CAUSE OF ACTION

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) allow individuals to sue someone for aiding and abetting the commission of an international human rights violation. The ATS allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. federal courts for violations of international law or U.S. treaties, while the TVPA allows individuals to sue for damages caused by torture. Cisco Systems, Inc. argues that neither the ATS nor the TVPA provides a valid cause of action for aiding and abetting, and that the current judicial landscape does not allow for creating a new cause of action under these statutes. Fourteen unnamed members of the Falun Gong (referred to as “Doe”) argue that aiding and abetting is a universal norm in international law, which the ATS was intended to enforce, and that the language of the TVPA allows for an aiding and abetting claim. This ruling could have impacts on U.S. foreign relations and foreign direct investment by U.S. corporations, and on the accountability for U.S. corporations’ involvement with countries committing human rights violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex Corporation shareholders contend that they have a right to file a private action against Emulex under Section 14(e). Emulex Corporation and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. counter that Section 14(e) does not allow a private cause of action based on negligence, and that a higher scienter standard should apply instead. The Supreme Court’s ruling will have significant implications for shareholders’ interests in the event of a merger.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (“the Act”), passed to compensate United States nationals for property seized by the Cuban Regime, provides a private cause of action only for property interests held at the time the Act was passed. Petitioner Havana Docks Corporation, whose facilities were confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960, argues that limiting the cause of action to present-day interests violates the original objectives of the Act. Although its ownership would have expired in 2004, Havana Docks asserts that it retains a continuing property interest according to the Act. Respondent cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, contend that the Act only protects specific types of property interests and that they did not “traffic” in Havana Docks’ property according to the statute’s definition. The outcome of the case has implications for United States foreign policy goals in Cuba as well as U.S. nationals’ ability to receive compensation for past confiscations by the Cuban government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources