unclear from the record. Testified that Excel terminated employees for non work related injuries but he did not have specific information about these terminations. Neither of which were provided while on a medical leave of absence. No grievance was filed at that time. No grievance was filed because Excel did not tell the Union or affected employees that they could be terminated if their leave of absence exceeded one year. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Was fatally injured at work on January 20. Carolina Stevedoring contends that despite the fact that Warren was killed during a job related incident. Carolina Stevedoring also contends that Warren did not have the wage earning capacity of a longshoreman at the time of the fatal accident. Was killed after being run over by a tractor trailer truck as he was standing on the docks talking with a coworker. His first known seizure was in July 1993. Carolina Stevedoring contends that it was not notified of Warren's entire history of seizures. He would not have been employed as a longshoreman and. Would not have been on the docks the day of the accident. He should not have been employed as a longshoreman. Although these factors would have made him ineligible for employment. Was the injuries suffered as a result of the accident. Compensation is payable irrespective of fault as a cause of the injury. 250 (4th Cir. 1982) (exceptions under § 903(c) are the only exceptions to an employer's liability). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Have invoked § 510 against their employers. They allege that AXA intentionally 2 No. 05 2495 deprived them of benefits by changing the way that insurance salesmen are defined as full time employees of the company. We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs' claim is timebarred. There is little dispute concerning the basic facts. AXA Network LLC and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States to whom we refer collectively as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hanson & DeTroy were on brief. Gillis and Richardson & Troubh were on brief. Were on brief. The primary obligation to provide LHWCA benefits is triggered by a worker's disability or by his awareness of the potential for disability. The date of disablement is the date on which a worker's long latency disease is first diagnosed or the date on which he first experiences a decrease in earning capacity. We conclude that congressional intent and administrative convenience are best realized by a system in which. Background Background The underlying facts are not seriously disputed. He was totally disabled and entitled to LHWCA benefits. Commercial Union Insurance Company (CUI) was on the risk. Liberty was still the carrier of record. The threshold issue here is whether. In respect to 1The principal respondents in this proceeding are CUI and the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the United States Department of Labor (the Director). BIW is a doubly honorific party (petitioner and respondent). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Aztec Well Servicing Company ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Which we reproduce below: Carlton and Latanza Gaddis were stopped at a street intersection when a postal employee drove his government vehicle into theirs. Who was pregnant. Arguing that there was no allegation of a conflict of interest among the Gaddises nor of any prejudice to Courtlin's interests. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules. 5 and guardian ad litem fees are not included in § 1920. Bean's claimed expenses were for his legal work as an attorney on behalf of Courtlin. § 2412(a)(1) is the applicable provision governing costs to be taxed against the nonprevailing government in an FTCA case. 5 Section 1920. The court fully considered the government's arguments regarding the taxation of guardian ad litem fees and determined that it was bound to follow our post Crawford Fitting precedents in Dickerson v. |
![]() |
LUCAS V. GRAINGER (7/17/2001, NO. 00-14323) He contends the district court erred in concluding that he was not disabled within the meaning of the statute. We address a number of issues about what constitutes reasonable accommodation and a few relating to retaliation.
|
![]() |
BRADBERRY V. DIRECTOR This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This petition for review of a decision and order of the Benefits Review Board ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Stated that the DOL had found that Duelley was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and thus. If an initial determination is made finding the coal miner is entitled to benefits. An operator who fails to file a timely response shall be deemed to have accepted the initial findings of the deputy commissioner and shall not be permitted to raise issues or present evidence with respect to issues inconsistent with the initial findings in any further proceeding conducted with respect to the claim. Arguing that the decision contained a mistake of fact because Duelley was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. The finding that EACC did not have good cause for its late filing was a mistake in a determination of fact. The ALJ should have considered whether the medical evidence supported the conclusion that Duelley was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. An administrative law judge does not have the authority to consider the case on the merits. We review de novo the legal question of whether EACC can contest the merits of Duelley's claim in a motion for modification when benefits were granted based on a failure to demonstrate good cause for an untimely response to the DOL's Notice of Initial Findings. |
![]() |
97-8053 -- WYOMING DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION V. STRAIGHT -- 06/09/1998 Straight was certified by the State of Wyoming as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE). DBE Definition 1.A(b) states a |
![]() |
97-8053A -- WYOMING DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION V. STRAIGHT -- 06/09/1998 Straight was certified by the State of Wyoming as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE). DBE Definition 1.A(b) states a |
![]() |
01-7131 -- COSHATT V. CANADIAN VALLEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. -- 05/09/2003 Coshatt's exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act of Oklahoma. See Okla. Price when it energized the distribution line upon which he was working. We review for clear error the district court's findings of jurisdictional facts. See id. The Workers' Compensation Act of Oklahoma is the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries sustained during the course and scope of a worker's employment. See Okla. A principal hirer for whom an independent contractor is working is immune under the Act from tort liability for injuries sustained by the contractor's employees during the course of employment. See Okla. 611 P.2d at 244 45). Work performed by an independent contractor is |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER As well as any past benefits he is due. Simmons was injured in 1989 while working at a sawmill. from that injury. 000 in settlement of his workers' compensation claims stemming Because he was found incompetent to manage the funds himself. The settlement proceeds were placed in trust and distributed to him at a rate of $800 per month. The statutory income limit for an SSI recipient was $466 per month. distribution was $800 per month. Simmons was denied benefits. Arguing that the trust distribution should not have been considered |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Boudreau was an employee of Wal Mart's distribution center in Benton County. Wal Mart promotes its charitable works and receives corporate good will from such programs. Boudreau was granted permission to take the dolly to his car for storage. No one saw the fall but it was captured on a surveillance videotape of relatively poor quality. The central issue at trial was what caused Boudreau's fall. Wal Mart's 2 theory of the case was that. WalMart's post trial motions were denied. Wal Mart raises two points of error: (1) the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because the surveillance video proves that Boudreau's fall was not caused by water on the steps. (2) the district court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether Boudreau was a licensee or invitee at the time of the accident because a ruling by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission preclusively determined that Boudreau was not an invitee. The nonmovant is not. |
