Source(As amended Mar. 30, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Aug. 1, 1991; Apr. 23, 2001, eff. Dec. 1, 2001.)
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1983
Section 1481 of Title 28 provides that a bankruptcy court “may not . . . punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.” Rule 9020 does not enlarge the power of bankruptcy courts.
Subdivision (a) is adapted from former Bankruptcy Rule 920 and Rule 42 F.R.Crim.P. Paragraph (1) of the subdivision permits summary imposition of punishment for contempt if the conduct is in the presence of the court and is of such nature that the conduct “obstruct[s] the administration of justice.” See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (a). Cases interpreting Rule 42 (a) F.R.Crim.P. have held that when criminal contempt is in question summary disposition should be the exception: summary disposition should be reserved for situations where it is necessary to protect the judicial institution. 3 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure—Criminal § 707 (1969). Those cases are equally pertinent to the application of this rule and, therefore, contemptuous conduct in the presence of the judge may often be punished only after the notice and hearing requirements of subdivision (b) are satisfied.
If the bankruptcy court concludes it is without power to punish or to impose the proper punishment for conduct which constitutes contempt, subdivision (a)(3) authorizes the bankruptcy court to certify the matter to the district court.
Subdivision (b) makes clear that when a person has a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt matter this rule in no way affects that right. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide the procedure for the imposition of civil contempt sanctions. The decisional law governing the procedure for imposition of civil sanctions by the district courts will be equally applicable to the bankruptcy courts.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1987 Amendment
The United States Bankruptcy Courts, as constituted under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, were courts of law, equity, and admiralty with an inherent contempt power, but former 28 U.S.C. § 1481 restricted the criminal contempt power of bankruptcy judges. Under the 1984 amendments, bankruptcy judges are judicial officers of the district court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (a)(1). There are no decisions by the courts of appeals concerning the authority of bankruptcy judges to punish for either civil or criminal contempt under the 1984 amendments. This rule, as amended, recognizes that bankruptcy judges may not have the power to punish for contempt.
Sound judicial administration requires that the initial determination of whether contempt has been committed should be made by the bankruptcy judge. If timely objections are not filed to the bankruptcy judge’s order, the order has the same force and effect as an order of the district court. If objections are filed within 10 days of service of the order, the district court conducts a de novo review pursuant to Rule 9033 and any order of contempt is entered by the district court on completion of the court’s review of the bankruptcy judge’s order.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1991 Amendment
The words “with the clerk” in subdivision (c) are deleted as unnecessary. See Rules 5005 (a) and 9001 (3).
Committee Notes on Rules—2001 Amendment
The amendments to this rule cover a motion for an order of contempt filed by the United States trustee or a party in interest. This rule, as amended, does not address a contempt proceeding initiated by the court sua sponte.
Whether the court is acting on motion under this rule or is acting sua sponte, these amendments are not intended to extend, limit, or otherwise affect either the contempt power of a bankruptcy judge or the role of the district judge regarding contempt orders. Issues relating to the contempt power of bankruptcy judges are substantive and are left to statutory and judicial development, rather than procedural rules.
This rule, as amended in 1987, delayed for ten days from service the effectiveness of a bankruptcy judge’s order of contempt and rendered the order subject to de novo review by the district court. These limitations on contempt orders were added to the rule in response to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–353, 98 Stat. 333, which provides that bankruptcy judges are judicial officers of the district court, but does not specifically mention contempt power. See 28 U.S.C. § 151. As explained in the committee note to the 1987 amendments to this rule, no decisions of the courts of appeals existed concerning the authority of a bankruptcy judge to punish for either civil or criminal contempt under the 1984 Act and, therefore, the rule as amended in 1987 “recognizes that bankruptcy judges may not have the power to punish for contempt.” Committee Note to 1987 Amendments to Rule 9020.
Since 1987, several courts of appeals have held that bankruptcy judges have the power to issue civil contempt orders. See, e.g., Matter of Terrebonne Fuel and Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1996). Several courts have distinguished between a bankruptcy judge’s civil contempt power and criminal contempt power. See, e.g., Matter of Terrebonne Fuel and Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d at 613, n. 3 (“[a]lthough we find that bankruptcy judge’s [sic] can find a party in civil contempt, we must point out that bankruptcy courts lack the power to hold persons in criminal contempt.”). For other decisions regarding criminal contempt power, see, e.g., In re Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174 (8th Cir. 1993); Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990). To the extent that Rule 9020, as amended in 1987, delayed the effectiveness of civil contempt orders and required de novo review by the district court, the rule may have been unnecessarily restrictive in view of judicial decisions recognizing that bankruptcy judges have the power to hold parties in civil contempt.
Subdivision (d), which provides that the rule shall not be construed to impair the right to trial by jury, is deleted as unnecessary and is not intended to deprive any party of the right to a jury trial when it otherwise exists.
Changes Made After Publication and Comments. No changes were made in the text of the proposed amendments. Stylistic changes were made to the Committee Note.
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