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Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk

Issues

Does a purported collective action become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff in the case receives a complete offer of judgment from the defendants and all other potential plaintiffs have not yet joined the case?

 

In a putative collective action, Laura Symczyk alleged that Genesis HealthCare Corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by automatically deducting break time from her and other employees’ pay, regardless of whether they performed compensable work during their breaks. Before any other plaintiffs joined the action, Genesis made an offer of judgment for full relief of Symczyk’s claims. Symczyk did not accept the offer, but the district court dismissed the case because the offer of judgment left Symczyk without a personal stake in the litigation. Symczyk argues that she continues to have a personal stake and that the interests of plaintiffs yet to join the action creates jurisdiction. Genesis argues that a complete offer to satisfy a lone plaintiff’s claim renders the case moot. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will decide whether an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a case moot and whether courts may consider the interests of unnamed, hypothetical parties in determining whether the parties have a personal stake in the litigation. The decision will affect collective-action trial practices for both plaintiffs and defendants, including plaintiffs’ use of the discovery process to join class members and defendants’ use of individual offers of judgment to forestall or avoid collective actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Between April and December 2007, Laura Symczyk worked as a Registered Nurse at a healthcare facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 190 (3d Cir.

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Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, et al.

Issues

May a class be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and collective action taken under the Fair Labor Standards Act when individual employee class members differ as to the amount of compensable time worked? Additionally, is the use of statistical analysis to prove liability and damages proper in that situation?

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether class certification or collective action may proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), when liability determinations and damage calculations will turn on statistical analysis that assumes all class members, regardless of actual differences between them, are identical to a statistical average. See Petition for Writ of CertiorariTyson Foods, Inc. v. Peg Bouaphakeo, et al., No. 14–1146, at i.  The Court will also consider whether Rule 23(b)(3) or the FLSA permits class or collective action when the putative class contains uninjured members without legal rights to damages. See id. Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages masks differences between class members that not only create individual questions of law and fact, but also result in uninjured class members being awarded damages. See Brief for Petitioner, Tyson Foods, Inc. at 18-19. Additionally, Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages also prevents it from raising defenses that it would otherwise be entitled to employ. See id. at 33. But Bouaphakeo claims that Tyson’s failure to keep statutorily required records of the amount of time that employees worked necessitated the use of statistical analysis, and such use was necessary and proper to prove liability and damages through a just and reasonable inference. See Brief for Respondents, Peg Bouaphakeo, et al. at 33-35. Bouaphakeo further contends that uninjured class members were not awarded damages, and that Tyson was not prevented from raising defenses. Id. at 57-60. The Court’s decision may affect litigation costs for businesses, economic growth, and the use of statistical analysis in class action proceedings. See Brief for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. (“Chamber”), in Support of Petitioner at 20–21, 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Independent Business Alliance, in Support of Respondent at 3–6; Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors, in Support of Respondents at 9–11.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample.

2. Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

Petitioner Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) operates and manages meat-processing facilities across the country, including a facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. See Bouaphakeo, et al. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.765 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir.

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