Juvenile justice is the area of criminal law applicable to persons not old enough to be held fully responsible for criminal acts. In most states, the age for adult criminal culpability is set at 18. In cases of extreme violence or other anti-social behavior, the age a child can be charged as an adult is lowered.
Does abolishing the insanity defense violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments?
This case asks the Supreme Court to balance states’ rights to write their own criminal code with individual rights under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The statute at issue, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220, abolished the traditional right-and-wrong test for the insanity defense in favor of a mens rea approach to insanity. Kahler argues that history and tradition demonstrate that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. He also contends that disallowing this test essentially abolishes the insanity defense, which is cruel and unusual because it punishes individuals who lack moral culpability for their crimes. Kansas counters that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is not a fundamental right because it is not deeply entrenched in tradition, and that disallowing the defense would not have been deemed cruel and unusual when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for states’ authority over their own criminal code, just punishment, and protecting individuals who lack moral culpability.
Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.
James Kahler and his wife, Karen, had two daughters and one son. State v. Kahler at 113. During the summer of 2008, Karen began a sexual relationship with another female, and their marriage soon began to fall apart. Id. Ultimately, Karen filed for divorce in January 2009 and moved out with their kids that Spring. Id. Kahler did not handle the divorce well, and it affected his life, both professionally and personally.
The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his guidance and insights into this case.
When a defendant presents expert testimony that he was not in the required mental-state to commit a capital offense because of methamphetamine use, does the State violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination by presenting rebuttal testimony based on a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant?
After he shot and killed Sheriff Matthew Samuels, Scott Cheever argued that his habitual use of methamphetamines prevented him from forming the necessary mental intent to commit capital murder. The State initially filed its case in federal court after Kansas temporarily abolished the death penalty. In federal court Cheever presented the defense of voluntary intoxication, which is not recognized as a mental disease or defect defense in Kansas, and used expert testimony to support his defense. The federal court ordered Cheever to undergo a mental evaluation. Later, Kansas reinstated the death penalty and the State asked the federal court to send the case to state court. In state court, Kansas used the results of Cheever's mental evaluation to rebut his voluntary intoxication defense. Cheever argues that this evidence should not have been presented because he did not intend to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he presented his mental status defense in state court. Kansas argues that by presenting mental health testimony, Cheever voluntarily opened the door to rebuttal testimony based on the court-ordered mental health exam. This case will address the role of state law in a defendant’s waiver of the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination. It will also impact prosecutors’ ability to rebut a defendant’s testimony in light of the Fifth Amendment. The issues in this case implicate questions of federalism and constitutional rights.
On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels near Hilltop, Kansas. See Kansas v. Cheever,284 P.3d 1007, 1014 (Kan. 2012). Cheever and four others were cooking and using methamphetamine in the early morning before the police arrived at the home.
Jeremy Byellin, Hot Docs: SCOTUS to Decide Whether Fifth Amendment Protects Against Testimony by Court-Ordered Psychiatrist, Thompson Reuters Legal Solutions Blog, Feb. 27, 2013.
Under the Fourth Amendment, can a police officer pull over a vehicle merely because its registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, even if the officer is unsure whether that owner is driving?
This case asks whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle if the officer knows only that the vehicle’s registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, but the officer is unsure whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, police officers may initiate brief stops of drivers who they reasonably suspect are committing a crime. In the present case, police deputy Mark Mehrer observed a moving vehicle and determined that the vehicle belonged to Charles Glover, who had a suspended license. Mehrer pulled over Glover’s vehicle after assuming that Glover was driving and thus violating the law. The State of Kansas argues that Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to stop Glover, because the Fourth Amendment allowed him to make the commonsense assumption that the driver of a vehicle owns that vehicle. Glover counters that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures, because without that assumption, Mehrer had no reason to stop his vehicle. The outcome of this case has implications for drivers’ privacy, public safety, and the amount of discretion police officers possess in deciding when to stop a vehicle.
Whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer was on patrol when he saw a 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck drive by. State v. Glover at 66–67. Deputy Mehrer ran a check on the truck’s license plate number and discovered that Charles Glover, Jr., the registered owner of the vehicle, did not have a valid driver’s license. Id. at 66. Deputy Mehrer neither observed any traffic violations, nor tried to confirm whether Glover was driving the truck.
Does a public official defraud the government of property interests by presenting a made-up public policy-based justification rather than the real reason for an official decision?
In 2010, two public officials, Bridget Anne Kelly and William E. Baroni, Jr., reallocated two toll lanes on the George Washington Bridge’s upper level to punish Fort Lee’s mayor for refusing to endorse then-New Jersey governor Chris Christie’s re-election campaign. Despite disguising this corrupt act as a traffic study, Kelly and Baroni were indicted for and convicted of wire fraud, defrauding a federally funded entity, and conspiracy to defraud. Petitioner Kelly and Respondent Baroni now argue that the Port Authority was never deprived of a legally-protected property right and that fraud cannot have occurred because the alleged victim received exactly what was bargained for, even though the public officials lied about their true intentions. Respondent United States contends that the Port Authority was deprived of a property right because Kelly and Baroni’s traffic-study lie encumbered the Port Authority’s exclusive free use of the George Washington Bridge and because neither Kelly nor Baroni had the authority to make such drastic changes. The outcome of this case has implications on future politics and whether political corruption should be prosecuted as a federal crime.
