Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Issues

In prior litigation the Murphys, parents of a disabled youth, were determined to be statutorily entitled to receive compensation from the Arlington Central School District  Board of Education for the youth’s private school tuition for a certain period. The Murphys claimed the compensation should include $29,350 paid as fees to an educational consultant. Arlington objected, claiming that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act only allowed payment of attorneys’ fees and the educational consultant was neither an attorney nor an “expert” within the scope of the statute. The District Court held that the statute does not allow payment of fees to a non-lawyer doing work similar to that of an attorney, but does cover expert consulting services. The Second Circuit affirmed, and Arlington petitioned to the Supreme Court, which will consider the scope of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s fee-shifting provision.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) gives federal funding to state and local school systems to ensure that children with disabilities receive a free, appropriate public education through individualized educational programs. The 1997 Amendments to IDEA provide that parents of disabled children “who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency” are eligible for tuition reimbursement if the school’s special education program is deemed inappropriate for the child’s educational needs. The New York State Education Department awarded Tom F. a tuition reimbursement for his disabled son Gilbert’s private school education, and the Board of Education of the City of New York appealed the decision. The Board argued that because Gilbert had never attended public school, he did not qualify for a tuition reimbursement under the language of the 1997 Amendment. How strictly the Supreme Court reads the language of the IDEA statute will determine if school boards are required to provide reimbursements to the parents of disabled children. The decision will affect the freedom that public schools have to allocate special education resources, as well as the autonomy parents have to direct special education placement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case will decide what unified standard public schools must provide students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). IDEA requires schools in receipt of federal funds to provide an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for each student with a disability. The IEP must comply with each student’s right to Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Should the school district fail to comply, parents are permitted to enroll their child into private school and seek reimbursement from the school district. Endrew F. argued that the Douglas County School District did not provide Endrew, a child with autism, the appropriate level of educational care because Endrew did not make any meaningful progress with his IEP. The Douglas County School District responded that Endrew’s receipt of some educational benefit was sufficient to satisfy the FAPE standard, and thus not a violation of the IDEA. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict between the “meaningful educational benefit” standard adopted by some courts of appeals and the “merely more than de minimis” educational benefit standard that the Tenth Circuit maintained.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether settlement with a school satisfies the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) so that a student might bring a claim for monetary damages in a district court. Miguel Luna Perez asserts that IDEA’s exhaustion is satisfied by a settlement with a school, not only by a decision on the merits. Perez further argues that requiring individuals to exhaust their claims in lieu of settlement would be futile. Further, Perez asserts that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion would not cause individuals to bypass the administrative IDEA process. Sturgis Public Schools and Sturgis Board of Education (“Sturgis”) counter that settlement is insufficient for exhaustion requirements especially when the individual seeks monetary damages. Sturgis further contends that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion might result in parents seeking monetary damages in the courts to the detriment of their child’s free appropriate public education. The outcome of this case has important implications on the substantive rights of children with disabilities in terms of the dispute resolution proceedings between the schools and parents. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., parents and schools work together to come up with an appropriate Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for children with special educational needs. When the two parties cannot come to an agreement on the appropriateness or the sufficiency of an IEP the IDEA provides for an “impartial due process hearing,” which either party can initiate, to challenge the IEP at hand. The IDEA is silent as to who has the burden of proof at these hearings. The Court granted certiorari in order to determine to which party the burden should be allocated—the parents or the school. In this case, as in many IEP challenges, the question of burden is outcome determinative. Petitioner argues that principles of due process as well as policy and fairness compel allocation of the burden to the school in all IEP challenges. Respondents argue that Congress intended the burden to be allocated to the party initiating the hearing and seeking relief, as is the customary rule when legislation fails to specifically allocate the burden. The decision in this case will have far reaching implications for children with special educational needs and their families, educational funding, taxpayers, and the IDEA program as a whole.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Jeff and Sandee Winkelman contested the adequacy of their eight-year-old autistic son’s “Individual Education Plan,” designed by Parma City School District, under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). Both the administrative hearing board and the federal district court that heard the Winkelmans’ claim approved the plan. The Winkelmans appealed the decision without a lawyer. The court of appeals dismissed the Winkelmans’ claim, holding that parents are barred from litigating IDEA claims pro se on behalf of their children. The Winkelmans argue that IDEA permits pro se litigation, while Parma City claims educational policy and precedent suggest otherwise. Courts of appeals are split on whether parents can litigate pro se their own procedural IDEA claims, their children’s substantive IDEA claims, or neither. The case will settle the split and define the scope of parental rights under IDEA and pro se litigation under federal law in general.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources