CAUSE OF ACTION

Devillier v. Texas

Issues

Under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, may a person whose property is taken without compensation file a court claim even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action.

In 1956, the Federal Aid Highway Act allocated billions of dollars to the states to construct an interstate highway system. Devillier v. Texas at 2. One of these highways is Interstate Highway 10 (“IH-10”) which passes through Texas into California.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian

Issues

Can an individual sue for inaccurate or missing disclosure statements in a firm’s tender offer under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and, is an alleged violation of Section 14(e) subject to a negligence or scienter standard of proof?

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex Corporation shareholders contend that they have a right to file a private action against Emulex under Section 14(e). Emulex Corporation and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. counter that Section 14(e) does not allow a private cause of action based on negligence, and that a higher scienter standard should apply instead. The Supreme Court’s ruling will have significant implications for shareholders’ interests in the event of a merger.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in express disagreement with five other courts of appeals, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer.

In February 2015, the technology companies Emulex Corporation (“Emulex”) and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. (“Avago”) announced that they would be merging. Varjabedian v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to CAUSE OF ACTION