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ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (AEDPA)

Brown v. Davenport

Issues

May a federal court grant a defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon finding a trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the defendant; or, must the court also determine that the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a difference in judicial opinion among several federal courts of appeal regarding which standard is appropriate for granting federal habeas relief. Petitioner Ervine Lee Davenport (“Davenport”) contends that the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Brecht v. Abrahamson, which requires that a defendant experience a “substantial and injurious effect” due to a trial error, is satisfactory. Respondent Mike Brown (“Brown”), Acting Warden, argues that the standard invoked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in Chapman v. California should instead apply. For a federal court to grant relief under Chapman v. California, a trial error must not be “harmless,” and the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California must be “unreasonable” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The outcome of this case will affect how much deference federal courts give to state courts’ interpretations of AEDPA, as well as the ability of defendants to successfully obtain relief in federal habeas proceedings. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal habeas court may grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the test from Brecht v. Abrahamson is satisfied, or whether the court must also find that the state court’s application of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

On January 13, 2007, Ervine Lee Davenport and Annette White were drinking alcohol and using cocaine at a friend’s house when White began acting belligerently. Davenport v. MacLaren at 2.  Several of White’s friends asked her to leave, and Davenport offered to drive White home. Id. Davenport testified that during the drive, White grabbed the steering wheel and sliced his arm with a box cutter. Id.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Keir Weyble for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Carey v. Musladin

Issues

Did the Ninth Circuit overstep its bounds by applying circuit court precedents, rather than Supreme Court precedents, to determine that Musladin was entitled to habeas relief?

 

 

 

Mathew Musladin was convicted in California state court of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife’s fiancé, Tom Studer. During the trial, Studer’s family members wore large buttons, visible to the jury, bearing a photograph of Studer. Musladin appealed his conviction on the grounds that the buttons influenced the jury and eroded his presumption of innocence. When his appeal failed, Musladin filed a habeas corpus petition with the federal District Court, which was also rejected. Relying on another Ninth Circuit case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court should have granted Musladin’s petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court may only overturn a state court’s decision on habeas grounds if the state decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision to overturn Musladin’s conviction relied heavily on Ninth Circuit case law, not a Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine what role, if any, circuit court opinions can play in the interpretation of  federal  law under AEDPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of controlling Supreme Court law, did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit exceed its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) by overturning respondent’s state conviction of murder on the ground that the Courtroom spectators included three family members of the victim who wore buttons depicting the deceased?

On May 13, 1994, Mathew Musladin went to the home of his estranged wife, Pamela, to pick up their son for scheduled visitation. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 2005).

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