![]() |
LUCAS V. GRAINGER (7/17/2001, NO. 00-14323) He contends the district court erred in concluding that he was not disabled within the meaning of the statute. We address a number of issues about what constitutes reasonable accommodation and a few relating to retaliation.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court found that the policy was not ambiguous and that coverage was excluded by the employee exclusion. The notice of appeal was timely filed under Fed. Douglas DeMerritt were picking up residential trash in Southwest City. DeMerritt was employed as a pick up man by Eddie Gravette's unincorporated business. Eddie Gravette was driving the garbage truck and accidentally ran over DeMerritt. Joyce Gravette is Eddie Gravette's mother. Appellants claimed that Eddie Gravette was not the sole owner of Southwest Sanitation and instead was doing business with his mother. United Fire is an insurance company incorporated in Iowa. The policy provided in part that United Fire will pay damages for injuries incurred as a result of an accident |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER ROWSEY Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Arguing the ALJ's decision was automatically affirmed on March 15. The 2001 Appropriations Act contains a similar provision to the 1996 Act and requires the Board to render a decision within one year of the date an appeal is filed. The appeal is considered automatically affirmed on the one year anniversary of the filing of the appeal. The Director argues Newport News is not an aggrieved party under the LHWCA. The party must have |
![]() |
BRADBERRY V. DIRECTOR This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 >
This petition for review of a decision and order of the Benefits Review Board ( |
![]() |
02-5133 -- TESH V. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE -- 11/21/2003 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Two claims are presented on this appeal: wrongful withholding of severance pay. The retaliatory discharge claim was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence of a causal connection between his claim for workers' compensation benefits and his discharge. It is undisputed that Article 5.5(a) of Danka's severance pay plan (assuming for the moment that this plan is the applicable governing document) requires applicants for severance pay to file a written application for benefits. It is also undisputed. That he was never informed either that this remedy existed. Back was never given a copy of the Danka severance pay plan. Back was fully informed of internal plan remedies. The ERISA claim was dismissed. The process is of substantial benefit to reviewing courts. Back of the available and required internal remedy was a violation of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). We have held that in similar circumstances the exhaustion doctrine does not apply. Certainly Danka is now fully informed of the details of Mr. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Applewhite apparently fell from the top of the feed mill when an adjacent roof on which he was standing gave way. His heirs then sued PPC alleging that Applewhite's death was caused by negligence on the part of PPC. We will affirm the dismissal of the complaint only if it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that entitle him to recovery. The first of the five Leflar factors is predictability of results. The Gomez court explained that this factor is primarily aimed at avoiding forum shopping and ensuring uniform results. Predictability is ordinarily not a 3 crucial concern when the suit arises out of an accident. Are not at issue here. Parties are unlikely to seek out Arkansas to undertake tortious behavior and thereby upset interstate order based on whether Arkansas or Texas law applies in this case. Application of either State's laws will not simplify our task and. Is the crucial factor in this case. The traditional lex loci delicti rule is a reflection of an older attitude. Suits arising from acts within their jurisdiction so as to insure that injuries to their citizens were redressed. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Alleges that a USPS employee negligently struck and injured him with a mail cage while Phillips was loading mail at one of the Little Rock facilities. Holding that Phillips was barred from maintaining a FTCA action against USPS because USPS was Phillips's special employer and because USPS was protected from tort liability by Arkansas's |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This petition for review of a decision and order of the Benefits Review Board ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This matter is before the court on Mr. A copy of an amended decision is attached to this order. The petition is granted as to that one change. The petition for rehearing is denied. This was incorrect. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent. Brazeal later determined that the information on Endlich's application for employment was false because Endlich had failed to disclose the rollover accident. Deck then terminated Endlich's employment because of Endlich's job performance problems and the information he had received from Oglesby.(1) Endlich sued Yellow under the ADA and wrongful discharge under state law claiming that he was terminated because Yellow regarded him as disabled and that Yellow asked impermissible questions about his medical history. Yellow moved for summary judgment on the ADA claim arguing that Endlich was terminated for making false statements on his employment application and for unsatisfactory job performance. The state law claim was tried to a jury and a verdict was entered in Yellow's favor. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This appeal requires us to decide how to compute the offset to which an employer owing benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is entitled under 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) when a claimant receives a third party tort recovery that includes ongoing. The Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Director) allowed the employer to offset the amount of each periodic payment against benefits owed at the time the payment was made. Claimant was awarded funeral expenses. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: This appeal requires us to decide how to compute the offset to which an employer owing benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is entitled under 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) when a claimant receives a third party tort recovery that includes ongoing. The Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Director) allowed the employer to offset the amount of each periodic payment against benefits owed at the time the payment was made. Claimant was awarded funeral expenses. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Because Riley made out a prima facie case of disability and Newport News's evidence of a performance based reason for her discharge is nonresponsive to its burden of showing suitable alternative employment. Her first assignment was in the Newport News pipefitters' department. Riley was working in the copper shop. She was sent to welding school. Because Riley was still in her probationary period. All of her grades through April 1996 were passing. Riley was then transferred to the U.S.S. A post probationary apprentice who receives a failing monthly grade on job performance is placed on shop probation for a four month period beginning on the second month following the failing grade. The apprentice is advised of the failing grade and is counseled. 3 she initialed the failing grade and that this was her second failing grade during her employment with Newport News. Asked her if there was anything he needed to know regarding her performance. She said there was no problem. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the joint briefs were Robert H. With him on the joint brief were Joel I. III were on the joint brief for intervenors Transporta tion Trades Department. The labor protections mandated for mid size railroads are as follows: The Board shall require any Class II rail carrier which receives [expedited approval of a rail line acquisition] to provide a fair and equitable arrangement for the protec tion of the interests of employees who may be affected thereby. Which shall not exceed the amount of earnings from railroad employment of the employee during the 12 month period immediately pre ceding the date on which the application for such certifi cate is filed with the Board. Have their severance pay reduced each month by their Wis consin Central earnings. Must exer cise seniority and employees of the selling carrier who are adversely affected by those other workers' exercise of seniori ty. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER There is no dispute that his last job driving trucks and equipment required some heavy work. Two medical opinions were obtained in connection with that claim. That Spivey did not have pneumoconiosis and that. He retained the ability to perform his previous coal mining work.1 The claim was denied in October 1991. This is the claim before us now. The Department of Labor (DOL) concluded after administrative proceedings that Spivey was entitled to benefits. Which was conducted in July 1999. Benefits were awarded by the ALJ after the hearing and then twice more on successive remands for further findings and reweighing of the evidence following petitioner's Dr. (5) that his disability was due at least in part to his pneumoconiosis.2 The ALJ's third decision awarding benefits. Was affirmed by the BRB on February 26. Only a few of which were |
![]() |
SLAGLE V. ITT HARTFORD This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Postmaster General when the case was filed. 1 Roger Jeseritz appeals from a final judgment entered in the district court2 granting summary judgment favor of the United States Postal Service (USPS) on his employment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. 430 and was to receive monthly checks of $2317 until August 1999. After the USPS received information that Jeseritz was involved in off duty physical activities that conflicted with his job restrictions. Who was a team physician for a professional baseball team. Noting his softball activities were beyond his claimed work capabilities. The doctor was especially troubled that Jeseritz had been operating |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Senior District Judge: This is a petition for review of an order and opinion of the Benefits Review Board (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Senior District Judge: This is a petition for review of an order and opinion of the Benefits Review Board (the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Contending that their alleged conduct was exempt under the McCarran Ferguson Act. The FWUA is a joint underwriting association Slagle appealed. State law mandates that the described insurers belong to the FWUA and provide windstorm coverage to eligible applicants who are unable to obtain such coverage through ordinary means. Member insurers are required to pay for the FWUA's losses on a proportionate basis. As 1 Fla.Stat. § 627.351(2)(b) reads: The department shall require all insurers licensed to transact property insurance on a direct basis in this state to provide windstorm coverage to applicants from areas determined to be eligible pursuant to paragraph (c) who in good faith are entitled to. Are unable to procure. Slagle alleged that the appellees have engaged in concerted anticompetitive conduct by the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Who was a member of the panel. This case presents the question of whether a change in a rule governing the adjudication of social security disability benefits claims that is applied as of its effective date to all pending cases has an impermissibly retroactive effect. Have their primary effect on claimants' applications when the claimants appear before the agency to have their claims decided on the merits. The change in the rule is thus not impermissibly retroactive. When Combs' claim was administratively adjudicated. It was not impermissibly retroactive in its effect. The district court correctly concluded that the Agency's determination in this case is supported by substantial evidence. The five steps are as follows: In step one. The SSA identifies claimants who |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER An employer's duty to pay benefits is limited to a two year period. If the employer can establish that an employee's work related injury was made |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Attorneys' fees is DENIED. At the settlement hearing Role was represented by Bernard Weinreb. One made payable to Role and the other to Weinreb.1 After the terms of the settlement were established. Took the witness stand and was sworn. The division of the settlement funds between Role and Weinreb was not made part of the settlement hearing record. Which is a point of contention on this appeal. Is part of the record before us as copied images of two checks made out by DieMatic. There was an incident that arose between the union and the employer that are named defendants in this case. What you're doing is resolving any claims that you have with the exception of a worker's comp claim that may outstanding [sic]. All other claims are withdrawn that are made in this litigation. There was a motion a request by you. So it's not only the claims that are asserted. It's any potential claims that you may have against either of these defendants before the Court. In return you are going to be paid $15. Do you understand what the division is between you and your attorney? |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Alleging that he was terminated from his employment as a union organizer because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Arising from an alleged defamatory statement made by Sauter after Murray was terminated. I. Local 400 is a labor organization that represents between 35. Many of whom are employed in retail food stores. Local 400 members are allowed to take a leave of absence from their employment to assist with organizational campaigns. One of Lowthers' initial goals was to build an effective organizing department and to recruit full time organizers. Christian Sauter was placed in the position of organizing director of the department. Murray is Caucasian. Ramirez is Hispanic. Williams is African American. Lowthers and Sauter are both Caucasian. Several additional employees were also selected for probationary status. Cash was a seasoned organizer and. Because the organizing department was largely comprised of newly hired. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs Appellants are 15 migrant farm workers who reside in Arizona who sued Defendant Appellee J.B. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I. BACKGROUND Martin Farms is a grower located in upstate New York. Inc. ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The claims were initially denied. The BRB unanimously ruled that full benefits are payable to each |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. He was exposed to dust throughout his career and particularly while he served as a long wall operations coordinator. IPF and UIP were different terms for the same pulmonary disease. For ease of reference we will simply refer to the condition as IPF. 2 501.). Latusek next was evaluated by Dr. A staff physician at the National Jewish Center who is board certified in internal medicine. Jennings believed that the IPF was |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is amended as follows: On page 10. Were on brief for appellant. Is a corporation conducting a restaurant business in Hato Rey. Its president is Jorge Carcavallo. Who is responsible for enforcing the FLSA. Conducted an investigation of Tango's and concluded that Tango's was keeping inaccurate records and failing to pay minimum wages and required overtime compensation. Only two episodes are pertinent to this appeal. The facts set forth below are limited to those episodes. A six day trial was held before the district judge. The district court ruled that 15 of the waiters (together with seven other former or present employees) were entitled to $51. Under the Act the minimum wage in force at the time of their employment was $3.35 per hour (FLSA 6(a)(1). That the defendants were entitled to treat a portion of the tips received by the waiters as a credit against the defendants' minimum wage and overtime compensation obligations. Santiago was also carried on Tango's books as working a 40 hour week at $2.95 per hour. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER WILLIAMS Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Maintaining that it was filed in an untimely manner. Williams injured his back when he was jerked off the ground by a magnetized plate. Notes indicate that he evaluated Williams's condition as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court ultimately concluded that ComEd had met its burden of demonstrating for purposes of summary judgment that the employees were correctly classified. The 55 plaintiffs are employed at five nuclear power plants now operated by Exelon Generation Company. Plaintiffs fall into five different groups: 42 are Work Planners. Three are Lead Work Planners. Four are First Line Supervisors. Three are Supply Analysts. Three are Staff Specialists (two in the Engineering Department and one in the Chemistry Department). This prompted us to ask what the relationship was between Exelon Business Services (obviously not an outside law firm) and ComEd. Whether ComEd was still a proper party in the case. In which they explained that ComEd is still a separate corporate entity. ComEd is the only defendant ever served in this case and it has admitted that it employed the plaintiffs at the time the case began in May 2000. Which is when ComEd became Exelon's subsidiary. That transfer was effective January 1. Which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Sitting by designation. * payments to the Local 149 JAF if the fringe benefits Bloom owed under its collective bargaining agreement with Local 70 were less than the fringe benefits provided for in the Local 149 agreement. Bloom is based in Ann Arbor. Whose total wage and fringe benefits are higher. Each Local Union shall negotiate a collective bargaining clause that signatory employers who work in the jurisdiction of the sister local shall contribute to the fringe benefit programs maintained by the sister local where the employees are working. The total package is still below that of the sister Local Union's territory. J.A. at 645. 3 2 An Out of Town Contractor on a job within the geographical area covered by this Agreement will pay visiting roofers (i.e. Roofers from a Local other than Local 149) whichever total package of wages (including vacation pay) and fringes are higher either their Local Union package or the Local 149 package. Vacation pay is considered wages for the purposes of this Article. If the Local 149 package is higher due to wages. |
![]() |
97-1079 -- ACKERMAN V. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC. -- 06/10/1999 Circuit Judge.
|
![]() |
SLAGLE V. ITT HARTFORD This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 2.7.5 > |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER In this appeal we must decide whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in holding Plaintiff Wayne Gardner is judicially estopped from pursuing his personal injury claims against Defendants because he failed to disclose his pending claims to the bankruptcy court in the context of his chapter 7 bankruptcy. I. Gardner was injured in an auto accident while in the employ of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR). The information contained therein was true and correct. Item 20 required Gardner to disclose |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lyons was on brief for appellant. Longshoreman Joseph England was seriously injured when a mooring line. Binding a barge to the pier on which he was working. Following the jury's verdict that all three parties were partially negligent. Was overseeing a gang of twelve longshoremen unloading and then loading cargo onto a barge. The line handlers were employed by Hale for the limited purpose of assisting with the mooring and unmooring of the barge. Were not on site during cargo operations. Just before the longshoremen were to begin unloading the barge. The jury was not. Asked to specify what duty or duties it found each party to have breached. Reinauer was prevented from introducing evidence that England received workers' compensation and medical benefits during his unemployment. That the evidence was insufficient to establish that it owed England any duty and that the court had erred by excluding evidence of England's collateral source benefits. Reinauer also filed a post judgment motion for disclosure of the terms of a settlement agreement that was reached by Hale and England after the close of all evidence but before the jury's verdict. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Is corrected as follows: On page 3. Were on brief. BACKGROUND The subsidiary facts are not in serious dispute. Occupy positions that are variously classified as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. OPINION PER CURIAM: This matter is on appeal from the district court's denial of Maersk Container Service Company's mandamus petition. The relevant facts in this case are not disputed. The Director approved the settlement agreement in a Compensation Order that was filed and served on December 1. Maersk then filed the complaint in district court requesting mandamus relief which is the subject of this appeal. Maersk asserted that Hamilton's claim was finally resolved by the Director's December 1 Compensation Order. The ALJ assigned to hear the claim (who is not a defendant in this action) remanded the proceedings to the Director for investigation and fact finding regarding whether the agreement was subject to rescission for fraud. Hamilton's claim is still pending before the Director. The court stated that the case was premature as administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Maersk argues that the LHWCA and its corresponding regulations mandate that an employer be discharged from any further liability once a settlement is approved by the Director. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER This is a negligence suit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Hanson & DeTroy were on brief for petitioners. Cloutier & Associates was on brief for respondent. * Of the Eighth Circuit. Barnard worked as a fish spotter for Zapata and was found disabled for work by his family physician and a Federal Aviation Administration medical examiner. He was grounded on November 8. Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation benefits under the LHWCA and a hearing was held on July 28. An Administrative 2 2 Law Judge (ALJ) ordered Zapata to pay Barnard compensation for temporary total disability and to provide medical treatment.1 Payments were made regularly until October of 1988. Barnard contends that the liability sought in this case is not on account of his work related injury but arises from injuries caused by defendants' intentional. Barnard claims to have suffered permanent psychological damage as a result of defendants' actions. This court held the failure to honor a draft issued as part of the benefits paid constituted an independent wrong and that plaintiff was not precluded under the LHWCA from pursuing independent state law remedies.2 We must respectfully disagree with the district court's ruling. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are asked to decide if a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Held that Defendants were immune from suit because Willamette had met the statutory requirements for contractor immunity under Kentucky's workers' compensation law. We have determined that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment for the Defendants. