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CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Concepcion v. United States

Issues

Whether drug offenders that are eligible for a sentencing reduction based on Section 404(b) of the First Step Act are entitled to have intervening legal factors and developments considered at their resentencing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the First Step Act requires or merely allows courts to consider post-sentencing developments during First Step Act sentence modifications. Petitioner Carlos Concepcion argues that the First Step Act requires courts to consider post-sentencing legal and factual developments during sentence modifications. Respondent United States counters that the First Step Act grants courts the discretion to consider post-sentencing developments during sentence modifications. The outcome of this case will impact the sentencing of many low-level drug offenders as well as a court’s authority over resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, a district court must or may consider intervening legal and factual developments?

In 2006, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion (“Concepcion”) was arrested on felony drug charges. Concepcion v. United States at 283. Federal investigators alleged Concepcion was involved in the illegal sale of at least 27.5 grams of crack cocaine and 186.34 grams of powdered cocaine. Id. In 2008, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion pled guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute or distributing at least 5 grams of crack cocaine. Id.

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Hewitt v. United States

Issues

Do the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant whose original sentence was judicially vacated before the Act’s enactment?

This case concerns the scope of the First Step Act’s sentencing reforms regarding defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s passage but have been re-sentenced since. The Hewitt defendants and the United States argue that the First Step Act’s inclusion of sentences “not imposed” before the statute’s enactment should apply to the defendants’ sentences, since the re-evaluation of the defendants’ sentences means that the original judgements were not “imposed sentences.” However, the Hewitt defendants and the United States differ in their reasonings. The Hewitt defendants contend their re-sentencing is covered by the Act because of the general principles that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal laws in favor of defendants and that vacated sentences should be treated as not having occurred. The United States contends that the Hewitt defendants are covered by the Act because of the specific language of the Act referencing currently valid sentences, the larger statutory context, and the larger legislative goals motivating the Act. This case has implications for the application of criminal justice sentencing reforms, as well as for how the Court evaluates Congressional intent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the act’s enactment, when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the act’s enactment.

18 USC § 924(c) requires that a person convicted of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime must receive an additional sentence of at least five years if the person possessed a firearm during the commission of that crime.

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