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Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935)

Definition

The Supreme Court case that invalidated as unconstitutional a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that authorized the President to approve “codes of fair competition” for the poultry industry and other industries. These codes regulated schedules of minimum wages, prices, maximum work hours, collective bargaining, and other rules that would be binding upon entire industries. Drawing upon the nondelegation doctrine and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the Court struck down this piece of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. First, the Court characterized this activity as intrastate transactions with effects that were only indirect in the sphere of interstate commerce. Thus, Congress had overstepped its bounds by regulating local commercial activity. Second, by giving the Agency for Industrial Recovery a broad mandate to ensure “fair competition,” Congress had effectively delegated legislative power to the Executive. This Congress could not do. The Court found an absence of standards and procedures in the statute to guide the President in deciding which regulations to impose upon various industries.

Definition from Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary

A U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act (a key measure of the New Deal) on the basis that the government had improperly delegated authority to make rules governing industries in interstate commerce. The decision by an aging Court (called "nine old men" by its critics) and other rulings that the New Deal was unconstitutional prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to launch his ill-fated effort to pack the Supreme Court by adding an additional justice for each one who would not retire at 70, Death and resignation soon gave Roosevelt vacancies to fill on the Court.

Definition provided by Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

August 19, 2010, 5:27 pm

 

“In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550, 55 S.Ct. 837, 851-52, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), the Court struck down regulations that fixed the hours and wages of individuals employed by an intrastate business because the activity being regulated related to interstate commerce only indirectly. In doing so, the Court characterized the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce as ‘a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system.’ Id., at 548, 55 S.Ct., at 851. Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress’ power; activities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress’ reach. Id., at 546, 55 S.Ct., at 850. The justification for this formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise ‘there would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government.’ Id., at 548, 55 S.Ct., at 851.” C.J. Rehnquist, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-555 (1995).

United States v. Lopez (1995)