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. McCarthy was injured while working on an oil rig on January 25. He was treated by Dr. I think he is capable of light to medium work. An administrative law judge ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Controlling shareholders are liable under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. Defendants in this case are America West. The shareholders were Defendants TPG Partners. Coulter was Director and Vice President of TPG and Director of America West. Schifter was Vice President of TPG and Director of America West. The following Defendants were officers and/or directors of America West: William A. The following Defendants were outside directors of America West: Stephen F. Were involved in the reorganization plan. Although the economic rights were identical between the two. The facts are presented in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. We also consider documents submitted by Defendants that were referenced in the complaint and whose authenticity has not been questioned. That these nine were chosen solely by TPG and Continental. TPG and Continental allegedly chose directors who were favorable to their interests. Was appointed a director of America West and served on its Executive Committee. Was also appointed to the Board of Directors and served on the Compensation Committee. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellant. The arbitrator ordered back pay to the workers who had received break in wages so that all workers would enjoy full wages during the period in which Kraft was in breach. 1996 shall be paid at the rate of eighty percent (80%) of the job rate in the classification in which the employee is working for the first six (6) months. All new production employees were paid the break in wages. The dispute was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. Finding that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This matter is before us on a petition for review of a decision and order of the Benefits Review Board of the United States Department of Labor dated October 26. The DOL required National Mines to file a controversion to the determination within 30 days or be deemed to have accepted the initial finding of entitlement and to have waived its right to contest the claim. The notice was sent to National Mines on June 27. Was essentially a default judgment. Counsel entered an appearance on behalf of National Mines and Old Republic who together are the petitioners. Old Republic stated that it elected to have Carroll examined by a physician on September 3. Requested that the record stay open on the ground that this was the earliest available appointment. 1986 telephone conversation in which |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER In a situation where actual wages have remained constant. We agree with the Benefits Review Board that |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Du Pont and DCI were statutory employers of Evans. Perkins was Evans' fellow statutory employee. The defendants were immune from Evans' Virginia common law action under the VWCA. We affirm. 1 We will refer to Du Pont. DCI and Perkins collectively as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER If Catipovic selected early termination he was required to pay $250. The Clinic also had an employee handbook that defined voluntary and involuntary separation as well as at will termination. Who was not a physician. Is Waterloo's second largest employer. 2 Catipovic. Work releases are a significant cost concern for IBP.4 In late fall 1997 or early 1998. This meeting was held on February 23. Workers' compensation procedures and IBP's policies were discussed. 700 to 800 were Bosnians. Labor is IBP's largest controllable cost. Each plant is assigned a point goal by corporate headquarters. Points are incurred when an employee visits a physician for a work related injury. IBP is self insured for workers' compensation and for medical insurance. Injured workers were placed on light duty when possible because they were fully compensated. Workers totally unable to work received two thirds salary compensation. 35 4 3 work releases be more specific to determine whether they were job related. Catipovic expressed concern that a patient he had placed on work limitations was returned to work at a light duty level in an undesirable plant position. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER A coal miner is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if he is able to show that he has |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs appellants ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Which was authored by Judge Berzon. 16751 D.C. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I. BACKGROUND Hibbs was an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources. His request was approved for the full 480 16756 hours (12 weeks) of leave under the FMLA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Police officers and firefighters who were subject to the age restriction filed two suits asserting in relevant part that the reinstated mandatory retirement program amounted to subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Although the text of the City's ordinance indicated that the City was reestablishing a mandatory retirement age in furtherance of public safety. The court subsequently certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether there is any evidence through which a plaintiff might prove that a mandatory retirement program. We conclude that the particular Nos. 02 2587 & 02 2588 3 theory of subterfuge that the plaintiffs pursue in this case is not viable. As it was originally enacted in 1967. See Lake Country (continued...) 4 Nos. 02 2587 & 02 2588 hiring and retirement ages for police officers and firefighters were now vulnerable to challenge. Only if it could be shown that age was a bona fide occupational qualification for these positions would the rules survive scrutiny under the ADEA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We are asked to review the propriety of damage awards. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. The suit arises from an arrangement known as the |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Which was authored by Judge Berzon. 16751 D.C. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I. BACKGROUND Hibbs was an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources. His request was approved for the full 480 16756 hours (12 weeks) of leave under the FMLA. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Each plaintiff is disabled because of on the job injuries.1 The Silver Spring Post Office system consists of six different stations: Aspen Hill. The Takoma Park Station is also referred to as the Blair Station. Duchesne stated that the operational purpose of the Blair Center was to sort through bulk mail looking for first class mail accidentally In 1995. Some of it was lying on the platform or some place else not secure. Where other mail was inadvertently mixed in with return tosender mail. Duchesne's problem was delay. Several options were discussed to address this problem. The creation of a centralized system was recommended by Duchesne. A similar program was used in Washington. Duchesne chose these hours because those were the hours when the mail could be put on trucks or existing runs without making special runs to or from the other area post offices. These hours also were anticipated to permit mail sorted out at the Blair Center to be returned to local stations as necessary without using special runs. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Before HARTZ. Plaintiff is a college graduate who has past relevant experience as a checker/cashier. She was 31 years old. She claims her disability is due to |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lee was injured when he stepped onto a moving conveyor belt installed by Siemens as he attempted to cross over the conveyor on an improvised stairway. * The Honorable James G. Lee argues on appeal that summary judgment was improper as to Siemens because Siemens breached its duty of care when it failed to adequately warn Lee and other employees that the conveyor was moving. Lee argues that summary judgment was improper because the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act did not immunize UPS from tort liability and because UPS breached its duty to Lee when it ignored complaints about the danger of crossing over the Siemens conveyor. Delta was a subcontractor for VI. Which are cabinets that contain motors to control the conveyors. Other Delta employees also agreed that crossing the conveyor was the only convenient way to leave the site or to use the restroom. The conveyor was two to three feet off the ground and had two four inch wide parallel belts. Its total width was approximately three feet. Although the parties dispute who was responsible for the structure. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We have jurisdiction over the BRB's final order pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). Labelle advances alternative arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ's determination that Labelle's former employee was entitled to benefits under the BLBA violated principles of res judicata. We hold that res judicata is inapplicable in the present context. We will therefore vacate the award of benefits and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Other than when he was employed as a barge loader (a position that he held for three or four years). One of whom was a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The district court concluded that Jensen's claims against the Postal Service were time barred because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and that she also failed to state viable claims against the individual co workers. Greene are fellow letter carriers at the Prairiewood Station. Her co workers were harassing her. Since we are reversing on other grounds. Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence. Demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact. That the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find it necessary to point out the record and facts before us are very limited. The facts in the record are limited to Jensen's complaint and the Postal Service's motion to dismiss with supporting affidavits. Thus a thorough discussion of the facts is difficult. 4 3 The district court's commentary on this issue is: The parties devote much energy in their briefs to whether this motion should be evaluated under the standards of Rule 12 (b) (1) [sic]. We will apply the summary judgment standard as used by the district court for the purposes of this opinion.5 III. |
![]() |
03-5124 -- MILLSAP V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. -- 05/21/2004 Any other damages based upon backpay) are available as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Before us now is the objectors' appeal from that order. I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PERCENTAGE CALCULATION [1] The district court found that the settlement fund was the product of the successful claim for benefits under Microsoft's 7008 VIZCAINO v. The percentage of recovery approach is used in calculating fees in common fund cases. We will do the same. The `benchmark' award is 25 percent of the recovery obtained. Objectors contend that the award is nevertheless excessive. Arguing that the court erred in failing to take into account that this is a megafund case to which it should have applied what objectors call the increase decrease rule. Was referred to the SPP administrator and subsequently to the plan's administrative committee. The issue was ready for judicial review by the district court but had not been decided when the settlement of all claims was reached. 2 VIZCAINO v. Fund size is one relevant circumstance to which courts must refer. Stating: We agree with the district court that there is no necessary correlation between any particular percentage and a reasonable fee. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Lindsey alleged that the pipe layer was defective in that it did not have a rollover protective structure. Even if preemption is at issue. He was operating a sideboom pipe laying tractor manufactured by Caterpillar. The tractors were traveling in reverse gear. Which was the lower of the two. The Caterpillar tractor was not equipped with a rollover protective structure. Which could have prevented Charles from being crushed. Opined that it was technologically and economically feasible for the Caterpillar pipe layer to have been equipped with a rollover protective structure. This opinion was based in part on the fact that Caterpillar had designed a rollover protective structure for the tractor model at issue. Was providing such structures on its sideboom pipe layers at the time Charles Lindsey's pipe layer was manufactured. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration Area Director recognized that pipe layers are exempted from the requirement for rollover protective structures. Caterpillar moved for summary judgment on the product liability claim on the basis that Lindsey's cause of action for defective design was preempted by the Act. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was $11.16 per hour. Although the court held that the union's agreement with the City is not vitiated by the fact that Heder commenced his training before the details were ironed out. Plus whatever extra is required to raise his compensation for |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER GILLUS Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Review of legal questions is de novo. No deference is due to the Board's legal conclusions. Is entitled to compensation for a disability resulting from a work related injury sustained on the navigable waters of the United States. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were managers of 13402 Appellee Trailer Inns. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Inc. is a Washington corporation. The managers are required to live in an apartment located in the park. Which is provided as part of the managers' compensation. The managers are helped by assistant managers. The agreement states that previous agreements between the contracting parties |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Appellants are three groups of plaintiffs whose separate actions were consolidated by the district court because they all claimed they were harmed by exposure to toxic wastes appellee. The third group are persons. The primary relief all parties seek is medical monitoring. Which was entered following orders granting the Army's motions for summary judgment. We will affirm the orders of the district court with respect to all appellants except the Elliotts. The only plaintiffs who have been able to produce evidence of actual harm by medical evidence showing the Elliott children are suffering from conditions that require medical attention beyond the medical services everyone in the general population should have. NCAD's Use of the Land as a Landfill The New Cumberland Army Depot is located just east of the Harrisburg Airport on about 974 acres of land. The former landfill is bordered by a railroad embankment and the Susquehanna River to the north and by Marsh Run Creek ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Michael contends that his early retirement benefits were impermissibly reduced by a subsequent amendment to the Riverside plan in violation of ERISA's anticutback rule. We conclude that he is correct. I. The material facts of this case are undisputed. Riverside's retirement plan was subsequently amended. Is that the terms of his second retirement under the amended plan impermissibly |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Jerry D. With him on the briefs was Douglas W. Atlas sought a declaratory judgment that its action was a legal modification of status quo employ ment conditions under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). That Atlas was free to make further status quo changes pending the onset of collective bargaining. