Vertical scheme

"Fruehauf Corporation . . . the nation's largest manufacturer of truck trailers, petitions to review and set aside a decision and order of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) finding that Fruehauf's 1973 acquisition of Kelsey-Hayes Company . . . a manufacturer of components for the motor vehicle and related industries, violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 . . . ."

"A vertical merger, unlike a horizontal one, does not eliminate a competing buyer or seller from the market.  It does not, therefore, automatically have an anticompetitive effect, or reduce competition. Accordingly, a vertical merger, as distinguished from price-fixing boycotts, or similar arrangements between competitors, does not amount to a Per se substantial lessening of competition."

"[T]he competitive significance of a vertical merger results primarily from the degree, if any, to which it may increase barriers to entry into the market or reduce competition by (1) foreclosing competitors of the purchasing firm in the merger from access to a potential source of supply, or from access on competitive terms, (2) by foreclosing competitors of the selling firm . . . from access to the market or a substantial portion of it, or (3) by forcing actual or potential competitors to enter or continue in the market only on a vertically integrated basis because of advantages unrelated to economies attributable solely to integration.  The ultimate objective, however, is to determine whether and how the particular merger in issue may lessen competition, i. e., what its anticompetitive effect on the market, if any, is likely to be."