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rational basis test

Definition

The level of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of a federal or state statute that does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect classification under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. When a court concludes that there is no fundamental liberty interest or suspect classification at stake, the law is presumed to be Constitutional unless it fails the rational basis test.  Under the rational basis test, the courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving that there is no conceivable legitimate purpose or that the law is not rationally related to it. This test is the most deferential of the three levels of review in due process or equal protection analysis (the other two levels being intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny), and it requires only a minimum level of judicial scrutiny. E.g., courts use the rational basis test when analyzing the constitutionality of statutes involving age discrimination, disability discrimination, or the Congressional regulation of aliens.

Definition from Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary

A legal standard to determine the constitutionality of a statute. To determine whether a statute passes the test, a court considers whether it has a reasonable connection to achieving a legitimate objective. (See also: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny)

Definition provided by Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

August 19, 2010, 5:23 pm

 

In United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), the Supreme Court formulated the rational basis test. The federal statute at issue was the Filled Milk Act of 1923, which prohibited interstate commerce involving the sale of filled milk. The defendant challenged the law on Commerce Clause and Due Process grounds. In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that the law was “presumptively Constitutional”; and because the legislature had a rational basis for believing that its law was in pursuit of some legitimate government purpose, the Court declined to step in and overrule the statue.

In Footnote Four of the decision written by Justice Harlan Stone, the Court suggested several levels of judicial review: “There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth…. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts these political processes such as voting, expression, and political association which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation….”

United States v. Carolene Products (1938)

“We reject the proposition that strikers as a class are entitled to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 286, 96 S.Ct. 2036, 2038-39, 48 L.Ed.2d 636 (1976); Hodory, 431 U.S., at 489, 97 S.Ct., at 2390. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973), does not counsel otherwise. There we upheld an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act and concluded that ‘a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group canno constitute a legitimate governmental interest.’ Id., at 534, 93 S.Ct., at 2826 (emphasis in original). This statement is merely an application of the usual rational-basis test: if a statute is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to an illegitimate governmental interest. Accordingly, in Moreno itself we examined the challenged provision under the rational-basis standard of review. Id., at 533, 93 S.Ct., at 2825.” J. White, Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 485 U.S. 360, 370 fn. 8 (1988).

Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implment Workers of America (1988)