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Atlas's second claim because it was insufficiently concrete. (Atlas) is a cargo airline. About half are cockpit crewmembers (pilots and flight engineers). The definition of |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Plaintiffs/appellants are appellee/defendant Earthgrains former employees of Circuit Judges. The plaintiffs sought recovery of wages that they claim should have been paid during the notice period. The employees alleged that they were entitled to wages for each calendar day within the violation period. There is no dispute that Earthgrains was an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Heisler & Piampiano was on brief for petitioners. Watson & Cohen was on brief. The award was pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. We must affirm if the Board properly decided that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with the governing law. (3) that he is totally disabled from performing his usual coal mining work. (4) that his pneumoconiosis is a contributing cause of his total disability. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Rowan ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We hold sufficient evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the City's articulated nondiscriminatory reason for termination was a pretext from which racial bias can clearly be inferred. This judgment follows from the wellrecognized proposition that in summary judgment cases the nonmoving party is entitled to all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. F. & Will. The bulk of the evidence is testimony of two people the appellant and the supervisor along with internal investigations that were based in large part on the supervisor's characterization of disputed events. We explore the record in terms of whether the appellant's alleged insubordination is disputed and a jury could reasonably find the appellee's reason for termination was pretext for racial discrimination. Because appellant's retaliation and discrimination claim are factually intertwined. Our discussion of the record for each claim will overlap. The Program was to be staffed by a supervisor and four juvenile diversion specialists who would be located in various police precincts throughout the City to work with at risk youth as an alternative to the court system. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER 1995.1 The claim was denied initially. That claim was eventually denied. The instant claim is therefore a |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We must decide (1) whether the grant of summary judgment was proper. (3) whether the award of attorney's fees was proper. The Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that he was eligible for such benefits on December 14. The Disability Retirement Pension to which he was entitled under the Union's Pension Plan. When calculating his length of service (upon which the amount of pension is based). |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Who are black. Are employed as |
![]() |
96-1470 -- GARRATT V. WALKER -- 12/09/1998 Because any contribution that an employer might make on behalf of employees (including himself) was completely discretionary. We view it in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Particularly given the employer's assertion in his answer that the plan was to be so construed. See Crouch v. We follow the panel's decision that a SEP is a pension plan within the meaning of ERISA. See Garratt. The employee requested whatever contribution percentage (based upon her salary) that the employer was making on his own behalf. Although it was suggested at oral argument that the employee was seeking an immediate contribution. Such an inference would be contrary to the standard by which we evaluate the record. It is undisputed that the employee was eligible to participate in the SEP plan and that the employee was earning $24. 000 amount was below the employee's 1993 and 1994 compensation level and. The employer conceded that he was asking the employee to take a cut in pay and fund the plan. Id. at 51. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Sued the Postal Service alleging that the inspectors are entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were managers of 13402 Appellee Trailer Inns. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Inc. is a Washington corporation. The managers are required to live in an apartment located in the park. Which is provided as part of the managers' compensation. The managers are helped by assistant managers. The agreement states that previous agreements between the contracting parties |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Michael contends that his early retirement benefits were impermissibly reduced by a subsequent amendment to the Riverside plan in violation of ERISA's anticutback rule. We conclude that he is correct. I. The material facts of this case are undisputed. Riverside's retirement plan was subsequently amended. Is that the terms of his second retirement under the amended plan impermissibly |
![]() |
97-8121 -- LANE V. WAL-MART STORES INC. -- 02/05/1999 1291 and affirm.
Lane was injured in early December 1992 when she fell from a fifteen foot ladder while stocking merchandise at a Wal Mart store in Gillette. A jury found Wal Mart was ninety five percent at fault and Lane was five percent at fault. Judgment was entered in favor of Lane in the amount of $282. 649.86.
Exclusion of evidence of workers compensation payments Wal Mart contends the district court should not have applied Wyo. We |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Were on brief for appellee. This appeal is from a civil action brought against the Postmaster General in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico by Roman Martinez. Roman Martinez was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981. Initially employed as a labor custodian a job which Roman Martinez alleges was unsuitable because he was unfit to do heavy lifting and carrying he soon became a distribution clerk. A medical examiner for the Postal Service found that Roman Martinez was unable to carry anything over ten pounds. His claim was initially disallowed for lack of supporting medical data. He was found to have a schizophrenic type disorder and was treated with psychotherapy and antipsychotic agents. Affirmed the Postal Service's determination that Roman Martinez's claim was untimely because of his failure to have brought it to the attention of an EEO counselor within the thirty day period. 5 The EEOC thereafter denied a request from Roman Martinez to reopen its decision. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Was repairing a phone cable and was seriously injured when a car drove over the cable he was holding. The primary issue in this appeal is whether an employee of an independent contractor may sue the hirer of the contractor under the direct liability theories set forth in sections 410 and 414 of Chapter 15 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965 & App. 1986) ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The arbitrator misinterpreted the grievance and issued an award under a separate and special plant modernization agreement negotiated by Champion and the Union to compensate only those employees whose positions were eliminated by the earlier shutdown of a specific paper making machine at the plant. Champion was party to a collective bargaining agreement with the United Paperworkers International Union. Was known as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Huck Store Fixture Company ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER We will deny the petition for review. An abbreviated recitation of the relevant facts and procedural history will suffice. Maintaining that his disability was caused by the exacerbation of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 1 ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER From which review is also sought. Ling is unrepresented by counsel. The latter was determined to be the operator responsible for any benefit award.2 The claim was heard before an Administrative Law Judge. (3) he was no longer able to perform