class action

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a district court is required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) without reviewing the validity of the interpretation. Petitioner, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. (“McLaughlin”), argues that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from interpreting the TCPA in private litigation. Respondents, McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. (collectively “McKesson”), counter that FCC orders are binding and can only be reviewed by a court of appeals. McLaughlin asserts that FCC orders do not bind courts because they are interpretive rules. The outcome of this case will have major implications for the authority of federal administrative agencies. 

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This case will determine whether a federal appellate court has appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual claims with prejudice. Microsoft Corporation argues that a federal court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review an order that denies class certification because it disregards the Supreme Court’s decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), and impedes the discretionary review created by the Court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Microsoft also maintains there is no jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article III’s mootness doctrine because a voluntary dismissal eliminates any adverse interests that the plaintiffs had in the case. Seth Baker et al. assert that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice created a final judgment allowing the federal appellate court to review the adverse class certification ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Furthermore, Baker argues that there is no Article III barrier preventing appellate review in this case because the individual plaintiff’s claims were impaired by the ruling and they still maintain an adverse interest in the case. The outcome of this case could impact the procedures that plaintiffs must follow when seeking a class certification. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts may apply equitable exceptions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal. After the district court decertified the consumer class suing Nutraceutical and denied Lambert’s motion for reconsideration, Lambert filed a petition for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) in June 2015. The Ninth Circuit held that the petition was proper because equitable exceptions applied. Nutraceutical now argues that the petition was not timely because it was filed well beyond the 14-day deadline and that equitable exceptions do not apply to Rule 23(f). Lambert contends that the petition was filed in a timely manner and that equitable exceptions make the petition proper even if the filing was not timely. This case will have implications for protecting unsophisticated litigants in class action suits as well as for judicial economy and resources.

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Over a decade ago, Petitioner Oxford Health Plans, LLC (Oxford) agreed to pay Respondent Dr. Ivan Sutter for providing medical services to members of Oxford’s managed care network. Their contract contains a broad arbitration clause which prohibits litigation of their disputes in court and instead requires that they arbitrate their disputes. In 2002, Sutter complained that Oxford failed to pay him and other primary health care providers for medical services. After an arbitrator decided that their contract clause allowed “class arbitration,” or the consideration of an arbitration claim on behalf of a group of similar claims, Oxford went to federal court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his power to arbitrate. Both the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Oxford’s motion to vacate and instead upheld the arbitrator’s decision to hear Sutter’s claim in class arbitration. Oxford argues that the arbitrator’s decision for class arbitration must be vacated because Oxford and Sutter never agreed to class arbitration in their contract exchanging medical services for compensation. In contrast, Sutter argues that the Court should uphold the award because the arbitrator acted within his powers and based his decision on the terms of the agreement between the parties. Oxford warns that a holding for Sutter would discourage parties from agreeing to arbitration to avoid the risk of being saddled with the costs of class arbitration. In contrast, Sutter argues that a holding for Oxford would encourage parties to challenge arbitration decisions in court, undermining the purpose of arbitration to avoid the costs of litigation, and effectively prevent individuals from pursuing their small claims by robbing them of the opportunity to present their claims as a group rather than individually.

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Freelance writers, led by Letty Cotton Pogrebin, brought a class action lawsuit against publishers, led by Reed Elsevier, Inc., for copyright infringement, claiming that the publishers electronically reproduced their works without authorization. The majority of the claims in the class related to alleged infringements of unregistered copyrights. With the approval of the District Court, the parties settled the lawsuit. The Second Circuit held, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class or to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from unregistered copyrights. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 411(a) will determine whether claims relating to unregistered copyrights can be settled in class actions along with claims arising from registered work. An affirmation of the Second Circuit’s opinion may make settlements more difficult.

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Bayer Corporation manufactured and distributed Baycol, a prescription cholesterol medication that was linked to thirty-one deaths. After removing Baycol from the market, Bayer was sued by thousands of individuals. These individual claims, including the claim of an individual seeking economic damages under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, were consolidated for pre-trial motions in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Two other individuals separately sued Bayer under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in West Virginia state court. The federal district court denied class certification of the West Virginia economic damages claim, determining that such claims required individual damages. Bayer moved to enjoin certification of the economic damages claim in West Virginia state court based on the district court's decision. The district court granted the injunction and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the claim fit the “relitigation exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act because the decision met the requirements of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the relitigation exception applies when the parties and issues involved in two actions are not entirely identical and whether a court can have jurisdiction over an absent class member or a nonparty if a class does not actually exist because the court denied certification. This decision may affect the ability of individuals to bring class actions in state court or, alternatively, the ability of defendants in federal class actions to efficiently preclude similar state court claims.

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After suffering property damage in a 2010 hailstorm, Greg Knowles filed a class action lawsuit in Miller County, Arkansas, against the Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Standard Fire") for failure to pay a contractor's retention fee. Standard Fire tried to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to CAFA, a federal court has jurisdiction over a class action only if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The district court remanded the case to state court because Knowles's complaint stipulated that he would not seek more than $5,000,000 in damages for the class. Standard Fire argues that Knowles cannot defeat removal under CAFA by using a stipulation because it would bind absent class members before class certification and before Knowles could be declared an adequate class representative. Knowles argues that as master of his complaint, he is free to limit his claims, and that class members are not adversely affected by the stipulation. The Supreme Court will determine whether a named plaintiff in a class action, before being declared an adequate class representative, can limit the entire class's claims to $5,000,000 in damages in order to defeat an attempt to remove the case to federal court.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether class certification or collective action may proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), when liability determinations and damage calculations will turn on statistical analysis that assumes all class members, regardless of actual differences between them, are identical to a statistical average. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Peg Bouaphakeo, et al., No. 14–1146, at i.  The Court will also consider whether Rule 23(b)(3) or the FLSA permits class or collective action when the putative class contains uninjured members without legal rights to damages. See id. Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages masks differences between class members that not only create individual questions of law and fact, but also result in uninjured class members being awarded damages. See Brief for Petitioner, Tyson Foods, Inc. at 18-19. Additionally, Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages also prevents it from raising defenses that it would otherwise be entitled to employ. See id. at 33. But Bouaphakeo claims that Tyson’s failure to keep statutorily required records of the amount of time that employees worked necessitated the use of statistical analysis, and such use was necessary and proper to prove liability and damages through a just and reasonable inference. See Brief for Respondents, Peg Bouaphakeo, et al. at 33-35. Bouaphakeo further contends that uninjured class members were not awarded damages, and that Tyson was not prevented from raising defenses. Id. at 57-60. The Court’s decision may affect litigation costs for businesses, economic growth, and the use of statistical analysis in class action proceedings. See Brief for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. (“Chamber”), in Support of Petitioner at 20–21, 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Independent Business Alliance, in Support of Respondent at 3–6; Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors, in Support of Respondents at 9–11.

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Philip Morris removed a class action tobacco lawsuit from an Arkansas state court to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs Watson and Lawson sought to remand the case to state court, but their motion was denied. The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris was a corporation qualifying as a “person acting under a federal officer” and thus entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Supreme Court takes up the question of whether parties operating in an arena of heavy federal regulation qualify under this federal officer removal statute or, to the contrary, if the statute’s origins and history preclude such interpretation.

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