evidence

res judicata

Riley v. California

Issues

Does the Fourth Amendment permit police officers to perform a warrantless search of an individual’s cell phone confiscated at the time of an arrest?

In August 2009, David Riley was pulled over in San Diego, California for having expired tags on his car and a suspended driver’s license. As per police department policy, the officer impounded Riley’s car and conducted a warrantless search of the car. The officer found two handguns that were later linked to a shooting that had taken place a few weeks prior. During the arrest, the officers confiscated and rummaged through the data on Riley’s smartphone without a warrant. Some of the data on the phone linked Riley to gang activity and the shooting and was entered into evidence at the trial, where Riley was convicted on three charges. Riley argues that allowing police officers to search through data on his cell phone without a warrant is an unacceptable intrusion on personal privacy. California argues that police officers need to be able to confiscate cell phones without first obtaining a warrant for safety reasons and to prevent destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the balance between those two concerns and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection available to personal technology. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether or under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest.  

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Facts

On August 2, 2009 around 2:30 p.m., David Riley, an alleged member of the Lincoln Park gang, was parked in a San Diego neighborhood with his girlfriend and three other men. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 BL 34220, 2013 ILRC 1385 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 08, 2013) at 1. When a member of a rival gang, Mr.

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Rodriguez v. United States

Issues

Does an officer’s continued detention of a driver, even after completion of the traffic stop, to conduct a canine sniff violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification to support the additional investigation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an officer may extend a traffic stop, even after the stop has been completed, to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification. Dennys Rodriguez claims that any extension of a completed stop to conduct further investigation, no matter how brief, violates the Fourth Amendment unless the extension is independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The United States counters that officers may lawfully engage in further investigations during a traffic stop so long as the officer does not unreasonably prolong the stop. The Supreme Court’s decision might curb law enforcement’s investigative powers with respect to routine traffic stops by potentially creating bright-line restrictions on those powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are “de minimis” intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

On the night of March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble saw a vehicle briefly drive onto the shoulder of a Nebraska highway in violation of Nebraska law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent, the United States at 2. Struble stopped the vehicle at 12:06 A.M.

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Shinn v. Ramirez

Issues

Are habeas claimants who raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in federal habeas proceedings despite having failed to raise such a claim at the state court level, as allowed under the Martinez exception, then permitted to develop evidence to support these claims despite 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)’s bar on such federal evidentiary development?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) bars a federal court from allowing habeas petitioners that fall under Martinez’s procedural-default exception to submit evidence beyond the state record in support of their claims. Petitioners David Shinn and Walter Hensley contend that expanding Martinez’s narrow procedural-default exception risks providing a free pass to federal courts that will incentivize forum-shopping, encourage the withholding of evidence, undermine state sovereignty, and contravene the purpose of AEDPA, which is to limit access to federal evidentiary review. Respondents David Martinez Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones respond that barring evidentiary development in federal court places prisoners in an absurd Catch-22 wherein their procedural defaults are excused due to ineffective counsel and yet they are barred from correcting the deficiencies in their state record due to that same counsel’s negligence. This case implicates federalism concerns over the depth of federal review of state criminal and habeas proceedings and the strength of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, particularly for indigent, innocent, and mentally ill defendants.      

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether application of the equitable rule the Supreme Court announced in Martinez v. Ryan renders the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief.

Barry Lee Jones

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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spousal communications privilege

Spousal communications privilege is a legal doctrine that protects the confidentiality of communications between spouses. This privilege ensures that one spouse cannot be compelled to testify against the other regarding private communications made during the marriage.

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