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BURGLARY

Quarles v. United States

Issues

Does burglary, which is a predicate offense triggering enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, require that a defendant form an intent to commit a crime at the time of first unlawful entry into a building, or does it allow for the formation of intent at any time in which the defendant remains in the building?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether parts of the Michigan third-degree home invasion statute fall under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “burglary.” Specifically, the Court will determine at what point in time a defendant who unlawfully enters a building must form the intent to commit another crime. Petitioner Jamar Alonzo Quarles argues that a defendant must form the intent to commit another crime at the initial moment of unlawful entry or unlawful remaining in a structure, in order for his or her conduct to qualify as burglary. Respondent United States contends that it is sufficient that a defendant develops the intent to commit another crime at any point while unlawfully remaining in the structure. This case will impact the number of criminal defendants subjected to enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Taylor v. United States’ definition of generic burglary requires proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, as two circuits hold; or whether it is enough that the defendant formed the intent to commit a crime at any time while “remaining in” the building or structure, as the court below and three other circuits hold.

Petitioner Jamar Alonzo Quarles pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Quarles at 837. According to 18 U.S.C.

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United States v. Stitt

Issues

Does the definition of "burglary" under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 include the burglary of tents or vehicles used for overnight accommodation?

This case asks whether the definition of burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) of 1984 includes nonpermanent or mobile structures used for overnight lodging. The ACCA’s definition of burglary was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, which defined burglary as any crime involving unlawful entry or unlawfully remaining in a structure or building with the intent to commit a crime. Respondents Victor Stitt and Jason Sims were previously convicted of burglary under their respective state statutes, which both defined burglary to include acts against mobile homes, trailers, tents, and other nonpermanent structures used for overnight accommodations. Now, the State contends Congress intended nonpermanent and mobile structures to be included within the ACCA’s definition of burglary, despite not being explicitly included in Taylor. On the other hand, Stitt and Sims contend that the Supreme Court in Taylor had the option of including language referencing nonpermanent and mobile structures and, by excluding it, established a line of case precedent that understands burglary to exclude such structures. The Court's decision in this case has implications on the rights of criminal defendants, as well as on existing protections for homeowners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

This case involves two Respondents, Victor Stitt and Jason Sims, from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, respectively.

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