Whether a public official “defraud[s]” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision.
The George Washington Bridge (“GWB”), operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (“Port Authority”), connects Fort Lee, New Jersey, and New York City. Kelly v. United States, at 5. The bridge’s upper level has twelve toll lanes that funnel traffic into Manhattan.
Does a private contractor cause “harm” as required for mail or wire fraud when it fraudulently misrepresents to the government that it hired a socially disadvantaged business as promised?
This case asks the Court to determine whether a private contractor’s fraudulent misrepresentation to a government agency regarding the contractor’s subcontracting duties causes harm sufficient for a conviction of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Kousisis argues that the fraudulent-inducement theory that formed the basis for his conviction expands the notion of a property interest beyond the language of § 1343. Kousisis claims that expansion would convert all purposeful breaches of contract into federal crimes with harsh sentences, increasing the size of the federal prison population. The United States argues that the fraudulent-inducement theory fits within the statute and the Court’s precedent. In any event, the United States claims that the government agency overspent on the project because of Kousisis’s misrepresentations, and the government has an interest in protecting against such harms. The United States asserts that overcriminalization is not an issue, and that contractors should not escape prosecution for misrepresentations to obtain government contracts.
(1) Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme; (2) whether a sovereign’s statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services; and (3) whether all contract rights are “property.”
The federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) funds infrastructure projects overseen by state agencies throughout the country. United States v. Kousisis at 233. DOT also operates a program to increase the participation of businesses run by the socially and economically disadvantaged—called “Disadvantaged Business Enterprises” (“DBEs”)—in federally funded projects.
Does the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act require restitution for costs incurred for private-party investigations not required or requested by the government?
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide if the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act requires or permits an order of restitution against a criminal defendant for a private party’s costs of investigating the underlying crime without a request from the government. Lagos argues that the text of the statute and its legislative context and history preclude such costs from being eligible for restitution. In contrast, the Government argues that the overarching goal of restitution pairs with the text of the statute to permit a broad definition of eligible expenses, including private investigations. Underlying these legal issues is a delicate balance of rights, with the Government supporting restitution in order to help victims recover from crime, and opponents worrying that large restitution awards would prevent defendants from achieving full rehabilitation.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) covers costs for reimbursement under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act that were “neither required nor requested” by the government, including costs incurred for the victim's own purposes and unprompted by any official government action.
Petitioner Sergio Fernando Lagos (“Lagos”) was owner and CEO of a holding company that owned USA Dry Van Logistics LLC (“Dry Van”). Brief for Respondent, United States, at 2. Dry Van was holder of a revolving-loan finance agreement, secured by their accounts receivable, with General Electric Capital Corporation (“GE Capital”).
Larceny by trick is a form of larceny, where the offender permanently deprives the owner of their personal property by using deception, lies, or by making false statements.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), defendants with prior state convictions relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” receive a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence; however, does the phrase “involv[e] a minor or ward” apply to each type of conviction above, or does it only apply to the last category, abusive sexual conduct?
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a mandatory minimum sentence is imposed on a defendant with a prior state conviction relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the clause “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct” or the entire series of terms preceding it. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lockhart v. United States, No. 14-8358, at 13 (Apr. 10, 2015). The convicted offender, Avondale Lockhart, urges the Court to adopt the series-qualifier principle of statutory interpretation by applying “involving a minor or ward” to the entire preceding series of terms contained in section 2252(b)(2). See Brief for Petitioner, Avondale Lockhart at 13. Lockhart contends that because his prior state conviction does not involve a minor or ward, he does not qualify for section 2252(b)(2)’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. However, the United States argues that the Court should interpret section 2252(b)(2) using the last-antecedent rule by applying “involving a minor or ward” only to the immediately preceding clause, “abusive sexual conduct,” thereby upholding Lockhart’s jail sentence. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 18. The Court’s decision will determine the scope of offenses covered by mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), and could impact the degree of protection afforded to federal defendants with prior state convictions. See Petition for Writ at 13; Brief for Petitioner at 41–42.
Is section 2252(b)(2)’s mandatory minimum penalty triggered by a prior state conviction “relating to” “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward”?
In June 2010, federal agents initiated an undercover investigation of Avondale Lockhart after learning that Lockhart had transferred money to receive child pornography. See United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir.
Does the prohibition on concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes, apply to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which covers defendants who cause death through use of a firearm?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. To violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), an individual must, in the course of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use a firearm to cause the death of another person. Petitioner Efrain Lora argues that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(d)(ii), which bars courts from sentencing defendants to concurrent terms of imprisonment, applies only to convictions under § 924(c) and not to convictions under § 924(j). Respondent the United States argues that, because § 924(j) can only be violated by also violating § 924(c), a sentence under Section 924(j) qualifies as a conviction under § 924(c) and must therefore also be subject to its sentencing requirements. This case has significant implications for federal sentencing law, including judicial discretion in sentencing.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed … under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,” is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).
In 2002, Efrain Lora was trafficking narcotics in the Bronx. United States v. Lora at 1. In collaboration with four co-conspirators, he decided to kill Andrew Balcarran, a rival drug dealer, over threats Balcarran had made towards Lora and his co-perpetrators regarding their drug territory. Id. On the day of the murder, Lora acted as a scout.
