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Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Issues

Does requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition to do business in a state violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Due Process Clause permits consent-by-registration as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute requires that foreign corporations registered in the state consent to general personal jurisdiction there. Robert Mallory contends that consent-by-registration statutes produce valid consent to personal jurisdiction because consent-by-registration has been traditionally accepted as a basis of personal jurisdiction, and recent cases have not overruled this notion. Norfolk Southern Railway Company counters that consent-by-registration statutes fail to provide valid consent because registration jurisdiction is neither widely accepted nor consistent with modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for businesses and state sovereignty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state.

Robert Mallory (“Mallory”) is a Virginia resident who was an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk”) from 1988 to 2005. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. at 551. Mallory sued Norfolk in a Pennsylvania state court for claims arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit the only venue that can hear challenges to a final EPA action under the Clean Air Act for a single state if the agency published it alongside other states?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether states are permitted to challenge final actions of the EPA in regional circuit courts; or, if publishing a state-specific final action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states forces challenges to be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Oklahoma contends that the final action as it pertains to it is local in nature and should, therefore, be presented in the regional circuit court. The EPA argues that the disapproval action applies nationally, making it reviewable only by the D.C. Circuit. The outcome of this case raises concerns about federalism and forum shopping as well as impacting the effectiveness of the EPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a final action by the Environmental Protection Agency taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because the agency published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.

The Clean Air Act (“Act”) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to create and regularly update the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”). Oklahoma v.

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TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC

Issues

Does the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, define “where the defendant resides” for purposes of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)?

In 1957, the Supreme Court held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), was the “sole and exclusive” venue provision in patent infringement actions. After Congress amended the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in 1988, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. held that the statutory amendments supplanted Fourco and § 1391(c)’s definition of a defendant’s “residence” applied to § 1400(b). In 2011, Congress amended the general venue statute again.

TC Heartland and its many amici argue that the 2011 amendments supersede VE Holding and reinstate Fourco, thereby restricting a corporate defendant’s “residence” to its state of incorporation. In contrast, Kraft maintains that the 2011 amendments bolster VE Holding’s conclusion that a corporate defendant “resides” wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court’s decision about which venue definition is proper in patent infringement actions could significantly limit where defendants are eligible to be sued, thereby reducing forum shopping in patent infringement actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

TC Heartland is an Indiana limited liability company, headquartered in Indianapolis, which manufactures and sells liquid beverage enhancer products.

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The Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

After suffering property damage in a 2010 hailstorm, Greg Knowles filed a class action lawsuit in Miller County, Arkansas, against the Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Standard Fire") for failure to pay a contractor's retention fee. Standard Fire tried to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to CAFA, a federal court has jurisdiction over a class action only if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The district court remanded the case to state court because Knowles's complaint stipulated that he would not seek more than $5,000,000 in damages for the class. Standard Fire argues that Knowles cannot defeat removal under CAFA by using a stipulation because it would bind absent class members before class certification and before Knowles could be declared an adequate class representative. Knowles argues that as master of his complaint, he is free to limit his claims, and that class members are not adversely affected by the stipulation. The Supreme Court will determine whether a named plaintiff in a class action, before being declared an adequate class representative, can limit the entire class's claims to $5,000,000 in damages in order to defeat an attempt to remove the case to federal court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When a named plaintiff attempts to defeat a defendant's right of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing with a class action complaint a “stipulation” that attempts to limit the damages he “seeks” for the absent putative class members to less than the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, and the defendant establishes that the actual amount in controversy, absent the “stipulation,” exceeds $5,000,000, is the "stipulation" binding on absent class members so as to destroy federal jurisdiction?

Issue

Whether a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit can defeat a defendant’s attempt to remove the action to federal court, by stipulating for the named plaintiff and absent potential class members that the class will not seek damages above the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, even where the defendant establishes that the amount in controve

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