cancellation of removal

Issues

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the stop-time rule in the context of removal proceedings and to determine what it means to be considered “inadmissible” under the rule. The stop-time rule is a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to cancel the removal of an alien and applies, in part, when the alien commits an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien “inadmissible.” Andre Martello Barton (“Barton”) argues that he cannot be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule because he was not seeking admission into the United States and, as a result, was never adjudicated as inadmissible. Alternatively, Barton asserts that it is a legal impossibility for him to be rendered “inadmissible” because he is an already-admitted lawful permanent resident of the United States. U.S. Attorney General William Barr counters that, for stop-time purposes, an alien is “inadmissible” if the alien is convicted of or admits to committing an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission or already admitted. The outcome of this case has important implications for the removability of lawful permanent residents who have prior criminal convictions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the procedure for determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a state-level crime is eligible for cancellation of removal from the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 (“INA”) gives the U.S. Attorney General discretion to cancel a noncitizen’s removal if the noncitizen has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Clemente Avelino Pereida was convicted of a state-level crime under a divisible statute. Three of the four crimes listed within the statute individually constitute CIMTs, but one crime does not. The convicting court did not specify Pereida’s crime of conviction. Pereida contends that he is not required to prove that he did not commit a CIMT and, therefore, that he is eligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction does not necessarily establish that he committed a CIMT. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that the INA requires noncitizens to prove that they did not commit a CIMT in such instances of ambiguity and that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proof. The outcome of this case has important implications for statutory interpretation and the removability of noncitizens who have prior criminal convictions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts can review an agency’s determination of 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1)(D), which permits a cancellation of removal if an applicant meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. Wilkinson contends that whether an applicant’s case meets the standard of hardship is a mixed question of fact and law that courts can review. Wilkinson argues that this procedure does not involve finding new facts but instead applies a legal standard to established facts, such as determining whether an applicant’s removal would bring extreme emotional distress to their family. The United States argues that whether an applicant’s case meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard does not involve applying a legal standard and is therefore an agency’s discretionary determination that is unreviewable by courts. The outcome of the case may significantly impact the procedure and available remedies in removal cases.  Also, the outcome could influence judicial efficiency and the method courts use to interpret statutes in other areas of law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources