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Void for vagueness

Definition

1) In criminal law, a declaration that a law is invalid because it is not sufficiently clear.  Laws are usually found void for vagueness if, after setting some requirement or punishment, the law does not specify what is required or what conduct is punishable.  For more information, see vagueness doctrine.

2) Under vagueness doctrine, a statute is also void for vagueness if a legislature's delegation of authority to judges and/or administrators is so extensive that it would lead to arbitrary prosecutions.

3) In property law, a declaration that a deed or other instrument purporting to affect property rights is invalid because it lacks a sufficiently clear description of the property.

Illustrative caselaw

See, e.g. Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010).

See also

Definition from Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary

A civil or criminal statute that is so unclear or ambiguous that a reasonable person of average intelligence could not determine its meaning or application. A vague criminal statute is unconstitutional on the basis that a defendant could not defend against a charge which could not be understood. (See also: due process of law)

Definition provided by Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

August 19, 2010, 5:26 pm

 

"These cases require us to consider the validity of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1531 . . . a federal statute regulating abortion procedures."

"The Act punishes 'knowingly perform[ing]' a 'partial-birth abortion.'  § 1531(a) . . . .  It defines the unlawful abortion in explicit terms.  § 1531(b)(1)."

"Respondents contend the language described above is indeterminate, and they thus argue the Act is unconstitutionally vague on its face.  As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  The Act satisfies both requirements."

"The Act provides doctors of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.  Indeed, it sets forth relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct and provides objective criteria to evaluate whether a doctor has performed a prohibited procedure.  Unlike the statutory language in Stenberg that prohibited the delivery of a ‘substantial portion’ of the fetus - where a doctor might question how much of the fetus is a substantial portion - [this] Act defines the line between potentially criminal conduct on the one hand and lawful abortion on the other.  Doctors . . . will know that if they do not deliver a living fetus to an anatomical landmark they will not face criminal liability."