his previous work. (4) his disability was due. Ling was admitted to the hospital for three days. He was treated with steroids. Ling's condition was likely caused by an |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Circuit Judge: A grandmother alleges in this civil rights action that she was deprived of the custody of her granddaughter for five years in violation of rights secured by the Constitution. The defendants are Chester County Children & Youth Services ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER That Local 1970 was therefore responsible for Sidwell's injury. Sidwell was employed as the president of Local 1970. Sidwell was the only full time employee of Local 1970. VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS 3 approximately one hour per week at locations where longshoring activity was taking place. The remainder of Sidwell's work week was devoted to representing Local 1970 on supervisory committees of the Hampton Roads Port Authority away from the waterfront terminals. Sidwell's primary employment was with VIT as a container repair mechanic.3 At VIT. Sidwell inspected the shipping containers offloaded from cargo vessels and the trailers on which they were placed for transportation by truck before they left the terminal. The inspections were performed in VIT's |
![]() |
OFFICE OF THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL V. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, ET AL. Argued for petitioner. With him on the brief were Peter D. Argued for respondent Office of Compliance. With him on the brief were Michael R. Argued for respondent Juanita Johnson. With her on the brief was Beth Slavet. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Settlement of O'Neil's benefit claim is governed by Section 8(i) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( |
![]() |
DUNN V. AIR LINE PILOTS ASS'N (10/25/1999, NO. 97-5587) The court held on summary judgment that the description of the pilots as |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Section 1 the status is changed from |
![]() |
97-1304 -- ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS INC. V. SLATER -- 09/25/2000 We are just one race here. It is American. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER With him on the briefs were Linda Lipsett and Edgar N. With her on the brief were Frank W. James was on the brief for amicus curiae Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association. Per Curiam: This is an appeal from the district court's judgment rejecting the claims of 14. The plaintiffs were employed between 1984 and 1995 in federal agencies such as the Customs Service. GS 9 investigators at Customs Service were not exempt from FLSA. These plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements with 1 The original defendants were then Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office Charles A. Was substituted as defendant. the United States. The authority of the GAO to settle claims against the United States is found in the Barring Act. Lawsuits for back pay under FLSA are subject to the Portal to Portal Act's statute of limitations two years for non willful violations and three years for willful ones.3 See 29 U.S.C. s 255(a). Shortly after FLSA coverage was extended to federal employees. The GAO ruled that |
![]() |
DUNN V. AIR LINE PILOTS ASS'N (10/25/1999, NO. 97-5587) The court held on summary judgment that the description of the pilots as |
![]() |
01-3019 -- GOODWIN V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. -- 01/03/2002 Who is African American. The district court granted that motion on the grounds (1) that the majority of Goodwin's claims for pay discrimination were time barred because her pay rates had been established more than 300 days before she filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Antonetti & Cordova were on brief for appellee. She was reassigned to her former position as a traffic operator on the night shift. Rivera was 1The district court decision directing judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. Are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing judgment. Her supervisors resumed their complaints that Rivera's visual problems were adversely affecting her job performance. Was diagnosed with. PRTC informed her that her position was no longer available because the Puerto Rico workers' compensation statute obligated employers to hold 2The physicians treating Rivera noted wide fluctuations in the intraocular pressure in her right ( |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER That is. The Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Smith asserts that she is entitled to recovery under the intentional tort exception to the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act. Finding that Smith had not presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether General Motors knew with |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The ALJ found that the extent of Berg's preexisting impairment to each knee was 16%. Our review of the Board's decision |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Because the claims are based on a collective bargaining agreement. We hold that the Wage Collection Law is preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Plaintiffs are 111 employees of the Shannopin Coal Company who were laid off on July 24. Defendants are seven individuals and three corporations. Plaintiffs were owed various sums for wages actually earned while the bankruptcy was proceeding. Personal days) all of which were wages guaranteed to and earned by the plaintiffs as part of their contract of employment with [Shannopin]. |
![]() |
01-1471 -- ABUAN V. LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, INC. -- 12/30/2003 Who is of Hispanic and Filipino heritage and was over fifty years of age at the time of the alleged discriminatory acts. Asserted that he was subjected to national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. The case was tried to a jury. The record reflects the following facts. Level 3 is a telecommunications company that began operations around the time Mr. He was one of the first people hired at Level 3. He was given the position of team leader and project manager directing the development of the NetExpert network management system. His compensation was determined by his band level. Abuan was placed in Band 5. His initial salary was $100. He was also eligible for a bonus of twenty five percent upon achievement of target goals and stock options that would become valuable only if Level 3's capital stock outperformed Standard &. Abuan's work was exemplary. The project was scheduled for completion in September 1998. Abuan presented evidence that all goals were met on schedule. |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER Jacob Mua is an African American woman who worked from September 1993 until 1995 as a Technology Transfer Specialist at the Lincoln. Which is part of the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service. Jacob Mua requested and was granted a detail to the Federal Building in Lincoln because of alleged racial discrimination at the Agroforestry Center. Klopfenstein was a GS 12 Research Plant Pathologist with the Agroforestry Center from February 25. When he was detailed to a Moscow. Kim was a college graduate research student at the Agroforestry Center during all times relevant to the law suit. Ceased her volunteer services at the Center when Klopfenstein was sent to Idaho. Jacob Mua alleges that throughout her employment at the Agroforestry Center she was subjected to her colleagues' racist comments. She was not given the technical support she needed to perform the duties of her job. She was assigned data entry projects commensurate with the skills of an intern. Bratton claims he was not aware of any such discrimination until Jacob Mua filed an employment discrimination complaint with the EEOC in May 1995. |
![]() |
01-1484 -- RAKITY V. DILLON CO. INC. -- 08/29/2002 Rakity did not have a covered |
![]() |
OPINION/ORDER The plaintiff is John Serbin. As the sun was rising on December 28. Struggled to move a stuck piece of equipment — known as a |
![]() |