criminal law

Issues

After Respondent Williams sent a hyperlink containing pornographic images of children to an Internet chat room dedicated to child pornography, he was prosecuted under the PROTECT ACT (18 U.S.C. � 2252A(a)(5)(B)) for "pandering" material in a manner intending to cause another to believe that the material contains child pornography. Williams pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the PROTECT Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and thus interfered with First Amendment free speech. In particular, Williams argued that the statute criminalized speech about child pornography when the actual materials were not pornographic or did not exist. Williams further claimed that the statute similarly criminalized those who appear to be but are not actually discussing child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit Court held the PROTECT Act unconstitutional, and the United States government appealed. The United States argues that the PROTECT Act is neither overbroad nor vague because it only criminalizes speech which the First Amendment does not protect. It further claims that the statute requires intent and that the PROTECT Act is necessary to combat child pornography.

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In 2006, an anonymous tip led Utah police officer Douglas Fackrell to investigate suspected drug activity at a house. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the house, Fackrell illegally detained him. During the stop, Fackrell learned Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant. Fackrell arrested and searched Strieff, and found drugs and paraphernalia. In Strieff, the Supreme Court will decide whether evidence obtained incident to an illegal search should be admitted under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Generally, the exclusionary rule permits defendants to suppress evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution. The attenuation exception, however, provides that evidence may be admissible if intervening circumstances have sufficiently weakened the taint of the original violation. Utah argues that the exclusionary rule only applies when it will deter future police misconduct. The state maintains that Fackrell did not flagrantly violate Strieff’s constitutional rights, and had a duty to arrest Strieff after discovering the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the rule would not deter misconduct. But Strieff contends the attenuation exception does not apply, because Fackrell could have foreseen that stopping Strieff illegally could have led to the discovery of a warrant. Strieff concludes that attenuation only applies when the “intervening event” that weakens the taint of Fackrell’s violation is unforeseeable. The Court’s decision could affect how police handle outstanding arrest warrants, and how judges balance Fourth Amendment protections with the need to admit relevant evidence.

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In December 1993, Khalil Kholi was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Three years later, Kholi filed a motion to reduce his sentence, seeking discretionary leniency in state court. In 2007, Kholi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The federal district court denied Kholi's petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA”). The First Circuit reversed, holding that a discretionary post-conviction motion to reduce a sentence constitutes collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and tolls AEDPA's one-year limitation period. Petitioner A.T. Wall appealed, arguing that a discretionary sentence-reduction motion does not constitute collateral review because it does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Kholi counters that collateral review includes motions seeking equitable, discretionary relief, and argues that his motion seeking a discretionary reduction of an imposed sentence tolls AEDPA's statute of limitations. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the finality of state court judgments, as well as the state court remedies a prisoner can pursue before filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.

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Following a transaction in which he exchanged illegally-obtained prescription drugs for a firearm, Petitioner Watson was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In addition to sentences imposed under other federal statutes, Watson received a mandatory consecutive five year sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). Watson pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the agreed-upon facts supported his conviction. The Fifth Circuit confirmed his conviction, finding that receiving a firearm constitutes "use" under the statute and under Supreme Court law set forth in Bailey v. United States, which defined "use" as "active employment" of the firearm. Watson argues that receiving a firearm is insufficient to constitute use, while the United States contends that both receiving and offering a firearm constitute "active employment" and therefore "use" under the statute. The Court's decision will set uniform standards of punishment throughout the country. A finding for Watson could reduce crowding in an already overburdened prison system, while a decision for the United States could reduce the strain on a similarly overburdened court system.

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This case will address the burden on the defendant who is asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim upon appeal. Kentel Myrone Weaver argues that proving that his counsel failed to object to a courtroom closure during the jury selection proceedings with no strategic considerations should merit a dismissal of the underlying conviction. The state of Massachusetts maintains that this was a harmless error and therefore the conviction should stand. The Supreme Court’s decision will have implications for the scope of protections for the right to effective assistance of counsel.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), should apply retroactively. If so, the Court may decide whether the sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Gregory Welch was sentenced to a mandatory minimum fifteen years of prison under the ACCA, because he had three previous violent felony convictions. Subsequently, Welch challenged his sentence, arguing that one of the predicate convictions, Florida-law strong-arm robbery, was not a violent felony. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, relying on the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Welch contends that Johnson struck down the residual clause as unconstitutional. Welch and the United States both argue that Johnson should be applied retroactively. Further, Welch argues that because Johnson should be applied retroactively and his conviction was based solely on the portion of the ACCA that was deemed unconstitutional, his conviction should be vacated. But the United States argues that the case should be remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether a sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a violent felony under the constitutionally valid “elements prong” of the ACCA. The Court’s decision could increase ACCA-related litigation and decrease the length of some defendants’ sentences.

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The issue in this case is whether “accompany” should require de minimus or substantial movement of a victim for bank robberies tried in federal court. Whitfield argues that the federal bank robbery statute (18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)) should be interpreted as requiring substantial movement of the victim and that any broader interpretation of “accompany” would yield absurd results. The United States counters that “accompany” should be interpreted literally, and that any finding of accompaniment justifies the imposition of an additional conviction under § 2113(e). This case will impact the interpretation of “accompany” in the context of bank robberies, and may also impact the interpretation of statutes involving other crimes, such as kidnapping.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine how sentencing courts should interpret the “occasions” provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for defendants who have three or more prior convictions for a serious felony or drug offense occurring on separate occasions. Petitioner William Dale Wooden (“Wooden”) argues that multiple offenses arising from the same criminal opportunity cannot serve as more than one “occasion” under the ACCA. Wooden maintains that his interpretation is consistent with the ACCA’s legislative history and Congressional record. Respondent United States counters that the focus of a sentencing court’s “different occasions” analysis should decide whether the crimes occurred at different times. The United States maintains that its position provides sentencing courts with a straightforward and uniform approach. This case has significant implications for criminal sentencing, recidivism, and the notion of what constitutes a “career” criminal.

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